

Steve Weinstein

Box 3124

Enfield Ct. 06033

Dear Mr. Mailer:

I'll make this short and sweet because I know you're busy.
I greatly admire your work and I want you to have these

clippings for your files. Thank you

Steve Weinstein

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Enfield Ct. 06083


CIA material

Norman Mailer

142 Columbia Heights Place

Brooklyn, N.Y. 11201

Thank you for making it possible for me
~~I'll study your~~ *I'll study your* clippings, I can't find any
I look forward to studying *Harold East*



Behind Agca's Gun

By Claire Sterling

Ever since Pope John Paul II was shot in May 1981, arguments have raged about who, if anyone, might have been behind Mehmet Ali Agca, the man with the smoking gun. A sorely beset Italian jury supposedly settled the question last spring by acquitting all of the gunman's alleged accomplices: three fellow Turks and three Bulgarians. Many took this to mean that the jury had found them innocent. It didn't.

The verdict was simply "not guilty for lack of sufficient proof," known in Italy as the "formula of doubt." Evidently, the jury had a lot of doubts. In keeping with Italian legal practice, a formal explanation of the jury's decision had just been filed by the presiding judge, Severino Santapichi, and a co-magistrate. It runs to 1,300 pages, summing up a year-long trial.

Picking their way through "a disgusting cloud of contradictions, falsehoods and reticence," the two judges have cited ample evidence to revive the Bulgarian connection, thought to be dead as a doornail. They have also shown how singularly frustrating it can be for any court of law

Claire Sterling, who lives in Rome, has written extensively on the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II.

to deal with a terrorist crime so entangled in politics.

The nature of this dilemma was bluntly put by the state's star witness, Mr. Agca, as soon as he took the stand. The Pope's would-be killer, serving a life sentence since 1981, had hoped to win a presidential pardon by landing the Bulgarians in the dock. Now he was no longer so sure that here lay his ticket to freedom.

For reasons of state, he declared, nobody in governing circles — East or West — really wanted to see the Bulgarians convicted: not their own countrymen or the Russians, or the Italians, or the Americans, or the Vatican. (No Western Government had given him cause to believe the contrary.) Therefore, he concluded, what was needed for him was "a political solution."

From then on, the trial was doomed. Without ever retracting the hard core of his confession, Mr. Agca deliberately set out to snip it of all

Revival of a Bulgarian connection

credibility. At first glance, the two judges wrote, his messianic claims to be Jesus Christ might be an expression of "exaltation," but they were also artfully contrived to "mislead the court and diminish his own contribution to the truth."

Not to be outdone, virtually everybody else implicated in the case was found to have lied his head off. Not least among them were the three accused Bulgarians, whose alibis proved worthless, and their Govern-

ment, whose foot-dragging proved hindrance enough to draw a stern magisterial rebuke.

On balance, Mr. Agca still came out looking more credible than the rest. Important parts of his original confession became "points of certainty" in the courtroom, the judges wrote.

They boiled down to this: Mr. Agca was a hired killer, closely linked to the Turkish mafia, which in turn had close ties with Bulgaria. The Turkish mafia had sprung him from an Istanbul jail for the job in Rome and provided "continuous help" along with others in an orchestrated network until he got there nine months later.

He must have known the three Bulgarians he identified personally. He had furnished one or two "precise details" about each of them before picking out their photos in an album. Many other details he provided — especially about the sole Bulgarian in custody, Sergei Antonov — could not have been learned from the press, the judges said. In the court's considered opinion, furthermore, nobody coached him.

Still more incriminating was his "incontestably" first-hand knowledge of a now famous truck that left the Bulgarian Embassy in Rome two hours after the shooting. Mr. Agca had claimed insistently since February 1982 that just such a truck was to have been provided for his getaway.

If this much might lend plausibility to the rest of Mr. Agca's story, it was not enough to seal the Bulgarians' fate. Whatever their connection with him, there was no solid proof that they had sent him to kill the Pope. The jury had only Mr. Agca's word for that. It was tantalizing and perhaps even persuasive, all things considered, but not enough to send a man to prison for life.

Hence, the jury's "doubtful" verdict. Whether it looks like half guilty or half innocent depends on who looking.

A Senseless Farm Policy

By Pete du Pont

ROCKLAND, DEL. Not long ago, the Federal Government announced the largest program in history for paying farmers not to grow corn, sorghum, barley and oats. The cost to taxpayers? About \$1.5 billion, maybe more. That's on top of the \$23 billion already spent on commodity support programs this year.

The 15 percent of farm acreage that would be taken out of production under the new program comes on top of the 20 percent already idled by farmers who participate in farm subsidy programs for these crops. Our policy, in short, is to tell farmers not to produce as much as they can. And to participate? The mar-

goals of his foreign policy. By 1986, the pendulum had swung the other way: under pressure from farm state politicians, Washington offered to subsidize Soviet grain purchases. Whatever you think of either of these decisions, look at them from the farmer's point of view: one day he's not allowed to sell to the Russians; next thing, we're paying him to do it.

The biggest folly of all, of course, is the very foundation of our farm policy — the target price system that has our farmers addicted to Government aid.

Instead of bolstering farm income, target prices cause farmers to grow more than the market will bear. The inevitable oversupply depresses market prices, requiring even greater subsidies.

How does the Federal Government respond? Rather than focus on the cause of the problem — target prices — one-side programs are established

Since 1980, Congress has tried to survive the farm crisis in its usual manner, opening the funding spigot and nervously asking the country to ignore the inevitable financial drain. During the past five years, spending on price support programs has increased more rapidly than any other budget item, including defense, from \$4 billion in 1981 to more than \$23 billion this year. And the average farmer is in worse shape than ever.

Neither money nor legislative tinkering will solve the problem. We must admit that price support programs are a trap for the farmer and taxpayer alike. The 50-year-old policy of commodity price regulation must be drastically altered to take American agriculture off the treadmill of oversupply, depressed prices, and growing loss of farm income and growing subsidy costs.

The simple answer is to forget about the politics of price fixing, remove the Government from the agri-



John Knapton

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Italian Judge Doubts Bulgarians' Alibis

Special to The New York Times

ROME, Nov. 11 — An Italian court document made public today contends that three Bulgarians who were acquitted after having been tried for plotting to kill Pope John Paul II in 1981 provided suspicious alibis.

The document says the alibis did not refute evidence that the papal assailant, Mehmet Ali Agca, had had dealings with them before he shot the Pope.

In reviewing the 10-month conspiracy trial and the verdict it produced, the document concluded that while no firm evidence emerged to link the defendants in an assassination plot, there were solid indications that Mr. Agca had not acted alone.

The three Bulgarians, along with three Turks, were acquitted in March on the ground of insufficient evidence, a formula that under Italian law means that the accusations had merit, but that the prosecution's case was not strong enough for a conviction.

Mr. Agca had admitted shooting the Pope in St. Peter's Square on May 13, 1981, and had accused his co-defendants of having organized and financed the assassination attempt.

Justification of Sentence

The document made public today was signed by Judge Severino Santapichi, who presided over the conspiracy trial. It says that Mr. Agca had willfully destroyed his own credibility as a witness, seemed intent on protecting his accomplices and might have

had reason to expect that he would be helped to escape from prison if he succeeded in subverting the prosecution.

The 1,200-page document is a justification of sentence that Italian judges are required to file.

In reviewing Mr. Agca's activities before the shooting, the document contends that there was a direct connection between his escape from a Turkish prison in 1979 and his public threats to kill the Pope during a papal visit to Turkey the same year.

Noting Mr. Agca's ties to Turkish criminal groups and political extremists, the document concludes that there is some credibility to "the hypothesis" that the suspected Turkish assassins were "commissioned" by "another group" that wanted to "disguise the political" motivation of the act.

The document said the trial left no doubt that Mr. Agca had received help from the Turkish underworld and it noted Mr. Agca's contentions of ties between Turkish criminal groups and the Bulgarian secret service.

After recalling the sanctuary Mr. Agca received in Bulgaria in 1980, the judge said that Bulgaria had refused to cooperate fully in the investigation.

The alibis provided by the three Bulgarian defendants were judged weak and suspicious in the document. Two of the Bulgarians, former embassy officials, were not present for the trial. The third, Sergei L. Antonov, former station manager of the Balkan Airlines office here, provided an alibi that was "suspect because it was patently fabricated," the document said.

Mr. Agca's contention that he had met Mr. Antonov on several occasions was held credible because of the detailed information Mr. Agca provided about Mr. Antonov's appearance and habits. The report said suspicions of a link between Mr. Agca and the Bulgarians persisted because Mr. Agca had testified accurately about a Bulgarian diplomatic truck that left Rome hours after the shooting and that he said was to be his getaway vehicle.

The document also rebutted allegations

that agents of the Italian secret service had coached Mr. Agca to implicate the Bulgarians.

Despite many indications of a conspiracy, the document said, "the evaluation of the evidence required extreme

caution" because of the courtroom behavior of the principal prosecutor witness, Mr. Agca, who offered "retractions and denials of the retraction: themselves on fundamental points of the investigation."

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Agencia Franco-Press

W. Botha, the President of South e-memorial to soldiers killed in ree bombs were exploded in Paris risk; no injuries were reported.

Nicaragua

ly destabilizing to Central America." He described the Sandinistas as an armed vanguard against their people and their neighbors.

"We cannot give lip service to democracy when it is convenient and stress, but turn our backs on it when there are costs or risks," he said, apparently in a reference to the Reagan administration's determination to continue supporting the contras. "As long as the legitimate desires of the Nicaraguan people for genuine democracy are repressed, the inevitable result will be rebellion, insurgency and civil war."

In an open letter published today in Guatemalan newspapers, contra leaders said they agreed that "solutions to the conflict must come from the countries directly affected by the crisis."

"The origin of the conflict is internal," said the letter, which was signed by Adolfo Calero Portocarrero, Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo Callejas, the three principal leaders of the United States-backed United Nicaraguan Opposition. "The causes have to do with the existence in Nicaragua of a totalitarian regime which is by nature expansionist and aggressive."

Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann of Nicaragua said today that the United States was mainly responsible for "the problem in Central America, the problem with Contadora, and the problems in Latin America."

He said the Contadora group, which has been seeking to find a formula for peace in Central America for nearly four years, was being undercut by the United States. Both Costa Rica and Honduras have withdrawn from participation in Contadora matters as a protest over Nicaragua's decision to bring suit against them in the International Court of Justice on charges of aiding the contras.

"The decisions made in those two instances are not made by their own

The Final Verdict

The Bulgarians implicated in the plot to kill Pope John Paul II were happy with their verdict this year of "not guilty by reason of insufficient evidence." But this didn't mean innocence. Last week, the Italians released a report by the jury saying that while Soviet-bloc instigation couldn't be proven in court under the rules of evidence, the plot theory is the best explanation. The Italian report said Mehmet Ali Agca didn't act alone and didn't answer to the Turkish underground, but to "another group." Guess who?

Presiding Judge Severino Santiapichi's report is 1,200 pages of evidence making out the Bulgarian connection. It says Agca was freed from a Turkish jail in 1979, where he was serving for the murder of a Turkish journalist, so that he could accept a contract to kill the pope. Agca's tie to the Turkish drug-running underground made him the perfect cover for doing dirty work for the communists. The Italian court report approves the "hypothesis" that Agca was commissioned by "another group" that was hoping to "disguise the political context" for the shooting of the Polish pope.

The three Bulgarians were declared not guilty and not innocent last March because Agca intentionally destroyed his own credibility. Italians generally call this a "Mafia verdict": witnesses are intimidated and the defendants can keep their activities secret. In this case, there was a "swarm of contradictions and falsehoods and witness reticence that cast a disquieting shadow," the report said.

The Bulgarian defense, for instance, was feeble. Sergel Antonov, whose job title was Rome manager of Balkan Airlines, was accused of training Agca. The report said his alibi was "suspect because it was patently fabricated." Agca proved that a diplomatic truck had been waiting at the Bulgarian embassy to whisk him

away after the shooting. He also had intimate knowledge of the three Bulgarians, from their hobbies to their birthmarks.

The report notes that Agca, claiming he was Christ, issued "retractions and denials of the retractions themselves." We suspect the best explanation here is that Agca is no fool. The Bulgarian state prosecutor announced during the Italian trial that Agca was going to be tried back in Bulgaria for "crimes against the state." Agca knew that if he didn't undermine the case against the communists, his worst sentence might well be the one another apparent enemy of the Bulgarian state, Georgi Markov, received in London at the end of a poisoned umbrella. The report says Agca hopes to be released within a few years from his Italian cell.

The Bulgarians' own defense only made them more suspect. They tried to pin the plot on the CIA, the Turkish fascists or the Italian secret service. The report says there was no evidence of these links, or that Agca was coached to implicate the Bulgarians.

In one particularly embarrassing alibi, the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency claimed that a mysterious French lawyer, Christian Roulette, had seen some secret files, belonging to former Italian agent Francesco Pazienza, in a Paris bank. These supposedly would clear the Bulgarians. At the time, however, we quoted Mr. Roulette as saying he hadn't actually seen any files. Judge Santiapichi read our report and threatened to arrest Mr. Roulette for giving false testimony.

For now, the case ends where it began. Only the Soviet Union and its allies had reason to try to kill the Polish pope in 1981. It will be recorded in the history books—if not in the legal case reports—that the communists very nearly murdered the spiritual leader who had the special effrontery to be born Karol Wojtyla.

Wall St. Journal
11/19/86

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Where Has All The Plutonium Gone?

To the Editor:

With the recent reporting on mas-
sive cuts in nuclear weapons, a cru-
cial question has gone conspicuously
unanswered. What is happening to the
nuclear material in the warheads?

While it is encouraging to read that
missiles are being cut in half and are
being made incapable of launch, as an
interested citizen I still want to know
what is done with the half carrying
the payload. According to the Hand-
book of Chemistry and Physics, plut-
onium "has a half-life of 24,360 years
... and is one of the most dangerous
poisons known."

How can such an obvious question
go unasked by the news media when
it is being so blatantly avoided by
government? At the least, the "de-
struction" of these weapons presents
a monumental waste disposal prob-
lem. At the worst, this weapons-grade
material is being recycled and stored
in readiness for future generations of
more advanced weapons and is thus
vulnerable to falling into the wrong
hands. The public is entitled to know
the answer and the news media
should not hesitate to ask the ques-
tion.

GERALD HARRISON
Philadelphia, Oct. 3, 1991

C.I.A. Played Catch-Up on Soviet Terror

To the Editor:

In his Oct. 7 column, dealing with
the Senate hearings on the nomina-
tion of Robert M. Gates to head the
Central Intelligence Agency, Anthony
Lewis spoke of my seemingly inordi-
nate and regrettable political influ-
ence on Mr. Gates and on former
C.I.A. Director William Casey. Mr.
Lewis blamed this on my books, "The
Terror Network" (1981) and "The
Time of the Assassins" (1984).

It is flattering but absurd to sug-
gest that Mr. Casey had to read "The
Time of the Assassins" to decide who
was behind the plot to kill Pope John
Paul II. Indeed, three Italian courts
since then — including Italy's Su-
preme Court, in 1988 — have ex-
pressed their moral certainty that
Bulgaria's secret service was behind
the papal shooting.

Whether or not Mr. Lewis has read
"The Terror Network," he does ap-
pear to have read an account of it in
Bob Woodward's "Veil." Thus, he
writes that C.I.A. specialists dis-
missed the book as "useless" when
Mr. Casey advised them to read it,
maintaining that I "had been taken in
by their own black propaganda."

While these C.I.A. specialists did
indeed dismiss "The Terror Net-
work" as useless 10 years ago, there

is stunning evidence today that they
were wrong. The book contained what
I held to be "massive proof that the
Soviet Union and its surrogates have
provided the weapons, training and
sanctuary for a worldwide terror net-
work aimed at the destabilization of
western democratic society." In 1981,
when the book came out, C.I.A. ana-
lysts could find nothing in their ar-
chives to support this thesis. By 1991,
the post-Communist governments of
Eastern Europe have uncovered
more startling facts than any of us
could have imagined.

I merely note that while C.I.A. ana-
lysts were searching in vain for some
sign of a Soviet bloc role in terrorism,
Carlos the Jackal was sheltering in
Hungary under President Kadar's
protection; Czechoslovakia's Omni-
pol factory was supplying Semtex to
Libya's Colonel Qaddafi; leaders of
West Germany's Baader-Meinhof
gang, living under President Hon-
ecker's wing in East Germany, were
given training and intelligence for
their biggest hits, while Abu Nidal
promoted East German arms sales to
the third world. That all this was
unknown to the C.I.A. 10 years ago
hardly justifies Mr. Lewis's failure to
notice it now.

CLAIRE STERLING
Rome, Oct. 11, 1991

N.Y. Times 10/26/91

Early Black Burial Ground Recalls Alleged Slave Conspiracy

To the Editor:

In 1741 Hughson's Tavern on "up-
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CHRISTOPHER MOORE
Brooklyn, Oct. 10, 1991

tions occurs frequently, but the pres-
ence of naval uniform buttons in a
cemetery for blacks in New York

At the CIA, Nobody Cares Who Shot the Pope

By CLAIRE STERLING

Before voting to confirm him as head of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Senate Intelligence Committee aired charges that Robert Gates forced the CIA to investigate allegations that the Soviet Union was responsible for the shooting of Pope John Paul II in 1981. I can reassure the committee that, if he tried, Mr. Gates was entirely unsuccessful.

Three Italian courts have expressed their moral conviction that Bulgaria's secret service was behind the Papal shooting: the Rome Court of Assizes In 1988, the Court of Appeals in 1987, and the Court of Cassation—Italy's Supreme Court—in 1988. The courts did not pronounce the three Bulgarian defendants guilty, but would not pronounce them innocent either. (They were acquitted "for insufficient evidence," meaning anything but innocence in Italy. Whether through indifference or contempt, the CIA showed no interest in these proceedings from the start.

The agency did not bother to get a copy of Mehmet Ali Agca's earliest confession (as its Rome station chief told Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, R., N.Y., in 1982). It did not try to obtain a later confession leading to the arrest of three Bulgarians. It did not call on investigating magistrate Ilario Martella to ask for or volunteer information of any sort. Nor, to my personal knowledge, did it rush to get a copy of the Italian prosecutor's report on Judge Martella's 20-month investigation—the first official document to reveal what the judge had found.

Well over a year before the Martello report appeared in 1984, the CIA had produced what purported to be a careful study

of the case, concluding that there was no reason to believe the Russians were involved.

Its next careful study, in 1985, concluded that the Russians were involved after all, through their Bulgarian surrogates. But that had nothing to do with Judge Martella's lengthy indictment, or testimony in the spectacular trial getting under way by then. The grounds were said to be new information from a secret Italian agent, contradicting old information from a secret Bulgarian agent who had said the Bulgarians didn't do it.

The CIA's performance throughout the case was bewildering. Officially, the CIA wanted no part of it. The papal shooting was "an Italian matter, and it would be inappropriate for the United States to interfere," a senior intelligence officer told the New York Times in February 1983. But the CIA did interfere, with repeated and distinctly inappropriate efforts to get Bulgaria off the hook.

Its leaks to the press from Washington and Rome began just weeks after the three Bulgarians' arrest. "On the basis of the evidence, the Bulgarian Soviet link (to Agca) cannot be proved," an unnamed intelligence analyst told the New York Times in December 1982, when nobody knew what the evidence was. Efforts to exonerate Bulgaria and the Russians followed in rapid succession, approaching the preposterous.

Unnamed intelligence analysts suggested that "the Bulgarian secret service hired [Agca] as an assassin or drug-trade enforcer, in an arrangement that had nothing to do with the pope or the Soviet Union." Later, this suggestion ran, "when

Mr. Agca found himself in Rome on a mission for the Bulgarian secret service, he independently plotted to kill the pope, without the support or knowledge of the Bulgarian authorities."

An alternative theory, offered straight-faced to the Los Angeles Times, conceded on the CIA's behalf that the three Bulgarians were "known intelligence agents," and that "officials of the Bulgarian government had advance knowledge of the assassination attempt." While this was "a 99% certainty," however, "the CIA is also convinced that neither the Bulgarians nor the Soviet Union instigated the attack," the sources said.

What seems to have stumped CIA analysts in all these years was an inability to comprehend why the Russians would want the pope dead. One faction apparently could think of no plausible motive (1983), while the possible motive finally offered in a revised policy paper (1985) strains belief. "The Soviets were reluctant to invade Poland" in 1981, "so they decided to demoralize [the Polish] opposition by killing the Polish pope," was how it read.

Any Pole in Warsaw or Cracow could do better than that—and not just a Pole. The Kremlin's urgent need to be rid of this pope was unmistakably clear by the time Agca set out from Bulgaria on his mission. He left Sofia on Aug. 31, 1981: the day Poland's communist rulers signed a formal contract with Solidarity in Gdansk. It was the first agreement in the history of worldwide communism to legitimize a free trade union and, seen in retrospect, the begin-

ning of the dissolution of the Soviet empire.

There was no mistaking who was held responsible by the Kremlin. The pope had been a menace since his first visit to Poland in 1979, when he told a defecious crowd of 6 million that "No country should ever develop at the cost of enslavement, conquest, outrage, exploitation and death." Solidarity was born in the Gdansk shipyards that winter, just six months after John Paul's unforgettable visit.

The Vatican was committing "innumerable acts of ideological sabotage"; was "training and sending propaganda specialists . . . and smuggling subversive literature" into socialist countries on a "vast scale"; had "inspired subversive activities in Poland" and furthered "the aggressive aims of imperialism" declared the Soviet review *Politicheskoye Samsoobrazovanie*. "Solidarity was not born of the disorders in the summer of 1980, but in the lap of the Church," said the Soviet news agency Tass.

Discerning a motive here, so difficult for the CIA, was no problem for Italian judges in three successive courts. Though obliged to acquit "for lack of sufficient evidence," the Appeals Court noted in its 150-page sentence "the fears induced by the election of a Slavic Pope; the social tensions in his native country; the recognition—for the first time in the contemporary history of the East European states—of a free Solidarity . . . How can we rule out that [such factors] would induce certain forces to maintain that the assassination of His Holiness could block a political situation in evident, dreaded evolution?"

Upholding that sentence, Italy's supreme court said bluntly that the shooting was "planned for political ends by the Bulgarian secret services."

It is probably too late for some senator to ask why Mr. Gates didn't mention this verdict in his own defense.

Mrs. Sterling is the author of "The Terror Network" (Holt, Rinehart, 1981).

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

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Dutch Slide Down Euthanasia's Slippery Slope

By JOHN KEDON

Residents of Washington state are to cast their votes today on Initiative 119, which, if passed, will permit a doctor to kill a "terminally ill" person upon his written request. Voters about to cast ballots in support of 119 may first want to take a look at the Netherlands, where euthanasia has been tolerated for around 20 years. They will not find the experience reassuring.

The latest research into Dutch euthanasia lends strong support to the argument that the dangers of legalizing voluntary eu-

ten death in a further 16,850 cases—in 8,750 by withholding or withdrawing treatment and in 8,100 by administering pain-killing drugs. Further, in all of the 8,750 cases, and in almost 5,000 of the 8,100 cases, the patient had not consented.

In short, Dutch doctors admitted that in 1990 they sought to kill some 20,000 patients and that, in a clear majority of cases, this was done without the patient's request.

The report also confirmed that more than 70% of euthanasia cases are dishonestly and illegally certified by doctors as

ample, a State Commission on Euthanasia recommended that it should be lawful to kill patients in a persistent coma even though they had never requested it. In both principle and practice, therefore, the need for a request has now been jettisoned by many in the Netherlands. The Dutch are undoubtedly sliding, if not skiing, down the slippery slope.

Least supporters of 119 are tempted to disregard the Dutch experience on the assumption that the guidelines in Holland are looser than those proposed in Washington.

1980 Soviet Defector Emerges With Account of K.G.B. Plots

By MICHAEL WINES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 2 — The K.G.B. had two sources in the State Department during the 1970's who supplied details of American arms-control strategies and other policies, a former K.G.B. officer who has lived secretly in the United States since 1980 alleged today.

The defector, Victor I. Sheymov, who spent a decade in hiding, spoke at a news conference during which he asserted among other claims that Soviet spies had thoroughly penetrated the French Government, failed to co-opt many Israelis and hatched a plot that culminated in the 1981 attempt to kill Pope John Paul II.

None of the claims by Mr. Sheymov, who said he was seeking to publish a book about his experiences, could be independently verified. The Central Intelligence Agency declined to comment on his statements about the Pope and the State Department.

In the past, however, American intelligence officials have cast doubt on claims of hard evidence that the Soviet Union engineered the attempt on the Pope's life. Mr. Sheymov's assertions about the assassination plot were reported today in The Washington Post.

U.S. Acknowledges K.G.B. Role

Bush Administration officials acknowledged today that Mr. Sheymov had worked in several K.G.B. positions and defected to the United States in May 1980.

Mr. Sheymov, who reached the rank of K.G.B. major before he defected to the United States in May 1980, said today that he had decided to abandon his secret identity in part to educate the public about the Soviet spy services and about Communism.

For the last 10 years, he said, he has lived under an assumed name in the United States, working at times as a consultant to the United States Government on matters he did not disclose.

Mr. Sheymov, 43 years old, said he joined the K.G.B. in 1971 in a vast division that intercepted radio and telephone communications and "was probably the most secret part" of the agency. He moved in 1974 to the foreign intelligence division to handle messages between headquarters and agents, and in 1976 to an important job that involved protecting the K.G.B. against hostile wiretaps and code-breakers.

'Get Physically Close' to Pope

He said that he first seriously considered defecting in 1979 when, on a visit to Poland, he saw a message from the former head of the K.G.B., Yuri V. Andropov, demanding information on "how to get physically close" to John Paul II, who had just been named Pope.

"In the K.G.B. slang, it was clearly understood that when you say physically close, there was only one reason to get close," he said, "to assassinate him. Words like murder or assassinations are never used. They have substituted gentler terms."

He said he believes it is "absolutely clear" that the Soviet Union was responsible for the attempt on the Pope's life, but that he could not bolster his belief with further facts.



The New York Times/José R. Lopez

Victor I. Sheymov, a former Soviet agent who defected, asserted yesterday that Soviet spies had penetrated the American and French Governments.

Pope John Paul II was shot in 1981 by a Turkish man who implicated Bulgaria, then a Soviet client state, in a plot on the Pope's life. Three Bulgarian Government officials were charged, but the charges were dismissed for lack of proof, an Italian term that means that evidence of wrongdoing exists but is contradicted by other evidence.

Mr. Sheymov also said today that during his time at the K.G.B., the spy service maintained "two sources in the State Department" who supplied "huge State Department documents, outlines of positions" on arms control and other matters. He did not describe them further.

Today the department refused to comment on Mr. Sheymov's assertion.

At his news conference, Mr. Sheymov frequently refused to answer questions, saying they involved intelligence matters too sensitive to discuss in public.

Some of his statements, nevertheless, seem certain to make headlines elsewhere in the West. He said that K.G.B. "illegals" — Russian agents with double identities — were well placed in the French Government, "in quite comfortable positions."

Mr. Sheymov also said that the K.G.B. once hoped to make Israel its platform for Middle East espionage by recruiting Soviet Jewish émigrés to work undercover. The results were disappointing, he said, because émigrés uniformly refused to work for the Soviets once they reached Israel.

The account in The Washington Post said that Mr. Sheymov, his wife and child were spirited from their Moscow home in 1981, leaving all their personal effects behind. Asked today how he escaped the Soviet Union, he chuckled and replied, "Very carefully."

saving way out of the corner he has painted himself into by refusing to make an irrevocable statement guaranteeing Poland's postwar borders.

A statement issued by a spokesman for the Chancellor repeated his recent proposal that the two German Parliaments adopt resolutions rejecting any claims to Polish territory.

This time, however, Mr. Kohl added that the resolutions "would have to make it clear that the Polish Government's declaration of Aug. 23, 1953, waiving any claims to reparations from Germany, remains valid, and that the rights of the Germans, as agreed by Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in the joint declaration of Nov. 14, 1989, will be regulated by a treaty."

"On the basis of such a resolution by the two freely elected German Parliaments, a treaty should be concluded between an all-German government and the Polish Government, and ratified by an all-German parliament," the statement said.

New Suggestion Emphasized

Diplomats called attention to the new suggestion that the parliamentary resolutions should become the basis for a future treaty, marking a possible step by the Chancellor toward Poland's demand that the two Parliaments now draft treaties that could be ratified after unification.

Mr. Kohl had previously rejected the idea, and the resolutions he has proposed would include the provision that

to seeking a Polish gesture would enable him to assert that he received something in return for his final loss of German territory to Poland after the war conditions would presumably be a problem for Warsaw, since included in existing agreement.

But if that was indeed Mr. Kohl's gambit, diplomats thought it the risk of further worsening public by giving the impression was bargaining with an island much of the rest of the world to view as a foretaste of how nations might behave once the United States and full sovereignty.

The Chancellor has come out at home and abroad for Poland's demands for a firm guarantee that a reunited Germany will juggle the borders laid down by victorious allies at the end of World War II. The borders were meant to land German territories in creation for Polish lands lost to the Union, and as a result, millions were forcibly expelled.

While insisting that Poland was not to fear, Mr. Kohl has repeated that only a united Germany could make a final determination of borders. His fence-straddling is largely to his fear of alienating a minority of those expelled from eastern lands, who are against the formalization of the borders. Still consider a historical injustice. The Chancellor has found it

Italy Says German Unity Treaty Should Include Other Nations

By CLYDE HABERMAN

Special to The New York Times

ROME, March 2 — Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti warned today that the two Germanys alone should not have "the last word" on their reunification or on the future borders of a single German nation.

But the Italian leader added that he did not believe that a united Germany would be a threat to peace in Europe.

"The last World War has acted as a form of vaccination in its destruction, and Germany certainly suffered immensely from the war," Mr. Andreotti said. "Therefore, I really believe that those bacteria are no longer present in the German body."

Nevertheless, he told American reporters in an interview that the United States and other European countries had to have a voice on the German question, especially as it affects NATO's future. He expressed skepticism about an agreement reached last weekend by President Bush and Chancellor Helmut Kohl that would keep a unified Germany in the Atlantic alliance but allow for the possibility of Soviet troops remaining in the east.

"A state cannot have Soviet and American troops on its territory as a definitive solution," he said. "That would be a kind of unprecedented paradise on earth."

Hint of Dissatisfaction

While avoiding direct criticism of Mr. Kohl, Mr. Andreotti also hinted at dissatisfaction with the West German Chancellor's insistence that it would be in the leaders of a new Germany to

decide the issue of the border land. Asked about Bonn's position, Prime Minister replied:

"The forum for the last word must be as wide and international as possible because this is not that one German government. As far as I'm concerned this is closed."

Mr. Andreotti, who became Minister for the sixth time in 1981, spoke with Rome-based correspondents as he prepares next week to Washington, to meet Mr. Bush and Congress. He is from Sicily, where he earned an honorary degree from Theological Seminary. He said that United States relations with Europe had to remain strong despite the reduced threat from the East.

Position Has Shifted

"It would be a paradox if improved relations between Italy and Moscow, and were relations with Washington in Europe," he said. "We created an absurd negative piece."

As the drive toward German unity gained steam, Mr. Andreotti, a Christian Democrat, has shifted his ground. For years he strongly opposed to unification. In the last few weeks he has changed his position, even though he in that what really changed was Europe's political situation.

The showdown could embarrass President François Mitterrand, who earlier in the week appeared to be deliberately courting a showdown to call an early referendum, bypassing parliament.

Bulgarian Convicted In 'Umbrella' Murder

Reuters

SOFIA — General Vladimir Todorov, the former head of Bulgarian intelligence, was sentenced to 14 months in jail on Friday after being convicted of destroying secret files on a murdered dissident, Georgi Markov.

Mr. Markov, a writer who worked for the BBC, died in 1978 while waiting for a London bus. A minute pellet containing a deadly poison was found in his thigh — apparently injected by a sharpened umbrella tip.

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