

INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
OF THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 1978

VOLUME III

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations

Carlson's interview

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1979

41-372 O

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INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:15 a.m., in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the select committee), presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, Fauntroy, Thone, Sawyer, Dodd, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar.

Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; Gary Cornwell, deputy chief counsel; Michael Goldsmith, senior staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk.

Chairman STOKES. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

NARRATION BY G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL

Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Cuba was an important concern of John F. Kennedy during his brief administration. It prompted the occasion of his "darkest hour"—the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion. In the missile crisis, it also brought the United States—and the world—to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. Understandably, therefore, among the many efforts to understand the assassination, those that include a Cuban element have been very prominent. Indeed, no less a figure than President Lyndon B. Johnson expressed his private view that John F. Kennedy might well have been the victim of the Cuban plot.

The Warren Commission explored the Cuban element in the assassination of the President from two perspectives.

First, it considered the extent to which Oswald "might have been motivated in the assassination by a desire to aid the Castro regime, which President Kennedy so outspokenly criticized."

In the months preceding the assassination, left-wing literature to which Oswald subscribed—chiefly "The Militant" and "The Worker"—reflected an extremely critical attitude toward the Kennedy administration's policy toward Cuba. Indeed, much of what appeared in these papers seemingly called for violent solutions to Cuban problems with the United States.

The possibility that Oswald may have been influenced by this literature seems real. Apparently in all seriousness, he told Michael Paine, the individual in whose home Marina was then living, that "You could tell what they wanted you to do * * * by reading

between the lines." Ultimately, however, the Warren Commission decided that it could not ascribe to Oswald any one motive or a group of motives.

Second, the Commission considered the extent to which Oswald's trip to Mexico in late September and early October 1963—a trip during which Oswald visited the Soviet Embassy and the Cuban consulate in Mexico City—may somehow have been related to the assassination. Based largely on the testimony of Sylvia Tirado de Duran, a Mexican national employed at the Cuban consulate, the Commission concluded the following about the visit.

Oswald first visited the Cuban consulate on September 27, 1963. He requested an in-transit visa to permit him to visit Cuba en route to the Soviet Union.

He was informed he could not obtain a visa to Cuba unless he first got one to enter the Soviet Union, and he was told at the Soviet Embassy he should not expect an answer to his visa application for about 4 months.

He carried with him newspaper clippings and other documents, some authentic and some forged, in an attempt to demonstrate he was a "friend of Cuba."

He used these documents, his previous residence in the Soviet Union, and his marriage to a Soviet national to curry favor at the Cuban consulate.

He persisted in his demand for a Cuban visa, resulting in a bitter argument between him and the Cuban Consul, Eusebio Azcue Lopez. Eventually, his request was denied, and he left, apparently in anger.

Ultimately, the Warren Commission expressed its satisfaction with the Duran account, noting that it had—

Reliable evidence from a confidential source that Senora Duran, as well as other personnel at the Cuban Embassy, were genuinely upset upon receiving the news of President Kennedy's death.

It also indicated that—

* * * confidential sources of extremely high reliability * * * establishes that her testimony was truthful and accurate in all material respects.

The Commission also checked out a number of specific conspiracy allegations stemming from Oswald's trip to Mexico City, most of which alleged that he had been enlisted by Cuban agents in a plot to carry out the assassination. Nevertheless, the Commission concluded:

Without exception, the rumors and allegations of a conspiratorial contact were shown to be without any factual basis, * * *

History has not permitted so simple a resolution of the complex questions surrounding the assassination, Cuba, and Oswald's trip to Mexico City. Ironically, too, it was the Premier of Cuba, not the President of the United States, who was revealed and documented in Senate Intelligence Committee hearings in 1976 as the target of deadly serious assassination schemes.

Between 1960 and early 1963, the committee concluded, the CIA conspired with known underworld figures to assassinate Premier Castro. Following the missile crisis in October 1962, the CIA-Mafia plots were brought to an end, or so we are told. But other assassination plots continued. Indeed, on November 22, 1963, a CIA case

officer was planning the killing of Castro with an official of the Cuban Government.

The revelation in 1976 that the Premier of Cuba was the target of an unsuccessful assassination planned by the United States served to fuel the fires of speculation that Cuba had been the perpetrator of the successful effort against the President of the United States in 1963. It was recalled that Premier Castro himself, in an interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker on September 7, 1963, seemed to be warning that U.S. leaders who approved terrorist attacks on Cuban leaders could themselves be vulnerable.

The AP story was carried in the New Orleans Times Picayune on September 9. Consequently, it could have been read by Lee Harvey Oswald himself. But the evidence of Cuban intentions may be interpreted in various ways. The Cuban delegate to the United Nations was in contact on September 5, 1963 with William Atwood, a U.S. delegate, to begin talks with the view toward starting the process of normalizing relations. And Jean Daniel, a French journalist, was with Premier Castro on November 22. He described Castro's reaction to the news of the Kennedy assassination as one of genuine surprise and deep regret.

The critics of the Warren Commission, too, have persisted in their questioning of its conclusions, offering the theory that Oswald met with Cuban agents and various additional allegations.

The most serious is the charge that it was, in fact, not Oswald who visited the Cuban consulate, but an imposter. Critics cite as evidence a photograph published by the Commission and thought by the critics to have been taken by a surveillance camera outside the Cuban consulate. It shows a burly man who bears no resemblance to Oswald, but who was identified as the individual who visited the consulate at the time Oswald was supposed to have done so.

Mark Lane, in his "Rush to Judgment," raised the issue of the mysterious photograph and asked, "Was someone posing as Oswald?"

Another widely circulated story after the Warren report was published is that Oswald, in a burst of anger on learning at the Cuban consulate that he could not secure a visa to visit Cuba, expressed an intention to assassinate President Kennedy.

The select committee has sought to explore a number of questions in connection with Oswald's trip to Mexico City. Committee members and staff made two separate trips to both Cuba and Mexico. The cooperation of the Governments of Cuba and Mexico was sought and secured. The committee and the staff expresses its thanks to each government and those officials and citizens of each country that helped the committee in its investigation.

Comment, however, must be made on the lack of cooperation by the Soviet Government. The select committee, both informally and through personal contacts and formally through the State Department, sought the cooperation of the Soviet Government, not only on Oswald's alleged trip to Mexico City where he is supposed to have visited the Soviet Embassy, but also in the period of time Oswald lived in the Soviet Union. Various documents and files not made available to the Warren Commission but which the commit-

tee had a reasonable basis to believe existed were requested. The most important were the KGB surveillance files on Oswald. It was hoped that these files particularly might have been assistance to the committee in the crucial area of trying to ascertain Oswald's motive in the assassination. Ironically the KGB may well have the most complete file in the world on this crucial aspect of Oswald's personality.

In addition, a request was made to interview officials and Soviet citizens who had contact with Oswald. The Soviet Government denied any relationship with Oswald or complicity in President Kennedy's death but declined to be of assistance, saying that it would be inappropriate for a great power to put itself in the position of having to defend itself against possible suspicion of complicity in the death of the leader of another country.

The committee posed to itself in its investigation in this area, that is, Oswald's trip to Mexico, as the following:

Was the man who visited the Cuban consulate in fact the man later accused of assassinating President Kennedy?

When did the man alleged to be Oswald visit the Cuban consulate?

What transpired at each visit?

Who were the Cuban officials who dealt with him?

Did he in fact express an intent to assassinate the President?

Did the man alleged to be Oswald have any companions in Mexico City?

The first witness who had been scheduled to be heard on Oswald's alleged trip to Mexico City was Sylvia Tirado Bazan, previously Sylvia Tirado Duran.

Ms. Tirado was employed in September 1963 as secretary to the Cuban consul in Mexico City.

Ms. Tirado was born November 22, 1937, in Mexico City. She is presently employed by the Mexican Social Security Office.

Mr. Chairman, I understand that it has not been possible to secure the appearance of Senora Tirado. I understand, however, with your permission, Mr. Cornwell has a short presentation on her testimony.

Chairman STOKES. The Chair will recognize Counsel Gary Cornwell.

Mr. CORNWELL. I might state, Mr. Chairman, that through the assistance of the Mexican Government, three members of the staff did interview Sylvia Tirado, whose present name is Sylvia Tirado Bazan, on June 6, 1978.

The Mexican Government thereafter agreed that she could come to the United States and testify at these hearings today. Mrs. Tirado Bazan also agreed to come. However, an unexpected business engagement of hers prevented her appearance here today.

There is a photo which was made of her at the time of the interview, which is being displayed on the easel and marked JFK exhibit F-433, and we also have a transcript of the interview marked for identification as JFK exhibit F-440A, and a tape recording of excerpted portions of that interview which we have marked for identification as JFK exhibit F-439.


Although the tape recording was not made for the purpose of playing it at these hearings—it was simply at the time intended as

a record of her statements—the staff has learned over the course of the investigation that it is often possible to gain a better understanding of a witness' testimony if you can hear or speak to the witness. Thus, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that at this time each of those exhibits be admitted into evidence, and that we play for the committee selected portions of her statement.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point, and you may proceed to play the recording.

[The tape recording mentioned above, JFK exhibit F-439, is being retained in committee files.]

[The information follows:]



JFK EXHIBIT F-433

9/18/78

Name Silvia Tirado (Duran) Date June 6, 1978 Time
Address Place

Cornwell: Would you state your name?

Tirado: Silvia Tirado Bazan.

Cornwell: And where's your present home address?

Tirado: Avenida Universidad 1900 Edificio 12 Departamento 402
Colonia Numero De Terrenos

Cornwell: For the record, my name is Gary Cornwell, and
with me here is Ed Lopez, Harold Leap and Dan
Hardway. We represent the House Select Committee
on Assassinations of the Congress of the United
States. Also with us here today representing
the Mexican Government is Honorio Escondon, Dr.
Alfonso Orozco Contreras. Today is June 6, 1978
and the time is approximately 5:45 in the after-
noon.

Would you tell us what your date and place of
birth is?

Tirado: 22nd of November, 1937.

Cornwell: You speak English so if you like my questions

Interviewer Signature _____

Typed Signature Gary Cornwell

-JFK Exhibit F-440A- Date transcribed br 6-19-73

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translated we'll be happy to, and likewise, if you'd like to answer in English that would be fine, or if you'd rather answer in Spanish, we'll translate it.

Tirado: I try to speak in English.

Cornwell: All right. If you have any question about the way I phrase something or you don't understand it, simply ask and Mr. Lopez will translate it for you.

Your name in 1963 was what?

Tirado: Silvia Tirado de Duran.

Cornwell: And your husband at that time was who?

Tirado: Horacio Duran.

Cornwell: Are you presently employed?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Where's that?

Tirado: Social Security.

Cornwell: Prior to that, what jobs did you hold?

Tirado: A long while, Social Security. I used to write.

Cornwell: And any other jobs? Have you held any other jobs?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: At one time you worked for the Cuban Consulate.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Is that the only other job you ever held?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Well, let's say back, since about 1960, could you tell us what the history of your employment is? Have you had many jobs?

Tirado: I don't remember exactly, but uh, I used to work for the Olympic Games. I was a translator for two months. And uh, another three months I used to work for the, I don't know, it was an Exhibit of Hispanic Art that was, I don't know he went all over the World and I helped him to choose the pieces and as translator. I was married in 1960. I separate in '68, July '68 and I start working.

Cornwell: During 1963, did you hold any jobs during that year other than your employment at the Cuban Consulate?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: When did you first obtain the job at the Consulate and how did you obtain it.

Tirado: Well, because I was uh, coordinating the Cuban, the Mexican-Cuban Institute, the cultural Institute in '62, I think, and that's where I met some people. Yes.

Cornwell: That was a private organization, is that correct?

Tirado: It's not exactly private. I don't know because all the countries have--there is the American there is the Russian Institute, Institute, there is the French Institute. It's cultural relations between the countries.

Cornwell: Was that associated with the Mexican Government?

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Tirado: I don't know exactly, but I think--you know
that. (Asks Orozco)

(Translation) The objective is to present culturally the dif-
of
Orozco ferent embassies and consulates that are here in
Mexico.

Cornwell: What was your job with that organization?

Tirado: Coordinator.

Cornwell: And in connection with that, did you know any
of the employees at the Cuban Consulate?

Tirado: Yes, at the Cultural Attache.

Cornwell: And what were the names of those persons?

Tirado: Teresa Proenza and Luis Alberu.

Cornwell: And who?

Tirado: Luis Alberu

Cornwell: Did you in any other way know any of the other
employees at the Consulate?

Tirado: Yes, well I knew Azcue, Eusebio Azcue who was
a consul, and uh, Maria Carman Olivari -- she's
dead.

Cornwell: She, in the summer of 1963, was a secretary. Is
that correct? (If you nod your head, the recorder
will not make any record of what your answer is.)

Tirado: Yes.

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Cornwell: Would you then explain to us how it was that you obtained the job at the Consulate?

Tirado: Because my friend Maria Carman, she was dead-- she had an accident, and during the funeral I told Azcue that if he wants me to help him, for some people come from Cuba, just to help him. And of course he says yes. They need some people they can trust, and I'd been working in the Institute. So...

Cornwell: How was it that you knew Eusebio Azcue by this time?

Tirado: I don't remember, because he was uh, he was an Architect and he knew a lot of people, friends of ours, I mean my husband and I.

Cornwell: Had he lived in Mexico for a long period of time?

Tirado: Yes, yes.

Cornwell: And, because of his occupation, he would have known your husband. Is that correct?

Tirado: Yeah, more or less.

Cornwell: Your husband Horacio was also an architect at that time.

Tirado: Industrial designer. Yes, sir.

Cornwell: Approximately when was it that you first obtained the job?

Tirado: The end of July or August, early August. I don't

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remember exactly.

Cornwell: And for how long did you continue to work there?

Tirado: Three or four months.

Cornwell: How long after the assassination of President Kennedy did you work there?

Tirado: Only two days.

Cornwell: During that period of time what were the hours of operation of the Consulate?

Tirado: It was about 9:30 or 10:00 to 2:00 and in the afternoon about 5:00 to 8:00 or something. If we have a lot of work, we stayed longer.

Cornwell: The hours were 10:00 to 2:00 and then 5:00 to 8:00. Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes, that's true.

Cornwell: Was the Consulate open for visitors during both of those sets of hours?

Tirado: No, it was just in the morning.

Cornwell: Would you mind sketching for us what the physical layout of the Consulate looked like at that time?
(pause) You have drawn a rectangular shape. What formed the outside of it? Was it a solid wall around the outside? Was the outside of the premises a wall?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: All right. And we'll just mark it the way you

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drew it. In the lower left-hand corner, there is a small box you drew. What is that?

Tirado: The consular.

Cornwell: That's the consulate's office?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: All right. We'll just put a one in that box, so we'll know that's the consulate's office. Then, the door was . . . where, on the corner?. you remember the name of the streets, still today?

Tirado: This is Tacubayo. This is Francisco Marquez.

You want me to write it down?

Cornwell: If you remember, yes.

Tirado: Here were the houses.

Cornwell: All right. You've labeled three sides of the building with street names and on the fourth side which on the top of the drawing, you said they are houses. Correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: What is in the long triangular shape on the drawing above the Consular office?

Tirado: It was the commercial office.

Cornwell: All right. We'll just put a two in there. That's. .

Tirado: And here was the cultural office.

Cornwell: And behind that, we'll mark it with a three, was the cultural office. In the center of the drawing

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is what?

Tirado: The Embassy.

Cornwell: All right. We'll put a four in that. That's the Embassy. And what's the small box in the lower right-hand corner?

Tirado: I don't know how to say it in English.

Cornwell: An entryway?

Lopez: Housekeeper.

Cornwell: Oh, a housekeeper? Okay. We'll put a five in there.

What is all the rest of the space inside the premises?

Tirado: Garden, it was garden. And here was the entrance for the cars.

Cornwell: And where you indicated there was an entrance for cars, we'll mark that seven. And all the interior space which was garden, we'll mark with an eight.

Tirado: Down here there was a movie room.

Cornwell: Where, behind the. . .?

Tirado: Behind the cultural room?

Cornwell: Want to draw that?

Tirado: No, because this is the first floor.

Cornwell: Oh, it was on the second floor.

Tirado: Yeah. On the first floor was a projection. . . movies.

Cornwall: Were the space which we marked one, two, three and also four, were they all two-story?

Tirado: Yeah.

Cornwall: Okay. And above the space marked one, what was there?

Tirado: The Consulate.

Cornwall: So it was on two floors.

Tirado: No, there was another floor over here but it was belongs to the commercial. . . Only on the first floor was the Consulate.

Cornwall: I see. What would be behind the Consulate on the first floor? In this area marked two?

Tirado: I don't remember.

Cornwall: You don't remember. So, where we marked two, that was a second story in that area. Correct?

Tirado: Warehouse perhaps.

Cornwall: Just a storage area or something like that, perhaps, in the lower area marked two.

In the space marked number one, which was the Consular's Office, who all occupied that area?

Tirado: Well, Consul, the Vice Consul and the secretary.

Cornwall: Which was you.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwall: During the time that we're interested in.

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The Consul's name of course was Eusebio Azcue.

The Vice Consul's name was what?

Tirado: I don't remember.

Cornwell: All right.

Tirado: This was Consulate.

Cornwell: All right. You have divided the area that we originally marked number one into two units. The smaller unit indicates where the Consul sat and you sat in a larger reception area in the front?

All right. And then, behind the Consul's office, was there another door? You marked that with a heavier area, and that would be where he could walk out into the courtyard. Is that correct? So if you wanted to get into the Consul's office, including the reception area from the courtyard, you needed to walk through the Consul's Office. Is that accurate?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Now, what kind of a door was at the corner, the lower left-hand corner here, so that if one were to walk from your office to the street, what kind of door was that? Glass, wood, solid, could you see through it?

Tirado: No, it was solid. I don't remember exactly, but perhaps it was wood. But it was solid.

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Cornwell: You don't remember being able to see out on the street?

Tirado: No, no.

Cornwell: Okay.

Lopez: You enter the Consulate right, in here?

Tirado: Uh huh.

Lopez: And your office would be right around here. Right?

Tirado: My desk was here.

Cornwell: You have drawn a small box now inside the larger half of the area we originally marked area number one, that's where your desk was?

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: From where you sat to the entrance into the office where you were, where would the entrance into the office be? Not into the whole consulate, but just into your office?

Tirado: It was open.

Lopez: Okay, it was open.

Tirado: You would enter here. Here was the stairs for the second floor, No? -- and here I think there were chairs, or something like that. For the people who were waiting. And the desk was here.

Lopez: Okay. Where would the entrance to your office be?

Tirado: Here, or here.

Lopez: Just to your office, not to the Consul's office. Not the Consulate, but just to your office.

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It would be at the same entrance?

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: And from where you sat, you couldn't see outside at all?

Tirado: No.

Lopez: You couldn't see any area in the yard? There was no glass.

Tirado: No. I can remember glass, a window, yeah. I can remember windows here, and perhaps here, but I don't

Cornwell: Okay. There may have been windows for you to see out in the street?

Tirado: Yeah, but I couldn't see outside because perhaps they were very high.

Cornwell: While Mr. Lopez was asking you questions, he drew a diagonal line across your office space. Does that represent anything? That line should not have been drawn, is that correct?

Tirado: Yeah. (Laughs.)

Cornwell: Now, did you know a Teresa Proenza? Was she employed at the Consulate or the Embassy?

Tirado: The Embassy. She was the Cultural Attache.

Cornwell: She would have worked in the area marked number four? Is that correct?

Tirado: Well, yes. But this was, this construction was uh, afterwards. This was the Embassy and the Consulate and this building was under construction,

constructed. A building.

Cornwell: Constructed?

Tirado: Later. It was the old buildings.

Cornwell: Did she work there during the same period of time you did?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: At that period where did she work? What area?

Tirado: Here.

Cornwell: That's the area we marked number three on the diagram.

Did you know a Louisa Calderon?

Tirado: Louisa? Yes, she was in the commercial. . .

Cornwell: And where would that be on the diagram? In the area we marked number two?

Tirado: I think her office was exactly above mine.

She was a secretary. And I think it was above.

Cornwell: Either above the area we marked one, or the area marked two, but on the second level.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Do you know the names of any other employees who worked there at the time?

Tirado: No, I don't remember.

Cornwell: The man named Mirabal, he was to replace Eusebio Azcue, is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And do you recall approximately when he arrived in Mexico City and began to learn the job so he could take it over from Eusebio Azcua?

Tirado: I didn't understand, what did you say please?

Cornwell: Do you remember approximately when he arrived? And began to learn the work from Azcua.

Tirado: No, some weeks earlier, I don't remember.

Cornwell: Would it be accurate to state that your best memory as you told us when we spoke to you informally before we turned the tape recorders on, that he was already there when you met the man you later identified as Oswald?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Now.

Tirado: But he wasn't there when I started working at the Embassy, at the Consulate.

Cornwell: Okay. So he must have arrived in late summer or perhaps September, or something like that.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Now, were there telephones in the office?

Tirado: Here.

Cornwell: You had one at your desk?

Tirado: This is the desk and here was a little table. I think it was the telephone. Here was the

safe box. And here was the Archivo.

Lopez: Archives.

Cornwell: So you've drawn two smaller boxes next to your desk. One of them was like a filing cabinet, or for storage of records?

Tirado: Yes. This one. The Files.

Cornwell: And the other one was a table.

Tirado: No, here was the safe box.

Cornwell: Oh, a safe. I see, a safe.
And there was a phone at the desk?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And did Azcue also have a telephone?

Tirado: Yes, it was the same but with an extension.

Cornwell: Extension.

Tirado: Here was the door.

Cornwell: All right. 1963, where were you living?
Did you have more than one residence?

Tirado: Yes. Constituyentes 143.

Cornwell: And during what part of 1963 was that?

Tirado: When I moved there?

Before I started working, at the Embassy. But
just a few weeks. . .

Cornwell: So sometime in the summer of 1963? Did you have

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a telephone at your home?

Tirado: Not at the moment that Oswald came. Because we had just moved. I think we moved in July because we were separated in July, also, July '68 and it is when the contract finished.
So perhaps. . .

Cornwell: I see. Your rent contract ran out in July of '68?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: About the same time that you and Horatio were divorced?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did you, you say that because of your move, it took some time to get a telephone in your home?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And do you remember approximately when it was that you finally got that in?

Tirado: At the assassination we had, a, let me see, we didn't have telephone--days later.

Cornwell: It was sometime after the assassination that you first got a telephone in this residence.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And do you by any chance recall the telephone number at the Consulate?

Tirado: Oh, so many times I write it down. Perhaps it was 11-28-45, perhaps?

Cornwell: Could it have been 11 28 47?

Tirado: Perhaps.

Cornwell: When were you first advised that we wanted to speak to you?

Tirado: Last week.

Cornwell: And since that time, of course, last Wednesday, I believe it was, we spoke to you informally, and told you basically what we were interested in. And learned most of what you could remember about the events we were interested in. Correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Apart from that, have you had any other opportunities to read anything, or speak to anyone, in order to refresh your memory about the events?

Tirado: Yes. In October of '76 some journalist from the Washington Post came to interview me.

Cornwell: We are familiar with the story that appeared in the Washington Post at approximately that time. apart from that have you for instance read the Warren Commission Report?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: When did you last have an occasion to read that?

Tirado: Uh, when Horacio told me you were coming, I was writing, and I try to remember exactly and I'm starting saying that again, the nightmare came, and so on

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and so on, and I wanted to check the dates.

Cornwell: So, last week sometime, you had a chance to read it over again?

Tirado: No, not everything just the one little thing.

Cornwell: Just the part that dealt with Mexico City and your testimony and that sort of thing. Correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Let me ask you, when you read that, was there any part of it that seemed to you to be inaccurate?

Tirado: Inaccurate?

Cornwell: Not correct.

Tirado: Not Correct? Yes, but with the Warren Commission, I get angry when I start reading it because they make some afirmacionnes (ph).

Lopez: Allegations or conclusions.

Tirado: Yes. I don't like it. So I tried to erase it.

Cornwell: Okay. What specifically about the report was it that makes you angry?

Tirado: That I was a -- let me see how to say it--, I don't remember exactly. but uh, I did more to Oswald when he was here than was my job, that it was extra.

Cornwell: You mean part of the report that suggests that you went beyond your duties at the Consulate, that you exceeded your authority, and you thought that you did not do so. Is that correct?

Tirado: Correct.

Cornwell: Is there anything else about the Warren Commission Report's resume of the facts that you felt was inaccurate, that made you mad?

Tirado: I cannot answer that because I only read at that time two pages. I didn't read the whole thing.

Cornwell: Okay. In addition to looking at that in order to refresh your memory, have you had a chance to speak to any one else?

Tirado: No, it was just for checking my writing.

Cornwell: What writing was that?

Tirado: Well, I was trying to remember everything that happened in the interrogatory. It was not hard, I mean, what I felt, but uh, what the police had done to me, so it was my but I'm writing, I'm writing an autobiography how do you say that, and this is a chapter.

Cornwell: I see.

Tirado: (Laughs.)

Cornwell: Directing your attention then to approximately late September of 1963, as we learned from you the other day, a man came to the Consulate, a man who you later associated with pictures in the newspaper and a name in the newspaper of the alleged assassin of the President. Is that correct?

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Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Do you remember how many times he came to the Consulate?

Tirado: Three times.

Cornwell: Do you remember the date or dates upon which those three visits occurred?

Tirado: No, I saw the application. you showed me the other day, and in the Warren Commission was September 27, but I didn't remember, of course, until I read it.

Cornwell: All right. Do you have a recollection whether it was all on one day or on separate days.

Tirado: The same day.

Cornwell: On the very first visit, would you describe to us what the man said and did, and what you said in response?

Tirado: Yes, he, well, he enter and he ask me if I speak English and I say yes, and then he start asking me about requirements to go to Cuba, to get a visa to go to Cuba, and I explain it.

Cornwell: What did you explain?

Tirado: Well, that he needed to, he said that a transit visa so that he needs a visa to the country that he was going, from; if it was a Socialist country, the visa was given, as soon

as he gets the other visa, and uh. . .

Cornwell: When he first asked about the requirements for a visa, did he tell you that his objective was to go to Cuba or to another country?

Tirado: To the Soviet Union.

Cornwell: Did you ever suggest to him that there was any alternative means to acquire a visa other than the in-transit visa requirement which you just described?

Tirado: I don't remember, I mean I hardly remember. But what I used to say is if you want to go to Cuba, you need or you have to have friends in Cuba, so they may, what do you say, take responsibility, if you get the visa. That was one way, no? And the other way was in-transit.

Cornwell: Okay. If I understand then, you don't have a distinct recollection about exactly what you said to Oswald, but you assumed it was what you said to everyone who came in, which was that you explained both processes, that they either must have friends in Cuba or the in-transit visa could be granted if they got a visa from another country.

Tirado: No, if only they asked me. Because they usually go there and say, "I want to go to Cuba." But if they say I'm just in transit, then I explain

Cornwell: Okay, then. Let me see if I can rephrase it and get what's in your mind as best we can.

Is it your best recollection that you did explain both alternatives to Oswald?

Tirado: I don't remember exactly, because I think he immediately says that he wants to go to Russia, and he was in transit to go to Cuba. I think he immediately says so.

Cornwell: Okay. So then your best recollection that you may have only explained the in-transit visa process. Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: But, I gather from the way you have answered the question, there is still the possibility that you also discussed with him going to Cuba if he had friends, but you're not sure about that second one. Is that accurate?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Now, after this first basic explanation, what if anything did he say or do?

Tirado: Well, I don't remember exactly. He show all the paper that he had, when he gave me the application when he came back, . . .

Cornwell: Okay. Wait a minute. Just the first visit. Is there anything else about the first visit? Or,

did he leave at that time and if he left, why did he leave?

Tirado: To have photographs of himself.

Cornwell: Okay. So your memory is that on the first occasion you also explained to him that he needed photographs and he left shortly thereafter to obtain them.

Tirado: Yes, and perhaps, but I'm not very sure, that, uh, he said that he was a friend of the Cuban Revolution, and when he showed me all the scrap paper that he has.

Cornwell: All right. You don't remember if that was on the first or the second occasion. Correct?

Tirado: Yeah, I don't remember.

Cornwell: Nevertheless, he did leave to go get photographs, and he did return?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did he return with the photographs?

Tirado: With four photographs.

Cornwell: Four of them.

Tirado: Yeah.

Cornwell: Were they all the same? To the best of your memory, was he wearing the same kind of clothes that he was wearing that day in the photographs?

Tirado: Yes.

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Cornwell: So, from all the circumstances, did it appear to you that he just went somewhere locally and had the pictures made?

Tirado: Yeah. I think that I already explained (to) him where he could take the photographs.

Cornwell: You told him some locations in town where he could go? Were there some right in the neighborhood of the Consulate there?

Tirado: That I don't remember.

Cornwell: All right. But at any rate you knew of some place at the time, mentioned one or two places to him?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Correct?. . . Did you look at the photos when he brought them back, careful about to be sure that it was the same man who was standing in front of you?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And what did you do at that time?

Tirado: I filled out application.

Cornwell: You personally typed it, and did you type it in duplicate or triplicate or just one copy?

Tirado: Duplicate.

Cornwell: And was the second copy a carbon?

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Tirado: Carbon?

Cornwell: Did you have it twice or did you type one and make two copies?

Tirado: Only one.

Cornwell: And made two?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And what did you do with the photographs?

Tirado: Stapled them.

Cornwell: Stapled them?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: On top of the application.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: The application has a place on it for a date, is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did you type in the date that was in fact that day?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Let's just talk hypothetically for a moment. Is there any chance that he was at the Consulate on more than one day?

Tirado: No. I read yesterday, an article in the Reader's Digest, and they say he was at the Consulate on three occasions. He was in Friday, Saturday, and Monday. . . That's not true, that's false.

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Cornwell: All right. Let's try a different hypothetical.

If the one in the Reader's Digest is definitely wrong, is it possible that he first came on like a Thursday, and then came back on a Friday?

Tirado: No, because I am positively sure about it. That he came in the same day.

Cornwell: Let me ask you then something about just the procedures for the Consulate at the time.

Would it have been consistent with your normal procedures for you to have typed the application on his first visit, even though he didn't have a photograph to put on it?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: In other words, before you started the process of typing it, you were sure you had everything you needed to make it complete.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did he tell you where he was staying at the time?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Did you recall any problem with him not knowing any address, where he was staying in Mexico City?

Tirado: No, because he say that he has no time to wait, he was in a hotel and uh, I didn't ask the address, in Mexico City because I mean didn't care.

Cornwell: You didn't have a need to know that?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Do you recall any problem coming up where he needed to know it? For any other reason?

Tirado: Me to know his address?

Cornwell: No, for him to know. Did he have any problem, did he have any need to know it himself? Do you remember anything along those lines? TIRADO: No.

Cornwell: Going back to the second visit, is it your memory that you typed the application in duplicate, you stapled the pictures at the top of each copy, is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Then what did you do with the application?

Tirado: Well, I used to put it in a file, and uh, I used to keep one copy, another to send, the original, we used to send to Cuba. And I think I have another file.

Cornwell: Was he required to sign the application?

Tirado: He signed it, yes.

Cornwell: Did he sign one or both of them?

Tirado: I think both, it has to be.

Cornwell: Was there any requirement in the Consulate that he do it in any particular person's presence? Anyone have to watch him while he signed it?

Tirado: I don't know, I mean I just don't remember.

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Cornwell: As a hypothetical, did Azcue have to watch people sign the applications?

Tirado: No. He was in his office.

Cornwell: So you could handle that all by yourself.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did he sign it in your presence?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did anything else occur on the second visit, any other conversation, or any other event?

Tirado: No, but I told you, it's uh, he said that he was a friend of the Cuban Revolution. He show me letters to the Communist Party, the American Communist Party, his labor card, and uh, he's working in Russia, I don't remember exactly, but he said on his application, his license number. . .

Cornwell: Marriage license?

Tirado: (Spoke in Spanish.) Se dice serup los recortes del periodico

Cornwell: Okay, we had to pause for a second to turn the tapes over. As I recall, you were explaining the kinds of things he brought with him.

Tirado: Yes, it was his labor card, from Russia, his uh, marriage pact, yes, that he was married with a Russian, and uh, a clipping that he was with two policemen taking him by his arms, that he was in a meeting to support Cuba. And a card saying that he was a member of the Fair Play for Cuba in New

Orleans. And

Cornwell: Do you recall what was said or what occurred that caused him to produce all of these documents about his having a Russian wife and his Fair Play For Cuba activity?

Tirado: Just a minute. (Spanish--what means recall?)

Lopez: Recordar.

He showed me all of these papers to demonstrate that he was a friend of the revolution.

Cornwell: But did you say anything to him or did anyone else say anything to him that made him feel he needed to produce this kind of documentation.

Tirado: No, I don't think so. What I said is that when he said he was a member of the Party, of the Communist Party, the American, I said why don't they arrange, the Party, your Party with the Cuban Party, and he said that he didn't have time to do it.

Cornwell: Did you ask him why he didn't just have the Communist Party arrange his trip to Cuba?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: The Cuban Communist Party? He just said he didn't have time?

Tirado: Yes. Because there was a manner to do it. I mean, we get, for instance, the visa directly

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from Cuba and saying give the visa to this people that's coming and somebody say oh, yes, you have your visa here.

Cornwell: Do you recall anything else happening on the second occasion? Or have you related all that's in your mind on that?

Tirado: No. It was strange. I mean because if you are a Communist and you're coming from a country where the Communist Party is not very well seen, and in Mexico City that the Communist Party was not legal at that moment -- crossing the border with all of his paper, it was not logical. I mean, if you're really Communist, you go with anything, I mean just nothing, just your passport, that's all. And that was something that I didn't like it but. . .

Cornwell: So, you were a little suspicious of the amount of documentation he brought?

Tirado: Yeah.

Cornwell: Did you say anything to him about that?

Tirado: Perhaps I told him, what are you doing with all of this? And he said to prove I'm a friend of yours

Cornwell: Did you discuss your suspicions with anyone else?

Tirado: With the Consul.

Cornwell: With Azcue?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Do you remember when that discussion occurred?

Tirado: It was afterwards.

Cornwell: Was that after his second visit as you recall?

Tirado: It was during his third visit.

Cornwell: During his third visit. All right.

Let's back up again for just a moment.

What time of day as best as you recall did he come to the Consulate the first time?

Tirado: Perhaps it was eleven o'clock or something like that, ten thirty.

Cornwell: And the second time?

Tirado: About twelve, or eleven, no, about one o'clock.

Cornwell: Okay. The first one was roughly late morning, and the second one was early afternoon.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And then, why did he leave the second time?

Tirado: To get his Russian visa.

Cornwell: Would it have been the standard procedure in the Cuban Consulate, to take the application, have him sign it, and have it ready to go in the file if the request was an in-transit, for an in-transit visa, even though he did not have the visa from the third country. Or from another country?

Tirado: Uh, huh.

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Cornwell: All right.

Tirado: Yes, I did send it to Cuba.

Cornwell: All right. Okay. So, then you sent him, in effect, to the Russian Embassy. And it was at that point after he left that you spoke to. . .

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: No, you didn't speak to the Consulate at all yet.

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Had there been any problem at all yet? TIRADO: No

Cornwell: So far, it's like any normal visa application.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Would it have been consistent with the procedures in the Consulate for you to have allowed him to take one or both of the applications typed up outside the Consulate?

Tirado: I don't remember very well if uh, there were only two copies. I mean, one original and one copy, but uh, it could have happened, but I don't remember

Cornwell: Okay. To the best of your memory then, the person who made the application was not permitted to have a copy.

Tirado: I don't know. I don't remember.

Cornwell: Okay. You're not sure. But your tentative memory is that would not have occurred.

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Would you have ever allowed a person to take all of the applications outside and attach the photos or sign them themselves?

Tirado: Yes, because you may come, ask for the application and you may keep it.

Cornwell: You, on occasion, would allow someone just to have a blank copy. Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes. But he was different because he did not speak in Spanish so I have to fill it.

Cornwell: I see. If he would have spoken Spanish or progressed to having someone with him who did speak Spanish, you might have allowed him to take the applications and fill them out.

Tirado: Perhaps.

Cornwell: At least on other occasions you have done that, with other people.

Tirado: That's something that I really don't remember.

Cornwell: There, at least, there was no requirement that you type it there in the office, as long as it got filled out.

Tirado: I think I have to type it. I have to type it because I have to make some observations, always.

Cornwell: Down at the bottom?

Tirado: Yes.

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And I think that if you fill it in in hand-writing, I have to type it, for, to send it to Cuba.

Cornwell: So, at most, you would allow someone to fill it out and bring it in so you could type it?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: If that procedure was employed, allowing someone else to fill it out, would you still be required to check the photograph to be sure it was accurate?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Would you still require the person to sign it in your presence?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Just so we can keep our documents straight, let's just mark as Exhibit Number 1 the diagram you draw earlier. And we will mark now on the back a photograph and we'll ask you some questions about it. We'll mark it as Exhibit Number 2. This is a photograph of what would appear to be a visa application. Does it appear to be basically the type of visa application that we have been speaking about?

Tirado: Yes. The numbers, I think they're mine.

Cornwell: The numbers in the upper right-hand corner which are hand-written?

Tirado: I think so.

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Cornwell: Those appear to you to be in your handwriting.

Tirado: Yeah, because when I file I write in the number, the following number?

Cornwell: Okay. And on the very bottom of the application, where it says "para uso de la mision" that means it's filled in by someone associated with the Cuban Government. Is that correct. Or the Consulate?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Who, according to the usual procedure, filled out that portion.

Tirado: Me.

Cornwell: The other day when we talked to you informally, you read through the words in that section. Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes. I remember.

Cornwell: And your memory is that you in fact typed that section on this application.

Tirado: Yes. I used to do this with all the applications.

Cornwell: And under that, there is a signature.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Are you able to tell whose signature that is?

Tirado: No, I was thinking it was Mirabal, but no-- I couldn't sign any papers.

Cornwell: Okay. So it was definitely not your signature?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Do you know whether, according to normal procedure,

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any particular person routinely placed his name at that location?

Tirado: No, only the Consulate. People in the Consulate.

Cornwell: What would be the purpose of a signature in the lower right-hand corner?

Tirado: I don't know, perhaps to check that it was right as it was written.

Cornwell: Did you ever see the Consulate or any other employee routinely sign the applications at the location?

Tirado: I don't remember, but what I used to do was put the originals in one packet and that was with a letter to the Minister, de Relaciones exterister (spanish), How do you say that? (Lopez - Minister of Foreign Relations), and I used to give to the Consul so he sign the papers and send it to Cuba.

Cornwell: Okay. One copy stayed in the Consulate and one was mailed to Cuba, to the Minister of Foreign Relations.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Is it possible then that the signature in the lower right-hand corner is someone in Cuba?

Tirado: Perhaps that one that get it.

Cornwell: That receives it in Cuba. All right. the stamp,

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which appears slightly over the name, the handwritten name, Lee H. Oswald, when did that get placed on the application if you know?

Tirado: Perhaps in the moment that he sign?

Cornwell: Was that part of the normal procedure? Did you have a stamp as you recall to do that?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And was that a means of authenticating the signature, that you would stamp on top of it like that?

Tirado: I think so. Because let me see.

This was signed by Cuba, I think, because this was October 10. This was the answer, perhaps.

Cornwell: So there's a date you just pointed to, around the middle of the application reading 10-OCT. 1963 and you are assuming, I take it, that that was the date placed on the document in Cuba?

Tirado: Perhaps but I don't know.

I don't know the date of when we send the application.

Cornwell: Or it was placed on there when you mailed it?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Do you know which?

Tirado: I don't know.

Cornwell: You don't remember which? Could it have been the date upon which the application was received

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in the Consulate here in Mexico City?

Tirado: In return.

Cornwell: In return? Back from Cuba? Is that what you mean?

Tirado: Perhaps. I don't know that.

Cornwell: Could it have been the date you received it from Oswald?

Tirado: No, because it was the same date.

Cornwell: Okay. The only date on here of receipt from Oswald was the one near the top, the second line, which reads: 27 Sep. 1963.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: So I guess the best we can do is say that you don't have a distinct recollection of how the 10th of October date would have gotten placed on here. Correct?

Tirado: Yeah.

Cornwell: How long normally would it have taken between the receipt of an application and the date that it would have been mailed to Cuba?

Tirado: Well, it depends on the flight. We had, I don't remember in that time, if we were three flights from Cuba to Mexico and from Mexico to Cuba and it depends on the work that we have to do, if we have a lot of work we wouldn't have sent it immediately or,--valise diplomatica, How do you say it?

Cornwell: Diplomatic pouch.

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- Cornwell: Would there have been some usual amount of time?
How much could it vary?
- Tirado: The flights were Monday, Wednesday and Friday,
I think. And uh, well, we send a bunch if, I
think, I don't know, when what day in the week
was the 27th? Perhaps if it was Wednesday, we
would send next Friday, or next Monday. Or...
- Cornwell: I have another photograph of just the upper left-
hand corner of the same document, which we'll
mark as Exhibit 3 on the back, and ask you if,
to the best of your recollection, that is a photo-
graph of the man whom you saw on or about the 27th
of September?
- Tirado: Yes.
- Cornwell: I don't understand. A moment ago, did you say that
there was a normal time of the week that mailings
to Cuba occurred?
- Tirado: Would you please repeat the question?
- Cornwell: Was there a usual day, did the mailings to Cuba
usually occur on one given day of the week?
- Tirado: Yes, I don't remember exactly, but I think it was
on Friday, perhaps, that we make, we send applica-
tions. Yeah, it was one day to send all the appli-
cations.
- Cornwell: All right. So, if we were to tell you the 27th of

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September was a Friday, then, the usual routine would have been either for you to have mailed this application on the very day that you received it, or to have to wait until at least the next Friday. Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Now. You have told us that after the second visit, he went apparently to attempt to obtain a visa from the Soviet Embassy.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: When do you recall him returning?

Tirado: He came in the afternoon.

Cornwell: About what time?

Tirado: Five or six.

Cornwell: And that would have been, according to what you told us earlier, not normal visiting hours?

Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: How were you able to speak to him on this occasion?

Tirado: Because when somebody came to the doorman and was speaking in another language that wasn't Spanish, he used to call me and say somebody's here that doesn't speak Spanish, someone sent me to you, so he takes the people to the Consulate.

Cornwell: And the doorman came and got you.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did you go outside to the main gate?

Tirado: No.

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Cornwell: What happened?

Tirado: Somebody took them to the Consulate.

Cornwell: Okay. You said the main gate. Was that the area that, on Exhibit One, you marked as being the door to your office, or some other area?

Tirado: He was closed. In the afternoon he was closed. But perhaps he came. . .

Cornwell: The door on Area One was locked up. Okay?

Tirado: Yes. And then he was open.

Cornwell: Over near Number Seven, is that correct? Where they let the cars in?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: There was a door there too?

Tirado: Yes. It was the garage and another door.

Cornwell: And the doorman from that area brought him to your office?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: What occurred on that occasion?

Tirado: What?

Cornwell: What happened on that occasion?

Tirado: Well, he came in and he said that he already have his Russian visa and uh, he want to get his Cuban visa. And I said that that was not possible because he has to be first sent to Cuba and then

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wait for the answer, no, it was necessary
that he has to have first a Socialist visa, the
Russian visa. And, uh, . . .

Cornwell: Did he show you his passport with a visa in it?
From the Russian Embassy?

Tirado: No, No. I don't remember exactly but what I remember is he says that he already has his Russian visa and I said I don't see it and well, I don't remember exactly what we discussed in that moment. But, he was very stubborn. So, I say, well, I'm going to call to the Russian Consul, so I called the Russian Consul and I said hey, listen, here's a man that, he say that he already got his Russian visa. And he said, yes, I remember it. He came to us for visa but uh, the answer will be in three or four months, that was the usual time.

Cornwell: So as you recall, then, the person at the Russian Embassy said in effect, no, he doesn't have it yet, he's only applied for it. Is that right?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Okay. Go ahead.

Tirado: And uh, and I told him what the Russian Consulate says and then, he was angry. He get angry. And he insisted that he was a friend of the Cuban Re-

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volution, that he has already been in jail for the Cuban Revolution, that uh, oh, that he wanted that visa and that he couldn't wait for so long time because uh, his Mexican visa was finished in three days. So he was insistent and uh, I didn't have time and well, I couldn't make him understand that. So, I went to the Consul's office and I explained to him, and would you please come and talk with him? Azcue came, Mirabal I think he didn't speak English, so Azcue came and told him those things, all the requirements that he needs to fly to Cuba, and he was really angry. He was red and he was almost crying and uh, he was insisting and insisting so Azcue told him to go away because if he didn't go away at that moment he was going to kick him, or something like that. So, Azcue went to the door, he opened the door and told Oswald to go away.

Cornwell: Okay. So he went to the door which was in the area we marked 'one,' which was the Consulate Office?

Tirado: Yes...Remember, I was feeling pity for him because he looked desperate.

Cornwell: He looked desperate?

Tirado: Yes.

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Cornwell: So, you felt kind of sorry for him?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: At any time during these three contacts, did he indicate to you that he could speak or understand Spanish?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: During this period was your normal work week, did it include Saturdays?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Is it possible that, in addition to his visits on Friday, he also came back the following day on Saturday morning?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: How can you be sure of that?

Tirado: Because, uh, I told you before, that it was easy to remember, because not all the Americans that came there were married with a Russian woman, they have live(d) in Russian and uh, we didn't used to fight with those people because if you, they came for going to Cuba, so apparently they were friends, no? So we were nice to them with this man we fight, I mean we had a hard discussion so we didn't want to have anything to do with him.

Cornwell: Okay. I understand that but I don't understand how that really answers the question. In other

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words, the question is, what is it about the events that makes you sure that he did not come back on Saturday, and have another conversation with you?

Tirado: Because I remember the fight. So if he (come) back, I would have remembered.

Cornwell: Did Azcue work on Saturdays?

Tirado: Yes, we used to work in the office, but not for the public.

Cornwell: Was there a guard, was there a guard out here at the corner near number seven on your diagram on Saturdays?

Tirado: Excuse me?

Cornwell: Was there a doorman out near the area that you marked as number seven, on the diagram?

Tirado: Yes, but on Saturday he never let people. . .

Cornwell: Never let people in.

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Not even if they came up to the doorman and didn't speak Spanish? And were very insistent?

Tirado: No, because they could answer or something. They could ask me for instance, no? by the inter-phone.

Cornwell: They could do that on a Friday, though.

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Tirado: But what I remember is that Oswald has my telephone number and my name and perhaps he show to the doorman (Spanish).

Cornwell: When did you give him the telephone number and name?

Tirado: In the second visit, perhaps.

Cornwell: Okay.

Tirado: I used to do that to all the people, so they don't have to come and to bother me. So I used to give the telephone number and my name and say "give me a call next week to see if your visa arrived."

Cornwell: Well. Are you saying that based on your memory the guard was allowed to bring people in during the five till eight o'clock at night uh, sessions during the week but not on Saturdays?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Do you have a distinct recollection with respect to telephone calls to the Russian Consulate, was it just one call or was it more than one call?

Tirado: Only one.

Cornwell: Just one.

The . . . I believe I asked you this, but just to be sure, although the application was typed with

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a carbon to make two copies with one typing, did he have to sign both independently? Or did you allow them to use a carbon to sign the paper?

Tirado: No, no. It was the original.

Cornwell: Two original signatures. All right.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Was anything said that you recall at this time which looking back on it indicated the possibility, even on that date, Oswald had on his mind some intension of killing the President of the United States?

Tirado: No, I don't think so.

Cornwell: Let me read something to you, and ask you if it at all refreshes your memory or if you have a memory of a conversation similar to this?

I don't believe I read this to you before, when we talked the other day, or did I? Did I read an excerpt from Daniel Schorr's book to you?

Tirado: No, you told me.

Cornwell: Okay. I'll read it to you then at this time. It's an excerpt from a book called Clearing the Air, written by Daniel Schorz, published in the United States in 1977. And page 177 reads as follows:

"In an interview in July 1967 with a British journalist, Comer Clark, Castro

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(meaning Fidel Castro) said that Oswald had come to the Cuban Consulate twice, each time for about fifteen minutes. The first time, I was told, he wanted to work for us. He was asked to explain but he wouldn't, he wouldn't go into details. The second time he said he wanted to free Cuba from American imperialism. Then he said something like 'Someone ought to shoot that President Kennedy.' Then Oswald said, and this is exactly how it was reported to me, maybe I'll try to do it."

Do you recall any conversation like that in either what was said to you by Oswald or that was said by Oswald to Azcue or anyone else that you might have overheard?

Tirado: No, I don't remember.

Cornwell: Did any part of that conversation occur?

Tirado: No, because I don't remember that he says he was to go to work in Cuba because he only that he wanted to go in-transit. That's what I remember.

Cornwell: What do you think, well, first let me ask you, do you think that conversation could have occurred and you just forgot it? In other words, is that the kind of conversation which, if it occurred, you would definitely remember it?

Tirado: Yes. Because in the fight with Azcue there was shouting and crying and things like that. I could miss something, but not, because even if would say so, I mean, I could have heard, no, I mean

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if you kill President you're not going to
change the whole system.

You see, that's why I give you answer,
even Azcue. I mean that's not the, I don't think
so, that he had that conversation with anyone.
He was arguing. . .

Cornwell: Do you remember any part of the conversation
indicating that Oswald blaming the United States
or President Kennedy for his inability to get
to Cuba?

Tirado: I don't remember but that could be possible.

Cornwell: In other words, if he's frustrated and he comes
to the Cuban Consulate, he might feel animosity
or anger towards various people. He might be
angry at you, or Azcue, or at the Cuban Govern-
ment or at the Russian Government or perhaps the
United States Government, depending on how the
conversation went. What do you recall about that?
Who was he angry at when told he couldn't go to
Cuba

Tirado: He was angry at us. That's why I called Azcue
Because he was not a strong man but anyway, I
didn't like to fight with him. He was very angry
and he was blaming me and Azcue. because he thought
it was in our hands to give the visa immediately,
and he couldn't understand that the visa has to

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come from Cuba.

Cornwell: You mentioned earlier that you had discussed with Azcue on this, as I understood this, during the third visit with Oswald, the suspicion that you had about the documents. Is that accurate or did I misunderstand?

Tirado: No, it was the third time when I told Azcue that there was a man that bother me, that when I told him about this man, I mean because it was normal, I used to, that was my job, to attend people who come in so I didn't have to bother the Consul for every man who came, because there was a lot crazy men from the United States that they wanted to go to Cuba.

Cornwell: Okay. So, from what I understand then, when you went in to Azcue to bother him, since you normally didn't do that sort of thing, you gave him a sort of background resume of your dealings with Oswald. Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And was it at that point that you told him of your suspicion about the documents?

Tirado: I think so.

Cornwell: What was his reaction? Azcue's?

Tirado: He was worrying. When he went to my office,

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he was very tranquil, he was very polite, he was explaining things, very polite. And uh, he was starting to get angry when he saw that he was a stubborn man, that he didn't want to understand, and he said uh, I remember now, he said 'you're not a friend of the Cuban Revolution, because if you are a friend, you have to understand that we have to take care, to be very careful with the people that are going to Cuba, and if you don't understand this, you are not friend of the Cuban Revolution.' And he was shouting and, I don't remember how long was this conversation, but uh, they got really angry, both.

Leap: May I call you Silvia?

Tirado: Yes.

Leap: At any time during your conversation with the Consul, did you discuss the possibility that Oswald was a penetration agent? Intelligence agent for a foreign power? Did you discuss that possibility?

Tirado: No. I don't think so because we didn't have time. Because this man was in my office and I was in Azcue's office so I couldn't leave him many times alone.

Leap: Did you ever have conversations with Azcue outside of Oswald's presence relative to the issue?

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Tirado: Repeat the question please.

Lopez: Did you ever have a conversation with Azcue when Oswald was not in the office about the possibility that he was an intelligence agent for some country?

Tirado: No, no. I don't think so. We only thought that he was
/a crazy man, an adventurer, or something like that.

Leap: Did it ever enter your mind that he was a penetration agent?

Tirado: Perhaps. Perhaps, because it happened, it happened sometimes that somebody came and say this is a policeman or something like that.

Leap: That's all the questions that I have.

Tirado: The only thing that I can say, it was that it was strange, travelling with all of his documents just to prove one thing.

Lopez: Do you think now, looking back on what happened then, that he may have been an intelligence agent?

Tirado: Perhaps.

Cornwell: Did anything else ever come to your attention? That caused that suspicion? Other than just his presentation of the documentation? Anything else ever happen?

Tirado: With him? No, no. The only thing that was strange is that if you belong to the Communist Party,

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any party. Your French, but French could get Cuban Visa but Mexico, for instance, if you're Mexican and you're a member of the party, of the Communist Party, you don't have to go and ask for application visa because the party writes to the Cuban Communist Party, and they arrange everything. That was the strange thing. There's no need. At first, he said that he was a Communist. That was strange. Because it would be really easy for him to get the visa through the Communist Party.

Cornwell: At any point in the conversations that you have told us about, did Oswald say anything indicating that he really wanted to stay in Cuba?

Tirado: No. He just wanted to go and visit and saw what was the Revolution.

Cornwell: Okay. That's sort of what I meant. In other words, he did indicate that he didn't just want to pass through, that he wanted to spend some time there. Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: What do you recall about that part of the conversations?

Tirado: I told him that he get to Cuba, for instance, at two o'clock, and there was a plane going to

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Russia at five o'clock, he has to stay in the airport, in the Cuban airport. That he couldn't go out.

Cornwell: Why didn't you tell him that?

Tirado: Because he was saying that he wanted to go to Cuba to visit and to see what the revolution had made.

Cornwell: Did you ever see him again, after the argument with Azcue?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Did you ever talk to him again?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Not in person nor by telephone.

Tirado: No, he never call.

He could have called when I wasn't there, but I used to get the message, if somebody answer, I used to get a message.

Cornwell: Did anyone else overhear any of the conversations you have described? Other than the one time in which Azcue was involved?

Tirado: Yes. Could be that people from the Commercial Office, could be Mirabal.

Cornwell: Was there anyone else physically present in the Consulate's Office during those conversations as you can recall?

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Tirado: I can't remember. The only thing that I remember is that it was only Mirabal.

Cornwell: And did Mirabal come out in the reception area during the conversations as you recall?

Tirado: No, I think he stay in his office.

Cornwell: But he could have overheard it at the time.

Tirado: Yes, everybody who was passing through, even in the streets, they were shouting, really!

Cornwell: Were the windows up as I guess they might have been at that time of year?

Tirado: (Didn't understand.)

Cornwell: The windows would have been up? The windows to the Consulate Office would have been open?

Tirado: What? I. . .

Cornwell: In other words, you're saying people on the street might have overheard it?

Tirado: Yes, yes. If you were here and there was always a police here, they could have heard the shouting, the crying.

(Lots of noise in background, unintelligible.)

KENNEDY

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

TAPE 2

Name Silvia Tirado (Duran) Date June 6, 1973 Time _____
Address _____ Place _____

Interview:

Cornwell: You told us previously when we discussed informally with you that you were sympathetic towards the Cuban Revolution during the early 1960's--

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did you ever overhear any conversation either in the Consulate or among any of the people you may have associated with concerning the possibility of killing the President?

Tirado: No, because I think the people I used to know during that time, they think like me, and I think the death of a man doesn't make anything good, I mean, you have to change the structures, I mean, it's just like a building, no? The President is like, I mean, for instance, a roof--not the top, but if you take the top, the building still stands. You have to destroy the whole building, not one man. If you kill the man, you make a hero. So, is no good.

Cornwell: What were your own feelings towards President Kennedy?

Interviewer Signature _____

Typed Signature Gary Cornwell

Date transcribed 6-26-73

By: br Form #4-1

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Tirado: Well, I like him. I mean, he was very nice, he was very intelligent. And I think of the relations with Mexico, as I remember now, they were very good in the commercial area, the cultural area. He came to Mexico and he was very acclamation. They loved him. They liked him very much.

Cornwell: And, what you're saying is, you're describing what you understood to be the basic reaction of the Mexican people? Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Was that feeling the same even among the part of the Mexican people who were sympathetic towards the Cuban Revolution?

Tirado: Uh, translate, please, Ed. I want to be sure of the question.

Lopez: Would you repeat the question, please?

Cornwell: Was the feeling that you just described as being that of the Mexican people?

Lopez: (Translated question.)

Tirado: In general.

Cornwell: The same with respect to that part of the Mexican people like yourself who were sympathetic to the Cuban Revolution?

Lopez: (Translated.)

Tirado: Well, yes, more or less. Because I mean, if you're uh, how can I explain this, uh, if you're a President

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of a country that is against uh, against Latin America, undeveloped countries, you don't love them, of course, but you may see that is different, that he has been a good President, that he was, I think he was ingenious with his Alliance for Progress, that he tried to have more friends, not like Dulles who said we don't have friends, we have interests, things like that. Do you know that phrase?

Cornwell: One more time.

Lopez: (Speaks to Tirado in Spanish.) Dulles.

Tirado: He said once the United States has no friends, they have interests. (Speaks in Spanish.) And Kennedy tried to destroy that phrase, saying we want to have friends. And he was changing the politics of Latin America, Kennedy.

Cornwell: So, you're saying that because of President Kennedy's policies towards Latin America, that even the part of the Mexican people who were sympathetic to the Cuban Revolution, they also very much liked President Kennedy?

Tirado: I think so. Now, I'm not sure, I mean I--

Cornwell: At least--

Tirado: Yeah, but you make difference with one President and another.

Cornwell: I understood your answer to my question a moment ago but let me ask it one more time, nevertheless.

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I asked you if at any time during the early 1960's you had overheard any conversations among people who were in favor of the Cuban Revolution to the effect that they would consider killing the President, and you answered with a statement on the logic of the situation, that you don't change the system by changing the President. Nevertheless, let me ask you again, more pointedly. Did you, nevertheless, ever overhear any such conversations?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Did you ever overhear them within the Cuban Consulate or outside it?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: I'm sorry, go ahead.

Tirado: No, but I'm Mexican and I was in Mexico and I was working there and you have to see that uh, even though the Cuban people know I was a friend, they would not say things like that in front of me, of course, no?

Cornwell: When the news came over the television and in the newspapers that President Kennedy had been killed, and then you heard the name Lee Harvey Oswald, and saw the picture, I guess you immediately reflected back on your contact, correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: At that time, did anything come into your mind

in connection with those contacts that you could have read as foreknowledge, in other words, did it totally surprise you that that was the alleged assassin, or was there anything about your contact with him which made it understandable?

Tirado: No. No, even now I don't think that he would have done it.

Cornwell: You still don't think that he killed him?

Tirado: No, because I think that he was a weak man. I saw that he could get angry, but uh, for me, he was not a man that could kill the President, because even when I saw him on television and he said all the time, "I'm innocent" and if I kill someone very important, I would be proud. I mean, because even if I'm with police I know that I'm going to be killed or die or something like that, I'd say, "Yes, I killed the President" and I don't think so.

Cornwell: So based on all of your contacts with him, you do not think that he killed the President?

Tirado: I don't think so.

Cornwell: Let me ask you just some miscellaneous questions about the nature of your contact with him. Was there ever any conversations or indications about money problems that he had? Was that ever the sub-

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ject of a conversation?

Tirado: No. The thing that I remember only that he was very in a hurry because his visa was finished and I think he said, he mentioned that he only had three days to stay here in Mexico City.

Cornwell: Did he ever indicate that he hoped the Cuban Government would finance his trip?

Tirado: I don't think so.

Cornwell: Had you ever done that before? Had the Consulate ever done that sort of thing?

Tirado: No, no. We used to do that but they were visitors and we had instructions from Cuba, from the Cuban Government.

Cornwell: Only visitors from Cuba, is that what you mean?

Tirado: No, no. For instance, your--the Cuban Revolutionary Anniversary, they invite people, they do have everything paid.

Cornwell: In other words, it was persons that had been invited to go to Cuba by the Cuban Government?

Tirado: Yes, yes.

Cornwell: Well, even though, then you would not, or the Cuban Government would not have financed this trip, did he ask for such assistance?

Tirado: At the time that I was working there, it never happens.

Cornwell: Specifically Oswald.

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Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Did he ask for monetary assistance?

Tirado: I don't remember. I don't think so. But I don't remember.

Cornwell: Did he ever say anything or did you ever observe anything to indicate that he had travelling companions in Mexico City?

Tirado: No, he didn't mention it.

Cornwell: Did he ever say anything or do anything that indicated that he knew other people in Mexico City?

Tirado: I don't know. I don't remember.

Cornwell: To the best of your knowledge he knew no one, is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Do you know when he left Mexico City?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: By what form of transportation?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Did anyone ever call or come by the Consulate on his behalf?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Did they ever deliver anything to the Consulate for him?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: There have, let me ask you this--Has any allegation ever been brought to your attention that you met

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with Oswald outside of the Consulate?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: On--let me show you two books, one of which is labeled photo ident book and has roughly three inch by five inch pictures in it and the other one which is labeled JFK Document 7549 and has smaller pictures in it, and I'll turn the recorder off for a second and give you a few minutes to look through them and ask us, and I will ask you if you recognize any of the people in these photos.

Recorder turned off.

Cornwell: Okay. We've turned the tape recorder back on and you've had five minutes, maybe ten, I don't know, to look through the two books. In the first book, you only picked out photograph--

Tirado: This looks like Fidel. But not exactly.

Cornwell: Which one: Number 12?

Tirado: Yeah.

Cornwell: Who does that look like?

Tirado: Fidel but not exactly.

Cornwell: All right. Just a little.

Tirado: Yeah.

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Cornwell: Okay. And you also I believe pointed to Number 57
when you went through the book.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And who do you think that is?

Tirado: Oswald.

Cornwell: Lee Harvey Oswald. Now, many of the pictures in
the book are not that clear, of course. When you
saw him the first time in the book, you indicated
that that looked like him except that as you recalled
him, he had either blue or green eyes and blond
hair. Correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: When you say blond hair, what color is that? Is it
very light?

Tirado: Light.

Cornwell: Let's see if we can find an example. Looking in the
second book--that's all you found in the first book,
correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: All right. Looking in the second book, uh, take as
an example, Number 266 04 268, would that be basically
what you recall to be the color of his hair, blond?

Tirado: Yes. Here it looks very, very light, not that light.

Cornwell: Okay. That would be what you describe as blond but
your memory is that it was close but not quite as

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light as that?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Okay, but the tape recorder was back away from us so just to make sure we got that answer, you picked out in the first book photograph #57. You stated that it looked like the way you recalled the man who came to the Consulate except that he had blue or green eyes and blond hair. And then we were trying to determine what shade you recall the blond hair being, and I asked you--all these are black and white--if it would be similar to photos #266 and #263 in the book 7549? And you said in those pictures that it looks very light and that it would not have been that light, quite that light to your memory. Is that right?

Tirado: Yes.

(Long break.)

Cornwell: I don't know how, working with black and white photos, we can do much better than that? But--

Tirado: A little lighter than your eyebrows.

Cornwell: A little lighter than my eyebrows? There's another photo. . . In the second book, number 26 or 27. You also pointed to those photos when you went through the book. Would the color of that hair approximate the way you remember it?

Tirado: No, because he had very light, almost white. . .

Cornwell: Okay, again, it would be not as light as that?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: All right. Then going to the second book, you pointed to photograph #4, when you looked at the book the first time. What is your memory about that?

Tirado: He reminds me of Mirabal, he reminds me but not exactly.

Cornwell: All right. He looks a little like Mirabal?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: If I skip a photograph you remember looking at, let me know, but I jotted down some notes as you came to 'em when you looked at the book. You next pointed to number 26 and 27. Does that appear to you to be the same man?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And who was that?

Tirado: Ernesto Lefel. He used to work with my husband.

Cornwell: Ernesto Lefel. And what's the nature of the association between he and your husband?

Tirado: He was working with him.

Cornwell: In the architectural business?

Tirado: Yes, yes. He's a designer.

Cornwell: He's a designer?

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Tirado: He started working with us. He learned some--

Cornwell: Is he a social acquaintance of yours in addition?

Tirado: Is what?

Cornwell: Do you know him on a social basis in addition to his being a business associate of your husband?

Tirado: No business associate. He was working for him, for Horacio.

Cornwell: Okay. That's what I meant. He was an assistant.

Tirado: Assistant.

Cornwell: All right.

Tirado: No social. Sometimes he came to our house to dinner, or something like that.

Cornwell: Next, you I believe pointed to Number 57. Is that correct? Fifty-seven?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Who does that look like?

Tirado: He looks like Gavino Fernandez.

Cornwell: What's the first name?

Tirado: Gavino.

Cornwell: Gavino? And who is he?

Tirado: Well, he's uh, dignitary, and he used to go to the Cuban Institute.

Cornwell: He was a dignitary of what?

Tirado: He was working for the Social Security and he was working, not in this Government period, in the last

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one, and he was working even with the President.

Cornwell: I see, so he was a dignitary of the Mexican Government.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Okay.

Tirado: But when he was going to the Cuban Institute, no, he didn't?

Cornwell: You also knew him from the Cuban Institute?

Tirado: He's an economist.

Cornwell: He's a what?

Tirado: Economist.

Cornwell: Economist. You then pointed to Number 65.

Tirado: Perhaps.

Cornwell: And that's a face that you're not sure you recognize?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: But looks a little bit like who?

Tirado: Solchi Vargas.

Cornwell: Solchi Vargas?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Okay. And who was she?

Tirado: She's Mexican lady who was married with a journalist, he used to work for the Cuban press, and she used to live in Cuba. And now she's at the Cuban Institute.

Cornwell: I believe you next pointed to Number 111--

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Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And that's a, sort of a three-quarter shot from behind.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Of a man you think you might recognize, is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: I'm sort of trying to recall the way you stated it when you first looked at the photographs, so if I misstated it, just correct me.

Who do you think that man may be?

Tirado: The attache, the Cuban Cultural Attache at that time, Luis Alberu.

Cornwell: Alberu?

Tirado: Alberu.

Cornwell: And then I believe you next indicated that you may recognize Photograph 115?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And who is that?

Tirado: Luis Alberu.

Cornwell: That of course is a front and you can clearly recognize him from that photograph, is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Then, you next pointed to Photograph 133. Do you recognize that man?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Who is he?

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Tirado: The doorman. Now I don't remember the name.

Cornwell: But he's the doorman who left Lee Harvey Oswald
into the Consulate on his third visit?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: That's accurate?

Tirado: Uh? . . . I said yes.

Cornwell: Okay. And then I believe you pointed to photograph
158?

Tirado: Numbers 157 and 158.

Cornwell: 157 and 158. Who was that?

Tirado: I think that he was working at the Consulate in
Vera Cruz?

Cornwell: And do you know what his position was at the Con-
sulate?

Tirado: I think he was Vice Consul but I'm not really sure.

Cornwell: And which Consulate is that?

Tirado: In Vera Cruz, Cuban, the Cuban Consulate.

Cornwell: The Cuban Consulate in Vera Cruz.

And I believe finally you recognized possibly the
center man in the group photograph labeled 275.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And who do you think he is?

Tirado: An American.

Cornwell: Do you remember anything more about him?

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Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Do you remember where you saw him?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Do you think you recognized the photo from a personal contact or from a picture?

Tirado: From a picture I think. I think he was an American Ambassador.

Cornwell: American Ambassador?

Tirado: Or something like that.

Cornwell: All right. And you don't have any memory what his name might be?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Okay. Uh. . .

Tirado: But tell me, who is it? (Laughter.) For a change.

Cornwell: Do you recognize the man in photo 266? Yes, that's the one I want. 266?

Tirado: No. He looks like Russian.

Cornwell: Do you recognize the man in 265?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Do you recognize the man in 213?

Tirado: No. You're not going to tell me who's that man?

Cornwell: Not right now. (Laughter.) But maybe later.

When the assassination occurred, do you remember where you were, when you first heard the news reports?

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Tirado: At the Consulate.

Cornwell: And do you know what you did at that time?

Tirado: No, it was almost noon, I mean the lunch hour, about two o'clock, or near two o'clock, and somebody came and said Kennedy was killed, and all was confusion and, uh, well, we were really sorry. Everybody came in and went out and there was confusion. All over. And then I went home to have lunch.

Cornwell: Did you speak to Horatio or anyone else prior to going home?

Tirado: I don't remember, really.

Cornwell: When you went home was he at home?

Tirado: We used to have lunch.

Cornwell: And? As you recall he was there on that day?

Tirado: It was my birthday so he has to be there, (Laughter.)

Cornwell: What if any conversation do you recall having with him at that time about the assassination?

Tirado: No, I don't remember. I only remember at night.

Cornwell: All right. You had a birthday party planned that night. Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: During the day, prior to the birthday party, had you received or heard as part of the news broadcast the name Lee Harvey Oswald?

Tirado: No, only in the afternoon.

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Cornwell: In the afternoon, after lunch?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: After you returned to the Consulate, is that correct?

Tirado: Perhaps.

Cornwell: And at that time, did you think you remembered the name?

Tirado: It was, I think, at night, because, it was in the afternoon, perhaps when they start saying about Oswald. Right? And, it was at night and uh, I don't know if I call my husband or we were in the kitchen mixing some drinks or food, I don't know, but we were in the kitchen and I told him, I think this man went to the Embassy to ask for a visa.

Cornwell: And at that time, had you heard his name?

Tirado: His name?

Cornwell: His name, seen his picture, or both?

Tirado: No, no. The picture was in the newspapers the next day.

Cornwell: Okay. So you only thought that you might have recalled the name. Is that correct?

Tirado: No, not the name, but when they say Lee Harvey Oswald, married to the Russian woman and he live in Russia, and things like that.

Cornwell: Okay. Did you have any other discussion that you can recall with him about it? Based on that news

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report? About your contact?

Tirado: With my husband?

Cornwell: Yes.

Tirado: I only told him, I think this man came to the Embassy.

Cornwell: Then, the next morning you saw a newspaper.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Were you sure at that time that that was the man?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Do you remember who was at the birthday party that night? Do you remember whether or not you discussed these events with any one else at the party?

Tirado: Yes, we were talking about it.

Cornwell: Whoever was at the party.

Tirado: The whole night, yes.

Cornwell: What was the tone of the party?

Tirado: Sorrow. And speculation, what's going on? Because with Kennedy we knew what was going on, but now, what will happen?

Cornwell: The next morning what did you do?

Tirado: I show the paper to Horatio and told him this is the man that went to the Embassy and I went to the Consulate and I look in the Archivos and I saw the application, I saw that it was the man and I went to the Embassy and I talked to the Ambassador and I told him that this

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Cornwell: What was the nature of your conversation with the Ambassador? Just to tell him that that was the man?

Tirado: Yes, I think so.

Cornwell: What was his name?

Tirado: Fernandez Arnes (or Hernandez).

Cornwell: And, did you do anything else? Did you pull the file on him or make any other attempts to put the facts together?

Tirado: I think I leave the file with him.

Cornwell: Pulled the file and left it with the Ambassador?

Tirado: Yeah, the whole bunch.

Cornwell: What would have been in the file besides the application, if anything?

Tirado: Another applications.

Cornwell: I see, you pulled the whole file which included his application?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did anything else happen that morning at work?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Then, did you go home for lunch again?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And what occurred at that time?

Tirado: Uh, my brothers-in-law, servant, maid came and when she saw me, she cried, she started crying, and she said "You're alive?" And I say "why?"; "because some man

came to the house and says that uh, you had an accident and you were dead and they take away Senor Ruben to identify you." Then we went to Ruben's house and it was full of men and they catch me.

Cornwell: They caught you. Okay. And the men were representatives of the Mexican police, is that correct?

Tirado: Yeah, but they never told me.

Cornwell: What happened when you walked into the house, to Ruben's house?

Tirado: I saw my brothers-in-law, wife, and the same thing. She cries, and says "Silvia, you're okay?" "Yes, I'm okay." She was between two men and she couldn't get near to me, but I was walking and I saw in the bedroom, it was Ruben, and full of photographs on the bed and he said the same thing--"Silvia, you're okay, you're all right?" and I say "Yes" and "What happened?" Then I saw the telephone and I try to get the telephone and a man hold my hand and he says you can't call because you are under arrest, and they say, I don't remember, but they say, ah, this is the accomplice of Kennedy. I thought that's what they told but I say I don't remember. They told me, "You're under arrest." I sat down on the bed and I said "You have to show me an order signed by a judge that I am under arrest." Then they hold

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me, my hands, and I try to defend myself, and
they kicked somebody and they took me--

Cornwell: You were trying to kick them and keep them from taking you with them, right?

Tirado: Yes, yes.

Cornwell: Who were you going to call on the telephone?

Tirado: The police.

(Laughter.)

Tirado: The police, the lawyer, I don't know. And when they took me out of the house and I was crying, "Call the police, call the police!" and they, he covered my mouth, and they took me to stationwagon that was parked at the corner. There was a man there but I didn't know him and I was quiet, and they say, "Don't cry. Scandalous woman." "Scandalous old woman, shut up. Because where we are going we will see what's going to happen to you." So, in that moment, I said quit.

Cornwell: So you were taken to the police station?

Tirado: No. It's not the police station. The office where the security, that was where the intelligence agencies were in. But I didn't know that because that building belongs to the State Social Security. Not the one I work for.

Cornwell: Then?

Tirado: For government employees.

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Cornwell: And who else was taken down there besides you?

Tirado: The whole--my brother-in-law, his wife, my sister-in-law, a friend of hers, another woman that was there, and me, but they were taken in another car.

Cornwell: And, at the police station, what inquiries were made of you? What did they ask?

Tirado: Everything. Everything. They asked me my name, where was I born, my jobs, when I married, my status, everything. They have my finger-prints, photographs of myself, everything. And uh, well, they ask me where I was working, if I had been in Cuba, some people that I saw in Cuba, and what I was doing at the Consulate, that there was a tunnel, that makes me laugh, it was a tunnel from the Cuban Embassy to the Russian Embassy, and uh, well, a lot of foolish questions.

Cornwell: Specifically, what did they allege that you had done?

Tirado: What?

Cornwell: Specifically, what did they allege you had done? What did they accuse you of doing?

Tirado: Nothing. They never said--

Cornwell: During the questioning on all the subject matters that you had mentioned, did they make a verbatim transcript? Did they record the conversation, or transcribe it?

Tirado: They used a little machine. They say it is a stenograph or something like that.

Cornwell: They made a stenograph record.

Tirado: Yeah, and a man was writing.

Cornwell: All the questions and all the answers?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did any of the procedures that we have asked you about cause you to say anything to the police that was not the truth?

Tirado: No, I don't think so. I don't have nothing to hide.
So. . .

Cornwell: Everything that you told them was the truth?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: At any time during the questioning did they ever allege that you had met with Oswald outside the Consulate?

Tirado: Yes. A lot of times.

Cornwell: Did they ever ask you any questions about a Negro?

Tirado: I don't remember.

Cornwell: You don't remember anything about that?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Did you ever know, during this same period of time, any Negroes?

Tirado: Yes. At the Commercial Attache was a Negro.

Cornwell: Anyone else?

Tirado: The doorman.

Cornwell: Anyone else?

Tirado: The wife of the Commercial Attache. And the children.

Cornwell: Is that all? Did they ask any specific questions about them?

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Tirado: No.

Cornwell: What was his name?

Tirado: I don't remember. I even don't remember if he was there when Kennedy was shot.

Cornwell: Were they from Cuba?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did you know any other Negroes from Cuba outside the Consulates?

Tirado: I don't think so. Well, this man, the boy at Consulado at Vera Cruz. He was a Negro, not completely, but--

Cornwell: The one you showed us in the photograph?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did you know any Negroes who had red hair?

None of the ones you described did?

Tirado: No, we used to call "Red" to a boy who was working there but he was like Spanish; I mean he was white and--

Cornwell: Not even very dark skinned?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Remember his name?

Tirado: Rogelio, Rogelio Rodriguez, I think, something like that.

Cornwell: After the questioning, first, how did that terminate? When did they finally release you?

Tirado: About one o'clock.

Cornwell: Did you meet again with your family, your husband?

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Tirado: Yes. Well, they were waiting for me and. . .
we went to have lunch, something to eat because we
haven't had. And well, we talk about it.

Cornwell: Remember where you went?

Tirado: No. Horacio told me we went to Sanborn's.
I don't remember. I even don't remember when I got
home and what happened. Next day everyone know.

Cornwell: Did the officers from the Seguridad Department
ever suggest to you during the questioning that they
had information that you and Oswald had been lovers?

Tirado: Yes, and also that we were Communists and that we
were planning the Revolution and uh, a lot of false
things.

Cornwell: What happened the next day?

Tirado: Well, we stayed home and at night a friend of ours
came and we didn't say anything.

Cornwell: Why was that?

Tirado: Why?

Cornwell: Why did you not say anything?

Tirado: Because these people told me to keep quiet.

Cornwell: The police?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Or the officers?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did you then go back over to the Consulate either
Sunday or Monday?

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Tirado: On Monday.

Cornwell: Okay. What happened then?

Tirado: When I got there everybody ask me what happened?
And I say "Why?" And in the newspaper was the
this part of the question that I told you about,
Azcue telling Oswald to go away.

Cornwell: It was in the newspapers?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: How did the newspapers get that story?

Tirado: I don't know.

Cornwell: You never had any idea?

Tirado: Well, of course. The police gave it to Excelsior.
It was the first government newspaper.

Cornwell: So you just always thought they got it from the
police?

Cornwell: But the people at the Consulate said they had read
the newspaper and asked you what had happened, right?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did you discuss that with anybody that you can remem-
ber specifically?

Tirado: With the Ambassador.

Cornwell: And what was the nature of that conversation?

Tirado: I tried to repeat all the questions.

Cornwell: Okay. Uh. . . would that have been a violation of
what the police asked you to do? To talk to the

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Ambassador about that?

Tirado: Huh?

Cornwell: Was that a violation of what the police asked you to do? Was that. . . .

Tirado: Well, of course. They told me to keep quiet. I never says anything about what happened on Saturday. Never. But when I saw in the papers I couldn't say "Well, nothing happened." It was all in the paper and it was exactly what I said to the police.

Cornwell: What did the Ambassador say to you?

Tirado: That he was going to write a report and he sent it in the plane.

Cornwell: What if anything did you consider doing at the time?

Tirado: What?

Cornwell: Did you consider taking any course of action at the time?

Tirado: Oh. I was going to make a protest to the Mexican Government. We went to, a friend of mine was a daughter of the Chief of Tinetra (En) and we could reach the President and we were going to ask to explain what happened and you know, there was an illegal (tape stops). . . .

Cornwell: Did, in addition to your considering filing formal protest with the Mexican Government, did you also consider taking a trip out of the country?

Tirado: No.

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Cornwell: Did you consider going to Cuba?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: What happened after that?

Tirado: Well, I told to the Ambassador all that happened during the questioning and I told him also about the protest that we wanted to make and I asked him, "Don't do anything because we are trying to do something here, against these police." And after that, uh, Tuesday, I went to work and Wednesday morning when I was going to have breakfast the police came again, two agents, and they asked me, very polite, if I want to go with them, just to answer some questions. They wanted to know something. And, uh, it was unnecessary to take my car because they were going to take me and bring me back. So I called uh, the Consulate. That's why I remember I already had the telephone and I said I'm coming in late because I'm going to the police station. Okay, don't worry, we wait for you. And they keep me two days and a half.

Cornwell: And why did they tell you that they kept you this time?

Tirado: Uh, to protect me.

Cornwell: Did they tell you anything in any more detail?

Was there a specific threat?

Tirado: No. They were very rough this time. They were very angry with me, the man that I told you, that I kicked him in his balls. He was very angry, and they repeat the same questions but they were more, how you say, how do you say anticipito?

Lopez: They anticipated her.

Tirado: And they were, wanted to know exactly what I have done in Cuba, the people that I met there, everything. They were asking me questions about all the people that were working in the Embassy and uh, this time I wanted to go to the bathroom and they wouldn't take me and it was longer, because it was about 10:00 from 10:00, I think almost 6:00, they questioned me.

Cornwell: Were you afraid during the two periods they held you?

Tirado: Yes. I don't know exactly what happened but I was uh, I was innocent. So I said, what am I doing here, no? And uh, the only thing that I have, I had the feeling that I was going to die and I said okay, if I'm going to die, I'm going to die, how you say it, with pride, my child will not be shamed. I remember I do anything that--I was very dramatic in those moments. So, sometimes I lost my temper. I never say no bad words or nothing. I cry sometimes, I shout and things like that but then I sat down again.

Cornwell: As I understand it, they tried to scare you, is that correct?

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Tirado: Yes. The first time.

Cornwell: The first time. Because of that was there anything that you knew that you simply refused to tell them?

Tirado: That's what they thought. Because all the time they tell me that I was a Communist and I said I'm not a Communist, but do you believe in Socialism? Yes, I believe in Socialism but I'm not a Communist; and they insisted that I was a very important people for the government, the Cuban Government, and that I was the link for the International Communists--the Cuban Communists, the Mexican Communists and the American Communists, and that we were going to kill Kennedy, and I was the link. For them I was very important.

Of course, it was not true.

Cornwell: Okay. Even though you were innocent of those charges, you had not conspired to kill the President and were not in the Communist Party.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Because that was what they were interested in, because that was the nature of the allegation, did you withhold any part of your story? Were you afraid that something you had done, although innocent, they might have misconstrued, misunderstood, so did you withhold any information from them because of the very severe accusations they were making?

Tirado: No. I tried to answer it, what they asked me I tried to answer. All the time.

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Cornwell: You understand though, the kind of question I'm asking you?

(Tirado spoke to Lopez in Spanish, who asked Cornwell to repeat the question.)

Cornwell: Okay, let me just ask you a hypothetical. Sometimes, a person has done something completely innocent but then they are confronted with a very severe accusation. They may think that their innocent act will be misunderstood by their accusers so they might withhold the innocent act simply to be sure that they don't get into more trouble--

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Simply to be sure they don't get into more trouble than they apparently are already in.

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: There was no thing that you had done or seen or knew about that you withheld because of that?

Tirado: No. No, I explain everything that they wanted to know and uh, I think sometimes they were fools.

Cornwell: They were what?

Lopez: Fools.

Cornwell: Fools.

Tirado: Tonto. Fools.

Cornwell: After they finally released you, they held you for another two, two and a half days. Did you make any

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trips out of the country then?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: How long did you continue to be married to Horatio after that?

Tirado: Five years.

Cornwell: Why were you finally divorced?

Tirado: We separate and we divorce perhaps four years after.

Cornwell: Why was that?

Tirado: Why? Why we divorce four years after?

Because we don't like.

Cornwell: Go ahead.

Tirado: Because he did not want to get legal problems and he said that it was a lot of problems to get divorced. He was married once so he said that it was nonsense.

Cornwell: Why were you separated?

Tirado: Because I used to believe in the romantic love, and even we have a very, how you say that, uh, we loved each other very much but it was not the passionate love that I used to believe in, so I thought it better to divorce, get divorced. It is very difficult to explain.

(Tirado speaks to Lopez in Spanish.)

Lopez: They were incompatible, had incompatible characters.

Cornwell: You have not spoken to anybody in the news media or any official investigating body since 1963 about these events, is that correct, except for the

Washington Post and that was approximately a year or so ago, a year and a half ago?

Tirado: Yeah.

Cornwell: You indicate that you read some part of the Warren Commission Report recently. Do you recall anything about that that was inaccurate other than what you have already related? The part that you read.

Tirado: What?

Cornwell: Was there any part of that which was inaccurate that you can recall?

Tirado: What I said. That I was exceeding my duties.

Cornwell: Had you either done anything or offered to do anything for Oswald other than what you have already described to us?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: And was that all within the scope of your responsibility?

Tirado: It was. . . .?

Cornwell: Was it all within the scope of your authority?

Tirado: Scope?

(Lopez translates.)

Tirado: Yes.

(Tirado speaks to Lopez in Spanish.)

Cornwell: Did you ever have any of the people at the Cuban Consulate attend parties in your home? Was there

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a social relationship with any of them?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Which ones?

Tirado: Azcue, Maria Carmen, I think Luisa, she went once.

Cornwell: Who is that? Luisa?

Tirado: Luisa Caldarón, the one you ask me.

Cornwell: Okay. Azcue, Luisa, and the secretary who was killed,
is that correct?

Tirado: Before, before this, before I used to work at the
Embassy, uh, and before we move to Constituyentes
we make some parties, for instance, when Armando Hart
(Ph.) was here, he was the Minister of Education, and
with the Ambassador he was in that time and Organa,
who was Director of the Movies Institute. Some people
who came from Cuba. We used to invite.

Cornwell: Okay. How about Theresa Proenza?

Tirado: Perhaps she came.

Cornwell: Did you ever receive any indication from them that
any of them had ever had a contact with Oswald?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Did Elena or Elinita Garro de Paz ever come to those
parties? In your home?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Or in the home of Ruben?

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Tirado: Once, but it was, I think it was before that I was
in the Cuban Embassy.

Cornwell: Would it have been approximately around '63?

Tirado: I don't know because when they came from France. . .

Cornwell: Approximately 1963?

Tirado: I only, perhaps, I don't know.

Hardway: Did you say that it was when they came from France?

Tirado: Yes.

Hardway: It was after they returned from France that they
came to one of the parties?

Tirado: Yeah, to Ruben's house.

Hardway: At Ruben's house.

Tirado: Yeah. That was the whole family there.

I only saw Elena a few times. One was the day that
I got married and another time was somewhere else,
I think three times I only saw her.

Cornwell: Did you know General Clark Flores?

Tirado: Yeah, but not very well.

Cornwell: Was he ever at those parties?

Tirado: I don't remember. Perhaps once, at Ruben's house
but not at my house.

Cornwell: Did you know Emilio Carbillido ?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did he ever attend those parties?

Tirado: I don't remember.

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Cornwell: Did Devaci?

Tirado: Devaci. Elena's sister.

Cornwell: Did she attend those parties?

Tirado: No, she went, I think I saw her sometimes at the Embassy.

Cornwell: How about Eunice Odio?

Tirado: No. I know her, I mean I met her sometime. But, no. She was not a close friend.

Cornwell: Over the years, have any of those people ever indicated to you that they had any knowledge of Oswald's trip to Mexico City?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Have they ever professed to have either seen him or heard any stories about any one who did see or meet with him?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Has anyone else ever come to you since 1963 and professed to have knowledge of Oswald's trip to Mexico City?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Would you have any reason to believe that if we spoke to any of those people they could have information of help to us?

Tirado: I don't know.

Cornwell: Have you ever had any association with any intelligence agency of any country, including our own?

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Tirado: Once I met a Russian when I was working at the Press Agency but he was from the Russian Press, and they say that he was from the police, the Russian Police but I don't know.

Cornwell: But you just met him one time?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: I don't have any additional questions.

Lopez: I have a few questions of Ms. Duran. As normal procedure, when a person came to the Cuban Consulate, do you explain to them that there are different types of visas?

Tirado: No.

Lopez: So they would normally come to you and ask you for a special type of visa, and then you would get that kind of application?

Tirado: Uh, huh.

Lopez: Okay.

Tirado: The application was the same.

Lopez: Same application. But they were different visas.

Tirado: There were only two visas. Transit visa and normal visa.

Lopez: You didn't normally explain to people whether there were two different types of visas when they came to you until after--

Tirado: Perhaps.

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Lopez: Okay. I just wanted to read to you a couple of sections of what was recorded in the Warren Commission Report. What happened was, there was a report given by the Mexican authorities to the Warren Commission and it was published in the report and let me read you one sentence, okay?

The declarant complied with her duties, took down all the information and completed the appropriate application form, and the declarant admittedly, exceeding her responsibilities, informally telephoned the Russian Consulate with the intention of doing what she could to facilitate issuance of the Russian visa to Lee Harvey Oswald.

Is that statement accurate?

Tirado: It's that one and I don't like it. The other one?

Lopez: That part about admittedly exceeding her responsibilities?

Tirado: Uh huh.

Cornwell: That's the part you had reference to earlier when you told us that you had read something--

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: It says here that you telephoned the Russian Consulate.

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: Did he ever telephone you back?

Tirado: No.

Lopez: Okay. And it says here with the intention of doing what she could to facilitate issuance of the Russian visa. Did you ever do anything else to facilitate the issuance of the visa?

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Tirado: No, nothing. I couldn't do anything.

Lopez: Did you ever explain to him that in order to get a visa he could have a recommendation letter from a fellow Communist or a fellow Cuban citizen, and then if he had that letter, he could get a visa?

Tirado: Yeah, that was one of the requirements.

Lopez: And then, did you ever send him to anyone, give him the name of anybody?

Tirado: No, never. I mean I never did that.

Lopez: I see. Okay. Then there's another section here that says:

However, they told her (this is the Russian Consulate) that there would be a delay of about four months in processing the case.

Was that the first time that you explained to Lee Harvey Oswald that it would take him about four months to get a visa?

Tirado: Yes, I didn't know it.

Lopez: Was that when he became angry?

Tirado: More or less.

Lopez: More or less. And that would have been on his third visit?

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: Okay. Then there's one other section here. It says:

The Consulate who came out and began a heated discussion in English with Oswald, that concluded by Azcue telling him that if it were up to him he would not give him the visa and a person of this type was harming

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the Cuban Revolution rather than helping it. It being understood that in the conversation they were talking about the Russian Socialist Revolution and not the Cuban.

Is that correct?

Tirado: No.

Lopez: What is your understanding of that?

Tirado: The conversation that he had with Azcue, was exclusively with the Cuban Revolution.

Lopez: Exclusively with the Cuban Revolution.

I wanted to ask you, in this report here, they don't say how many times Lee Harvey Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate. Did you ever tell the Mexican officials how many times he had visited?

Tirado: I think so.

Lopez: And it was probably taken down by a stenographer.

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: Do you consider this report which is about a page long to be completely fair and accurate and complete?

Tirado: No, because about exceeding my duties and about Azcue speaking about the Russian Revolution, that's not true.

Lopez: But, my question is, they interrogated you from about four in the afternoon until about twelve at night, and in that process you spoke to them for eight whole hours and yet the whole conversation, interrogation, has been reduced to one page. Do you consi-

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der this accurate? Is it complete?

Tirado: No, of course not. Because they ask me a lot of questions that has not been in the Warren--about my trip to Cuba, about my job at the Institute, the Cuban Institute, about why I have been Communist, as they say, and I say I'm not a Communist, and it takes hours to explain them. And as you explain you are not a Communist, if you are a member of the Communist Party, things like that, and where did you take your beliefs, no? I say at the University, oh, at the University, and then there's a discussion and uh, the classes I take at the University, and things like that.

Lopez: Okay. You do remember telling the Mexican officials when they questioned you how many times Oswald visited the Consulate?

Tirado: I think so. And I, they asked me I don't know how many times, the way that I used to give my name and telephone number and they made me write and they take the paper out and then again, they ask me, how do you do this, and I write it down, and I give the paper. I think I did it five or six times.

Lopez: And did they ever ask you to describe Oswald?

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: Would you do me a favor and describe him for me now?

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Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: For example, let's start at the beginning. Was he tall, short?

Tirado: Short.

Lopez: Short. Could you stand up for a minute, Gary?

(Laughter.)

Would you say he was as tall as Gary?

Tirado: Yeah, more or less.

Lopez: Would you say he was taller than Gary?

Tirado: No, I think just the same. He was about my size.

Lopez: About your height?

Tirado: Yeah.

Lopez: Okay. And what's your height?

Tirado: 160. I think 160 or 162. **-5'5"**

Lopez: Was he skinny?

Tirado: Yes. Skinny.

Lopez: Could you estimate how much he weighed?

Tirado: About your weight, more or less.

Lopez: About my weight. We already went over. . . .

Tirado: He has stronger shoulders, perhaps, than yours.

Lopez: Just for the record, my weight is 119 pounds. You told us before he had a suit on.

Tirado: That I don't remember very well. I think he was wearing a jacket but what I can remember is that he was not wearing nice clothes, expensive clothing.

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He was cheap, perhaps.

Lopez: Do you remember what his nose looked like? Was it skinny? Fat?

Tirado: No. He was normal. There was nothing that you may remember. The eyes were small.

Lopez: Small eyes.

Tirado: Smaller than yours.

Lopez: Smaller than mine, for the record. I can't do that.

Tirado: If you describe, you say small eyes.

Cornwell: Okay. In sum, you identified a picture in the book as being as best as you can remember his face and hair. Was there anything about that which in your memory was different from the picture other than the fact that you do remember his eyes being blue or green and his hair being very light colored or blond but not as light as some of the other pictures look.

Tirado: And he has not very much. He was, has few, poco pelo.

Lopez: He didn't have very much hair.

Cornwell: Is there anything else about that picture in the book which does not look like your memory of him?

Tirado: No, but because even when I saw the television when he was shot, I used to remember him. I mean it was the same that I remember.

Lopez: I understand. If you bear with me just a few more minutes--his hair line, was it receding?

Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 45.

Tirado: Yeah, yeah. Quite a bit.

Lopez: Okay. And his cheeks, were they high cheek bones or low cheek bones? Do you remember that?

Tirado: Well, I remember that he was a little, I don't know what you call it (spoke with Lopez in Spanish.)

Lopez: An elongated face.

Tirado: Uh huh.

Lopez: Did he have a long chin?

Tirado: No.

Lopez (To Cornwell): Do you have any more questions about his description?

Lopez (To Duran): Just wanted to ask you a few other questions. Did Luis Aparicio ever attend any of those twist parties that you had, or that Ruben had?

Tirado: No, Ruben never, Ruben never have parties for the people at the Embassy.

Lopez: Did he ever attend?

Tirado: Aparico, he was, I don't remember, where he was, I think he works in the Commercial Office. I don't remember.

Lopez: You don't remember if he went to any parties?

Tirado: No. But he was at the Cuban Embassy.

Lopez: Okay. Do you know a person named Eunice Odio?

Tirado: Yes.

Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 46.

Lopez: What was your relationship to Eunice Odio?

Tirado: It was not close. I know her because she's a poetess and uh, well, I know a lot of painters, things like that, but just hello and. . perhaps if I meet her now I don't know if I could recognize or even she recognize me.

Lopez: I see. And did she ever attend any of those parties?

Tirado: No.

Lopez: Do you know a person named Ricardo Guerra?

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: And what was your relationship to him?

Tirado: Very close.

Lopez: Very close. Could you elaborate?

Tirado: Well, when I was unmarried I had a lot of friends and his sisters were friends of mine, that's when I met him, before I got married. And when I married, we continued our friendship and uh, he got married with a writer, but I admire her very much, and he was a very close friend of mine, and we continue the relation all the time that we were married. Both. And uh, he was professor at the philosophy faculty, he was my teacher also. I mean he was a close friend.

Lopez: I see. He was a professor, you said.

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: Did you ever attend any seminars at the University of Mexico where he was lecturing?

Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 47.

Tirado: No, we used to have in our house.

Lopez: What were those seminars about?

Tirado: Marxism seminar.

Lopez: You never, though, attended any seminars at the University of Mexico?

Tirado: No, he was a teacher and I used to take lessons with him. Existentialism, you know? (Spoke in Spanish.) Only two courses.

Lopez: Do you know if he ever held seminars at the University of Mexico?

Tirado: He had to.

Lopez: By any chance do you remember if he would ever hold seminars on Saturdays?

Tirado: No.

Lopez: No, he did not or no, you do not remember?

Tirado: I don't know, I don't know.

Hardway: I've just got a few questions that if you'll bear with me. . . .

During the three times that you met Oswald, did you ever hear him speak any language other than English?

Tirado: No.

Hardway: In general, in the Consulate's Office, was it common for any other language other than Spanish to be spoken?

Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 48.

Tirado: No.

Hardway: Was Russian ever commonly spoken at the Consulate's Office?

Tirado: No.

Hardway: Do you remember anyone having spoken Russian in that office?

Tirado: No.

Hardway: At any time?

Tirado: No, I don't think. The only language they speak, it was English, and not everybody, just a few of them.

Hardway: When Oswald came back the third time, did he tell you that he had a Russian visa or that the Russians had told him that there wouldn't be any problem?

Tirado: That he was going to get the Russian visa, that there was no problem.

Hardway: Did he tell you that he was going to get it, or that he already had it?

Tirado: He said I already got it.

Hardway: And he told you that he already had it as opposed to telling you that they had assured him that there was no problem?

Tirado: Yes.

Hardway: Could you tell me what Eusebio Azcue thought about John Fitzgerald Kennedy, President Kennedy?

Tirado: What he thought? About the assassination?

Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 49.

Hardway: No, about President Kennedy.

Tirado: I don't know, I don't remember.

Hardway: Did you ever discuss President Kennedy with
Consul Azcue?

Tirado: No, he was not here when Kennedy was killed.

Hardway: I'm asking not about the assassination but about
Kennedy and his policies and things like that.

Tirado: No.

Hardway: Did you ever hear Azcue discuss it with anyone
else?

Tirado: No.

Hardway: Did--

Lopez: Have you seen Azcue since 1963?

Tirado: I don't remember if he came. His son came, and
I don't remember if he came once to Mexico and he
told me about the conversation that he had with
Fidel Castro but I told you the other day what
Fidel says and all of that and the way they write
a protest to Mexico, to the Mexican Government,
but I'm not really sure if he was his son, or if he
was Azcue.

Lopez: Would you have seen Azcue at any time during the last
two years?

Tirado: No, I think that I never saw him again.

His son, he came, I saw him, but, Azcue, I don't remember.

Lopez: Do you know if Eusebio Azcue is still in Cuba?

Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 50.

Tirado: I think so. I don't know.

Hardway: Did you ever discuss with Consul Azcue the policies of United States towards Cuba? Or other Latin American countries?

Tirado: Perhaps we did, but I don't remember.

Hardway: Do you remember by chance what Azcue's views would have been on that? Did you ever discuss Azcue's views on changing that policy?

Tirado: What I remember is that during the Blockade (spoke to Lopez in Spanish.)

Lopez: The Student Economic Bloc of 1968.

The strike, I'm sorry. The economic blockade.

Tirado: What I remember but I don't remember exactly if it was Azcue, the Commercial Attache, the Ambassador, but what I remember, it was all the people, they have expectations and they were how you say, trusting, that with Kennedy, the policy of the American Government was changing. They were hoping. . .

Hardway: Did you or anyone else at the Consulate ever offer Lee Harvey Oswald any aid of any kind?

Tirado: No.

Hardway: Did you ever know a person by the name of Guillermo Ruiz?

Tirado: No.

Hardway: Just for the record, when you were arrested on that Saturday afternoon, what time that arrest was, approximately?

Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 51.

Tirado: About three o'clock.

Hardway: Was the interrogation that was conducted at that time transcribed or taped?

Tirado: It was written and when I sign I read it.

Hardway: Was it written out in a summary form or was it written out as you said it?

Tirado: They change, because once it was a man with a little machine, and another moment it was a man writing, typing.

Hardway: But most of it was taken down literally, as you said it?

Tirado: And with the typewriter.

Hardway: Did you sign that which was taken down as you said it?
Or did you sign a summary of that?

(Lopez translated.)

Tirado: No, no, no. They were typing, all the time. They were typing all the time, even once, I don't know how many times, they told me, slow, because he was writing. But they didn't write exactly what I said sometimes because when I read all of that bunch of papers they say, come on, it's one o'clock, here, sign this. I said, no, I'm not going to sign this if I not read it. And sometimes I said this, I didn't say that. For instance, no? For instance, I'd remember, they say she was very, very glad when Kennedy came. And I say no. I said I like it but I didn't say that I was

Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 52.

very, very glad. Things like that, no?

But almost, it was what I said. But they didn't want to change anything.

Hardway: Okay. Did you ever discuss the allegation that they made that you had been Lee Harvey Oswald's lover with your husband?

Tirado: Well, I told him almost all what happened. He told me what they did to him and I told him what they did to me.

Hardway: Do you remember specifically talking about that specific allegation with your husband?

Tirado: No, it was not important.

Hardway: Going back to when you recognized Oswald, the man whose picture you had seen in the paper as the man who had been at the Embassy three times. Were you certain that the man in the papers was the same man, before you checked your records at the Archives?

Tirado: Yes. Immediately I saw the paper, I told him. This was the man that I want to check.

Hardway: To your knowledge, was Horatio ever a member of the Communist Party?

Tirado: I think that he was, I don't know if he was exactly member, but he was sympathizer and we had a lot of friends that they were members of the Communist Party.

Hardway: Oh, to your knowledge, was Horatio ever a member of any intelligence organization?

Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 53.

Tirado: I don't remember exactly. I think he was working for the, how you say that? I think he was in a campaign. Against the drugs.

Hardway: Do you know when that would have been?

Tirado: No.

Hardway: Do you know when he would have been a sympathizer for, with the Communist Party?

Tirado: I think it was before we got married.

Tirado: Well, I'm completely sure. Being Communist, being policeman. All of that, it was after I meet him.

Hardway: Do you know why--

Tirado: I mean before I meet him.

Hardway: Do you know why they asked you to keep quiet after the first interrogation?

Tirado: No, I don't.

Hardway: Did you ever attend a party where Lee Harvey Oswald was present?

Tirado: The party where Lee, no, I don't know that he attends some parties.

Hardway: The question was, did you ever attend a party where he was present?

Tirado: No.

Hardway: That's all I've got.

Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 54.

Cornwell: Just two brief matters and I promise we will end this very long questioning session.

The questions which were just asked you about which languages he spoke, by Mr. Hardway, when the call was made to the Russian Embassy, what language was spoken there?

Tirado: Spanish.

Cornwell: Did the Russians speak Spanish too?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did at any point in that conversation Russian-speaking people get involved? Did anyone at the Russian Embassy speak Russian to you?

Tirado: I don't speak Russian.

Cornwell: Well. I understand that. Did you at any point put Oswald on the phone and let him talk?

Tirado: No, no.

Cornwell: The reason I'm asking of course is to try to jog your memory. Did he at any point in that transaction speak Russian? Did Oswald speak Russian that you recall?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: The second question, just to be sure that we've got your memory as accurate as we can on it, have you not spoken to Azcua at all since 1963?

Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 55.

Tirado: That's something that I don't exactly remember.

If he came once or if he was with his son, but I knew all about Fidel's and Azcue's conversations.

Cornwell: So you do remember either talking to Azcue or his son about the Oswald trip?

Tirado: Not the Oswald trip, the Fidel, what he says. Because Azcue was called by Fidel Castro in that day when the Cuban Ambassador sent my report. That's what I told you the other day. In the same day they speak to Azcue, Fidel, they spoke, they have a conversation, and then on the second day, that Sunday present, they protest to Mexican Ambassador.

Cornwell: You described to us earlier how the Ambassador filed a report. Did you ever see the report?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Do you know what was in it by any other means? To the best of your knowledge, it would at least have

(Tape ends.)

TAPE 3

Sylvia Tirado (Duran)
Page 1.

Cornwell: Okay. The first part of your memory is that, as I understand it, the Ambassador filed a report within three days or so after the assassination and your arrest, right?
Then you mentioned something about Fidel talking to Azcue is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: How did you learn that?

Tirado: That's what I don't remember.

Cornwell: Okay. At any rate, what can you remember about the nature of that contact? Between Azcue and Fidel?

Tirado: Fidel asked him what happened exactly that day in the Consulate and Azcue tried to remember everything and he said what he knew, that Fidel was afraid of uh, if I was going to say something false to, because I was threatened by the police, and uh, Azcue says that no, that I was honest and I was not going to do anything false. That that was not the right thing, the truth, . . .

Cornwell: Okay. In other words, Fidel was worried about the possibility that you would say something against the Cuban Government?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And that's because you were a Mexican citizen, is that correct?

Sylvia Tirado
Page 2.

Tirado: And I was, . . . (asked Lopez how to translate)
threatened.

Cornwell: Okay. So he was afraid that the Mexican authorities might threaten you and that you might say something against the Cuban Government?

Tirado: Yeah. Because the police many times told me, you have to say the truth. Remember that you have a little child. And . . . remember, you have a daughter. And remember you have a daughter. All the time they were telling me this.

Cornwell: Okay. Did you possess any information that might have incriminated the Cuban Government?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: And you can't remember how it is that you learned about this questioning of Azcue by Fidel, is that right?

Tirado: Yeah.

Cornwell: Then, several years later, you had another conversation with either Azcue or his son, is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Do you think it might have been Azcue?

Tirado: Could be.

Cornwell: Is that when you learned about his conversations with Fidel?

Tirado: Yes.

Sylvia Tirado
Page 3.

Cornwell: During that period of time, when you spoke to Azcue two or three years later, what if anything did he have to say about the assassination?

Tirado: What did he say?

Cornwell: Yes.

Tirado: I don't know.

Cornwell: When you believed you may have talked to him.

Did he have any theories or speculation?

Tirado: I don't remember. I only remember the part that they were talking about me.

Cornwell: Did he believe as strongly as you apparently do that the person who was on television and in the newspapers was the same man who went into the Consulate?

Tirado: Yes. I don't know about television because he was not here.

Cornwell: He was not on television here?

Tirado: No, no. Azcue was not here.

Cornwell: I know, but I mean when you talked to him two or three years later. Did he say anything about that?

Tirado: No. I don't remember.

Cornwell: Do you think for sure that the man who was on television was the man who came to the Consulate?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: The man who was killed by Jack Ruby?

Tirado: Yes.

Sylvia Tirado
Page 4.

Cornwell: Did you see him being killed by Ruby on television?

Tirado: Yes, yes.

Cornwell: Was there anything about him that looked different to you?

Tirado: No. It was black and white. So I couldn't see the color. But he looks like the one that I met.

Cornwell: Guess that's all the questions and thank you again for being so patient with us and answering all of our endless questions.

Lopez: It is 9:15 p.m.

br 7-6-73


Mr. CORNWELL. Also there is a diagram which is made reference to in the transcript. We might mark that separately as F-440B, and with your permission, also enter that in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]



Zacwota



Francisco Márquez

Exhibit #1
Prepared by Sylvia
Duran, 6/6/78.

Calzada Tacubaya

JFK EXHIBIT F-440B

JFK Exhibit F-440B

Mr. CORNWELL. The early portion of the transcript simply established her present name, that her name in 1963 was Sylvia Tirado Duran, the fact that the tape recording of the interview began at 5:45 in the afternoon, and that her birthday is November 22, 1937.

We might ask that those who have transcripts—there were copies provided both for the press and the public and to the committee, if you would turn to page 5, we will begin the tape recording at the top of page 5 of the transcript.

[Tape recording was played.]

Mr. CORNWELL. At that point, Mrs. Tirado did make a sketch of the consulate which is now part of the record. We would ask, however, that we now move to page 19 of the transcript and continue her testimony at that point, near the bottom of page 19.

[Tape recording was played.]

Mr. CORNWELL. At this point, Mr. Chairman, we would ask that we turn to page 25 of the transcript, beginning near the bottom.

[Tape recording was played.]

Mr. CORNWELL. We next ask, Mr. Chairman, that we turn to page 45, or 40, excuse me, near the top of the page.

[Tape recording was played.]

Mr. CORNWELL. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we turn to page 47, near the top portion of the page.

[Tape recording was played.]

Mr. CORNWELL. I next ask, Mr. Chairman, that we turn to page 54, toward the middle or slight upper portion of the page.

[The playing of the recording was resumed.]

Mr. CORNWELL. And the final portion of the tape recording, Mr. Chairman, begins on the following page, which is labeled page 1 of tape 2.

[The playing of the recording was resumed.]

Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. Chairman, we also, while we were in Mexico, spoke to Mr. Horacio Duran. That is the man who is displayed in the blue coat, in JFK exhibit F-432, and who was Sylvia Duran's husband in 1953. We also spoke to Ruben Duran, who is Horacio's brother, and who is displayed in the white shirt in JFK exhibit F-431. And to Betty Serratos, the lady on the left in the array of JFK exhibits, numbered F-430, and who was the wife of Ruben.

Each of those individuals was, of course, around Sylvia, spoke to her during the traumatic events after the assassination of the President. And each of them provided information to us of substantially the same nature in all significant respects as that which you have just heard in the tape recording of Sylvia Duran.


We would ask at this time that those three exhibits be placed into evidence.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point.


[The information follows:]



JFK EXHIBIT F-432



JFK EXHIBIT F-431



JFK EXHIBIT F-430

Mr. FAUNTROY. Would the gentleman yield, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from the District of Columbia.

Mr. FAUNTROY. I take it that their statements are also a part of the record, a part of our files.

Mr. CORNWELL. They are part of the files of the committee, that is correct.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you.

Chairman STOKES. Is counsel finished?

Mr. CORNWELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, the next witness to be called is Eusebio Azcue Lopez. Mr. Azcue was the Cuban consul in Mexico City in September 1963 who informed the individual who visited the consulate and gave his name as Lee Harvey Oswald that he would not be issued a visa to Cuba. Senor Azcue is presently living in retirement in Cuba. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Senor Azcue.

Chairman STOKES. Prior to calling the witness, the Chair will once again advise that this particular witness, due to security reasons, we are requesting that all persons remain in their seats any time the witness comes into the hearing room or at any time that the witness is leaving the hearing room. We ask that all persons please cooperate with those arrangements with the committee.

At this time the committee calls Mr. Azcue.

The Chair requests first that the interpreter please stand and be sworn.

Sir, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you interpret before the committee will be a truthful and accurate interpretation of the testimony of the witness to the best of your ability?

Mr. ANTHONY J. HERVAS. I do.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you. I would ask that the witness be sworn.

Mr. Azcue, please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Senor AZCUE [through the interpreter]. Yes, sir.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you. You may be seated.

Does counsel desire to be heard prior to the witness testifying?

Mr. STANDARD. Yes; with the Chairman's permission. My name is Michael Standard of the law firm of Rabinowitz, Boudin & Standard of New York.

Mr. CORNWELL. Excuse me, Mr. Standard. Would you mind moving the microphone so we can make a record of your statement.

Mr. STANDARD. For the past 17 years the office has represented the legal interests of the Government of Cuba in the United States.

To my immediate left sits Sr. Eusebio Azcue, the witness. To his left sits Sr. Ricardo Escartin, first secretary and consul of the Cuban Interest Section in Washington; and to his left, Capt. Felipe Villa, of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Cuba.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appear here today in two capacities. One, to reflect the view of the Cuban Government that the assassination of President John F. Kennedy

was an act of the vilest kind, an act unacceptable by any standards of human and political behavior.

Both at the time of the convening of the Warren Commission and today, the Cuban Government has cooperated to the fullest extent in providing what information it has at its disposal to the U.S. authorities investigating the event.

Second, to accompany two former consuls of the Republic of Cuba who were present in Mexico City in the period September 1963 through August 1964, both of whom appear today of their own volition, and as a result of the Cuban Government's decision to provide the Congress of the United States with the testimony of such witnesses as may aid in the process of gathering evidence regarding the assassination.

On the day following the assassination, President Castro, in a speech televised to the people of Cuba, and devoted exclusively to the implications for his country, said, and I quote:

It is in the interest of the American people and all the people of the world that it be known, that it be demanded what is really behind the Kennedy assassination, that all the facts be revealed.

On April 3, 1978 members and staff of this committee had an extensive interview with President Fidel Castro in Havana. President Castro made it abundantly clear, and I quote from the transcript of the interview:

We are very much interested in having Kennedy's assassination clarified because in one way or the other attempts have been made to try to have Cuba involved in it. We have our conscience clear. There is nothing as important as having your conscience clean—absolutely clean. That's why it is not a matter of conscience, but rather a matter of political, historical interest to have all these problems clarified.

It is in that context, and with that hope, that Senors Azcue and Mirabal appear here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you, counsel.

The Chair at this time recognizes Mr. Gary Cornwell.

TESTIMONY OF SENOR EUSEBIO AZCUE LOPEZ, FORMER CUBAN CONSUL IN MEXICO CITY

[The examination of Senor Azcue was conducted through the interpreter.]

Mr. CORNWELL. Would you state your name for the record.

Senor Azcue. Eusebio Azcue Lopez.

Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, you are presently a resident and a citizen of Cuba, is that correct?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. CORNWELL. What is your age?

Senor AZCUE. 67.

Mr. CORNWELL. And where were you born?

Senor AZCUE. Havana, Cuba.

Mr. CORNWELL. You are presently retired?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir, I am retired.

Mr. CORNWELL. In 1963, what was your occupation?

Senor AZCUE. Consul of Cuba in Mexico, Mexico City.

Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, when did you first go to live in Mexico prior to 1963?

Senor AZCUE. In 1944.

Mr. CORNWELL. What was the basic nature of your occupation between that date and 1963?

Senor AZCUE. I was an architect in Mexico before the triumph of the revolution. At the time the revolution triumphed, I was requested to take charge of the Cuban consulate in Mexico City.

Mr. CORNWELL. For how long a period of time or until what date did you hold that position?

Senor AZCUE. Until November 18, 1963, though since the month of September of 1963 I had started to turn over affairs to the new consul who was to replace me, Mr. Alfredo Mirabal.

Mr. CORNWELL. And on November 18, 1963, when you did ultimately turn over that position to Senor Mirabal, where did you go?

Senor AZCUE. I went directly and definitively to Havana.

Mr. CORNWELL. I would like to direct your attention to an exhibit which has been marked for identification as JFK exhibit F-408. That exhibit is provided in an enlargement form, and a photograph of it in a smaller form has been handed to the witness.

Can you tell us what type of document that is?

Senor AZCUE. This form is a request that was given to foreigners who approached the consulate requesting a visa to travel to Cuba.

Mr. CORNWELL. May we have that exhibit admitted into evidence, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered in the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, can you tell us, do you recognize that document?

Senor AZCUE. Yes; it is a document that we used at the consulate to be completed at the request of the applicant.

Mr. CORNWELL. The document bears the date 1963. Would you tell us what function that document served during that period of time.

Senor AZCUE. This document?

Mr. CORNWELL. That is correct.

Senor AZCUE. We had large amounts of printed forms of this nature, of these applications, and they had to be completed in sextuplicate, that is to say six copies of this document, to which were attached their photographs. They had to affix their signatures, as well as provide all the detailed information that was required to accompany the request.

Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, this particular document bears the name Lee Harvey Oswald, and the date September 27, 1963. Do you recall the occasion upon which this application was filed with your consulate?

Senor AZCUE. Fine. This gentleman wants me to narrate the antecedents of the visits of this individual to the consulate. Is that the nature of the question?

Mr. CORNWELL. That is correct. If you recall the occasion on which this specific application was filed, would you describe that occasion for us.

Senor AZCUE. Certainly, with pleasure. Yes, this gentleman appeared on the date indicated at the consulate, requesting a visa to travel to Cuba. This gentleman was referred to, as was the usual practice in the consulate, to Mrs. Sylvia Duran, a Mexican citizen, who was responsible for handling these contacts with persons applying for such visas.

Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, in a previous interview with the staff you stated that the very first occasion to your memory on which you saw this individual was 1 to 2 days before the date on this application. Is that still accurate to the best of your memory?

Senor AZCUE. It is something that I cannot state categorically. I cannot state whether it was on the very same day, a day before, or several days before, and I am in a position to explain why.

Mr. CORNWELL. Please do.

Senor AZCUE. He approaches us. The secretary normally takes care of the case. There is no need for me personally to go out to see him unless he specifically requests that I do so, as a special case, that he requests either my presence or the presence of another Cuban consul responsible. He did so. He requested my presence because when he initially formulated the application with the secretary, the secretary explained to him all of the requirements that he would have to fulfill in order to obtain the visa. And as he was carrying along certain documents which he believed would be sufficient for the visa, and the secretary could not resolve the case, he then calls upon me to see whether I, upon examination of those documents, can proceed to issue the visa immediately. I answered negatively.

The documents that he submits are not enough. He is exhibiting or producing documents such as, one, attesting to his membership

in the U.S. Communist Party. Also another indicating that he is a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Also another document indicating his residence in the Soviet Union, as well as a marriage certificate to a Soviet citizen.

Upon presentation of these documents, he thinks that I will be able to solve his problem and grant him a visa.

I at that time tell him that this is not sufficient; that I must request authorization from the Cuban Government. And at that point he agrees to proceed to fill the application out in order to process the visa.

At that point, he leaves the consulate, conceivably to look for some photographs. One could think whether he returned on that very same date with the photographs; it is possible that he might have returned on that very same date with the photographs, or that he might have returned the following day.

As far as the date that appears herein, and bearing in mind that I received him on three occasions, maybe it would be possible to determine that on this very same date, it is possible, I cannot fully guarantee this, it is possible that on that same day he might have made the first two visits to the consulate; one during the morning very early, and the second one a little later, bringing the photographs in order to complete the application.

There is a sufficient time for such a thing.

Mr. CORNWELL. Was the first visit of this man that you have just described to us during the normal working hours at the consulate?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, without a doubt. The consulate opened at 10 in the morning and closed at 2.

Mr. CORNWELL. Directing your attention, then, to the second occasion on which, as you have just described, the individual returned with photographs which could be attached to the visa application, what occurred on that second occasion?

Senor AZCUE. I did not assist. I was not present at the very time when the secretary receives the photograph and fills the documents. That is a function that pertains properly to her. He very probably insisted once again on the need to proceed urgently to Cuba or to transit Cuba.

As the amount of time required to process this document by our own Government was one that I could not predetermine, it could be a matter of 15 days, 20 days, or the response could be negative, during this second visit that he makes to me I bring up or note that if he already had a visa to go to the Soviet Union, I would be in a position to grant him a visa to Cuba without the need to consult my Government, in terms of a transit to the Soviet Union.

This should have been clearly stated or established during the course of the second visit that he made. Whether it might have been on the same day or 2 days thereafter, I tend to believe that it will have been on the date that appears on the application, that is to say on the 27th.

Mr. CORNWELL. So the second occasion that you have just described would have been the date on the visa application, September 27, is that correct?

Senor AZCUE. That is very correct.

Mr. CORNWELL. At the termination of the conversation on this occasion, what if anything did the individual do?

Senor AZCUE. I believe, and this is something I think, that he left or withdrew from the consulate, and we can imagine or conclude that he attempted to obtain a visa from the Soviet Union, because he was a resident of the Soviet Union and he was married to a Soviet citizen, according to what he stated.

Mr. CORNWELL. After he left on this second occasion, did you have any conversations with the Soviet Embassy about this routine, in other words, about the possibility of him obtaining a visa from the Soviet Embassy?

Senor AZCUE. I don't know whether it was that very same day or on the following day. A few years have gone by since, and it is very difficult to determine or recall exactly the manner in which the events occurred exactly. It is possible to reconstruct a sequence.

It could have been that very same day or the following day. But obviously if the first two visits took place on the 27th, the third visit would have had to take place on the following day, because in and during the same day it is not possible to complete three visits that are separated by time, and at the same time to undertake the necessary actions to obtain the photographs we needed.

In fact, after he left the consulate, I received a telephone call from the consulate of the Soviet Union. I cannot guarantee whether it was on that very same day or on the following day. But whatever day it might have been, the consulate of the Soviet Union gets in touch with me over the phone. And the consul tells me that apparently the documents that he is exhibiting or producing attesting to his residence in the Soviet Union and his marriage certificate with the Soviet citizen are apparently legal, are correct, and he believes that they are correct. But without a doubt he cannot issue the visa without consulting Moscow.

Consequently, I cannot, in turn, grant him a visa to transit Cuba without consulting the Government. That was the content of my telephone conversation with the Soviet consulate.

Mr. CORNWELL. After that conversation, did you again see the individual, did he return to the consulate?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir. That was the third and last time I saw him. He possibly thinking that his documents had been legalized orally, verbally, that I would consequently change my attitude and in view of the legality of the document would grant him the visa; these were his hopes. And in addition one noticed that he was very anxious that we grant him the visa, because we never had any individual that was so insistent or persistent, in spite of our refusals which were logical and legal.

Mr. CORNWELL. Did all three of these visits occur during normal working hours at the consulate?

Senor AZCUE. We never received anybody, any individual, outside these regular office hours.

Mr. CORNWELL. As I understood your testimony, the first visit may or may not have been on September 27. The second visit was most probably on September 27. And the third visit would have been most probably on a day afterward, is that correct?

Senor AZCUE. That is correct. I believe that on the 27th, that was the day that the application was completed. I have no doubt about it.

The first visit, however, could have been that very same day, earlier in the day. And the third visit could have taken place the following day or could have been on the same 27th if the first visit had taken place on the 26th.

But my private opinion, the first two visits took place on the 27th and the last one, after my conversation with the Soviet consul, was on the following day, that is to say September 28.

I believe this would be the most reasonable thing if one were to analyze it.

Mr. CORNWELL. September 27, 1963, was a Friday. Does that mean that the third visit could have occurred on the following Saturday?

Senor AZCUE. On Saturday, exactly.

Mr. CORNWELL. The consulate was open on Saturday.

Senor AZCUE. Saturday morning—not open to the public.

Mr. CORNWELL. Would you tell us how the conversation on the third visit ended.

Senor AZCUE. He had great hopes that I would grant him the visa in transit. When I told him no, that if the Soviet Union does not grant him the visa as destination of his trip, I cannot grant him an in-transit visa to Cuba without consulting my government.

He always had a face which reflected unhappiness. He was never friendly. He was persistent. And he was not pleasant.

So on the last visit, when he loses the opportunity to obtain the visa, he gets very worked up. And then in English, which is a language that I have not full command, and all our conversations took place in English, and with great effort on my part because it is a language that I do not have full command of, but I do hear him make statements that are directed against us, and he accuses us of being bureaucrats, and in a very discourteous manner.

At that point I also become upset and I tell him to leave the consulate, maybe somewhat violently or emotionally. Then he leaves the consulate, and he seems to be mumbling to himself, and he slams the door, also in a very discourteous manner.

That was the last time we saw him around.

Mr. CORNWELL. Was he with anyone on any of these occasions?

Senor AZCUE. With my colleague, Mirabal, who probably was always with me, because I was together with him. I was the exiting consul and he was the new consul. I am handling this case because I had a better knowledge of the English language than he did. But we were both handling the case, he in order to become more familiar with the situation and I also in order to train him.

So this was a colleague of mine who saw him, how many times I don't know, whether on one or two or all three occasions; he was a colleague who was present there, and I know that he also saw him.

And in addition to Consul Mirabal, he was also seen by the secretary, because she was the one who took care of his application.

The three of us were the only ones who were able to see Oswald, nobody else. He could not have seen anybody else, because the business that brought him to us was one that was of the exclusive responsibility of the consulate. And therein the only ones present were the three of us.

Mr. CORNWELL. Was the individual who came to your consulate on these three occasions accompanied by any other persons? Did anyone come with him?

Senor AZCUE. I never saw. The private area of the consulate, from this private area it is difficult to observe who comes in from the street. My secretary from the chancery, maybe she was able to see. But whenever I emerged from that area, and to the chancery, I always saw him alone.

Mr. CORNWELL. Did he say anything in any of the conversations with you which would have indicated that he either had a companion with him in Mexico City or that he knew any persons who lived in Mexico City?

Senor AZCUE. No, never. We did not hold any conversations other than those directly related to the visa.

Mr. CORNWELL. If I could direct your attention again to the JFK exhibit F-408, I would like to ask you first, was the document signed in your presence?

Senor AZCUE. No. It is not necessary. It is never necessary. This is a document that is provided to him by the secretary. It is filled in by the secretary. She affixes the photograph, turns it over to him, and right there he signs, until it is sent, forwarded to Cuba, through the pouch.

Mr. CORNWELL. Would it have been necessary, under the usual custom and practice of your office at that time, for the document to have been signed on the premises of the consulate?

Senor AZCUE. This document or this application does not leave the desk of the secretary. She types it out and places the photograph, places the seal, and hands it over for the individual's signature.

Mr. CORNWELL. You told us earlier that the normal procedure for the preparation of such applications was that more than one copy of the document was made, is that correct?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, six. Six photographs, six signatures, and six copies of the application is complete.

Mr. CORNWELL. Do you feel certain about your memory today as to the number of copies that are made or were made in 1963?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, absolutely. There was never an exception made. They come already together in a bunch.

Mr. CORNWELL. The copies as opposed to the original, the carbon copies, were they signed separately or was the carbon paper used to transfer a signature from one to the other?

Senor AZCUE. No, one by one, because the paper is very thick. This is mimeograph-type paper.

Chairman STOKES. Will counsel suspend for a moment? I think this would be an appropriate place for us to take a 5-minute recess at this time. The Chair requests that as the witness departs from the room, that all persons remain in their seats please until the witness has left the room after which we will have a 5-minute recess.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Chairman STOKES. The committee will come to order.

All persons in the hearing room are requested to remain in their seats while the witness is being brought in to the witness table.

The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Cornwell.

Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before we begin again, I believe that we neglected to have the interpreter identify himself for the record.

Would you do so?

Mr. HERVAS. My name is Anthony J. H-e-r-v-a-s.

Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you.

Senor Azcue, I would like at this time to show you JFK exhibit F-407. For the record, that would appear to be a carbon copy of the previous JFK exhibit F-408. The previous JFK exhibit, F-408, is a photograph of a visa application which the staff of this committee took while they were in Cuba this year. It was taken of a document which was provided to us by the Cuban Government in an original form. We were allowed to inspect the original and to photograph it.

The exhibit which we just placed on the easel, JFK F-407, is a photograph of a visa application which was provided to the Warren Commission in 1964 by the Cuban Government. As you can tell, the writing on JFK F-407 appears to be somewhat displaced on the lines; part of it sitting directly on top of lines instead of resting over them as you would expect, and otherwise its content appears to be virtually identical to 408.

Would the two documents in that form have been expected, based upon the usual procedures in effect at the consulate in 1963?

Mr. HERVAS. May I ask a question? Did you say would the two documents have been expected or inspected?

Mr. CORNWELL. Expected to be in that form with those type of variations based upon the procedures in effect at the consulate in 1963?

Senor AZCUE. Do you have some other copy of the actual size that I could be able to look at or analyze because from this distance it is for me very difficult to see the exhibit on the easel.

Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, would you like to go to the easel to get a better picture of the blowups? Do the representatives from the National Archives have a small photograph of that document with them here today?

OK, we do have a smaller photograph we will show the witness. It is also marked for identification as JFK F-407.

Senor AZCUE. As I stated before, the paper on which the application is printed is a very thick or heavy paper. So it is not possible to prepare six copies at one time, not even three in an ordinary typewriter such as the one Sylvia Duran had in the consulate. Conceivably, she prepared them two at a time, an original and one copy, an original and one copy, an original and one copy.

So conceivably it is possible that there be some differences between some of them, between three, for instance.

Mr. CORNWELL. But at any rate your examination of the two documents would indicate that JFK F-407 is a carbon copy of the original JFK-408; is that correct?

Senor AZCUE. I am not an expert on these matters, but any one of you could—and I cannot see very well either and the quality of the copy is not very clear. However, in looking at these two documents I note that the words appear exactly one on top of the other in both documents in the same places.

So, consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that the copy, that the second exhibit constitutes a copy of the first one. It would be very difficult to place them in separate.

In spite of my limitations, I believe I can affirm that this one is the original and this other one is the copy. One does notice, if one analyzes the margin on the right side, that the text on both copies coincides perfectly one with the other. That is very difficult to do otherwise.

Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, the pictures on the upper lefthand portion of each document would appear to be of the same individual; is that correct?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. CORNWELL. Do those pictures of that individual appear to you to be the same individual who visited the consulate in Mexico City on the occasions you have previously described to us?

Senor AZCUE. Truly, this photograph is one that I saw for the first time when the honorable U.S. committee members came to Cuba in April of this year, and I was surprised that I believe that it was not the same person. Fifteen years had gone by so it is very difficult for me to be in a position to guarantee it in a categorical form.

But my belief is that this gentleman was not, is not, the person or the individual who went to the consulate.

Mr. CORNWELL. Directing your attention to the period of time immediately after the assassination, the day of the assassination or the day after the assassination, did you during that period of time have an occasion to see pictures of the alleged assassin in the newspapers or to observe on television the man identified at that time as Lee Harvey Oswald?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir, not so close to the date, not in the first few days, not immediately thereafter. Some time I calculate approximately—and I say this because I am not a great movie fan, but it was in mid-December approximately—I saw at that time the film in which Ruby appears assassinating the Oswald who was there, and I was not able to identify him and only 2 months had gone by since I had seen the Oswald who appeared at the consulate. And I had a clear mental picture because we had had an unpleasant discussion and he had not been very pleasant to me and I did not recognize when I first saw him. I did not recognize Oswald.

The man who went to the consulate was a man over 30 years of age and very thin, very thin faced. And the individual I saw in the movie was a young man, considerably younger, and a fuller face.

Mr. CORNWELL. What color hair did the individual have to the best of your memory who visited the consulate?

Senor AZCUE. He was blond, dark blond.

Mr. CORNWELL. Did the individual you saw in the movie, the person who was killed by Jack Ruby, resemble more closely the individual in these photographs to your memory than the individual who visited the consulate?

Senor AZCUE. I believe so.

Mr. CORNWELL. I would like to show you JFK exhibit F-434. Do the representatives from the National Archives have the original or a small photograph of that exhibit?

*— longer + description
might have given him a different face*

While they are looking, Mr. Chairman, I believe we neglected to ask that JFK exhibit F-407 be admitted into evidence.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection it may be entered into evidence.

[The information follows:]

27 de Septiembre de 1963.

Nombre: John F. Kennedy

Fecha y lugar de nacimiento: Washington

Expediente No. 1999 en New Orleans, Louisiana Octubre 15.

Profesión: Político

Ocupación (aprendiendo ocupación para la que trabaja): Político

Estancias anteriores en Cuba: Ninguna

Motivos de las estancias anteriores: Ninguno

Familiares o personas conocidas residentes en Cuba: Ninguno

Ha sido invigado desde Cuba? (Si:) (No:)

Con qué objeto? Ninguno

Cual es el motivo del viaje propuesto: viaje de tránsito para la Unión Soviética

Fecha y punto de partida: Washington y Nueva York

Dirección en Cuba: Septiembre 15 de 1963

(Firma del entrevistado)

PARA USO DE LA MISIÓN

OBSERVACIONES

El entrevistado es un miembro del Pdo. Republicano y se encuentra en la ciudad de New York. Fue entrevistado el 15 de Septiembre de 1963. Desde 1959 al 10 de Junio de 1963, que él es uno de los miembros del Comité de Asesoramiento para la Unión Soviética. Ha sido entrevistado en la ciudad de Washington y en la ciudad de Nueva York. Se le ha informado de la misión de la Misión de la Unión Soviética en la ciudad de Nueva York y de la ciudad de Washington. Se le ha informado de la misión de la Misión de la Unión Soviética en la ciudad de Nueva York y de la ciudad de Washington.

JFK EXHIBIT F-407

Mr. CORNWELL. That is a passport. May we have that exhibit admitted into evidence, Mr. Chairman, JFK F-434?

Chairman STOKES. Without objection it may be entered into evidence.

[The information follows:]

→ **WARNING**—ALTERATION, ADDITION OR MUTILATION OF ENTRIES IS PROHIBITED.
ANY UNOFFICIAL CHANGE WILL RENDER THIS PASSPORT INVALID.

NAME LEE HARVEY OSWALD		BIRTHPLACE LOUISIANA, U.S.A.	
BIRTH DATE OCTOBER 12, 1959		HAIR BROWN	
HEIGHT 5 FEET 11 INCHES		EYES GREY	
WIFE X X X		ISSUE DATE JUNE 25, 1965 ←	
MINORS X X X		PASSPORT RENEWAL	
SIGNATURE OF BEARER			

→ **IMPORTANT:**

UNLESS OTHERWISE LIMITED
THIS PASSPORT EXPIRES THREE YEARS FROM ISSUE DATE.
IF RENEWED, IT EXPIRES FIVE YEARS FROM ISSUE DATE.



Lee H. Oswald

JFK EXHIBIT F-434

Mr. CORNWELL. Did the individual who visited the consulate look like that individual?

Senor AZCUE. No.

Mr. CORNWELL. What differences were there?

Senor AZCUE. Many differences. The individual who visited the consulate is one whose physiognomy or whose face I recall very clearly. He had a hard face. He had very straight eyebrows, cold, hard, and straight eyes. His cheeks were thin. His nose was very straight and pointed. This gentleman looks like he is somewhat heavier, more filled, his eyes are at an angle with the outside of his

eye, at an angle with his face. I would have never identified him or recognized him.

I believe I can recall with fairly good accuracy the individual in such a way that I could recognize him now in a group of 100, that is better than a photograph of him because obviously during a period of 15 years he might change. I think I could recognize him, and this is not him.

Mr. CORNWELL. We would like to show you what has been previously admitted into evidence in this case as Exhibit 194. As you can see, Senor Azcue, the pictures on the right are simply blowups of the same visa application, but I would like to direct your attention to the two pictures on the left which come from photographs taken by the Dallas Police Department.

I ask you if that individual looks like the man who visited the consulate?

Senor AZCUE. I would have never recognized him as I did not recognize him in the movie where he dies, and I can, however, identify him as or think of him as the person who was killed or assassinated by Ruby. It is a question of personal evaluation on my part. But it is very clearly imprinted.

Mr. CORNWELL. The staff of the committee has had an opportunity to speak to Mrs. Sylvia Duran, and during the interview with her she expressed no doubt about the fact that the person who was killed in Dallas by Jack Ruby was the individual who visited the consulate.

Do you have any reason to question her memory or the reason that her memory might differ from yours?

Senor AZCUE. Categorically, I could not affirm it without any doubt. However, it is possible that she might be more susceptible to impression or more impressionable than I. I remember what I saw on the film and also what I saw on TV later or maybe before. I remember that moment when he was killed and I remember I did not recognize him. I did not have any prejudices or preconceptions.

I wanted to recognize, however, only 2 months had gone by. It was between September and November. At that time I was much younger. That was 15 years ago, and I think that because of my own profession I probably had better eyes. And because of the impression that was made by this person who visited the consulate, for these reasons, maybe my version is correct or more correct.

Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you. I have no further questions.

Chairman STOKES. At this point the procedure will be as follows: The Chair will recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, chairman of the Kennedy subcommittee, Mr. Preyer, for such time as he may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 5-minute rule.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Preyer.

Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Azcue, it is good to see you again.

As I understand it, at the time Lee Harvey Oswald visited the consul in Mexico there were three people who could have seen him: yourself, Sylvia Duran and Mr. Mirabal. Is that correct?

Senor AZCUE. That is correct.

Mr. PREYER. And you were the consul at that time and Mr. Mirabal was in training to replace you as consul?

Senor AZCUE. I would say it was the opposite. The consul who was already functioning as such was Mirabal. From the very time he arrived as a designated consul. When the consul arrives—of course, there could be two or three consuls—but when the consul arrives, he takes over the functions, the responsibilities, and I was turning over the official business of the consulate to him.

Mr. PREYER. What I was getting at was, you had been the consul before Mr. Mirabal arrived?

Senor AZCUE. Yes.

Mr. PREYER. Mr. Mirabal came to replace you as consul?

Senor AZCUE. Yes.

Mr. PREYER. At the time of the assassination on November 22, you were no longer in Mexico and Mr. Mirabal remained as the consul at that time; is that correct?

Senor AZCUE. I had already returned to Cuba and Mirabal had assumed the position of consul there alone.

Mr. PREYER. You returned to Cuba, as I understand it, on November 18, which was, of course, after your encounters with Oswald and before the assassination; is that correct?

Senor AZCUE. That was the case. I returned on November 18.

Mr. PREYER. Did your return to Cuba have anything to do with your encounters with Oswald or did it have anything to do with the assassination of President Kennedy?

Senor AZCUE. It was not related to any of those things. I returned to Cuba because all of my family was already there. As of June of that year I had been awaiting a consul to replace me because I already had a son studying in Havana and a son working there and already in June they had given me permission to return permanently to Cuba.

I was not able to return before because they were not sending me a consul to replace me, and the reason I did not leave immediately upon Mr. Mirabal's arrival was, first, because I had to train him. He did not have any experience in the handling of consular affairs there, and, second, because there was a meeting or congress of consuls being held at that time and I was asked to stay. This was because of my connections developed over the 5 years that I had spent there.

Mr. PREYER. So that it is fair to sum up your answer by saying you were not recalled by the Cuban Government, but, you, at your request, returned to Cuba?

Mr. HERVAS. Excuse me, sir, did you say at your wish?

Mr. PREYER. Yes, at his wish.

Senor AZCUE. I cannot say it was at my wish exclusively. I need the permission of the Government of Cuba, but I had requested my return in June because, as I noted previously, my sons were back in Havana. One was already working. One was studying there. I was then alone in Mexico with my smaller daughter, and I also wanted her to study in Cuba. I wanted to return there.

Mr. PREYER. I would like to turn to the visa application, the JFK exhibit F-408, for a moment.

In the middle of that document, over on the right-hand side, there is a printed date that says October 10, 1963. I don't believe there has been any discussion about that as yet.

Could you tell us what that date is?

Senor AZCUE. I will relate the manner in which I believe that appeared. We sent, of the six copies of the application with photographs, five to Havana. Those are distributed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to different organizations in government, different entities, and these receive different copies of the document. Immigration possibly receives two copies. The Interior Ministry receives a copy. Each organization receiving a copy might possibly stamp the date of receipt of the document on such a document. One organization in this case must have stamped that date on the document. On the other document, the organization probably did not have its routine practice to date such document because it was not a rigid requirement.

Mr. PREYER. So that this was a date stamped on the document in Cuba.

Senor AZCUE. I believe that that is so, because if we received the reapplication on 27th, we never hold on to or retain, in order to protect the interest of the applicant, the document for such a long period of time before forwarding it to Cuba. We will be mailing it in the next mail departure, 2 or 3 days at most, and this date, October 10, corresponds more closely to what I had just indicated, that is, to the distribution of the correspondence to the different entities, where they are supposed to receive copies of this document, that is, 13 days thereafter.

Mr. PREYER. So it does not indicate that Lee Harvey Oswald was in Mexico on October 10.

Senor AZCUE. No; in no manner. He never returned to the consulate. We never saw him again. This date is completely independent of Mr. Oswald. This is an internal matter.

Mr. PREYER. Looking again at this document, the visa application form, doesn't it indicate on this form how long Oswald wanted to stay in Cuba?

Senor AZCUE. Here it should be stated. Sometimes we included it, 2 weeks, and, if possible, a longer period of time.

Mr. PREYER. Does it also indicate when Oswald wanted to leave for Cuba?

Senor AZCUE. Proposed date of arrival in Cuba, September 30, 1963.

Mr. PREYER. That was just 3 days after he applied for the visa, and I believe you have testified earlier today that you had never seen anyone so persistent in seeking a visa.

Did Oswald tell you why he was in such a hurry to get to Cuba?

Senor AZCUE. None whatsoever. He arrived there convinced that with the documents that he exhibited at the time, I would issue the visa immediately, and one can analyze the fact that if he had a great need to go to the Soviet Union, he would have chosen the shortest route, and that was not through Cuba.

Mr. PREYER. But he gave you no explanation of why he was in such a hurry, why he was so anxious to go to Cuba?

Senor AZCUE. I do not recall it, and it is hard to find a reasonable explanation, because if he is in a hurry, he can go through any other country.

Mr. PREYER. Down in the right-hand corner of the visa application there is a signature.

Is that your signature?

Senor AZCUE. No.

Mr. PREYER. Is it Sylvia Duran's signature?

Senor AZCUE. It is a signature, and we have been able to check it thereafter, of Alfredo Mirabal, who, as I have already mentioned earlier, he already was empowered as a consul. He had already been named or appointed consul.

Mr. PREYER. So it is Mr. Mirabal's signature.

Just above that signature there is a section, a printed section, that has the title "Observations."

Now you have testified, in general, as to what those observations were, but I wonder if you could read out loud for us, for the sake of the record, what that section says.

Senor AZCUE. The applicant states that he is a member of the U.S. Communist Party and also the secretary of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans, and that he lived in the Soviet Union from October 1959, that he is married to a Soviet citizen. He showed documents certifying that he was a member of the organizations mentioned, as well as a marriage certificate.

He went to the Soviet Embassy in this city requesting that his visa be forwarded to their embassy in Cuba. We called the Soviet consulate, and they responded that they had to obtain, they have to await authorization from Moscow to issue the visa, and that it would take approximately 4 months.

This is the very same thing I told the members of your committee in Havana in April without having seen this document before.

Mr. PREYER. This section of the application was not filled in by you?

Senor AZCUE. No, no, I had never seen it. This was made or prepared by Sylvia Duran, and it was signed by Mirabal, as it appears here. I repeat once again that the first time I saw this document was when the committee showed it to me in April.

Mr. PREYER. Is there anything in those observations that would make you think that the person who wrote them believed that Oswald would be given a visa?

Senor AZCUE. Probably no, this is something that is written or addressed to Cuba, all of the information that we can provide Cuba, but we do not prejudge what Cuba is going to determine, even if we may have an interest in seeing something resolved.

Mr. PREYER. Incidentally, to clear up one point on that, I believe you testified this morning that you initiated the call to the Soviet Embassy.

No, I'm afraid I have that just reversed. I believe this morning you testified that it was the Soviet Embassy that called you, but in the observations it states you initiated the call to the Soviet Embassy.

Would you like to clarify that point?

Senor AZCUE. It is relatively easy, I believe, if one analyzes it. Conceivably, I was under the impression that the Soviet Embassy had called me because I was told to pick up the telephone. I did not call. It is possible, however, that at Oswald's request, Sylvia might have called the Embassy and then would have transferred the call to me, and thereafter I was under the impression that it was the Soviet Embassy that had called me, and I was always under that

impression. But it is possible that she might have initiated the call and thereafter transferred the call to me.

Mr. PREYER. One final question.

Going back to the observations written on the bottom of the application, written by Sylvia Duran, in your opinion, did Sylvia Duran ever pressure you to grant the visa or encourage you to grant the visa to Oswald?

Senor AZCUE. She, the poor woman, was in no position to pressure me. She might have been in a position to make a personal recommendation, and the recommendation was not a personal matter.

Yet she might have believed that because of the fact that he was a resident in the Soviet Union and he was a member of the North American Communist Party, she might have believed that we might have been in a position to make an exception, but this is simply as a comment, a possible comment. She did not exert pressure or any such thing.

Mr. PREYER. Did she make any personal recommendation or did she evidence any unusual interest in Oswald's case?

Senor AZCUE. No; she might have thought that we might be in a position to grant him a visa because of his personal conditions or circumstances, not for any reason of friendship. It wasn't any such thing. She never spoke again about him, nor did we ever speak about him. As in the case of many of the hundreds of applicants who come through a consulate, we see them at that time, and thereafter we never remember them again or discuss them again. And if it hadn't been for the unfortunate incident, I would have by now completely forgotten about this gentleman.

Mr. PREYER. After Oswald visited you the first time, that visit ended when you sent him out to have a photograph taken, as I understand it.

Was there a place nearby where he could have had the photograph taken?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, yes, about four or five blocks away in a street known as Calzada de Tacubaya. There are photographic studios. Possibly Sylvia might have pointed out to him where he could obtain the photographs, or maybe he already had the photos.

Mr. PREYER. Well, in the photographs on the application, and also in the passport, Oswald appears to have on a tie and a sweater. How was he dressed when he came to the Embassy, to the consulate?

Senor AZCUE. I always imagine him or visualize him as wearing a suit, coat and pants, trousers, with a pattern of crossed lines, not very clear design. Blue, some reddish. I never conceived of him or visualized him wearing a light sweater.

When I saw this photograph in April of this year, I also noticed that the clothing he was wearing was not the same.

Mr. PREYER. So that the clothing he was wearing in the photographs was not similar to that which he was wearing when he actually visited you in the Embassy.

Senor AZCUE. I am almost in a position to assure that.

Mr. PREYER. When he returned with the photographs and with his application, visa application form, and his passport pictures,

would you have looked at the pictures on the visa application and on the passport?

Senor AZCUE. No, I did not see the photograph, nor did I witness the preparation of the form. I did not see the photograph at that time. I only saw this photograph last April, when they came to Cuba.

Mr. PREYER. So that at the time of processing his visa and the passport, you never looked at the photographs, you never compared them with the man standing before you.

Senor AZCUE. No, I was never present during the preparation of this form nor of the affixing of the photograph. And it is also signed by Mirabal. And in the normal course of business this is a matter that goes to Cuba. It is generally kept until it is prepared for shipment in the next plane, outgoing plane, and there was no reason for me to go back searching for this form.

Mr. PREYER. You have indicated to us that you don't believe the man whose photograph appears on the visa application and the passport was the same man who appeared before you in the consulate. Have you ever seen a photograph of the man you believed to have appeared before you in the consulate?

Senor AZCUE. Never. I shall explain. The committee brought to me an album with many photographs. I shall try to explain. It is very possible that amongst all of those photographs which were made available to us by those persons who took pictures of every person that went near the consulate or the Embassy and that were contained in those that I was shown, it is very difficult when I consider all of the photos that I saw, that anyone could escape being photographed if he approached the consulate during working hours, that is, escape without having his photograph taken.

It would be easy for them, having at hand the photographs and the dates, to facilitate or make available the photograph of the person who went to the consulate, be it the decedent or the dead man or the other person that I think I saw went to the consulate.

It is indeed curious that they did not provide that photograph, because if it were the same man, you would have recognized him in that photograph. And if I remembered the face, I would have recognized it amongst those photos. And there was no photo of either.

This is very curious, that something like that should happen, especially among individuals or men who are so efficient and who spied on our consulate and our Embassy.

Mr. PREYER. I would like to ask if we could have exhibit 437 displayed. Mr. Azcue, I will ask if that is a picture of you in Cuba looking through the album of photographs which the committee made available to you.

Senor AZCUE. Right. That is a photograph of myself with the photo album that you provided me.

Mr. PREYER. And I believe you recognized none of the photographs in that album as being the man whom you feel you saw in the Embassy. Have you ever seen that man again, the man who you believe you saw in the consulate?

Senor AZCUE. No, never. This is what I stated before.

Mr. PREYER. I believe you said that the man who signed the visa application did not sign it in your presence, as far as you recall.

Senor AZCUE. No; the secretary is the one who takes care of all of this. And we are normally in our private office while she is having the applicant provide the information and fill the forms and attaching the photograph. During all of that time we are in our offices working.

Mr. PREYER. If analysis of that handwriting, of that signature on the visa application showed it to be Lee Harvey Oswald's signature, would you still believe that the man who visited you in the consulate was not Oswald?

Senor AZCUE. Under such circumstances I would have to accept that I was being influenced or that I was seeing visions.

Mr. PREYER. Mr. Chairman, I am at a point now at which there are two other areas that I wanted to ask Mr. Azcue some questions. It will probably take about 15 minutes. Would you prefer to go forward or to recess until after lunch at this time?

First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that JFK exhibit F-437 be admitted into evidence at this point.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point.

[The information follows:]



JFK EXHIBIT F-437

Chairman STOKES. The Chair thinks this is a good time for us to take a recess. Accordingly, the committee will recess until 2 p.m. this afternoon.

I request at this time that all persons remain in their seats until the witness has been escorted from the hearing room, after which we will declare a recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., a recess was taken until 2 p.m.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Chairman STOKES. The committee will come to order.

All persons in the hearing room are requested to take their seats and to remain seated while the witness is being brought into the room and to the witness table. Thereafter you may move about if you please, but then once again, whenever the witness departs the room, you are also further requested to remain in your seats for security purposes.

You may bring the witness in.

The Chair at this time recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer, for such time as he may further consume.

TESTIMONY OF EUSEBIO AZCUE—(Resumed)

Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask that JFK exhibit F-428 be placed on the easel, please.

Do we have JFK exhibit F-428?

In the earlier testimony that was read to the committee today from Sylvia Duran, mention was made of a newspaper article by a reporter named Comer Clark which appeared in an American paper. This is a copy of that article.

I would like to read you about the first five or six paragraphs of that article, Mr. Azcue, and get your comments upon it.

I would suggest to the translator that I might read by sections of it and give you a copy of the article and you can translate it directly, in the interest of time.

The article reads in the first paragraph, it begins in quotation marks:

"Yes, I heard of Lee Harvey Oswald's plan to kill President Kennedy. It's possible that I could have saved him.

"I might have been able to—but I didn't. I never believed the plan would be put into effect."

These were the dramatic words spoken to me by Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel Castro in Havana on July 15.

"Lee Oswald came to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City twice," Castro went on. The first time—I was told—he wanted to work for us.

"He was asked to explain, but he wouldn't.

"He wouldn't go into details.

"The second time he said he wanted to 'free Cuba from American imperialism.'

"Then he said something like: 'Someone ought to shoot that President Kennedy.'

"Then Oswald said—and this was exactly how it was reported to me—'Maybe I'll try to do it.'

"This was less than 2 months before the U.S. President was assassinated."

Mr. Azcue, would you comment on that statement?

Senor AZCUE. I have already commented to you, in the course of previous conversations, that Mr. Oswald did not see nor could he have seen, either at the consulate or the Embassy, any persons or individuals other than we. He did not have any contact other than contact with us, consul Mirabal, I as consul, and Sylvia Duran as a secretary. He did not mention any such thing to any of us, and much less would we have passed this information on to Fidel.

So I see no way in which our Commander in Chief could have been aware of a conversation that Oswald says he held with one of our agents. The only agents present were those three I have mentioned—the two consuls and the secretary.

First of all, I would have never tolerated a conversation of that nature because, without any doubt, that would have constituted a provocation, and we do not allow ourselves to be provoked, and our revolution never dealt with anything related to terrorism, much less so the death of President Kennedy.

What would become of us should we have intervened? This is ridiculous that we should attempt to walk into the mouth of the lion, and this has been repeatedly asserted by our Commander in Chief. We have never used terrorism. We have never supported terrorism, and we have never even supported terrorism even in those cases in which we sympathize with the views of those who did practice it.

Mr. PREYER. So that the man who appeared before you in the consulate did not say these words as set out in the article, nor anything that sounded like those words.

Senor AZCUE. I repeat once again that I would not have tolerated it because I would have taken this as a provocation, and our behavior in this context is extraordinarily clear and clean.

Mr. PREYER. Moving to another area, Mr. Azcue, Sylvia Duran and her husband often entertained, I believe, in Mexico City.

Did you socialize with the Durans from time to time? Did you attend their parties?

Senor AZCUE. Yes; in Mexico naturally it is a custom to have social gatherings in the home of one or another friend. They did host them, not as frequently as the question you have formulated would imply, but they did, and I in turn have attended some of those gatherings, and I believe that whenever they did have a party, they always invited me because I was very friendly to both.

Mr. PREYER. Do you know if they had any parties in September of 1963; that is, the time when Lee Harvey Oswald was in Mexico?

Senor AZCUE. It is possible, but it is difficult that they would have held such a party without inviting me, a person that was so close to them. And I recall that the last gathering that I attended at the Duran home was one that was carried out in order to bid me farewell in preparation for my return to Cuba, and it was during the month of November, a few days before my departure from Mexico.

Mr. PREYER. Do you know Elena Garro de Paz?

Senor AZCUE. Yes. I have seen her on some occasions in the home of one of her sisters, whose husband is a Mexican painter, Horacio, whose name is Guerrero Galvan, and who was a friend of mine.

Mr. PREYER. I believe her husband is Octavio Paz, the Mexican poet?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, Octavio Paz, who was also Mexican Ambassador to Paris and a distinguished poet, was her husband at the time I met her.

Mr. PREYER. Elena Garro de Paz was a friend of the Durans and also a friend of yours, I believe; is that correct?

Senor AZCUE. That is correct; yes. She was related to Horacio Duran.

Mr. PREYER. And did I understand you to say that the painter, Guerrero Galvan—is that the way you pronounce that?—was a

friend of yours and was married to the sister of Elena Garro de Paz?

Senor AZCUE. Exactly.

Mr. PREYER. Perhaps I should get the blackboard out and draw some lines to spell out the family tree there.

But let me just sum up by asking: You knew Elena Garro de Paz fairly well?

Senor AZCUE. Not very well. I have met her on two, maybe three opportunities because she was living at that time in her sister's home, the home of Mrs. Guerrero Galvan, the home that I used to visit with a certain frequency, but we were not intimate friends. It was simply a social acquaintance.

Mr. PREYER. Would you describe her as an emotionally stable person?

Senor AZCUE. She appeared to me to be a delicate person, a refined person, a cultured writer.

Mr. PREYER. Did she have what we might call a vivid imagination about things other than her writing?

Senor AZCUE. I believe it is very difficult in the course of two or three visits to be able to fully understand the character of a lady without being a close or intimate friend, and her writings I have only read from the standpoint of literary criticism or review. I would not attempt to make a critical evaluation of her personality or character because I am not a psychologist.

Mr. PREYER. Let me put it this way. If she told you a story about something that had happened, would you be apt to believe her?

Senor AZCUE. It would depend on the kind of story she would be telling me.

Mr. PREYER. If she told you something of a serious nature, would you be apt, likely to believe that she would be telling the truth about it?

Senor AZCUE. I repeat once again that it will depend on the subject matter. It depends on the issue itself, not who is telling the story. If it has some viability or credibility, I would accept it. If not, I would not.

Mr. PREYER. Did you ever hear that Lee Harvey Oswald had attended one of the Durans' parties when he was in Mexico?

Senor AZCUE. No, never, and that is one of the things I would not believe, no matter who would tell me, because I knew the Durans well, and I knew that this gentleman, I know that this gentleman who turned up at the consulate to request a visa had no other activities or purpose while there. He came to the consulate and thereafter we never talked about him or saw him any other time. And I repeat once again that I wouldn't believe that either Sylvia or Horácio would host a gathering during those days without inviting me.

Mr. PREYER. Did you know a man named Emilio Carbellido, a Mexican writer, I believe?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, of course, very well known in Mexico. He is a well-known writer, and well known in Cuba also, because he has visited there repeatedly.

Mr. PREYER. Did you ever discuss President Kennedy with Mr. Carbellido?

Senor AZCUE. It is my prior practice not to discuss with anyone outside of my own group, members of my own Embassy, or of our own group, any of these issues of foreign policy or policy of other nations. We are very careful regarding our own views, especially in the presence of a gentleman who was not such a great friend of mine.

Mr. PREYER. Would Mr. Carbellido have been at the parties or some of the parties that the Durans gave from time to time?

Senor AZCUE. It is possible. I do not recall his presence at any specific one, but it is possible that he might have attended.

Mr. PREYER. I have asked you some questions earlier, Mr. Azcue, about Miss Elena Garro de Paz, and as to whether you would be likely to believe a story if she told it to you.

Miss Garro has told us that on one occasion she was at a party at one of the Durans' houses, and that you and Oswald were both at the party. She has told us that at another party at one of the Durans' homes she overheard a conversation in which you and Emilio Carbellido were discussing President Kennedy. She says that at the conclusion of that conversation, you stated that there was no alternative than to kill President Kennedy.

Would you care to comment on her allegations?

Senor AZCUE. Yes; first, because it is not possible or conceivable in my own mind to kill anyone, much less so the President of the United States, and much more so because of the possible implications or effects upon our own revolution, which I would defend with every effort that I could muster. It would be necessary to ask this lady why she makes such statements; it is incredible. Because, I repeat, I have seen her only two or three times in my whole life, and much earlier than the time when this gentleman showed up at our consulate. With some analysis, I could probably even determine the date of these meetings with her. And I know that the last time I saw her was much before Mirabal arrived at the consulate, and Mirabal arrived on September 2. I can almost fix the date.

The previous secretary, the one who preceded Sylvia Duran, was a relative of mine who died on July 19. And I clearly recall that the son of Guerrero Galvan, the painter, who was a student of medicine, was discussing with me the unfortunate death of my secretary, who was, in turn, my relative, as a result of a car accident in a Volkswagen, and he was explaining to me how dangerous it was to be in an accident in a Volkswagen because of the shortness of the car and the proximity of the riders to the windshield, and it was a date so close to July 19 that he was telling me that, during that same period, those same days, there had been three fatal accidents similar to the one in which my secretary had died, and that was the last opportunity on which I saw Elena Garro.

What did they offer Elena Garro to make such absurd statements or declarations?

Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no further questions at this time.

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.

Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

How are you again?

Senor AZCUE. Glad to meet you, sir.

Mr. DODD. I am not going to speak in Spanish. My Spanish isn't that good.

Could you please tell me, Mr. Azcue, how long you had been the consul in Mexico prior to your departure in November of 1963?

Senor AZCUE. When the revolution achieved its victory, I was appointed consulate the beginning of January 1959. Thereafter they called upon me, thereafter the Government of Cuba recalled me to put me in charge of the reconstruction of housing for peasants in our country, and who were members of the rebel army, and housing that had been destroyed during the course of the war. So at that point I returned to Cuba in June of 1959 and was working in the Sierras, in the mountains, in charge of construction, work, probably until 1960. I do not recall the exact date. Then I returned to Mexico as an attaché, a diplomatic attaché, to the Embassy, and shortly thereafter I had to take over or take charge of the consulate, and on this occasion until November of 1963.

Mr. DODD. Am I to understand, then, that you assumed the duties of consul in 1960, some time early in 1960, the end of 1960? What period of time did you assume those responsibilities?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, it was in April of 1961, after the Bay of Pigs.

Mr. DODD. Now, did I understand your testimony correctly, that you were not aware of how the photograph on the exhibit, the visa application, you are not aware of how that photo got on that application? In fact, you had not seen the photograph on the application?

Senor AZCUE. That is the case. Sylvia Duran was handling that area. She typed in the form, affixed the photo, had the applicant sign the forms. In the meantime there was no reason for us consuls to be present there observing the procedure. We were simply in our private offices. We had a lot of work.

Mr. DODD. The reason I asked you that question, is that when several of us had the opportunity to interview you in Cuba a few short months ago, on page 14 of our interview, which I hope you have a copy of, I was questioning you and I asked you:

Going back to the physical appearance of Lee Harvey Oswald, apart from having a receding hairline, was there any gray in Lee Harvey Oswald's hair?

You responded:

You know he had blond hair. It is all very interesting. You see this picture, I really did not study carefully. The picture was taken by the secretary and she applied it to the application.

It would seem from your response to my question then that, one, you did see the picture on the application or that you did not see the picture on the application then, but were merely looking at it when it was in front of you, and that you had very specific knowledge as to how the picture got on the application, that in fact Sylvia Duran stapled it to the application.

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair will permit the witness to respond to the question.

Senor AZCUE. Yes; it is a matter of routine. She is the one who handles all of these detailed operations. I could assure that she was the one who did it without having seen her do it. There was no one,

no other person there, that would do that work for her, and neither Mirabal nor I did that work.

Mr. DODD. All right, then.

May I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, just to proceed and finish this line of questioning, which should take just a couple of minutes? I will try to make my questions brief for the translations.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman may proceed.

Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Based on the testimony you have given, if we are to believe your testimony with regard to the description of the individual that you said you saw that day, it would vary quite significantly, or significantly from the actual photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald, the one on the visa application and the photograph that you see to your left over here. They would be different than the person that you saw in the Cuban Consulate, isn't that correct?

Senor AZCUE. For me, yes. When I saw in April the photograph placed on the application, I was surprised by his looks or similarity with the Lee Harvey Oswald who had been killed. This was my reaction in front of you. You were the ones who showed me that picture. That was the first time that I saw that application completed with the photos and all of the other information.

Mr. DODD. But what you saw was someone that was very different looking from the person that you met in the Cuban Consulate in September of 1963?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, as different as I found him when I saw him in film. The image I had of the individual who showed up at the consulate was the man in his thirties, maybe 35 years old, and with the very thin face. You will recall that he had very natural lines, very thin straight nose, except for all of the items I mentioned, and this gentleman appeared to me to be much younger and with a much fuller face. That is the evaluation I have with absolute certainty. It is my truth.

Mr. DODD. My question is this, after having gone through that, I am left with two choices that I perceive that caused this to occur, since according to your testimony and the testimony of others, there were three people who were working in the consul's section. There was Mr. Mirabal, there was yourself and there was Sylvia Duran. It was either a terrible mistake on the part of Sylvia Duran, who also saw this individual come into the office and who stapled this on here, or there was complicity in placing the photograph on the application at the time. If the two people were that different, then the only people who could have been involved would have been people at the consulate.

Would you please help me out with that possible contradiction?

Senor AZCUE. Well, I am sure that it was not a case of complicity. It is possibly a matter of what I see as the truth and what she sees as the truth, my image of the individual present there, her image of the individual there, and whether she carefully studied the photo. These types of photographs are not necessarily that precise. They are not as regular passport pictures which have to be very clear. And there is, of course, one other possibility, and I cannot guarantee that this is the case, but it is conceivable that

while writing down all the information on the application, that she might not have checked exactly the picture against the individual who was applying, that, occupied as she was, she most probably proceeded to place the photograph on the application without this check.

Mr. DODD. In effect suggesting that there was an enormous error.

Senor AZCUE. It is a mistake that results very often in the case of the course of one's work, in the normal or ordinary case.

Mr. DODD. And that also, if I understood you, the third option being is that you could be mistaken as to separating the identity of the two people.

Senor AZCUE. It is possible. We are all exposed to error or mistake. It is not, however, my view. My view is that I am right.

Now I have to say I am not infallible.

Mr. DODD. I wasn't suggesting that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the additional amount of time.

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am just curious. You had been in Mexico from 1943; am I correct in that?

Senor AZCUE. 1944.

Mr. SAWYER. You were a Cuban by birth and had lived in Cuba before that time, I understand.

Senor AZCUE. Yes, many years.

Mr. SAWYER. Why had you spent so long a time in Mexico as opposed to being in Cuba?

Senor AZCUE. I first left Cuba during the time of the government of Machado in 1931. I lived for about 10 years almost in Europe. At that time I wanted to return to Mexico, to conclude my studies. Because I did not agree or follow the politics in Cuba during the time, I never felt at home with Batista, I never felt well. I preferred to live in a country that offered me opportunities to study and to work, and I built my life there. It was my second homeland, as is the case with so many other Cubans who at that time had to be bouncing around from one place to another.

Mr. SAWYER. So then since about 1931, up until about 1959, you were what you might say a political refugee, or political exile, in effect, from Cuba.

Senor AZCUE. A voluntary exile. Nobody forced me not to live in my country. I did not find it pleasant because of the political climate in my country to live there.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. THONE. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask just one question in line with the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd, on which I am a little confused.

Chairman STOKES. Certainly. The gentleman is recognized.

Mr. THONE. Consul Azcue, did I understand, and I may not have gotten it right this morning, that when you went back to Cuba you saw a film which depicted the shooting by a Mr. Ruby of Lee Harvey Oswald, and at the time you were concerned that this wasn't the same person at all that was at the consul applying for a visa?

Senor AZCUE. Exactly. Only 2 months back I had seen the individual who appeared at the consulate. So I had his image clearly engraved in my mind, and I did not recognize him in the movie.

Mr. THONE. Exactly. Now my question. Did you report this to the Cuban Government, and if so to whom and what happened on your report in this regard?

Senor AZCUE. I reported this to some of my friends in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But in fact, in truth I was aware of the fact that it was testimony of my own, it was of my own imagination. And that the conditions under which I had seen him in the film at the time he was killed, with distorted features as a result of pain, it is conceivable that I might be mistaken.

I reaffirmed my view when Attorney Garrison of New Orleans stated that the Oswald who visited or was at the consulate was not the one who allegedly killed Kennedy, because of the date he departed New Orleans and the date he had visited the consulate in Cuba. So that confirmed my own view, and at that point I believed that as being the truth. And then I communicated this. And that was probably filed, recorded.

I did not write a report. I made an oral report. But it would be necessary to investigate whether such a report in writing exists or does not.

But that was the time when I saw my own views confirmed in my opinion that there were two Oswalds. Garrison shares the same opinion.

Mr. THONE. Senor Azcue, I don't want to be too repetitious. But just a quick followup question. Again, to whom in the Foreign Division, or Service, down in Havana, did you report this after you had seen the Ruby film, and at what time?

Senor AZCUE. These were colleagues of mine in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But at that time all three of us were working in the National Council for Culture. And it was Mr. Lechuga and Mr. Otero.

Mr. THONE. And when did you make that report?

Senor AZCUE. Immediately after reading Garrison's statements in the newspaper. Possibly at the end of 1964. That would be something very easy to check out. Or maybe beginning of 1965.

Mr. THONE. Last this, and it is probably a question you cannot answer. Do you know what action at all was taken within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on your report in this regard?

Senor AZCUE. Honestly, I do not know that.

Mr. THONE. Because this is quite a startling development here. You would have thought that your government would have done something with the report from the consul who supposedly had three confrontations with the man reported to be Lee Harvey Oswald. And when you came up with this information that this was not the same person that was down there, you would have thought something would have happened. Just a comment. I don't know that it needs a response, Mr. Consul, unless you would have a thought on it.

Senor AZCUE. Yes. It is very possible, it is a possibility that they did not believe me at all, that they might have thought that this was simply my own impression or evaluation. And moreover, that

it might be with reference to a matter that was not one of immediate concern in terms of current events at that time for us.

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time to the Chair.

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Azcue, you testified that Oswald produced a document showing his membership in the U.S. Communist Party. To your knowledge was that document valid?

Senor AZCUE. I did not concentrate much of my attention on the documents themselves. And I could not see whether they were authentic or not. The person who saw them, or the person who made the notations might have been Sylvia. But she had no way of telling whether they were authentic or not, any of the documents. That is the reason that he addresses himself to the Soviet Embassy, so that they in turn could tell us whether the Soviet documents are or are not valid.

Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you. At your consulate, whose responsibility was it to compare the applicant in person with the picture on the application, or the picture offered to be put on the application, to assure that the photo was indeed the photo of the person applying for a visa?

Senor AZCUE. The first one that should have checked that out was Sylvia. And I feel that we also should have checked. But fatally I did not make the comparison or that check. I had not seen that photograph until April of the present year.

Mr. FITHIAN. May I direct a question to counsel, Mr. Cornwell. Would the passport, the application that we have on the display board, would we have gotten that from Havana, or the consulate in Mexico City?

Mr. CORNWELL. The passport and the passport application came from New Orleans. Are you talking about the visa application?

Mr. FITHIAN. I am talking about the visa application that was submitted to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City, the large display on the board.

Mr. CORNWELL. Two visa applications; No. 408 is the one on the right, that is a photograph of an original visa application which was provided to us for inspection during our trip to Cuba by the Cuban Government. The one on the left, No. 407, is a photograph of a visa application provided by the Cuban Government to the Warren Commission, and would appear to be a carbon copy.

Mr. FITHIAN. My question, Mr. Cornwell, goes to the stamping of October 10 on it. Obviously if it were from the Cuban consulate at Mexico City, and it had a date of October 10 on it, that is one thing. It is quite another, obviously, if it is a photo of a copy that has been sent on down to Havana to one of the other bureaus.

Mr. CORNWELL. I don't believe there is testimony solving that issue yet. The only testimony I believe we have had is with respect to the exhibit 408, and as I recall, Senor Azcue provided information about his understanding of the date October 10 on that document. He was not asked why there was no similar date on document 407, to my memory.

Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you. Mr. Azcue, Lee Harvey Oswald was a radar operator in the Marines and was familiar with the U.S. spy plane, the U-2. Did Oswald ever mention to you his service in the Marines or in the military in the United States during your conversation with him as he was trying to get a passport to Cuba?

Senor AZCUE. He did not provide any information on his own background other than the presentation of the documentation that he had brought forth in connection with his application. It was clear, and I was able to check out from the first time, that his only intent was to obtain a visa immediately. Therefore his background, especially his nonrevolutionary background, was of a nature that he had no interest at all in communicating to us.

He was interested in telling me that he was a member of the Communist Party, that he was a resident of the Soviet Union. In other words, that which he believed would be sufficient to obtain the visa. And our conversations were always extremely brief, because I used to put an end to these conversations, referring to the instructions I had from my government of a need to obtain their prior authorization before issuing any visa, either the final destination visa to the Soviet Union, so that I may be in a position to provide him, without prior consultation to Cuba, with a transit visa, but with the visa of the Soviet Union already affixed to his passport. Everything went around that very issue.

He did not speak a single word outside of that issue.

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Does counsel have anything further? Excuse me. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.

Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to pursue one other line of questioning, if I may, and I will try and be brief on it.

Could you tell me, Mr. Azcue, what the Cuban surveillance of the Cuban consulate in Mexico might have shown during those days in September 1963? Did you conduct or have photographic surveillance of people who came into your Embassy, or did you keep any sort of surveillance mechanism by which you could keep a record of those people who came to your Embassy or stopped in for whatever business?

Senor AZCUE. We were very young, maybe trusting. We did not have great experience. And we had great trust in our neighbors. At first we did not mistrust anyone. Intuitively we might have had certain reasons to be concerned or to fear certain individuals, but we did not take any photographs, nor did we have any mechanisms or systems. We simply took measures to protect ourselves from some possible aggression or aggressive act. But it was a result of our own action. And with some small security protection or guard that the Mexican Government provided outside the premises, and our own colleagues within the Embassy, who might be able to react to outside aggression, but with nothing much other than their own physical ability to do so, with their bodies.

Mr. DODD. As I understood your testimony, you were in Cuba on November 22, 1963. You had returned from Mexico.

Senor AZCUE. I left on the 18th.

Mr. DODD. I presume once it became—once the knowledge was acquired in Cuba that the alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had applied for a visa in your consulate in Mexico, that there was

then an investigation in Cuba, that it was then a concern, I presume, of Premier Castro and his government to inquire as to those people who had knowledge of that particular circumstance as to actually what in fact happened in Mexico in September of that year. Is that a fact?

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has again expired. The Chair will permit the witness to answer the question.

Senor AZCUE. Immediately, as soon as I saw the name, I communicated it, or got in touch myself with the Foreign Ministry, and after a quick interview with the Minister and with the Chief of the Bureau, I was immediately sent to the person responsible for such matters in the Interior Ministry, and that was Commandante Pineiro. Naturally this event constituted a great commotion for us because we feared that we might be involved in that dirty business.

At that time the Commander in Chief, in his speech of November 27, he is already informed in advance of all those points on which I had personally reported, reported to Commander Pineiro of the Ministry of the Interior. Therefore it is in that speech that Fidel comments or reflects and states what I have always stated.

Mr. DODD. Did you make any effort or are you aware of any effort that was made to also talk to either Sylvia Duran, Mr. Mirabal, anyone else that could possibly shed any light as to what actually happened in the consulate in Mexico, other than talking to yourself?

Senor AZCUE. Our colleague, Sylvia Duran, was arrested by the Mexican Government in order to obtain from her clarification or other types of statements from her.

Regarding other possible investigations on the part of the Cuban Government, I am not aware of them, because I am not an intelligence agent of the Cuban Government. I provide the information I hold so that it might be processed or acted on.

Mr. DODD. So am I to understand that you gave oral testimony, there was no written statement, there was no tape recording or any stenographer that took your statement at the time?

Senor AZCUE. No. Commander Pineiro and I were alone in his office. But a few days thereafter I heard the speech of Fidel and I realized that the Commander in Chief was fully informed of all points. So the precise report summarized in brief form is incorporated in the speech of Prime Minister Castro. All of the information is contained therein, and consequently printed in the press and televised and transmitted through radio.

Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask whether or not we as a committee have asked the Cuban Government for any and all documentation which they may have prepared or have at their disposal as a result of their investigation of this particular aspect of the case at the time that they became aware of Lee Harvey Oswald's visa application in Mexico. Have we made that request, and, if so, have we had a response?

Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Dodd, we have indeed asked the Cuban Government to provide us with any written reports filed at that time by either Mr. Azcue or any of the people with whom he dealt. And they have informed us that this was handled orally; that no written reports were made at that time.

Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions.

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Azcue, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before this committee, the witness is entitled, under the rules of this committee, and of the House, to have extended to him 5 minutes in which he may comment upon the testimony he has given before our committee, and I would extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose at this time, if you so desire.

Senor AZCUE. Thank you very much. I will use the 5 minutes or possibly less.

First, I want to thank you for the good reception that we have had in this visit here during our trip, for all attentions extended. It has been more than we could have expected. And at the same time I want to state or express that it is in our greatest interest that this entire issue be clarified to the utmost, and that we have always cooperated, and that you must have been able to note it as a result of statements made by our own Prime Minister reflecting our sincere cooperation, without holding back any information, an attitude which we have consistently maintained.

We have the greatest interest in seeing that the issue is clarified, possibly an interest equaling your own interest in having it clarified.

At any and all times we are available to you and at your disposition within the context of our possibilities.

We have always played with clean decks, with clean cards, as has always been our custom.

Once again, thank you very much.

Chairman STOKES. Mr. Azcue, I want to also say to you it is nice to see you again. We enjoyed the visit we had with you in Cuba, the testimony we took from you at that time. And on behalf of the committee, we want to also thank you for the cooperation you have given this committee and for you voluntarily appearing here today as a witness.

So on behalf of the committee and the House of Representatives, we thank you for the cooperation you have given this committee.

You are now excused.

Senor AZCUE [in English]. You are welcome, Mr. Stokes. Can I go?

Chairman STOKES. Yes, you may go. All persons are requested to remain in their seats until the witness has departed from the hearing room.

Mr. STANDARD. Mr. Chairman, if I may, for a moment.

Chairman STOKES. Yes, counsel.

Mr. STANDARD. The witness has made reference today to two speeches of Prime Minister Fidel Castro of November 23 and November 27, 1963, and I ask they be incorporated as part of this record.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection, your request is granted. JFK exhibit F-684 may be entered into the record at this point. [The exhibit follows:]

JFK F-684

Una guerra contra la humanidad

El material consumible material de Imputaciones. Infracciones de las regulaciones fue destruido por Fidel en el análisis cuidadoso de los factores que concuerdan en el crimen. La muerte de Kennedy no fue la obra decaída de un factor, sino la obra de un conjunto de factores. La manera, los lugares, los momentos, los personajes de Sarajevo y Marseilla. Lo de Philip, revela las características de una persona, que es, esencialmente, planificada con un objetivo, el oportunismo criminal. Fueron tres disparos realizados a distancia regular, sobre un vehículo en movimiento, de motor de explosión, en un momento a Kennedy y al gobernador Connally, en el coche a la izquierda y las otras cuatro personas que viajaban en el apretado espacio de un vehículo presidencial.

[illegible]

De la comparecencia de Fidel podían tomar nota los investigadores del crimen si de yura

Texto del

En la noche del sábado el primer ministro del Gobierno Revolucionario y primer secretario del PURSC, comandante Félix Castro, realizó su comparecencia por televisión y radio orientando al pueblo respecto al triste suceso del atentado en que perdiera la vida el presidente de los Estados Unidos, John F. Kennedy, y la infame campaña de histéricas desatada por elementos reaccionarios, guerrillistas, en relación con ese suceso.

A continuación ofrecemos la versión taquigráfica de los esclarecidos pronunciamientos del máximo líder de nuestra Revolución.

(DFTO. DE VERSIONES TAQUIGRAFICAS DEL
(GOBIERNO REVOLUCIONARIO))

LUIS GONZÁLEZ WANGUENBERT. Muy buenas noches a todos los televidentes.

El comandante Fidel Castro, primer ministro del Gobierno Revolucionario y primer secretario general del Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista de Cuba, va a hablar al pueblo a través de todas las emisoras de radio y televisión.

DR. FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.—Siempre que ha ocurrido algún hecho de trascendencia, tanto nacional como internacional, hemos estimado la conveniencia de hablarlo al pueblo para expresar nuestras opiniones, y en cada una de esas circunstancias expresar también la orientación del Gobierno, la orientación de nuestro Partido, y saber cada uno de nosotros cuál es la actitud que debemos adoptar frente a cada una de esas situaciones.

Es verdad que estamos un poco acostumbrados a mirar a algún tipo de hechos inesperados, de hechos importantes y gravedad, porque desde el triunfo de la Revolución nosotros ha tenido que enfrentar una serie de problemas, un serie de situaciones que han ido tripulando ya los nervios del pueblo para llevar adelante su Revolución victoriosa.

ANÁLISIS
OBJETIVO Y SERENO ①

Por eso, con motivo de los hechos ocurridos ayer en las Islas Unidos, que dieron lugar al asesinato del Presidente de ese país, por la repugnancia que esos hechos pueden tener y por el papel el rol que la nación norteamericana juega en los problemas de la política internacional, es por lo que nosotros creemos que debemos hacer un análisis imparcialmente objetivo y sereno de los hechos y de sus posibles consecuencias.

El Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, tanto la Administración anterior de Eisenhower, como la Administración de Kennedy, no practica una política plenamente amistosa hacia nosotros. La política de ambas Administraciones se caracteriza por su espíritu agresivo, hostil e implacable hacia nuestro país.

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**EL ABESINATO
NOTICIA GRAVE
Y MALA**

Hereros síe víctimas de una hostilidad constante por parte de los Estados Unidos. Y entre los gobernantes y los hombres dirigentes de los Estados Unidos se culpa a Kennedy una lamentable irresponsabilidad en esta cuestión.

Y en cambio, de noticia del nominato del Presidente de los Estados Unidos es una noticia grave y mala. Eso debe ser tratado bien para comprenderlo; sobre todo, es importante para nosotros, especialmente, que es como un hecho que debe ser tratado bien.

De la incompetencia de Fidel podría tomarse puntos los investigadores del crimen si de veras se interesaban en la verdad y no en ocultarla o deformarla. Clave que los "sheriffs" y fiscales de la gran transnacional que maneja el mundo, como las autoridades policíacas de Dallas aceptaron con tanto apresuramiento y regocijo la versión de un asesino de filiación "marxista" y "castrocomunista". Culpable o no, el ex infante de marina resultó el blanco perfecto a la medida de los intereses de la guerrilla cubana y un res pre-fabricado. Lee Harvey Oswald necesitó todos los requisitos para llenar las exigencias de los partidarios de la línea de fuerza. Sólo que el ángulo, trasluz como el viento, en la zambra, no fue el mismo. La intervención del hijo de la Revolución Cubana.

Si mis alusiones de juicio ni otras evidencias que las mismas noticias de fuente yaquil, examinando uso por uno y renglón por renglón en el texto de la Cpl. 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

Por supuesto que ni las autoridades de Dallas, ni la Ciudad Prosa, ni las agencias ubicadas que agitan la guerra civil en Cuba, se dan como una bandera de odio, iban a responder a las preguntas y planteamientos del dirigente cubano. Fidel tampoco habló por ellos. Lo hizo, en primer lugar, para el pueblo de Cuba, alerta y firme frente a lo que pudiera venir, y en segundo término para llamar la atención en la opinión pública del mundo, porque es definitiva la única verdadera cooperación traidora al pueblo de Kennedy, Lyndon, Johnson, así como de los comunistas, que es la asistencia económica de la "guerra sucia" en Cuba.

[illegible]

2

Hemos sido víctimas de una hostilidad constante por parte de los Estados Unidos Y entre los gobernantes y los hombres dirigentes de los Estados Unidos, le cabía a Kennedy una importante responsabilidad en esos hechos.

Y sin embargo, la noticia del asesinato del Presidente de los Estados Unidos es una noticia grave y mala. Esto debemos analizarlo bien para comprenderlo; sobre todo, analizarlo seriamente, desapasionadamente, que es como lo revo-

Mala noticia, dejando a un lado el problema humano en que siempre la penibilidad del hombre, de cualquier hombre, no siente afectada ante un acto de esa naturaleza, ante un crimen, ante un asesinato: digo que, dejando a un lado esas cuestiones, yo siempre reacciono — y estoy seguro que fin en la reacción de la inmensa mayoría de los seres humanos — reaccionamos siempre con repudio frente al asesinato y frente, al crimen.

• No podemos considerarlo como un arma correcta de lucha, no debemos considerarlo. Y sobre todo, en las condiciones en que se produce, porque —como todas las cosas— siempre hay que circunscribirlo al ambiente, al escenario, a la circunstancia.

②

En dos casos, a veces, en medio de una guerra civil, en medio de una feróz represión, en que los revolucionarios se ven obligados a recurrir a la matanza contra los defensores. Y otro escenario, otra circunstancia - esta vez que sea - en una situación de normalidad, de paz, no siempre un hecho de esta naturaleza no justificable. Nunca, en medio de la multitud con presencia de mujeres, incasas de pensar, que sobre todo - digan - las circunstan- cias permitan hacer un juicio condenatorio de la vida y si algunas hechas de tipo político, algunas atentados de tipo político, puedan tener o no justificación.

De las circunstancias que rodean el asesinato del Presidente de los Estados Unidos, nosotros entendemos que no tiene justificación.

Pero, analizando la cuestión desde el punto de vista político, objetivo, decía también que era una noticia grave y una noticia mala.

Y algunos se preguntarán: ¿cómo? ¿cómo precisamente los cubanos, que han recibido tantas agresiones por parte de los Estados Unidos, de la propia administración de Kennedy, pueden decir que es una mala noticia, pueden tener una actitud de este tipo frente a esa noticia?

④

En el caso de las relaciones, en primer lugar, debemos recordar una cosa revolucionaria. En primer lugar, los cambios, los cambios revolucionarios, no se hacen en el vacío, sino que se hacen en el contexto de las relaciones. Y tenemos que empezar por comprender que nosotros no estamos a los hombres, estamos los hombres.

En segundo lugar, de algunas imperfecciones humanas, como la falta de confianza. Pero esto no quiere decir que nosotros estemos a los hombres, sino que nosotros estamos a los hombres, y esto es lo que nosotros tenemos que hacer. Y esto es lo que nosotros tenemos que hacer.

En tercer lugar, de algunas imperfecciones humanas, como la falta de confianza. Pero esto no quiere decir que nosotros estemos a los hombres, sino que nosotros estamos a los hombres, y esto es lo que nosotros tenemos que hacer. Y esto es lo que nosotros tenemos que hacer.

[illegible][illegible]

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[illegible]

Ahora bien: en cualquier, dentro de la sociedad americana y dentro de la política de los Estados Unidos, hay elementos partidarios de una política todavía más agresiva, reaccionaria, de una política todavía mucho más agresiva, de una política mucho más guerrillera. Pa decir, que dentro de una situación determinada se dan grados, y dentro de una política mala se dan grados: de lo malo a lo peor y a lo pésimo.


Y adn dentro de una politica mala puede haber aspectos mas negativos y aspectos menos negativos e, incluso, pueden existir aspectos positivos dentro de una politica que, en su conjunto sea mala.

Y todas las circunstancias de la política interna de los Estados Unidos, de las pugnas internas por el poder dentro de los Estados Unidos, de las corrientes que luchan dentro de los Estados Unidos, el asesinato del presidente Kennedy tiende a convertir la política de los Estados Unidos en una política peor y agravar los males de la política de Estados Unidos.

...nacionalismo en el de la política interna, y ésto con los
valores elementales llamados a beneficiarse de los sucesos que
ocurrieron ayer en los Estados Unidos.

¿Por qué? En Estados Unidos se han desarrollado una serie de formas, una serie de organismos muy poderosos dentro de la sociedad norteamericana muy influyentes por los grandes intereses dentro de los Estados Unidos y no cabe ninguna duda de que un presidente de tal naturaleza no puede ser el jefe dentro de los Estados Unidos, incluso para nosotros es muy grave que un presidente en la misma situación se encuentre en esa situación.

La presidente de la Cámara
cuenta numerosos hechos
la opinión, que es omni-



nos, que tienen en todos los organismos internacionales una influencia completamente reaccionaria; hay dentro de los Estados Unidos corrientes partidarias de una mayor intervención de los Estados Unidos en los problemas internacionales, de un mayor empleo de la fuerza militar de los Estados Unidos en los problemas internacionales; hay corrientes, por ejemplo, en Estados Unidos, mucho más partidarias, incluso, de corrientes partidarias de la invasión directa contra nuestro país.

Hay en Estados Unidos corrientes partidarias de la aplicación de medidas drásticas contra cualquier gobierno que asuma la menor medida de carácter nacionalista, de carácter económico en beneficio de las masas.

T, en fin, hay una serie de sectores que se pueden an-
ticipar en una sola concepción: la ultraderecha en los Es-
tados Unidos, la ultraderecha en los Estados Unidos y que
la ultraderecha, en todos y cada uno de los problemas
internos y externos de los Estados Unidos, se particulariza
en los problemas de la política más agresiva, más
belligrama para la paz, y más aventurera.

Dentro de los Estados Unidos hay corrientes humanitarias, más liberales, más avanzadas, truenos avanzados, hay hombres de derecha más reaccionarios, otros más moderados; hay ciertas corrientes intelectuales que no están necesariamente permeadas por la función de la fuerza, que están permeadas por la diplomacia —el es quibero—, en vez de estar permeadas por la misma agresiva, que tiene

...hombres que se han dirigido nada a la

10

↳ OSD:
Système en Capon. 4



✓ 200!
à la pag 3 et 4

Es decir, que analizando objetivamente la cosa, desde el momento en que falta una autoridad más fuerte, una autoridad personal fuerte, en la situación, en la forma y en las condiciones en que se elabora la política de Estado (y todas estas fuerzas racionales pueden encontrar una máxima oportunidad —y de hecho están encontrando una mala máxima oportunidad— para destacar su política dentro y fuera del país).

HISTERIA CONTRA I PRESS Y' CITT

... la seguridad por la mente de la izquierda, me-
do de los estudiantes, no me acuerdo, pero, y en la
palma... que el Gobierno del Presidente Kennedy
de algunos de los estudiantes, los estudiantes
internacionalistas, no decir que en la política, me
con un millón respecto a Cuba, —

LA CAMPARA
MENTUOSA
DE LA "UPT"

"Nuestro 22 UFL",
 "hay una vez que me
 "y hay una vez que
 "procedimientos de
 "entre los que se
 "Pero no solo eso, si
 "completo de la UFL
 "Kennedy, que la UFL
 "para la población, me
 "también Kennedy.
 "según lo podemos ver en las cables de una manera

[illegible]

7

[illegible]

Vamos a leer este: "Noviembre 22, UPL.— El asesino del Presidente Kennedy es un marxista confeso que pasó tres años en Rusia tratando de reunirse a su ciudadanía estadounidense, pero luego cambió de idea y obtuvo un pasaje de regreso a Norteamérica pagado por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos".

Es decir, ya una insinuación de imputación a la Unión

Fue identificado como Lee H. Oswald, de 24 años, ex-
fante de Marina y Presidente de un "Comité de Juego Lim-
pio en Cuba".

Se dice, inmediatamente después la imputación contra Caba. Y así han encadenado todos los cables, todos los de la UPI, todas las informaciones; a través de la información han repetido veinte veces la misma idea y la misma cosa, usando una técnica conocida en la cual son ellos muy habilidosos para instaurar lo que quieren instaurar, para sembrar la sospecha que quieren sembrar sobre esta cuestión, para difamar a la Revolución Cubana, para difamar a la Unión Soviética, para sembrar la historia que nosotros no damos crédito.

Dice: Oswald fue capturado al momento una batalla y tiene, cuando se sorprendió en un momento...

Sobre este violero más informaciones, muchas de ellas registradas.

"... La policía dice que Oswald trabajó en el edificio
almacén de textos escolares de Texas... Después del crimen
la policía encontró en el edificio un frasco "mamm", etc.
Dice donde nació, dice que el 20 de octubre se apareó en
la Embajada de Estados Unidos en Moscú, el 20 de Octubre
de 1963, diciéndole a los funcionarios que quería renunciar a

La Oficina Federal de Investigación de la Policía Federal de los Estados Unidos, que Oswald fue un asesino y un terrorista.

[illegible]

1. The first of these is the fact that the
 2. of the system is not a simple matter.
 3. of the system is not a simple matter.
 4. of the system is not a simple matter.

一、政治
 二、經濟
 三、文化
 四、教育
 五、社會
 六、宗教
 七、藝術
 八、科學
 九、法律
 十、道德
 十一、哲學
 十二、歷史
 十三、地理
 十四、生物
 十五、醫學
 十六、農業
 十七、工業
 十八、商業
 十九、交通
 二十、通信
 二十一、能源
 二十二、環境
 二十三、人口
 二十四、民族
 二十五、語言
 二十六、文字
 二十七、圖畫
 二十八、音樂
 二十九、戲劇
 三十、電影
 三十一、電視
 三十二、廣播
 三十三、報紙
 三十四、雜誌
 三十五、圖書
 三十六、期刊
 三十七、叢書
 三十八、傳記
 三十九、小說
 四十、詩歌
 四十一、散文
 四十二、雜文
 四十三、評論
 四十四、報告
 四十五、演講
 四十六、會議
 四十七、展覽
 四十八、比賽
 四十九、節日
 五十、紀念
 五十一、慶典
 五十二、儀式
 五十三、典禮
 五十四、宴會
 五十五、舞會
 五十六、聚會
 五十七、郊遊
 五十八、旅行
 五十九、旅遊
 六十、觀光
 六十一、度假
 六十二、休閒
 六十三、娛樂
 六十四、遊戲
 六十五、運動
 六十六、體育
 六十七、健身
 六十八、康樂
 六十九、養生
 七十、保健
 七十一、美容
 七十二、化妝
 七十三、服飾
 七十四、髮型
 七十五、指甲
 七十六、香水
 七十七、眼鏡
 七十八、首飾
 七十九、手錶
 八十、包包
 八十一、鞋子
 八十二、衣服
 八十三、褲子
 八十四、裙子
 八十五、襪子
 八十六、手套
 八十七、圍巾
 八十八、帽子
 八十九、口罩
 九十、面罩
 九十一、耳塞
 九十二、眼罩
 九十三、枕頭
 九十四、被子
 九十五、毯子
 九十六、浴巾
 九十七、毛巾
 九十八、抹布
 九十九、拖把
 一百、掃帚

Via
98

⑦

ESTIMAN DEBE LA POLITICA CONTRA CUBA

THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY

**SOSPECHOSO
ANUNCIO DE
SERGIO CARRERA**

[illegible]

Ni ahora ni nunca nuestro heroico pueblo debe ser tolerante con los vicios ni con el delito

Mr. STANDARD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I have one other request, if I may.

Chairman STOKES. You may proceed.

Mr. STANDARD. Congressman Thone addressed himself to what in fact happened to the discussion which Señor Azcue had, and I would refer him to what I believe is part of the interviews of your committee and your staff with Mr. Otero, which is not yet part of this record as far as I know; and second to the transcription of the 4-hour interview with President Castro, which I understand will be made part of this record by reference when the witnesses have completed their testimony.

Chairman STOKES. That is correct. The full transcript of the statement with President Castro will be made and incorporated into the entire record.

Mr. STANDARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you, counsel. At this time, Mr. Azcue, you are excused. All persons are requested to remain in their seats while the witness leaves the room.

Mr. STANDARD. Mr. Chairman, the witness would like to remain in the room; if I could provide a chair for him, I would.

Chairman STOKES. Professor Blakey.

Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, in light of the questions raised as to the identity of the man who visited the Cuban consulate, that is whether or not he was Lee Harvey Oswald, the committee decided to test by handwriting analysis the authenticity of the signature on the visa application. The committee was advised by the Cuban Government that the visa applications had to be typed in duplicate and that the applicant had to sign both copies.

In 1964, one of the forms allegedly signed by Mr. Oswald was turned over to the Warren Commission.

In 1978 the committee obtained the second copy, which has been incorporated in the record, in Havana.

Consequently, there are two checks to be made in a handwriting analysis of this question, one, to determine that both visa application forms were signed by the same person, and two, to determine if possible whether the signatures were in fact or are in fact identical with the other writings attributable to Lee Harvey Oswald.

For the purposes of verification, the committee asked its handwriting experts to compare the signatures on the two forms which are part of the record with two other writings. Those other writings were the signature on Oswald's fingerprint card at the time of his arrest in New Orleans in August 1963, and his passport application dated June 24, 1963.

Mr. Chairman, the committee's panel of handwriting experts have in fact made that analysis, and a representative of it will be with the committee on Monday to report in full on those findings.

In essence, however, it is that Lee Harvey Oswald signed both of the visa applications.

That representative of the handwriting panel will be Mr. Joseph P. McNally. The committee will recall that Mr. McNally has already testified before the committee and will be available again on Monday to be fully cross-examined on this and several other issues that have arisen in the handwriting area.

At this time, Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate to note that another member of the Cuban consulate staff who was present when Oswald allegedly applied for a visa was Senor Alfredo Mirabal Diaz. Senor Mirabal succeeded Senor Azcue as Cuban consul in Mexico City. Senor Mirabal was born August 11, 1923.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Senor Mirabal.

Chairman STOKES. Will the witness please stand. Raise your right hand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

[The testimony of Senor Mirabal was given through the interpreter.]

Senor MIRABAL. I do.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you. You may be seated.

TESTIMONY OF SENOR ALFREDO MIRABAL DIAZ, ACCOMPANIED BY MR. HERVAS, INTERPRETER FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Chairman STOKES. The Chair recognizes counsel, Michael Goldsmith.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mirabal, when did you assume your position as Cuban consul in Mexico City?

Senor MIRABAL. September 2, 1963.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. How long had you worked in that capacity?

Senor MIRABAL. Eleven months.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. What hours of the day was the Cuban consulate open to the public?

Senor MIRABAL. Ten in the morning to two in the afternoon.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. And what days of the week were these hours observed?

Senor MIRABAL. Monday through Friday.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Was the consulate open to the public on Saturdays and Sundays?

Senor MIRABAL. No.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Mirabal, while you were Cuban consul in Mexico City, did you ever see Lee Harvey Oswald?

Senor MIRABAL. Twice, on two occasions, when he was at the consulate processing his visa application.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did anything unusual happen when Oswald was applying for his visa?

Senor MIRABAL. Yes; since he first came for the visa, I must note that I do not know English, and therefore it was my colleague Azcue who took care of him, though he had in fact concluded his responsibilities in the position. When I arrived, he stayed on to help me out and he, together with the secretary, took care of this visitor.

From inside my private office I could hear loud voices, and I came out of my office several times to see what was happening in the area where the secretary worked. I asked my colleague, Azcue, who was taking care of the visitor, I did not know who the visitor was. But my colleague Azcue told me that the visitor was in need

of an urgent visa, that he was in a great hurry to travel to Cuba. However, as our own procedures dictated, and as our instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Relations provided, we were not authorized to issue a visa, and therefore the visa was not issued.

He continued in this discussion.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Did Mr. Oswald get involved in arguments with Mr. Azcue on both occasions that he, Oswald, visited the consulate?

Senor MIRABAL. Yes; on both occasions there were discussions or arguments to such an extent that from the very first moment it appeared to me as if this instance could be a case of a provocation. I sensed that there was an intent to create some kind of a scandal, of a disturbance. That was my feeling.

The second time the same thing happened.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Approximately how long did these arguments last?

Senor MIRABAL. Today I could not be exact or precise; 15 years have gone by since then. Some time, 15, 20 minutes.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. And you had occasion to see Mr. Oswald on both of these occasions?

Senor MIRABAL. Yes. I had an opportunity to see him. But it was from my private office where I stuck my head over and had a look at him from that vantage point.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. How far away from you was Mr. Oswald during these two visits?

Senor MIRABAL. About 4 meters away.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Do you recall when Mr. Oswald made his visits to the Cuban consulate?

Senor MIRABAL. It was at the beginning or shortly after my arrival.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. At this time, Mr. Mirabal, I would like to refer your attention to what has been marked as JFK exhibit F-408. That is the second exhibit from the right. And I believe you have just been handed a copy of that exhibit.

Mr. Mirabal, does the date on that application refresh your memory as to when Oswald visited the Embassy?

Senor MIRABAL. Yes; it is close to the date of my arrival. Yes, in addition the visa applications are filled in at the very time that they are being requested, and this would be on the second occasion.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Mirabal, please look at the picture that appears in that application. Is the person whose picture appears in this visa application the same Lee Harvey Oswald who visited the Cuban consulate requesting a visa?

Senor MIRABAL. I really did not observe him with any great deal of interest. He for me was one of many who visited the consulate. The image that I have of him, I believe that the answer is yes, that he is the same person.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Mirabal, after the assassination of President Kennedy, was there ever any discussion at the Cuban consulate or Embassy concerning whether the Oswald arrested in Dallas was actually the same person identified as Oswald who visited your consulate requesting a visa in September 1963?

Senor MIRABAL. Yes; on the day following the assassination it is my own secretary that communicates this information to me in the morning when I arrive at the consulate. At that point, she advises

me of the fact that the assassination has occurred. Later, and I cannot recall exactly how late or how soon thereafter, she communicates to me the fact that the alleged assassin is the same person that came to the consulate.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Mr. Mirabal, at this time I would like to read to you a quotation from Comer Clark's article. He attributes the quotation to President Castro. I believe that Mr. Hervas has been given a copy of that.

"Lee Oswald came to the Cuban embassy in Mexico City twice," Castro went on. "The first time—I was told—he wanted to work for us.

"He was asked to explain, but he wouldn't.

"He wouldn't go into details.

"The second time he said he wanted to 'free Cuba from American imperialism.'

"Then he said something like: 'Someone ought to shoot that President Kennedy.'

"Then Oswald said—and this was exactly how it was reported to me—'Maybe I'll try to do it.'

Mr. Mirabal, do you recall Mr. Oswald making the remarks that are allegedly attributed to him?

Senor MIRABAL. I feel that what has just been read is totally absurd, it is incredible. In addition, it is completely false, it is a lie, and it is impossible to imagine that that has been stated.

Mr. GOLDSMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Mirabal.

I have no further questions at this time.

Chairman STOKES. Does any member seek recognition?

Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.

Mr. DODD. Mr. Mirabal, let me just follow up the one line of questioning I had for Mr. Azcue, and that is with regard to how the photo on the visa application got there.

Can you enlighten us at all as to how that photograph got on the application, what either the normal operating procedures were or if there were any unique operating procedures in this case which would explain how that photograph ended up on that visa application?

Senor MIRABAL. The entire matter of the processing of the paper work relating to the application was entrusted to the secretary. I did not participate in any manner. She was most efficient, and we trusted her in this task.

Mr. DODD. In other words, you never saw the visa application when it was in the consulate in Mexico.

Senor MIRABAL. Yes, I did. In fact, there is a footnote with a series of remarks or a remark or observation that I included or I made.

Mr. DODD. Do you recall that photograph as the photograph of the man that you saw, granted not all that clearly, during the 30 minutes or so, the total period of time that he was in your office back in September of 1963?

Senor MIRABAL. I know that this was the photograph that was affixed to the request of the application, but at no point did I verify whether this photograph was in fact that of the person who submitted the application, because this was not a matter that I took care of. It was the secretary who was responsible for this, and when she brought these documents to me, I assumed that everything was in order.

Mr. DODD. Fine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Yes, I just have one question.

You stated that the statement attributed to President Castro as to the statements made in the consulate by Lee Harvey Oswald were not correct and were a lie or something to that effect.

At that time, I understood you could not speak English and did not understand English; is that correct?

Senor MIRABAL. Yes, it is true. I did not speak English at that time. However, my colleague, Senor Azcue, and the secretary would, without any doubt, have informed me if he had stated anything of such a nature. I have complete trust in my colleague, Azcue, and in the secretary, and obviously because of the unusual and extremely alarming nature of any observations or statements of that kind, I feel sure that they would have advised me had they heard them.

Mr. SAWYER. I just wanted the record to be clear that you are repeating what the other two told you rather than stating an observation as to what he said yourself. You are nodding your head yes.

Senor MIRABAL. Yes; I don't understand English. Even if I heard it in English, I wouldn't have understood it—yes, it was my colleague, Azcue, and the secretary who took care of the application submitted by Lee Harvey Oswald. It was also them who provided me with all of the information that enabled me to add the observation contained in that footnote to the effect that he was requesting at the same time a visa to go to the Soviet Union.

In fact, I noticed that he presented a card or credentials as belonging to the Communist Party of the United States. I understand, or it is also my understanding, that the Communist Party of the United States stated that he never belonged to the party. I was surprised by the fact that the card seemed to be a new card.

I must say that I also have been a Communist for a number of years and that generally we do not use credentials or a card to identify ourselves as members of the party. Rather, we are identified to ourselves as Communists by our own behavior and by our own ideas. I was surprised by his unusual interest in using identification as a Communist.

I would think it would be interesting to know how he obtained the card. It did have his name, and it did coincide with the same name that appeared in the other document. And, as I indicated, it was my colleague, Azcue, who brought all these documents and all this information to my desk for my report. It is then that I talked with the Soviet consul, and when I mentioned this to him, he told me that Oswald had in fact requested a visa for the Soviet Union but that he had been told that it would take about 4 months to obtain a response, and that is the reason that I included that information in the footnote that was to be sent to Havana.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Mirabal, was it standard operating procedure for an applicant to affix his signature to the application in the presence of a consulate official?

Senor MIRABAL. That was normal. And it was always applied in that manner.

Chairman STOKES. Were there ever any occasions when an application form would be signed in blank?

Senor MIRABAL. During the 11 months that I was there, that was never done.

Chairman STOKES. And under the procedure as you knew it, were applicants ever permitted to take the application forms out of the consular office?

Senor MIRABAL. To my knowledge, no. The ministry did not allow that to be done. I could not authorize it, and as far as I know, it was never done.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you, Mr. Mirabal.

Is there anything further?

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Could I get Mr. Mirabal to describe Mr. Oswald's demeanor, please?

Senor MIRABAL. What I recall, and this, of course, is not only an image that time has eroded, but also I looked at him without concentrating great attention on him. At that time his appearance was not a cause of concern, but rather the events that were taking place at that time, the loud conversation, et cetera.

As I recall him, he was a rather small man, medium height or somewhat less, narrow shoulders. I believe he was wearing a coat, short hair. I do not recall him having a moustache. He did have a serious expression on his face. He appeared hard or tough, someone who is upset or unhappy. That is the image that I retain of him.

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired. Is there anyone else seeking recognition?

Mr. Mirabal, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before our committee, he is entitled under the rules of this committee and of the House to address the committee for a period of 5 minutes in the event he desires to in any way clarify his testimony or expand upon it or explain it. I would at this time extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose if you so desire.

Senor MIRABAL. Thank you. I would like to state to the members of the committee that in connection with this entire process of the two visits that he made to the consulate, my impression from the very first moment was that it was in fact a provocation. He insisted on the urgency of his need for a visa. He indicated that he was being persecuted. He indicated that he could not stay long in Mexico, that he had an urgent need to travel to Cuba and therefrom to go to the Soviet Union.

On the first day he was not given the visa because he did not fulfill the necessary requirements, requirements that are asked of all individuals who are visa applicants.

On the second time he came to file the application, and yet he insisted that he needed to have it processed rapidly with great urgency. It was because of these demands of his that the argument with Mr. Azcue and with the secretary followed, and in fact during the argument he accused us all of not being true revolutionaries, of not being sensitive to the fact that he was being persecuted.

I must say that from the very beginning I considered this a provocation, and I assured that in the manner in which we handled the case we followed the directives of the Foreign Ministry in the

sense that all individuals have to follow certain procedures in order to obtain a visa.

I would also like to say personally that as far as I am concerned, it is a source of great satisfaction to be present here before the committee because in the first place I consider this a very important investigation in itself and also because we are very interested in its successful outcome.

I am individually—and my government wants to insure—that things will be perfectly cleared up as a result. We feel that there have been efforts at making propaganda, at conducting campaigns, and Cuba has been, attempts have been made to link Cuba to this horrendous assassination.

From the reports that have been read here, apparently even I had been linked to this event, and I can assure that neither Cuba nor I in any manner whatsoever participated in something that we very strongly repudiate, as was clearly stated by Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you very much, Mr. Mirabal.

We also want to thank you for having volunteered to be here today and to testify before this committee, and we are deeply appreciative for your appearance.

Does counsel have any statement to make?

Mr. STANDARD. Just this, Mr. Chairman. In anticipation of your incorporating in this record the 4 hour approximate transcript of the interview with President Castro, I ask that you incorporate into the record and make it a part of it a series of articles which are referred to but not with specificity by date or name.

First, a series of three articles by the French journalist, Jean Daniel, one which appeared in L'Express in French and two articles which appeared in the magazine, The New Republic.

Second, in the course of the interview several references are made to Ambassador William Atwood. Those statements describe his role in contacting the Cuban Government at the behest of President Kennedy. And I ask that those be included as well.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection, counsel's request is hereby granted.

JFK exhibit F-685 may be entered into therecord at this point.
[The information follows:]

Nov 28, 1963 L'EXPRE

LES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

CUBA

Avec Castro
à l'heure du crime

Dans la pièce où est Fidel Castro, on capte la radio de Miami. La nouvelle arrive: Castro se lève et parle à Jean Daniel...

Il était aux environs de 13 h 30. L'heure de Cuba. Nous étions en train de déjeuner dans la salle de séjour de la suite résidentielle cubaine que Fidel Castro possède, sur la magnifique place de Verdade, à 120 kilomètres de La Havane. Nous, les dix-huit tous ses invités, le saluâmes en levant ensuite les deux bras devant la télévision. Les deux heures avant l'installation des fusées l'an dernier. La sonnerie d'un téléphone à rétro: un secrétaire, la femme de guerillero a annoncé que le président de la République Dorticos venait parler d'urgence au Premier ministre. Fidel a pris l'appareil et je lui ai entendu dire: « Come? Un attentat? » Il s'est adressé à nous pour nous dire que Kennedy venait d'être abattu à Dallas. Il a repris la conversation et a déclaré tout haut: « He-fello? Muy graveemente? » (Brisé gravement).

Il est revenu s'asseoir devant la table à manger et il a répété trois fois: « Ex una mala noticia » (Voilà une nouvelle mauvaise). Puis il est resté silencieux pendant un moment. Il attendait un autre coup de téléphone et plus de détails. Il a dit ensuite qu'il y avait dans la société américaine une proposition inquiétante de déséquilibres et que ça pouvait être l'œuvre aussi bien d'un fou que d'un terroriste. Un Vietnamien peintre? Ou un membre du Ku Klux Klan. Le second coup de téléphone est arrivé: on venait pouvoir lui annoncer que le président des États-Unis était en vie et qu'on pouvait le suivre. La réaction immédiate de Fidel Castro a été de dire: « Alors, il est revenu. » Il a prononcé cette phrase avec satisfaction.

Un réquisitoire

Cette phrase faisait suite à une conversation que nous avions eue l'avant-veille, pendant la nuit dernière. Évidemment de 10 heures du soir à 1 heure du matin. Une bonne partie des entretiens avait tourné autour des impressions dont je lui avais fait part sur une audience que m'avait accordée le président Kennedy le 24 octobre dernier et sur les réactions de Fidel Castro à ces impressions. Il s'était livré alors à un implacable réquisitoire de la politique des États-Unis, ajoutant qu'en plus le Gouvernement américain avait eu toutes les chances dans un passé récent de neutraliser les rapports avec Cuba et qu'au lieu de cela il avait toléré que la C.I.A. entraîne une cinquième et organisée la contre-

révolution. Il s'était dit qu'il n'était en rien « meilleur » que le danger était son milieu naturel et me devait une visite. Les États-Unis avaient en effet, récemment dans l'Amérique latine, comme dans le monde occidental, il parlait, disant, du point de vue des intérêts de la politique dans deux continents: américains. Pour cela, il fallait que naissent aux États-Unis un homme capable de comprendre la réalité explosive de l'Amérique latine et de s'y adapter.

L'annonce fatale

Soudain, ensuite, il s'était dit: « Ce homme, n'avait-il dit, ce pourrait être encore Kennedy. Il a gardé encore toutes les possibilités de devenir, aux yeux de l'histoire, le plus grand président des États-Unis. Celui qui comprendrait enfin qu'il peut y avoir une coexistence entre capitalistes et socialistes, même dans la zone américaine. »

« Et voilà alors un président soupçonner à Lincoln. Je suis sûr, pour

Kennedy par exemple, Kennedy est un homme avec qui l'on peut parler. C'est l'impression que j'ai recueillie de toutes nos conversations avec Kennedy. D'autres m'assurent que, pour cela, il faut attendre sa réélection. Moi, je le crois responsable de tout cela. Je vais vous dire, le crois qu'il a compris pas mal de choses depuis quelques mois et puis aussi, en fin de compte, je suis persuadé qu'il n'importe que d'autre serait pire. »

Puis Fidel a ajouté avec un grand rire d'humour: « Si vous le voyez, vous pouvez lui dire que je suis prêt à déclarer que Goldwater est mon ami, si cela doit assurer sa réélection. »

Cette conversation datait du 19 novembre.

Maintenant il était 2 heures environ, et nous nous sommes levés de table pour aller installer devant une radio. Le commandant Vallerio, son médecin, aide de camp et ami intime, a immédiatement pris l'émission en anglais du relais de la N.B.C. à Miami. Au fur et à mesure de l'arrivée des nouvelles, Vallerio les traduisait à Fidel. Bressure à la tête. Pourrait de l'assassin. Meurtre d'un policier. Enfin l'annonce fatale: le président Kennedy est mort.

Alors Fidel s'est levé et m'a dit: « Tout a changé. Tout va changer. Les États-Unis occupent une telle position dans le monde que la mort d'un président de ce pays affecte des millions de gens dans tous les coins du globe. La guerre froide, les relations avec la Russie, l'Amérique latine, Cuba, la question noire, tout est à repenser. Je vais vous dire une chose: Kennedy était un conciliant auquel on s'était habitué. C'est une affaire grave, très grave. »

Après un quart d'heure de silence observé par toutes les stations de radio américaines, nous nous sommes réinstallés devant le poste: le silence n'avait été interrompu que pour la retransmission de l'hymne national américain. Cela procurait une étrange impression que d'attendre retentir cet hymne dans la maison de Fidel Castro au milieu des villages précaires.

« Maintenant, disait dire Fidel, il faut vite, très vite, qu'il se retrouvent l'assassin, sinon, vous allez voir, je les connais, ils vont essayer de nous


mettre ça sur le dos. Mais, dites-moi, cela fait le quatrième président des États-Unis qui est assassiné sur son poste? 36? C'est inquiétant. A Cuba, il n'y en a pas un seul. Vous savez, lorsque nous étions dans la Sierra, il y avait des gens (pas dans un groupe, dans un autre) qui étaient très braves. Ils croyaient qu'on pouvait en finir avec un régime en le décapitant. Moi, j'ai toujours été l'opinion la plus sage. Je paye au révolutionnaire la marque du dictateur. Mais par tempérament aussi car, au fond, ce genre d'assassinat me répugne. »

Quelle mentalité?

Les ambassadeurs ont repris. Un reporter craill devait parler des difficultés que John Kennedy trouve à se défendre de son bas enseignement. Fidel explique: « Que mentalité? Il s'agit plusieurs fois à la mentalité, après tout, c'est la même différence de civilisations. » Surtout que vous êtes comme ça, en Europe? Pour nous, les latins d'Amérique, la mort, c'est quelque chose de sacré, non seulement c'est un de de l'histoire, mais cela implique la dignité, le respect. Il y a des voyous qui deviennent mécontents devant la mort. À propos, cela me fait penser à quelque chose, à vos écrits tout ce que le monde a dit hier contre la politique de Kennedy, maintenant ne êtes pas sans nom, parce de la politique du Gouvernement des États-Unis. »


Quand il a prononcé cette phrase, j'ai pensé au crétin qui était resté dans la chambre que j'avais réservée. J'ai pensé aux églises catholiques, aux temples protestants que j'avais vus, remplis de fidèles le dimanche matin précédent à Santiago. Je me suis souvenu que tous ces révolutionnaires célébraient religieusement la naissance, le mariage,

(*) A gauche: Fidel Castro. De droite: le commandant Vallerio, Jean Daniel, le frère, l'envoyé cubain Juan Arechaga. Au fond, le commandant Vallerio.



CASTRO DANS UNE CHAMBRE DE L'HOTEL HABANA-RIVERA (*).
« Maintenant, ça y est! Ça va être mon tour. »

(MARTIN RICHARD - L'EXPRE)



FIDEL CASTRO ET JEAN DANIEL.
« C'est le quatrième Président des États-Unis naissant. C'est inquiétant. »

et la mort. J'ai pensé à cette phrase d'un ministre cubain : « N'oubliez jamais que cette révolution socialiste parle l'espagnol. Vous ne pourrez la connaître vraiment que si vous êtes un familier du « *Romancero* », du « *Cid* » et de « *Don Quichotte* ». Moi, j'ajouterais qu'il faut aussi être un familier de l'Afrique depuis que j'ai entendu chanter l'« *Internationale* » par des petites filles devant la nation où l'on célébrait un « *cheengo* » qui est une sorte de vaudou cubain.

Vers 5 heures, Fidel Castro a déclaré que, puisque nous n'y arrivions rien, il fallait tout de même essayer de respecter l'emploi du temps. Il tenait à me faire visiter lui-même une « *granja de pueblo* » (ferme d'État) dans laquelle il s'était livré à des expériences personnelles. Son obsession actuelle, c'est l'agriculture. Il ne li que des études agromomiques. Il parle avec lyrisme du sol, de sa fertilisation et des possibilités que donnera à Cuba la canne à sucre. En 1970, d'acquiescer une complète indépendance économique.

Un « administrateur »

Nous avons pris la voiture et ouvert la radio. On était sur la piste de l'assassin de Dulles. « C'est un espion russe », dit le reporter. Correction cinq minutes après : « C'est un espion marié à une russe ». Fidel dit : « Maintenant, ça y est, cela va être mon tour. » Pas encore. L'assassin est en effet qu'il s'agit

d'un jeune homme, membre du « *Fair Play Committee for Cuba* ». C'est un admirateur de Fidel Castro. Fidel déclare : « S'ils avaient des preuves, ils auraient dit un agent, un complice, un tueur à gages. S'ils disent simplement un administrateur, c'est simplement pour tenter de lier dans l'esprit des gens le nom de Castro et l'émotion suscitée par l'assassinat. C'est la méthode de la publicité, c'est la méthode de la propagande. C'est terrible. Mais vous savez, je suis sûr que tout cela va se dégonfler très vite. Il y a, aux États-Unis, trop de polices concurrentes pour que les intentions de l'une d'elles puissent être imposées à toutes, très longtemps. »

Nous arrivons à la « *granja de pueblo* » où les paysans accueillent Fidel. Au même moment, un speaker de la radio annonce avec une voix étranglée par l'émotion que l'on sait désormais que l'assassin est un « *pro-castro-marxiste* ».

Les commentateurs se succèdent, ils deviennent de plus en plus enus et de plus en plus agressifs. Fidel s'exécute alors : « Il faut abandonner la piste de la ferme. » Nous allons vers Malanzan d'où il pourra téléphoner au président Dorticos. En chemin il pose des questions : « Qui est Lyndon Johnson ? Quelle réputation a-t-il ? Quel rapport avait-il avec Kennedy ? avec Krouchtchev ? Quelle était sa position au moment de la tentative d'invasion à Cuba ? Quelle autorité, enfin et surtout, a-t-il sur la C.I.A. ? » Et puis, soudain, il regarde sa montre, vérifie qu'il nous faut une demi-heure pour arriver à Malanzan et comme sur commande, il s'endort.

Si je puis en juger par le temps qu'il m'a consacré pendant ces trois jours, il n'avait pu dormir auparavant que quelques heures à peine.

L'ironie de l'histoire

Après Malanzan d'où il devait ordonner l'let d'alerte, nous sommes revenus à Varadero pour dîner. Il a dit, étant le premier qu'une femme lui avait tenu peu avant, que c'était une ironie de l'histoire pour les Cubains, dans la situation qui leur avait été faite depuis le blocus, d'avoir à déplorer la mort d'un président des États-Unis. « Après tout, a-t-il ajouté, il y a peut-être des gens dans le monde que cela rejoint, les guerilleros du Sud-Vietnam, par exemple, et aussi, au fait, l'ex-prince, Mme Nhu. » Je pense, en effet, au peuple de Cuba habitué à voir des affiches comme celle qui représente l'armée rouge en surimpression derrière des maquisards et sur lesquels on peut lire : « *Alto Mr. Kennedy, Cuba no esta sola.* » A tous ceux que l'on a conduits à lier leurs privations à la politique du président des États-Unis, mais ce peuple cubain est égaré. Il se demande ce qui va lui arriver encore. Ce peuple cubain est aussi un peuple léger, je dis cela dans la meilleure acception du terme. Les Espagnols n'ont pas été imprégnés de la gravité indienne comme au Mexique : ils sont imprégnés de la jovialité africaine. C'est le peuple du rythme et la haine ne revêt pas au rythme.

Au dîner, j'ai pu reprendre toutes mes questions. Comment Castro

avait été amené à mettre en danger la paix du monde avec les fusées ? Quelle était la dépendance à l'égard de l'Union Soviétique ? S'il n'était pas possible d'envisager des rapports avec les États-Unis, comme la Finlande en a avec les Russes ? Comment le passage s'est fait de l'humanisme de la Sierra Maestra au marxisme-léninisme de 1961 ? Fidel Castro, à nouveau en pleine forme, s'est expliqué sur tout. Puis il m'a questionné à nouveau sur Kennedy et chaque fois que je faisais un éloge des qualités intellectuelles du président assassin, j'éveillais chez lui le plus vif intérêt.

Les Cubains ont vécu avec les États-Unis dans cette intimité cruelle, et que je connais bien, des colonies avec les colonisateurs. C'est tout de même une intimité. L'événement qui frappe les hommes frappe en même temps les autres. Dans cette si séduisante ville de la Havane où nous sommes retournés dans la nuit, tandis que brillait les enseignes lumineuses des slogans marxistes qui ont remplacé la publicité du Coca-Cola et du dentifrice, au milieu des quotations soviétiques et des camions techniques, une certaine émotion américaine vibrât dans l'air, faite de ressentiment, de trouble, d'anxiété, mais tout de même aussi de je ne sais quel imperceptible rapprochement. « Après tout, ce président américain n'est pas d'accord, pendant sa vie, avec nos amis russes », m'a dit, au moment de mon départ, un jeune intellectuel cubain, comme si d'accuser de ne pas le rejoindre de l'assassinat.

JEAN DANIEL.

LE TESTAMENT
DE KENNEDYLe
dernier
dialogue

*Les conclusions
de Kennedy sur
de Gaulle et
Castro confiées
à Jean Daniel.
Et la vérité
sur l'affaire
des fusées.*

J'ai été reçu à la Maison-Blanche par le Président Kennedy, le jeudi 24 octobre, à 17 h 45. Je m'étais attendu pendant un quart d'heure dans la salle des Conférences de la Maison-Blanche, contiguë au cabinet du Président des États-Unis. Au bout d'un quart d'heure, c'est le Président lui-même qui est venu me chercher pour m'introduire dans son bureau. Il s'est excusé de m'avoir fait attendre, non pas pour être courtois ou pour m'accorder quelque explication au léger trouble apporté dans un emploi du temps dont l'organisation paraissait très stricte. En passant dans la petite pièce où se tient le secrétaire, nous avons vu sortir par une porte-fenêtre Mme Jacqueline Kennedy, qui se dirigeait vers les jardins privés de la Maison-Blanche. Le Président l'a rappelée pour que je puisse lui être présenté.

C'était encore, à Washington, l'indian Summer. Il faisait très chaud et le président, comme Mme Kennedy, étaient très légèrement vêtus, ce qui ajoutait à l'extrême impression de jeunesse, de charisme et de simplicité que l'on était surpris de ressentir en accédant à cette solennelle enceinte. Le Président (allure sportive et régulière, gestes rapides et courts, le regard mobile mais qui, à certains moments, se figeait dans une immobilité inquiétante, je dirai presque hypnotique) m'a fait assoir sur le canapé semi-circulaire qui se tient assis, en face de son bureau. Lui s'est assis, en face de ce canapé, sur un fauteuil à bascule. L'entretien devait durer de vingt à vingt-cinq minutes. Il ne fut interrompu que par un bref coup de téléphone.

D'accord sur rien

Le Président Kennedy m'a aussitôt demandé comment évoluait la situation française. Après ma réponse, il m'a parlé du général de Gaulle.

Il m'a fait de façon détendue comme un homme qui a mis trop tard à l'œuvre ses connaissances, après avoir dit que Kennedy était un homme qui plus vite encore. Avec de Gaulle, ce n'était pas possible. C'était, plus encore, impossible de ne pas comprendre, et s'acharné à persuader, il avait téléphoné directement au général de Gaulle. Et voilà. Mais, fait singulier,

depuis la visite récente de M. Courvoisier, le Président Kennedy était, selon ses propres termes, « franco-américain ». Il avait décidé de ne plus s'en préoccuper. C'était, selon lui, une inutile perte de temps.

« Nous avons vérifié, M. Courvoisier et moi, m'a dit le Président, que nous n'étions d'accord sur rien, et nous sommes convenus que ce désaccord total ne devait pas nuire à l'amitié entre deux grands

JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY.
« J'ai téléphoné directement à de Gaulle... »

peys occidentaux. Ce que j'ai compris, c'est que la stratégie du général de Gaulle, que je comprends mal, n'est pas d'être catégoriquement franc-américain. Il semble que seule cette tension pourrait redonner aux Européens l'envie de penser par eux-mêmes et de ne plus compter passivement sur les dollars et sur l'impulsion politique des États-Unis. Mais nous n'allons pas donner à la France des conseils de cette nature. »

La notion d'indépendance


Le Président Kennedy a poursuivi en résumant, avec concision et vigueur, les désaccords entre les États-Unis et la France.

Sur l'Allemagne, la politique nucléaire, l'Europe, le notion d'« indépendance », il m'a dit ce qui, depuis, a été publié partout. Il a cependant ajouté que la France avait une sin-

gularité, façon de manifester son indépendance à propos, en particulier, du Vietnam et du Cuba. Il était le chef de l'État français, mais il ne donnait pas de leçons sans prendre aucun risque. Il m'a dit que lui-même ne s'appropriait pas les informations, mais qu'il les utilisait, mais que les amis qui les lui procuraient étaient, eux-mêmes, engagés dans l'action.

J'ai alors demandé au Président Kennedy ce que l'on pouvait attendre du voyage aux États-Unis projeté par le général de Gaulle en février prochain. Il a répondu : « Absolument rien. »

Mais il a aussitôt précisé avec un large sourire, et comme s'avouant à l'avance le plaisir de la future rencontre : « Ce sera tout de même très excitant, le général de Gaulle est un



(Herald)

Non ? Vous croyez que cela ne compte pas, l'honneur ou politique ? Non, hommes des rouaniques ? Peut-être. Pourquoi pas ? En tout cas, nous nous sommes mis d'accord sur l'installation des fusées.


« Alors, au mois de juin 1962, Raul, mon frère, et Che Guevara sont allés à Mexico pour discuter des modalités de la mise en place des fusées. Le contrat est arrivé par mer en trois semaines. Les États-Unis sont parvenus à savoir qu'il s'agissait d'armes, bien sûr, mais ils ont mis deux mois pour découvrir qu'il s'agissait de fusées. Deux mois, c'est-à-dire davantage que ce que nous avions calculé. Car il est bien évident pour tout le monde qu'il s'agissait d'intimider et non d'agresser.

« Maintenant, nous allons parler de l'Alliance pour le Progrès. Je vais vous dire : dans un certain sens, c'était une bonne idée, cela a marqué un progrès. Même si on peut dire que c'est tardif. Humide, que cela a été fait à chaud, sous la contrainte, malgré tout cela l'acte de dire, je conviens que l'idée en elle-même constituait un effort d'adaptation au cours extraordinairement rapide des événements en Amérique latine.

Les pétroles argentins

« Quand nous apprenons par exemple (vous avez vu les journaux ce matin ?) que l'Argentine nationalisait le pétrole ! Le gouvernement argentin ? Non, mais vous vous rendez compte ? À la Bourse de New York, cela a dû faire plus de bruit que le crashisme ! Les conservateurs catholiques et militaires de l'Argentine, les hommes les plus liés aux intérêts américains ! Ici on parle de nationalisation, là de réforme agraire, bon, si l'Alliance pour le Progrès provoque cela, ce n'est pas mauvais, cela va dans le sens des aspirations populaires.

« Lorsque je pense qu'entre les États-Unis et nous, du temps d'Eisenhower, ou plutôt de Nixon, tout a commencé lorsque nous avons décrété une réforme agraire qui se visait, écoutez bien cela, que les propriétaires de plus de 200.000 hectares ! Mais ont 1.200.000 ! Mais alors la réaction des trusts avait été terrible. Aujourd'hui, pour les autres, et parce qu'on agit l'épouvantail communiste, la réaction des trusts américains est en apparence plus ha-



FIDEL CASTRO...
« C'est le rapport d'Abjoubel... »

bile. Ils vont choisir des hommes de paille, pour soustraire indirectement. Mais les difficultés vont commencer.

« C'est pourquoi les bonnes idées de Kennedy ne pourront rien donner. C'est très facile à comprendre et lui, en ce moment, il doit s'en apercevoir, parce que le vous l'ai dit, c'est un homme réaliste : depuis des années et des années, la politique américaine, c'est-à-dire non pas le gouvernement, mais les trusts et le Pentagone, appuie en Amérique latine sur des oligarchies. Le prestige, les dollars, la puissance passent par les mains d'une classe dont Kennedy lui-même vous a dit ce qu'elle était en parlant de Batista.

« Tout d'un coup, un président arrive qui prétend appuyer sur une autre classe (qui n'avait entre les mains aucun des leviers de commande) pour que les peuples aient l'impression que les États-Unis n'appuient plus les dictateurs et que l'on n'a plus besoin de faire des révolutions à la Castro.

« Qu'est-ce qui se passe alors ? Les trusts voient leurs intérêts compromis (à peine, mais tout de même !), le Pentagone pense que les bases stratégiques sont en danger, les oligarchies puissantes de tous les pays d'Amérique latine alertent leurs amis américains, elles sabotent la nouvelle politique, bref Kennedy a tout le monde contre lui. Sur place, les quelques présidents libéraux, ou prétendus tels, que l'on a choisis comme instruments de la nouvelle politique,

ou bien sont balayés comme Bouché à Saint-Domingue, ou bien se transforment. Belaisnir n'était pas un Batista : il l'est devenu.

« Je demande à Castro où est l'issue ? Comment la situation peut-elle évoluer ?

« Même si les États-Unis utilisent contre vous ce que vous appelez l'allié du communisme, il reste que vous avez dit la communitaire, que votre économie, votre défense ou votre sécurité dépendent de l'Union soviétique, et que même si vous n'y êtes pour rien, les États-Unis considèrent que vous faites partie d'un système international, que vous constituez une base soviétique dans un monde où le pais dépend du respect d'un partage terribile des zones.

« Si les États-Unis posent le problème comme vous l'avez posé, alors, tranche Castro, n'est vrai, il n'y a pas d'issue. Mais qui est prêt à le faire du compte ? On a tout essayé contre nous, tout, absolument tout, et nous vivons encore, de mieux en mieux, nous sommes debout, et nous allons aller avec un écrit plus grand que d'habitude, le 1^{er} janvier 1964, le cinquantième anniversaire de la Révolution cubaine. La politique d'hostilité des États-Unis est chaque jour moins efficace...

Ni dollars ni banquiers

« Je viens de vous parler en révolutionnaire cubain. Mais si je dois vous parler comme un homme soucieux de la paix et qui considère que les États-Unis sont un pays trop important pour ne pas influencer la paix dans le monde, alors, évidemment, je ne peux pas m'empêcher d'espérer qu'il se trouvera un homme en Amérique du Nord, un homme pour braver l'impopularité, lutter contre les trusts, dire la vérité et surtout laisser les peuples agir comme ils l'entendent.

« Je ne demande qu'une chose : ni des dollars, ni une aide, ni des diplomates, ni des banquiers, ni des militaires, rien sauf la paix, qu'on nous accepte tels que nous sommes. Nous, nous sommes socialistes, les États-Unis sont capitalistes, les pays d'Amérique latine choisissent ce qu'ils veulent. Tout de même, à l'époque où les États-Unis vendent du blé aux Russes, où le Canada approvisionne la Chine, où de Gaulle respecte Ben Bella, pourquoi serait-il impossible de faire comprendre aux Américains que le socialisme conduit pour eux non pas à l'hostilité, mais à la coexistence. Pourquoi ne serait-ce pas Tito ou Sékou Touré ?

« Vraiment, je crois qu'un homme comme Kennedy peut découvrir que l'intérêt des États-Unis n'est pas de poursuivre une politique qui se mène qu'à des échecs. Avec nous, sur la base du respect réciproque des souverainetés, tout peut se normaliser.


Fidel Castro s'est levé et m'a dit encore, pour conclure :

« Politique vous allez avoir Kennedy, soyez un maître de paix. Je précise bien, je ne veux rien, je m'attends rien et comme révolutionnaire, la situation actuelle ne me déplaît pas. Mais comme homme, comme homme d'État, j'ai le devoir d'indiquer où peuvent être les bases d'une bonne entente.

Deux jours après, Kennedy était assassiné. Fidel Castro, il était houlé.

JEAN DANIEL.

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« AU CŒUR DE L'AMÉRIQUE...
...qui a tout déclenché. »



(D'après Neilson-Magnum.)

« Pourquoi ne serait-ce pas Tito ou Sékou Touré ? »

Dec. 7, 1963 *New Republic*

When Castro Heard the News

Havana

It was around 1:30 in the afternoon, Cuban time. We were having lunch in the living room of the modest summer residence which Fidel Castro owns on magnificent Varadero Beach, 120 kilometers from Havana. For at least the tenth time, I was questioning the Cuban leader on details of the negotiations with Russia before the missile installations last year. The telephone rang, a secretary in guerrilla garb announced that Mr. Dorticós, President of the Cuban Republic, had an urgent communication for the Prime Minister. Fidel picked up the phone and I heard him say: "*Como? Un atentado?*" ("What's that? An attempted assassination?") He then turned to us to say that Kennedy had just been struck down in Dallas. Then he went back to the telephone and exclaimed in a loud voice "*Herido? Muy gravemente?*" ("Wounded? Very seriously?")

He came back, sat down, and repeated three times the words: "*Es una mala noticia.*" ("This is bad news.") He remained silent for a moment, awaiting another call with further news. He remarked while we waited that there was an alarmingly sizable lunatic fringe in American society and that this deed could equally well have been the work of a madman or of a terrorist. Perhaps a Vietnamese? Or a member of the Ku Klux Klan? The second call came through: it was hoped they would be able to announce that the United States President was still alive, that there was hope of saving him. Fidel Castro's immediate reaction was: "If they can, he is already re-elected." He pronounced these words with satisfaction.

This sentence was a sequel to a conversation we had held on a previous evening and which had turned into an all-night session. To be precise, it lasted from 10 in the evening until 4 in the morning. A good part of the talk revolved about the impressions I recounted to him of an interview which President Kennedy granted me this last October 24, and about Fidel Castro's reactions to these impressions. During this nocturnal discussion, Castro had delivered himself of a relentless indictment of US policy, adding that in the recent past Washington had had ample opportunity to normalize its relations with Cuba, but that instead it had tolerated a CIA program of training, equipping and organizing a counter-revolution. He had told me that he wasn't in the least fearful of his life, since danger was his natural milieu, and if he were to become a victim of the United States this would simply enhance his radius of influence in Latin America as well as throughout the socialist world. He was speaking, he said, from the viewpoint of the interests of peace in

both the American continents. To achieve this goal, a leader would have to arise in the United States capable of understanding the explosive realities of Latin America and of meeting them halfway. Then, suddenly, he had taken a less hostile tack: "Kennedy could still be this man. He still has the possibility of becoming, in the eyes of history, the greatest President of the United States, the leader who may at last understand that there can be coexistence between capitalists and socialists, even in the Americas. He would then be an even greater President than Lincoln. I know, for example, that for Khrushchev, Kennedy is a man you can talk with. I have gotten this impression from all my conversations with Khrushchev. Other leaders have assured me that to attain this goal, we must first await his re-election. Personally, I consider him responsible for everything, but I will say this: he has come to understand many things over the past few months; and then too, in the last analysis, I'm convinced that anyone else would be worse." Then Fidel had added with a broad and boyish grin: "If you see him again, you can tell him that I'm willing to declare Goldwater my friend if that will guarantee Kennedy's re-election!"

This conversation was held on November 19.

Now it was nearly 2 o'clock and we got up from the table and settled ourselves in front of a radio. Commandant Vallero, his physician, aide-de-camp, and intimate friend, was easily able to get the broadcasts from the NBC network in Miami. As the news came in, Vallero would translate it for Fidel: Kennedy wounded in the head; pursuit of the assassin; murder of a policeman; finally the fatal announcement: President Kennedy is dead. Then Fidel stood up and said to me: "Everything is changed. Everything is going to change. The United States occupies such a position in world affairs that the death of a President of that country affects millions of people in every corner of the globe. The cold war, relations with Russia, Latin America, Cuba, the Negro question . . . all will have to be rethought. I'll tell you one thing: at least Kennedy was an enemy to whom we had become accustomed. This is a serious matter, an extremely serious matter."

After the quarter-hour of silence observed by all the American radio stations, we once more tuned in on Miami; the silence had only been broken by a re-broadcasting of the American national anthem. Strange indeed was the impression made, on hearing this hymn ring out in the house of Fidel Castro, in the midst of a circle of worried faces. "Now," Fidel said, "they will have to find the assassin quickly, but very quickly,

otherwise, you watch and see, I know them, they will try to put the blame on us for this thing. But tell me, how many Presidents have been assassinated? Four? This is most disturbing! In Cuba, only one has been assassinated. You know, when we were hiding out in the Sierra there were some (not in my group, in another) who wanted to kill Batista. They thought they could do away with a regime by decapitating it. I have always been violently opposed to such methods. First of all from the viewpoint of political self-interest, because so far as Cuba is concerned, if Batista had been killed he would have been replaced by some military figure who would have tried to make the revolutionists pay for the martyrdom of the dictator. But I was also opposed to it on personal grounds; assassination is repellent to me."

The broadcasts were now resumed. One reporter felt he should mention the difficulty Mrs. Kennedy was having in getting rid of her bloodstained stockings. Fidel exploded: "What sort of a mind is this!" He repeated the remark several times: "What sort of a mind is this? There is a difference in our civilizations after all. Are you like this in Europe? For us Latin Americans, death is a sacred matter; not only does it mark the close of hostilities, but it also imposes decency, dignity, respect. There are even street urchins who behave like kings in the face of death. Incidentally, this reminds me of something else: if you write all those things I told you yesterday against Kennedy's policy, don't use his name now; speak instead of the policy of the United States government."

Toward 5 o'clock, Fidel Castro declared that since there was nothing we could do to alter the tragedy, we must try to put our time to good use in spite of it. He wanted to accompany me in person on a visit to a *granja de pueblo* (state farm), where he had been engaging in some experiments. His present obsession is agriculture. He reads nothing but agronomical studies and reports. He dwells lyrically on the soil, fertilizers, and the possibilities which will give Cuba enough sugar cane by 1970 to achieve economic independence.

"Didn't I Tell You"

We went by car, with the radio on. The Dallas police were now hot on the trail of the assassin. He is a Russian spy, says the news commentator. Five minutes later, correction: he is a spy married to a Russian. Fidel said: "There, didn't I tell you; it'll be my turn next." But not yet. The next word was: the assassin is a Marxist deserter. Then the word came through, in effect, that the assassin was a young man who was a member of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee," that he was an admirer of Fidel Castro. Fidel declared: "If they had had proof, they would have said

he was an agent, an accomplice, a hired killer. In saying simply that he is an admirer, this is just to try and make an association in people's minds between the name of Castro and the emotion awakened by the assassination. This is a publicity method, a propaganda device. It's terrible. But you know, I'm sure this will all soon blow over. There are too many competing policies in the United States for any single one to be able to impose itself universally for very long."

We arrived at the *granja de pueblo*, where the farmers welcomed Fidel. At that very moment, a speaker announced over the radio that it was now known that the assassin is a "pro-Castro Marxist." One commentator followed another; the remarks became increasingly emotional, increasingly aggressive. Fidel then excused himself: "We shall have to give up the visit to the farm." We went on toward Matanzas from where he could telephone President DORTICOS. On the way he had questions: "Who is Lyndon Johnson? What is his reputation? What were his relations with Kennedy? With Khrushchev? What was his position at the time of the attempted invasion of Cuba?" Finally and most important of all: "What authority does he exercise over the CIA?" Then abruptly he looked at his watch, saw that it would be half an hour before we reached Matanzas and, practically on the spot, he dropped off to sleep.

After Matanzas, where he must have decreed a state of alert, we returned to Varadero for dinner. Quoting the words spoken to him by a woman shortly before, he said to me that it was an irony of history for the Cubans, in the situation to which they had been reduced by the blockade, to have to mourn the death of a President of the United States. "After all," he added, "there are perhaps some people in the world to whom this news is cause for rejoicing. The South Vietnamese guerrillas, for example, and also, I would imagine, Madame Nhu!"

I thought of the people of Cuba, accustomed to the sight of posters like the one depicting the Red Army with maquis superimposed in front, and the screaming captions "HALT, MR. KENNEDY! CUBA IS NOT ALONE. . . ." I thought of all those who had been led to associate their deprivations with the policies of President John F. Kennedy.

At dinner I was able to take up all my questions. What had motivated Castro to endanger the peace of the world with the missiles in Cuba? How dependent was Cuba on the Soviet Union? Is it not possible to envisage relations between Cuba and the United States along the same lines as those between Finland and the Russians? How was the transition made from the humanism of Sierra Maestra to the Marxism-Leninism of 1961? Fidel Castro, once more in top form, had an explanation for everything. Then he questioned me

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once more on Kennedy, and each time I eulogized the intellectual qualities of the assassinated President, I awakened the keenest interest in him.

The Cubans have lived with the United States in that cruel intimacy so familiar to me of the colonized with their colonizers. Nevertheless, it was an intimacy. In that very seductive city of Havana to which we returned in the evening, where the luminous signboards with Marxist slogans have replaced the Coca Cola and toothpaste billboards, in the midst of Soviet exhibits

and Czechoslovakian trucks, a certain American emotion vibrated in the atmosphere, compounded of resentment, of concern, of anxiety, yet also, in spite of everything, of a mysterious almost imperceptible rapprochement. After all, this American President was able to reach accord with our Russian friends during his lifetime, said a young Cuban intellectual to me as I was taking my leave. It was almost as though he were apologizing for not rejoicing at the assassination.

JEAN DANIEL

Unofficial Envoy

An Historic Report from Two Capitals

by Jean Daniel

A recent trip to the United States, followed by a journey to Cuba, made it possible for me to establish a "dialogue" between the late President Kennedy and Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Since my arrival in Mexico, where this article is being written, I have been asked whether the impressions I derived from these interviews could shed any light on the assassination of the President and on future relations between Lyndon B. Johnson and Castro.

Last week in these pages I answered the first question by describing the reactions of Fidel Castro, with whom I was visiting at the time, to John Kennedy's death. Here I shall explore the second question by reconstituting the Kennedy-Castro dialogue from the viewpoint of one who was a witness to it.

THE AUTHOR

President Kennedy received me at the White House on Thursday, October 24. My appointment had been scheduled for 5:30. I waited in the Cabinet Conference Room, and at 5:45 the President, following his usual custom, came to look for me himself so that he could escort me into his office. He apologized for the delay, not so much as a courtesy or to flatter me, but to explain the scheduling of his time, which seemed to be very strictly organized. As we passed through the small room where his secretary was working, we caught a glimpse of Mrs. Kennedy leaving by a French window on her way to the private garden of the White House. The President called her back to introduce me.

It was still Indian summer in Washington. The weather was very warm, and both the President and Mrs. Kennedy were very lightly dressed, thus enhancing the impression of youth, charm, and simplicity which was in rather surprising contrast to the solemnity of entering these august chambers. The President (athletic looking in his well-tailored suit, speaking with quick, abrupt gestures and a mobile expression but, at times, freezing up and becoming disconcertingly, almost, I would say, completely expressionless) invited me to be seated on the semi-circular sofa which was in the middle of his office. He sat in a rocking chair opposite the sofa. The interview was to last from 20 to 25 minutes, and it was interrupted only by a brief telephone call.

The President immediately asked me how the French situation was developing. After my reply, he spoke about General de Gaulle. He talked in a relaxed fashion,

like someone who has at last found solace in indifference after having long been exasperated and fascinated. John Kennedy was a man who liked to get to the heart of a matter quickly, and make decisions even more rapidly. But this was not possible in dealing with de Gaulle, who is more difficult to handle than Khrushchev. One day, impatient at not understanding the General's reasoning and intent upon convincing him, Kennedy telephoned de Gaulle direct. All in vain. Oddly enough, however, since the recent visit of de Gaulle's foreign minister, Couve de Murville, to Washington Mr. Kennedy had ceased to be so deeply concerned about Franco-American relations. The truth is, he had made up his mind not to worry about them any more. According to him, it was a waste of time.

"Mr. Couve de Murville and I both verified that we didn't agree on anything," the President told me. "And we agreed that such total disagreement was hardly calculated to create a flourishing friendship between two great Western nations. I came to the conclusion that General de Gaulle's strategy, which is rather incomprehensible to me, requires a certain amount of tension with the United States. It would seem that only through this tension is it possible to restore to Europe the desire to think for itself and renounce its torpid dependence on American dollar aid and political guidance!"

President Kennedy went on to sum up, with conciseness and vigor, the points of disagreement between the United States and France. On the subject of Germany, nuclear policy, Europe, the idea of "independence," he told me what has since become public

knowledge. He added, however, that France had a strange way of manifesting its independence, particularly, for example, on the subject of Vietnam and Cuba. It seemed ironic and irritating to him that the French Chief Executive was apparently bent on telling him how the United States should proceed, without assuming any risks himself. He told me that no one was more appreciative than he of advice, information, and even criticism; but that these were all the more valued if the friends proffering them were themselves committed to a program of action.

I then asked Mr. Kennedy what could be expected from General de Gaulle's proposed visit to the United States next February. He replied: "Absolutely nothing." But he followed this up immediately and with a broad grin, as though savoring in advance the pleasure of the impending meeting: "It will be exciting, just the same. General de Gaulle is an historic figure; he is decidedly the strangest great man of our time."

Relations with Cuba

Taking the initiative at this point, I brought up the subject of Vietnam and Cuba, saying that the Gaullists were not the only ones in France who deplored certain mistaken US policies. I pointed out that the first time I had the opportunity of meeting John Kennedy, he was a Senator and had just made a resounding speech on the subject of Algeria. Had the ideas set forth in that speech been faithfully applied in Saigon and Havana? Here my notes are very specific, and I shall let the late President speak through them:

"We haven't enough time to talk about Vietnam, but I'd like to talk to you about Cuba. Incidentally, our conversation will be much more interesting when you return, because Ben Bradlee [of *Newsweek*] tells me you are on your way to Cuba now.

"Every now and then I read articles in the European press pointing out that we Americans were blind to what was happening in the Cuban situation. I have just learned that General de Gaulle himself regarded Communism in Cuba as nothing but the accidental and temporary form of a will to independence from the United States. Of course it is very easy to understand this 'will to independence' around President de Gaulle."

John Kennedy then mustered all his persuasive force. He punctuated each sentence with that brief, mechanical gesture which had become famous:

"I tell you this: we know perfectly what happened in Cuba, to the misfortune of all. From the beginning I personally followed the development of these events with mounting concern. There are few subjects to which I have devoted more painstaking attention. My conclusions go much further than the European analyses. Here is what I believe.

"I believe that there is no country in the world, including all the African regions, including any and all the countries under colonial domination, where economic colonization, humiliation and exploitation were worse than in Cuba, in part owing to my country's policies during the Batista regime. I believe that we created, built and manufactured the Castro movement out of whole cloth and without realizing it. I believe that the accumulation of these mistakes has jeopardized all of Latin America. The great aim of the Alliance for Progress is to reverse this unfortunate policy. This is one of the most, if not the most, important problems in American foreign policy. I can assure you that I have understood the Cubans. I approved the proclamation which Fidel Castro made in the Sierra Maestra, when he justifiably called for justice and especially yearned to rid Cuba of corruption. I will go even further: to some extent it is as though Batista was the incarnation of a number of sins on the part of the United States. Now we shall have to pay for those sins. In the matter of the Batista regime, I am in agreement with the first Cuban revolutionaries. That is perfectly clear."

After a silence during which he was able to note my surprise and my interest, the President continued: "But it is also clear that the problem has ceased to be a Cuban one, and has become international—that is, it has become a Soviet problem. I am the President of the United States and not a sociologist; I am the President of a free nation which has certain responsibilities in the Free World. I know that Castro betrayed the promises made in the Sierra Maestra, and that he has agreed to be a Soviet agent in Latin America. I know that through his fault—either his 'will to independence', his madness or Communism—the world was on the verge of nuclear war in October, 1962. The Russians understood this very well, at least after our reaction; but so far as Fidel Castro is concerned, I must say I don't know whether he realizes this, or even if he cares about it." A smile, then: "You can tell me whether he does when you come back. In any case, the nations of Latin America are not going to attain justice and progress that way, I mean through Communist subversion. They won't get there by going from economic oppression to a Marxist dictatorship which Castro himself denounced a few years ago. The United States now has the possibility of doing as much good in Latin America as it has done wrong in the past; I would even say that we alone have this power—on the essential condition that Communism does not take over there."

Mr. Kennedy then rose to indicate that the interview was over. I apologized for keeping him to ask two quick questions. The first: Could the United States tolerate economic collectivism? He answered: "What about Sekou Touré? And Tito? I received Marshal Tito three days ago, and our discussions were most posi-

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tive." Second question: What does the American government expect to gain from the blockade? Is the economic isolation of Cuba a punishment or a political maneuver?

Kennedy's reply: "Are you suggesting that the political effectiveness of the blockade is uncertain [smile]? You will see when you go to Cuba whether it is or not. In any case, we can't let Communist subversion win in the other Latin American countries. Two dikes are needed to contain Soviet expansion: the blockade on the one hand, a tremendous effort toward progress on the other. This is the problem in a nutshell. Both battles are equally difficult." (Silence.) Then, a last comment: "The continuation of the blockade depends on the continuation of subversive activities."

The interview was over. I did not really wish to suggest anything, since I had never been to Cuba and, on the other hand, I had heard from all sides tales of the privations the Cuban people were suffering owing to their isolated economic situation. But I could see plainly that John Kennedy had doubts, and was seeking a way out.

That same evening I recounted this conversation in detail to an American colleague—an intimate friend of President Kennedy, through whom I had obtained this interview—and to the editor of *The New Republic*. Both my confidants, who knew the President a thousand times better than I, agreed that John F. Kennedy had never before expressed himself so specifically and with such feeling on his understanding of the first phase of the Castro revolution. They hesitated to draw any political conclusions from his remarks. However, they were not surprised at Kennedy's invitation to come and see him again when I returned from Cuba.

In effect, John Kennedy displayed two basic characteristics in his exercise of power: first, an overwhelming degree of empiricism and realism. A man without a particular doctrine, he reacted decisively to events, and only to events. Nothing but the shock of collision with a problem was sufficient to make him come to a decision, and because of this, his decisions were unpredictable. At that point he had a consuming need for information, and this need had increased a great deal since experience had taught him not to rely solely on official channels.

After this, I went to Havana.

Night Session

In the "Pearl of the Antilles, rum-perfumed and steeped in triumphant sensuality," as Cuba is described in those American tourist folders still lying about in the hotels of Havana, I spent three closely packed and intensive weeks, but thinking all along that I would never get to meet with Fidel Castro. I talked with farm-

ers, writers and painters, militants and counter-revolutionaries, ministers and ambassadors—but Fidel remained inaccessible. I had been warned: he was snowed under with work; as a result of the hurricane, the Cuban government had been obliged to revise its whole planning program; and then, above all, he no longer had any desire to receive any journalists, least of all Western newsmen. I had practically given up hope when, on the evening of what I thought was to be my departure date (the capricious plane which links Havana with Mexico happily did not leave the next day after all), Fidel came to my hotel. He had heard of my interview with the President. We went up to my room at 10 in the evening and did not leave until 4 in the following morning. Here, I shall only recount that part of that interview which constitutes a reply to John F. Kennedy's remarks.

Fidel listened with devouring and passionate interest: he pulled at his beard, yanked his parachutist's beret down over his eyes, adjusted his maqui tunic, all the while making me the target of a thousand malicious sparks cast by his deep-sunk, lively eyes. At one point I felt as though I were playing the role of that partner with whom he had as strong a desire to confer as to do battle; as though I myself were in a small way that intimate enemy in the White House whom Khrushchev described to Fidel as someone with whom "it is possible to talk." Three times he had me repeat certain remarks, particularly those in which Kennedy expressed his criticism of the Batista regime, those in which Kennedy showed his impatience with the comments attributed to General de Gaulle, and lastly those in which Kennedy accused Fidel of having almost caused a war fatal to all humanity.

When I stopped talking, I expected an explosion. Instead, I was treated to a lengthy silence and, at the end of that silence, to a calm, composed, often humorous, always thoughtful exposition. I don't know whether Fidel has changed, or whether these cartoons caricaturing him as a ranting madman which appear in the Western press perhaps correspond to a former reality. I only know that at no time during the two complete days I spent with him (and during which a great deal happened), did Castro abandon his composure and poise. Here too, I shall let Castro speak for himself, reserving only the possibility of correcting certain judgments on these two political leaders based on my own experiences in Cuba.

"I believe Kennedy is sincere," Fidel declared. "I also believe that today the expression of this sincerity could have political significance. I'll explain what I mean. I haven't forgotten that Kennedy centered his electoral campaign against Nixon on the theme of firmness toward Cuba. I have not forgotten the Machiavellian tactics and the equivocation, the attempts at

invasion, the pressures, the blackmail, the organization of a counter-revolution, the blockade and, above everything, all the retaliatory measures which were imposed before, long before there was the pretext and alibi of Communism. But I feel that he inherited a difficult situation; I don't think a President of the United States is ever really free, and I believe Kennedy is at present feeling the impact of this lack of freedom. I also believe he now understands the extent to which he has been misled, especially, for example, on Cuban reaction at the time of the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion. I also think he is a realist: he is now registering that it is impossible to simply wave a wand and cause us, and the explosive situation throughout Latin America, to disappear.

Why the Missiles Were Installed

"There is one point on which I want to give you new information right away. I have refrained from doing this until now; but today an attempt is being made to frighten all mankind by propagating the idea that Cuba, and in particular I, might provoke a nuclear war, so I feel the world should know the true story of the missile emplacement.

"Six months before these missiles were installed in Cuba, we had received an accumulation of information warning us that a new invasion of the island was being prepared under sponsorship of the Central Intelligence Agency, whose administrators were humiliated by the Bay of Pigs disaster and by the spectacle of being ridiculed in the eyes of the world and berated in US government circles. We also knew that the Pentagon was vesting the CIA preparations with the mantle of its authority, but we had doubts as to the attitude of the President. There were those among our informants who even thought it would suffice to alert the President and give him cause for concern in order to arrest these preparations. Then one day Khrushchev's son-in-law, Adzhubei, came to pay us a visit before going on to Washington at the invitation of Kennedy's associates. Immediately upon arriving in Washington, Adzhubei had been received by the American Chief Executive, and their talk centered particularly on Cuba. A week after this interview, we received in Havana a copy of Adzhubei's report to Khrushchev. It was this report which triggered the whole situation.

"What did Kennedy say to Adzhubei? Now listen to this carefully, for it is very important: he had said that the new situation in Cuba was intolerable for the United States, that the American government had decided it would not tolerate it any longer; he had said that peaceful coexistence was seriously compromised by the fact that 'Soviet influences' in Cuba altered the balance of strength, was destroying the equilibrium agreed

upon and [at this point Castro emphasized his statement by pronouncing each syllable separately] Kennedy reminded the Russians that the United States had not intervened in Hungary, which was obviously a way of demanding Russian non-intervention in the event of a possible invasion. To be sure, the actual word 'invasion' was not mentioned and Adzhubei, at the time, lacking any background information, could not draw the same conclusions as we did. But when we communicated to Khrushchev all our previous information, the Russians too began to interpret the Kennedy-Adzhubei conversation as we saw it and they went to the source of our information. By the end of a month, the Russian and Cuban governments had reached the definite conviction that an invasion might take place from one moment to the next. This is the truth.

"What was to be done? How could we prevent the invasion? We found that Khrushchev was concerned about the same things that were worrying us. He asked us what we wanted. We replied: *do whatever is needed to convince the United States that any attack on Cuba is the same as an attack on the Soviet Union.* And how to realize this objective? All our thinking and discussions revolved around this point. We thought of a proclamation, an alliance, conventional military aid. The Russians explained to us that their concern was twofold: first, they wanted to save the Cuban revolution (in other words, their socialist honor in the eyes of the world), and at the same time they wished to avoid a world conflict. They reasoned that if conventional military aid was the extent of their assistance, the United States might not hesitate to instigate an invasion, in which case Russia would retaliate and this would inevitably touch off a world war."

At this point I interrupted to ask how Cuba could have been absolutely certain of Soviet intervention. After all, I said, Stalin certainly "let down" Markos, the Chief of the Greek Communist Resistance, because such help would have conflicted with prevailing zones of influence.

"I know," Castro replied, "but the two situations cannot be compared." Then he continued:

"Russia was much too deeply committed to us. Moreover, since then we have had every proof of the immense solidarity of the Soviet people and its leaders. You can see for yourself how clearly this solidarity is manifest here. Then there is something else, specifically apropos of Stalin. When I was in the USSR and others, outside Russia, were reproaching Khrushchev for taking a more conciliatory stand than Stalin toward the capitalists, Khrushchev confided to me several examples, which I will not repeat to you, illustrating the prudence, even the abdication of Stalin. He told me—and I believe him—that Stalin would never have emplaced missiles in Cuba.

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"It is true that it was said then by other factions that the real reason for installing the missiles was because certain internal problems were driving the Russians to use us to provoke the United States. I am here to tell you that the Russians didn't want and do not today want war. One only need visit them on their home territory, watch them at work, share their economic concerns, admire their intense efforts to raise the workers' standard of living, to understand right away that they are far, very far, from any idea of provocation or domination. However, Soviet Russia was confronted by two alternatives: an absolutely inevitable war (because of their commitments and their position in the socialist world), if the Cuban revolution was attacked; or the risk of a war if the United States, refusing to retreat before the missiles, would not give up the attempt to destroy Cuba. They chose socialist solidarity and the risk of war.

"Under these circumstances, how could we Cubans have refused to share the risks taken to save us? It was, in the final analysis, a question of honor, don't you agree? Don't you believe that honor plays a role in politics? You think we are romantics, don't you? Perhaps we are. And why not? In any event, we are militants. In a word, then, we agreed to the emplacement of the missiles. And I might add here that for us Cubans it didn't really make so much difference whether we died by conventional bombing or a hydrogen bomb. Nevertheless, we were not gambling with the peace of the world. The United States was the one to jeopardize the peace of mankind by using the threat of war to stifle revolutions.

"And so in June, 1962, my brother Raoul and Che Guevara went to Moscow to discuss ways and means of installing the missiles. The convoy arrived by sea in three weeks. The United States was able to find out that weapons were being shipped in, of course; but it took them two months to discover that these weapons were guided missiles. Two months . . . in other words, longer than we had calculated. Because, of course, we were seeking intimidation, not aggression."

Alliance for Progress

The conversation now turned to the Alliance for Progress. "In a way," Castro said, "it was a good idea, it marked progress of a sort. Even if it can be said that it was overdue, timid, conceived on the spur of the moment, under constraint . . . despite all that I am willing to agree that the idea in itself constituted an effort to adapt to the extraordinarily rapid course of events in Latin America. Such as, for example, what we read in the papers this morning—did you see the news? That Argentina is nationalizing the oil industry? The Argentine government! Do you realize what that means? This

will cause more commotion on the New York stock exchange than Castroism! The Catholic and military conservatives of Argentina, the factions most closely linked with American interests! There is talk of nationalization of industries there, of agrarian reform there . . . well and good! If the Alliance for Progress provokes these developments, then it's not doing so badly; all these things are consonant with the aspirations of the people. I can look back to the days of Eisenhower, or rather of Nixon, and recall the furore which broke out when the United States and Cuba together decreed an agrarian reform which was to apply, mark this well, only to landowners of over 200,000 hectares! Yes, 200,000! Yet the reaction of the trusts was terrible at that time. Nowadays, in the other Latin American countries, because the Communist banner is used as a bogeyman, the reaction of the American trusts is shrewder. They are going to choose strawmen, so as to rule indirectly. But there will be difficulties.

"This is why Kennedy's good ideas aren't going to yield any results. It is very easy to understand and at this point he surely is aware of this because, as I told you, he is a realist. For years and years American policy—not the government, but the trusts and the Pentagon—has supported the Latin American oligarchies. All the prestige, the dollars, and the power was held by a class which Kennedy himself has described in speaking of Batista. Suddenly a President arrives on the scene who tries to support the interests of another class (which has no access to any of the levers of power) to give the various Latin American countries the impression that the United States no longer stands behind the dictators, and so there is no more need to start Castro-type revolutions. What happens then? The trusts see that their interests are being a little compromised (just barely, but still compromised); the Pentagon thinks the strategic bases are in danger; the powerful oligarchies in all the Latin American countries alert their American friends; they sabotage the new policy; and in short, Kennedy has everyone against him. The few liberal or allegedly liberal presidents who were chosen as instruments of the new policy are swept out of office, like Bosch in Santo Domingo, or else they are transformed. Betancourt, for example, was not a Batista; now he has become one.

"In view of all these things, how can the American government seriously believe that Cuban subversion is at the root of explosions taking place all over the South American continent? In Venezuela, for example, are you familiar with the situation there? Do you think the Venezuelans need us to understand what's going on in their country? Do you think we don't have enough problems of our own? Right now I ask only one thing: Leave us in peace to better our country's economic situation, to put our planning into effect, to

educate our young *compañeros*. This doesn't mean we do not feel solidarity toward nations that are struggling and suffering, like the Venezuelan people. But it is up to those nations to decide what they want, and if they choose other regimes than ours, this isn't our business."

"We Have Always Lived with Danger"

I asked Fidel where is this all going to end? How will the situation develop? Even if the United States uses against you what you call the alibi of Communism, it still remains true that you have chosen Communism, that your economy and your security depend on the Soviet Union, and that even if you have no ulterior motives in this association, still the United States considers that you are part of an international strategy, that you constitute a Soviet base in a world where peace depends on mutual respect for a tacit division of zones of influence.

"I don't want to discuss our ties with the Soviet Union," Fidel Castro cut me short. "I find this indecent. We have none but feelings of fraternity and profound, total gratitude toward the USSR. The Russians are making extraordinary efforts on our behalf, efforts which sometimes cost them dear. But we have our own policies which are perhaps not always the same (we have proved this!) as those of the USSR. I refuse to dwell on this point, because asking me to say that I am not a pawn on the Soviet chessboard is something like asking a woman to shout aloud in the public square that she is not a prostitute.

"If the United States sees the problem as you have posed it, then you are right, there is no way out. But who is the loser in the last analysis? They have tried everything against us, everything, absolutely everything, and we are still alive and getting better day by day; we are still standing upright, and we plan to celebrate with greater festivities than usual, on January 1, 1964, the fifth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution! The United States' policy of isolating us economically is less effective with each passing day; we are increasing our trade with the rest of the world. Even with Spain! We have just sold a shipment of 300,000 tons of sugar to the Spaniards. Far from discouraging us, the blockade is maintaining the revolutionary atmosphere we need to stiffen the country's backbone. Are we in danger? We have always lived with danger. To say nothing of the fact that you have no idea how many friends one discovers in the world when one is persecuted by the United States. No, truly, for all these reasons, we are not suppliants, we ask nothing. I'll tell you something else: since the rupture and the blockade, we have forgotten the United States. We feel neither hatred nor resentment any more, we simply don't think about the US. When I think of the problems

which diplomatic relations with the United States would pose! The Swiss Ambassador is representing the US at present. I prefer to do business with him than with 200 members of an Embassy among whom surely some spies would be spotted.

"I have just talked to you as a Cuban revolutionary. But I should also speak to you as a peace lover, and from this viewpoint I believe the United States is too important a country not to have an influence on world peace. I cannot help hoping, therefore, that a leader will come to the fore in North America (why not Kennedy, there are things in his favor!), who will be willing to brave unpopularity, fight the trusts, tell the truth and, most important, let the various nations act as they see fit. I ask nothing: neither dollars, nor assistance, nor diplomats, nor bankers, nor military men—nothing but peace, and to be accepted as we are! We are socialists, the United States is a capitalist nation, the Latin American countries will choose what they want. All the same, at a time when the United States is selling wheat to the Russians, Canada is trading with China, de Gaulle respects Ben Bella, why should it be impossible to make the Americans understand that socialism leads, not to hostility toward them, but to co-existence? Why am I not Tito or Sekou Touré? Because the Russians have never done us any injury such as the Yugoslavians and the Guineans have complained of in the past, and because the Americans have never given us any of the benefits for which these two nations congratulate themselves today.

"As to this matter of fearing Soviet intentions in Latin America through Cuba's subversive activities, this is just attributing to others one's own desire to dominate. You said yourself just a little while ago that the Russians have had enough of their Cuban involvement. Economically this is obvious. This is why, speaking from a military viewpoint, it is better not to force nations to turn to the Russians for help. Really, it seems to me that a man like Kennedy is capable of seeing that it is not in the United States' interest to pursue a policy which can lead only to a stalemate. So far as we are concerned, everything can be restored to normalcy on the basis of mutual respect of sovereignty."

In conclusion, Fidel Castro said to me: "Since you are going to see Kennedy again, be an emissary of peace, despite everything. I want to make myself clear: I don't want anything, I don't expect anything, and as a revolutionary the present situation does not displease me. But as a man and as a statesman, it is my duty to indicate what the bases for understanding could be."

All this was said two days before President Kennedy's death.

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Mr. STANDARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. Because of the lateness of the hour, it will be the plan of the committee to make the presentation tomorrow morning of the interview with President Fidel Castro in Cuba. For that reason I would like to make some other remarks at this time.

This committee made two trips to Cuba, one on March 30, which extended from the 30th of March to the 4th of April. The second trip was from August 24 to August 29. Prior to going to Cuba on both occasions, it required a great deal of preparation and a great deal of contact between this committee and the Cuban Interest Section in the Cuban Government.

I want to acknowledge the presence here today at the witness table of one of the gentlemen who was extremely helpful and cooperative to this committee in terms of both of those trips, Senor Ricardo Escartin, who is the Consul and the First Secretary of the Cuban Interest Section. It was necessary for Mr. Escartin and other members of the Cuban Interest Section to meet with me on many occasions and also with Professor Blakey and members of this staff. We spent a great deal of time and received a great deal of cooperation from him on every occasion.

Also, in Cuba, Senor Senen Buergo, the American Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was extremely helpful and cooperative with this committee.

I also want to acknowledge the presence here at the witness table today of another gentleman who was extremely cooperative with us, and that was Senor Felipe Villa, Captain of the Ministry of the Interior, and during the course of both of our trips he extended a great deal of cooperation and help and assistance to this committee.

I would like also to mention two very talented and able Cuban translators who were extremely helpful to us, Ms. Juanita Vera Nellie and Ruiz de Sarade.

Others who gave cooperation and hospitality to this committee were Dr. Mondo Torres Santrail, the Minister of Justice; Oscar Fernandez Mel, the mayor of Havana; Jose Raimond Fernandez, Minister of Education, all of whom were extremely helpful and hospitable to us on our stay in Cuba.

In addition, we want to express our deep appreciation to President Fidel Castro. On the first trip we made to Cuba, President Castro spent in excess of 4 hours being interviewed by the chairman of this committee and other members of the committee and staff. The entire transcript will be put into the record at some point tomorrow.

During that period of time, the President made it very clear that it was the purpose of the Cuban Government to make it very clear that their government had nothing to do whatsoever with this very tragic occurrence in this country. It was the intent of their government to do everything possible to cooperate and see that the Cuban Government did everything in its power to clear up whatever it could around a tragedy of this type.

So we are indeed grateful for the kind of cooperation that this congressional committee has received, and we want to thank each of you gentlemen for the assistance you have given us in this very important matter.

If there is nothing further at this time, I might also say that we are once again indebted to the U.S. Marshall Service for the security arrangements here around the distinguished witnesses who have appeared here today.

We also would like to thank the interpreter from the State Department, Mr. Hervas, for a very efficient job he has done here today.

At this time the Chair will request that everyone remain seated until our witnesses have departed from the hearing room. Thereafter, we will adjourn these hearings until 9 a.m. tomorrow morning.

Thank you, gentlemen. You are excused.

[Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Tuesday, September 19, 1978.]