

MR. & MRS.
NORMAN MAILER

LETTRE



Air Mail

Mr. Norman Traiber
142 Columbia Heights
Brooklyn N.Y. 11201

U.S.A.



Paris, November 28, 1992.

Dear Norman:

You have written a most powerful, exciting and resourceful book, that is already shaking the world. Believe me, I know what I am talking about: in 1948 and 1949, in Berlin, I was, so to speak, close to the CIA.

Here is my article in the Figaro. I am preparing a 30-minute broadcast on the book, for France-Culture. At Laffont's, they told me you would be in Paris, on December 15th, and the following days, with Norris and one of your sons. I asked them to send you a fax: could you, the three of you, come to dinner on December 16th? Norma and I would be happy to spend an evening with you. Is there anyone you might want to meet at my home?

Please let me know.

In true and deep admiration,

Alain Bosquet

Alain Bosquet: 32 rue de Laborde 75008 Paris
Tel: 43 87 96 76
Code, front door: 0932 A1.

NORMAN MAILER : L'APPÉTIT DES ABÎMES

**PAR
ALAIN
BOSQUET**

Aucun écrivain américain de sa génération n'a su être à la fois aussi plongé dans les contradictions du siècle et aussi attiré par les ténèbres abyssales de l'homme que Norman Mailer. Il arrive qu'on le voie à Paris. De taille moyenne, le regard perçant mais doux, l'intonation mélodieuse, il donne une extraordinaire image de vivacité et d'immédiate sympathie. On ne saurait le surprendre, quel que soit le sujet de l'entretien : il a tout digéré, tout aimé, tout essayé. Là où la connaissance est limitée, il possède une intuition rare. C'est un ogre d'une finesse extrême, un monstre très apprivoisé et un séducteur impénitent. Il ne saurait se contenter d'un choix, dans les idées, les attitudes, les élans. Il lui faut aussitôt se remettre en cause et courir à quelque vérité qui contredit la vérité qu'il vient ou d'énoncer ou de vivre. Norman Mailer vit pleinement la chose charnelle, la chose spirituelle et les spéculations les plus hardies. Il n'est jamais pris au dépourvu, et encore moins indifférent. La planète, il en ausculte les viscères, sans cesse. C'est dire que sa vie est traversée de foucades, de croisades, de superbes retournements. L'œuvre est tout aussi démesurée, généreuse, trop publique et, de temps en temps, capable d'une profondeur qu'on peut qualifier de faustienne. *Les Nus et les morts* dit tous les drames de la guerre, chez les justes et les moins justes : une tragédie qu'il décrit comme jadis Dreiser ou Upton Sinclair, avec moins de préjugés et un sens plus prométhéen de la destinée humaine. On eût dit, par instants, un Tolstoï en lambeaux, qui n'a pas peur de succomber sous le poids de son livre. Il participe : il ne domine pas, et c'est peut-être une des marques indélébiles de

son génie. Le siècle, il le tord et lui fait rendre gorge. D'autres tragédies, plus américaines aussi, l'assaillent. Il a su dire dans *Le Chant du bourreau* la honte de la peine de mort, mais cette honte-là n'est pas sans rémission: le condamné sait se surpasser, et la mort, depuis trop longtemps programmée, se change en une sorte de passion revulsée. De Prométhée à Apollon, il y a la distance entre la cellule et la chaise électrique. L'imagination a pour vertu d'extrapoler: quand Norman Mailer écrit les *Mémoires imaginaires de Marilyn*, il prête à cette pauvre poupée adorable des réactions qui pourraient être de Clytemnestre et d'Œphélie, de Desdémone et d'Œndine en même temps, dans un milieu qui est celui du gangstérisme le plus abject: une grandiose aliénation et une image de l'Amérique qui, tout idéal étant perdu, s'en crée un chaque matin, fût-ce jusqu'à l'overdose fatale: un paradis à n'importe quel prix. Mais Norman Mailer ne saurait se contenter de chanter ou de faire déchanter sa patrie. Il a des racines et il n'est pas situable. Il ne s'expatrie pas parce qu'il est en désaccord avec l'Amérique: il s'expatrie par besoin de penser à autre chose: ni l'exotisme ni la drogue à Katmandou, mais une sourde et somnambule solidarité avec des rivages qui ne ressemblent ni à Brooklyn ni à Long Beach. Il met, par exemple, plusieurs années à rédiger un chef-d'œuvre, qu'on a mal compris en Europe, et sans doute chez lui: *Nuits des temps* est un

hymne à la complexité de l'Égypte antique, l'empire le plus secret et le plus durable de l'Histoire. Quarante siècles de discipline, de dictature et d'épaulement, sur un territoire minuscule, n'y a-t-il pas là matière à questionner – oui, à torturer – l'esprit de l'homme moderne qui, au bout de ses certitudes, n'en peut plus de supporter ses propres interrogations ? En tout cas, depuis le *Moby Dick* de Melville, aucun écrivain américain ne s'était à ce point immergé en des mystères lointains et graves. Il en est sorti comme rajeuni, par ces noces avec les puissances obscures, auxquelles il n'a rien cédé de son inimitable lucidité.

plus subtile, une psychose, un dévoiement de tous les instants. Il n'a pas de thèse à défendre : un créateur vise à autre chose qu'à une démonstration. Il n'accuse personne, et il ne plaint aucune victime, réelle ou imaginaire. Rien n'est explicite dans son attitude, qui doit rester implicite. Il lui suffit de faire vivre un personnage unique, le plus complexe qui soit, au milieu d'une douzaine de personnages également riches en sursauts, qu'accompagnent des centaines de comparses et la plupart des acteurs politiques, depuis les frères Dulles jusqu'à Ken Kennedy.

Norman Mailer mêle l'histoire de son pays à son intrigue : il n'a besoin d'aucun masque, et il

tion comme on entrain, à la Renaissance ou au XVIII^e siècle, dans les ordres : pour y exercer ses pouvoirs, sans trop s'occuper de sa foi. Car il ne s'agit nullement de se limiter à un quelconque devoir : Harry Hubbard n'est pas un patriote fanatique ni un completneur né. Il va à l'aventure avec goût et il connaît les risques qu'il court. Il est le contraire d'une brute et il n'aime rien autant que de se jouer, en quelque sorte, à pile ou face. Le danger le stimule, l'enrichit et le pousse à un dépassement de soi constant.

Il est passé par les meilleures écoles de l'Est : les Kennedy, les Lodge et autres Kelly n'ont rien à lui envier. Il a de qui tenir, et son père peut lui servir d'exemple. Servir sa patrie, c'est, non sans une gouarnande perversité, donner à son pays la possibilité de servir l'individu insatiable qu'il entend bien être en toutes occasions. Les services secrets ne sont pas ce que les lecteurs de Conan Doyle ou de John Le Carré imaginent. On ne va pas d'un meurtre à l'autre, et on n'a rien d'un parachutiste lâché sur un repaire de vilains communistes, couteau entre les dents. On est civilisé, dans cette énorme machine qui, quelquefois, ne sait pas très bien pour quelle idéologie ou pour qui elle tourne. L'exemple le plus frappant, pour Harry Hubbard, est celui du débarquement dans la baie des Cochons, contre Castro. La CIA fonctionne de façon indépendante : nul ne l'oblige à révéler au jeune John Kennedy ses opérations. Un Etat dans l'Etat n'est efficace que s'il soustrait à l'Etat des renseignements susceptibles de l'affaiblir. Ce paradoxe est une garantie de durée. Il faut aussi — c'est la moindre des choses — que la CIA soit faillible. Se tromper est également un principe de vie. L'apprentissage en tous sens de

Norman Mailer : il ne s'expatrie pas parce qu'il est en désaccord avec l'Amérique ; il s'expatrie par besoin de penser à autre chose. (PhotoGrail/Sygma.)

Harry Hubbard est coïteux : il en redemande. Il accumule les secrets, dont certains sont nécessairement faux, approximatifs, abracadabrants. Le livre est fait de cet amour de l'intrigue : on dégaîne dans l'âme, si ce n'est pas devant un ennemi, d'ailleurs invisible. Petit à petit, tout y passe : à force de comploter, on voit partout des attentats possibles, exécutables ou non. Les esprits claquent comme les portes, et les codes, comme les visages, sont chiffrés. Allen Dulles, le grand patron, déjoue les guets-apens, mais il est, à lui seul, un guet-apens. Kennedy maîtrise-t'il mieux ses subordonnés qu'il ne se maîtrise ? Tout agent devient un agent double en prenant du grade : afin de tromper l'autre côté, il faut au moins lui donner le sentiment qu'on est son complice : donnant. donnant. La

mer et se mentir : on doit se mentir pour s'aimer encore davantage. L'espionnette au lit est, bien entendu, un ingrédient supplémentaire : pour un esprit supérieur comme Harry Hubbard, la simple jouissance se complique à l'infini. C'est que ce héros à facettes multiples refuse de se défaire de ses masques : la cape et l'épée ne sont pas de vains accessoires. Quand il ne songe pas aux gentilles traîtrises qu'il pourrait ajouter à sa fébrilité naturelle, cette chatte fatale de Kitteredge lui prête les siennes. On apprivoise les souris et les sorcières dans les officines du renseignement. Il arrive qu'après plusieurs années de bons et ravageurs services on sente quelque lassitude. On tente alors le diable.

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ils entrent vivants dans la légende. Ici, James Bond est son propre patron, et il a des réactions de Méphisto comme de Raskolnikov. En tout cas, il demeure fidèle à l'homme qui, pour lui, est l'exemple parfait : un agent qui s'appelle Hugh Tremont Montague, et qu'on surnommait Harlot, ce qui signifie « fille de joie ». En fait, le livre, dans sa traduction française, aurait pu – aurait dû – avoir pour titre : *Fille de joie et son fantôme*. C'eût été une ambiguïté de plus.

Un critique américain a dit de ce livre colossal qu'il était au service de l'espionnage ce que *La Montagne magique*, de Thomas Mann, est à la tuberculose. C'est parfaitement juste. Tout, ici, est subtil et joyeusement mesuré. On lit Norman Mailer avec fièvre, passion, affolement. On Kennedy, deux Kennedy, trois

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
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er sur la scène améri- man Mailer publie un plus de mille pages, ent au double dans aphie normale, *Har- fantôme*. Ce monu- un phénomène qui is la fin de la dernière que les États-Unis ne nt pas dans le pre- et demi de leur exis- face de plus en plus prise par la CIA. n Mailer, homme de nilitant dans sa jeu- it attaqué à ce qu'il èrer, dans cette dé- comme l'équivalent ec ses pouvoirs éten- n apparence moins saurait étonner. Il lui, d'un État dans les ramifications ne lement politiques ou es: une mainmise

appelle par leur nom les passa- gers du calendrier. C'est sa ma- nière, inimitable, d'affirmer que les silhouettes réelles et les per- sonnages inventés font partie de la même fiction. L'Histoire est en marche, avec ses joies et ses infamies, ses pièges et ses mo- ments de joie. On ne juge pas : on change d'événements et de décor, car ainsi le veut la respi- ration même de l'espèce. Nous ne sommes plus à l'époque où il est aisé de séparer le bien du mal. Norman Mailer ne se veut pas un moraliste : ses ressources intérieures préfèrent la vitalité avec son cortège de vilénies, de vertus et d'interrogations, sou- vent inextricables. Pour parler de la CIA, l'auteur choisit un homme de haute intelligence, de belle éducation et de tempéra- ment complexe, Harry Hub- bard. Il entre dans l'organisa-

tion comme on entrerait, à la Renaissance ou au XVIII^e siècle, dans les ordres : pour y exercer ses pouvoirs, sans trop s'occu- per de sa foi. Car il ne s'agit nullement de se limiter à un quelconque devoir : Harry Hub- bard n'est pas un patriote fana- tique ni un comploteur né. Il va à l'aventure avec goût et il connaît les risques qu'il court. Il est le contraire d'une brute et il n'aime rien autant que de se jouer, en quelque sorte, à pile ou face. Le danger le stimule, l'en- richit et le pousse à un dépasse- ment de soi constant.

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faute, au moins, lui donner le sentiment qu'on est son com- plice : donnant, donnant. La glissade est lente, mais inexora- ble : en cours de route, comme aux échecs ou au poker, si on arrive à comprendre l'adver- saire, on sympathise avec lui, qu'on le veuille ou non. Et c'est soi-même qu'on se met à surveil- ler. A l'ère nucléaire, le jeu consiste à ne permettre aucune victoire. La guerre froide évite la guerre tout court.

C'est une façon d'être huma- niste en notre temps que de raisonner ainsi, ce dont Harry Hubbard ne se prive pas. La qualité majeure de cet homme est d'incarner au maximum l'en- semble de ses potentialités. Il n'est pas dans sa nature de ne pas comprendre, et il a horreur de simplifier ce qui est à double ou triple tranchant. Il est par excellence un personnage à re- bondissements, et il retombe toujours sur ses pattes, quand ce n'est pas sur les pattes des au- tres, qu'il choisit d'ailleurs avec doigté, sans jamais se tromper. Cet opéra du Sublime Secret — pardon pour les majuscules —, Norman Mailer sait qu'il doit lui donner plusieurs dimen- sions et qu'un récit, aussi com- pliqué soit-il, ne saurait suffire. C'est pourquoi le livre comporte des fragments de journal intime, de registre, de pense-bête et, surtout, un choix de lettres. Cet éclatement partiel ne saurait nuire à une cohésion foison- nante et perpétuellement renou- velée. La forme épouse les fluc- tuations d'une conscience qui s'émoustille de mille événements ou graves ou dérisoires. La vie de la CIA ne doit pas être rectili- gne ou sans méandres.

La caractère de Harry Hubbard prend un malin plaisir — il est Don Quichotte et Sancho Pança, Jekyll et Hyde, ange et bête — à se doubler lui-même en prenant pour maîtresse une forte femme, qui fait le même métier que lui. Cette Kitteredge est aussi friande que lui d'aven- tures et de frissons. C'est à peine s'ils ne s'endorment pas, chacun, avec un revolver sous l'oreiller : oui, le premier qui se réveille pulvérise l'autre. On peut s'ai-

mer et se mentir : on doit se mentir pour s'aimer encore da- vantage. L'espionnage au lit est, bien entendu, un ingrédient sup- plémentaire : pour un esprit su- périeur comme Harry Hubbard, la simple jouissance se compli- que à l'infini. C'est que ce héros à facettes multiples refuse de se défaire de ses masques : la cape et l'épée ne sont pas de vains accessoires. Quand il ne songe pas aux gentilles traîtrises qu'il pourrait ajouter à sa fébrilité naturelle, cette chatte fatale de Kitteredge lui prête les siennes. On apprivoise les souris et les sorcières dans les officines du renseignement. Il arrive qu'après plusieurs années de bons et ravageurs services on sente quelque lassitude. On tente alors le diable.

En l'occurrence, Harry Hub- bard, qui se sent chez lui au Kamchatka comme sur la Terre de Feu, pour prendre un peu de recul, s'installe à Moscou. Est-ce pour mieux comprendre le com- portement de quelques traîtres célèbres ou est-ce pour lancer un suprême défi à ses supérieurs comme à lui-même ? Après avoir tâté de tous les jeux, jouer avec le feu devient indispensa- ble. La roulette russe est tout de même plus excitante que la courte paille ou le bilboquet. Il ne s'offre pas en victime expia- toire de sa supériorité, mais rien ne garantit qu'il ne sera pas descendu, soit par les siens, soit par l'adversaire, soit, encore, par une conjuration qui compte- rait les uns et les autres. Nor- man Mailer a l'air de nous pro- mettre une suite. Les espions de haut niveau ne meurent jamais :

'ils entrent vivants dans la lé- gende. Ici, James Bond est son propre patron, et il a des réac- tions de Méphisto comme de Raskolnikov. En tout cas, il de- meure fidèle à l'homme qui, pour lui, est l'exemple parfait : un agent qui s'appelle Hugh Tremont Montague, et qu'on surnommait Harlot, ce qui signi- fie « fille de joie ». En fait, le livre, dans sa traduction fran- çaise, aurait pu — aurait dû — avoir pour titre : *Fille de joie et son fantôme*. C'eût été une ambi- guïté de plus.

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On lit Norman Mailer avec fièvre, passion, affolement. Un Kennedy, deux Kennedy, trois Kennedy : les États-Unis respi- rent, se tordent et renaissent à chaque page de ce film à rebon- dissements. Le rythme de la phrase a quelque chose d'une rhapsodie qui caresse, qui énerve, qui ranime le lecteur. S'il y a des longueurs, elles sont comme des moments de répit. Harry Hubbard est un person- nage inoubliable : pour lui, vivre est une volupté, réfléchir, un besoin libérateur, comploter, un jeu exquis et, peut-être, mourir, une ouverture sur la sérénité.

HARLOT ET SON FANTÔME
DE NORMAN MAILER
TRADUCTION
DE JEAN ROSENTHAL
Robert Laffont, 189 F.

beauty

This lunge sculpts buttocks while making the backs of her thighs sleek and strong

Squats

Stand with feet shoulder-width apart. Bend knees and lower hips, keeping them behind your heels (while leaning forward slightly); place left hand on your left thigh while you extend right arm in front of you to shoulder height. Return to starting position by straightening up and squeezing buttocks tight. Repeat (alternating arms) 16 to 24 times.

Inward Rotational Lifts

Get on all fours (shown left), with elbows under your shoulders, knees under your hips. Cross the left leg behind the right knee and bend the left knee. From this position, lift the left leg up to hip level without moving your torso, then lower. Do 12 repetitions, then switch sides.

Stationary Lunges

Holding on to a chair (shown below)

For a shape that fits the clingiest clothes, Karen Voight of Voight Fitness and Dance Center in L.A. offers six swift moves

Get a Great, Um, Behind

stand with left foot forward, right foot back, weight on left heel. Bend knees, slowly lower your body halfway to the floor and hold for a few seconds. Return to standing position by pushing down on your left heel. Switch sides after eight to ten repetitions.

Squeezes

Stand with feet slightly wider than shoulders, toes turned out, holding on to a chair. Bend knees, press tailbone back and tilt torso slightly forward to keep back from arching. Squeeze buttocks, rotate pelvis under, hold for two counts, then straighten legs. Repeat 16 times.


Rotated Rear Lifts


Using the back of a chair for balance (shown left), stand with right foot turned out slightly. Place left ankle behind right foot and lift left leg up and out behind you. (Keep left knee bent; lift slowly.) Lower and repeat 12 times, then switch legs.

Straight Leg Lifts

Lie facedown, legs straight, head resting on forearms. Lift left leg as high as you can, keeping pelvis on the floor. Lower and repeat eight times, then switch legs. □

The leg lift shapes up a less-than-perfect posterior









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НАЦЫЯНАЛЬНЫ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫ
РАЗДІЛКОВЫ БІЛЕТ
НАЦЫЯНАЛЬНАГА БАНКА

РАЗДІКОВЫ БІЛЕТ НАЦЫЯНАЛЬНАГА БАНКА БЕЛАРУСІ

1992

АДЫН РУБЛА

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АП 9256063



Jeudi 17 décembre à 22 h 25

NORMAN MAILER DÉSHABILLE LA C.I.A.

D'ores et déjà salué aux Etats-Unis comme un chef-d'œuvre, "Harlot et son fantôme"*, le vingt-septième livre de Norman Mailer, sort actuellement en France. Dans ce gigantesque "roman organique", l'écrivain prend pour nouvelle cible la CIA. Entretien avec Jean Rosenthal, son traducteur et ami.

Je connais Norman Mailer depuis une bonne vingtaine d'années et j'ai traduit sept ou huit de ses livres. Chaleureux, amical, très direct, il n'est jamais pontifiant alors qu'il est l'un des plus grands écrivains américains actuels, reconnu et célèbre dès son tout premier livre, *"Les nus et les morts"*... Ce monsieur — qui aura 70 ans cette année — est bouillonnant de vie, l'œil pétillant d'intelligence et d'humour. Fondamentalement, c'est un personnage ouvert sur le monde et sur son époque, à la différence d'un Philip Roth par exemple, juif new-yorkais comme lui, dont l'œuvre est beaucoup plus "nombriliste". Norman Mailer s'implique toujours personnellement. A de multiples reprises, il a non seulement écrit mais aussi manifesté et défilé, contre la guerre du Viêt-nam par exemple. Son militantisme, cependant, est le fait d'un homme lucide, d'un observateur averti, et non pas d'un fanatique. Il porte un intérêt très vif à la politique. Par le passé, il a même été candidat à la mairie de New York, mais sa campagne n'a pas donné grand-chose !

Pourquoi, selon vous, a-t-il consacré sept ans de sa vie à écrire sur la C.I.A. : sa passion de la politique, une fascination pour les milieux et les affaires secrètes, le goût de connaître l'envers des cartes ?

La C.I.A. l'a toujours intéressé. Il a rédigé des articles sur le sujet à différentes époques de sa vie, rassemblés d'ailleurs dans un ouvrage paru en France sous le titre *"Morceaux de bravoure"*. Il a réalisé un énorme travail de documentation, épuisant une bibliographie impressionnante et recueillant des informations auprès de certaines personnes de sa connaissance rompues à ce milieu. Il a aussi eu la chance de tomber à une période où l'on dévoilait de

nombreux éléments sur les agissements de la C.I.A., à la suite de la Commission Warren et de diverses autres enquêtes.

Dans l'espionnage, c'est la démarche intellectuelle qui, me semble-t-il, l'intéresse en premier lieu : l'officier de renseignements tente de comprendre ce qui se passe, collecte des informations, élabore divers scénarios avec des bribes de preuves, se forge un tableau d'ensemble d'une situation donnée. Norman Mailer compare ce travail à la recherche que fait le romancier pour bâtir son livre. L'écrivain se donne beaucoup de mal pour mettre sur pied une intrigue, et si les choses vont trop bien, il devient nerveux, exactement comme l'agent de renseignements lorsque les éléments concordent trop parfaitement et qu'il soupçonne alors une manipulation.

La curiosité est une autre de ses motivations. Norman Mailer s'est toujours intéressé à ce qui fait marcher la société américaine. Or, la C.I.A. téléguide de nombreux événements et rebondissements de la vie politique.


Avec humour et des moments de dérision féroce, Norman Mailer détruit l'image mythique de la C.I.A. véhiculée par le polar traditionnel...

Qu'il s'agisse de films ou de romans, cette vision est totalement fautive parce que idéalisée et manichéenne. La supériorité d'un tel livre par rapport à un banal roman d'espionnage, est qu'il donne l'impression de quelque chose vu de l'intérieur. Les personnages sont pris dans la réalité et décrits sous leur vrai jour. Les héros de fiction frayent avec des personnages réels dont Norman Mailer a gardé les vrais noms. Les affubler de pseudonymes lui paraissait parfaitement ridicule, et cela aurait faussé les rapports avec le lecteur. Tan-

dis qu'ici, celui-ci a le sentiment d'être dans un univers intermédiaire entre l'Histoire et la fiction.

Personnellement, la dimension humaine du livre m'a passionné, notamment la manière dont un jeune homme de bonne famille se trouve recruté et embrigadé, et comment il devient un officier de renseignements, sans vocation irrésistible... C'est un superbe roman d'initiation. C'est un livre d'une matière foisonnante, comprenant au moins deux, voire trois romans ! A la dernière page, on peut lire : "A suivre"...

Propos recueillis par Françoise Langlès



Norman Mailer : "La C.I.A. existe dans notre conscience comme l'amant fantôme".
*"Harlot et son fantôme", Norman Mailer (Editions Robert Laffont)

Photo : Ed. Robert Laffont / Nancy Crampton

GRAND TOUR ITINERARY

15 Dec

5:45pm lv for airport, Heights Car
you will be met at Delta terminal by Hoffman rep
8:50pm Delta fl 118

16 Dec. arv. Paris/Orly 10am

you will be met by Laffont's car and driver; also
Delta has "VIP remark" on your ticket so their rep will
assist with baggage, etc.

Hotel Lutetia
rue de Sevres
phone 45 44 38 10
fax 49 54 46 00

rest and lunch on your own.
following 3 meetings @ hotel:

2pm intv, Annette Levy-Willard (Liberation)
3pm intv, Christine Pouget (AFP wire service)
4 pm intv, Bernard Genies (Nouvel Observateur)

8:30pm dinner, Alain Bosquet's home

32 rue de la Borde
75008 Paris ,

DOOR CODE 0932A1 (PHONE IN YARD)

the phone after 8 is: 45 22 01 13

17 Dec.

9:30am Jacques Bertoin meets NM @ hotel

12:30pm lunch @ hotel w/ Franz-Olivier Giesber (Figaro)

4pm EX LIBRIS (tv) taping w/ Patrick Poivre-D'Arvor

→ 3:30

Norris
Revel Palazchenko
3/6-7961
Callum 9-10
where ready for call

Jean M.
46-33-24-04
Celine

12/16/92

To: Norman Mailer
Hotel Guest
Hotel Lutetia
fax 011-33-1-49 54 46 00

From: Judith

Larry wants you to know following:

rates for car and driver:

\$3/hr; minimum 8/hrs/day

1 hr lunch (paid) starting no earlier than 12 or
starting no later than 2:30

1 hr dinner (paid) starting no earlier than 7 or
starting no later than 8:30

flat fee of \$20 for airport pickup and \$20 return

Also, Keith had \$200 stolen from his apartment by his
cleaning lady. Ludmilla says you will understand the
meaning of this matter. (She also sends her best)

Larry said to tell you you were right about Ernst.
Then a short re-hash of what we know already. I will save
all such in a special file on top of piano for your return.

Berlins will want to Xerox the last page of your ticket
and Norris's. If you can remember, easier to do while
you're there.

Good luck tomorrow.

12/11/92

To: Norman Mailer
Hotel guest
Adam's Mark Hotel
fax 918-582-0012

PLEASE DELIVER TO MR. MAILER

from: Judith

1. Message from Larry: When you talk with/meet with MO, he feels it very important you keep talk about asnt minimal. He had long chat w/ her. He thinks if you get into lots of sentimental reminiscences and MO then contacts V, V may then clam up. Full details too lengthy for here. Am taking L's message home w/ me; if you want to call me Sat am between 8 and 11 am my time at home, I can read it to you. After that in and out all weekend.
2. Storm bad but all OK here. John sent home from school early; he is fine. House OK, 2 VERY SMALL leaks only. Repeat VERY SMALL. Public transport major mess, Wall st. bldgs evacuated due to flooding, Thomas may have to walk home from work. No power outages here, but foolish to have computer on longer than absolutely necessary.
3. Eurail charges an \$80 flat booking fee for the party, plus a \$25 rush fee. Said OK.
4. Re Delta NY/Paris--no aisles across available; only what you have (window/aisle one row window seat in row immediately in front) and 3 together in center section. Hoffman representative will be with you at checkin @ airport and pressure Delta to give you what you want--odds excellent for good results w/ that approach as long as you're there at 7 pm.

The Houston Post

Houston owned, Texas proud



SUNDAY, November 22, 1992

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EARLY EDITION

Oswald ID card may be missing link

BY RAY LAFONTAINE
AND MARY LAFONTAINE
SPECIAL TO THE HOUSTON POST

DALLAS — On the tense evening of Nov. 22, 1963, the 112th Army Intelligence Group at Fort Sam Houston transmitted a confidential priority message to the U.S. Strike Command at Florida's McDill Air Force Base.

The cable from San Antonio to McDill, which remained on Red Alert following that morning's assassination in Dallas of President John F. Kennedy, identified arrested suspect Lee Harvey Oswald as a "card carrying member of (the) Communist Party."

He was not, but 29 years ago today Oswald was carrying a card that suggests he may have been an employee of an organization much closer to home.

Found by Dallas police in Oswald's wallet — along with a photograph of his wife, Marina — was a U.S. Department of Defense "Uniformed Services Identification and Privilege Card," or more simply, a DD Form 1173.

It's a card officials today say Oswald should not have had.

But why he had it and what it might have meant is one of a lengthy list of unanswered questions surrounding Kennedy's death. Also in question is whether Oswald — as the Warren Com-

Please see **OSWALD, A-29**

OSWALD: Postmark on ID card creates more speculation

From A-1

mission concluded — acted alone in shooting the president that clear, crisp day in Dallas, or was he part of any one of several conspiracies that have been offered up over the past three decades.

DD 1173 bears Oswald's photo, the circular seal of the U.S. Department of Defense, and what appears to be a postmark — dated Oct. 23, 1963, less than a month before the assassination.

Oswald was issued the identity card by the U.S. Marine Corps on Sept. 11, 1959, nine days after his request for a dependency discharge from the corps was approved. His stated reason for the request was to support his mother, Marguerite, then living in Fort Worth.

Five weeks after receiving the card issued at El Toro Naval Air Station, Santa Ana, Calif., Oswald crossed the Finnish-Soviet border on his way to Moscow. Two weeks later, he announced his intention to defect to the Soviet Union.

Oswald's military record notes the identity card was issued "in accordance with paragraph 3014.5 PRAM (Personnel Records and Accounting Manual)." However, this paragraph pertains only to the issuance of USMC member cards and does not apply to a DD 1173. The appropriate card for the discharged Oswald, as stipulated by the PRAM, would have been a 2MC

sirable discharge from the Marine Corps in 1960. Oswald's card did not expire until Dec. 7, 1962.

Oswald's card was not printed in the photographic evidence of the Warren Commission's report on Kennedy's assassination. But the head-on photograph of Oswald on DD 1173 is the same as two other Oswald photos included in the report.

One is Warren Commission Exhibit 2892, identified by the FBI as "Photo taken in Minsk." (The "Minsk" photo has a white circular cutout in the lower right hand corner corresponding to the overlapping postmark on the Defense Department card.)

The Minsk contradiction — Oswald's trip to Russia occurred after the issuance of the DOD identity card — was not evident to the commission, apparently because the card was not made available to its members by the FBI.

In December 1966, when the FBI finally released Oswald's Defense Department identity card to the National Archives, it arrived "nearly obliterated by FBI testing," according to archivist Sue McDonough of the Civil Reference Branch. "The color, the image, the printing, everything is gone," she said. "You couldn't use it to show anything."

Challenging the archivist's assertion, FBI spokesman Bill Carter of the Public Affairs Office in Washington asks, "How does she

N 4, 271, 617

1. CARD NUMBER
2. EXPIRATION DATE **7 Dec 1962**
3. ISSUED TO (Typed name and relationship) **OSWALD, Lee H**
4. COLOR EYES **GRAY** COLOR HAIR **BROWN** 5. HEIGHT **71"** 6. WEIGHT **145**
7. DATE OF BIRTH OF DEPENDENT **18 Oct 32** 8. GRADE **23**
9. SERVICE & STATUS **CR/INACT** 10. SERVICE NO. OF SPONSOR **1653230**
11. AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE **Lee H. Oswald**
12. THEATRE **CONSPIRACY**

Found by Dallas police in Lee Harvey Oswald's wallet was this U.S. Department of Defense (DD Form 1173) identity card. Officials today say it is a card the accused assassin of President John F. Kennedy should not have had.

Found by Dallas police in Lee Harvey Oswald's wallet was this U.S. Department of Defense (DD Form 1173) identity card. Officials today say it is a card the accused assassin of President John F. Kennedy should not have had.

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM NOTICE OF CLASSIFICATION Approval not required

ALEK **JAMES** **HIDELL**
(First name) (Middle name) (Last name)

Selective Service No. **12 271 617** has been classified in Class **1-A** (Until **1962**) by ☐ Local Board ☐ Appeal Board, by vote of **19** to **0** (Show vote on appeal board once only) ☐ President

(Date of mailing) **19** (Signature or clerk of local board)

Also found in Oswald's wallet is this phony Selective Service classification card, bearing the name of Alek James Hidell — the name law enforcement officials say Oswald used to purchase the rifle they contend he used to kill Kennedy.

However, this paragraph pertains only to the issuance of USMC member cards and does not apply to a DD 1173. The appropriate card for the discharged Oswald, as stipulated by the PRAM, would have been a 2MC (RES), reflecting his new status in the Ready Reserve.

Lt. Kim Miller, a Washington spokeswoman for the Marines, said Oswald could have been issued a DD 1173 for one of two reasons: because of an injury while on active duty entitling him to medical privileges, or because he was a civilian employee overseas needing a military ID.

But records do not show an injury to Oswald, and civilian employment, she adds, "would not have been annotated to his military book."

A similar finding was reached by Dennis Vetock, reference historian of the U.S. Army Military History Institute of Carlisle, Penn. He notes issuance of DD 1173 was regulated under Defense Department guidelines at the time Oswald received his card. These guidelines limited recipients of such cards largely to military dependents "and civilians who require military identification."

If such a card was issued in error, says Vetock, "it wouldn't have been authorized, and immediately upon being called to official attention would have been changed or revoked."

There is no evidence Oswald's identity card was revoked, even after he defected, threatened to provide military secrets to the Russians and received an unde-

the image, the printing, everything is gone," she said. "You couldn't use it to show anything."

Challenging the archivist's assertion, FBI spokesman Bill Carter of the Public Affairs Office in Washington asks, "How does she (McDonough) know it was tested by the FBI? Does she have a report?"

"Who else but the FBI could have done it?" McDonough responds. She adds that there are no pictures of the card in its unobliterated state at the archives.

According to assassination writer David Lifton, there is no mention of DD 1173 in any FBI testing reports he has reviewed. These include non-published commission documents, FBI Dallas field office reports and FBI summary reports to the Warren Commission.

The same photo of Oswald on DD 1173 also appeared in the Warren Report (Cadigan Exhibit 15) on a phony Selective Service classification card found in Oswald's possession with the name Alek James Hidell, the name he supposedly used to purchase the assassination rifle by mail order.

It was the 112th Army Intelligence Group at Fort Sam Houston that notified the FBI that he was carrying a fraudulent Selective Service card. How the military knew this has never been explained.

The Hidell card, with its photograph of Oswald, was one of two major links between Oswald and the assassination weapon. The other is a photograph — known by its commission designation of 133A — allegedly taken of Os-

Also found in Oswald's wallet is this phony Selective Service classification card, bearing the name of Alek James Hidell — the name law enforcement officials say Oswald used to purchase the rifle they contend he used to kill Kennedy.

wald brandishing the weapon in the back yard of a home in the Oak Cliff area of Dallas.

The 26-volume Warren Commission publication acknowledged the existence of the DOD identity card in only two places: Oswald's military record and the report of FBI agent Manning Clements, who listed the contents of Oswald's wallet on the night of Nov. 22, 1963, after the Army intelligence tip. Clements cited both the DOD identity card and the Hidell card.

Clements' report, however, did not reveal that the two cards had the same picture — or that the DOD identity card had a photo at all.

The Oct. 23, 1963, postmark on Oswald's DOD identity card is a further enigma. "If found, drop in any mailbox," the card's reverse side instructs. It then tells the Postmaster: "Return to Department of Defense, Washington 25, D.C."

Reached at Notre Dame University where he now teaches law, Robert Blakey, former general counsel to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, considered the possibility that the card was lost, dropped in a mailbox, postmarked and delivered to the Defense Department.

"In that case," says Blakey, "Defense would have had to have given it back to Oswald. Interesting."

W.J. Liebeler, an associate counsel to the Warren Commission, expresses similar surprise at the convolutions of Oswald's mysterious ID card:

"This is all new to me," he says. "Two things seem odd. The picture identified as Oswald in Minsk, and the postmark on the defense card. The postmark implies the Defense Department either mailed it back to him or gave it to him at some time."


If so, that would have happened less than a month before Kennedy's assassination. Was, as some conspiracy theorists suggest, Oswald working for the U.S. government at the time?

Renowned assassination researcher Paul Hoch of Berkeley, Calif., attempted to discover the significance of Oswald's DD Form 1173 as early as 1974.

Today, he says: "The HSCA (the House assassination committee) attempted to deal with the possibility that Oswald had been working with the U.S. government after he left the Marines. But as far as we know, they didn't deal with this card. It may have been the missing element."

Retired gardener finds Roman gold cache in Britain

Was Oswald A Spy,



And Other Cold War Mysteries

The Russian revelation of Soviet intelligence documents is answering old questions — and raising new ones.

By David Wise

IN MOSCOW EARLY IN THE evening of May 13, 1981, the teletype clattered to life in the headquarters of the K.G.B. in Dzerzhinsky Square. The flash was top priority.

"From Rome, May 13: John Paul II was wounded by an unknown assailant. The crime was perpetrated while the Pope was driving through a crowd of the faithful in an open automobile. ... Early reports connect this attempt on the life of John Paul II with the complex political situation in the country."

The dispatch quoted above is not a wire-service account of the shooting of the pontiff by Mehmet Ali Agca, a Turkish terrorist and convicted hit man with a right-wing background who claims he was a hired gun for Bulgarian intelligence and the K.G.B.

Rather, it is one of several extracts from what the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service says are top-secret cables that passed between the K.G.B.'s Rome and Sofia

residences and K.G.B. headquarters in Moscow, dealing with the assassination attempt. The documents are the first relating to the attempt against the Pope to be released by Russia under President Boris N. Yeltsin.

The cables were released for an obvious reason: if authentic, they tend to absolve the K.G.B. of complicity in the attempt on the Pope. The message sounds like straightforward reporting by a field officer to headquarters, not some cable from a Soviet Maxwell Smart reporting a flubbed assassination attempt.

The documents are the first trickle of what may become a flood of material flowing to the West from Soviet archives. And that, says James G. Hershberg, the 32-year-old coordinator of the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, could present historians with the well-nigh impossible challenge of determining which Soviet documents can be believed. "One has to worry not only about false docu-

David Wise is the author of "Molehunt," a book about the C.I.A.'s search for Soviet spies in its ranks.



Mehmet Ali Agca takes aim at Pope John Paul II in Rome. Newly released K.G.B. documents counter charges that the gunman was a Soviet agent.

ments that someone put in a file or doctored documents," says Hershberg, "but the fact that the original document might not tell the whole story."

The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, the source of the documents about the Pope, is now called the Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki, or S.V.R. (Formerly, it was the First Chief Directorate, or espionage arm, of the K.G.B.) Its headquarters are in a heavily guarded, unmarked complex at Yasenevo, outside Moscow.


The text dated May 13, 1981, is one of several made available by the S.V.R. Another excerpt, datelined Sofia a year and three months after the Pope was shot, informs K.G.B. officials in Moscow that Rome newspapers have picked up an American news report suggesting that Bulgarian and K.G.B. agents were behind the assassination attempt.

It adds: "Bulgarian friends" — a veiled reference to the Durzhavna Sigurnost, the Bulgarian secret service — "informed the Soviet representative that the aforementioned article is a crude falsehood. No 'secret documents' exist to connect the terrorist Agca to Bulgarian organs because friends have not sought to establish any contacts." The other excerpts are in a similar vein.

Russia's spies, in the manner of American political operatives, are adept at putting their own spin on events. Says Yuri G. Kobaladze, chief of the press bureau of the Russian intelligence service and the official who brokered the release of the documents: "The cables show we were as much surprised as anyone."

The documents bore volume and page numbers, as though they were archival material. No original cables were made available, although I requested them. Were the documents created by someone after the fact? There is simply no way to know, in the absence of additional evidence.

There is testimony from defectors from the Soviet bloc that conflicts with the S.V.R.'s claims. For example, a former K.G.B. major who sur-



Top secret sharers: Dmitri Antonovich Volkogonov and James Hershberg.

faced in Washington in 1990, Viktor I. Sheymov, has said that when he visited Warsaw in 1979 the K.G.B. chief there told him of an urgent cable from headquarters asking for all possible information on "how to get physically close to the Pope," a phrase that Sheymov said was K.G.B.-speak for assassination.

The final answer to the question of K.G.B. or at least Bulgarian involvement may come from Allen Weinstein, the American historian, who has obtained 37,000 pages of microfilm Bulgarian documents under an arrangement with the post-Communist Government of President Zhelyu Zhelev. Weinstein's Center for Democracy, a Washington-based policy group, is now translating and analyzing the documents; by year's end he plans to report his findings to an international commission of which he is chairman.

But Weinstein, who scored something of a coup in gaining access to the Bulgarian archives on the Pope, readily concedes that his inquiry faces formidable problems. "I have no way of knowing what was there initially," he says, "or what was kept out of the files or destroyed." So far, Weinstein says, he has found "no smoking gun."

The case is even more intriguing now that Bulgaria has admitted that its spy agency was responsible for the famed "poison umbrella" attack on Georgi I. Markov, a Bulgarian exile, in London in 1978. Markov died after he was jabbed in the back of his right thigh with the umbrella tip, which implanted a tiny pellet under his skin containing ricin, a deadly poison derived from the seeds of the castor oil plant. Former K.G.B. general Oleg Kalugin has said that he dispatched Gen. Sergei Mikhailovich Golubev of the K.G.B.'s Directorate K to Sofia to advise the Durzhavna Sigurnost on the hit, and to provide the umbrella and the poison pellet. But Kalugin says reports that the K.G.B. also plotted with Bulgaria to kill the Pope are "rubbish."

Agca, who is serving a life sentence, at first said he acted alone, then told Italian investigators that he had Bulgarian and Turkish accomplices. In 1985, Italy tried three Bulgarians and five Turks, including Agca, for conspiracy to assassinate the Pope. All were acquitted of the charge, except Agca, who was already in jail for life, and whose claims were considerably undermined when he announced in court on the second day of the trial, "I am Jesus Christ."

Nevertheless, suspicions remain about the K.G.B.'s role in the shooting. The theory is that the Soviet intelligence agency decided to murder the Polish-born Pope, using its Bulgarian surrogates, because of his support for Solidarity in Poland and the fear that Poland would escape the Soviet orbit. But Agca publicly threatened to kill the Pope in November 1979, several months before Solidarity and its leader, Lech Walesa, had risen to prominence.

GEN. DMITRI ANTONOVICH VOLKOGONOV has the unenviable task of deciding which K.G.B. secrets to reveal and, by extension, which controversies to ignite. In October, for example, he announced after a one-month search of Soviet archives that Alger Hiss had never been a Soviet spy, as his accuser, Whittaker Chambers, had claimed. Hiss, 88, the former State Department official, served almost four years in Federal prison after he was convicted of perjury in 1950. At a news conference, Hiss, who has always denied any guilt, declared himself "overjoyed" at Volkogonov's findings. But students of the case, notably Allen Weinstein, remain skeptical. Weinstein, whose 1978 book, "Perjury," concluded that Hiss had lied about spying for the Soviets, says he doubts Volkogonov conducted a truly comprehensive search.

I interviewed Volkogonov, 63, during his visit to Washington earlier this year. A three-star general and a histo-

rian, he heads the official commission on declassifying K.G.B. secrets and is also co-chairman of the joint United States-Russian commission tracking missing Americans taken prisoner of war during World War II and the Korean War. Officials in Moscow, I began, including Yevgeny M. Primakov, the current head of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, have denied any K.G.B. involvement in the attack on the Pope.

"Well, they are representatives of the secret services," Volkogonov replied drily. "That's why. Representatives of secret services are not very talkative. I don't imagine they are in this country either." Was he implying there was a file showing K.G.B. links to the papal assassination attempt? The general backpedaled. "I cannot confirm or deny," he said. "So far, we've looked at only 1 percent of the K.G.B. documents."

I tried again. Would there be files linking Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy to the K.G.B.? "I don't believe it," Volkogonov said. The Oswald file, but not its contents, was shown on American television, I noted. "Who knows if it was the real file?" Volkogonov replied. "If they connect Oswald and the K.G.B., it would be a sensation in Russia. But there were no ties. I think it [the assassination] was carried out by inside forces in America. My understanding is, I could predict we wouldn't find any ties between the K.G.B. and Oswald."

"But you don't say that about the Pope."

"I can't say, but we must continue to look."

THE LIST OF COLD WAR MYSTERIES that might — or might not — be answered given full access to the archives of the K.G.B., the Politburo, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Soviet foreign ministry, the defense ministry and other agencies of the former Soviet Union, is lengthy. How close did the world come to Armageddon during the Cuban missile crisis? Was Alger Hiss a spy, Volkogonov's assurances notwithstanding? What about the Rosenbergs and the atom bomb? What was Nikita S. Khrushchev thinking when he put up the Berlin wall? And so on, ad infinitum.

The answers, and some are bound to come, will be like a glimpse of the dark side of the moon. Never did the rulers of the Kremlin think that the innermost secrets of the party and state would be made public.

But the collapse of Communism has made the inconceivable possible. Only two months ago, for example, President Yeltsin released Soviet files on the 1983 downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007. Last month, on a visit to Seoul, he turned over the plane's flight recorders to South Korea.

The disclosure of a large number of documents, while likely, is not a fait accompli, however. There are forces in the former Soviet Union, both old-

One word of caution to historians before they celebrate: of some of the darkest deeds there may be no record at all.

guard Communists and new conservatives, strongly opposed to the release of "state secrets." After Vadim Bakatin, the reform chief of the K.G.B., handed United States Ambassador Robert S. Strauss a suitcase full of bugs that had been planted in the new, but unused, American Embassy in Moscow, he soon found himself under political attack.

Nevertheless, the Russians are coming, sooner or later, with documents. The material dealing with the assassination attempt on the Pope is only the beginning. What follows is an exploration of a number of other cold war mysteries, along with some guesses about the answers to be found in the archives in Moscow. The list is necessarily selective. It does not pretend to cover all of the most famous mysteries, but it does include some of the more intriguing ones.



Was Lee Harvey Oswald a Soviet agent, and was he acting for the K.G.B. when he shot President John F. Kennedy?

Late in January 1964, two months after President Kennedy was murdered in Dallas, a 36-year-old K.G.B. officer named Yuri I. Nosenko met with two C.I.A. officers, George Kisevalter and Tennent H. (Pete) Bagley, in a safe house in Geneva, Switzerland. Nosenko had startling news for the C.I.A. men: he said that in Moscow in October 1959 he had personally handled the case of Lee Harvey Oswald, turning down his request to remain in the Soviet Union after his visa expired. Oswald then attempted suicide. The K.G.B. decision, according to Nosenko, was overruled at a higher political level. Oswald was sent to Minsk, where he met and married Marina Prusakova, whose uncle was a colonel in the M.V.D., the Soviet internal police agency, and left with her for the United States in June 1962 after living in the Soviet Union slightly more than two and a half years.

Because Oswald had been a radar operator in the Marines, and had been stationed at Atsugi, Japan, a base for the secret U-2 spy plane that had been overflying the Soviet Union, the C.I.A. assumed that the K.G.B. at the very least would have had an interest in debriefing Oswald about his military knowledge.

In Geneva, Nosenko defected to the C.I.A. and was brought to Washington. He insisted that the K.G.B. had neither questioned Oswald nor tried to recruit him.

Richard M. Helms, then head of the C.I.A.'s espionage operations, and later director of the entire agency, testified to the House Committee on Assassinations that he found Nosenko's claim "strained credulity. . . I have not been able to swallow it." Helms's skepticism about Nosenko was shared by the influential chief of counterintelligence, James J. Angleton, who regarded Nosenko as a false defector.

In part because of disbelief of Nosenko's story about Oswald, the K.G.B. man was imprisoned by the C.I.A. for almost five years under conditions that were, for much of that time, extremely harsh.

Helms defended the C.I.A.'s actions by testifying that if Nosenko fed it false information about the K.G.B.'s relationship with Oswald, "it was fair for us to surmise that there may have been an Oswald-K.G.B. connection in November 1963, more specifically that Oswald was acting as a Soviet agent when he shot President Kennedy."

Nosenko stuck to his story and was eventually rehabilitated by the C.I.A. He now lives somewhere in the United States under an assumed name, still under the agency's protection.

Oswald was under close and constant K.G.B. surveillance in Minsk, where agents gave him the code name Likhoy, meaning "valiant" or "dashing." This may have been deliberately ironic, since Oswald obviously was neither, but was more likely a play on the name Lee Harvey. There is also evidence he may have been drugged — the chief of the Belarus K.G.B., Eduard Shirkovsky, was quoted recently in the Russian press as saying: "Well, maybe they did drop a few tablets in his glass, but just the kind to make him let down his guard and be a little more talkative."

But officials in Moscow continue to deny that Oswald was enlisted to work for the Soviet spy agency. Yuri Kobaladze, the spokesman for Yeltsin's intelligence service, says, "Foreign intelligence had nothing to do with him."

The FBI does not dispute that conclusion. Asked whether there is any reason to believe that Oswald was acting for the K.G.B., Wayne R. Gilbert, the FBI's counterintelligence chief, replies: "Not that I'm aware of." Gilbert's deputy, the veteran counterintelligence agent R. Patrick Watson, says he thinks Nosenko's information

about Oswald was true and that Nosenko was a genuine defector. "I don't think any Soviet intelligence officer has been sent," he says.

Until now there has been no credible evidence brought to light suggesting that Oswald was working for the K.G.B. Although a link cannot unequivocally be ruled out, if the complete K.G.B. files on Oswald are ever opened up, General Volkogonov's prediction that they will show "no ties" between Oswald and the K.G.B. is, on balance, probably correct.



Was there a K.G.B. mole in the C.I.A., and could it have been James Angleton?

On Dec. 15, 1961, Anatoly M. Golitsin, a K.G.B. counterintelligence officer, defected to the C.I.A. in Helsinki. In a safe house near C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., Golitsin told his interrogators that there was a Soviet agent inside the C.I.A. He did not know the mole's identity, he said, but his K.G.B. code name was Sasha, he had served in Germany, his background was Slavic, and his true name began with the letter K.

James Angleton, whose job was to root out any moles burrowing away inside the agency, believed Golitsin and launched a hunt for the presumed Soviet spy that was to last for years. His Special Investigations Group screened 120 C.I.A. officers, eventually narrowing down the number of serious suspects to about 18.

Many careers were damaged by the investigation. The principal suspect, S. Peter Karlow, had served in Germany and his name at birth had sounded Slavic; he was dismissed. Richard Kovich, a C.I.A. officer who had handled a number of major cases, also fell under suspicion, as did Paul Garbler, who had served as the agency's first chief of station in Moscow in the early 1960's. By then, the search had spread beyond the letter K to the entire alphabet. All three officers were later found innocent of the charges and were compensated for their mistreatment under an obscure law passed by Congress in the 1980's and known inside the C.I.A. as the Mole Relief Act. Karlow received close to \$500,000 and was secretly awarded a medal in 1989 by then-C.I.A. director William H. Webster.

In time, the mole hunt spread to

England, France, Norway and Canada. At Langley, the mole hunters' attention focused for several years on Igor Orlov, a Russian-born agent for the C.I.A. who had served in Germany in the 1950's under two operational names that began with the letter K. Although Angleton became convinced that Orlov was the mole, the F.B.I. was unable to gather any evidence against him. In any event, Orlov was a low-level contract agent in the field, never a C.I.A. officer with access to major secrets at headquarters. Orlov opened a picture-framing gallery in Alexandria, Va., which his wife still runs. He died in 1982.

Golitsin's charges divided the C.I.A. His statements touched off the "war of the defectors," because information provided by Yuri Nosenko undercut Golitsin's warnings of a mole. Angleton and his supporters contended that Nosenko had been sent by the K.G.B. to discredit Golitsin's story.

Before it was all over, Angleton became a victim of his own mole hunt. Clare Edward Petty, a member of Angleton's staff, suggested that the Soviet agent was none other than the counterintelligence chief, James Angleton. A later C.I.A. study discounted that startling possibility.

Was there a mole? Over the years, more than half a dozen C.I.A. employees are known to have sold or transmitted agency secrets to the Soviets or other countries. It is entirely possible that during the 1960's one or more agency employees succumbed to temptation and betrayed secrets to Moscow. Indeed, General Kalugin, says that there was one such low-level mole in the C.I.A. in the early 60's, now dead; Kalugin claims to have met with his widow. He says he cannot recall the man's name. But there is no hard evidence, from later defectors or other sources, that the C.I.A. was penetrated by a high-level mole, a Langley version of the British traitor, Kim Philby. The K.G.B. archives, if opened, are likely, therefore, to disappoint the mole hunters.



Was the Kremlin behind the Congo plane crash that killed Dag Hammarskjöld?

Shortly after midnight on Sept. 18, 1961, a chartered DC6B belonging to a Swedish company crashed while

approaching Ndola airport in Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia, on a flight from Leopoldville in the former Belgian Congo, now Zaire. Sixteen people died, including Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Hammarskjöld, who was 56, died on a mission of peace; he was in the Congo to try to end the fighting there. When his plane went down, he was on his way to a meeting with President Moïse Tshombe of the separatist Katanga regime, whose troops were battling United Nations forces. The Belgians had pulled out of the Congo in 1960, leaving chaos in their wake. The African republic quickly became a cold war battleground. The Eisenhower Administration considered Patrice Lumumba, the first Prime Minister of the Congo, to be a radical pawn of the Soviets, and the C.I.A. plotted his murder. An agency chemist was dispatched to the Congo with a vial of lethal biological material — its precise nature has never been revealed — and the C.I.A.'s operatives were instructed to put it on Lumumba's toothbrush. Before the agency could act, Lumumba fell into the hands of Joseph Mobutu, the United States-backed army chief who had seized power. Lumumba was later flown to Katanga, where he was murdered.

The United Nations commission that investigated the plane crash was unable to fix any cause, but said that "the possibility . . . of sabotage cannot be excluded." The commission's report noted that the aircraft had been left unguarded for four hours on the runway at Leopoldville before Hammarskjöld took off. The report concluded that the plane had not been shot down, and stated that "no evidence of a bomb" had been found. But Harold M. Julien, a United Nations security officer who was severely burned but survived the crash for three days, spoke of an explosion aboard the plane before it went down. More recently, two former United Nations officials, Conor Cruise O'Brien and George Ivan Smith, said they believed gunfire from mercenaries in Katanga, acting for Belgian, British and American mining companies, had caused Hammarskjöld's plane to crash.

In his book, "Breaking With Moscow," Arkady N. Shevchenko, a Soviet diplomat who defected in 1978 while he was Under Secretary General of the United Nations, reported that unnamed friends told him they had seen "a top-secret K.G.B. report indicating that the aircraft had been shot down by pro-Soviet Congolese forces penetrated and guided by operatives from the U.S.S.R."

The Soviets certainly had the motive to eliminate Hammarskjöld — he stood in the way of their plans to dominate the Congo, they blamed him for the death of Lumumba and they had publicly called for a troika, a three-man executive, to replace

him. The cause of the crash remains a mystery, but the Soviet archives may add little to its solution. "There is nothing in the [K.G.B.] files on Hammarskjöld," Yuri Kobaladze insists. "Only political judgments, nothing operational."



Was Vitaly Yurchenko a true K.G.B. defector who changed his mind, or a plant from the start?

On Aug. 1, 1985, Vitaly S. Yurchenko, deputy chief of the K.G.B. department in charge of espionage in the United States and Canada, walked into the United States Embassy in Rome and defected. Whisked to a C.I.A. safe house in Vienna, Va., Yurchenko proved a major catch. He provided clues to the identities of two American intelligence officers who had sold secrets to the Soviets, Edward Lee Howard, a former C.I.A. man dismissed by the agency just before he was due to go to Moscow, and Ronald W. Pelton, a former employee of the National Security Agency. Howard escaped to Moscow, slipping through a net of FBI agents who had surrounded his house in New Mexico. Pelton is serving a life sentence for espionage.

Three months after he defected, Yurchenko walked out of a Georgetown restaurant, leaving his young C.I.A. guard to pay the check. Two days later he was produced at a sensational televised news conference at the Soviet Embassy. Yurchenko falsely claimed that he had been drugged in Rome and kidnapped by the C.I.A.

He flew back to Moscow, where, as far as is known, he remains alive and well. Ronald Kessler, an author who interviewed Yurchenko in Moscow in 1989, reported in his book "Escape from the C.I.A." that the Russian claimed he was still a colonel in the K.G.B. but worked in a "research institute." According to Kobaladze, the Russian spokesman on intelligence, the facility was then part of the K.G.B.'s First Chief Directorate at Yasenevo. "Yurchenko recently retired," he says. Oleg Tsarev, a consultant to the Russian intelligence agency, says that Yurchenko "was not punished at all but taken from operational work. That's

the rules of the game. He was in the hands of a hostile intelligence service for some months. Any officer knows he will be removed after that."

United States counterintelligence officials remain divided over whether Yurchenko was a genuine defector or a dispatched agent sent to mislead them in a complex K.G.B. game. But an interesting clue was provided by Vladimir A. Kryuchkov, who was head of the K.G.B. until he was imprisoned for his role in the abortive 1991 coup against Mikhail S. Gorbachev. In the summer of 1990, Diane Sawyer interviewed Kryuchkov in Moscow for "Prime Time Live" on ABC. Off camera, the K.G.B. chief told her that Yurchenko had been temporarily deranged, had suffered a mental breakdown and had been hospitalized when he returned to Moscow. The K.G.B., Kryuchkov added, was no longer saying that Yurchenko had been drugged by the C.I.A.

On balance, Vitaly Yurchenko was almost certainly a true defector who changed his mind and decided to take his chances on returning home. He had not been handled well by the C.I.A., and he was rejected by a woman he visited in Canada (with the C.I.A.'s help) to try to rekindle an old affair. The Soviet archives will probably show that the K.G.B. was horrified when he defected in 1985.



Was Felix Bloch a spy for the K.G.B.?

On May 14, 1989, Felix Bloch, a senior State Department official, dined with a large, bearded man in the Hotel Meurice in Paris. As French counterintelligence agents watched and secretly photographed the encounter, Bloch placed a small black bag under the table. The bearded man left with the bag. The man had traveled to Paris under the name of Reino Gikman, although Bloch says he knew him as Pierre Bart, a fellow stamp collector. In fact, the bearded man was a K.G.B. agent with a valid Finnish passport

Allen Weinstein, who is analyzing documents from Bulgarian files, says, 'I have no way of knowing what was kept out of the files or destroyed.'

issued to Reino Gikman, a person probably long dead, whose identity the agent had assumed. Bloch claims that the bag contained stamps. The F.B.I., which wiretapped Bloch and bugged his Mercedes, thinks otherwise and accused Bloch of passing secrets to the Soviets. But the bureau lacked proof of espionage.

When the story broke in July 1989, Gikman/Bart vanished from Vienna, where he had been living, the city where Bloch was born and served as the No. 2 man in the United States Embassy from 1980 to 1987. For weeks, television crews followed Bloch around Washington, a bizarre spectacle that became a familiar sight on the nightly news. Suspended from his State Department job, Bloch was finally dismissed and denied his pension. He has never been arrested or charged with any crime. Recently, he has been working as a checkout clerk in a grocery in Chapel Hill, N.C. Although the F.B.I. has urged the Russians to provide information about Bloch, it is extremely unlikely that the Russian intelligence service would ever provide documents about any recent operations. Despite improved relations with Washington, Russia is still, after all, in the spy business. Betraying agents discourages others.

ONE WORD OF CAUTION IS IN ORDER before historians celebrate their impending access to the world's biggest cookie jar. Quite aside from the question of what the Russians may or may not choose to release and whether the documents are authentic, there may be no record at all of some of the darkest deeds. Alexander Dallin, a Soviet specialist at Stanford University, predicts that as documents surface, it will be discovered that "they didn't bother to write down a lot of this stuff." When Lavrenti P. Beria, the notorious head of the secret police, organized the murder of the exiled Leon Trotsky, Dallin says, "I'm sure Stalin didn't go out of his way to write on a piece of paper, 'Beria, have Trotsky assassinated.'" ■

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
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MAYDAY

THE U-2 AFFAIR

THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE
GREATEST US-USSR SPY SCANDAL

A BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB MAIN SELECTION

MICHAEL R. BESCHLOSS

Appendix: *Telephone Conversation Between Former
President Eisenhower and Director of Central Intelligence John
McCone, August 13, 1964, 10:10 A.M.*

In August 1964, Dwight Eisenhower was nearing the end of work on *Waging Peace*, his second volume of Presidential memoirs, when he turned to the U-2 affair. After perusing his own files, enough ambiguities remained in his mind to telephone CIA Director John McCone, who had once been Chairman of his Atomic Energy Commission. The CIA taped or otherwise transcribed their conversation:

Eisenhower: Say, John, I['ve] got a question to ask you. How much of the [Francis Gary] Powers report—what's happening, just telling my side of the U-2—that is, what I understood and what's happened now. Now, the Powers report was, of course, made to you people, and I don't know if it was ever published or not. Or I don't know whether I'd be justified in using any information out of it.

McCone: Yes. Well, his report was pretty well made public.

Eisenhower: That's what I remembered.

McCone: Yes.

Eisenhower: Could you send me—matter of fact, did he say that he was shot down?

McCone: That was the impression he had. He couldn't say positively. He felt a burst astern of him, a flare, and lost control of his plane.

Eisenhower: How far did he glide before he ejected?

McCone: He—as I remember it, he didn't glide. He nosed over and a wing came off, and then he went into a spiral and apparently ejected at twenty or twenty-five thousand feet.

Eisenhower: Now, the plane was pretty well destroyed.

McCone: Well, strangely enough, it was not pretty well destroyed. Apparently leveled off and made something of a soft landing so that—

Eisenhower: I thought the plane—maybe I'll go back and ask you a couple of other questions.

McCone: —rather large pieces.

Eisenhower: Yes, I remember that now. Now, let me ask you this, John. As I understood it, I mean, as was told me all those years by both [Richard] Bissell and by Allen [Dulles], this thing that the plane could never be recovered—it had self-destruction built in it and also they were—they assured me there was really no fear of ever getting back a live pilot if it was knocked down by a hostile action in Russia. Even if damaged, they figured that at that height, if he tried to parachute at seventy thousand feet, he'd never survive.

Now, the trouble is we've got records after the event—as late as May 20th [1960], or something like that—we've got conversation between [Thomas] Gates and Dulles. And Gates says, "Well, what was the pilot supposed to say if he landed?" And Dulles said, "He's to say he's a CIA man and that's it—and give his name."

McCone: That's correct.

Eisenhower: Well, now, the point of it is I was told it would be almost impossible for the man if he came down just . . . of his own and just glided down and no hostile action of any type—well, that might be a remote possibility, but otherwise they discounted. And the whole cover story was built on the basis that the man would never survive.

McCone: I realize that and I realized it at the time, but it was absolutely wrong. Now, there have been three pilots whose planes have performed just as his did in test flights and so forth where they lost control at seventy thousand feet. The wings came off and spiraled down and the pilots ejected and lived. Now, in interrogating Powers as to exactly what happened to him, the same interrogators interrogated the other pilots—and these events happened in Louisiana and Nevada and so forth, and the planes performed and the pilots performed in just identical manners.

Now, as far as the destruct mechanism is concerned, there was a destruct mechanism that presumably would destroy the camera and the film—not the plane, but that was—the destruct switch was not pushed, and the experts felt that Powers was in such a posture with his plane in a spin that he could not reach the destruct button prior to ejecting.

Eisenhower: Would you have any records of your own to show what these people—what the presentations they were making to people like [John] Foster Dulles and me about what would probably happen? You see, I don't want to be accusing people of having fooled me. But I do know that they told me that the possibility of anyone surviving—matter of fact, that's the reason I argued against putting out the cover story, and they said, "You just don't have to worry, General. It is perfectly all right because there's nobody there." That's all. . . .

McCone: Now, I'll tell you what I will do. Let me go into this thing and let me get something—I'd do it myself, but I'm going to go West for two or three days.

Eisenhower: O.K. If you'll just have some of your staff look up the sequence of events from the time we designed this blasted thing until the present—I mean, until it was finally ended with the Powers thing, that can be told—that is, where I could tell it without violating secrecy. If you could do that and then just tell them to send me something like that, I'd be much obliged to you.

McCone: I'll either send it to you or I'll have somebody come up and go over it with you.

Eisenhower: Fine.

(Source: Richard Bissell Private Papers)

If Allen Dulles had indeed told Gates that, on landing, Powers was to say nothing but his name and the fact that he was a CIA man, he was misinformed. U-2 pilots were told by their commanders that they were "perfectly free to tell the full truth about their mission," if downed, "with the exception of certain specifications of the aircraft."¹

In *Waging Peace*, Eisenhower finally insisted that he "had been assured that if a plane were to go down, it would be destroyed either in the air or on impact, so that proof of espionage would be lacking."² On how the plane was downed, the former President was mute, but without further comment he quoted Andrew Goodpaster as telling him on May 2, 1960, that the pilot had "reported an engine flameout" before going down.³ In his own memoirs, Powers found this "astonishing" and said, "I had neither an engine flameout nor did I radio back to the base."⁴ The riddles remain.

1. Memorandum to Detachment Commanders, December 9, 1957, appended to CIA Board of Inquiry Report to John McCone, February 27, 1962, John F. Kennedy Library.

2. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1965), p. 547.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 543.

4. Francis Gary Powers, *Operation Overflight* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 351-52.

Posted: Fri, Dec 11, 1992 7:32 AM EST
From: POLARIS.MINSK
To: POLARIS.RUSSIAN/MEP.1
Subj: UP DATE

Msg: IGJC-5557-3696

FOR NORMAN
OK FOR PHONE CONTACT

1) VALTINE FOUND OLEG TARUSSINA IN LENNINGRAD. HE SPEAKS PERFECT ENGLISH. WE HAVE ADDRESS AND PHONE NUMBER WHEN WE WANT TO CALL.

2) I MADE A MAJOR BREAK THROUGH WITH MAR'S AUNT. SHE HAS CONFIRMED WHAT HAPPENED TO HER HUSBAND AFTER LEE AND MAR MOVED FROM USSR TO USA AND WHAT FURTHER HAPPENED TO THEM AND THE ENTIRE FAMILY AFTER THE DEATH OF JFK. AFTER THE MOVE INDIRECT STORIES ABOUT THEM IN THE PAPERS (THE STAR), ETC THAT FORCED THEM OUT OF THE HOUSE AND INTO A SMALLER ONE, ETC. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OTHER AUNT'S. AFTER DEATH OF JFK IT WAS ALL OVER "PERESCOVA NIECE" NOT MARINA PERESCOVA. IT WAS A DISCRASE TO THE FAMILY AND ALL THAT HAPPENED. WENT INTO THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE ENTIRE FAMILY AND MO WHEN SHE TOLD THEM SHE WAS GOING TO GO TO THE USA. ALL THIS. THE CONVERSATION WITH ALL AND HOW THE FAMILY STARTED TO GO DIFFERENT WAYS. HOW THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY DID NOT WANT TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH LEE AND MAR. GOT INTO THE NEGATIVE SIDES OF MO PERSONALITY, THE DEFFENCE BETWEEN DIFFERENT BOYFRIENDS AND LEE. LOTS OF MATERIAL BETWEEN THE LINES THAT LUDMILA HAS PLACED ON THE TAPE. SHE IS STARTING TO OPEN UP. HER FEAR IS THAT WHAT SHE SAYS WE WILL TELL MO. I HAVE TRIED TO BREAK THIS FEELING. AM DOING SOME GOOD. LUDMILA SAY TRY NOT TO TALK TO MUCH ABOUT VALIA BECAUSE IF MO NOW CALLS AGAIN VALIA WILL STOP TALKING AS SHE IS STARTING TO DO. THE MOTOVIATION THAT MO CALL AND NEVER SENT A LETTER OR EVEN 100 DOLLARS IS WORKING FOR US AT THIS TIME. VALIA STARTED TO GIVE HER REAL FEELINGS ABOUT THE CHARACTER OF MO, THE NEGATIVE ATTATUDE, ETC. THIS GIRL MO (VALIA SAYS) WAS OUT FOR HERSELF (AS TRANSLATED BY LUDMILA). SHE NEVER THOUGHT ABOUT ANYONE ELSE. ANOTHER LITTLE SIDE BY. AFTER THE DEATH OF JFK VALIA HAD AN OPERATION ON HER FACE AND SHE HAD TO GO TO THE PHARAMCY WHER MO WORKED TO GET THE MEDICNE. THEY LOOKED AT HER AND TREATED HER LIKE SHIT. (ALMOST HER WORDS) SHE WAS NOT WANTED. SHE NOW CONFIRMED THAT AFTER THEY LEFT FOR THE USA HER HUSBANDS WORK IN THE SERVICE WENT NO WHERE. IT JUST STOPED DEAD. AND AFTER THE DEATH OF JFK IT KILLED HIM. SHE NOW ATTRIPTUES THE DEATH OF HER HUSBAND IN LARGE PART TO THE EVENTS OF DISCRASE AFTER THE DEATH OF JFK. SHE IS OPENING UP. SHE FINNALLY SAID AS WE WERE LEAVING, "LYALA" MO FRIEND WILL TELL YOU EVERYTHING WHEN SHE COMES BACK. SHE HAS TALKED TO HER AND I THINK THEY HAVE AGREED IT'S BEST FOR THIS TYPE OF INFORMTION TO COME FROM A FRIEND AND NOT A FAMILY MEMBER.

3) LUDMILA DID THIS INTERVIEW AND WILL DO PAVEL TONIGHT, BUT SHE IS NOW BACK IN BED BETWEEN INTERVIEWS. IT HAS BEEN THREE DAYS OF TESTS AND THE DOCTORS WON'T TELL HER WHAT IS WRONG.

IN THE HOSPITAL SHE GOES THROUGH HELL, NOW KNOWING WHAT THEY ARE DOING TO HER, THEY DON'T TELL HER WHAT KIND OF PAIN THE TEST WILL BRING. SHE IS NOW IN REAL PAIN, DID NOT SLEEP ALL LAST NIGHT. I SAT WITH HER BEFORE THE TESTS STARTED TRYING TO GET HER INTO MENTAL SHAP. NOT AFTER THE TESTS SHE IS JUST, SHE IS THINKING THE WORCE. TOMARROW WE HAVE INESSA IN THE MORNING AND SASHA IN THE AFTERNOON. SUNDAY WE HAVE MISHA, ETC.

Posted: Sat, Dec 12, 1992 4:43 PM EST
From: POLARIS.MINSK
To: POLARIS.RUSSIAN/MEP.1
Subj: URGENT

Msg: FGJC-5560-4347

SOVENTEL DOES NOT WORK ANY LONGER FROM MISNK. ONLY FROM RUSSIA. THE INTER-REPUBLIC AGREEMENT ON THIS TYPE OF SERVICE NOT SIGNED ON FRIDAY. SOVENTEL WILL NOT ACCEPT CALLS.

I HAVE TRIED FOR TWO DAYS TO GET NORMAN I CANNOT GET OUT.

PLEASE HAVE HIM CALL ME AFTER HE RECEIVES THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE.

RE: LENINGRAD PERIOD / STREETWISE, HOTEL VISTS, FRIENDS.

INTERVIEW WITH INESSA.

MO TOLD OF THIS PAST TO INESSA IN GREAT DETAIL. A PURGING OF THE SOLE. "SHE SAID HER STEPFATHER PUSHED HER INTO THE STREET AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS DARK SIDE OF HER PAST"

INTERVIEW WITH SASHA

VALLY TOLD SASHA WHEN SHE THOUGHT THE RELATIONSHIP WAS LEADING TO MARRAGE ABOUT THE SAME PAST. SHE WANTED HIM TO KNOW AND NOT HOLD IT AGAINST MARINA. THEN MARINA TOLD SASHA ONE DAY IN VALLY'S HOME. THIS WAS MOTIVATED BY VALLY TELLING MARINA THAT SHE TOLD SASHA. SASHA HEARD THE FACTS FROM MARINA DIRECTLY. MORE ABOUT SERVICE AND SASHA. ALL THIS AND MUCH MORE BEFORE HE READ THE TRANSLATION OF THE BOOK. HE ALSO SAID HE KNEW WE HAD THE HELP OF THE SERVICE IN OUR WORK. WE SAID WE WERE INTERVIEWING MANY PEOPLE AND SOME THAT WERE IN THE PAST CONNECTED WITH THE SERVICE. HE WAS NOT UPSET. LATER I GAVE HIM THE TRANSLATION FROM THE BOOK AND THEN IT STARTED TO COME OUT. WE THEN HAD DINER AND HE WANTS TO TALK MORE. HE SAID THE WOMEN WHO SIGNED THE APPROVAL TO MARRY THEM WAS FIRED AFTER THEY WENT TO THE USA. A LOT HAPPENED TO EVERYONE AFTER THEY WENT TO THE USA, NOT AFTER THE DEATH OF JFK. AFTER THE DEATH OF JFK THE SERVICE DID OTHER THINGS. SASHA INDICATED THAT HE HAD MUCH MORE CONTACT WITH THE SERVICE THEY HE ADMITTED IN HIS FIRST CONVERSATION. HE INDICATED THAT HER PAST WAS USED AGAINST HER AND HER FAMILY AFTER IT WAS KNOWN SHE WAS GOING TO THE USA. ALL HELL BROKE LOOS WHEN IT WAS KNOWN THAT HE WAS GOING TO THE USA. HE UNCLE DID EVERYTHING HE COULD TO STOP IT.

INESSA SAYS HER LOVE FOR LEE WAS ONLY A 2ND CHOICE. HE NEED FOR A FAMILY THAT WOULD SHED HER PAST WAS HER 1ST CHOICE. MARRAGE WAS A ROAD TO HIDING THE PAST. INESSA KNOWS IT ALL. ALL FROM MARINA. LUDMILA SAYS THIS MAY HAVE BEEN MY BEST INTERVIEW TO DAY. INESSA'S LETTERS WERE BURNED AFTER DEATH.

ADDITIONAL NOTES ON INTERVIEW WITH VALAY YESTERDAY..

AFTER THE DEATH OF KENNEDY THERE WAS A PURGING OF ALL TRACE OF THEM IN MINSK IN WRITING, ETC. VALLY HAD TO HIDE HER LETTERS FROM HER HUSBAND. HE WENT LOOKING FOR THEM. THE SERVICE WAS OUT TO MAKE SURE NOONE HAD ANY CONTACT WITH MO. LOTS TO TALK ABOUT BEFORE FINAL INTERVIEW WITH YOU.

Posted: Mon, Dec 14, 1992 1:19 PM EST Msg: AGJC-5562-2988
From: POLARIS.MINSK
To: POLARIS.RUSSIAN/MEP.1
Subj: NEWS FROM NOWHERE / OH THAT EDWARD J. EPSTEIN'S BOOK

NORMAN:

BY THE WAY IS ED ONE OF THE WORKERS ON THIS PROJECT.

NOW FOR TOP OF THE NEWS FROM NOWHERE.

INESSA ON TAPE TOLD HOW MARINA DREADED THE WEDDING NIGHT. HOW IT MIGHT GIVE HER PAST AWAY. THAT SHE WAS NOT A VIRGIN AS THE SAYING GO AND MORE AND MORE.

SO SHE PLANNED WHAT TO DO. SHE CONSULTED SOMEONE AT THE HOSPITAL CONNECTED WITH THE DRUG STORE, GOT WHAT SHE NEEDED FROM THE DRUG STORE AND DID WHAT SHE HAD TO DO TO HAVE BLOOD AT THE RIGHT TIME IN THE RIGHT PLACE. ALL WENT OFF WELL, SHE TOLD INESSA AND SHE WAS SHURE THAT LEE THOUGHT SHE WAS A VERGIN. IF HE EVERY HEARD ABOUT THE PAST FROM SOMEONE THEN THE WEDDING NIGHT WOULD PROVE THAT THE PERSON TELLING HIM WAS A LIER. MORE TO THE STORY, ETC.
I CANNOT FIGURE OUT WHY INESSA IS SAYING SO MUCH.

LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING YOU AND THE NEW RESEARCHERS WORKING ON THE PROJECT. WHOM EVER THEY ARE.

Posted: Mon, Dec 14, 1992 6:42 AM EST
From: POLARIS.MINSK
To: POLARIS.RUSSIAN/MEP.1
Subj: M.O. AND SERVICE

Msg: NGJC-5561-1038

JUST AS I EXPECTED IT MAKES A BIG DIFFERENCE ON WHAT WE WILL GET IF MARINA IS GOING TO SIGN WITH US. I ASKED FOR INFORMATION ABOUT NORMAN'S MEETING WITH MARINA. I HAVE SCHEDULED ANOTHER MEETING WITH THE SERVICE FOR TOMORROW. I MUST HAVE CONTACT AND/OR INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT OF NORMAN'S FIRST MEETING WITH MARINA. I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY SOME INFORMATION IS NOT FORTHCOMING VIA E-MAIL. WE ARE A DAY AHEAD (IN EFFECT) AND I NEEDED THE INFORMATION TODAY.

PLEASE TRY TO UNDERSTAND.

Posted: Fri, Dec 11, 1992 2:56 PM EST
From: POLARIS.MINSK
To: POLARIS.RUSSIAN/MEP.1
Subj: SERVICE

Msg: OGJC-5558-8695

TELL NORMAN

WE HAD A MEETING WITH THE SERVICE, VERY GOOD THE BEST, MEETING.

THEY SAID THAT THEY HAVE DESIDED THAT MANY SENTIVE AREA FROM OUR QUESTIONS WILL BE ANSWERED BY IVAN. HE WILL NOT LIE, BECAUSE SOME DAY THE FILES WILL BE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC AND IVAN AND THE SERVICE DOES NOT WANT TO BE FOUND OUT TO BE A LIER. SO THEY SAID IVAN WILL NVER LIE. HE MAY NOT ANSWER, BUT WILL NEVER LIE.

THEY SAID THAT SOON THE POLICY WILL CHANGE FOR THE BETTER, NORMAN SHOULD WORK WITH THEM NOW THE HARD WAY AND THE WAY WILL GET BETTER.

THEY LIKE THE IDEA ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE DIALOGUES. IF I ASK A QUESTION AS TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF EACH AND EVERY DIALOGUE THEY WILL GIVE US A LIST OF EACH SUBJECT MATTER.

SINCE WE ARE LEAVING NEXT WEEK THEY WANT A COMPLETE SET OF QUESTIONS FOR THE FILES. AT LEAST 50 QEUESTOINS. SOME WILL BE ANSWERED WITH DOUCMENTS, SOME BY IVAN AS IF THE FILE WAS BEFORE US. SOME WILL BE READ INTO TAPE RECORDING BY LUDMILA AND SOME BY DOCUMENTS. BUT THEY WANT QUESTIONS TO WORKON DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME THAT WE ARE AWAY. THIS IS A MUST.

THEN I MUST HAVE FROM NORMAN HIS FIFTY QUESTIONS. I WILL MAKE MINE AND LUDMILA WILL MAKE HERS.

NOW WE HAD A VERY GOOD INTERVIEW WITH PAVEL. HE WAS NOT DRINKING AND HE WAS LEVAL HEADED. HE WENT THROUGH ALL HIS PERSONAL EXPERENCES WITH BIG UNCLE. STEP BY STEP, DAY BY DAY, PERSON BY PERSON, SOME WE KNOW, SOME WE DON'T. HE WAS OBJECTIVE. WE DISCUSSED GOOD AND BAD. I THINK YOU WILL LIKE THE RESULTS AND IT'S SET FOR THE BIG ONE ABOUT THE FAMILY., ETC.

LUDMILA HAS NOW SPOKEN TO HER DOCTOR AND HE DOES NOT KNOW OR LIKE WHAT HE SEES IN THE TESTS. HE IS CONSULTING ANOTHER DOCOTOR AND WANTS TO SEE HER AT 10:00 AM TOMARROW. WE HAVE AN INTERVIEW AT 10:30 AND I WANTED TO CANCEL IT FOR HER PEACE OF MIND. BUT SHE SAID NO, NO, THEN WENT ON ON HOW HE IS USED AND ABUSED. I THINK ALL THIS THE LAST THREE WEEKS HAS BEEN, SHE KNOWS SOMETHING THAT SHE WON'T TELL ME. NOW IT MAY BE CONFIRMED AND SHE WANTS TO JUST WORK THROUGH IT WITHOUT ANY SUPPORT, JUST TAKING HER DEEP FEELING OUT ON THE ONES AROUND HER. ONES THAT SHE KNOWS SHE CAN HURT. YOU UNDERSTAND BETTER THAT ME.

Posted: Tue, Dec 15, 1992 10:31 AM EST
From: POLARIS.MINSK
To: POLARIS.RUSSIAN/MEP.1
Subj: MAILER / VARIOUS

Msg: IGJC-5564-4687

LUDMILA HAS ARRANGED FOR NORMAN TO HAVE THE CAR AND DRIVER DURING NORMAN'S STAY IN MOSCOW. PLEASE ADVISE FLIGHT NUMBER AND DATE OF ARRIVAL AND DATE AND TIME LEAVING. THIS IS NEEDED WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS.

GOOD INTERVIEW WITH YURI. WENT THROUGH ALL THE SERVICE DETAILS IN DETAIL. HE WAS NOT DRUNK AND HE WENT OVER ALL THE INFORMATION AS BEFORE IN THE SAME DETAIL. HE BECAME A MAN ON THE RUN FOR TWO MONTHS AFTER SERVICE INTERVIEWS. GOOD MATERIAL AND IT SOUNDS ALL REAL. HE WENT INTO MO AGAIN AND THEIR SEX TOGETHER. HE WENT AS FAR AS SAYING THAT SHE KNEW WHAT HE KNEW BECAUSE THE OTHER GIRL TOLD MARINA THAT HE WAS TOLD. HE HAS NOW GIVEN US THE NAME OF THE GIRL AND THE TOWN SHE LIVES IN. IN ADDITION WE NOW HAVE THE NAME OF THE ARCHITECT. ALL FALLING INTO A NICE STORY.

GOOD MEETING WITH IVAN. HE ACCEPTED 18 QUESTIONS AND WE WILL GIVE HIM 20 MORE TOMORROW. HE IS READY FOR THE FIRST INTERVIEW WHEN YOU RETURN.

AM NOT GOING TO LENINGRAD NOW. WILL PUT TOGETHER A TRIP WITH YOU BEFORE YOU GO BACK IN FEB. 93

PLEASE TRY TO CALL ME TONIGHT AT MY NEW APARTMENT.

General Dmitri Antonovich Volchagoneff
1903 is his internet telephone
Take passport.

Car will call at 3:00

Steve's no is 244-7979

my no is 244-7718

Dmitri's no is 365-6065

Pavel's office no 943-9588 Pavel
4) 316-7961 Palazchenko

Hotel Arbat Plotnikova Lane

Fax #095-230-20-60

no english



Comp, 6 persons

Dec 29

8am - 12:07

1:13 6pm

Dec 27 846/1etd

7:15 - noon

11:15 4:05

U TRI PSTROU (THE THREE OSTRICHES), Družického nám 12, in a charming four-story Gothic building sitting virtually beneath the Charles Bridge, making for a romantic walk across it to city center, is small and select, Prague's choicest property for demanding individual clients. Tiny reception is adjacent to lovely medieval-style restaurant with stained-glass windows, excellent local and French cuisine. Evocative public areas with vaulted ceilings and tiled floors include cozy bar and a lounge with antiques. Accommodations vary in accordance with the capabilities of the old house, but all are of good size and comfortable, more stylish than most here. Decor runs to blond modern furnishings, fitted carpets covered with Oriental rugs, cheerful modern fabrics, upholstered seating, comfortable beds, and nicely tiled combination baths. Three suites are larger, with sitting areas and superior decor. Staff speaks English and pampers guests, including affluent and knowledgeable travelers from Europe and North America. Direct bookings are preferred. 15 rooms, \$79 single, \$110 double. Karel Klubal, mgr. (C-6) Phone (2) 536007.

(HOTEL PARIZ, U Gvozdího domu 1, in a lovely neo-Gothic building in center, nicely evokes the Old World and offers updated accommodations and attentive, bright, English-speaking management and staff. Overall, hotel is a very attractive second-class choice, especially considering its fine central location. Many details here hark back to a more glorious past. Charming lobby has domed ceiling, antique furnishings and accents, good trim, good carpets, curved staircase, and two elevators. Main dining room is elegant, with chandeliers, upholstered chairs, lovely linen, and place settings, and some big round tables for convivial guests. There is also a popular carpeted cafe-bar with chandeliers, lace curtains, comfortable seating, paneled walls, elegant service, newspapers, and live music in the afternoon. Meeting facilities accommodate 500 delegates. Corridors are attractive, with gold-trimmed blue carpets and pretty lamps. Guest rooms were renovated in 1956 and are still very pleasant. All have handsome, modern dark wood furnishings, firm beds with duvet and feather pillows, and carpets, dark wood wardrobes and make-up tables, white bed-sheets. Rooms with baths have small, busy tile facilities, with showers only. A few units have TVs. Housekeeping and maintenance are good. 66 rooms, 52 with bath, \$79 double with bath. BB Josef Vladar, mgr. (C-4) Cedok. Phone (2) 232-2951. Telex 121082.



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