

1944-46

1944-45
et seq.

Waite
Heiden
Kulbyah
Luhacs

OD: ADOLF HITLER

question of Hitler's per-
answers suggest. Why.
emitism? Why did he

ation, irrationality, and
pathologists who have
i that anti-Semites dis-
understanding of Hitler's
gained by comparing
have been described as

ce and intensify many
we have already met
tile personalities with
They, too, are troubled
both all-powerful and
swaggering self-assur-
ak. Their defenses are
rejection—they project
selves, and they insist
ative elite. Like border-
it into all good and all
aimed directly at the
ople.⁴³ Typically, anti-
ons; male anti-Semites

ve contributed to our
ilosophers. One of the
ondition was made by
e description of Adolf

e anti-Semite. He is a
sure, but of himself.
admit his cowardice
censures his tendency
... The existence of
tifle his anxieties. ...
a pitiless stone, a fur-
thing except a man.⁴⁴

symptoms of an emo-
ts chief defense. But
mality" does not solve
judiced people in the
le—is much too broad
storical consequences.

From Private Neurosis to Public Policy

1945

Hatred and fear of the Jews dominated his life and haunted him in his hour of death—to the last word of his last public statement. Never in history has there been such an anti-Semite. He established a government dedicated to anti-Semitism; he sought to kill every Jew in Europe. Is there any possible way for a biographer to explain these historic facts? Perhaps not. History is not a science, and there are many historical facts that defy explanation. This may well be one of them. But since it is not possible to explain Hitler's anti-Semitism by relying on traditional tools of historic analysis, let us, with due recognition of the difficulties, attempt to apply psychoanalytical techniques in a discussion of reasons for Hitler's personal hatred of Jews.

It seems likely that Hitler's hatred was precipitated by the traumatic events of his infancy and childhood. As we have seen, these included the primal scene trauma, the rumors of his Jewish ancestry, and the suffering and death of his mother while being treated by a Jew. The bitter memory of her suffering in 1907 was reinforced in 1918 when—according to his view—the Motherland was betrayed and defiled by Jewish traitors. His historic decision to become a politician was directly related to his desire to destroy the Jews and save the Motherland.

The mother was important, but so was the father. The role played by Alois Hitler in the development of his son's anti-Semitism may be seen from the perspective provided by an American psychoanalyst. In this view, Hitler's famous projection onto the Jews was a specific type derived from the ego-splitting characteristic of borderline personalities. Since he saw himself as Christ, the symbol of absolute purity and goodness, he required an opposite symbol of evil, the Devil incarnate. The Jew became for him such a symbol of total evil, a kind of negative absolute. In exalting the Jew as the one threat and persecutor, the one enemy both of himself and of the Motherland, Hitler's hatred reached the dimensions of a persecution mania. According to classical psychoanalysis, there is a peculiarity about this kind of mania, this manifestation of paranoia. Freud believed that whenever a paranoid raised anyone to the level of sole persecutor, "He is raising him to the rank of father; he is putting him into a position in which he can blame him for all his misfortunes."

Thus, in attempting to destroy all the Jews, Hitler was attempting to destroy his father. That he was never able to accomplish his objective was more than a problem of logistics; it was also a problem of internalization. As Harry Slochower has written, "No matter how many Jews Hitler sent into his hell-fires, the Jew—the father-figure—remained ineradicable. . . . Wherever Hitler went, along came his satanic shadow—the Jew."⁴⁵ And thus it was, as Hitler himself said, "Der Jude sitzt immer in uns."

It is commonly said that Hitler made the Jews a "scapegoat" for all the Motherland's problems. Psychologically, scapegoats are helpful in alleviating feelings of inadequacy, self-hatred, and guilt. If, for example, a person feels guilty about incest or sexual perversion, he can

* D.T. The problem was that anti-Semitism was the only explanation for a multitude of evils, and so he had to depend on it, it was his more and more

He was in the position of a father figure. In addition, it was that a little anti-Semitism in less, vice versa, but a great deal more actually, cause something to be

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

1945

And, miraculously, it came! For on 12 April there was suddenly announced the death of Franklin Roosevelt. Champagne corks popped in Berlin and Hitler's entourage rejoiced with their Führer; for just as Frederick in his extremity in 1762 was saved by the sudden death of the Tsarina Elizabeth, Hitler too had received deliverance through the death of his enemy.

Besides identifying with the beleaguered Frederick of the Seven Years War, Hitler believed that he and the great Prussian king had many other things in common. Both men as children had good reason to respect and to despise fathers who had hurt and humiliated them.* Both rulers, Hitler was convinced, had strikingly similar skull measurements and hand structures. He also thought that their eyes were very much alike; in 1934 he bought Anton Graff's portrait of Frederick in a powder blue uniform which set off "the startling clear blue of his eyes." Hitler took the portrait with him as a kind of talisman wherever he set up residence and gave specific orders at the close of his life that all his personal effects should be destroyed, but not the portrait of Frederick the Great.¹⁸

Hitler was also persuaded that he and the Prussian king were alike in other respects: they shared the same attitude toward Jews; both showed a mastery of the arts of politics, music, and war. And—according to Hitler—they had strikingly similar intellectual capacities. "Over and over again," Hitler remarked, he was delighted to find that his own ideas "were so very similar to the thought processes of *Der alte Fritz*." As an example, Hitler noted that he too was really a very tolerant person who believed in the candid give-and-take of ideas and was convinced that truth would ultimately prosper. In a passage in the *Tischgespräche* which reads like Frederick—and even more like J. S. Mill's *Essay on Liberty*—the Nazi dictator observed:

I do not believe that the truth can be suppressed for any length of time. Truth must in the end be victorious! . . . I foresee a time of absolute tolerance. I can only say [with Frederick the Great] that everyone should be permitted to save himself according to his own fashion.

The man who established one of the most extensive and heinous secret police systems in history said that he was very like Frederick

* Frederick the Great never forgot one childhood incident which was typical of the way his father had treated him. Frederick William, before retiring for the night, would line up his family and order them to kiss him. One day the little prince, who had just been brutally and unjustly whipped by his father, demurred. The king grabbed him by the hair, threw him to the floor, and ordered him to kiss the royal boot. As an adolescent and young man, the son was publicly whipped, imprisoned, and forced to watch his closest friend beheaded at his father's orders. An additional turn of the screw was given when the king ordered that the decapitated body be left where it fell from eight in the morning until two in the afternoon. Fritz stood and gazed at the corpse for hours.

256

* Hitler masturbated to the image. Might start as a tale told to his nightgown

The Past As Prologue: Hi

in his dislike of spying conversations he told "a d had refused to use s subjects. The Führer spying completely "ref with Frederick were no guarded moment he re Souci between Frederic one ashamed of the de who has struggled thro to agree with him.) H was the greater milita headquarters at the Wo

When one recalls force twelve time shithead [Scheissk cal superiority! Qu

As he hid in his : called that Frederick h equanimity. Finding h Seven Years War, the collapses, I should calm

The royal absoluti vided efficient governn political health of the with a feeling of gratit in their historic past. A North; Frenchmen are XVI; and Englishmen c gave them the Magna Revolution, and by the Hanoverian Georges. W was not merely possible,

The Prussian kings conviction that the best that those in authority to the *Obrigkeit*, but e ernment was good gove there was need neither it came about in Pruss became a political stater "Everything comes down It was a political le;

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

dearly called "my Rudi . . . my Hesserl" and whose loyalty to Hitler was canine, was openly ridiculed as "the greatest mistake of my life." Albert Speer, an admirer who wanted desperately to be close to Hitler and who had said of him, "If Hitler could have had a friend, I would have been that friend," also said that Hitler's attitude toward his intimates was one of contempt: "He seemed to enjoy destroying the reputation and self-respect of even his close associates and faithful comrades."¹¹⁷

Hitler was a lethargic person who frittered away thousands of working hours in idle self-indulgence. Day after day and in all-night sessions he forced his associates to listen to interminable and empty dissertations on trivia. Yet he was also a man of remarkable energy and capacity for hard work. In the electoral campaign of 1932, for example, he traveled tirelessly by airplane—though he was frightened by air travel—and in one day spoke to several hundred thousand people. On his first campaign swing across Germany he visited 21 towns in seven days; on the second, 25 towns in eight days; on the third, 50 towns in 16 days; on the fourth, another 50 towns in 24 days.¹¹⁸

1944
He had a taste for erotic art and pornography; he was also a prude with unctuous concern for proper conduct. He did not permit swearing or off-color jokes; gentlemen never removed their coats no matter how warm the weather. He was shocked at Stalin for having his picture taken while smoking a cigarette and furious with Mussolini for being seen in public in bathing trunks. Great statesmen, he observed in one of his more perishable political pronouncements, do not run around bare-chested. He was terribly afraid that "some skillful forger would set my head on a body in bathing trunks!"¹¹⁹

To limit the number of times a tailor touched him, he would have many shirts and suits made at one fitting; these were expected to last for years. He was embarrassed to disrobe before doctors and never allowed an X ray of his chronically ailing stomach. He rejected out-of-hand Himmler's suggestion that some of his ailments might be alleviated by a masseur. He liked to have his body carefully covered at all times, and even in the hottest weather he wore long white underwear—as was observed for the first time in public on that sultry, hot day of 20 July 1944, when the bomb explosion tore off part of his trousers.¹²⁰

He was careful to say that he was not in the least embarrassed by nudity—it was others who were: "The idea of nakedness torments only the priests, for the education they undergo makes them perverts."¹²¹

Hitler was both a pathetic little man filled with self-pity and an awesomely effective dictator. In childish bids for sympathy, he sniffled about the loneliness of his life and how he would be neglected and forgotten when he grew old:

The Image and the Man

Perhaps one of my former a but I can't count on it. Aside from me. Fräulein Braun and anyone voluntarily stay with will take notice of me anyone successor. Perhaps once a year

One day during the electoral intimate, Hitler was feeling sorry soup and asked plaintively for assistance cure his stomach cramps, excessive he started talking about his determination, strode around the room, and greatness. Before one's eyes, the formed into the great demagogue force them to become true believers.

The Führer flatly denied that weakness. Max Planck remembered in which he shouted that it was "him of having weak nerves. "I tell of steel!" When he said that, Plan spoke ever faster, and worked he was nothing for me to do but . . . who observed his Führer closely and he so often praised, he himself did.

Hitler felt it necessary to prove feelings of inferiority. "Only an inferior say that I have an inferiority complex. I have never had an inferiority complex later: "Do the English really imagine could have an inferiority complex?"

One evening during the war, When a secretary had the temerity mistake in the melody, the Führer nerability—and his lack of humor it wrong. It is the composer who His press chief, who followed him if an associate corrected him on knowledge, "no matter how valid it his mistake." His personal interpreter I interpreted for Hitler [to make . . . an admission of error even]

Such statements need some qualification, in fact, admit a mistake. hedged his admission in a number of things a colossal blunder when he a

* ~~Hitler~~ D.T. Hitler insulation for his. One might also say he could see

*Now, by the end, his dreams served
forward into the day*
THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

After he became chancellor, the worlds of fantasy and reality continued to interconnect in his life and in the life of the Third Reich. He himself sometimes became confused by his own fantasies and experienced difficulty in separating them from reality. In a highly revealing statement he confided to his doctors: "I suffer from tormenting self-deception." ¹⁰⁶

Toward the end, the images he had created of himself grew stronger than reality and destroyed him. The self-proclaimed worker of miracles was required to produce the miracles. And with frantic intensity he applied his mind and his will to the problem. Thus he convinced himself that Roosevelt's death in April 1945 meant the salvation of Germany; or that British war prisoners would volunteer to fight with the Nazis against the Russians in an "Anti-Bolshevik Legion." It became an article of his faith that the Russians in April 1945 were on the verge of collapse, and that Churchill and Roosevelt would join him against the U.S.S.R. ¹⁰⁷

As we shall later see, when the military miracles he conjured up failed to appear, he summoned forth one final illusion of supernatural omnipotence and ended his terrestrial life.

Courage and Cowardice

Hitler was both a brave man and a coward. As a private first-class (Gefreiter) during World War I, he had won, and deserved to win, the Iron Cross, both first and second class. Yet fear was one of the driving emotions of this man who spoke so often of courage. The world to Hitler was devil-filled and threatened at any moment to undo him. Anyone with the stamina to read the entire *Tischgespräche* can list a whole catalog of people who evoked fear and apprehension in the Führer. They included priests, hunters, Jews, liberals, journalists, Communists, Freemasons, judges, Jehovah's Witnesses, academics, Poles, meat eaters, Frenchmen, poets, Englishmen, cigarette smokers, Americans, and skiers. There was, finally, innate peril rooted in man himself: human beings could never be trusted.

Thus, everywhere he looked there was cause for apprehension:

Nothing is anchored anymore, nothing is rooted in our spiritual life anymore. Everything is superficial, fleeing past us. Restlessness and haste mark the thinking of our people. The whole of life is being torn completely apart. . . .

As one German writer has observed, "It is legitimate to ask whether any practical politician of stature has ever expressed convictions of this kind as frequently and as emphatically." ¹⁰⁸

In addition to all the threats that encompassed Germany, there were others that beset him personally. He was frightened by all manner of germs, by water, by moonlight, and by horses—although he

38 D. R. Fear of germs on the one hand
his schism-ridden passions on the
other - Mauthausen & beyond.

The Image and the Man

loved to look at pictures and st his body odors were offensive a that he took huge quantities of contained strychnine and atrop "pounded" on him personally. ¹⁰⁹

Since his fears were so m felt a great need to consolidate could recognize, one that would he could release all his pent-up shall see, in the Jewish people.

Other Personal Dualities

Hitler could be a delightf He was also a boor, offensively like women guests to wear lips was ~~manufactured~~ ~~variously~~ ~~garbage~~. Once, when ladies at t ler announced loudly, "That loo

At social gatherings he w He nervously checked and rec worried whether his guests wot which tie he should wear. Anx everything was fine. He would show them that I know as muc

Hitler was both frugal and exception of chocolates, cake, a time he developed a liking for "sinfully expensive." His spart reminded his generals of a coml tration camp."

Yet Hitler was a very rich having his portrait on German Kampf came to over a million d Reichsmarks in back taxes wh dered these obligations cancel As his architect reminds us, l unnecessary and unused buildin headquarters I ordered built for seldom or never used." ¹¹²

Hitler swung between the t wanted many things to remain habits, wearing apparel, membe And he prided himself on being a desire to change things and tc and rebuild, to take sudden tri

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

mind with decapitation. He saw in Cromwell the foe of parliamentarianism, Communism, and Catholicism, but he particularly admired him because he had the courage to have a king beheaded. "Ah, Cromwell," he said, "that's my man. He and Henry VIII are the only two positive figures in English history." He was also greatly impressed with Frederick William I and the decapitations he ordered. He saw a film in 1923 entitled *The Life of Frederick the Great* and talked repeatedly about the scene that pictured young Prince Frederick as he was forced to watch the executioner chop off the head of his closest friend. Hitler commented "That is the way German justice should be handled: either acquittal or beheading."⁶⁷

As soon as he became chancellor, he restored the use of the headman's ax, but his preferred method of execution seems to have been the rope. A special decree of 29 March 1933 saw to it that hanging by the neck was introduced for an exceptionally large number of cases. His own fear of strangulation was further projected onto others in the grisly orders he gave for the execution of generals who had conspired against him in the plot of 20 July 1944. He ordered that each man be "hung on a meathook and slowly strangled to death with piano wire, the pressure being periodically released to intensify his death agonies." Hitler had a color film made of the scene. He "loved the film and had it shown over and over again; it became one of his favorite entertainments."⁶⁸

Hitler was infatuated with the Medusa. He once expressed great enthusiasm for the mosaic Medusa head in the rotunda of the University of Munich, and one of his favorite paintings was by Franz von Stuck, a sinister, flashing-eyed Medusa which he had first seen in a book in Hanfstaengl's house. When he designed his gigantic desk for the Chancellery, three heads adorned the front panels. One was of the Medusa, with writhing snakes emerging from her hair.⁶⁹

Freud believed that men who are fascinated with decapitation and the legend of the Medusa's head are expressing castration anxiety in a disguised form. As we shall see, Hitler showed his own concern about loss of testicles in many other indirect ways. But he also talked explicitly about it. He told the French ambassador, for example, that the Poles were castrating German citizens. And he tried to persuade the League of Nations' representative in Danzig that the Nazi press was attempting to tone down stories of Polish atrocities: "No one believes me about this, but I have ordered that the sensational cases, such as castration, should not be mentioned in the press. They excite public opinion too much."⁷⁰

Blood

Just as primitive tribes attribute magical significance to blood, so did Hitler. He was sure, for example, that all of human history was explicable in its terms and, in one of his messier metaphors, observed

The Image and the Man

that "blood is the cement of civilization the historical problem of explaining the earth. Everything depended upon one ifty of blood.

He used the word often in describing his opponents would "drown sacred "Blood Flag" of 9 November "Blood Order" for those who had introduced the idea of *Bluthitt* (blood cer the SS. He seems to have come acro about Genghis Khan while a prisoner he may have heard that it was also pi sance murder societies. (Similar techni Mau Mau and the Manson cultists.) T to enforce absolute loyalty and obedier force a prospective member, as part an act which directly and flagrantly viol taboos. Such an atrocity, by cutting t from his previous value system, ties h ization because it is the only group w outrage he has perpetrated. In psycho he has been obliged to commit reinfor his value system, his new conscience.

In Hitler's Germany, medical doc perform, or to watch, "medical experi abdominal surgery on the unanesthet "patients." Other initiates of the SS w before the eyes of their mothers. Hitler' of his SS had participated in such together by the bonds of a common e to have worked rather well.*

* The process of acquiescing to atrocities illustrated in the experience of Professor Doe a distinguished medical career and was cha University of Münster before joining the SS. doctor at Auschwitz was to observe what was (a "Special Action"), a method of mass ex and their babies, were customarily thrown aliv on piles of wood soaked in gasoline. The piles experienced his first *Sonderaktion* he found t Dante's Inferno. . . . I cannot stand it." But l performances he was able to take them in s with equanimity. "September 6, 1942: Today, half a hen with potatoes and red cabbage . . . In the evening at 8 o'clock outside for a So Sixth and seventh *Sonderaktion*. . . . In the banquet. We had pike . . . good coffee, exce Human Behavior in the Concentration Camp

* It was obscene. The art of

the obscene is to connect elements that should remain separate. He was connecting horror and medicine. The film was more beneficial to him than any of the medicines he took. "Look, there's Stauffenberg!" etc.

12 April 1945

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

defeat in 1918 was that America entered the war—that and the Jews.”¹⁸⁷

But now—very late in 1941—the Jews were no longer available to provide this kind of explanation. They were, as the horrifying euphemism had it, about to “go up the chimney.” Only America could guarantee the *total* destruction of Germany. And it worked out that way.

As America's power was asserted and the Second Front advanced, as the Soviet Union and the United States—the two powerful enemies he had created—closed in on him, his passion for destruction increased. He wanted everything destroyed: not only positions of military value but churches and art galleries, hospitals, nursery schools, farm animals and pets, statistical records, marriage certificates—everything he could think of. On 21 April 1945, for example, he yelled at the startled chief of staff of the Luftwaffe that “the entire leadership of the Luftwaffe is to be hanged immediately.” He thought of announcing the shooting of all RAF war prisoners in order to ensure the retaliatory saturation air raids that would level German cities. He thought of giving orders—indeed, he apparently gave them—to kill German soldiers wounded in the war, for they were no longer “useful” to him.¹⁸⁸

Again, when one asks the obvious question about this planned holocaust, namely *why*, the answers are either very difficult or too easy.

“It was because he was evil,” it is said, “completely evil.” But he had been evil all along—though never completely so. Others have explained his conduct by saying, “He was seized by demons.” One must ask, *what kind?* “Well, he was just crazy,” it has been asserted by those who agree with the ancient Greeks that “whom the Gods would destroy they first make mad.” But *what kind* of madness was his?

Evidence of Hitler's last days—as we shall see—does not indicate that he had become psychotic. He was a physical wreck by April 1945, but he talked coherently enough as he dispensed to his admirers cyanide capsules and autographed pictures of himself. He had not suddenly become “mad” or seized by demons. His behavior during the last months of his life was not an aberration; it was deeply rooted in his early life. It illustrates Erikson's observation that every basic conflict of childhood lives on, in some form, in the adult. The child, Adolf, was the father of this man.

Hitler's desire to punish and destroy was a part of a persistent pattern of his life. We should not try to make the pattern too clear, too neatly assembled. But into it fits, somewhere, the childhood conviction that evil had been done to him; he would do evil in return. Into it belongs the searing memory of being beaten and hurt and unable to get revenge; he would get it now. Very early in his life he had learned to mistrust; he would now destroy those who had abandoned him. He had been made to feel inadequate and guilty; he would show them all that he had power—if no longer to conquer and create, then to destroy. He was still omnipotent; he could order the death of a nation.

From Private Neurosis to Pul

There was, we have life: the unconscious imp he had tried to direct th others. The juxtaposition in December 1941 sugges punishment of others. On by declaring war on the U on the next day, 12 Decer upon others the most terrifi it the *Nacht und Nebel* de that meant that any persc loyalty to him could be an be informed of the pris would never be learned— night and fog. But even ti different way: he would guilty and unworthy. Thus [*meiner nicht würdig*]; let l

But what did these v he was, in a sense, destr “*Ich bin das deutsche Vo* Germany with his mother Motherland now because s Klara, had abandoned him to punish him? “Let her pe Or was it something else?

He had tried to blame guilt. He had repeated over of him; he had killed the could not be exorcised. Per] let him perish. Perhaps. At thus fulfilling the promise l he would kill himself.

TRIUMPH THROUGH

During his last days, mem discover that their once in broken old man, his once ir

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

and stained by sweat, vegetable soup, and chocolate-covered cherries. Hitler was aware of his physical condition and even called attention to it in order to demonstrate once again how hard and cold he really was, and how much he resembled his hero, Frederick the Great. He delivered his last speech to his *Gauleiter* on 24 February 1945, while sitting at a table; his left hand shook so violently that he could not control it. After an hour and a half of turgid oratory, he concluded with these words:

As you see, I am at the moment not in the best of physical condition. My left arm trembles. . . . I hope it doesn't go into my head so that I also waggle my head. Anyway, come what may, my heart remains *ice-cold*. . . . Now for the first time, I understand Frederick the Great so completely who, after the end of his military campaigns, came back home a sick and broken man. . . . Just as Frederick the Great lived out his last years with bowed upper body and plagued by palsy and all other possible sufferings, so this war has also left its deep marks on me.¹⁰⁰

Although several writers have insisted that Hitler's physical decline was accompanied by a remarkable psychological transformation, the evidence shows no radical departure from previous patterns, but rather reinforcement and intensification of lifelong personality traits and habits. Even in the last months, when his physical condition deteriorated rapidly, we note an intensification rather than a change of behavior patterns. As an infant, he had learned to mistrust people; now he said that he could trust no one except his dog—and, perhaps, Eva Braun. Both as child and man he had liked to stay up very late at night; now, in the spring of 1945, he often did not go to bed before six or seven o'clock in the morning. As an adolescent he had wanted to tear down buildings and build them anew; destruction and reconstruction now became a mania with him. He had always liked to talk about the same things; now he "told the same stories at lunch, dinner, and supper and at nighttime tea." At least once a day, he would say, word-for-word: "That animal, Blondi, woke me up again this morning. . . . When I asked her 'Do you need to do a business?' she put her tail between her legs and crawled back to her corner. She is certainly a clever animal." Or he would repeat daily: "Look, my hand is getting better. The trembling is not so bad—I can hold it completely still." He had always been a bore in private conversation, but now his monologues grew longer and duller. Increased volubility was also shown in his military briefings (*Lagebesprechungen*). In 1942 the average length of the briefings recorded each day by stenographers was 89 pages of typescript. As defeats mounted, so did Hitler's oral aggression. By the spring of 1945 the average number of daily pages had grown to 150.¹⁰¹

He had always been inordinately fond of sweets and the childhood delights of candy and cakes, but now, after his *Lagebesprechungen*, at about 6:00 A.M. he would "lie back fully exhausted, apathetically filled

From Private Neurosis to

only with the thought of chocolate and cakes. . . pieces, he now had his; that he didn't eat much. While he greedily satisfied, he observed that he simply to eat sweets."

Throughout his life he took his greatest pleasure in his dog, "Wolf." After the two-hour tour of the kennel in the bunker allowed, he was allowed to touch. "He sat down and started sweetly repeating his name."

Hitler had always considerate of others; no a whim, ordered people could twaddle with the euphoric expectation an he heard that the U.S. Elbe River on 26 April 1945.

as if electrified. His "Gentlemen, that is lies! Wouldn't the criminal if I signed became disunited. . the Bolsheviks and t

Psychologically, it is a 1
is saying, all will be bac
soon as something out the

But the saving battle was fought by the Red Army under Marshal Zhukov, who surrounded Berlin with 2,500,000 men, 42,000 artillery pieces, 6,000 tanks, 14,000 units, and 3,500 boys 15 years of age. There was a final battle. Hitler leaned back from his chair and contemplated glorious death. "I am," he said, "we must see to it that we die like men."

Hitler's lust for killing
death in 1945; but he h
of others. During his ab
as leader of a new Germ
"all the November Crimi
In a speech made at his

chocolate-covered cherries. I even called attention to it and told he really was, like the Great. He delivered it in 1945, while sitting at a table and could not control it. After he finished with these words:

the best of physical condition, it doesn't go into my way, come what may, my first time, I understand the end of his military life as a broken man. . . . Just years with bowed upper lip and possible sufferings, so on.¹⁹⁰

that Hitler's physical de-
moralization, in previous patterns, but
lifelong personality traits
in his physical condition
rather than a change of
attitude to mistrust people;
his dog—and, perhaps,
he did not stay up very late at
night did not go to bed before
the dawn as he had wanted to
destruction and reconstruction
always liked to talk
the stories at lunch, dinner,
once a day, he would say,
he was up again this morning.
business?" she put her tail
corner. She is certainly a
Look, my hand is getting
hold it completely still."
sation, but now his mono-
lucidity was also shown
n). In 1942 the average
monographs was 89 pages
er's oral aggression. By the
pages had grown to 150.¹⁹¹
sweets and the childhood
his *Lagebesprechungen*, at
austed, apathetically filled

1945

only with the thought that soon would come his favorite meal of the day: chocolate and cakes. . . . Whereas in earlier days he ate at most three pieces, he now had his plate heaped high three times. . . . He said that he didn't eat much for supper, so that he could eat more cakes. While he greedily satisfied his craving . . . by way of apology he always observed that he simply couldn't understand anybody who did not like to eat sweets."

Throughout his life he had expressed affection for animals; now he took his greatest pleasures in one of Blondi's pups, whom he called "Wolf." After the two-hour morning tea, he would personally go to the kennel in the bunker and fetch the little dog that no one else was allowed to touch. "He stroked the animal interminably, all the while sweetly repeating his name, Wolf."¹⁹²

Hitler had always been both cruel and kind, thoughtful and inconsiderate of others; now he heaped flattery on his secretaries and, upon a whim, ordered people to risk their lives flying into Berlin so that he could twaddle with them about trivia. He had often swung between euphoric expectation and deep despair. He continued to do so. When he heard that the U.S. and Soviet troops had met, historically, at the Elbe River on 26 April 1945, he seemed

as if electrified. His eyes flashed again. He leaned back and cried "Gentlemen, that is another clear proof of the disunity of our enemies! Wouldn't the German people and history stamp me as a criminal if I signed peace today . . . and tomorrow . . . our enemy became disunited. . . . Cannot daily, yes hourly, the battle between the Bolsheviks and the Anglo-Saxons begin?"¹⁹³

Psychologically, it is a revealing statement. All will yet be saved, he is saying, all will be back in its proper order and brought together, as soon as something out there splits apart.¹⁹⁴

But the saving battle never took place. Instead, by 27 April, the Red Army under Marshals Zhukov and Koniev had completely surrounded Berlin with 2,500,000 well-equipped and battle-tough men, 42,000 artillery pieces, 6,250 tanks, 7,560 airplanes. To oppose them, Hitler had available 44,600 soldiers, 42,500 old men in home-guard units, and 3,500 boys of the *Hitlerjugend* ranging from 12 to 16 years of age. There was one rifle for every two defenders. On that day, Hitler leaned back from his military maps, smiled confidently, and contemplated glorious new conquests. "When I get this thing solved," he said, "we must see to it that we get back all those oil fields."¹⁹⁵

Hitler's lust for killing reached its apogee just before his own death in 1945; but he had always enjoyed contemplating the death of others. During his abortive coup of 1923, he had promised that as leader of a new Germany he would hang on the highest gallows "all the November Criminals and arch-traitors" of the Weimar Republic. In a speech made at his Party rally in Nuremberg in 1929 he pro-

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

claimed that ideally 70 to 80 percent of the babies born in Germany every year should be killed off in order to strengthen the blood line.¹⁹⁶ He had promised in 1932 that when he came to power, "heads will roll in the sand." In 1934 he ordered the "Blood Purge" which killed hundreds of people he suspected of personal disloyalty. Prior to the war he told a British diplomat that the best way to deal with political opponents was to shoot them in groups of 12; if that was unsuccessful, they should be shot in groups of 200. In 1935 he had planned a sweeping "euthanasia" program to kill off the physically and mentally defective. His plan was implemented, in 1939, with instructions that action "should cover any category of 'unworthy' persons." Beginning with patients in mental institutions, the program was later extended to include senile and tubercular patients and those with birth defects. Within five years, some 100,000 people were killed.¹⁹⁷

In 1945 he sought the destruction of Germany in the greatest planned *Götterdämmerung* of history. But had he not foretold even that? Was that the meaning of a curious and little-noted sentence of a speech he made in 1932, in the electoral district of Lippe, before he became chancellor? It was then that he uttered strange words which later events would make ominous. "We are the last people," he said, "who will make history in Germany. [*Die letzten, die in Deutschland Geschichte machen, sind wir.*]" What do these words mean? Is it not conceivable that Hitler, from the very beginning—perhaps unconsciously—had been working for the total destruction of Germany?¹⁹⁸

His mind, to the very end, was no more irrational—or rational—than it had ever been. Reports of his staff conferences from December 1944 through 27 April 1945 show a familiar pattern: an incredible memory for detail used both as a crutch and as a weapon against those who disagreed with him; long disquisitions on his career as a soldier in World War I and the "battle years" after the war; a compulsive need to dominate every conversation. On 28 December 1944, to take one example, in a conference with his generals, he delivered a monologue which went on for the equivalent of eight single-spaced, typewritten pages. The speech was as coherent as any of its predecessors.¹⁹⁹

Prior to destroying himself, Hitler performed one of the genuinely kind acts of his life. He married Eva Braun, the woman who had loved him devotedly for years and who had risked death to be with him at the end. Hitler now granted her most cherished wish: to commit suicide with her bridegroom. There was a minor contretemps at the wedding, which was held between one and three o'clock on the morning of 29 April. The ceremony was performed by a hastily summoned city official who was so flustered by the honor that he misspelled his own name on the wedding certificate. The name was Wagner.²⁰⁰

After the wedding, Hitler withdrew with a secretary, Frau Junge, to dictate the personal will and political testament which would blame the war and all the evils of mankind upon "the universal poisoner of all

From Private Neurosis to Pub

peoples, international Jew Hitler. The style, phraseology have come from almost a the preceding decade.²⁰¹

Having signed these bride, and together they pla

The way Hitler died ha about his life. For many yea solved by Hugh Trevor-Rop in British Intelligence, was out exactly what had happen many of the survivors of H in 1946. Published the folk still be considered a master the excitement of a myste: tinguished historian who is a

In solving this mystery two formidable obstacles: th and key witnesses at the de family were dead, as was L had pronounced his Führer dead and certainly missing w edgeable and influential pri Party Chancellery. Also una sonal adjutant, Otto Günscl whom had been captured by tl

Nevertheless, by careful stantial evidence, Trevor-Rope that was so persuasive it wa: —including the writer of the: ler had entered his sitting roor at about 3:30 on the afterno himself by a shot through hi: of self-administered cyanide wrapped the bodies in blankets courtyard, where they were b two-and-a-half hours; and that

If Trevor-Roper's eminent all we had to go on, the mys There would be, as Lord Tedde possibility of distortion in thi new testimony has appeared anew that clarity—if not accu by a paucity of evidence than b

In 1950, for example, Eri

the babies born in Germany strengthen the blood line.¹⁹⁶ came to power, "heads will Blood Purge" which killed disloyalty. Prior to the war way to deal with political if that was unsuccessful, in 1935 he had planned a the physically and mentally 1939, with instructions that worthy' persons." Beginning program was later extended and those with birth defects. killed.¹⁹⁷

Germany in the greatest had he not foretold even and little-noted sentence of a district of Lippe, before he uttered strange words which the last people," he said, letzten, die in Deutschland these words mean? Is it not beginning—perhaps uncon- destruction of Germany? ¹⁹⁸ are irrational—or rational— conferences from December liar pattern: an incredible and as a weapon against sitions on his career as a ars" after the war; a com- on. On 28 December 1944, his generals, he delivered alent of eight single-spaced, rent as any of its predeces-

formed one of the genuinely , the woman who had loved death to be with him at the and wish: to commit suicide ontretemps at the wedding, clock on the morning of 29 istly summoned city official misspelled his own name on ver.²⁰⁰

his secretary, Frau Junge, to ament which would blame the universal poisoner of all

peoples, international Jewry." The two documents are quintessential Hitler. The style, phraseology, content, and thought processes could have come from almost any one of his speeches or conversations of the preceding decade.²⁰¹

Having signed these historic documents, Hitler returned to his bride, and together they planned their funeral.

The way Hitler died has become one of the most disputed questions about his life. For many years it was assumed that the problem had been solved by Hugh Trevor-Roper, an Oxford historian who, as an officer in British Intelligence, was charged in 1945 with the task of finding out exactly what had happened to the Führer. Trevor-Roper interviewed many of the survivors of Hitler's air raid bunker and wrote his report in 1946. Published the following year, Trevor-Roper's little book must still be considered a masterpiece of historical literature, combining all the excitement of a mystery thriller with the scholarship of a distinguished historian who is also a master of English prose.

In solving this mystery, however, the author was confronted by two formidable obstacles: the body of the victim had not been found, and key witnesses at the death scene were missing. Goebbels and his family were dead, as was Ludwig Stumpfegger, the SS physician who had pronounced his Führer dead and helped to burn him. Presumed dead and certainly missing was Martin Bormann, the immensely knowledgeable and influential private secretary to Hitler and head of the Party Chancellery. Also unavailable for interviews were Hitler's personal adjutant, Otto Günsche, and his valet, Heinz Linge, both of whom had been captured by the Soviets in May 1945.

Nevertheless, by careful use of hearsay testimony and circumstantial evidence, Trevor-Roper reconstructed a version of Hitler's death that was so persuasive it was accepted by most subsequent historians—including the writer of these lines. Trevor-Roper concluded that Hitler had entered his sitting room in the air raid shelter with his new bride at about 3:30 on the afternoon of 30 April 1945; that *he had killed himself by a shot through his mouth*; that Eva Braun-Hitler had died of self-administered cyanide poisoning; that Linge and others had wrapped the bodies in blankets, and carried them up to the Chancellery courtyard, where they were burned with 180 liters of petrol for some two-and-a-half hours; and that *"these bones have never been found."*²⁰²

If Trevor-Roper's eminently readable and persuasive account were all we had to go on, the mystery of Hitler's death would be solved. There would be, as Lord Tedder wrote in his foreword to the book, "no possibility of distortion in this case." Since its publication, however, new testimony has appeared to muddy the issue and to remind us anew that clarity—if not accuracy—in history is often achieved more by a paucity of evidence than by a plenitude.

In 1950, for example, Erich Kempka, Hitler's chauffeur, the man

April 1945

GOD: ADOLF HITLER

His attention was caught by a gray blanket. He began to look at a man and a woman. Gradually they brought the body into the room. He did not pay much attention. He had already found him in a picture taken at the wreckage of the Reich's chest. It was only when the police director, Karl Schneider, told him that Hitler had been found on 4 May.* The autopsy had been performed, but he understood the doctors had been wrong. She was directly wounded by the Red soldiers and he and a Soviet colonel. But he had already fled. Fräulein Käthe Heuser showed him X rays of Hitler's teeth placed in the Führer's teeth from memory and sketches which he questioned her again, which they had brought. Fräulein Heusermann identified the body was followed with had actually made the result was the same. He. Rzhnevskaya concluded, "an irrefutable proof of his death in Moscow."²⁰⁹ In the publication, first in the Soviet press, and others found hastily; we have noted, the auditing pathologists of the

Hitler's corpse was badly damaged, gone from the face and as missing and the brain

over the caption "False Body" in 1973, accepted the photo in an inventive passage he wrote enough for someone to take a mother's picture against his father (New York, 1973), 568.

From Private Neurosis to Public Policy

30 April 1945

cavity visible; that the lower cheekbones and upper and lower jaws were preserved; that glass splinters from the wall and bottom of a thin-walled ampule were found in the mouth; that the scrotal sac was burned but intact and the left testicle missing (see Chapter 3, pp. 150-151). They determined that "no visible signs of severe lethal injuries or illnesses could be detected." There was a distinct smell of bitter almonds emanating from the body; forensic chemical tests of internal organs established the presence of cyanide. The commission of Soviet doctors concluded that death was caused by poisoning with cyanide compounds.

The Soviet journalist who published the official autopsy report asked the chief of the Medical Commission specifically about the presence or absence of a pistol wound. Dr. Shkaravski replied:

The fact of the poisoning is incontrovertibly established. No matter what is asserted today, our Commission could not detect any trace of a gunshot on May 8, 1945. Hitler poisoned himself.

The Soviet author was greatly relieved by this statement, for it supported his conviction that the fascist dictator had sought a coward's death through poisoning rather than shooting himself "like a man."²¹⁰

Since the facts of Hitler's death are so confusing, how are we to tell what happened in his Berlin bunker on the afternoon of 30 April 1945?

It is a truism of history—as it is of traffic accidents, divorce courts, and judgments about pass interference on football fields—that eyewitnesses give conflicting testimony. But the reconstruction of this historical event is further complicated by unusual circumstances. Everyone who cowered in the air raid shelter that day was frightened to the point of hysteria by the Red Army. One thought spread trauma: the Russians are coming! Soviet artillery had already zeroed in on the Chancellery and was shaking the bunker; advance platoons of the Red Army were within a few blocks of the shelter. Hitler's entourage was confronted by an awful choice: to stay and be captured and, they believed, tortured or raped and killed; or try to "escape" to the blazing hell of a city that was now a battlefield, there, in all probability, to suffer the same fate.

Furthermore, the man who had just died was no ordinary mortal. Children had prayed to him, women had swooned upon hearing him, soldiers had died whispering his name. To the people in the bunker he was the Messiah. And now this god had killed himself. Small wonder the minds of these witnesses to history were confused and contradictory.

There is another reason why the testimony is conflicting. Wit-

30 April 1945

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

nesses like to believe those facts that support their personal convictions. Thus the Nazis, who had been ordered to carry out their Führer's last command, wanted very much to believe that his body really had been reduced to ashes. Hence the chauffeur—consciously or unconsciously—moved up the time when he said he started to burn the bodies to 2:00 P.M., whereas every other witness sets the time at about 4:00 P.M. The Russians, who wanted Hitler to die by poison, have consistently played down the possibility of a pistol shot, or, like Mrs. Rzhnevskaja, have conjectured that the bullet entered Mrs. Hitler's body, not her husband's.

Historians are not immune from the inclination to accept that testimony which supports their own point of view. Hugh Trevor-Roper understandably wants Hitler to have died the way he did in his admirable little book. He therefore scoffs at the Soviet autopsy report and those who take it seriously.²¹¹ Werner Maser has persuaded himself that the body found by the Russians was not Hitler's because he prefers to believe that Hitler was sexually normal. Therefore the cadaver with one missing testicle found by the Russians could not belong to his Hitler.²¹² And what about Waite? He is not without his own prejudices. He prefers to think that the Russian autopsy proved Hitler to be a monorchid. He would also like to believe that Hitler was discovered in the death room with his hands folded in his lap. That, however, is a conjecture. Eyewitnesses are not quite sure where Hitler's hands were placed; they may have been resting on his knees. But given Hitler's continual concern about his scrotum and his lifelong habit in moments of tension of covering it protectively with folded hands, it seems likely that *in extremis*, while awaiting death, he would have folded his hands over his crotch. Let us assume that he did. And until new discoveries appear to prove us wrong—as they may very well do—let us accept the evidence of the autopsy and suggest a solution to the problem of how Hitler died: he took poison and then was shot, but not through the mouth.

We are assuming that in planning their deaths, Hitler and his bride agreed to take cyanide together. Capsules had been prepared for them, and cyanide was said to be virtually instantaneous and very sure. That they both swallowed cyanide is attested by the autopsy.

How then justify and explain the pistol shot? One of the few points of agreement among many witnesses is that a shot was fired in the death room. Everyone except Linge heard a shot, and gunpowder was smelled by everyone entering the room. But why a pistol shot at all when Hitler and his bride already had available lethal doses of cyanide? The answer must lie in Hitler's psyche. *He could not trust people—he never could.*

In particular, he could no longer trust Heinrich Himmler, the man who had supplied the cyanide capsules, for this man, "*Der treue Heinrich*" as Hitler had called him in a better day, was now a traitor treating with the enemy behind his back. What if Himmler in his perfidy had adulterated the capsules so that they would only render the Führer

From Private Neurosis to Publ

unconscious—to be handed Hitler was suspicious. He t
It worked beautifully—but i

It was absolutely cruci
totally consumed—that not
emy. It must never happen
ported had happened to Mu
upside down in a public se
by a hate-filled crowd. Nor
being suspended from a m
bodies of German generals ir
would he go on display as a
sure indeed that he was dea
He could not trust the poison
coup de grâce? Who indeed?

Linge, his valet of man
or Bormann were obvious c
with all of them: they were
which Hitler had once calle
fealty to him alone—was not
their belt buckles had becom
There was, Hitler was now
perfidy he had not suffered.

In the whirling world of
person he could rely upon t
and that was Eva Braun-Hitl
flown into a doomed city to
obedience by fulfilling his ev
mands; she was a sportswom
deed, she wrote to a close fri
practice made her "so good a
pete." ²¹³ And she had been fou

But Linge thought Hitler
his left temple and exited fr
taken, for Hitler was not left-
shook so badly he could not co
the right temple would indic
were made an inch or two aw
have been the case if Eva Bra
the muzzle pushed tightly ag
gaseous recoil, leaving a large
pulling portions of the brain ou

Cyanide acts quickly bu
could have had time to bite th
pistol tightly against his right
said that he was found with hi

ort their personal convictions. carry out their Führer's last hat his body really had been nssciously or unconsciously—

ed to burn the bodies to 2:00 time at about 4:00 P.M. The ison, have consistently played , like Mrs. Rzhnevskaja, have dler's body, not her husband's. ie inclination to accept that t of view. Hugh Trevor-Roper the way he did in his admir-oviet autopsy report and those has persuaded himself that Hitler's because he prefers to herefore the cadaver with one uld not belong to his Hitler.²¹² it his own prejudices. He pre-ved Hitler to be a monorchid.

was discovered in the death hat, however, is a conjecture. tler's hands were placed; they t given Hitler's continual con-abit in moments of tension of nds, it seems likely that in d have folded his hands over d until new discoveries appear ell do—let us accept the evi-m to the problem of how Hitler t not through the mouth.

ieir deaths, Hitler and his bride s had been prepared for them, antaneous and very sure. That / the autopsy.

pistol shot? One of the few sses is that a shot was fired in heard a shot, and gunpowder oom. But why a pistol shot at d available lethal doses of cya-yché. *He could not trust people*

1st Heinrich Himmler, the man for this man, "*Der treue Hein-day*, was now a traitor treating if Himmler in his perfidy had would only render the Führer

From Private Neurosis to Public Policy

unconscious—to be handed over by Himmler to the Anglo-Saxons? Hitler was suspicious. He tested one of the vials of poison on his dog. It worked beautifully—but it might not work on him.

It was absolutely crucial that he should die, and that his body be totally consumed—that nothing, absolutely *nothing*, be left to the enemy. It must never happen to him and Eva what the wireless had reported had happened to Mussolini and his mistress: shot, then hanged upside down in a public square to be pelted with filth and invective by a hate-filled crowd. Nor could he stand the thought of his body's being suspended from a meathook, as he himself had exhibited the bodies of German generals in June 1944. Never, *never*, he had screamed, would he go on display as a freak in a Russian circus. He must be very sure indeed that he was dead and his body consumed "without a trace." He could not trust the poison. But who, he had asked, would perform the *coup de grâce*? Who indeed?

Linge, his valet of many years, or Günse, his personal adjutant, or Bormann were obvious candidates. But there was one thing wrong with all of them: they were members of the SS. And Himmler's SS—which Hitler had once called his Society of Jesus, sworn to absolute fealty to him alone—was now honeycombed with treason. The motto of their belt buckles had become a mockery: "My Honor is My Loyalty." There was, Hitler was now convinced, no honor left in the world, no perfidy he had not suffered.

In the whirling world of his paranoid suspicion, there was only one person he could rely upon to perform this act of cosmic importance, and that was Eva Braun-Hitler. She was a woman of courage who had flown into a doomed city to be with him; she had demonstrated her obedience by fulfilling his every wish and his most unusual sexual demands; she was a sportswoman who knew how to handle pistols. Indeed, she wrote to a close friend on 19 April 1945 that constant pistol practice made her "so good at it that none of the men dared to compete."²¹³ And she had been found seated at Hitler's left side.

But Linge thought Hitler himself had fired the shot which entered his left temple and exited from his right.²¹⁴ He must have been mistaken, for Hitler was not left-handed, and we know that his left hand shook so badly he could not control it. That the larger bullet hole was in the right temple would indicate entrance from the left only if the shot were made an inch or two away from Hitler's skull—as would probably have been the case if Eva Braun-Hitler had shot him. A shot fired with the muzzle pushed tightly against the skull would have produced a gaseous recoil, leaving a large hole at the point of entry and probably pulling portions of the brain out with it.²¹⁵

Cyanide acts quickly but not instantaneously. Hitler probably could have had time to bite the ampule, swallow its contents, put the pistol tightly against his right temple and pull the trigger. But it was said that he was found with his hands resting quietly on his knees—or,

30 April 1945

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

more likely, folded characteristically over his crotch. If so, it is unlikely that he had shot himself.

The shot could have been fired through the mouth, except that the same problem of timing arises, and the Russians found no evidence of a wound in the oral cavity, a part of the skull that was preserved. It also seems likely that an explosion in the mouth would have precluded finding glass shards from the ampule. The top of the cranium was missing—the part that, presumably, would have shown bullet wounds. It had probably been blown off by the steam generated from a brain that had been bubbling in the heat of petrol fire.²¹⁶

Thus, we conjecture, that at about 3:30 on the afternoon of 30 April 1945, Adolf Hitler swallowed a lethal dose of cyanide, clasped his hands over his crotch, and waited for his dutiful bride who, following his orders, shot him through the left temple either with her own 6.35 Walther pistol or with his 7.65. She then tucked her feet beneath her as she liked to do when listening to phonograph records, took poison herself, and died seated beside the man she loved.

Hitler's body was badly burned but not completely consumed. Apart from the evidence of the Russian autopsy, there is another reason for believing that the bodies were not totally destroyed. Linge stresses the lack of effective planning and the confusion surrounding the whole incident. He and his helpers had collected enough petrol, they thought, to do the job; but they had not planned on where they would burn the bodies. Hence, with Russian artillery bursting about them, they hurriedly placed the corpses in a shallow indentation in the sandy soil of the courtyard. That, of course, was a mistake, for the soil rapidly absorbed much of the petrol. Both Linge and the chauffeur, Kempka, recalled that it was a windy day. The men had trouble relighting the bodies with petrol when the flames died down. Thus the bodies burned, off and on, for perhaps two or three hours. It was not enough. Having failed to fulfill their promise to Hitler that his body would be utterly destroyed, they tried to bury it. Again the job was botched, for no shovels were available; and with the Russians coming closer by the minute, there was little desire to risk lives for a now thoroughly dead Führer. He was covered as well and as quickly as possible with loose earth and rubble. A few days later the charred body was found by the Russians. An autopsy was performed after identification had been made by a careful examination of his rotting teeth.

The finale had not been as Wagnerian as Hitler might have wished, but it was not an inappropriate ending to his career.²¹⁷

Having attempted to answer the traditional historical question of "what actually happened," let us call upon psychology to help us with the more difficult question of *why* Hitler killed himself.

One might quickly conclude that suicide, given the external conditions, was the obvious way to end his life. But deliberate self-destruction,

From Private Neurosis to Pul

tion, we are told by those completely logical act. Indeed, survival—a drive that is normal in the concentration camps at sea testifies. Once of the rational and irrational.

On the rational level, 1945 the military situation was unbearable. Certainly that he planned to put a thing to do. But he may a parent yet equally compelling.

The act of suicide has of their findings may help and death.*

Freud thought he had by deriving its dynamics from problem has shown, a great clinical symptoms of depression are deeply depressed are not.

It is popularly supposed from reality. And indeed, to perate that "normal" people does not preclude the possibility conditions psychological means usual circumstances would occur.

There is something else a rational decision, a logic of humiliation, ill health, discom or loved one. The idea assumes are wholly external. In the push from within is often met.

Suicide may be seen as of an unconscious desire for

* The clinical literature on specifically, to the following studies (1917), in *Collected Papers*, (London) "Longing to Die," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 16, 1917; Hendin, "Suicide," *Psychiatric Quarterly* 30, 1957; Siegel, "Suicide," *Psychiatric Quarterly* 30, 1957; Siegel and Jacob Friedman, "The System 16 (February 1955); Charney, *of the Menninger Clinic* (May 1955); "Suicide," *International Journal of Psychiatry* (New York, 1961); Gregor, *can Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 3, first suggesting this line of approach 226-227.

26 April 1945

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

have found, that Hitler had displayed throughout his life: he had often threatened to kill himself. It should be emphasized that to the masochist, suicide is not seen as defeat; rather, it is a twisted sort of triumph. Indeed, after years of clinical experience with masochism, Theodor Reik concluded that the essence of the masochist's attitude toward life can be summarized in three words: "Victory through Defeat." Others may view the suicide of such a person as an obvious admission of failure, but he himself feels vindicated and triumphant.²²¹

Suicide may also gratify feelings of hostility and aggression. One way to externalize masochism is to inflict punishment on others. The suicide punishes his survivors—parents or spouse and anyone else who has abandoned the sufferer.²²² Certainly Hitler felt that he had been deserted by everyone. As his country lay in rubble, the Führer's thoughts turned inward. "Nothing is spared me," he lamented on 26 April 1945, "no allegiances are kept, no honor lived up to . . . no betrayals I have not experienced. . . . Nothing remains. Every wrong has already been done me."²²³

Karl Menninger has shown a different facet of the problem which reflects an important aspect of Hitler's personality. Menninger has found in suicide a connection between fear of examination and feelings of omnipotence. People who consider themselves unique, who refuse to be examined physically or to have their beliefs questioned, may find in suicide a confirmation of their omnipotence. "To kill oneself instead of being executed or slain by fate," Menninger has written, "is to retain for oneself the illusion of being omnipotent since one is, even by and in the act of suicide, master of life and death." Thus, paradoxically, the instinct for life may be fulfilled through death.²²⁴

Another psychiatrist agrees: "Through the primitive act of suicide, man achieves a fantasied immortality . . . it is another method of restating and reasserting one's own immortality." Such fantasy, according to most observers, is a reversion to infancy.²²⁵

It will be remembered that all his life Hitler—like other borderline personalities—was given to infantile fantasizing. In his boyhood he delivered impassioned orations to the trees on lonely hills near Leon- deling; in his teens, he saw himself winning lottery sweepstakes, rebuilding entire cities, and establishing a new Reich; as an adult, he was convinced that he was the German Messiah to whom it was proper that the prayers of children be addressed. Sometimes he thought of himself as Christ; at other times, he said, he was one of the immortals who would live forever among his fellow Olympian gods.

But at the end, he saw himself as a different kind of deity. He was really like neither Jesus nor one of the serene and radiant company on the azure heights of Olympus. Rather, he was a darkly brooding Teutonic god enthroned in Valhalla, the shadowed hall of the dead. Especially as he hid in his Berlin bunker, he may have reverted to a childhood fantasy that he was Wotan, dread ruler of the universe. The two had much in common. Wotan appears in German mythology as a

From Private Neurosis to Pub

deeply split deity, the god I worker who—like Hitler—ple, he was the all-knowing; runes. But he was also the demanding human sacrifice

Wotan was also the V ravaging horde of the Furi said, saw himself in preci *Die wilde Jagd*, by his favo identified so completely wit blance to himself so striki suggest that he would see in of himself: "Hitler as Wota vinced that the "Hand of W Eagle's Nest in the Obers. talisman.

Hitler and Wotan also s will recall the curious fact c wolves, but these were the e Munin, perched on his shou of chaos and destruction, c from his hand alone. (In h himself to touch or feed Blor time of *Ragnarok*, the end of and "appalling deeds of mu vances, his great gaping jaws relentlessly, hideously, he dev

In ordering the *Götterdäm* Hitler envisaged himself as know that one of his most j "with which he never parted We know, also, of his lifelon recast by Richard Wagner. Th tion of the world in a tremen sumed by flames. Hitler was Wotan as "rising to the tragic It seems likely that in the end ever-present refuge and stren and creative genius who had in began" with Wagner. And thus

Fantasy was often confus est actor in Europe." For his c role of Wotan-Siegfried, a coi

* He may have reinforced thi Nordic legend who, though vanquist splendid defiance as they cut his h *Mythology* (New York, 1942), 444.

broughtout his life: he had often emphasized that to the masochist, it is a twisted sort of triumph experience with masochism. One of the masochist's attitude words: "Victory through Defeat." person as an obvious admission of and triumphant.²²¹ of hostility and aggression. One fict punishment on others. The or spouse and anyone else who ly Hitler felt that he had been in rubble, the Führer's thoughts he lamented on 26 April 1945. d up to . . . no betrayals I have . Every wrong has already been

rent facet of the problem which r's personality. Menninger has fear of examination and feelings themselves unique, who refuse to air beliefs questioned, may find potency. "To kill oneself instead ininger has written, "is to retain oment since one is, even by and nd death." Thus, paradoxically, igh death.²²⁴

ugh the primitive act of suicide, . . . it is another method of reality." Such fantasy, according ncy.²²⁵

life Hitler—like other borderline fantasizing. In his boyhood he trees on lonely hills near Leon- izing lottery sweepstakes, rebuild- ew Reich; as an adult, he was siah to whom it was proper that ometimes he thought of himself was one of the immortals who mpian gods.

a different kind of deity. He was re serene and radiant company ther, he was a darkly brooding he shadowed hall of the dead. ker, he may have reverted to a dread ruler of the universe. The ears in German mythology as a

April 1945

deeply split deity, the god both of creation and of destruction. A magic worker who—like Hitler—appeared in different forms to different people, he was the all-knowing god, source of inspiration, inventor of the runes. But he was also the god of desolation and death, insatiable in demanding human sacrifices.

Wotan was also the Wild Huntsman who rode forth to lead the ravaging horde of the Furious Host (*wütendes Heer*). Hitler, we have said, saw himself in precisely that role as depicted in the painting *Die wilde Jagd*, by his favorite artist, von Stuck. Indeed, he may have identified so completely with this Wotan figure, and found the resemblance to himself so striking, that it does not seem too fanciful to suggest that he would see in this painting of 1889 a miraculous portrait of himself: "Hitler as Wotan, the Wild Huntsman." He was also convinced that the "Hand of Wotan" had miraculously appeared at his own Eagle's Nest in the Obersalzberg. He preserved it as his personal talisman.

Hitler and Wotan also shared similar tastes in animals. The reader will recall the curious fact of Hitler's special fondness for ravens and wolves, but these were the emblems of Wotan. Two ravens, Hugin and Munin, perched on his shoulders; the great grey wolf, Fenrin, symbol of chaos and destruction, crouched fettered at his feet, eating food from his hand alone. (In his last days, Hitler permitted no one but himself to touch of Teed Blondi's pup "Wolf.") When Wotan orders the time of *Ragnarok*, the end of the world, there will be cataclysmic battle and "appalling deeds of murder and incest . . . The wolf Fenrin advances, his great gaping jaws filled the gap between earth and sky" . . . relentlessly, hideously, he devours gods and men.²²⁶

In ordering the *Götterdämmerung* for his world, we are suggesting, Hitler envisaged himself as Teutonic god fulfilling ancient myth. We know that one of his most precious boyhood possessions, a treasure "with which he never parted," was a book of German mythology.²²⁷ We know, also, of his lifelong infatuation with the ancient legends as recast by Richard Wagner. These myths foretold the inevitable destruction of the world in a tremendous holocaust, with gods and men consumed by flames. Hitler was familiar with Wagner's conception of Wotan as "rising to the tragic height of willing his own destruction." * It seems likely that in the end he was drawn once again to Wagner, his ever-present refuge and strength in time of trouble, the fellow artist and creative genius who had inspired his Reich. He had said that "it all began" with Wagner. And thus it would end.

Fantasy was often confused with reality in the mind of "the greatest actor in Europe." For his own death scene he may have created a role of Wotan-Siegfried, a commanding Wagnerian hero who would

* He may have reinforced this image by recalling another boyhood hero of Nordic legend who, though vanquished, yet triumphed over his foes by laughing in splendid defiance as they cut his heart from the living flesh. See Edith Hamilton, *Mythology* (New York, 1942), 444.

OD: ADOLF HITLER

ue. How else can one
mm, who had watched

who never experienced
l be its strength that it
l force radiating from
ntense as to be almost

strength, integrity, and
ion of possessing them.
ause he was able—in
hange himself from a
towering historic force
s to do his will.
a psychic necessity be-

From Private Neurosis to Public Policy

or the call of irrational faith, they too, like Hitler before them, preferred delusion.

Albert Speer, a notably rational person, has shown with remarkable clarity how this process worked both in himself and in his compatriots—indeed, in all those who kept the faith long after reason had told them that all was lost. Speer wrote:

Hitler's obsessive faith inevitably influenced his entourage. One part of my consciousness certainly acknowledged that now everything must be approaching the end. But despite that, I spoke all the more frequently of "restoration of the situation." Strangely, this confidence existed apart from the recognition of inevitable defeat.⁷⁷

2 existences above,

BRUTALITY AND OBSTINACY IN ACTION

In the struggle between two conceptions of life, only the weapon of brute force used continuously and ruthlessly can bring about decision.

—Adolf Hitler

It was very important for Hitler to avoid any suggestion of feminine softness and always to appear masculine and masterful. One way of doing so was by acting the part; another was through the repetition of adjectives which he considered descriptive of masculine virtues. A tribute to Field Marshal Göring revealed Hitler's own masculine ideals:

The Reichsmarschall went through many a crisis with me and has proven himself to be ice-cold. There is no better adviser in times of need than the Reichsmarschall. The Reichsmarschall is in times of crisis *brutal* and *ice-cold*. . . . Bend or break, he proves himself to be without consideration an *ice-cold* man, and they could not get a better one than him. He was with me through all the difficult days, he was always *ice-cold*. Whenever it became really bad, he turned out to be *ice-cold*.⁷⁸

CIS RALT

A man who had survived dozens of "Table Conversations" with Hitler recalled that "never once have I heard from his lips words which would show that he had a warm or feeling heart in his breast."⁷⁹

The cultivation of hardness and brutality ran through Hitler's political career. As early as his trial after the Beer Hall Putsch, he set forth his solution to the problem of French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, saying, "Only fervent, *reckless, brutal fanaticism* could have saved the situation at that time." A witness at the trial recalled that throughout Hitler's long harangue he "concentrated on the word *brutality*."⁸⁰

et seq. (Herc)

CHAPTER 3

The Child As Father to the Man

I and the public know
What all schoolchildren learn,
Those to whom evil is done
Do evil in return.

—W. H. Auden

Every basic conflict of childhood lives on, in some
form, in the adult.

—Erik Erikson

HITLER'S GENEALOGY, which has puzzled biographers since his death, worried him all his life. It seems likely that one of the reasons he required all citizens in his Reich to identify and prove the racial purity of their ancestors was because he harbored nagging doubts about his own.

Difficulties in tracing his lineage are increased by a tangled web of family intermarriage, incest, and illegitimacy, as well as by name changes and incomplete or altered baptismal records. A few facts, however, have emerged from provincial archives, parish church records, the oral traditions of the countryside, and the sedulous research of historians.

1837
It can be affirmed that one spring day in 1837 a middle-aged peasant woman from the tiny farming village of Stronnes in Lower Austria journeyed to a nearby hamlet to have the parish priest baptize her baby boy. The entry in the Baptismal Registry for the Parish of Döllersheim, Tomus vii, page 7, records that the woman was Maria Anna Schickelgruber, unwed daughter of Johann Schickelgruber, a farmer in Stronnes. Her baby, who was to become the father of Adolf Hitler, was christened Aloys Schickelgruber. The blank for the father's name

The Child As Father to the Man

was not filled in that day. Ma
Georg Hitler was added in a d

The mother never reveals years doubt and controversy Hitler's paternal grandfather. mother is clear. For generatic or itinerant farm laborers i Austrian Waldviertel. Even incest was not uncommon, ticularly complex family int mental and physical aberrati stapo files show, for example Veit, a cousin of Hitler's fat them committed suicide in a family seem to have been sl

Maria Anna Schickelgrul contemporary farm women to vincial city, as a domestic s and returned to her home vi Alois, (as he later preferred t Führer. When the boy was five mill worker named Johann G Hüttler, Hidler, Huetler, Hittl unable to care for the boy, hardworking farmer, Johann raised him as his own son o the boy, at the age of 13, left t

In the capital, Alois bec began a rise in life remark unique in the family annals. ship, at the age of 18, he w in the Department of Inland ber of the Royal and Imperia siderable prerogatives and pr would do with palpable pride :

In 1876, when he was 3 father, Johann Nepomuk Hi Thus, on an autumnal day in of his illiterate relatives harn the narrow, winding country the blank in Adolf Hitler's o aged parish priest that his fo had in truth been sired by his The priest accepted the testir 1837 was altered in the Regis space "Name of the Baptized" out, and the space for the fa

1944
THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

1888
What differentiates a Jew from an anti-Semite: if a Jew lies, he knows he is lying; the anti-Semite does not know that he is always lying.⁶⁵

His revulsion at being associated with anti-Semites was so great it made him physically ill, as he noted in a bitter letter to his sister, who had married a racist and was misusing his work:

... You have committed one of the greatest stupidities—for yourself and for me! Your association with an anti-Semitic chief expresses a foreignness to my whole way of life which fills me again and again with ire or melancholy. . . . It is a matter of honor with me to be absolutely clean and unequivocal in relation to anti-Semitism, namely, *opposed* to it, as I am in my writings. . . . That the name of Zarathustra is used in every *Anti-Semitic Correspondence Sheet*, has almost made me sick several times. . . .⁶⁶

the V.S. in his concentration camp thinking of Nietzsche
Far from exalting the state, Nietzsche feared and opposed its encroachments on the freedom of man. He was appalled by the power of the military-industrial complex of Imperial Germany and despised the whole cult of Germanism: "Behold the Germans, the lowest, most stupid, most common race that exists on earth, now hohenzollerned [verhohenzollert] to hate spirit and freedom."⁶⁷

Finally, in mind, character, and intent, Nietzsche was a world apart from Hitler. Nietzsche would destroy in order to create a finer order; he dreamed of new beginnings and higher creative purposes; he was "boundlessly honest," with a courageous commitment to self-awareness and truth. Hitler had no vision beyond his lust to brutalize and dominate other men in a racist dictatorship. Nietzsche was a courageous and instinctive heretic. When he cried out that God was dead, he meant that all systems of authority were dead. He would have joined Luther as one of the first victims of Nazi tyranny.⁶⁸

All this needs to be said. But his admirers are unable to make a persuasive case that Nietzsche was "a good European" who had no connection whatever with the rise of Hitler to power in Germany. True, Nietzsche himself had said he was a "good European," in part to dissociate himself from the noisy nationalists of his day. But he was not being a good European when he sought to destroy the European heritage: rights of citizens protected by laws and constitutions; the conviction that people could shape their own social and political future through parliamentary government; a code of ethics and morality based on Judeo-Christian and humanist principles. All these things Nietzsche despised and ridiculed. Certainly he sought to build new forms in the rubble of destruction, but the lust to destroy was more potent than the hope of creation.

Nietzsche's unintended contribution to the coming of Nazism was twofold: negative and positive. By the turn of the century, his call for

The Past As Prologue: Hitler

"triumphant negation" w Germans. It is noteworthy: went to war in 1914 they t along with Luther's transl: so thoroughly despised. A was specially printed, bou thousands of German sold Adolf Hitler, read and rei and announcing the comi: man [der verächtlichste M

Alas! The most
he who can
Behold! I show

What is love? V
What is the sta
Thus asks the li

How many young mi
tion of traditional ethical v
tion, his sneering reference:

You say a good can
I say unto you: it is
any cause.

You shall love peace
And the short peace

For a sword wants
And glistens with d

I sing and I mock a
God is dead . . .

"Man is evil," so spr
comfort me . .

"Man must become

The greatest evil is
best

[Das Böseste ist nöt

It may have been g
little people

* The title page of the co
Kriegsausgabe.

1888
Thomas Mann

who in the end was more
1944
THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER
(Nietzsche)

was more German than he; who served the Germans as still another model for those traits which made them a disaster and terror to the world, and led them ultimately to ruin themselves: romantic passion; the drive to eternal expansion of the self into space, without any fixed object; will which is free because it has no goal and aspires to the infinite. . . . In more than one sense Nietzsche has become historic. He made history, frightful history, and did not exaggerate when he called himself "a nemesis." 75

We are left with the question posed by Karl Jaspers: "Is he the one who wanted the highest, who yearned for the impossible, who against his will became a power which unleashed among us all the devils of hell?" 76

Regrettably, the answer is yes, he was such a one.

OTHER ANTIDEMOCRATIC INTELLECTUALS

Even those intellectuals who were critical of Imperial Germany had nothing but scorn for parliamentary democracy. Priding themselves on being "unpolitical," they forfeited the political game to others. Many called explicitly for a Führer to rescue Germany from the confusions which their disdain for democracy had done little to alleviate. When the young Thomas Mann professed his admiration for Lagarde, Nietzsche, and Wagner, it was because, Mann said, they had performed the service of proving that "democracy is alien to us."

The attitude of German intellectuals during the Second Reich was given classic expression in a long and important essay written by Mann and proudly entitled *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* (Reflections of an Unpolitical Man). In this influential book, Mann urged his fellow Germans to be nonpolitical because politics was associated with democracy and democracy was deeply un-German. Freedom from politics, he argued, constituted the basic foundation stone of German Kultur. A typical passage reads:

I declare my deep conviction that the German people will never be able to love political democracy for the simple reason that they cannot love politics and that the much decried *Obrigkeitsstaat* is and will remain the form of government suited to, deserved, and basically desired by the German people.⁷⁷

In fairness to the memory of the great novelist and humanist, it must be reported that Mann later regretted having written the essay. When he recognized the menace of Hitler, he urged his countrymen to participate in politics and to support the Weimar Republic. But the hour was then very late. His influential statement, widely publicized at the birth of the republic, expressed the sentiments of most German intellectuals of the pre-Hitler period.

Another seminal thinker, Max Weber, provides an additional exam-

The Past As Prologue: Hitler

ple of the forces that stunted sociologists often spent help to establish the understanding of the term was Germany would be defeated urging that he sign a permit. The following conversation

Ludendorff: Then v

Weber: In a de

they tr

obey m

no long

Ludendorff: I could

That Weber meant when, after the Weimar considerable influence to produce the "chosen lecture to Munich student profession, Weber paid special devotion of the masses to ture by saying that Germany and the present leaderless not a true German government

Anti-Semitism in the Second Reich

Something of the long is caught in the following v

In October 1743, a boy asking permission to enter he had to ask permission only were required to they had to have a permit back Jewish boy had the ghetto, and he knew was "Dessau," the city the other word was "J

* Nietzsche can be used as a leit-motif. Use his words as quote + counter-quote. As the and the Viennese Jew V.S. Mann as another? Also in '44 in a camp.

not utterly defeated, it was because of two factors which came to her aid: first, the rising British sea-power which distracted and paralyzed Spain; second, the Protestant German princes, who were continuously rising up against the Catholic, Habsburg-Spanish emperor, thus immobilizing at least one of his arms. It is understandable that France should henceforth have placed her hope in this strife between German emperor and German princes, and viewed it as the immutable aim of her foreign policy. For two centuries she did her best to tear Germany apart.

The split of European civilization into two enraged religious parties gave France an advantage which her own strength would not have given her. At the end of the sixteenth century she settled her own religious conflicts, while Germany was torn by religious wars, culminating in the most terrible conflict of modern times. For thirty years (1618 to 1648), the soldiers of Europe staged on German soil the most frightful slaughter in modern history, and the German nation nearly bled to death. For thirty years Swedes from the Arctic regions and Spaniards from the south streamed into Germany to fight battles and massacre the population; German cities, situated but half an hour's journey from one another, but worlds apart by reason of religion, fought on opposing sides. Provinces were turned into deserts, covered with heaps of ashes; cities vanished forever from the face of the earth; men died by murder, fire, starvation, and plague; cannibalism was not unknown.

When the thirty years' butchery was over, the number of Germans had fallen from about twelve to four millions. No other modern people has ever experienced anything of the sort. A generation later, the war broke out anew at the western borders of the country: France tried to snatch the left bank of the Rhine from Germany, and when this failed, Louvois, the French Minister of War, gave orders to create an artificial desert in the border province of the Palatinate: 'Brulez le Palatinat' was his order, and the ruins of Heidelberg castle remain a monument to this policy. A century and a half later, the armies of Napoleon, emperor of the French, marched across Europe, and Germany was more torn than ever.

This was the great turning-point in German effects are clearly discernible in the German France, newborn through revolution, possessed a superiority of spirit and will over the other nations of the Continent; the Caesar of France with all the refined dexterity later so well described Napoleon broke the millennial German Empire a new Germany. He founded new German new German princes, who were to endure determine the course of German history. Beethoven dedicated his Third Symphony, the out contemptuously to German patriots: 'Tug the man is too big for you, you will never be philosopher, saw Napoleon riding through the owned that he felt as though he had seen horseback.' This son of Corsica, emperor of the testably the greatest single figure in Germany down to our own day. But at the same time French oppression and domination of Germany swallowed up Holland and Belgium; for a time Germany as far as the mouth of the Elbe manipulated at will the new states she had created Bavaria, Württemberg, Westphalia. She brought tarism to Germany and levied armies in Germany conduct her own wars. But above all, in the process she brought to Germany the idea of democracy the conspirator who makes himself a tyrant by the . . . the living model of the Wise Men of Zion. Germany learned and imitated. When the broke out, the best of the German intelligent time there were Jacobin republics on the Rhine tion of the French revolutionary armies. The France; the immense power they gave the country before had been in a state of collapse; the system by the tyrant of this new spiritual might, made on the clearest heads in Germany. What we organization, was first learned from Napoleon

1957

in accordance with them as seriously and consistently as a monk who has consecrated his life to God. In Vienna, this sink of iniquity, where even prostitution was made the object of the artist's glorification — this was an exception indeed!

Actually, Adolf had written to Stefanie once during that period. It can no longer be established whether this letter was sent before or during our time together in Vienna. The letter itself is lost, and I came to hear about it in a curious manner. I told a friend of mine, an archivist, who is working on a biography of Adolf Hitler and of whose scientific soundness I am assured, about Adolf's love for Stefanie. The scholar ascertained the address of the old lady, the widow of a colonel, living in Vienna, called on her and laid before her his peculiar request — that she should tell him about her youthful acquaintance with a young, pale student from the Humboldtstrasse, who later moved to the Blütengasse in Urfahr. He used to stand and wait for her at the Schmiedtoreck every evening, he added, accompanied by his friend. Upon this, the old lady began telling him about balls, excursions, carriage trips and so on which she had enjoyed with young men, mostly officers, but with the best will in the world she could not recollect this strange young man; even when, to her astonishment, she learnt his name. But suddenly a memory awoke within her. Didn't she once receive a letter, written in a confused manner, which spoke of a solemn vow, begged her to keep faith and only to expect further news of the writer when he had finished his training as an artist and had an assured position? The letter was not signed. From its style, it can almost certainly be concluded that it was Adolf who sent it. And that was all the old lady could tell him.

When the thought of his beloved became too much for him, he no longer spoke directly of Stefanie, but threw himself headlong, with a great display of feeling, into dissertations about early marriages to be promoted by the State,

about the possibility of trousseaus by means of which many children to be born here, on or about the 1st of May, could be brought into the world without violent arguments. State furniture factories should be able to furnish examples strongly against this idea. In all, on this subject I have heard a great deal. It is of good, high-quality furniture. We made our calculations so that the newly furnished quality furniture in the dining room, the dining chairs and couches there still existed mass

Much that Adolf talks is concentrated in his theory, and in this case, the discussion is the star. However, even the questions of the raised, this magic of the Flame of Life pure and simple is a task of that Idea which he himself in his lonely search for precision, I was not the Flame of Life, and of meaning. But I think it is right. The Flame of Life which is awakened by themselves pure in blood which would produce

Such phrases, impressive and again — and Adolf — had quite a queen — solemnly proclaimed rather pathetic, and

1907?

discovery
1957?

incontrovertibly proved, yet some-
s remained: a textbook of world
The leaders of the Black Hundreds
of demagoguery, the tsar's secret police
call this clique of political officials,
ficers, by their proper name: the
seize power over the masses. He
no, no, this was not my work. The
stole them and brought them to
ad. But today we know better. An
the truth, even anti-Semitic propa-
myth of the Jewish conspiracy in
worship. At first the anti-Semites
dea that Joly was a Jew and that a
to write his book; but then Joly's
ploding this last hope; since then,
ed merely that the *Protocols* are
possibility of documentary proof.
er truth; but the demonstrable his-
his truth involves not a Jewish but

necessary, for the first and the last time in
ootnote. The German 'Intellektueller' and
e same thing. The German word has (espe-
r meaning and is frequently used merely
a above the average; either academic or
top here. This book deliberately uses the
p, or rather a type, characterized, not by
st, but a common outlook. It comes close
hanistically minded modern man, product
is: Will it work? Such a man may be,
engineer, but whatever his occupation, he
ue to an education above the average. In
disillusioned, that gravitated most readily
of the movement.

i later, can best be defined as the 'intel-
ociety; who was 'uprooted and disinherited'
ties and thirties, and unable — owing to
European — to slide comfortably down
as been perfectly described by Karl Marx,
Louis Bonaparte, where he calls the scum
re coup d'état of Napoleon III 'creatures
that they are men of ill repute . . . each
tate.'

At first the concept of conspiracy is purely symbolical. The human mind, with its tendency to personify great objective phenomena, interprets surprising objective contexts as a personal plan. World history becomes a moral drama; the eternal struggle between man and society becomes the struggle between good and evil; the lofty ruthlessness of history seems bearable only when it is humanized. Thus we give it a mythological form: the great hereditary enemy, the Antichrist, the destroyer, and finally, the conspirator. The nineteenth century in Europe was indeed full of conspirators, from the German Burschenschaften, the Italian Carbonari, the Irish Fenians, to the Russian Nihilists and Socialists. Behind all this, our imagination seeks a world context, a world conspiracy aiming at world domination. Where is the kernel of historical truth in the fantasy of a Jewish world conspiracy? It lies in the great world struggle for human equality to which the Jews owe their admission to modern society; this is the historical fact standing in the broad daylight of truth, whence it casts weirdly magnified, indistinct, and unfathomable shadows into the background of fantasy. On the opposing side, the great principle of inequality fights to preserve its rule; the ruling class philosophy of a natural hierarchy, of innate differences between men. Once this principle is expressed in the form of historical events, it also soon assumes an aspect of conspiracy. The coup d'état of Napoleon III on December 2, 1851, and *The Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion* were not hatched out by the same mind. But they are acts of one and the same psychological type; only this made it possible for history to combine one with the other by the thin red thread of a documentary connection.

The spirit of the *Protocols*, therefore, contains historical truth, though all the facts put forward in them are forgeries. Hence its influence on such varied times and peoples. When they were published, their deeper, genuine content beneath the varnish of falsification found a receptive mood in many sections of the Russian people — a mood of decadence and despair. The Russian literature of the period from Tolstoi to Sologub bears witness to this mood. The superstitious tsar permitted himself to be frightened and influenced by wonder-working monks. Serious religious people were

Dr. T. can take this up. Given the
fundamental fact of human nature —
that every impulse and every desire
generates its opposite. After lust,
for example, comes one or another
species of spiritual honor in all those
who have a mixed relation to lust,
so, too, can the same be said for all
political desires — which are their own
species of lust.

good for you.' " 269 Eva's own private diary and in letters the diary is that of an immature for Hitler is unmistakably

more and more bound to Eva. every night, and we have a apt on his life in the "Bomb typewriter and pocked with ases of the kind Hitler had ice with Kubizek. One must possible for Hitler to love anyone and tender concern for

perhaps a little tired. I hope rest in your arms. I have a to the German people comes that the dangers I encounter ers at the Front. I thank you ask you also to thank your us mother for their greetings the honor—please tell them who comes from such a dis- the uniform I was wearing of that Providence has pro- ore to fear from our enemies. m my whole heart, your A.H.

de of the barracks after the

tiety now that I know you are sible. I feel as if I am going

d everything seems so peace- self [for enjoying such tran- told you that I would die if

is a fraud. An authentic, unpub- lishes. This diary covers only the when Eva's attraction for Hitler Fucke-Michels, has vouched for as Sources."

1944

anything happened to you. From our first meeting on, I have promised myself to follow you wherever you go, even to death. You know that I live only for your love.

Your Eva

In the end, as we shall see, she flew to crumbling Berlin to die with the man she loved. Amid the bedlam of the last days in Hitler's air raid shelter, and others faced death with varying degrees of cowardice, panic, and histrionics, Eva Braun grew in stature. There was about her a quiet inner strength. Even someone who had cordially disliked her said at the end that "she attained heights which more than atoned for the vanities and frivolities of the past." 270

Affairs with Other Women

Though he could not possibly have had the number of sexual liaisons with beautiful young women that rumor and conjecture have claimed, Hitler apparently had a number of fleeting affairs or overnight experiences during the years that he lived with Geli Raubal and Eva Braun.

A German film director testified to OSS officers during the war that he had helped supply Hitler with attractive starlets for the night.²⁷¹ He had been infatuated with the famous movie director Leni Riefenstahl, who filmed both the Berlin Olympic Games of 1936 and the effective propaganda film *The Triumph of the Will* in 1934. Fräulein Riefenstahl later denied having anything more than a platonic relationship with the Führer. The Italian foreign minister believed that Hitler had had intimate relations with a Sigrid von Lappus, whom he described as 20 years old with "beautiful quiet eyes." ²⁷² U.S. Military Intelligence found evidence of intimate affairs with two young Munich women, Fräuleins Abel and Haue.²⁷³ Ernst Hanfstaengl reported that, while entertaining Hitler in his home one evening, he returned from calling a taxicab to stumble upon an awkward scene. Hitler was down on his knees in front of Hanfstaengl's beautiful wife, Hélène. He was proclaiming his love for her, saying that it was a shame he had not met her while she was still free and declaring himself her "slave." He made a similar declaration in Berlin to one of the daughters of a benefactor, again going down on his knees in front of the embarrassed young woman.²⁷⁴

According to another intimate, Hitler had an affair with a young married woman, Suzi Liptauer, who, after one strange encounter, tried to hang herself in a Munich hotel. The last wife of the leader of the Labor Front, Frau Inge Ley, committed suicide, it is reported, after having an affair with him. The German film star Renaté Mueller also killed herself, reportedly after a harrowing sexual experience with him.²⁷⁵ Hitler himself claimed that Frau General Ludendorff was quite mad about him, and that shortly before she married the general she had entreated the Führer to be her lover.²⁷⁶

THE
HITLER
OF
HISTORY

John Lukacs

*Earlier
1920's
1930's
1940's
Later*



ALFRED A. KNOPF New York 1997

1898 1944

-a Hug

ed by the instability caused by on in 1892 brought the move to ren, now including the new baby ed to Linz in April 1894. The nly by brief visits, lasted a year. and his stepsister and stepbrother ling, Adolf had for a time the run s the first signs of tantrums if he much later that even as a boy he or the most part, he was free to o his heart's content. nall farm in the hamlet of Hafeld, Lambach, some thirty miles away ily joined him there. It was at the olf began his schooling on 1 May de good headway, attaining high Outside school, Adolf continued : games. At home, however, the rement in June 1895 after forty in order to devote himself to his e home more than ever before; the ancial liability, the children - now - trying his nerves. When Alois Jr of his father, Adolf became, apart usehold and more directly exposed

and the family moved to temporary of Lambach, moving house within oling, now in Lambach, continued rs, though he later claimed that he idle'.⁷⁰ At this time Adolf also went : singing lessons - probably at the oral singing. According to his later esiaistical splendour and looked up irable ideal.⁷¹ ess soul. The Hitlers had moved

house several times within Braunau during the lengthy stay there, and had subsequently been uprooted on a number of occasions. In November 1898, a final move for Alois took place when he bought a house with a small plot of attached land in Leonding, a village on the outskirts of Linz. From now on, the family settled in the Linz area, and Adolf - down to his days in the bunker in 1945 - looked upon Linz as his home town.⁷² Linz reminded him of the happy, carefree days of his youth.⁷³ It held associations with his mother. And it was the most 'German' town of the Austrian Empire. It evidently symbolized for him the provincial small-town Germanic idyll - the image he would throughout his life set against the city he would soon come to know, and detest: Vienna. In the 1940s he would speak repeatedly of making Linz the cultural counterweight to Vienna, and the most beautiful city on the Danube. He would pour vast sums into the town's reconstruction. With the Red Army at his portals, he was still poring over the model constructed by his architect, Hermann Giesler, of the city of his youth, where he had intended to spend his last days and lie buried.⁷⁴

Adolf was now in his third elementary school. He seems to have established himself rapidly with a new set of schoolmates, and became 'a little ring-leader'⁷⁵ in the game of cops and robbers which the village boys played in the woods and fields around their homes.⁷⁶ War games were a particular favourite.⁷⁷ Adolf himself was thrilled by an illustrated history of the Franco-Prussian war, which he had come across at home.⁷⁸ And once the Boer War broke out, the games revolved around the heroic exploits of the Boers, whom the village boys fervently supported.⁷⁹ About this same time, Adolf became gripped by the adventure stories of Karl May, whose popular tales of the Wild West and Indian wars (though May had never been to America) enthralled thousands of youngsters. Most of these youngsters graduated from the Karl May adventures and the childhood fantasies they fostered as they grew up. For Adolf, however, the fascination with Karl May never faded.⁸⁰ As Reich Chancellor he still read the May stories, recommending them, too, to his generals, whom he accused of lacking imagination.⁸¹

Adolf later referred to 'this happy time', when 'school work was ridiculously easy, leaving me so much free time that the sun saw more of me than my room', when 'meadows and woods were then the battleground on which the ever-present "antagonisms"' - the growing conflict with his father - 'came to a head'.⁸²

In 1900, however, the carefree days were drawing to a close. And just around the time when important decisions had to be made about Adolf's future, and the secondary education path he should follow, the Hitler family

the growing expectation to leave
[1898] *
1944
attach larger forces
we offer one.
we withdraw, face to face with us,

* He carries them over to his war games.
* Gives examples of how
Stratford defeats the enemy
in the climactic swim. He
knows his superiority and he
used it as the defining element in
the contest.
Are you all afraid to ask about our
superiority? No, it is our
philosophy. Our confidence, that we are not only
winning but in the eyes of providence deserve to
win. So, let us be bold. let us

March 1945, Speer was deeply shocked when Hitler ordered the destruction of all factories, plants, bridges, and the like before the retreating German lines in the west. But Speer also recorded his impression that by the end of March Hitler no longer seemed to insist on that. What he insisted on, till the very end, was that the Allies wanted to destroy the German people.*

IN A MOST TRENCANT (though, alas, seldom sufficiently contemplated) short chapter—"Some Characteristics of Historians in Democratic Times"—in the second volume of *Democracy in America* Tocqueville made some very important statements about the problems of history in the then coming mass democratic age. Among other matters, he suggested that, contrary to expectations at first sight, a proper reconstruction of the history of peoples will be a more difficult task than the reconstruction of history at the time of aristocratic societies. Despite the increasing openness of all kinds of archives during the last one hundred years, this has proved true. Of course, it is a mistake to believe that the phenomenon—as we shall soon see, imprecisely so named—of public opinion became a factor not only during the last century or two. It has played a role from the beginning of history. As Pascal wrote in his *Pensées*: "Opinion" is after all "the queen of the world." But it is also true that the evolution of modern history toward democracy (and by this I do not only mean the evolution of universal education but the evolution of consciousness), what may be called "the structure of events" has undergone changes, by which I mean an increasing intrusion of mind into matter. Contrary not only to Marx but also to Adam Smith and, indeed, to all materialist philosophies, it is at least

*An interesting observation by Klaus-Dietmar Henke, *Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands*, M, 1995, p. 308. Allied propaganda was directed against Nazism and militarism, not against the German people. "It is remarkable that Hitler was personally and accurately concerned with this, and that he wanted to falsify the expressed intentions of the Allies. In February 1945 he looked over the text of a speech by Hermann Esser which he changed only in one way. Each time Esser wrote that in Yalta 'the destruction of National Socialism' had been decided, [Hitler] changed the wording into 'destruction of the German people.'"

** Deeds are the king. It is the actions of men and not their sentiments that make history.*

arguable that what matters primarily in the events of the world is not belief; and that the very matter is the consequence of that. And as, for example, to "market" Hitler's dependence on the German people he was wholly aware, and with a certain degree of freedom—perhaps both of the degree of dependence in the cases of Cro and of Mussolini and Stalin.

But there are peculiar problems with the modern "sample research" are relatively new (the United States in 1935)—and, alas, seldom considered a trend away from political to social German historians after 1965—more important, descriptions of German people during the their relationship to Hitler, of insightful passages in the memoirs of participant observers; but systematic appeared only during the last two decades. Authors have been aware of the many of the most valuable of the German people had come to power,† few of them thereafter and during the war.

*A few examples. Thomas Childers, Jürgen W. Falter, *Hitlers Wähler* (M, 1995), Ian Kershaw, *Hitler: The Rise and Fall* (M, 1995), and his pioneer study *The Third Reich, Bavaria 1933-1945* (M, 1995), especially insightful J. P. Stern, *Hitler: The Secret Ruler* (M, 1995); important Steinert, *ST/HK/D*; there are

†In addition to many of the excellent studies on the Weimar Republic (Bracher, for example), attitudes may be found in 1933: W. Brodersen, Humann, v. Paczensky, eds. *1933: Fünfzig Jahre danach* (M, 1983).

visit to Paris at dawn, he spent a few moments contemplating Napoleon's tomb in the Invalides; and in December 1940 he ordered that the coffin of Napoleon's son be brought from Vienna to a wintry Paris, to be deposited next to that of his father—a gesture that evoked little reaction among the French people. To this we may add that a contemptuous dislike for France and the French marked Hitler's thinking from his earliest years.*

There were grave differences between Napoleon's and Hitler's personalities and temperaments. Unscrupulous cruelty—of a calculating Machiavellian and Mediterranean kind—marked what was probably the worst element in the mental habits of the former; hatred—and the cultivation of unbridled hatreds—was perhaps the worst element in the latter. It is at least arguable that Napoleon, that supreme egoist, was more confident—and often more optimistic—than was Hitler.† Another difference between the two lies in their attitudes toward the past. In that sense Napoleon was much less revolutionary than was Hitler. One attractive—and surprisingly human—facet of Napoleon's personality was his hereditary and family feeling, his 1810 inclination to settle down with a family, for his affection for Marie Louise and his love for his son amounted to more than the calculated purpose of consolidating his power through a grand

*A book remains to be written about Hitler's expressed views of other nations and nationalities, which were in many instances varied or changing rather than constant and uniform. There is, for example, place for a serious study of his attitude toward Britain and the British people, which was more complicated than the sometimes overused cliché of a love-hate relationship. However, what is striking is the evidence of Hitler's hatefulness toward people who dared to oppose or defy him. Thus his occasional expressions of respect or even admiration for the people disappeared and gave way to expressions of a contemptuous hatred as the war went on and neared its end. Not dissimilar was his treatment of Poland and the Poles, about whom he uttered few disparaging remarks before 1939 but whose defiance—leading to the outbreak of the war in 1939—made him impose cruelties on them unparalleled anywhere except in his treatment of Jews. We find nothing similar in the reactions of Napoleon or even Stalin, who on occasion showed some respect for the bravery of his opponents.

†Fest in *F*, p. 309, is convincing that Hitler's "entire intellectual and emotional system" seemed to have been dominated by a fundamental element of "Angst" [*Angsterlebnis*]. This, among other matters, also differentiates Hitler from the young Mussolini, who resembled the early Bonaparte rather than Hitler.

dynastic marriage. There was often maligned word) side of At his most grandiose, Napoleon at his coronation in 1804; Hitler had none (except perhaps There is, too, the contrast marshals were bloodhounds hold them back, whereas Hitler and drive his generals forward

More significantly, Napoleon third force between Revolution downfall: "After me, the Reich formed it—will resume its course the marker is removed, and left off."† Hitler's vision was once there would be no return fifty or a hundred years, a re

Again, I must insist (for biography of Hitler; but I place in history. And it is in ups and downs of Napoleon per. Most of the substantial Napoleon were written and published whereas we have seen that it began to appear within a day many of the great artists expected Napoleon (Beethoven a time); this does not apply Hamsun or Ezra Pound or prominent Englishmen who

*On one occasion in 1940 Hitler impose his victorious peace treaty the European state system that he

†Cited by Mathieu Molé in *France*; also by François Furet pp. 260–70.

* D.T. Yes, and it was the heart of it in which to work.

Misc.

He also wrote or dictated many weekly articles (especially between 1928 and 1931) for his party newspaper (the *Illustrierte Beobachter*); their importance was first noted and evaluated by Deuerlein and then by Zitelmann.

But his secretiveness is only one element within the larger issue. We shall never know everything (and perhaps we shall never know enough) about him. That is not a reason for despair. It is not given to human beings to know everything—as Kierkegaard said, the pure truth is for God alone; what is given to us is the pursuit of truth.* As a matter of fact—or, rather, condition—the understanding of the limits of our knowledge, instead of impoverishing us, may actually enrich us. Or, as Pascal said, we understand more than we know, which is not a paradox; it suggests that it is not necessarily the amassing of knowledge that eventually leads to understanding but that understanding may actually precede the accumulation of knowledge. On the first page of this book I wrote that the purpose of historical knowledge may be understanding, even more than accuracy—though of course not deliberately at the expense of the latter—and a recognition of this condition may be even more applicable to the analysis and description of historical “problems” than of “periods.”

And Hitler Was, Is and Remains a Problem. Everything has its history, including memory: fluctuating and fallible human memory that may be obscured or clarified by distance, strengthened or weakened by perspective. It is not only the tremendous accumulation of materials, research, and writings about Hitler but a certain perspective that allows me to make a shocking statement: He may have been the most popular revolutionary leader in the history of the modern world. The emphasis is on the word *popular*, because Hitler belongs to the democratic, not the aristocratic, age of history. He is not properly comparable to a Caesar, a Cromwell, a Napoleon. Utterly different from them, he was, more than any of them, able to ener-

gize the majority of a great people of the world, convincing them of his astonishing achievements and making them believe that what they were doing was not evil. He led them to a prosperity and power with which they could not have imagined German hegemony soon after the First Reich, which was to have lasted for centuries yet he had an enormous influence in this century than any other leader. That is why his place in the history of the world is the main subject of this book and not the time to come. We are not

*Here again is the profound Heer in *HR*, p. 11: “In the heart of every human person there remains something that no human being—not even that person himself—may entirely grasp, discover, or unravel. That untouchableness of his deepest kernel Adolf Hitler shares with every other human being.”

D.T. ~~So~~ In his case, I am that kernel.

①

1898,

1914-19

~~1899~~

Geyl wrote in his preface in
impelled to cite in detail:

er with Napoleon," so, lis-
ay, I heard that Winston
ouse of Commons, only to
er upon the comparison all
and so it is with me. It is
The resemblances are too
to state this with unmis-
ne contrasts, are such that,
had hated the dictator in
sence of Hitler began dark-
as if one should ask the
ng his name in one breath
ot want to say that French
mer stuff than German: the
French civilization, albeit
accompanied the conquest,
that it has been the lot of
mpatible with any civiliza-
Napoleon—indeed, when
son on that score, I sud-
st [his] "detractors" with
on quite friendly terms.

ing up Napoleon's tyranny

ies? The worst that our
o parallel in Napoleon's

ered Moscow and Hitler did not;
after having crossed the Russian
Hitler's mechanized armies five
in Russia, after which his armies
Napoleon suffered a catastrophe
is.

system. Indeed that system remained true, from first to last,
to conceptions of civil equality and human rights with which
the oppression or extermination of a group, not on account
of acts or even of opinions, but of birth and blood, would
have been utterly incompatible. And yet methods of com-
pulsion and atrocities are inseparable from the character of
the dictator and conqueror, and we shall see that Napoleon
incurred bitter reproaches, at home and abroad, for some of
his acts. Nevertheless this is one of the points where the
comparison is bound to do good for his reputation. What is
the proscription of "the general staff of the Jacobins" beside
the annihilation of all opposition parties in jails or concen-
tration camps such as has taken place in the Third Reich?
What is the murder of the Duke of Enghien beside those of
Dollfuss, of General Schleicher and his wife, and of so many
others on June 30th 1934? What are the executions of Palm,
of Hofer, what are even the severities with which so many
villages and towns in Germany and Spain were visited,
beside what in our time all occupied territories have had to
suffer from Hitler's armies? The French police were hated
and feared in the occupied and annexed territories, but
when one reads about their conduct with a mind full of pres-
ent experiences, one cannot help feeling astonished at the
restraints and resistances they still met within the stubborn
notions of law and in the mild manners of a humane age.

Written in October 1944, this still rings true. But now allow me
to continue this comparison a little further. It may be of some
interest to note that throughout his life, Hitler made very few refer-
ences to Napoleon.* In June 1940, during his fast and almost furtive

*A strange coincidence not noted by other historians: It was in Hitler's birth-
place, Braunau, that in 1810 Napoleon's new bride, the Archduchess Marie Louise,
was festively transferred from her Austrian to her French entourage. During
his campaigns against Austria in 1805 and again in 1809, Napoleon spent the night
in that frontier town—in the same Haus Schüdl (and presumably in the same
second-story rooms) where seventy years later Hitler's father came to live. (It is a
well-proportioned building on the south side of the large market square.)

1898
*
family
love
for
young
Hitler

* D. T. I did not have to do a
thing here. He believed that the
spiritual power of Napoleon had been
left w him. One of his most
private secrets. Use it all thru
the war. (1914-19)

1929, 33, 38, 44

(3)

er 1934: "In Germany bayo-
government is supported by
I have not been imposed by
ple I have grown up, in the
return. My pride is that I
with greater right than I can
ne."* Fest's insight is consid-
ish a tyranny [Gewaltherr-
er is insufficient to explain
be studied as [yet] another
een that Hitler himself said
wish to be one. Kershaw
"To suggest that Hitler's
aving aside difficulties with
te only a partial truth."† In
on that at least until 1938
but an authoritarian state,
orships in the Europe of the

racy—and that Hitler's vision of history and of the future entailed a radical break with the institutions of the Modern Age. He would have agreed with Tocqueville on one thing: that the age of democracy was now irreversible. One hundred years before Hitler's assumption of power, Tocqueville projected a new kind of tyranny, peculiar to the democratic age: the tyranny of a majority. What was perhaps peculiar to Hitler was his establishment of a tyranny not so much of but through a majority.* "The state"—i.e., state interests, the security of the state—was a sacrosanct term in the modern world, even in Stalin's Soviet Russia, at the latest by 1939.† But already in *Mein Kampf*, Hitler had written that "the state is but a means to the end" ["Der Staat ist ein Mittel zum Zweck"]. And—with all of the compromises he had to make for the sake of the state—he remained consistent about this priority till the end. In March 1929, he said: "For us the idea of the Volk is higher than the idea of the state." On 10 May 1933: "It is not an accident that religions are more stable than forms of states." On 6 April 1938, he put it tersely in a speech in Salzburg: "In the beginning was the Volk, and only then came the Reich." Or, in his significant speech to officers in the Platterhof in May 1944: "The state is only an enforced framework" [eine Zwangsform].‡ On 5 September 1934, in Nuremberg:

*Zitelmann (ZIT/B, p. 85) cites Haffner: In 1933, among the German majority there existed a widespread feeling of freedom, of being "relieved of [parliamentary] democracy." He adds: "Hopes for a revival of national greatness were joined with utopian aspirations for a better, more socially minded society. It may sound paradoxical: but the end of [parliamentary] democracy seemed to mean to many the beginning of true popular rule."

†The term *the state*, originally anathema not only to Marx but also to Lenin, had become sacrosanct in the Soviet Union by 1939. (It may even be argued that Stalin's 1936–39 purges signified in large part the transformation of a party bureaucracy into a state bureaucracy.) In any event, Stalin (who, the very opposite of Lenin, was not a revolutionary but a statesman) discovered the supreme importance of the state at the very time when Hitler found that supreme importance to be outdated—another example of the backwardness of Stalin's Communism compared with Hitler's National Socialism.

‡Jäckel (JHW, p. 99) also cites МК: "The question of the external structure of the state . . . is not of principal importance, it only serves certain practical purposes." Haffner (HF/AN, p. 86) goes further—in my opinion, correctly—recognizing the significance that "in Hitler's political system the state plays an entirely subordinate part."

urse, a difference between
s; between, say, Hitler's on
or Pilsudski's or Metaxas's
than one of nuances. Most
tain total control over per-
attention on *the state*, we
tes Hitler's vision—and his
emporary dictators, including

it, was a creation of the
renaissance Italy and then
ears ago; in an age marked
narchy, aristocracy, democ-

1945 He, who was obsessed with the influence of Jews on Roosevelt and Churchill, knew that Jews had no influence on Stalin; that, indeed, Stalin was an anti-Semite of sorts. Great Russian nationalism, and—perhaps—pan-Slavism made Stalin and Russia formidable. Near the end, in 1945, he even ruminated whether he should have attacked Russia at all; and that a nationalist Russia, purged of Jews, might be the greatest danger yet.

WE NOW COME TO THE last year of the war and the last year of Hitler's life. Now the necessity of adjusting his ideas to circumstances, of subordinating what remained of his military strategy to what he thought were the requirements of statesmanship, had become absolute. Military and political decisions, and their purposes, are of course never entirely separable. This Hitler knew very well. Yet it is possible for a historian to list their respective evidence

1944
1945 of danger to Moscow in the winter of 1941 in which he saw something similar to [his own] situation. [This in 1945.] On other, earlier occasions he said, half-jokingly, that in the event of a victory over Russia the best thing would be to entrust Stalin with the administration of that country, naturally under German supremacy, for Stalin would be the best man for that. All in all, he saw in Stalin something like a colleague. As late as July 1944 (SP, p. 399), Hitler speculated that Stalin might have been right in the purges; perhaps the Moscow process against General Tukhachevsky was not a fake. Zitelmann in ZIT/A, p. 161: "The thesis spread by propaganda [it was not only spread by propaganda but expressed by Hitler on occasion] that 'the issue was the defeat of Jewish Bolshevism Hitler did not himself believe'; he had concluded that Stalin pursued 'a national-Russian policy, having freed himself from the Jewish influence through his purges.' Yet the same Hitler, on 8 November 1941, in one of his public speeches (Heer, HR, p. 384): Stalin is 'nothing else . . . but an instrument in the hands of an all-powerful Jewry', behind him stand Kaganovich 'and all those Jews who are [leading] that powerful state.'"

1945 CH/B, 26 February 1945: "The brutal manner in which [Stalin] decapitated the Jewish intelligentsia, who had rendered him such signal service in the destruction of Tsarist Russia, encouraged me. . . ." Also: "That Stalinist empire which, in all its essentials is only the spiritual successor to the empire of Peter the Great." 2 April 1945: "It is possible that under the pressure of events, the Russians will rid themselves completely of Jewish Marxism, only to reincarnate Pan-Slavism in its most fierce and ferocious form."

separately, while recognizing the same: to bring about a

Hitler's phrase in July battle at Kursk, is telling as a giant torch ("ein I flame, demonstrating to be invincible, that it was still counter-Stalingrad. The Russia and Italy were in defense and invincibility remarkable how, in early German retreat from France the Allies' attempt to create preparations for a great denouement.† He knew, in a situation, that the great running out of steam, and thrust into Germany pre the great winter offensive perhaps even all of Belgium not Paris but Antwerp) but and British armies in Montgomery's army into a sea to stun the Americans to see

*He was, of course, impressed by the production. From 1942 to 1944 support [Hitler's] thesis that the noses and anxieties may be too

†Carr (C, p. 105; also Schra general on 31 August 1944: "I shall not let an opportunity pass. The time will come when the spite of everything the rupture will come, but you must await the moment to continue to fight until there is no more. . . . Whatever happens we: Great said, 'one of our damned

(2)

1943 (44) 46

in 1944-45 that Hitler
wal in northern Norway,
a that subarctic vacuum
nland would bump into
the German withdrawal
ehind to both the Roy-
munist guerrillas, hoping
war. (Hitler thought—
Bulgaria to Thrace and
the increasingly obvious
iders to give up fighting
still bitterly fighting the
demnation from Hitler,
hem. In any event, it was

sodes were the political
44 and 1945 to split the
onographic articles and
m policy of that period
as been devoted to it by
dence is interesting. In
und at least on one occa-
o Hitler the advisability
re Reich's enemies; but
nced as he was not only
move before some re-
front or another. Thus,
s Stalin's dissatisfaction

land and the German Resistance to
dispatch by Dulles to Wash-
(NA. RG. 226. OSS Entry
tly and without formality in
Germans. . . . If we do noth-
committee may monopolize
alles have at least indirectly
theory after the war.

with his Anglo-American allies was appreciable, and when for about
three months there was a lull of fighting along almost the entire
German-Russian front line), Hitler forbade the further develop-
ment of a—perhaps—promising contact between German and Rus-
sian agents in Stockholm.* (Whether that was a great opportunity
missed is debatable. There are indications that Stalin permitted such
a—not entirely secretive—contact to impress—that is, blackmail—
his Western allies: a tactic not unlike Hitler's "message" to London
via Burckhardt in August 1939.)

But in 1944 there was a new development. Heinrich Himmler
himself, and officials of the SS, were establishing contacts with
Jewish organizations and, through them, indirectly with American
ones. Note that by that time Himmler had become the most power-
ful personage in the hierarchy of the Third Reich. (In the winter of
1944-45 Hitler also appointed him to a high military command.)
Yet it was Himmler, the director of the extermination of masses of
Jews and others, for whom "Staatsräson" (another German word for
Realpolitik) now had risen above the categorical dictates of National
Socialist ideology. The negotiations of his agents (including Eich-
mann) with certain Jewish persons in Budapest had but one aim: to
engage in some contact with Americans and make that fact known
to Allied intelligence, including that of the Russians. The British
knew what this was about. They were unimpressed with some of the
Jewish agents whom the SS had permitted to travel to Turkey in
June 1944, and arrested them. Yet Himmler was able to arrive at a
clandestine agreement with a representative of Roosevelt's Refugee
Board in Switzerland in September 1944; and a month later he
ordered the ending of the gassings at Auschwitz. Near the end, in
April 1945, he himself negotiated with Jewish representatives from
Switzerland and Sweden, with a former Swiss president, and with
the Swedish prince Bernadotte. On 25 April 1945, he broke with
Hitler, offering capitulation to the Western Allies. Of course there

*Fest exaggerates this possibility. F, p. 948: "In December 1942 and once more
in the summer of 1943 [in reality, the most significant contacts were suggested in
September], the Soviet Union through its representation in Stockholm made
known its willingness to negotiate with Hitler about a separate peace."

* To my surprise, the O.C. told me to
block all efforts to move Hitler in
this direction.

1943

*

1944-45

(7)

1935
1944

oldiers, workers, and
d lower-middle-class
o Hitler. All of those
re creation of a new
ng his original ideas,
he movement which
asses of the cities."
th century who had
entieth century have
ry and the land. The
Socialist propaganda
agriculture. Heiden,
city people. . . , "† to
id began to appeal to
928, during the great
23), Hitler said: "For
l than an economic
ecome free, it needs
d once again hate."
s, he projected them
nalism and racism.‡
testerton knew when
and particular, it is

but was there anything new in that? The principle of the triumph of the Tough over the Weak goes back even beyond Machiavelli, perhaps to Cain and Abel themselves.* Hitler understood that people respond to—indeed, that they will respect—the realities of power.† Moreover, unlike many Social Darwinists, Hitler was not a materialist, convinced as he was of the power of ideas.

He was an extreme nationalist—perhaps the most extreme nationalist of all the principal figures of the twentieth century. And while nationalism is atavistically human, deeper, and stronger than class consciousness, the trouble is not only its latent inhumanity but the—perhaps surprising—abstractness of its assumption about human nature itself. "Love of the people": but who *are* the people? Nationalism is both self-centered and selfish, because human love is not the love of oneself, it is the love of *another*. Patriotism is traditional and not merely biological, because charitable love is human and not merely "natural." Nature has—and shows—no charity.‡ That Hitler believed. He also believed that charity does not have a function in the history of mankind. Whether that amounted to his belief in Social Darwinism is arguable. What is not questionable is that his hatred for his opponents was both stronger and less abstract than was his love for his people.** That was (and remains) a distinguishing mark of the mind of every extreme nationalist.

1935
Rohm

ist" designations ex-
ival of the Strongest,

*Zitelmann—as well as others—overemphasized Hitler's Social Darwinism. Hitler often made references to Marx but seldom, if ever, to Darwin.

†In February 1924, before the court: "The psyche of the people is such that it respects the existence of power, first of all." (ZIT/A, p. 47.)

‡It is therefore that the dignity of human life must proceed from a denial of Darwinism, and from the recognition that, no matter how biologically small, there is an essential difference between human beings and all other living beings. Both Christianity and Western civilization are humanist in that sense, in the sense of their requisite denial of the survival of the fittest as a principle governing humanity.

**And yet consider: Hatred is a *human* inclination, as is love. Just as human love is something more and different from an animal's instinctive affections, hatred in humans is something different from the "red tooth and claw" of nature. And while human love is always a love for another, human hate is inevitably self-centered; for we often hate in others something that we hate in ourselves. (That, too, is true less of racism than it is of nationalism.) And what did Hitler hate in himself? That is a secret that he died without divulging.

Survival of the fittest destroys the potentiality of the weak

arity (or, more precisely,
pressions. (Churchill was
e also Hitler's speech in
our Western opponents
... I do not suffer in the
) His remarks (9 January
w: Chancellery, cited by
e the self-respect of each
r, to the contrary we are
Hitler's gigantic buildings

It is mediocrity
My strength is also my lead to
mediocrity. D.T. This too, I had to
succumb to the struggle 1948

Often it is the head of the secret of his foreign opponents better. It was thus that Fouché negotiated in the end; thus, too, he attempted to arrive at wide-
gton.

of Himmler and the SS were, in—
—but not all of them against his difficult scene, in February 1945, upon such dealings; but a few days after that single instance, there were criticisms of Himmler because of the plenty of jealous enemies in his own circle.* The aim, for example, in the enemy coalition. That the man Himmler is unquestionable.
id.

of some kind of accommodation and Goebbels were partisans of the occasion Ribbentrop even offered lightly, rejected the idea, saying that Hess, flying to Scotland, had in February 1945 he allowed Ribbentrop (and others) to send a memorandum in a "Sprachregelung," permitting contact with Western counterparts to facilitate penetration into Germany and to avert the gravest danger to the world. Such attempts would be successful; a natural alliance between America and Germany—though no longer necessarily

within the SS. (About this see also the fact that makes too much of Himmler's conviction, wrongly—that Himmler received Hitler with the purpose of eventually

①

because of him.* Neither his strategy nor his statesmanship was of much further use. In this respect his face-to-face talk with Speer on 28 March may be telling. He knew that the war was lost. But he grabbed Speer's arm and, with tears in his eyes, implored him: "If you still believe that the war could still be won, if you could at least believe that, all would be well."† Belief still mattered—in fact, it was the only thing that mattered. It could no longer be adjusted to conditions. It was the only condition left. That was no longer the mark of a realistic idealist; it was the admission of the defeat of his determinist idealism.

Eight days before his suicide, when he had decided to stay in a Berlin encircled by the Russians, he said to Jodl: "I should already have made this decision, the most important in my life, in November 1944, and should have never left the headquarters in East Prussia." That could have achieved two things. One: Hitler the *Feldherr* would have died in battle, on the front, at the head of his battered armies, on the eastern frontier of the Reich, breasting the Asiatic flood—an act that might have had incalculable symbolic

*Goebbels diaries, citing Hitler, 22 March 1945: "The enemy coalition will break up in any circumstance; the question is only whether it breaks up before we are beaten down, or only after that." 28 March 1945: "Sometimes one had the impression that he [Hitler] lives in the clouds. But so often he has come down to earth like a *deus ex machina*. He is as convinced as before that the political crisis in the enemy camp is a justification for our greatest hopes." Speer, *SP*, p. 433: "In February and March 1945 Hitler suggested on occasion that he has allowed contacts with the enemy in different ways, yet without explaining any of them."

†Speer's account in *SP*, pp. 457–58. Irving's account (*I/H*, p. 785) is predictably condemnatory of Speer. Contrary to Haffner, who thinks that Hitler's Scorched Earth order (to destroy all installations in the German cities and towns before and during the retreat of the army) was not only categorical but unalterable and the definite evidence of Hitler's criminal intent. Speer, *SP*, p. 461: "I think that now it was clear to Hitler that parts of his destruction orders will no longer be fulfilled." Yet the same Hitler still wished to instill faith in his people. Irving (*I/H*, p. 768) cites Hitler to Kaltenbrunner in late February 1945 (after the architect Giesler had come to show Hitler his model of Linz): "My dear Kaltenbrunner, do you imagine I could talk like this about my plans for the future if I did not believe deep down that we really are going to win this war in the end?" (As often with Irving, no source is given, but perhaps it is not implausible.) Also Hitler to Speer, a fortnight after that 28 March confrontation, at the news of Roosevelt's death (*SP*, p. 467): "Here! Read it! You did not believe it! . . . The war is not lost. . . ."

1944 1945

1945

Scene

1944

Calder
April 12

1945

1943
1944

iders to hold this measure for
r."

no written directive ought to
res meant,† and he also knew
ple throughout the world—
ns throughout his career, the
ain) a state secret. There is
effect.‡

else. The mass extermination

p. 21. It corresponds with Goeb-
it the Jewish problem. The Führer
sttag had come true, that if Jewry
would end that with the extermi-
the Jews must pay the bill; in Ger-
future they will have to pay more.
so they will have to pay sooner or
n to laugh in the future. . . . And
sures against Jewry." On that day,
he compulsory wearing of yellow

ers that Hitler's unwillingness to
Berlin in November 1941 may
maining American journalists in
sion to proceed to extermination
ed all hope of a negotiated peace
ting America from joining the
offensive before Moscow. I think
e: the first gassing of Polish Jews

had to eliminate [entfernen] the
I you not have done this more
ve been more complicated—or

lan was ghettoization, but then
: "head of the state . . . this dark
not as a state secret than was the
ler did exist—if only because it
oath to preserve life.) Fleming,
a program," Hitler ordered that
nces be seen to be active in this
: "Final Solution" of the Jewish

of Jews was a state secret of the Reich, not to be admitted to the out-
side world or even to the German people at large. But it was also
Hitler's own secret—a secret at least to the extent that he pushed
that knowledge away from himself. He surely did not want to know
anything about its details. There are three kinds of evidence for this.
One consists of his repeated statements that the Jewish "problem"
must be looked at and dealt with in "cool, scientific" ways.* Another
was his refusal to admit—not only to foreign visitors whom he
accused of not being severe enough with their Jews but also to
people close to him—that the aim of the concentration of the Jews
into camps in the east was something other than deportation, and
their being forced to work.† Finally, and most significantly, there

question was a 'masterpiece of concealment.' (FL, p. 61, calls it "Hitler's Cun-
ning," perhaps not the best term.) Deuerlein, b, p. 152: "Hitler did not talk about
everything . . . including the so-called Final Solution. . . . He was not a murderer in
the sense of criminal justice; he did not murder or kill anyone; but he was still the
author and the cause of all of the murders committed by members of the German
people." Finally, there was Bormann's confidential instruction from the chancery
on 11 July 1943: The words "Final Solution" must not be mentioned, not even the
term "Special Treatment" [Sonderbehandlung]; only references to Jews sent to work
are allowed.

1943

*As late as in his speech of 30 January 1944: He hopes that "other nations too
will become acquainted with the elements of a scientific understanding and
objective solution of the [Jewish] question." (Also in 1944, cited by Heer, HR,
pp. 446-47: "England too may shake herself and get rid of the Jewish bacteria in
the last minute.")

†Throughout the war, Hitler kept speaking of Jews being deported eastward to
work. On 17 July 1941 to the Croat Kvaternik: "where the Jews are sent, to Siberia
or Madagascar, is the same for him." As late as July 1942, he still talked to his circle
about Madagascar—and about Siberia too. When he berated the Hungarian
Regent Horthy in April 1943 for not being tough about Hungarian Jews, Horthy
responded, plaintively, that he could not simply beat them to death—whereupon
Hitler said something about Jews being "bacilli," while Ribbentrop declared that
they "would either have to be annihilated or put into concentration camps: there
were no other alternatives." Goebbels in his diary of 27 March 1942 wrote of "a
fairly barbaric procedure that cannot be precisely described: how many Jews will be
left over. Roughly speaking about 60 percent liquidated, 40 percent in labor detach-
ments." In 1944, Hitler asked Horthy for 100,000 Jews to work in German facto-
ries. Speer confirmed to Fleming (in a letter in 1981, FL, p. 161, note 12) that Hitler
wanted Speer to gather Hungarian Jews for the construction of large underground

1943

1944

that liquidation
not

(1944) ①
1945
prisoners of war near the end of the war: Not more than 9 percent were convinced anti-Nazis, 15 percent were passive anti-Nazis.* We must of course consider the cohesion of soldiers in camps run by an enemy; and there is much evidence that within Germany, after mid-January 1945, the belief in National Socialism was eroding. Then, and only then, began the erosion of trust in Hitler, too. But even then it was not an overall development.

The mass of the German people admired, and perhaps even loved, Hitler, while they did not necessarily admire or love National Socialism and the party. We must, perhaps for the last time, observe this distinction—keeping in mind, too, the limitations of such a categorical statement, for there were overlappings and split-mindedness at work, too. The German people believed in Hitler. Or: they put their faith in him. This may not be excusable. But it was understandable. It had much to do not only with his startling successes, with his elevation of German prestige in the world, but with the national prosperity he achieved soon after his assumption of power. "Hitler," wrote Hans Frank from prison, "had become the leading principle of all the nation's deeds and hopes. . . . [But] about the party, the bureaucracy, the ss and many other things the people had many reservations [Sehr ablehnend] . . . 'Der Führer,' 'der Hitler,' was the exception. Quite popular were such expressions as: 'The Führer does not know about that!' or: 'The Führer will get into this!' Or: 'The good Führer, how he is being misused!'"† Written shortly before his execution—note Frank's title, "Within Sight of the Gallows"—he saw in this the very obverse of a poverty in the national imagination; rather, it was a sentimental German kind of faith, and, indeed, touched by a primitive loyalty. His pages,

*Lothar Kettenacker, "Sozialpsychologische Aspekte der Führerherrschaft," in *Der Führerstaat: Mythos und Realität*, s, 1981, p. 107. Henke, p. 806: At the end of 1944, 40 percent of German prisoners of war still believed in a German victory; in the first months of 1945, 44 percent, but in early March only 11 percent. (Yet a belief in a German victory was not necessarily identical to loyalty to National Socialism or even to Hitler.)

†Frank, pp. 260–61. Another high official, Otto Dietrich, Hitler's press secretary, in *Hitler* (Chicago, 1955), "The majority of the German people had put their trust in a single man, had revered him like a saint and loved him as a father. This man then led them into the greatest catastrophe of their history."

1945
* D.T.
* D.T. as a father and a god. With Hitler's fall so was the Dummhoff we gravely lowered. The human god, the Führer had failed. The divine god had been unable to prevent the concentration camps. How much could the D.K. salvage from this?

state, it was a Führer state. . . .
ted virtually the entire nation
lished in less than ten years!
sole not by demagogy but by
ian Haffner, a liberal conserva-
lectual reputation. And Hans
he Party Congress in 1938 was
people. . . . Above everything
blessing, bewitching, touching
al images in the memory of a
ignore other such evidence of
stically high German marriage
with the extraordinary drop in

German people, after so many
e reacted to Hitler's pact with
sentiments of admiration—by
nd relieved. Thereafter, during
ent sometimes lagged behind
of him—as in the summer of
ted an impatience among the
England: "Wann geht es los?"

loved him rather than feared
under Stalin.) "Under Hitler
ted, or revolted as they might
had had to take him away from
it had bound them to [him] for
e as September 1944, a call for
and sixteen-year-olds) in the
the Palatinate) resulted in 96
es a British survey of German

164.

elmut Krausnick, who wrote that in
into the war with a "reluctant loyalty

This may be put too simply.

well that I had
the O.P. but the
also loved him

consequences for future German generations. Two: Such an end of the Third Reich, in late 1944, must have meant the flooding of most of Germany by the Americans and the British, a great swirling confusion of Anglo-Saxon and German armies, the former wending their way eastward in the midst of a still largely intact German army and a still largely intact German people, eventually meeting the suspicious Russians somewhere in eastern Germany, Anglo-Saxons as well as Russians attempting, first nervously, then more and more determinedly, to get the Germans on their side during a developing confrontation. Schramm quotes Jodl further: "He should have fallen in battle rather than taking flight in death, it is said. He wanted to, and he would have done so if he had been physically able. As it was, he did not choose the easier death, but the more certain one. He acted as all heroes in history have acted and will always act. He had himself buried in the ruins of his Reich and his hopes. May whoever wish to condemn him for it do so—I cannot."*

With all respect to the forthright quality of Jodl's loyalty: did Hitler really "not choose the easier death"? This is debatable. More important: was he a hero? This is perhaps not a matter left for historians to debate. The moral dimensions of that epithet are more important, greater than that. Let me say only that he was bereft of the nobility that the word *hero* implies, as imply it must. His mind and his willpower were extraordinary: but mind and willpower alone do not a hero make.

*Schramm, *SCB*, pp. 180-81. Also Haffner's discussion of Hitler's last days (*HFAI*, p. 234): "We have no proof that Hitler actually continued to believe in final victory up to the very end." A similar duality in Maser (*M/A*, pp. 426, 428): He no longer believed in victory but "to postpone his own end . . . was an awesome crime." Bullock's judgments are unduly simplistic (*bu*, p. 397): "... and in the last years of his life he was cut off from all human contact and lost in a world of inhuman fantasy"; also *bu*, pp. 783, 797: "All the grandiloquent talk of dying in Berlin cannot disguise the fact that this petulant (?) decision was a gross dereliction of his duty to the troops still fighting under his command and an action wholly at variance with the most elementary military tradition." And: "His death was anything but a hero's end; by committing suicide he deliberately abandoned his responsibilities and took a way out which in earlier years he had strongly condemned as a coward's." (No: Hitler angrily condemned General Paulus for *not* having committed suicide at the end of Stalingrad.)

Even so, there remained some in Hitler's last testament, where as his successor as Reich president.* Doenitz, who was not a nationalist conservative, would I naturally inclined to seek some kin Allies; Goebbels, on the other his believer and spokesman for a de- like balance, between West and That balance—if that is what i wording of his testament and in i ment itself, he did not say one wo blamed the Jews for having creat his postscript, his last statement t the inevitability of the struggle i who had made an attempt to n manding general in the Battle o family Doenitz remained person- contact the Western Allies, while tination of the war against the E many and "Europe" against "Bols well after the dissolution of the E the head of an almost powerless b ment, representing the two-war th which the war against the Weste the war against Russia was both un regrettable, too, that the Western that. This was not only a tactic b Doenitz; it was believed by many

*Hitler had held these two offices and in 1943 ordered that in the customary "Führer" designation be omitted.

†Note the language of Hitler's last Order to the German Front, 16 April 1945. It began: "For mortal enemy masses have begun an attack." "Bolshevist" character? He did not.

sider the practicality of their avowed aim of forcing Germany to surrender unconditionally.*

"The Battle of the Bulge" failed. But—in this Hitler was in accord with the majority of the German people—he had begun to think that among his opponents the Americans might be the most amenable to making compromises.† Thus, for example, in June 1944 he not only

At that time Hitler was very ill. He told his favorite physician (Morell) that the weeks after the twentieth of July were the worst of his life. No one can imagine what he had to fight through. "Despite severe complaints, hour-long losses of balance, a dreadful condition about which he said nothing to no one, he stood fast and struggled through with an iron energy. There was the danger of a collapse, but he defeated it with his will." (Schenck, PH, p. 131.) Also: during September and October there were days when he had to cancel his daily situation conferences, and he was bedridden for almost two weeks. In mid-November (Schenck, PH, p. 396, relying in part on Goebbels's diary), Hitler stayed in bed, pale and thin, in his nightshirt under army blankets. He was advised to summon his generals to his bedroom and hold the situation conference there. No: "Heavily breathing he got up, stumbling, dressing himself without help, hobbled to the conference map table, sat down, wiped the sweat from his eyes, and asked for the generals to come in." While in their postwar prison in Spandau, Walther Funk told Speer that Hitler did not tell his doctors how he really felt ("he believed in his own lies"). Speer (SP, p. 367) is more plausible: People around Hitler "admired his composure in critical situations. . . . This self-command was an extraordinary achievement of his will till the end: in spite of his aging, in spite of illness, in spite of [Morell's medical experiments] and endlessly accumulating burdens. To me his will seemed unbridled and untrammelled like that of a six-year-old child who will not be discouraged or worn out; that was, in part, ludicrous, but it was also impressive."

*Haffner, HF/AN, p. 156: "Why did he insist [on the Ardennes offensive]? The answer is a riddle to this day." No. Henke (p. 314) cites Hitler's address to division commanders at his headquarters in Ziegenberg, four days before the offensive: "When we strike a few heavy blows here, then it may happen that at any moment [their] artificially upheld [alliance] suddenly collapses with a gigantic thud." (From Helmut Heiber, ed., *Hitler Lagebesprechungen. Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942-1945*, s. 1952, p. 713.) Also: "The strategic calculation behind his orders for the great offensive in the West was not at all as wrongheaded or irrational as it is often said."

†Haffner (HF/AN, p. 52) does not see this: "In his struggle against the allied coalition of 1942 to 1945 he never showed even the glimmer of an idea of exploiting the internal tensions of the coalition with a view of splitting it apart." There were times when Hitler thought that his main chance might be a contact with Stalin (Goebbels diary, 5 March 1945), but that was not his main inclination.

allowed a peaceful German which he hoped to gain from Marshal Kesselring to attend. And when, in March 1945, negotiations with the American German armies in Italy, Hitler 17 April received Wolff in Berlin in his endeavor.* Around the same time, Speer, to allow some of the German view of their previous conduct before the Russians and headquarters in Germany. By then Hitler had power enough to drive a bargain still convinced that a break in negotiations did lead to a showdown with the Soviet and Stalin, who complained

*"In his way," because a few hours before an armistice. Henke, p. 676: Hitler hoped that Wolff's negotiations with the Americans would cause dissensions within the anti-Hitler camp. Dulles, *The Secret Surrender* (NY, 1951); *Operation Sunrise* (NY, 1979); and especially the men negotiators, the Swiss Max W. 1981). The negotiations began as early as

†With some reason. Waibel, p. 21: certain Germans "had hoped even to force an armistice against the Russians." P. 31: "... the last great hope for the Russians was the last great hope thread through all of the negotiation American generals and an SS general. On 15 April, Wolff wrote a letter to Du Roosevelt's death. The next day Hitler (in the order three times) to Berlin, where he met Kaltenbrunner before seeing Hitler dividing of the Allies from the Russian Hitler to Wolff: In the East and in the West two months. "During these two decisive months, the Russians and the Anglo-Saxons will co-operate with him, he will gladly ally with them again."

of Jews on Roosevelt and
ice on Stalin; that, indeed,
Russian nationalism, and—
ussia formidable. Near the
r he should have attacked
, purged of Jews, might be

the war and the last year of
ating his ideas to circum-
d of his military strategy
nts of statesmanship, had
decisions, and their pur-
ple. This Hitler knew very
t their respective evidence

hich he saw something similar
earlier occasions he said, half-
sia the best thing would be to
ntry, naturally under German
bat. All in all, he saw in Stalin
, p. 399). Hitler speculated that
ps the Moscow process against
in ZIT/A, p. 161: "The thesis
propaganda but expressed by
if Jewish Bolshevism Hitler did
n pursued "a national-Russian
ce through his purges." Yet the
ilitic speeches (Heer, HR, p. 384):
ands of an all-powerful Jewry";
who are [leading] that power-

which [Stalin] decapitated the
ignal service in the destruction
Stalinist empire which, in all its
re of Peter the Great." 2 April
its, the Russians will rid them-
amate Pan-Slavism in its most

separately, while recognizing that their aims were, by and large, the
same: to bring about a break in the enemy alliance.

Hitler's phrase in July 1943, exhorting the army before the great
battle at Kursk, is telling: A German victory there must work
as a giant torch ["ein Fanal"], a sudden, dramatic eruption of a
flame, demonstrating to the world that Germany was still in-
vincible, that it was still capable of great offensives, of winning a
counter-Stalingrad. The defensive achievements of the army in
Russia and Italy were important but not sufficiently impressive, for
defense and invincibility were not quite the same thing.* It is
remarkable how, in early September 1944 (that is, during the rapid
German retreat from France and Belgium, and before the failure of
the Allies' attempt to cross the Rhine at Arnhem), Hitler ordered
preparations for a great German offensive to come in the Ar-
denne.† He knew, in what otherwise verily seemed a desperate
situation, that the great American-British offensive was temporarily
running out of steam, and that the Allies were not ready—yet—to
thrust into Germany proper; but there was more to it. The aim of
the great winter offensive was not to reconquer northern France or
perhaps even all of Belgium (the ultimate goal of the offensive was
not Paris but Antwerp) but to drive a wedge between the American
and British armies in Belgium (whether he hoped to force Mont-
gomery's army into a second Dunkirk was not clear); to shock and
stun the Americans to such an extent that they might have to recon-

*He was, of course, impressed with Speer's achievement of German armament
production. From 1942 to 1944, this had *tripled*. Speer, *SP*, p. 299: This seemed "to
support [Hitler's] thesis that the impossible *can* be made possible, and that all prog-
noses and anxieties may be too pessimistic."

†Carr (c, p. 105; also Schramm, *sch*, p. 165) cites Hitler speaking to two of his
generals on 31 August 1944: "The time is not yet ripe for a political decision . . . I
shall not let an opportunity pass . . . but at a time of heavy military defeats it is quite
childish and naive to hope for a politically favourable moment to make a move. . . .
The time will come when the tensions between the Allies become so strong that in
spite of everything the rupture occurs. History teaches us that all coalitions break
up, but you must await the moment, however difficult the waiting may be, [I shall]
continue to fight until there is a possibility for a decent peace . . . then I shall make
it. . . . Whatever happens we shall carry on in this struggle until, as Frederick the
Great said, 'one of our damned enemies gives up in despair.' "

June 1944

became rightist rather than
and, on occasion, anti-Semitic.
ved from the Left to the

er in the sovereignty of the
n old-fashioned demagogue.
im. But the very idea of who
last few centuries.† Among
a, was only latent; but Hitler
modern populism, by its very
are important—that nation-
is "Volksgemeinschaft" and
y" and "folk-comrades," in-
rere basic to Hitler's prin-
Führer and the people was
er and his citizens: "not a
the voluntary and unlimited
the Hitler movement Ger-
olution, even though that did
il model of 'revolutions.' ***
Hitler] had become in reality

ir populist terminology: "People's
Capitalist Democracies"). Yet these
earlier political terminology.

the United States in the twentieth
ized thus: populism is nationalism,
e) conservatism are entirely incom-
ves" say). A conservative and anti-
ognized this, though only after his
pulism that began with the demo-
e wrote during the war—has now
evils" (*Strahlungen*—his diaries—
Also in his *Auf den Marmorklippen*
when the weak misread the laws [of
ir own hands the gates that were

Aspekte der Führer-Herrschaft,"
zur Struktur und Politik des Dritten

the German phenomenon [*Erscheinung*] of Revolution." Further:
"His place in history is much closer to the great revolutionaries than
to the conservative despots." And: "He may have [seemed] anachro-
nistic; but he was more modern and more devoted to modernity
than all of his domestic political opponents."* The fact that during
his election campaigns Hitler did not outline a program for his
future government was neither due to a cautious calculation nor to
the condition that he had no precise economic program. It accorded
with his plan to appeal to all social strata "in the name of the Volks-
gemeinschaft, an entire people's community."† Even at that time of
great unemployment and social distress, his populist nationalism
was more influential than any economic appeal.

He carried the revolutionary theme into the war. On 8 November
1940, he said in a speech: "Every soldier knows and must know that
the armies now marching under our flags are the revolutionary
armies of the Third Reich." And in one of his table talks (21 Sep-
tember 1941), he said that William II should have destroyed the
Habsburg monarchy: "As neither the emperor, nor his circle, nor
the German people had recognized this task, there remained no his-
torical justification for the existence of Hohenzollern monarchy,
and its fall was a historical necessity. That the monarchies were ter-
minated by the Marxists . . . and not by National Socialists the
Führer finds a special gift of Destiny."‡

Destiny . . . Hitler did believe in God, in a God (perhaps Stalin
did too).** Hitler was a new kind of revolutionary, transcending

*F, pp. 1035, 1037.

†M. Rainer Lepsius, *Extremter Nationalismus. Strukturbedingungen zu der national
sozialistischen Machtergreifung*, 5, 1966, p. 111.

‡Koeppen ms., pp. 23-24.

**HR, p. 343, cites FR: Hitler told Frank that in the hospital he had hoped in
Providence; if he recovered, he would see that as a sign, to be a politician; and when
he regained his sight, "I was really stunned and took it as a call from Heaven for
me." Speer (SP, p. 570, note 19) cites Hitler's speech to industrialists on 26 June
1944: "It seems to me as if we must endure all of the trials of the Devil and Satan
and Hell until we win the final victory. Perhaps I am not a pious churchgoer, that I
am not. But deep inside I am still a devout believer [ein frommer Mensch], meaning
that the laws of nature that a God has created correspond to this world: whoever
fights bravely and does not capitulate but recovers again and again and advances
new, will not be abandoned by the Almighty but receive the blessing of Provi-
dence in the end. And that has been the lot of all great souls [Geister] of this world."


110
Footnote
cont. → p. 110

①

1941,

1944-5

1944-5



ish were not giving in. As the Berghof on 31 July 1941 and America. Against Russia was knocked out, could be eliminated. The men be untrammelled and Hitler and Roosevelt would not see people would be forced to; and many among them the liquidation of Com-

nable. "Russia: England's generals and to his staff; many records of that and probably not only for

war in the East (it was not yet a convinced of the possibility of so convinced then. The often, p. 516) wrote: "He took the lock is not clear about this (but, on of Britain in the front of his attack on Russia in 1941, whether likely; but he is undecided. JH, Lebensraum in Russia. That was this when he attempted to conclude: "Everything indicates that he thought he really believed the new or whether he introduced it to test is of course hard to deter-

among which is the one on concentrating all German one until England's last conti- When Russia is defeated, "this" Halder's war diary, 14 June of his calculation that the cold struggle." That same day: lished source taken by a Luft- ever—in Irving, 1/H, p. 266.)

purposes of self-justification. It was not to them but to his party cronies that he kept speculating about Lebensraum during his 1941 and 1942 table conversations (though seldom before the beginning of the invasion of Russia). And at the end, in one of his last "table" (i.e., Bormann-recorded) conversations, he said: "No decision which I had to make during the course of this war was graver than to attack Russia."

For Time—and it's always Time, you notice—would have been increasingly against us. In order to persuade Britain to pack up, to compel her to make peace, it was essential to rob her of her hope of being able still to confront us, on the Continent itself, with an adversary of a stature equal to our own. We had no choice, we had at all costs to strike the Russian element out of the European balance sheet. We had another reason, equally valid, for our action—the mortal threat that a Russia in-being constituted to our existence. For it was absolutely certain that one day or another she would attack us.*

"We had no choice"? "Absolutely certain"? Not at all. And what is significant: In Hitler's explanation of his decision there is not one word about Lebensraum.

It is of course possible that his emphasis on the English factor was meant to impress his generals. Possible, though not probable: for none of his leading generals showed the slightest reservations about

Hewel diary, 20 June 1941: "A long conversation with the Führer. Expects a lot from the Russian campaign . . . he thinks that Britain will have to give in." (Note that Hewel was not a general.) To Keitel on 18 August 1941 (ADAF/D/13/1, p. 346): "The ultimate objective of the Reich is the defeat of Great Britain." On 22 August 1941, with his armies at Leningrad, storming toward Kiev, and closer and closer to Moscow, Halder war diary: Hitler's aim is "to finally eliminate Russia as England's allied power on the continent and thereby deprive England of any hope of a change in her fortunes with the help of the last existing Great Power." Hitler to Admiral Fricke (КТВ/СКЛ, 28 October 1941): "The fall of Moscow might even force England to make peace at once."

*AH/B, p. 15, February 1945.

Account
1941

194

THE HITLER OF HISTORY

1941, '43, 1944-5

was his evident unwillingness to read or hear or see reports of what was really done to Jews in the east. This unwillingness accorded with his unwillingness to visit or even to look at photographs of severely bombed German cities, or at pictures of the German refugees trekking westward in the brutal winter of 1944-45, pictures that he, at least on one occasion, pushed aside (and perhaps even with his unwillingness to look at photographs of the July 1944 conspirators' executions).^{*} Here we are faced, again, with a duality in his character. Generally speaking, not wanting to know something means preferring not to think about it at all. Within Hitler's person we may recognize an element of weakness in a man who otherwise could not be described as a coward; or, at best, a sensitive (and, in a way, feminine) element in the character of a man whose brutal ideas and brutal expressions were the very opposite of sensitive. Hitler was not a sadist. He took no sensual pleasure in the sufferings of his enemies or victims. Sadism is a sin of the flesh; Hitler's sins were those of the spirit. There is no evidence that his often-stated beliefs—that by persecuting the Jews he was acting as an instrument of God, and that the war had been forced on him by Jews—were meant for public consumption only.[†]

1943

factories in Germany. In March 1943, Dr. Korherr, a statistician working for the SS, was ordered by Himmler to prepare an exact statistical account of the number of Jews remaining in the East; this was then summarized and typed on a special typewriter for Hitler to read. According to Eichmann (FL, p. 138), Hitler saw it and then ordered it to be destroyed.

^{*}See also the article by Dieter Pohl ("Die Holocaust-Forschung und Goldhagens Thesen") in VFZ, January 1997, p. 11: "... it is still not wholly clear whether economic motives, meaning the preservation of Jews for work, did not have a considerable influence on the sequence of the mass murders."

[†]Maser (M/A, p. 255) makes an interesting remark about Hitler's unwillingness to confront one of his last cooks, Frau Manziyal, who was of (partly) Jewish origin: "... this also suggests that even in connection with the killing of Jews he was 'only' inhuman as long as he did not have to face his victims."

1944

[†]To this we may add another possible connection of the Final Solution with his private knowledge that the war could no longer be won: He knew not only that he would lose his war but also that the Jews of the world knew this. The perceptive Burrin (his concluding paragraph), p. 169: "Around the middle of September 1941, when he decided to kill the Jews, he certainly did not think defeat was inevitable. But he must have assuredly felt that it would take a great deal of luck in the future

1944

* The angels were coming to him every night. How hideous ~~and~~ they must have seemed to him. Power to torment him. Like devils.

§ P.T. He could confront an entire society more easily than ^{the} one victim, that was good for us. Nothing messy in his habits for us to have to clean up. Much better to have expectations who do it with a pen, or in case of greater security with a

XXXX Give me a monster who long to become human again, and I can allow half human place.

HERE WERE, as we have seen, the ical condemnation of Jews. individuals. There is the st Giesler,* who saw Hitler re-raphy of Emperor Frederic-ralist Ernst Kantorowicz. (11 December 1941), he ask are there, any decent Jews? "who took his own life as decomposition of other nati-sions Hitler mentioned the ' Dr. Bloch, as we have seen

for him to win; and he saw clearly The extermination of the Jews, th vengeance. By putting to death th little did it matter to his obsessec civilians—he was demonstrating somehow sacrificial death of the Je victory, to fight on to annihilator ating spilled German blood, and a conduct this exercise of vengeance as the situation worsened, and as h

*Giesler, p. 520; about him see

†In *Hitlers Tischgespräche im Füh* 1968), p. 36, Dietrich Eckart, Hid, decent Jew. Lukacs, LEW, pp. 452-book entitled *Geschlecht und Chara* Jews and Christians, the problem [He . . .] was probably right in fo anti-Semitism. He was wrong in t and rising, Christianity: "Against d Humanity thirsts for the founder o a decision as in the Year One. Betw and culture, between woman and between nothingness and Godhead the two opposite kingdoms: There i a Third Reich that was to be ruled religion of the folk."

XXXX better to have a man who lusts for blood in the abstract.

word for an ~~idea~~ ^{inspiration} of the land then with the broad ~~are~~ ^{are}

ia-Moravia, and Slo-
rrient to him. A. J. P.
n between Germany
ted a Poland that was
ermanny, without any
of a Hitlerian Real-
All over Europe (for
mania, and in a few
tional Socialist leaders
not support them and
red to work with the
provinces and states.
Romania in January
st Iron Guard (whose
raps the most fanatic
th the nationalist and
hom Hitler respected
oke out between the
is unequivocally sup-
er, on occasion with

war lasted, he needed
ellites—a kind of sta-
nary experiments, and
y material supplies to
allied chiefs of state—
ngary, King Boris of
olly loyal or uncondi-
r. Still, it is significant
e the slightest indica-
fter the war, his for-
ir rewards.* In sum, a
erman foreign policy

f them in 1944, when his
was no longer important

was a must, while a perfect conformity with the ideology and prac-
tices of German National Socialism was not—except in the case
of Jews.

THIS DISCREPANCY between ideology and statesmanship is most
startling when we observe Hitler's views and expressed opinions of
Stalin. Hitler respected (and, later, increasingly admired) Stalin.*
There are many recorded expressions of Hitler in that regard,
before the war and in many instances during it.† Yet none of this
can be found in his public speeches, or in the official propaganda
of the Reich as directed by Goebbels. The unavoidable struggle
against "Jewish Bolshevism" was the main theme, and the main jus-
tification of the war against Russia, as presented to the German
people and to the rest of the world until the end, with no diminution
or alternation in tone. There were many people outside Germany
who did not believe this, or did so only with reservations. Yet it had
lasting effects within Germany, as may be seen in the approval of the
war against Russia even by such anti-Nazi or non-Nazi personages
as Bishop (later Cardinal) von Galen in 1941, or by the continued
evocation of the "Bolshevik" terminology by the Dönitz govern-
ment and by German generals even after Hitler's suicide. But there
is a good deal of evidence that Hitler himself did not believe this.‡

*In August 1939, he ordered his photographer Heinrich Hoffmann (whom he
also entrusted with a special personal message to Stalin) to retouch the photo
showing Stalin with a cigarette in his left hand. Gisevius (G1, p. 449) cites Hoff-
mann, who recalled Hitler's words: "The signing of a pact between two great
nations is a solemn act; one does not do that with a cigarette between one's fingers!
Such a picture does not show seriousness enough."

†Hitler to Mussolini in January 1940: "... since Stalin's final triumph Russia has
been experiencing a change from the Bolshevik [ideology] to a more nationalist
Russian way of life." Conversely, there is evidence of Stalin's admiration for Hitler
(as late as December 1944, he made a sympathetic remark about Hitler to de
Gaulle). There is also some reason to believe that Stalin's purges of some of his fol-
lowers, beginning in 1935, were influenced by his perception of Hitler's liquidation
of Röhm in 1934.

‡Speer, SP, p. 319: As the war went on, Hitler "spoke of Stalin with full acknowl-
edgment; he especially emphasized the parallel with Stalin's resolution in the face

* P.T. I did not have the answer
but I had to wonder whether

Stalin's treason trial purges of the
old Bolsheviks had been stimulated
by the ^{murder} execution of Röhm.

1170
P 163

1935, Aug 1939

1945

1939

1935
✱

1945

(2)

134

THE HITLER OF HISTORY

1919, 1925
1945

States. We shall return to these crucial matters in the course of this chapter.*

D.T.
what a
sense he
had of
for this
I hardly
needed
to help
him here

MUCH THAT WAS SUCCESSFUL in Hitler's career was due to his opponents' underestimation of his abilities. The head of the small party that Hitler joined in 1919 underestimated his capacity to attract people and power to his side;† the German politicians (and not only politicians) woefully underestimated his political abilities; and after he came to power many people throughout the world derided his talents as a potential European statesman. Yet he proved to be an alarmingly effective statesman—not only in peace but also in war—and an often alarmingly successful strategist.‡ From a provincial demagogue, he rose to a successful politician and an awesomely respected leader of a great nation, and then—at least for some time—to the director of the greatest war machine in the world. In that capacity, the world—including his leading opponents—finally learned not to underestimate him, even though there

*I must also state another disagreement with Hillgruber, who was a proponent of the—to many Germans still attractive—two-war theory: that the war in the West (which was a "normal European war" [ein europäisches Normalkrieg]) was regrettable, a tragic development to which Hitler had decisively contributed, whereas the war with Russia, at least in its latter stages, amounted to a heroic defense of the German land, the German people, and Western civilization. I understand the sentiments of this native of East Prussia, but I must abide by the answer that Field Marshal Montgomery gave in May 1945 to the exclamation of the German generals who wished to get from him a partial surrender: "The Russians are savages!" Whereupon Montgomery: "You should have thought of that in June 1941."

†Fest, p. 203: "With a mixture of coldbloodedness, calculation and determination as well as [his] readiness to take great risks for the sake of limited aims—and this he demonstrated in all kinds of crisis situations—he succeeded in getting the Party in his hands." Also, p. 206: His later demonstrated ability to master crises included, too, his repeated tendency "to endanger his triumphs through their further exaggeration."

‡Some of his biographers shy away from the word "statesman," mostly because of the positive connotations of the word. Thus Heiber in *HA*, p. 117: "No. Hitler was a very clever leader of a party, a dedicated demagogue, an inspiring speaker, and even about Hitler the military commander there will be something to say: but a statesman he was not."

an statesman gets the
best of a compromise

then instructive person in
war time to him. What

they saw as impossible
for them opened his
eyes to the real possibility.

little in Hitler's past
Cesar or a Napoleon.
and learned a bitter and
One—perhaps the m:
diplomatic and strategi
had an ability—mostly
ize the weaknesses of l
those of his actual, or
always know with certai
bly confident (and oft
they were loath to do. I
sides of human nature ca
greatest failures when h
and therefore failed to i
standing of human natu
not only a statesman but
knew this when he quip
where an amateur is of
stitution and the othe

In Hitler's case we may
Napoleon's contemporar
cian of war.‡ His famous
politics by other means,
trium: even a tyrant pre
than fights.) But Clausev
many dynastic wars of the

*Churchill, for example. Also
the worst from his enemies. Thi

†Schramm (sch, p. 32, note
reliable of Hitler's doctors): "I
capacities, which he could depen
brief impression was sufficient
man was and how he could best l

‡Görlitz-Quint cite a Hitler
science. It is the application of a
Grundformen] may be studied a
bodies." This corresponds to H
human being writ large, a "Macr

this
ability
to think
creatively
defended

on
triumphs
where
other
cultural
defeat.

It was when he believed
to surround himself
with mediocrities

He, who was obsessed with the influence of Jews on Roosevelt and Churchill, knew that Jews had no influence on Stalin; that, indeed, Stalin was an anti-Semite of sorts. Great Russian nationalism, and—perhaps—pan-Slavism made Stalin and Russia formidable. Near the end, in 1945, he even ruminated whether he should have attacked Russia at all; and that a nationalist Russia, purged of Jews, might be the greatest danger yet.*

WE NOW COME TO THE last year of the war and the last year of Hitler's life. Now the necessity of adjusting his ideas to circumstances, of subordinating what remained of his military strategy to what he thought were the requirements of statesmanship, had become absolute. Military and political decisions, and their purposes, are of course never entirely separable. This Hitler knew very well. Yet it is possible for a historian to list their respective evidence

of danger to Moscow in the winter of 1941 in which he saw something similar to [his own] situation. [This in 1945.] On other, earlier occasions he said, half-jokingly, that in the event of a victory over Russia the best thing would be to entrust Stalin with the administration of that country, naturally under German supremacy, for Stalin would be the best man for that. All in all, he saw in Stalin something like a colleague. As late as July 1944 (SP, p. 399), Hitler speculated that Stalin might have been right in the purges; perhaps the Moscow process against General Tukhachevsky was not a fake. Zitelmann in ZIT/A, p. 161: "The thesis spread by propaganda [it was not only spread by propaganda but expressed by Hitler on occasion] that 'the issue was the defeat of Jewish Bolshevism Hitler did not himself believe'; he had concluded that Stalin pursued 'a national-Russian policy, having freed himself from the Jewish influence through his purges.' Yet the same Hitler, on 8 November 1941, in one of his public speeches (Heer, HR, p. 384): Stalin is 'nothing else . . . but an instrument in the hands of an all-powerful Jewry'; behind him stand Kaganovich 'and all those Jews who are [leading] that powerful state.'"

CH/B, 26 February 1945: "The brutal manner in which [Stalin] decapitated the Jewish intelligentsia, who had rendered him such signal service in the destruction of Tsarist Russia, encouraged me. . . ." Also: "That Stalinist empire which, in all its essentials is only the spiritual successor to the empire of Peter the Great." 2 April 1945: "It is possible that under the pressure of events, the Russians will rid themselves completely of Jewish Marxism, only to reincarnate Pan-Slavism in its most fierce and ferocious form."

separately, while recognizing the same: to bring about a

Hitler's phrase in July 1941, is telling as a giant torch ["ein Fackel", demonstrating its invincibility, that it was still counter-Stalingrad. The Russia and Italy were in defense and invincibility remarkable how, in early German retreat from France the Allies' attempt to crush preparations for a great offensive.† He knew, in a situation, that the great running out of steam, and thrust into Germany precisely the great winter offensive perhaps even all of Belgium not Paris but Antwerp) and British armies in Belgium Montgomery's army into a sea of fire the Americans to surround

*He was, of course, impressed by the production. From 1942 to 1944 support [Hitler's] thesis that the Jews were the enemy of the German people and anxieties may be too

†Carr (c, p. 105; also Schraeder), 31 August 1944: "I shall not let an opportunity pass. The time will come when the spite of everything the rupture will come, but you must await the moment. . . . Whatever happens we will continue to fight until there is no more. . . . Great said, 'one of our damned

(2)

in 1944-45 that Hitler
 wal in northern Norway,
 1 that subarctic vacuum
 nland would bump into
 the German withdrawal
 ehind to both the Roy-
 munist guerrillas, hoping
 war. (Hitler thought—
 Bulgaria to Thrace and
 the increasingly obvious
 iders to give up fighting
 still bitterly fighting the
 demnation from Hitler,
 hem. In any event, it was

sodes were the political
 44 and 1945 to split the
 onographic articles and
 n policy of that period
 as been devoted to it by
 dence is interesting. In
 und at least on one occa-
 o Hitler the advisability
 ie Reich's enemies; but
 nced as he was not only
 move before some re-
 front or another. Thus,
 s Stalin's dissatisfaction

l and the German Resistance to
 dispatch by Dulles to Wash-
 (NA. RG. 226. OSS Entry
 dy and without formality in
 Germans. . . . If we do noth-
 ommittee may monopolize
 ulles have at least indirectly
 heory after the war.

with his Anglo-American allies was appreciable, and when for about
 three months there was a lull of fighting along almost the entire
 German-Russian front line), Hitler forbade the further develop-
 ment of a—perhaps—promising contact between German and Rus-
 sian agents in Stockholm.* (Whether that was a great opportunity
 missed is debatable. There are indications that Stalin permitted such
 a—not entirely secretive—contact to impress—that is, blackmail—
 his Western allies: a tactic not unlike Hitler's "message" to London
 via Burckhardt in August 1939.)

But in 1944 there was a new development. Heinrich Himmler
 himself, and officials of the SS, were establishing contacts with
 Jewish organizations and, through them, indirectly with American
 ones. Note that by that time Himmler had become the most power-
 ful personage in the hierarchy of the Third Reich. (In the winter of
 1944-45 Hitler also appointed him to a high military command.)
 Yet it was Himmler, the director of the extermination of masses of
 Jews and others, for whom "Staatsräson" (another German word for
 Realpolitik) now had risen above the categorical dictates of National
 Socialist ideology. The negotiations of his agents (including Eich-
 mann) with certain Jewish persons in Budapest had but one aim: to
 engage in some contact with Americans and make that fact known
 to Allied intelligence, including that of the Russians. The British
 knew what this was about. They were unimpressed with some of the
 Jewish agents whom the SS had permitted to travel to Turkey in
 June 1944, and arrested them. Yet Himmler was able to arrive at a
 clandestine agreement with a representative of Roosevelt's Refugee
 Board in Switzerland in September 1944; and a month later he
ordered the ending of the gassings at Auschwitz. Near the end, in
 April 1945, he himself negotiated with Jewish representatives from
 Switzerland and Sweden, with a former Swiss president, and with
 the Swedish prince Bernadotte. On 25 April 1945, he broke with
Hitler, offering capitulation to the Western Allies. Of course there

*Fest exaggerates this possibility. F, p. 948: "In December 1942 and once more
 in the summer of 1943 [in reality, the most significant contacts were suggested in
 September], the Soviet Union through its representation in Stockholm made
 known its willingness to negotiate with Hitler about a separate peace."

*^{D.I.} To my surprise, the O.C. told me to
 block all efforts to move Hitler in
 this direction.

1943, 44, 45

1943

✱

1944-45

(2)

Statesman and Strategist

1941 1945
1947-4

against America was "a tragedy";
and hopes of a break between
which he could then profit, at least
were in accord with the great
although in 1945 latent difficul-
were much more evident than
now, Hitler, again like most Ger-
not between the former but
had given up all of his earlier
blute anti-German strategy and

his private statements we may
can statements and clichés, and
of American civilization.* Yet
ed and realistic view of America
instances, it may be too much to
of his thoughts; but it may not
them.

that is, before the failure of the
and before the event of Pearl
no longer win the war: more pre-
ed to wage and to win. There is
war diary of 18 November 1941
my Group Center to resume its
"The recognition, by both of
not annihilate each other, leads
not consider the possibility that it
principal opponents to annihilate
" This is corroborated by an

th America might come only after his
its until they began to accumulate in
—probably because he then foresaw
Thus, for example, his table conversa-
on 25 October, and to the Bulgarian

emphatic statement by Colonel-General Jodl, the man who was per-
haps closest to Hitler during the war.* From prison in Nuremberg, he
wrote that by the winter of 1941 Hitler knew that "victory could no
longer be achieved." In a memorandum dictated to his wife about
Hitler: Hitler's "military advisers—today one often hears it said—
should certainly have made it clear to him that the war was lost. What
a naive thought! Earlier than any person in the world, Hitler sensed
and knew that the war was lost. But can one give up a Reich and a
people before they are lost? A man like Hitler could not do it."

Significant considerations arise here for a historian. One of them is
obvious: The portrait of Hitler, blinded by his fanaticism, believing
till the end that the war would not, because it could not, be lost is, at
best, oversimplified and, at worst, false. The other, connected with
the above, is the now growing discrepancy between Hitler's publicly
expressed views and his private ones. ("Private" may not always be a
useful term, since so many of his statements to his private circle were
meant to impress them.) In other words, this man, who was at times
capable of making circumstances conform to his ideas,† would from
now on be increasingly compelled to adjust at least some of his ideas
to circumstances that he could perhaps influence but not control. In
other terms: the purpose of his military strategy now was less con-
quest than the forcing of at least one of his enemies to deal with him,
preferably on his terms. But: this was not truly an admission of defeat.
Invincibility now had a priority over conquest. The time for short,
sudden victories ("Blitzkriege") may have been over; he and the Reich
must now settle down for a longer war, during which German power
would still be so strong that sooner or later one of his enemies—of
that unnatural coalition of Anglo-Saxons and Russians, Capitalists

*Halder diary, 18 November 1941. Jodl's statements cited by Schramm, *sch.*,
pp. 26-27 and 204. There are some signs that Hitler began to think that as early as
mid-August. (Goebbels diary, 18 August 1941: "Separate peace with Stalin? Will
Churchill fall?") Hitler considered the American entry into the war as practically
inevitable.

†Hitler on 23 May 1939 to his generals: "The principle whereby one evades
solving a problem by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible. Circum-
stances must rather be adapted to demands [*Forderungen*]." (IMT, xxxviii, 079-L,
p. 549)

1945
Jodl
letter
to
his
wife

1942-4

for about seventy years after 1870, was not only that the practices and standards of German education and learning had influenced and were adopted in many places of Europe and of the world, including nations that were opponents of Germany in the two world wars. Something that had begun after the French Revolution: a romantic (and often sentimental and categorical) idealism, reacting against the materialism (and often against the rationalism) of the Enlightenment. This most important and potentially fruitful intellectual achievement—a great chapter in the history of the European mind—was mostly represented and exemplified by Germans; and then it was carried by some of them to extremes, to a deterministic idealism* that proved to be more inhumane than the deterministic materialism that had preceded and (lamentably) survived it—at least for a while. And an incarnation of an unstinting belief in a determinist idealism was Adolf Hitler.†

The English historian of religion Owen Chadwick wrote: "The Reformation would have happened without Luther. But without Luther it would not have happened in the way it happened."‡ Four centuries later the same condition—mutatis mutandis—applies to nationalist socialism and Hitler. He was the greatest revolutionary of the twentieth century. That is not an approbatory adjective.

"One has to go back a long way in history—perhaps to Alexander the Great—to find a man who, in a below-average short span of life, transformed the world so fundamentally and lastingly as Hitler. But what one would not find in the whole of world history is a man who, with an unparalleled and gigantic effort, achieved, as Hitler did, the exact opposite of what he had hoped to achieve."

*This is but a brief statement of what is summarized at somewhat greater length in Lukacs, *IEW*, especially pp. 6–7 and pp. 519–27.

†Two random examples of an, alas, wholehearted belief in this deterministic idealism by two of his generals. Jodl on 7 November 1943: "We will win because we must win, for otherwise world history will have lost its meaning." Field Marshal Model on 29 March 1945: "In our struggle for the ideals [Ideenwelt] of National Socialism . . . it is a mathematical certainty (!) that we will win, as long as our belief and will remains unbroken." Cited by Manfred Messerschmitt, "Die Wehrmacht in der Endphase. Realität und Perzeption," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 4 August 1989, pp. 37–38.

‡Owen Chadwick, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge, 1991, p. 73.

"Great" may be applied to need not be a reactionary to twentieth century, that to design may be even more approbatory than the epithet of a Great followed Hitler was our still-prerevolutions—something that quieuville had.

What he had seen—and, a notable attraction of populism: That nationalism proved to twentieth century. He was its that sometime after 1870 nasced the older nineteenth-century liberalism, indeed perhaps even two, nationalism was more gories of socialism and capitalism because strength was more quality was more powerful than powerful than internationalism formerly rigid categories of private ownership began to less than management; and owner be ultimately obedient to the

Hitler was not the founder Germany. Among the principles was the first national socialist was an Italian first and a Social creation of "Fascism." We had practices but in the ideas, of solini's Fascism. But that became the reciprocal influences of 1940s: Mussolini, Stalin, and influences—more precisely, something. Mussolini was no Stalin was not (and did not become influenced and imple

* D.T. Now the last great barrier to the triumph of materialism had been removed. Neither America nor Russia would prove a + + +

for about seventy years after 1870, was not only that the practices and standards of German education and learning had influenced and were adopted in many places of Europe and of the world, including nations that were opponents of Germany in the two world wars. Something that had begun after the French Revolution: a romantic (and often sentimental and categorical) idealism, reacting against the materialism (and often against the rationalism) of the Enlightenment. This most important and potentially fruitful intellectual achievement—a great chapter in the history of the European mind—was mostly represented and exemplified by Germans; and then it was carried by some of them to extremes, to a deterministic idealism* that proved to be more inhumane than the deterministic materialism that had preceded and (lamentably) survived it—at least for a while. And an incarnation of an unstinting belief in a determinist idealism was Adolf Hitler.†

The English historian of religion Owen Chadwick wrote: "The Reformation would have happened without Luther. But without Luther it would not have happened in the way it happened."‡ Four centuries later the same condition—mutatis mutandis—applies to nationalist socialism and Hitler. He was the greatest revolutionary of the twentieth century. That is not an approbatory adjective.

"One has to go back a long way in history—perhaps to Alexander the Great—to find a man who, in a below-average short span of life, transformed the world so fundamentally and lastingly as Hitler. But what one would not find in the whole of world history is a man who, with an unparalleled and gigantic effort, achieved, as Hitler did, the exact opposite of what he had hoped to achieve."

*This is but a brief statement of what is summarized at somewhat greater length in Lukacs, *Lew*, especially pp. 6–7 and pp. 519–27.

†Two random examples of an, alas, wholehearted belief in this deterministic idealism by two of his generals. Jodl on 7 November 1943: "We will win because we must win, for otherwise world history will have lost its meaning." Field Marshal Model on 29 March 1945: "In our struggle for the ideals (*Ideenwelt*) of National Socialism . . . it is a mathematical certainty (!) that we will win, as long as our belief and will remains unbroken." Cited by Manfred Messerschmitt, "Die Wehrmacht in der Endphase. Realität und Perzeption," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 4 August 1989, pp. 37–38.

‡Owen Chadwick, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge, 1991, p. 73.

"Great" may be applied to need not be a reactionary twentieth century, that to designate may be even more approbatory than the epithet of a Great. Hitler was our still-prerevolutions—something that the quaville had.

What he had seen—and, n-dable attraction of populism. That nationalism proved to twentieth century. He was its that sometime after 1870 nascent the older nineteenth-century liberalism, indeed perhaps even two, nationalism was more gories of socialism and capitalism because strength was more reality was more powerful than powerful than internationalism formerly rigid categories of vate ownership began to less than management; and owner be ultimately obedient to the

Hitler was not the founder Germany. Among the principles was the first national socialist was an Italian first and a Social creation of "Fascism." We have practices but in the ideas, of solini's Fascism. But that became the reciprocal influences of 1940s: Mussolini, Stalin, and influences—more precisely, something. Mussolini was not Stalin was not (and did not become influenced and im-

* D.T. Now the last great barrier to the triumph of materialism had been removed. Neither America nor Russia would prove a . . .

①

1934

1945

here were many com-
among his early allies
the higher members of
er, were numerous and
the establishment of
Himmler's "primitive
chramm noted that he
ion of the early period
his followers."* Speer
list mysticism: "What
ives mysticism behind,
Ve might as well have
at least." A number of
ed Rosenberg seriously
senberg's cloudy book
er, Hitler said, "A step
r cited one of Hitler's
pleasure with Cardinal
g's screed.†

tements about races are
national characteristics.
is true of almost every
ere not biological. He
the German people to
as by Rosenberg and
y where and when they
tural rather than racial.
and delicacy which lies
is) a superficially slight
a folkish and a racist type
ished to evoke was the
And that reflected, too,

the evolution—if that is what it was, if not a gradually hardening recognition—of his own beliefs.

In May 1944, to officers in a remarkable speech at the Platterhof, Hitler said: "We have this people of ours that is not to be identified with a race, and this is now clear to millions. . . . But when I began [speaking] about twenty-five years ago this was not so. I was told by [counterrevolutionary-bürgerlich] circles: Yes, Volk and Race are one and the same! No! Volk and race are not the same. Race is a component of blood, a hematologic [blutmässig] kernel, but the Volk is very often composed not of one race but of two, three, four or five different racial kernels. . . . Each of these racial kernels possesses particular talents."* And in the Bormann records, on 13 February 1945, Hitler said: "Pride of race is a quality which the German, fundamentally, does not possess. We use the term of Jewish race as a matter of convenience, for in reality and from the genetic point of view there is no such thing as the Jewish race." *There is no such thing as the Jewish race. . . .†*

1945

NATIONALISM AND RACISM are not easily definable terms. (Nor is there a first-rate general history of either nationalism or of racism. One reason for this is that nationalism may differ from country to country more than internationalism or socialism does.) And this is not the place to expatiate on their differences or on their origins, except to emphasize three matters: (1) that Adolf Hitler was more of a nationalist than a racist; (2) that nationalism can be even more exclusionary than racism—mostly because of its attribution of cultural,

1935

*Speech of 26 May 1944, published and annotated by Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, in *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, 1976 (2), pp. 149-50. In this speech Hitler did not insist on the superiority of the Nordic racial "kernel": "The strongest of these racial kernels, with a commercial but no creative talents, would have been the Jews among us, in the long run, and with the difference that this Jewry would not have been absorbed racially by the German people but that it would have destroyed the German Volk gradually, step by step."

†The Testament of Adolf Hitler. The Hitler-Bormann Documents, I, 1961 (hereafter AH/S). In these last recorded monologues, Hitler also referred to Jews as "a spiritual race."

* 1945

* The question grew greater as

that I had tried
to be there always
to assure him
that of a
certainty there
were the lost and
a spawn of the devil

his body became more and more
began to betray more and more
Each time he failed (doubtless, because
of his spirit) he thought contemptuously
his continuing remarks that the Jews
were a spiritual race, for that says the
rest of the world - that kind of a spiritual
race - that is what he wanted to say

1940-44, 45

①

since, unlike in the natural
edge may be understanding
its a substantial body of his
only in his public speeches
fore that, in the hundreds
German foreign policy and
Kampf and in *Hitler's Secret*
dictated or wrote during the
here may be a case of not
k (as, for example, Bullock
t forth in *Mein Kampf*, and
consistency in his purposes
, too, that he was also a very
as were (and we have also
them, an evolution), there
human being (not to speak
just them to circumstances
seen that many of his state-
es, including the purpose
f listeners but men around
o historian—and surely no
s (and, consequently, ought
o define and divide and nail
as what his subject said he
ly thought.

Deuterlein is very perspicacious
a "Timetable of a World Con-
himself said; lead articles for [a]

Berkeley, Calif., 1982 (hereafter:
der when appointing the latter as
should know first of all that you
intentions until I give them out as
ent. You will never learn what is
personally to Fleming.) See also
r, admitting his own "three ways

my influence becomes

We may say—at the risk of some imprecision—that his purpose was to make Germany one of the greatest powers of the world, certainly the greatest in Europe. The fundament of this was the achievement of a new and unprecedented unity of the German people (which involved the expulsion of the Jews among them), and the eventual unity of nearly all German-speaking people in Europe in a single Reich. We may essay the statement that this was probably his minimal aim,* even though he did not (and could not) follow it with any great consistency. Especially during the war, his policies would evolve and change. We shall see, for example, that his policy of expelling Jews from Germany eventually evolved into the aim in 1940 of expelling them from most, if not all, of Europe; then (in 1941), when emigration and expulsion were no longer possible, to have masses of them exterminated, and then (in late 1944) the mass extermination of the remnant millions in the death camps was suspended (a complicated matter to which in chapter 6 I shall have to return). There is, of course, ample evidence that the presence of Jews (at least in Germany and Europe) was a fundamental obsession of Hitler's. There is also ample evidence of his desire for "Lebensraum": to obtain, or conquer, if need be, more lands for German settlement in the east of Europe, including Russia. But while obsessions and intentions may overlap, they are not altogether the same thing; and, despite Hitler's innumerable and often categorical statements and directives concerning the latter, his Lebensraum policies were less consistent than his Judeophobic ones.†

This is the main reason why we must qualify the widely accepted view, according to which anti-Judaism and the conquest of European Russia leading to *Lebensraum* were not only the two fundamental but

"God writes straight with crooked lines." Paradoxically, his defeat and death achieved this (except for Austria and the South Tyrol). In the last year of the war, millions of Germans abandoned their lands and fled westward, into what remained of Germany; after the war, millions more were expelled from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Thus, for the first time in eight hundred years, there were few Germans left in Eastern Europe beyond the Oder River—which was perhaps the most enduring, and historic, consequence of Hitler's war.

†Schreiber (снрв, p. 65) mentions that Hitler used the term "Lebensraum" in мк only twice. (The term came from the German geographer Ratzel and others, as early as 1897.)

1940
1944

1945

①
1942-4
and Communists—would be constrained to admit it. He might no longer be able to win *his* war on his terms, but he might still win a different sort of war, or at least not lose it.

1942-4
This conviction sustained him almost until the very end. It was his final shift to a Friderician strategy; more, to a Friderician view of his own future. He had always admired Frederick the Great rather than Bismarck the Iron Chancellor—in this case the warrior-king rather than the statesman.* The result was his vision of—or, rather, his hopes for—a historic parallel. Frederick won because—unexpectedly—he defeated one of his main enemy powers, and then the whole group of enemy powers fell apart. It was not only that Frederick was brave and resolute, winning victories in the field against great odds; his resolution led to a break in the coalition of his enemies, a coalition less unnatural than that between Capitalists and Communists in this war. Elements of this vision inspired Hitler almost until the last week of his life.† What he failed to understand was that, yes, a break between Americans and Russians might come—but too late for him. This was not a war between eighteenth-century dynasties but a world struggle in which his opponents, no matter how disparate, were agreed on one thing: He and his Third Reich must be conquered and occupied, without conditions and without reservations. Even if Frederick had not won at Rossbach or Leuthen, his opponents would at some time have signed a peace with the Prussian king; but Hitler's adversaries would not make peace with Hitler.‡

However, we are running ahead of our main story. December

*A good summary of historians' comments about this is SCHUB, p. 133, note 252.

1945
†On the night of 12 April 1945, Goebbels rushed to the chancellery bunker with the news of Roosevelt's sudden death. He brought champagne: "The Empress is dead!" (The sudden death of the Russian empress Elizabeth in 1762 led immediately to the dissolution of the anti-Prussian coalition and to Frederick's triumph.) This episode is often misread by historians. (SV, p. 781: "Goebbels's mood was fully shared by Hitler.") It was Goebbels, not Hitler, who was carried away by enthusiasm that night. (Hitler also disliked champagne.)

‡The American diplomatic historian Paul Schroeder, in his excellent book (*The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848*, Oxford, 1994), p. 477, on the great coalition of 1813–14 against Napoleon: "Military victory was never the primary goal for the coalition as a whole, even in the final stages of the war. The allies, though they sometimes differed sharply over terms, always sought a negotiated

1941 not only marked the Hitler's view of it; it led work habits. He ordered t on a full wartime footing. (Speer as a successor to the was neither an economist nized his organizational at of army commander in chi- eral Brauchitsch. But most suggestions and inclination: cautious retreat of the Germ in spite of the awesome seve; less awesome fighting abiliti at the latest by March 1942 but he, with his unorthodox A catastrophe was avoided, a tered a destiny which broke :

peace in one form or another and the right terms were attained. Th though not total victory, was Nap As soon as a French government at the time the French army was st France and vital areas outside it as War II, certainly not after 1941.

There was an astonishing recov he sometimes gave the impression established habits of work. These h unorganized in his daily routine. Bu ous work disappeared. Speer was on of his former habit of arranging thin came now an extensive working rou to let others work for him; now he, details upon himself. He made him this went against his character [We sions]. Also Fest (F, p. 917): "his gre p. 254): Deep down and secretly he in 1941–42, and that "kept him from result of a fear for his own life." Th habit of rising late in the morning a dependence on a great variety of me

ften it is the head of the secret
f his foreign opponents better
was thus that Fouché negoti-
trayed in the end; thus, too,
attempted to arrive at wide-
m.

Himmler and the SS were, in
but not all of them against his
ult scene, in February 1945,
such dealings; but a few days
for that single instance, there
isms of Himmler because of
plenty of jealous enemies in
's own circle.* The aim, for
in the enemy coalition. That
Himmler is unquestionable.

ome kind of accommodation
id Goebbels were partisans of
sion Ribbentrop even offered
rdly, rejected the idea, saying
less, flying to Scotland, had
1945 he allowed Ribbentrop
ers) to send a memorandum
Sprachregelung," permitting
th Western counterparts to
ration into Germany and to
gravest danger to the world.
ch attempts would be suc-
rral alliance between Ameri-
ough no longer necessarily

within the SS. (About this see also
akes too much of Himmler's con-
cion, wrongly—that Himmler rec-
der with the purpose of eventually

①

because of him.* Neither his strategy nor his statesmanship was of
much further use. In this respect his face-to-face talk with Speer on
28 March may be telling. He knew that the war was lost. But he
grabbed Speer's arm and, with tears in his eyes, implored him: "If
you still believe that the war could still be won, if you could at least
believe that, all would be well."† Belief still mattered—in fact, it was
the only thing that mattered. It could no longer be adjusted to con-
ditions. It was the only condition left. That was no longer the mark
of a realistic idealist; it was the admission of the defeat of his deter-
minist idealism.

Eight days before his suicide, when he had decided to stay in a
Berlin encircled by the Russians, he said to Jodl: "I should already
have made this decision, the most important in my life, in Novem-
ber 1944, and should have never left the headquarters in East
Prussia." That could have achieved two things. One: Hitler the
Feldherr would have died in battle, on the front, at the head of
his battered armies, on the eastern frontier of the Reich, breasting
the Asiatic flood—an act that might have had incalculable symbolic

*Goebbels diaries, citing Hitler, 22 March 1945: "The enemy coalition will
break up in any circumstance; the question is only whether it breaks up before we
are beaten down, or only after that." 28 March 1945: "Sometimes one had the
impression that he [Hitler] lives in the clouds. But so often he has come down to
earth like a *deus ex machina*. He is as convinced as before that the political crisis
in the enemy camp is a justification for our greatest hopes." Speer, *SP*, p. 433: "In
February and March 1945 Hitler suggested on occasion that he has allowed con-
tacts with the enemy in different ways, yet without explaining any of them."

†Speer's account in *SP*, pp. 457–58. Irving's account (*I/H*, p. 785) is predictably
condemnatory of Speer. Contrary to Haffner, who thinks that Hitler's Scorched
Earth order (to destroy all installations in the German cities and towns before and
during the retreat of the army) was not only categorical but unalterable and the
definite evidence of Hitler's criminal intent. Speer, *SP*, p. 461: "I think that now it
was clear to Hitler that parts of his destruction orders will no longer be fulfilled."
Yet the same Hitler still wished to instill faith in his people. Irving (*I/H*, p. 768)
cites Hitler to Kaltenbrunner in late February 1945 (after the architect Giesler had
come to show Hitler his model of Linz): "My dear Kaltenbrunner, do you imagine
I could talk like this about my plans for the future if I did not believe deep down
that we really are going to win this war in the end?" (As often with Irving, no
source is given, but perhaps it is not implausible.) Also Hitler to Speer, a fortnight
after that 28 March confrontation, at the news of Roosevelt's death (*SP*, p. 467):
"Here! Read it! You did not believe it! . . . The war is not lost. . . ."

1944 1945

1945

Scene 1944

Calder 1945

1945

ate, it was a Führer state. . . .
d virtually the entire nation
shed in less than ten years!
le not by demagoguery but by
n Haffner, a liberal conserva-
tual reputation. And Hans
Party Congress in 1938 was
eople. . . . Above everything
essing, bewitching, touching
il images in the memory of a
more other such evidence of
ically high German marriage
ith the extraordinary drop in

man people, after so many
reacted to Hitler's pact with
entiments of admiration—by
relieved. Thereafter, during
it sometimes lagged behind
of him—as in the summer of
an impatience among the
England: "Wann geht es los?"

red him rather than feared
nder Stalin.) "Under Hitler
d, or revolted as they might
d had to take him away from
had bound them to [him] for
as September 1944, a call for
nd sixteen-year-olds) in the
le Palatinate) resulted in 96
a British survey of German

ut Krausnick, who wrote that in
to the war with a "reluctant loyalty

this may be put too simply.

*well that I had
the O.P. but that
nationalism*

1944 ①
1945
prisoners of war near the end of the war: Not more than 9 percent
were convinced anti-Nazis, 15 percent were passive anti-Nazis.* We
must of course consider the cohesion of soldiers in camps run by an
enemy; and there is much evidence that within Germany, after mid-
January 1945, the belief in National Socialism was eroding. Then,
and only then, began the erosion of trust in Hitler, too. But even
then it was not an overall development.

The mass of the German people admired, and perhaps even
loved, Hitler, while they did not necessarily admire or love National
Socialism and the party. We must, perhaps for the last time, ob-
serve this distinction—keeping in mind, too, the limitations of
such a categorical statement, for there were overlappings and split-
mindedness at work, too. The German people believed in Hitler.
Or: they put their faith in him. This may not be excusable. But it
was understandable. It had much to do not only with his startling
successes, with his elevation of German prestige in the world, but
with the national prosperity he achieved soon after his assumption
of power. "Hitler," wrote Hans Frank from prison, "had become the
leading principle of all the nation's deeds and hopes. . . . [But] about
the party, the bureaucracy, the ss and many other things the people
had many reservations [Sehr ablehnend] . . . 'Der Führer,' 'der Hit-
ler,' was the exception. Quite popular were such expressions as:
'The Führer does not know about that!' or: 'The Führer will get
into this!' Or: 'The good Führer, how he is being misused!' "†
Written shortly before his execution—note Frank's title, "Within
Sight of the Gallows"—he saw in this the very obverse of a poverty
in the national imagination; rather, it was a sentimental German
kind of faith, and, indeed, touched by a primitive loyalty. His pages,

*Lothar Kettenacker, "Sozialpsychologische Aspekte der Führerherrschaft," in
Der Führerstaat: Mythos und Realität, s. 1981, p. 107. Henke, p. 806: At the end of
1944, 40 percent of German prisoners of war still believed in a German victory; in
the first months of 1945, 44 percent, but in early March only 11 percent. (Yet a
belief in a German victory was not necessarily identical to loyalty to National
Socialism or even to Hitler.)

†Frank, pp. 260–61. Another high official, Otto Dietrich, Hitler's press secre-
tary, in *Hitler* (Chicago, 1955), "The majority of the German people had put their
trust in a single man, had revered him like a saint and loved him as a father. This
man then led them into the greatest catastrophe of their history."

1945
* D.T. as a father, and a god. With
better fall so would the Dummkopf
be gravely wounded. The human
god, der Führer had failed. The
divine god had been unable to
prevent the concentration camps.
How much could the D.K. salvage
from this?

1945 1946

①

tion. The majority of the German people, in the midst of their greatest dangers and shocks and tribulations, were stunned. Many of their remaining officials were unwilling and unable to come to terms with the phenomenon of their departed leader. After all, as late as March 1945 his successor, Admiral Doenitz, had addressed his commanders: "Let us place our trust unconditionally in Adolf Hitler's leadership. Believe me, in my two years as Navy Commander-in-Chief I have found that his strategic views always turned out right." During the days between Hitler's death and the final capitulation of Germany, Doenitz and most of his government continued to be respectful of Hitler. (Doenitz did not announce the dissolution of the party, nor did he remove the swastika flag or pictures of Hitler from government offices at Flensburg.) He announced on 2 May: Hitler's "struggle against the Bolsheviks was made in behalf of Europe and the entire civilized world. . . . The Anglo-Americans are therefore no longer continuing the war in the interest of their peoples but only in order to promote the spread of Bolshevism in Europe."* His diary on the day after the capitulation, 9 May 1945: "The fundament for the continued existence of the German people is the national community created by National Socialism."†

1945

That giving up the struggle against the West was preferable to giving up the struggle against the East was obvious by then. It was also obvious that for Germany, National Socialism was preferable to Bolshevism—among other things, because of the living standards of the German people. For a long time after the war, this notion that National Socialism was, after all, better than Bolshevism remained a strong article of belief, surely in West Germany (and also among some Americans in the anti-Communist 1950s). There were many reasons for such a belief: not only the prosperity that Hitler had

*Doenitz in Nuremberg, IMT, XIII, p. 33, cited by Maser: [Hitler] was "a tremendous personality . . . with extraordinary intelligence and willpower, with a truly universal culture [*Bildung*], with a powerfully impressive character and with an enormously suggestive power."

†This is perhaps the only instance where I must express my disagreement with the otherwise unexceptionable Schramm, *sch*, p. 180: "That Admiral Doenitz, who unexpectedly succeeded to power, immediately initiated the surrender, remains a service for which he deserves no less recognition than General Weygand in France five years earlier." This estimation of Weygand is questionable.

1946

Germany—a German resistance (and not only because of its resistance of men and women subjugated or were unwilling to solitary persons, families, changing small minority content the General Staff of the Army, that, too, was unlikely). This earlier, a resistance to Hitler did sometimes within the split minds of event, "resistance" meant a loyalty to Hitler (and we ought not to consider that the anti-Jewish support among the German peoples (examples: Romania, a tentative general statement from many of the recorded acts of many Germans who tried difficult times. On the other hand, and evident acts of a hard mute obedience and respect of Hitler than for Hitler.

ing to which respect for Hitler also requires some qualifica-

"... Hitler's anti-Semitism was the Führer—the majority of the people—people who in the privacy of their homes were convinced that this proved they no longer dared to speak out, let alone number of Antis who later, after 'inner emigration,' or even as the old be used with great caution." (1946)

to Hitler in institutions such as the army, which he knew that very well—but their loyalty was secured by Hitler's undoubted powers of persuasion, achieved as head of the state (as in the case of the army and accepted ideas). At the same time, in Germany (as elsewhere in Europe), the most principled opponents of Hitler were in the patriotic, often religious, circles of an older and better Germany. In the struggle that was less between Left and Right, this was as true of Stauffenberg as of Churchill and de Gaulle in England, and of patriotic and religious men and women in Austria.

The convincing thesis (in *Hitler's Rise to Power*) of his earlier *Hitler's Weltanschauung*—of Hitler's appeal and power, of the long division in Germany between "Left" and "Right"—or in other, perhaps less convincing, but in other, perhaps less convincingly and fairly accurately of the Right to the Left, he writes hardly more than a page

which Hitler reacted by ordering the disarming of the program). But consider, too, Galen's case: he was liberated from Hitler by the British troops of our enemies (!) passing through his atypical—episode: At the bishops' conference when some priests reported that they would not take communion together with those who were affixed to their clothes. Some priests refused to do so. Others, however, did not come about, save for a few isolated cases. A handful of such Catholics of Jewish origin were killed in November 1939, was

about the, perhaps even more startling, passivity of the German working class and the millions of former Socialist and Communist voters, or about the unions, who, in 1933, "watched rather passively [Hitler's] assumption of power and then tried to adjust themselves to the new regime." It would be wrong, I think, to attribute Jäckel's argumentation to the Social Democratic sympathies of this otherwise thoughtful historian. But in his intention to emphasize the responsibility of the German traditional classes for the inclination (whether actively or passively) to support Hitler, he overlooks something that many historians, and not only Marxists, have overlooked for more than a century: the inclination of the working classes, too, toward respectability—something that on many levels, and in many cases, has been inseparable from their nationalism. Added to this was Hitler's unquestionable ability not only to declare but actually to elevate the German industrial working class to newer and higher situations within the structure of German society (and in the armed forces). In chapter 3 we saw his consistently high estimation of the "working class" and his often expressed contempt for the "Bürgertum." During the last thirty years many studies have revised the earlier general opinion according to which Hitler's main support had come from the middle and lower-middle classes. In reality, the former boundaries between lower middle class and working class had begun to melt away during the Hitler era. More than that, there is ample evidence that among the workers support of Hitler and belief in him not only remained strong but endured to the very end. There are many accounts of this, from many sources.†

†JH, pp. 49–50.

†Not only in Goebbels's diaries, where some of the significant items record workers' reactions to Hitler, even close to the end of the war. Also a report by the Reichspropaganda Ministry in December 1944, cited by Henke, p. 572: "The worker is the most reliable follower of the Führer and willing to shoulder any kind of burden." Steinert in *ST/HR/D*, p. 526, gives many examples of a "radical commitment to the war" among armament workers as late as the spring of 1945. This impressed Speer decisively, deterring him when he first began to think of the need to do away with Hitler. Kershaw is right in *KER*, p. 181: "Hitler's popularity among the German people, greatly reduced though it was since the heyday of 1940, was, given the conditions of the last war years, remarkable."

to the end of the war

* D.T. Speer will think himself that he was not quite aware of it. Speer also had ambitions. He was the only man left—in his opinion—who could be accepted as a leader.

The Jews: Tragedy and Mystery

*Hitler and the Jews: the evolution of a historiography—
The motives of his obsession—The purposes of his policies—
Levels of his knowledge*

IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO separate a biography of Hitler—or a study of his strategy and statesmanship—from the history of Jews, particularly those within the Reich before 1939 and generally those within Europe and Russia during World War II. He and his regime engaged in many kinds of barbaric cruelties, involving millions of victims who were not Jewish. But we must give at least a thought to whether Hitler's historical reputation would be different had it not been for the mass murder of at least 4.5 million Jews due to his orders, or at least in accordance with his wishes. (The trouble with what is unthinkable is that at times it must be thought about.) He wanted to win a great war for Germany, and he wanted to eliminate Jews from Europe; and these two aims were complementary, indeed inseparable, in his mind. Near the end he was compelled to separate them. In February 1945, he said that he had at least "lanced the Jewish abscess." Yet in this he failed, too: It was because of him that anti-Semitism became unacceptable, if not unthinkable, intellectually as well as politically after the war, and especially in Germany.

* And in this, too, I saw the presence of the O.D. What indeed was he up to?

The consequences of the triple, protean, and perhaps the swift international accretion (Israel.) The origins of that Semitism existed in many before and independently of the mass executions cannot evolve historiography of

The literature of the Holocaust is a small part of it has been an evidence connecting Hitler (a) the search for the document, (b) the reconstruction of the sion, deportation, and "re-ghettoization) of Jews chanton. We shall turn to some problems—later. But before rapid sketch of the history of

That the cruelties visited Hitler was obvious enough. special attention was directed by professional or popular. Of course, documentary material after 1945 (though more rare) but there was more to this popular, interest in the Holocaust about two decades. The various appear in American (or English) reasons that are not easy to with the Holocaust began to

*See LEW, p. 436 et seq. for a treatment of the sources and symptoms of modern

†I found what may have been its temporary Review, March 1944. (A review of the same issue of this, not-very-radical was brought to Hitler's attention and the Franklin article.)

generations. Two: Such an end of it have meant the flooding of most of the British, a great swirling conman armies, the former wending a still largely intact German army people, eventually meeting the sus-tem Germany, Anglo-Saxons as nervously, then more and more on their side during a developing d further: "He should have fallen in death, it is said. He wanted to, ad been physically able. As it was, h, but the more certain one. He acted and will always act. He had reich and his hopes. May whoever -I cannot."*

ght quality of Jodl's loyalty: did death"? This is debatable. More erhaps not a matter left for histo-nsions of that epithet are more ne say only that he was bereft of lies, as imply it must. His mind ty: but mind and willpower alone

ffner's discussion of Hitler's last days der actually continued to believe in final ty in Maser (M/A, pp. 426, 428): He no ne his own end . . . was an awesome plistic (SV, p. 397): "... and in the last human contact and lost in a world of 'All the grandiloquent talk of dying in dant [?] decision was a gross dereliction r his command and an action wholly at r tradition." And: "His death was any-icide he deliberately abandoned his in earlier years he had strongly con-ly condemned General Paulus for not ngrad.)

Even so, there remained something of a "realpolitical" calculation in Hitler's last testament, whereby he appointed Admiral Doenitz as his successor as Reich president, and Goebbels as Reich chancellor.* Doenitz, who was not a committed National Socialist but a nationalist conservative, would head a new government, very obviously inclined to seek some kind of agreement with the Western Allies; Goebbels, on the other hand, the most radical of Nazis, was believer and spokesman for a deal with Soviet Russia. A statesman-like balance, between West and East, Hitler may have thought. That balance—if that is what it was—is also perceptible in the wording of his testament and in its so-called postscript. In the testament itself, he did not say one word about the war against Russia: he blamed the Jews for having created the war with the West. Yet in his postscript, his last statement to the armed forces, he insisted on the inevitability of the struggle in the East.† On 1 May Goebbels, who had made an attempt to negotiate with the Russian commanding general in the Battle of Berlin, killed himself and his family Doenitz remained personally intact in the north, ready to contact the Western Allies, while insisting on the necessary continuation of the war against the Russians, for the defense of Germany and "Europe" against "Bolshevism" well after Hitler's death, well after the dissolution of the National Socialist Party. He was the head of an almost powerless but still functioning Reich government, representing the two-war theory until the end, according to which the war against the Western Allies was regrettable, while the war against Russia was both unavoidable and heroic; and it was regrettable, too, that the Western Allies had failed to appreciate that. This was not only a tactic but a conviction of men such as Doenitz; it was believed by many Germans for many years after

*Hitler had held these two offices and titles since 1934, but a directive in 1943 ordered that in the customary "Führer and Reich Chancellor" the latter designation be omitted.

†Note the language of Hitler's last Order of the Day to soldiers of the Eastern Front, 16 April 1945. It began: "For the last time the Jewish-Bolshevist mortal enemy masses have begun an attack." Did he really believe in their "Jewish-Bolshevist" character? He did not.

1945

were historical precedents for this. Often it is the head of the secret state police who knows the power of his foreign opponents better than do others in the government. It was thus that Fouché negotiated against Napoleon, whom he betrayed in the end; thus, too, it was Beria who after Stalin's death attempted to arrive at wide-ranging compromises with Washington.

These and other similar attempts of Himmler and the SS were, in part, arranged behind Hitler's back—but not all of them against his wishes. We know of only one difficult scene, in February 1945, when Hitler ordered Himmler to stop such dealings; but a few days later Himmler resumed them. Except for that single instance, there is no evidence of accusations or criticisms of Himmler because of these attempts—and Himmler had plenty of jealous enemies in the German hierarchy and in Hitler's own circle. The aim, for Himmler as well as Hitler, was a break in the enemy coalition. That Hitler had fewer hopes about this than Himmler is unquestionable. Yet this was his objective until the end.

1945 While Himmler hoped to achieve some kind of accommodation with the Western Allies, Ribbentrop and Goebbels were partisans of seeking a deal with Stalin. On one occasion Ribbentrop even offered to fly to Moscow. Hitler, probably rightly, rejected the idea, saying that Ribbentrop should not do what Hess, flying to Scotland, had tried in May 1941. Still, in February 1945 he allowed Ribbentrop (who was the most rigid of his followers) to send a memorandum to German diplomatic posts abroad, a "Sprachregelung," permitting German diplomats to seek contact with Western counterparts to remind the latter that a Russian penetration into Germany and to the center of Europe would present the gravest danger to the world. But Hitler no longer believed that such attempts would be successful. He still believed that the unnatural alliance between Americans and Russians would break up—though no longer necessarily

*Including the cold and brutal Kaltenbrunner within the SS. (About this see also Fleming, FL, pp. 169–70.) Maser (M/A, p. 349) makes too much of Himmler's conspiracies, suggesting the possibility—in my opinion, wrongly—that Himmler recommended the physician Dr. Stumpfegger to Hitler with the purpose of eventually poisoning the latter.

because of him.* Neither his so much further use. In this respect 28 March may be telling. He grabbed Speer's arm and, with you still believe that the war can believe that, all would be well." the only thing that mattered. Ititions. It was the only condition of a realistic idealist; it was the minist idealism.

Eight days before his suicide Berlin encircled by the Russian have made this decision, the month 1944, and should have a Prussia." That could have acl Feldherr would have died in his battered armies, on the east the Asiatic flood—an act that r

*Goebbels diaries, citing Hitler, : break up in any circumstance; the qu are beaten down, or only after that. impression that he [Hitler] lives in the earth like a deus ex machina. He is a in the enemy camp is a justification for February and March 1945 Hitler suggests with the enemy in different ways

†Speer's account in SF, pp. 457–58 condemnatory of Speer. Contrary to Earth order (to destroy all installation during the retreat of the army) was definite evidence of Hitler's criminal was clear to Hitler that parts of his d. Yet the same Hitler still wished to it cites Hitler to Kaltenbrunner in late I come to show Hitler his model of Lir I could talk like this about my plans that we really are going to win this source is given, but perhaps it is not i after that 28 March confrontation, a: "Here! Read it! You did not believe it

1945

aim of forcing Germany to

it—in this Hitler was in accord
le—he had begun to think that
night be the most amenable to
nple, in June 1944 he not only

is favorite physician (Morell) that the
orst of his life. No one can imagine
: complaints, hour-long losses of bal-
nothing to no one, he stood fast and
: was the danger of a collapse, but he
n.) Also: during September and Octo-
is daily situation conferences, and he
id-November (Schenck, PH, p. 396,
stayed in bed, pale and thin, in his
d to summon his generals to his bed-
e. No: "Heavily breathing he got up,
bled to the conference map table, sat
d for the generals to come in." While
Funk told Speer that Hitler did not
in his own lies"). Speer (SP, p. 367) is
ired his composure in critical situa-
inary achievement of his will till the
in spite of [Morell's medical experi-
To me his will seemed unbridled and
who will not be discouraged or worn
o impressive."

ist [on the Ardennes offensive]? The
314) cites Hitler's address to division
erg, four days before the offensive:
n it may happen that at any moment
ollapses with a gigantic thud." (From
n. *Die Protokollfragmente seiner mili-*
713.) Also: "The strategic calculation
e West was not at all as wrongheaded

is: "In his struggle against the allied
d even the glimmer of an idea of
ion with a view of splitting it apart."
his main chance might be a contact
ut that was not his main inclination.

allowed a peaceful German withdrawal from the city of Rome (from
which he hoped to gain propaganda advantages) but allowed Field
Marshal Kesselring to attempt negotiations with American gen-
erals. And when, in March 1945, SS general Karl Wolff entered into
negotiations with the Americans about a partial capitulation of the
German armies in Italy, Hitler not only was apprised of this but on
17 April received Wolff in Berlin and, in his way, wished him well in
his endeavor.* Around the same time, he agreed to a proposal from
Speer, to allow some of the Czech directors of the Skoda Works, "in
view of their previous connections to American industry," to flee
before the Russians and prepare a direct flight to American head-
quarters in Germany. By that time Hitler no longer believed that he
had power enough to drive a wedge between his enemies. But he was
still convinced that a break would come; indeed, the Dulles-Wolff
negotiations did lead to a short but bitter controversy between Roo-
sevelt and Stalin, who complained sharply about it.†

*"In his way," because a few hours later he told him to wait a bit before signing
an armistice. Henke, p. 676: Hitler had known about this for months; he sanctioned
Wolff's negotiations with the Americans "because he saw in it a good instrument to
cause dissensions within the anti-Hitler coalition." About this episode see Allen
Dulles, *The Secret Surrender* (NY, 1966); Bradley D. Smith and Elena Agarossi,
Operation Sunrise (NY, 1979); and especially the memoirs of one of the chief middle-
men negotiators, the Swiss Max Waibel, 1945: *Kapitulation in Norditalien* (Basel,
1981). The negotiations began as early as February.

†With some reason. Waibel, p. 28: Parilli, the Italian middleman, thought that
certain Germans "had hoped eventually to fight together with [the Americans]
against the Russians." P. 31: "... the thought of dividing the Western Allies from
the Russians was the last great hope of the German leadership and ran like a red
thread through all of the negotiations." Thus two months before Hitler's suicide,
American generals and an SS general sat at the same table in Switzerland. On
15 April, Wolff wrote a letter to Dulles, expressing his condolences on President
Roosevelt's death. The next day Himmler—and Hitler—ordered Wolff (repeating
the order three times) to Berlin, where he spent more than ten hours with Himmler
and Kaltenbrunner before seeing Hitler. Waibel, p. 106: "... in this way alone the
dividing of the Allies from the Russians could be achieved." And pp. 107-8, citing
Hitler to Wolff: In the East and in Italy the German armies may fight for another
two months. "During these two decisive months of the war a break... between the
Russians and the Anglo-Saxons will come, and whichever of the two sides comes to
him, he will gladly ally with them against the other."

a scene

v 6

than other cities in Germany, were centers of such political activities and organizations. There was the proximity—geographic, racial, and linguistic—of Lower Bavaria with Austria. Elsewhere in Germany Hitler's Austrianness (including his diction) may have been a political handicap, but in Munich it was not a disadvantage. These circumstances were important and helpful, but what was really decisive was Hitler's self-discovery: his ability as a speaker. That may have occurred as early as late April 1919,* and thereafter developed quickly. It was not entirely independent of its circumstances: The extreme and hyperbolic character of his oratory echoed better in the raucous atmosphere of Munich than in the tighter-lipped north: the rough and beery, jocular South German virility summed up in the untranslatable Bavarian-German word "Gaudi."[†]

Consequent to his ability to impress people with his speaking came the discovery of his ability (and the exercise of his will) to influence them: a less ephemeral and more enduring task, amounting to the truly political portion of his genius. His confidence in that ability grew gradually. Where Demosthenes failed, this modern demagogue succeeded: he became the leader of a party, then the leader of *his* party, and finally the leader of a national movement. That does not concern us in this chapter; what should concern us here is the change or development in Hitler's public and private *persona*. It was in Munich that this odd (and odd-looking) young man

*Possibly the first consequential event: Hitler haranguing (and convincing) his fellow soldiers in the barracks not to follow the Red leader Egelhofer into the streets. (This happened on 29 or 30 April 1919, the day of his suicide twenty-six years later.) *Saved for 1945, April 30*

[†]Closest English suggestion: a rough feasting—in our case, rejoicing in hearing something brutally exclaimed. The Old English word "gaudy" (OED) also meant rejoicing, but without the element of brutality; at most, a prank (Oxford Oriol College gaudies: annual college dinner events).

Fest is very good about this in F, p. 212: "... Hitler's party could profit, too, from the specific Bavarian crudeness ["Grobianismus"], in accord with its political rules of the game. The beer-hall battles with their crashing chairs and flying beer steins, the songs calling for 'murder,' the big thrashings; it was all a tremendous Gaudi." He adds that it was then that the word "Nazi" first appeared: "to Bavarian ears an abbreviation of the name 'Ignaz' [but] thereby a familiar sound, evidently a help in the widely spreading awareness of the Party."

became not only a political figure at least to some people, and in his respectable women. In Munich—was eventually introduced to even patrician families, acquiring, as the Germans say, "sexual: an assistance in the tability. As some of Hitler's friends (Strasser) said at the time, the young bachelor made him appealing—sexual: The ladies Bechstein, Remann, Hanfstaengl,* saw him with a young man in need of affection (once-humiliated child?).[†] None Munich there occurred a *complot*. Many of his personal habits did not for economics, continued; it stood out his career many of his close Bavarians and Austrians, ex-Catholics (or, at least, the most satisfactory) mid-1930s: the national leader's that small restaurant or café in circle. It was not by accident that house (which was more than a remained grateful to Munich that he mentioned to the architect of Munich. (Later, he changed that

*Helene Bechstein: "I wished he'd I Frau Carola Hoffman, Christmas 1925 my beloved true little mother [Mutterchen p. 112].

[†]The adoration that so many German sexual characteristics. (So had the fren unmarried Mayor Karl Lueger, who was Hitler.) That Hitler was unmarried was motherliness in the trust and hope with shocking or unpleasant events: "If only I

①

1945, 1946

Germany—a German resistance (and not only because of its the resistance of men and subjugated or were unwilling to solitary persons, families, ranging small minority contingents of the General Staff of the Army, that, too, was unlikely). This, a resistance to Hitler did not exist within the split minds of the German people. "resistance" meant a struggle against Hitler (and we ought not to consider that the anti-Jewish sentiment among the German people (examples: Romania, etc.) is a tentative general statement from many of the recorded instances of many Germans who tried to resist at difficult times. On the other hand, the evident acts of a hard-headed obedience and respect of Hitler were more than for Hitler.

to which respect for Hitler also requires some qualification.

Hitler's anti-Semitism was the result—the majority of the people—people who in the privacy of their homes were convinced that this proved they no longer dared to speak out, let alone number of Antis who later, after the inner emigration,¹ or even as the result of the use of Hitler. (I should be used with great caution." (I

tion. The majority of the German people, in the midst of their greatest dangers and shocks and tribulations, were stunned. Many of their remaining officials were unwilling and unable to come to terms with the phenomenon of their departed leader. After all, as late as March 1945 his successor, Admiral Doenitz, had addressed his commanders: "Let us place our trust unconditionally in Adolf Hitler's leadership. Believe me, in my two years as Navy Commander-in-Chief I have found that his strategic views always turned out right." During the days between Hitler's death and the final capitulation of Germany, Doenitz and most of his government continued to be respectful of Hitler. (Doenitz did not announce the dissolution of the party, nor did he remove the swastika flag or pictures of Hitler from government offices at Flensburg.) He announced on 2 May: Hitler's "struggle against the Bolsheviks was made in behalf of Europe and the entire civilized world. . . . The Anglo-Americans are therefore no longer continuing the war in the interest of their peoples but only in order to promote the spread of Bolshevism in Europe."² His diary on the day after the capitulation, 9 May 1945: "The fundamental for the continued existence of the German people is the national community created by National Socialism."³

That giving up the struggle against the West was preferable to giving up the struggle against the East was obvious by then. It was also obvious that for Germany, National Socialism was preferable to Bolshevism—among other things, because of the living standards of the German people. For a long time after the war, this notion that National Socialism was, after all, better than Bolshevism remained a strong article of belief, surely in West Germany (and also among some Americans in the anti-Communist 1950s). There were many reasons for such a belief: not only the prosperity that Hitler had

¹Doenitz in Nuremberg, IMT, XIII, p. 33, cited by Maser: [Hitler] was "a tremendous personality . . . with extraordinary intelligence and willpower, with a truly universal culture [*Bildung*], with a powerfully impressive character and with an enormously suggestive power."

²This is perhaps the only instance where I must express my disagreement with the otherwise unexceptionable Schramm, *sch*, p. 180: "That Admiral Doenitz, who unexpectedly succeeded to power, immediately initiated the surrender, remains a service for which he deserves no less recognition than General Weygand in France five years earlier." This estimation of Weygand is questionable.

1946

1946

1946

Jennifer
Faulstich

his rule, after his death, after the triumph of the Allies, in German lands, especially in Christian and conservative circles, [people] were willing to regard Hitler as a daemon, an anti-Christ, as a phenomenon beyond understanding, disappearing [thus] into metaphysical clouds. This retreat into a . . . metaphysical hell . . . served, first of all, as a kind of relief: one did not want to admit that one was also responsible for the rise, for the assumption of power, for the Europe-wide destructive achievements of this man."

In his massive biography Fest is sometimes, at least implicitly, ambiguous about such an assumption of a unique German responsibility. Yes, Germany was a special place. There evidently existed "national characteristics that had made National Socialism different from the Fascistic movements of other countries, but then Hitler had found obedient followers everywhere." And: "Even though every nation carries in itself the responsibility for its history," it is wrong "to deny the recognition that in [Hitler] culminated the powerful tendency of a time that marked the entire first half of the century."* This may be too Hegelian, with its implication of *Zeitgeist*, but there is truth in Fest's conclusion: "In the end it is also certain that he could not have destroyed Europe without [a] concurrence from the latter." In sum: "He was much less a great contradiction than the reflection [*Spiegelbild*—literally "mirror image"] of his times." The young Zitelmann, in his early commentary on "Hitler-research,"† which contains interesting and insightful commentaries and criticisms of Hitler's various biographers, distinguishes the external circumstances that allowed Hitler to assume power and to accomplish his extraordinary success from what Zitelmann—in my opinion employing the wrong term—calls the "subjective" factor; that is, the characteristics of Hitler's personality.

In 1985 Martin Broszat summed up the problem: "Extraordinary in our situation is the necessity, as well as the difficulty, of fitting National Socialism properly into German history."‡ Haffner asked

*F, pp. 516–17; F, p. 1024.

†"Hitlers Erfolge—Erklärungsversuche in der Hitler-Forschung," in *Neue Politische Literatur* (hereafter: NPL), 1982, p. 22.

‡In *Merkur*, 8 May 1985.

Post-war

ence between public opinion and popular sentiment. (Kershaw, above, prefers to use the term "popular opinion.") What is "public" is not necessarily "popular"; and "opinion" is not identical with "sentiment." (The subtitle of Marlis Steinert's study suggests this: It is "Stimmung und Haltung der deutschen Bevölkerung im Zweiten Weltkrieg"—and note that the German "Stimmung" means sentiment rather than opinion; in other words, an inclination rather than an actuality—while "Haltung" suggests something like character, attitude, or behavior.) To this we ought to add the inadequacy of quantitative formulations of "public opinion." Such numerical affirmations are useful, and even close to being precise when it comes to electoral predictions—that is, to questions involving choices. But choice is not necessarily identical with opinion (especially when it involves a choice of predetermined and fixed alternatives, as in the case of electoral procedures). While each vote amounts to one vote and to nothing else, both the intensity and the influence of opinions vary. Moreover, history is full of examples of "hard minorities" and "soft majorities"—with the influence of the former often being larger than its numbers might indicate. This applies to the German people in the Hitler era, too.* If, on the basis of nearly discovered and reliable evidence, someone should convincingly prove that at a certain time "only" 20 percent of Germans were opposed to Hitler, this does not mean that 80 percent of the rest were convinced Hitlerites; conversely, a convincing study indicating that at a certain time "only 20 percent" were unquestioning followers of Hitler does not mean that

*HC, pp. 92-93, quoting the eminent Dutch historian Pieter Geyl in an essay about the American Civil War: "Did the majority of the Netherlands people will the complete rupture with Philip II and with the Roman Church? . . . No. Did the majority of the English people will the overthrow of the monarchy and the execution of Charles I? . . . No. Did the French people will the Republic and the execution of Louis XVI? . . . No. Did the majority of the German people in 1933 want Hitler, did they will war? No." The very election of 1860, in which Lincoln polled less than 40 percent of the votes, proves that the majority of the American people had not deliberately willed the Civil War; but Geyl rightly asks: "Does this prove that the war might therefore have been avoided? Is it not rather one more proof of the general truth that the course of history is not governed by the conscious will of the majority?"

Postwar
D. T. *

*D.T. The conscious will of the majority is but a tide. A vessel with a powerful motor will make history against any tide but a cataclysmic storm.

I hope that my readers will allow this brief summary disquisition, if for no other reason than the existence of a recognizable condition: at the time of this writing, fifty or more years after Hitler took his own life, we in the Western world are threatened not by an endangerment of "culture" but by grave dangers to civilization.* Let me repeat: The kind of civilization that we still know was the product of the so-called Modern Age. The term "Modern" is both unhistorical and imprecise, suggesting that this "modern" age would last forever.† It would be more accurate to name the last five hundred years the Bourgeois Age, characterized as it was by the coexistence of aristocracies and bourgeois, and with the gradual and uneasy rise of the latter. That Hitler was the enemy of almost everything that was "bourgeois" needs no further explanation.‡ He belongs to the end of an age, and he was defeated, and—for a while—bourgeois civilization has been restored, at least in Western Europe and West Germany. But if Western civilization melts away, threatening to collapse, two dangers lie in the future. During a rising flood of barbarism his reputation may rise in the eyes of orderly people, who may regard him as a kind of Diocletian, a tough last architect of an imperial order. At the same time he might be revered by at least some of the New Barbarians. But this book is the work of a historian, not of a prophet.

*Speer in prison already in 1947: Hitler's war has shown "the vulnerability of modern civilization, built up during centuries. We know now that we live in a building that is not immune to earthquakes . . . if the automatism of progress leads to a further dehumanization [*Entpersönlichung*] of people, depriving them of responsibility even more. [In the] decisive years of my life I have served technology, blinded to its possibilities. In the end I am sceptical about it." This is the opposite of Spenglerianism.

†The Middle Ages is a misnomer, too, because the term suggests a position in the "middle," between Ancient and Modern. But there is a difference, due to our historical consciousness: People during and at the end of the Middle Ages did *not* know that they lived in the Middle Ages, whereas we know that we have been living in the Modern Age, and that we are near the end of it.

‡We must recognize, too, that in an essential way he belonged to his age, for in his own way, he believed in Progress—unable and unwilling to recognize that the grave task before civilization now is a necessary rethinking of the entire meaning of Progress (a term that Tocqueville abhorred, but Hitler did not).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABBREVIATIONS

No complete bibliography are SCHRB and the series is a list of works cited in the abbreviations by which the each case. The most frequent in the footnotes as M—Munich, L—L P—Paris

- | | |
|------|---|
| ADAP | Akten zur deutschen |
| AH/B | <i>The Testament of</i>
documents. |
| BU | Alan Bullock, <i>Hitler</i>
ed., 1962. |
| C | William Carr, <i>Hitler</i>
L, 1978. |
| D | Ernst Deuerlein, |
| DL | John Lukacs, <i>The</i>
<i>Struggle Between</i> |
| F | Joachim Fest, <i>Adolf</i>
with a new introduction |
| FAZ | <i>Frankfurter Allgemeine</i> |
| FL | Gerhard Fleming
Calif., 1982. |
| FR | Hans Frank, <i>Im Reich</i> |
| GD | German Documents |
| GI | Hans Bernd Gisevius
M, 1963. |

to disorder. Here again, an anti-Marxist epigram of the profound Simone Weil (1942) is telling: "It is not religion but revolution that is the opiate of the people"—and Hitler's usage of "revolution" was a kind of opiate for the New Order.

The third element is Tocqueville's vision of the last one thousand years. Aware and knowledgeable as he was of the classic division of European history into ancient, medieval, and modern epochs, he had another view that transcended these categories. This was the change from the aristocratic age to the democratic age; from entire societies ruled by minorities to societies ruled by their majorities (or, at least, in the name of their majorities). He thought that this was the deepest change in the history of the last thousand years.

What we may then see now, at the end of the so-called Modern Age, is that this last great era, which began about five hundred years ago, may have been marked by the—sometimes uneasy but civilizationally and culturally fruitful—confluence of tradition and reform, of aristocracy and democracy, with the former weakening and the latter rising, until now, when we live in an overwhelmingly democratic age (and when we may have to rethink the very political terms associated with democracy). What this means for the future, I cannot tell; new divisions and new hierarchies will appear. But what it means for the recent past, a historian can—and ought to—recognize: that Hitler was a new kind of revolutionary; a populist revolutionary in a democratic age, notwithstanding all of the then still extant older elements of German institutions and German society, many of which he knew how to employ for his purposes.*

*A general tendency of most historians—and perhaps especially the German ones—has been to see the Hitler chapter of German history as a horrid but transitional one: something between (or a compound of) the old and the new, in part also because of the evident ambiguities in Hitler's character and ideas. There is truth in this vision, though, in my opinion, it does not go far enough.

State; I

*The insufficient
Hitler and the state—H
Hitler the ex.*

THE TERM "TOTALITARIANISM" not included in the O. cluded in its Supplement appeared in the late 1920s, in a Fascist Italy. We may find applied to Fascist Italy or to seldom to Communist Russia the most "totalitarian" "totalitarianism" became a applied especially to Communist and, as we shall see, imprecise twentieth century.* However

*An influential example of the term *Origins of Totalitarianism*, published intellectuals, especially in New York belatedly) willing to recognize the flawed and dishonest book (see my *Works Reconsidered*, April 1990)

1941

Dwayne - note

X-ray the ~~area~~ below.
Dx to it

It may be too soon, or possibly, I do
can participate on the next day but to
explain the conference and the action
among those who refer to the long
on the I am hopeful and anxious to
problems.

In early 1961, during a visit to
Istanbul, and his common conference
He wants us to go away for our
Netherlands, with a representative of the country.
Qualities like whether enthusiasm is
a mistake. He is thinking, and looking
of the time when we will be able to

Church
+
Choir 20

1897 and 1924 (V)
School The Young Hitler

at Fischlham, and because the farm was not paying its way. In July, 1897, he sold the property, which was to exchange hands a dozen times in the next twenty years.

As soon as the farm was sold, the whole family went into lodgings at Lambach, the nearest town of any size. Lambach was halfway between Linz and Salzburg, and like Passau it had an ancient and distinguished history. There was a great Benedictine monastery, which had been founded in the eleventh century. Byzantine frescoes and many paintings by medieval masters were still preserved in the monastery. Lambach had many other churches, including the famous Paura Church, built in the form of a triangle with three towers, three gates, three windows, and three altars.

Adolf was admitted to the school attached to the Benedictine monastery and was immediately fascinated by the new world of church ritual, the black-robed monks, the abbot ruling his flock with all the authority of an earthly king. He did well in the school and was overwhelmed by the beauty of the services. Ecclesiastical music fascinated him, and in his spare time he took singing lessons so that he could sing in the choir. "Again and again I enjoyed the best possibility of intoxicating myself with the solemn splendor of the dazzling festivals of the Church," he wrote later. "It seemed to me perfectly natural to regard the abbot as the highest and most desirable ideal, just as my father regarded the village priest as his ideal." There was thus no trace of anticlericalism in the family. For two years Adolf contemplated the possibility of one day joining the community of monks, eventually rising to the position of abbot, with supreme authority over all the monks. But while he enjoyed the church ceremonies and looked upon the abbot with awe and veneration, he remained a quite normal schoolboy with a schoolboy's capacity for mischief. One day, when he was about nine years old, a priest caught him smoking a cigarette. This was a serious matter, and for a while he was in danger of receiving exemplary punishment. The danger passed, for the priest quickly forgave him, and he resumed his schooling as though nothing had happened.

Visitors to the monastery have observed one curious and memorable detail. In six or seven places—over the ornamental gateway, over a stone well, and over some of the stalls in the abbey—a swastika appears. The swastika was included in the coat of arms of Abbot Theodorich von Hagen, who ruled over the monastery in the fifties and sixties of the last century. In German a swastika is a *Hakenkreuz*, and evidently the abbot regarded it as a pun on his own name, the difference between *Haken* and *Hagen* being so small that it might pass unobserved. The abbot's swastika inspires no fear: it was carved delicately and simply, and the only emotion it conveys is one of surprise that an abbot should

amuse himself with such ill-considered building. Kirchengasse, could see it from his apartment, and he saw it. Theodorich von Hagen's *Hakenkreuz*.

About this time Alois roof. He was the black came from him. In 1900, imprisonment for theft, sentence, this time of eight years, and France, practi him in Dublin, and in a small restaurant in Livery Dowling, and fathered a World War I he abandoned, he was sentenced to six years of Hamburg for bigamy.

opened a bar and restaurant, much frequented by Nazi leaders, related to the old called Café Alois, prospered in Linz by one of his Russia and was taken prisoner many years later. In 1945 and nothing more was ever

Although Alois Jr. was member of the family. Women, and lived by his getting rich quickly and poverty soured him. Her when he was about to be ing his latest wife. Her was The unhappiest member January 21, 1896. She was docile. Quiet and easily. the day of her birth and married, and died in 1960.

The family at Lambach children: Angela, Adolf, lodging house in the center apartment on the second smith's shop. The children

* Obviously from Mein Kampf. He doesn't miss a political tip. 1924 - pub in 1924

Repeat page

III-5

D.T.

HITLER'S YOUTH

'What with games in the open air, the distance we had to walk to school and my association with the other toughest of tough youngsters (often a source of acute concern to my mother), I became anything but a stay-at-home.'

Yes, accurate as far as it goes, but not a word is said about the countryside, its joys and its endless variety, which the young Adolf was then experiencing for the first time. He appears to have had little feeling for Nature.

His second school in Lambach

In July 1897, for reasons which have been explained in a previous chapter, the Hitler family moved to the market town of Lambach, where they went into lodgings. The primary school in Lambach, which Adolf attended for sixteen months, was better organized than his first school. Throughout this time his reports were excellent.

As he had a good natural voice, Adolf was given singing lessons at the choristers' training school run by Father Bernhard Gruner at the local monastery. During his training, as Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf*, 'I had a fine opportunity to drink in the solemn splendour of the church festivals which were gorgeous in the extreme; and what could be more natural than that the office of Abbot should seem to me an ideal infinitely worth striving for?' The youthful Hitler, in that case, would seem to have been more accessible to idealistic emotions than the average boy of his age, whose only reaction to ecclesiastical pomp would probably be to ask how soon it would all be over.

Konrad Heiden has a story that Adolf was expelled from the boys' choir because he was caught smoking in the monastery garden, but the punishment seems improbably heavy for such a crime, particularly when the offender was only nine years old.

The gateway of the monastery at Lambach is adorned with the coat of arms of the Abbot, Theodorich Hagen—namely a wolf-trap with the initials TH. The device bears a certain resemblance to a swastika which prompted someone during the Nazi period to paint a tasteless pastiche of the well-known picture of Saint

For all of these two pages, D.T. is searching through the Adolf's boyhood

Francis of Assisi receiving the Stigmata in which the boy Adolf was portrayed kneeling before the gateway with rays of light falling from the coat of arms on to his outstretched hands. This blasphemy gave rise to the opinion that the Nazi swastika originated from the monastery at Lambach; which is, of course, quite untrue.

His third school in Leonding/Linz

In January 1899, after buying a small house there, Alois Hitler moved his family to Leonding, on the western outskirts of Linz. The primary school which Adolf attended was only five minutes walk from his home. Hitler himself described this period as follows:

'I was really anything but "good" in the usual sense of the word. The ridiculously easy learning in school left me so much spare time that the sun saw more of me than the ceiling. I became the leader of a small gang.'

Every statement forthcoming from Hitler's former fellow-pupils in Leonding confirms the accuracy of this description. He was out of doors almost continually, playing with a gang of boys. With his town upbringing, Adolf was quicker-witted than they and was the instigator of all their pranks. They often played the popular children's game, 'Cops and Robbers', and the fringe of the nearby Kurnberger forest was ideal ground, offering plenty of hide-outs. In later years one who had played in these games as a boy told me: 'Once, through sheer carelessness, we started a forest fire. We tried to stamp it out and when we found we couldn't, we ran off. Adolf kept dinning into us not to tell anyone, otherwise, he said, we would all be thrashed and put in jail. Finally the fire brigade from Linz had to deal with it.'

Adolf, I was told, was never a fighter. He used his tongue instead of his fists. He was more alert than the other boys and in their games it was he who used his wits to best advantage. War games were always Adolf's favourite and he was always the leader in them. One of the boys, Balduin by name, was destined to become Abbot of the Cistercian Monastery at Wilhering. The Abbot recalled: 'We were always playing at war—war-games, endlessly.'

D.T. His relations to tough kids.

Explore it. Keep the doors open and shut in his mind concerning the past.

Balance Edmund's class by the Hitler's class.

62 June 1947 to October 1949
ADOLF HITLER'S EARLY CHILDHOOD
Feb 1949 to January 1950

nication between father and son increasingly difficult. Alois took out some of his difficulties on his son, and the youngster, unable to express his anger at his father, probably repressed his problems, turning to childhood games as a means of acting out some of this aggression. Nothing in the record indicates a crisis in family relations at this stage, and a change was in the offing.

Once again, Alois gave up in the face of an unpleasant situation. In November 1898 he purchased a one-story country house on a half-acre adjacent to the cemetery wall in the village of Reunheim on the outskirts of the small provincial city of Linz. On February 23, 1899, the family moved into the new house. Four days later Adolf was enrolled in his third elementary school.³³

The acquisition of the Leonding property, Alois' third effort to discover a stable life in retirement, proved successful at last. He settled down as owner of the property and continued to reside there until his death in 1903, while the rest of the family, less dominated by wanderlust than the head of the household, made the Linz area their home. This was especially true of Adolf, who grew up in Leonding-Linz and never overcame the influence of the town. One of his secretaries, speaking after the war, said: "Even in March of 1945, I have seen Hitler stand for endless periods in front of a wood model representing the rebuilding and extension of the city of Linz. In such moments Hitler forgot the war; he lost the marks of tiredness, and for hours he told us of the detailed changes that he planned to make in his home city." 34

To a lesser extent, Alois also put down roots in Leonding-Linz. The half-acre of land permitted him to resume his dabbling with bees, but without the heavy costs that had turned Hafeld into a liability. He eased into a routine of putting in the garden, punctuated by a morning visit to the *Gasthaus Stiefler* and an evening get-together there or in one of the other inns in the area.³⁵ He attained a degree of genuine contentment, but his nature was too explosive for him to be able to settle down to a completely passive existence. He continued to be unhappy about the events of the day

⁵³ *Jetzinger* (G), pp. 69 and 90, *Jetzinger* (E), pp. 50-51, "Aus Adolf Hitlers Jugendland," HA, File 17, Reel 1A.

³⁴ Zoller, p. 57.

³⁵ *Jetzinger* (G), pp. 69 and 73; *Jetzinger* (E), pp. 51-52.

the final
optical system

much her talk
in 1900 in bars,
more than action.

The City

scene

The sorrow and
~~self-pity~~ self-pity he felt
in himself for what
would now not
come to pass could have
passed was beautiful
enough for a saint's
heart. Self-pity can reach

~~The father of the~~
~~father of all kings~~
~~the Emperor and the~~
~~Emperor of China~~
~~Emperor of China~~

④ D.T. → let us not pass over
the 12th anniversary of the death of the

1945 (#2)

1945

(#2)

In this Folder

The Ailing Empire - Hattner
The life & Death of A.H.

a few hours and awoke
prisoners often sleep
the first time in many years
no orders to give. When
Möhre Mohnke, the com-
mander of the railroad station had
there had been some other
the noon conference, Hitler
the Russians were
at the Potsdamer Platz, and
the Friedrichstrasse. A few
to prevent them from being
hundreds of people who had
now within a block of the
the empire only a few ruined

two secretaries and his
was not hungry and
which consisted of a dish of
a few minutes. Frau Junge
indeed there was nothing
was to be played in silence
the reverberations of artillery

last meal, Otto Guensche
came in in jerricans and place
Guensche telephoned to
a port officer, who knew all
the curves of gasoline in the
though incredulously. Why
but Guensche's tone was
the Kempka was able to
bring four men rolling the
the underground bunkers,
in the bunkers with gaso-
a satisfactory explanation was
himself.

lower bunker. Those who
the women—Magda Goeb-
el, Manziyal, and Fräulein
about a dozen men. They
the generals Burgdorf and
Walter Hewel, who repre-

sented Ribbentrop's nonexistent Foreign Ministry; Johann Rattenhuber, who was in charge of Hitler's security; Werner Naumann, of the Propaganda Ministry; and Otto Guensche. Heinz Linge, Hitler's personal servant, was also present, and Kempka stood some distance away at the foot of the stairs.

Like an actor who returns to the stage to give a series of farewell performances, Hitler had already said farewell to the people who formed a line in the corridor. He had walked among them, shaking their hands in silence, not looking at their faces. Now he came for the last time, accompanied by his wife, who wore a dark blue polka-dot dress, nylon stockings, her favorite brown Italian-made shoes, and on her wrist a platinum watch studded with diamonds. Although pale, she was completely self-controlled. She embraced the women and smiled at the men in uniform who kissed her hand. Hitler shook hands with everyone mechanically and said nothing at all. Then, slowly, they walked back to the small room with the portrait of Frederick the Great hanging on the wall. There would be no more leave-takings.

Otto Guensche stood guard outside the door, and Heinz Linge was standing a few feet away. Suddenly there was a commotion. Magda Goebbels came running up to the door screaming that there was still hope, that Hitler must not commit suicide, and that, if she could only talk to him, she could dissuade him. Guensche was six feet, two inches tall and looked like a gorilla. Magda Goebbels was so insistent that he decided to open the door, which was unlocked, and ask Hitler if he was prepared to receive her. Hitler was standing at the table. There was no sign of Eva, who was evidently in the bathroom, for he heard the sound of running water. Hitler turned and said, "I don't want to see her," and then the door closed.

In this small room, twelve feet long and nine feet wide, no larger than the room in the Viennese Männerheim where Hitler had spent his early manhood, the last act of the drama that convulsed the world and led to the greatest bloodletting in history took place. It was a strangely bourgeois suicide, the lovers sitting together on a couch, saying nothing, going about their affairs silently. No voices were heard, and there was not even the sound of a shot. Heinz Linge, standing nearby, all his nerves keyed for the sound of a shot, remembered distinctly that he was aware of Hitler's death only when there came to him the faint, barely perceptible smell of gunpowder. Probably, like Geli Raubal, Hitler had dulled the sound of the shot by wrapping the revolver in a towel.

When Guensche and Linge entered the room, they found both Hitler and Eva sitting on the couch. Hitler, according to Linge, had a small hole the size of a German silver mark in the right temple, and the blood was trickling slowly down his cheek. Eva had bitten the phial of potas-

Life & Death of A.H.

1945

God, I am afraid he won't give me his answer today. If only somebody would help me—it is all so terribly depressing.

Perhaps my letter reached him at an inopportune moment. Perhaps I should not have written. Anyway, the uncertainty is more terrible than a sudden ending of it all.

I have made up my mind to take 35 pills this time, and it will be "dead certain." If only he would let someone call.

second suicide attempt follows

*The first suicide had
cemented their relations.
~~He understood~~ She understood
that he could not undergo
another Cate Denouement.*

M

Since 1914 when, as World War which was

In these three decades have guided me in all strength to make the had to face. I have experienced in these three decades.

It is untrue that I was desired and insisted who were either of Jews made so many offers to posterity cannot explain outbreak of this war after the first terrible war or even against American cities and monuments who alone are ultimately

As late as three days proposed to the British problem—similar to control. This offer came because the responsibility in the expectation of promoted by international

But I left no doubt again to be treated as money and finance for this murderous struggle also left no doubt that children of Aryan descent to suffer death, or hit burned and bombed taking his due punishment

After six years of struggle in history as the most people's will to live. capital of this Reich. I resistance against the is rendered valueless to share the fate that I shall remain in this case of enemies who for the spectacle promoted by

I have therefore res of my own will at the

1945

MY POLITICAL TESTAMENT

Since 1914 when, as a volunteer. I made my modest contribution in the World War which was forced upon the Reich, over thirty years have passed.

In these three decades only love for my people and loyalty to my people have guided me in all my thoughts, actions, and life. They gave me the strength to make the most difficult decisions, such as no mortal has yet had to face. I have exhausted my time, my working energy, and my health in these three decades.

It is untrue that I or anybody else in Germany wanted war in 1939. It was desired and instigated exclusively by those international statesmen who were either of Jewish origin or working for Jewish interests. I have made so many offers for the reduction and limitation of armaments, which posterity cannot explain away for all eternity, that the responsibility for the outbreak of this war cannot rest on me. Furthermore, I never desired that after the first terrible World War a second war should arise against England or even against America. Centuries may pass, but out of the ruins of our cities and monuments of art there will arise anew the hatred for the people who alone are ultimately responsible: international Jewry and its helpers!

As late as three days before the outbreak of the German-Polish war, I proposed to the British Ambassador in Berlin a solution of the German-Polish problem—similar to the problem of the Saar area, under international control. This offer cannot be explained away, either. It was only rejected because the responsible circles in English politics wanted the war, partly in the expectation of business advantages, partly driven by propaganda promoted by international Jewry.

But I left no doubt about the fact that if the peoples of Europe were again to be treated as so many packages of shares by these international money and finance conspirators, then the people who bear the real guilt for this murderous struggle would also have to answer for it: the Jews! It also left no doubt that this time we would not permit millions of European children of Aryan descent to die of hunger, or millions of grown-up men to suffer death, or hundreds of thousands of women and children to be burned and bombed to death in the cities, without the real culprit suffering his due punishment, though in a more humane way.

After six years of struggle, which in spite of all reverses will go down in history as the most glorious and most courageous manifestation of a people's will to live. I cannot separate myself from the city which is the capital of this Reich. Because our forces are too few to permit any further resistance against the enemy's assaults, and because individual resistance is rendered valueless by blinded and characterless scoundrels, I desire to share the fate that millions of others have taken upon themselves, in that I shall remain in this city. Furthermore, I do not want to fall into the hands of enemies who for the delectation of the hate-riddled masses require a new spectacle promoted by the Jews.

I have therefore resolved to remain in Berlin and there to choose death of my own will at the very moment when, as I believe, the seat of the

1945

Fuehrer and Chancellor can no longer be defended. I die with a joyful heart in the awareness of the immeasurable deeds and achievements of our soldiers at the front, of our women at home, the achievements of our peasants and workers, and the contribution, unique in history, of our youth, which bears my name.

It goes without saying that I thank them all from the bottom of my heart and that it is also my desire that in spite of everything they should not give up the struggle, but continue fighting wherever they may be, faithful to the great Clausewitz, against the enemies of the Fatherland. From the sacrifices of our soldiers and from my own comradeship with them, there will come in one way or another into German history the seed of a brilliant renaissance of the National Socialist movement and thus the realization of a true national community.

Many very brave men and women have resolved to link their lives to mine to the very end. I have requested them, and finally ordered them, not to do so, but instead to take part in the continuing struggle of the nation. I ask the commanders of the army, navy, and air force to strengthen by all possible means the spirit of resistance of our soldiers in the spirit of National Socialism, emphasizing especially that I too, as founder and creator of this movement, have preferred death to cowardly flight or even capitulation.

May it be one day a part of the code of honor, as it is already in the navy, that the surrender of an area or of a town is impossible, and above all in this respect the leaders should give a shining example of faithful devotion to duty unto death.

Second Part of the Political Testament

Before my death I expel the former Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering and deprive him of all the rights he may enjoy by virtue of the decree of June 29, 1941, and also by virtue of my statement in the Reichstag on September 1, 1939. I appoint in his place Grossadmiral Doenitz as President of the Reich and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

Before my death I expel the former Reichsfuehrer-SS and Minister of the Interior Heinrich Himmler from the Party and all offices of state. In his place I appoint Gauleiter Karl Hanke as Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police and Gauleiter Paul Giesler as Reich Minister of the Interior.

Goering and Himmler, by their secret negotiations with the enemy, without my knowledge or approval, and by their illegal attempts to seize power in the state, quite apart from their treachery to my person, have brought irreparable shame to the country and the whole people.

In order to give the German people a government composed of honorable men, who will fulfill their duty of continuing the war by all available means, I, as the Fuehrer of the nation, nominate the following members of the new Cabinet:

President of the Reich:
Chancellor of the Reich:
 Party Minister:
 Foreign Minister:
 Minister of the Interior:
 Minister for War:
 C.-in-C. of the Army:
 C.-in-C. of the Navy:
 C.-in-C. of the Air Force:
 Reichsfuehrer-SS and Ch
 Police:
 Economics:
 Agriculture:
 Justice:
 Culture:
 Propaganda:
 Finance:
 Labor:
 Munitions:
 Leader of the German La
 Member of the Reich (

Several of these men, s
 gether with their wives, h
 wish to leave the capital o
 contrary are willing to peri
 request, and in this instan
 own feelings. Through thei
 to me as companions after
 remain amongst them and
 but never unjust; above
 actions, but may they place
 earth. Finally, may they be
 a National Socialist state
 this places every single p
 common interest and to s
 Germans, all National Soc
 Armed Forces, that they r
 ment and to their President

Above all I charge the
 with the strict observance
 against the universal poiso
 Given at Berlin, 29 April

As witnesses:

Dr. JOSEPH GOEBBELS
 MARTIN BORMANN

President of the Reich:	Doenitz
<u>Chancellor of the Reich:</u>	<u>Dr. Goebbels</u>
Party Minister:	Bormann
Foreign Minister:	Seyss-Inquart
Minister of the Interior:	Gauleiter Giesler
Minister for War:	Doenitz
C.-in-C. of the Army:	Schoerner
C.-in-C. of the Navy:	Doenitz
C.-in-C. of the Air Force:	Greim
Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German	
Police:	Gauleiter Hanke
Economics:	Funk
Agriculture:	Backe
Justice:	Thierack
Culture:	Dr. Scheel
Propaganda:	Dr. Naumann
Finance:	Schwerin-Krossigk
Labor:	Dr. Hupfauer
Munitions:	Saur
Leader of the German Labor Front and	
Member of the Reich Cabinet:	Reichminister Dr. Ley

Several of these men, such as Martin Bormann, Dr. Goebbels, etc., together with their wives, have joined me by their own free will and do not wish to leave the capital of the Reich under any circumstances, but on the contrary are willing to perish with me here. Yet I must ask them to obey my request, and in this instance place the interests of the nation above their own feelings. Through their work and loyalty they will remain just as close to me as companions after my death, just as I hope that my spirit will remain amongst them and will always accompany them. Let them be hard, but never unjust; above all, let them never allow fear to counsel their actions, but may they place the honor of the nation above everything on this earth. Finally, may they be conscious of the fact that our task of building a National Socialist state represents the labor of the coming centuries, and this places every single person under an obligation always to serve the common interest and to subordinate his own interests. I demand of all Germans, all National Socialists, men and women and all soldiers of the Armed Forces, that they remain faithful and obedient to the new government and to their President unto death.

Above all I charge the leadership of the nation and their followers with the strict observance of the racial laws and with merciless resistance against the universal poisoners of all peoples, international Jewry.

Given at Berlin, 29 April 1945, 4 A.M.

ADOLF HITLER

As witnesses:

Dr. JOSEPH GOEBBELS
MARTIN BORMANN

WILHELM BURGDOFF
HANS KREBS

1938-45

Hitler may have attached even more importance to his actual leadership than to his actual leadership. The majority of Germans, insofar as they were nor had close links to Jews, this or issue; they could ignore or accept as the Reich remained as unified as it had become. And that feeling lasted until the end. I am anticipating the persecution and extermination of Jews not belong in the next chapter, but the history of World War II. The Jews were not an act of war, but took place during the war.

The anti-Jewish campaign grew in that year Hitler decided to test the effect of his anti-Semitic propaganda by launching a nationwide pogrom. He once again called on the practical. The test results were negative. The armless designation Kristallnacht the German people's response to the events responsible for this comical name were the least of what that day. Shop windows were not the only ones smashed: Jewish homes, synagogues were torched, thousands arrested and shipped to concentration camps where they were killed. That was not a pogrom, it was a pogrom. The people acknowledge it. They distanced they did not take part; there even

1938-45

were some public displays of disgust. At the same time, they sought to minimize the horror of it all by tagging it Kristallnacht, a nasty yet semicomical excess for which they disclaimed all responsibility. Yet at the same time they did not wish to hold National Socialism itself responsible, and most certainly not the Führer.

Be that as it may, from Hitler's vantage point the test did not live up to expectations, and he called a halt after twenty-four hours. He had found out that the mass of German people, his faithful and obedient minions, were not ready to take an active part in anti-Jewish excesses. Hitler learned a lesson from this, one that is often overlooked. When he embarked on the Final Solution, he did not carry it out on German soil. The extermination camps were put into eastern Poland. Germany itself, and various other countries, were the scenes of Jewish "transports": the removal of Jews, allegedly for resettlement in other areas. Unlike the other extreme acts and crimes of the Third Reich, the mass murder, the systematic extermination of millions of Jews, was never publicized, let alone trumpeted. Goebbels's superb propaganda machinery was not activated. The German press under Goebbels's control never said that the Jews must be exterminated, and certainly not that they were actually being exterminated. Even as late as 1945 they kept on playing the same old tune about the Jews being Germany's misfortune who must not be trusted. As far as the German newspaper

a further rise of the masses

Hitler

1938-45

one to which Hitler may have attached even greater importance than to his actual leadership role. For the majority of Germans, insofar as they were neither Jews nor had close links to Jews, this remained a minor issue; they could ignore or accept it as long as the Reich remained as unified and powerful as it had become. And that feeling did not change until the end. I am anticipating the end because the persecution and extermination of the Jews does not belong in the next chapter, which deals with the history of World War II. The mass murder of the Jews was not an act of war, even though it took place during the war.

After 1938 the anti-Jewish campaign grew more virulent. In that year Hitler decided to test the public mood and the effect of his anti-Semitic propaganda by launching a nationwide pogrom. For this purpose he once again called on the practically impotent SA. The test results were negative.

The fairly harmless designation Kristallnacht is indicative of the German people's response to this pogrom. The events responsible for this comparatively innocuous name were the least of what took place that day. Shop windows were not the only things that were smashed: Jewish homes were razed, synagogues were torched, thousands of Jews were arrested and shipped to concentration camps, and some were killed. That was not a crystal-smashing night, it was a pogrom. The people refused to acknowledge it. They distanced themselves, they did not take part; there even

were some
time, the
by taggin
ical exce
sibility.
to hold N
most cert
Be th
the test c
called a h
out that t
and obedi
active par
a lesson f
When he
not carry
tion camp
itself, and
of Jewish
legedly for
other extr
the mass r
millions o
trumpeted
chinery w.
der Goebb
must be ex
were actua
1945 they l
the Jews b
not be tru:

1938-1945

readers and radio listeners were concerned, there was no Holocaust.

This conscious hiding of the Holocaust from the German public partially explains their failure to act. Another, and I believe even more valid, explanation is the fact that even if they had known they could not have done anything about it under the conditions that prevailed in the second half of the war.

Whether or not the Germans knew about the mass murder of the Jews is a question that can be answered only on an individual basis. Of course a great deal seeped through. Was it believed? I don't know. For a long time it also was not believed outside of Germany; the horror of it all went beyond the limits of the human imagination. The German Jews themselves did not believe that anything of this kind could happen, or more of them might have tried to flee after 1938.

A history of the German Reich cannot ignore the persecution of the Jews and their programmatic extermination. It happened, and it is an ineradicable blot on the history of Germany. Yet on the other hand, it cannot be put into the same category as other aspects of that history which, like so much else in the Führer state, were rooted in the history and nature of the German Reich. After 1933 something like a Führer state would probably have come into being even without Hitler. And there probably would have been another war even without Hitler. But not the murder of millions of Jews.

on Septe
visualize
from Wo
against R
Russia tu
it was fo
the end c
ended up
that he w

1939,

1944-5

he came back to this, not publicly, but in secret meetings with his generals. He told them that he was like the spider in his web waiting for a falling-out between the West and the Soviet Union. The only thing wrong with this picture was that he was not the spider but the fly. He failed to understand that the disagreements over the postwar order and the ideological differences between the West and the Russians would not surface, let alone lead to an armed clash, as long as a Germany at war with both of them acted as a buffer. Before the possibility of a third world war could arise, Germany had to be defeated and occupied, the two big power blocs had to meet and confront each other in the heart of Germany. Every delay in this process kept the differences between the two blocs from erupting. As long as Germany stayed in the war, their conflict was bound to remain latent. Thus Germany's continued resistance prevented the very thing Hitler hoped for. His calculation about a possible disintegration of the East-West alliance, if indeed there was one, was a miscalculation. We have no proof that Hitler actually continued to believe in final victory up to the very end. His reasons for continuing the war to the last man might have been psychological rather than political.

There was something mock-heroic about Hitler. According to fairly reliable sources, Göring 1939 allegedly told him in August 1939, "Let's stop this

gam
bling,
it, it
for b
work
great
are in
desire

A
Germ
report
people
termi
surviv
anothe
Germa
the lips

At
of his c
many's
German

The
Directiv
ler orde
Reich, ev
ulation, i
fall into
not be th
then at l
struction.

1939, 1941, 1945
gamble," to which Hitler replied: "I've been gambling all my life." Whether or not he actually said it, it was the truth. He was a man who had to go for broke. If he could not make Germany into the world power then he was prepared to set off the greatest conflagration in German history. There are indications that at the end Hitler consciously desired that catastrophe. — *think of a genuine person*

At the end of 1941, when the first signs that Germany might be facing defeat appeared, Hitler reportedly told a foreign diplomat: "If the German people should no longer be strong enough and determined enough to sacrifice their blood for their survival then let them perish and be destroyed by another, greater power. I will shed no tears for the German people." A truly unique admission from the lips of a German statesman.

At the end of the war, to the horror of many of his comrades, Hitler did indeed try to turn Germany's military defeat into the annihilation of the German people.

There exists a document, the so-called Nero Directive of March 18 and 19, 1945, in which Hitler ordered all still remaining resources of the Reich, even those vital to the survival of the population, to be destroyed rather than allow them to fall into the hands of the enemy. If Hitler could not be the architect of Germany's greatest victory then at least he could be the architect of its destruction. This order, which epitomizes Hitler's

~~1944~~ 1945

mentality, was successfully sabotaged, particularly by Albert Speer, his minister of armaments and war production.

Hitler always tended to think in terms of destruction. He wanted to destroy the Jews, he wanted to destroy the Soviet Union, and now, for historical effect, he was willing to destroy Germany. There is of course no proof for this hypothesis, but various reliable reports tend to support it.

By the summer of 1944 Germany's situation had become absolutely hopeless, yet still it fought on to the bitter end, some say heroically. Germany was literally ground down by the armies and air power of the West and the Soviet Union. At the end, every inch of German soil was under occupation; the German army surrendered unconditionally; the last government, appointed by Hitler shortly before his suicide, was arrested; and on July 5, 1945, the three powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom—France joined somewhat later—declared themselves the sovereign rulers of Germany. They previously had reached agreement on their respective zones of occupation. The German Reich was administered by the Allied Control Commission, and it continued in this form for a number of years. It was under the unconditional control of foreign powers, and would inevitably fall apart if the four powers could not reach agreement on their German policy.

laps
Con
as a
of p
this
thos
Reic
chan
Upo
the C

1945

particu-
aments

s of de-
ws, he
ow, for
y Ger-
hypo-
to sup-

uation
fought
rmany
nd air
At the
occu-
condi-
Hitler
nd on
states,
om—
hem-
y pre-
ective
is ad-
sion,
ears.
reign
four
Ger-

1945

The dissolution of the German Reich, its col-
lapse, did not happen in 1945. At the Potsdam
Conference the Big Three agreed to treat Germany
as an economic entity and even grant it a measure
of political sovereignty under their aegis. Because
this proposal was never put to the test, there are
those who persist in the belief that the German
Reich still exists. After 1945, however, a great deal
changed, and these changes cannot be ignored.
Upon closer scrutiny it becomes clear that in fact
the German Reich has ceased to exist.

Jan 1946

and he held one key to the baggage, showing him a sheaf of papers; "The Great Wheel."

"U.S. Army lieutenant? Perhaps it carry letters to Emmy and little thing Jail on November 24. Göring presenting to Wheelis the solid wristwatch engraved with his sig- wheels had given him, and the gray somehow Göring retrieved from the his gold epaulets and a swastika and them to reward other American

minuscule scale, and each side ed Germany before the war, the of medical ethics to submit to e had overheard. Then prosecutor Washington, as his papers show. one Atlantic islands for war against erently is that Roosevelt speeches red Göring will testify to statements ndors William C. Bullitt and Joseph aggression against Germany."

declared to Gilbert that the victors and drums into the others the idea a sovereign ruler, and the court the charge of waging "aggressive erica, and Russia had all done the comes a crime—because we lost!" eutral Norway and Sweden, which ements captured in 1940, defense challenged the British government request caused acute embarrassment east Beyin, in London. Sir Norman agreed that the defense's allegation against allowing the production of ally when we do not know pre- the other side may have."

hall's only supporters were Rosen- leader Baldur von Schirach was Marshal Keitel was "afraid to talk concentrate on winning over banker minister Albert Speer, using two

chinks in the Reichsmarschall's armor—the Nazi atrocities, and his acquisition of art treasures. "They spoil his pose as a hero-patriot and model officer."

The damning evidence of the concentration-camp atrocities flabbergasted Göring. "I still can't grasp all those things," he admitted. "Do you suppose I'd have believed it if somebody came to me and said they were making freezing experiments on human guinea pigs, or that people were forced to dig their own graves and be mowed down by the thousands? I would have just said, 'Get the hell out of here with that fantastic nonsense.'"

The Nazi newsreel film of people's court judge Roland Freisler screaming at once-respectable general staff plotters turned Göring's stomach. But when the psychiatrist mentioned Röhm, Göring erupted about the "dirty homo-sexual swine" and angrily paced his tiny cell in shirt sleeves and slippers. "It was a damned good thing I wiped them out," he roared. "Or they would have wiped us out!"

Two days before Christmas Gilbert found him brooding on the future. What was his own fate compared to such a tide of history? "If I have to die," he pondered out loud, "then I'd rather die as a martyr than a traitor." He brightened, and said, "Don't forget that the great conquerors of history are not seen as murderers—Ghenghis Khan, Peter the Great, Frederick the Great!" Five years hence, he predicted, Hitler would be the idol of Germany again, and with a rueful laugh he invited Gilbert to mark his prophecy.

The new year, 1946, began with fresh unpleasantness for Göring. SS General Otto Ohlendorf testified on January 3 with apparent sincerity about mass liquidations that he had himself directed; worse, that afternoon Speer's defense attorney calmly invited the SS officer to testify whether he was aware that Speer had plotted to kill Hitler.

Göring choked. A major breach was appearing in the defense front line. He flounced over to the ex-minister as the session ended, but Speer pointedly ignored him. **GOD IN HEAVEN!**

"*Gott im Himmel!*" Göring exclaimed to Gilbert that evening. "I nearly died of shame. To think that a German could be so rotten, just to prolong his wretched life—to put it crudely, to piss in front and crap behind a little longer. *Herrgott! Donnerwetter!* For myself," he barked, "I don't care if I get executed. . . . But there is still such a thing as honor."

A few days later, on January 12, Colonel Andrus heard from Gilbert of the uproar among the prisoners caused by the arrest of their next of kin by the CIC. Andrus had little sympathy for the CIC officers, most of whom had only recently been German citizens themselves. "Göring's wife," he protested in a secret letter to the tribunal, "was reported to have been arrested and the child taken from her. . . . She has not written to him and it may be that she is not permitted to do so." Fearing that the defendants might bring this painful matter up in open court, "which would place the Americans on the defensive," Andrus demanded that the womenfolk be released at once.

God, damn it!

Febr. 1946

complained to the tribunal, writing had received only three letters from asking the tribunal to order the authorities again.

to American custody [he ex-isenhower to take care of my headquarters (General Patch) request would be honored. My of kin were taken to Velden-orth of Nuremberg, and interned ound the castle freely, though ch was very satisfactory to me.

complained, neither his wife nor am. complaint, the American chaplain, old Lutheran from Wisconsin who Straubing. Afterward, Göring wrote

from visiting you and brought happy they made me, thank

custody—just because you are e No. 1 principal war criminal, red and the thirst for revenge boundless. . . . But I am not e. . . .

thoughts and try to imagine the ough books? My treasure, I u. You and Edda have always d with gratitude to you both. and faithful [nurse] Christa. sta? "

luck. It was removed before Göring e same. "Luck—ours has run out ed him to write one letter and one

s [he wrote] to know that you, ll of this because of me! Just

because you are my wife you have to suffer this persecution. You only did good to people, but what does that matter? You are my wife, and that's enough.

I wanted to bring you happiness forever, but I brought you misfortune. And yet you know how immense is my love for you and how much I long for you. I am keeping my chin up although things are looking grim. Greetings to Else and everybody. Kiss my little Edda. A big hug and kisses, and endless love, from your Hermann.

"Day and night," he wrote in another letter, "two eyes stare at me through the porthole in the cell door. A spotlight shines on me all night. . . . Your letters are the only sunshine in my life."

On the last day of February 1946, Emmy and Edda left Straubing Jail. They were permitted to move into a cottage deep in the forest at Sackdilling, near Veldenstein. The cottage had neither water nor electricity, but it was home. Once or twice Jackson's oily ex-German aide Kempner called on them out there. Edda, grave and unsmiling, declined the oranges that he offered.

"You will see," Göring predicted to Dr. Gilbert that month. "This trial will be a disgrace in fifteen years' time." A few days later Field Marshal Paulus took the witness stand. Acting now as a witness for the Russian prosecution team, the former Stalingrad commander testified that Hitler had begun planning *Barbarossa* in 1940. "Ask that dirty swine if he knows he's a traitor," shouted Göring to his defense attorney, Stahmer. But it was Himmler's murder operations that still haunted Göring. "Anybody can make an atrocity film," he sniffed on February 15, "if they take corpses out of their graves and then show a tractor shoving them back in again."

Over lunch he scurried to repair the breaches torn in their front line by Speer's self-serving "treachery," bullying the other defendants like a sheep-dog chasing errant sheep. He urged the craven homosexual Walter Funk to stop worrying about death—in fifty years' time Germany would recognize them all as martyrs and heroes, and they would put his (Göring's) cadaver into a marble mausoleum like Napoleon's. Alerted by Gilbert to Göring's intensive canvassing, Jackson persuaded Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, the British prosecutor, to agree to Göring's being isolated over lunch. Dr. Gilbert himself drafted the new seating plan: Göring would sit in a cold, dim room for lunch alone, separated from the other twenty defendants. The order went into force at lunchtime on February 18. Speer crowed, Gilbert found Göring dejected and tremulous like a rejected child. In the even greater solitude of his cell, later that day the Reichsmarschall came close to contrition. "Don't think," he pleaded to Gilbert, "that I don't reproach myself in the

loneliness of this cell for not having lived my life differently, instead of coming to this end."

"Effect of separating defendants & isolating Göring marked," reported Gilbert to Jackson, "and on the whole favorable for trial."

On the twentieth, the court was shown a Soviet-made atrocity film. As the images of torture instruments, mutilated bodies, guillotines, and baskets of decapitated heads flickered and danced across the movie screen on the far wall to their left, Göring yawned demonstratively. "They could just as easily have killed a few hundred German prisoners of war and put them into Russian uniforms for the atrocity picture," he scoffed to Kelley's successor, Major Leo N. Goldensohn, that evening. "You don't know the Russians the way I do!" He shrewdly pointed out that the corpses had obviously been filmed before rigor mortis had had time to set in. "It is not that atrocity films leave me stone cold," he felt compelled to explain to Dr. Gilbert a few days afterward. "But I have seen so much already . . . women and children burned alive in air raids." Embroidering on the facts, he continued, "All that [Hans Fritzche] had to do was *broadcast* that Berlin or Dresden had suffered another terror raid. But I went and *saw* the corpses—sometimes still burning—because I was air minister." When a woman who claimed to be an Auschwitz survivor started a moving testimony (the American judge Francis Biddle wrote, "This I doubt," in his diary), Göring took off his earphones in disgust. "The higher up you were," he explained to Dönitz's attorney as they rose for the adjournment, "the less you saw of what was going on."

Göring was now back in his physical prime. On March 6, 1946, as he passed Field Marshal Milch in a corridor, they exchanged illicit salutes, and Milch noted in his diary that the Reichsmarschall was fitter and slimmer than he had ever seen him before. It boded ill for Jackson and the prosecution.

On Friday the eighth, the defense called Bodenschatz into the box. Jackson made mincemeat of the servile, elderly general, and Göring felt sorry for him. "Wait till he starts on *me*," he boasted, as he accepted a cigarette from Dr. Gilbert with trembling fingers. Milch followed Bodenschatz to the microphone that afternoon, and Göring murmured to his counsel, "Now I'm for it—we weren't on the best of terms." But the field marshal, despite a clumsy attempt at blackmail by Major Englander in November, did his best for Göring.

Sworn in [Milch recorded in his diary], everybody wearing earphones; then examination by attorney Stahmer. . . . When I was asked about Göring's attitude to prisoners of war Jackson interrupted, "We've shown enough patience, but this is going too far. I object!"

The Tribunal sustained his objection and poor Stahmer, somewhat confused, asked me one more short question and sat down. . . .

Febr. 1946

An hour later the court adjourned mostly very crushed," Milch his eyes were filled with tears

That Saturday morning Göring what I know now," he wished I could have Himmler here earth he was up to out there."

For a few more days he was Jackson cross-examined Milch of Göring—whom he had on diary as "this idiot . . . this of London, reporting on his that he was engaged in a battle of at such pains to discredit his than Göring, was the accused in his diary, "I must have known means is found," warned the the point, the Nuremberg defendants and false trails." Displaced American Army tossed him into the concentration camp a few days testify.

On March 13, 1946, the five was not an empty seat in the control his trembling hands, hours. Jackson knew that the need of them—perhaps both. He and over the heads of the tribunal The trial might even fuel renewed

The tall, red-faced British judge manuscript on the trial that proceedings. He had followed evidence required it, and had reflected Birkett, seemed to have ability and knowledge, or for his documents.

Göring was stripped of his features some in feature once again. As out there in the depths of the listening to his voice—he gave answer. Even Speer was moved back. He began to pump out this last arbitrary tribunal of mine

"Göring is being permitted to preach," objected Jackson. "He is becoming constantly more arrogant, and if this goes on it will do our countries more harm than good."

Maxwell-Fyfe agreed. "We must tell the court that we are dealing with an experienced politician. He will make the proceedings ridiculous unless the tribunal cooperates. The result will be that the trial is a disaster."

He recommended that they unofficially convey this to "our own judges." "The Allied Control Council, for instance," he continued, "is apprehensive lest Göring's examination-in-chief do a great deal of harm in restoring Nazi prestige."

"This," agreed Jackson, "is a critical point of the trial as far as achieving its objective is concerned." If this remark did not unmask the true, political face of the trial, Jackson's subsequent outburst did. "Göring is permitted to become a hero of the Nazis because he dares talk back to the United States. This wins him admiration from all the Nazis who remain in Germany, and he will influence the other defendants to do likewise. I almost felt this afternoon that it would have been wiser to have shot these men out of hand."

The British prosecutors were more fortunate than Jackson. Maxwell-Fyfe, an incisive, bullying barrister who would rise to the very pinnacles of the British legal establishment, brought beads of perspiration to Göring's brow over the Gestapo's execution of the escaped British aviators. When the Englishman asked if he was still loyal to Hitler despite the atrocities that had now come to light, Göring hesitated, recognizing the lethal burden of the question, then answered true to form—he believed in being loyal in times of hardship as well as in the more golden years. Most likely, he pointed out, the Führer had known as little of the atrocities as he himself had.

After that, the show ended rapidly. The Russian naïvely inquired why Göring had not refused to obey Hitler. "If I had," replied Göring with easy humor, "I certainly should not have had to worry about my health."

"If you handle yourselves half as well as I did," Göring bragged to the other defendants, resuming his place in the dock, "you'll be doing all right." It had thrilled him to see his own ability to withstand the taunt and thrust of his prosecutors without crumpling. "Don't forget," he reminded Dr. Gilbert in his cell some days afterward, "I had the best legal brains of Britain, America, Russia, and France arrayed against me. And there I was—alone!"

His bearing in the witness box had impressed friend and foe alike. Fan mail from Germany and abroad poured into the prison for Göring—letters reading, "Keep your chin up, Hermann," and "Good for you!" (He was not allowed to get them, of course.) "Göring had nothing to lose," Keitel's veteran attorney said in private, shortly before the final act. "That's why he played the part to the very end—with élan and shrewdness, and dialectically adept. He won round after round against Jackson, much to the glee of the other Americans. But he's as self-centered, vain, and pompous as ever."

Dr. Gilbert went out to see Emmy at Sackdilling, and returned on March

March 1946

24—her birthday—with a letter to Emmy show, however were preying upon his nature out there, bringing those words Sackdilling. "You can imagine I long to walk through this with Edda and you all! Although and longing for you have never another card to Emmy, "hearing you're getting on and keeping big and small. Today my courage him implicitly. Talk about even at the cottage. You know how my love for you. I hug you a

Then Wilhelm Frick's defense Hans Bernd Gisevius, took the did far more harm to Göring's years," snorted Göring on the view of these traitors." Jackson chief Allen Dulles three days evius] fulfilled the expectation is in a badly depressed state

Despite threats from Göring even, Schacht testified on the emperor Nero, wearing lipstick the lipstick, talking that even save his skin; but then Grand for Germany. "Now I am read relieved, during the recess after like Speer; and these, Göring their Führer had favored to philosophized to Werner Bross like a rabbit."

Die, yes—but not by the hanging that if guaranteed a firing squad dirt on Schacht. Jackson, foolish then intensified his contacts with To make doubly sure, he eavesdropped surreptitiously from his earphone and his cell minutely searched "My darling," he now wrote Edda goes off. So this week I call for [letter] No. 19. What the next

March 1946

objected Jackson. "He is becoming
on it will do our countries more

the court that we are dealing with
the proceedings ridiculous unless
it be that the trial is a disaster."

convey this to "our own judges."
he continued, "is apprehensive
a great deal of harm in restoring Nazi

point of the trial as far as achieving
did not unmask the true, political
burst did. "Göring is permitted to
dares talk back to the United States.
Nazis who remain in Germany, and
to do likewise. I almost felt this
to have shot these men out of hand."
than Jackson. Maxwell-Fyfe,
ould rise to the very pinnacles of the
years of perspiration to Göring's brow
escaped British aviators. When the
to Hitler despite the atrocities that had
recognizing the lethal burden of the
he believed in being loyal in times
ten years. Most likely, he pointed out,
anilities as he himself had.

The Russian naïvely inquired why
"If I had," replied Göring with easy
and to worry about my health."
well as I did," Göring bragged to the
the dock, "you'll be doing all right."
ity to withstand the taunt and thrust of
Don't forget," he reminded Dr. Gilbert
had the best legal brains of Britain,
against me. And there I was—alone!"
d impressed friend and foe alike. Fan
ted into the prison for Göring—letters
ann," and "Good for you!" (He was
"Göring had nothing to lose," Keitel's
y before the final act. "That's why he
elan and shrewdness, and dialectically
ainst Jackson, much to the glee of the
ntered, vain, and pompous as ever."
at Sackdilling, and returned on March

24—her birthday—with a letter from her and a postcard from Edda. Göring's letters to Emmy show, however, how the continued restraints and captivity were preying upon his nature. "I keep thinking about the onset of spring out there, bringing those wonderful woods alive," he wrote in one letter to Sackdilling. "You can imagine how I am seized by yearning for you—how I long to walk through this awakening forest with you. God protect you and Edda and you all! Although we have to be apart, believe me that my love and longing for you have never been greater." "My dearest," he wrote on another card to Emmy, "heartfelt thanks for yesterday's dear lines. I hope you're getting on and keeping together at Sackdilling—you, Edda, and Eles big and small. Today my counsel Dr. Stahmer is allowed to visit you. I trust him implicitly. Talk about everything with him. Best wishes to everybody at the cottage. You know how endless is my yearning, and how powerful my love for you. I hug you and kiss you all fondly. Your Hermann."

Then Wilhelm Frick's defense witness, the Abwehr/OSS double-agent Hans Bernd Gisevius, took the stand. Through his purposeful distortions, he did far more harm to Göring's case than good to Frick's. "In ten or twelve years," snorted Göring on April 25, "history will take an entirely different view of these traitors." Jackson was delighted, however, and thanked OSS chief Allen Dulles three days later for making Gisevius available. "[Gisevius] fulfilled the expectations stated in your letters," he added. "Göring is in a badly depressed state."

Despite threats from Göring, loudly uttered to Schacht's attorney, to get even, Schacht testified on May 3 that Göring used to appear dressed as the emperor Nero, wearing lipstick, rouge, and nail polish. (Göring hotly denied the lipstick, talking that evening with Dr. Gilbert.) Schacht was fighting to save his skin; but then Grand Admiral Dönitz testified, and he was fighting for Germany. "Now I am ready to listen to some more treason," said Göring, relieved, during the recess afterward. Schirach followed, and "sold out" like Speer; and these, Göring commented ironically, were both men whom their Führer had favored to the very end. "Rather die like a lion," he philosophized to Werner Bross, Stahmer's deputy, "than survive to scamper like a rabbit."

Die, yes—but not by the hangman's hand. Göring let it be known to Jackson that if *guaranteed* a firing squad he would give the prosecution some *real* dirt on Schacht. Jackson, foolishly as it turned out, did not heed him. Göring then intensified his contacts with the American Army's Lieutenant Wheelis. To make doubly sure, he evidently removed one wafer-thin metal diaphragm surreptitiously from his earphones in the courtroom. The loss was discovered and his cell minutely searched, but the sliver of metal was never found.

"My darling," he now wrote to Emmy. "Today the birthday letter for Edda goes off. So this week I can only send you a postcard. Heartfelt thanks for [letter] No. 19. What the newspapers are writing is a matter of supreme

indifference to us. Never let it get you down! I've been in bed for three days, sciatica in my right leg. Now I can understand what you must have been through. In passionate love, I hug and kiss you. Your Hermann."

The "birthday letter" to Edda has survived:

My darling, sweet child! My golden treasure!

Now's the second time that your birthday has come around and I can't be there. And yet, my darling, today I'm especially close to you, and send you my warmest and most heartfelt greetings.

I pray to Almighty God from the bottom of my heart to look after you and help you. I can't send you any gift, but my boundless love and longing is all around you and always shall be!

You know, my little sparrow, how fond I am of you! You are always so sweet and tender. You'll always be our happiness and joy.

Mama has told me what a brave little helper you are everywhere and how good you are being. I'm proud of you.

I hope the weather's fine so you can spend your birthday outside in the wonderful forest. My little sweetheart, once more all my warmest wishes for today and always: fondest hugs and kisses from your Papa.

The letters from them, he wrote to Emmy a few days later, in June 1946, were the "only ray of sunshine in my solitude." He went on:

So the darling child's birthday went off well after all. I thought it was going to be almost impossible for you to get hold of any present for Edda.

Just imagine: Ronny [probably his adjutant Ondarza] is in Hamburg but refusing to have anything at all to do with me, even a written statement. He hasn't even replied to Stahmer. There's gratitude! . . . I am in better health again. . . . In the prison yard three jasmine bushes are in blossom. You've realized my yearning to be out in the forest and breathe free air again. But even greater is my longing for you and Edda, and greater still my love. . . . Is Teske [Major Werner Teske, another adjutant] a free man?

He wondered if he would ever see Edda's golden curls again.

June 1946

RE

31, 1946, "The German people direction of the state, they had no of which we know today, the peace and courage, and they have suffered which they were arbitrarily through "are free from blame."

Fighting here on their behalf, and thereby rendered his last us execution—by firing squad, he compensate all crimes.

He expected no earthly reparation to Hitler, the prosecution had at of every crime in Nazi Germany. staff, had alleged that Göring had ordered Allied airmen shot. To his war conferences, Göring argued showed how inaccurate such translations

This letter is not as long as the one to Emmy. (C)

crimes of the Nazi forces in occupied Europe, Göring scoffed that these were no more criminal than those of the victors now—in suspending the Geneva Convention, dismantling industry, confiscating property, and enslaving millions of Germans.

A letter arrived from Edda, stamped CENSORED & PASSED—CENSOR, IMT. She had enclosed a pressed flower plucked from their forest.

My darling Daddy!

How happy I was when the chaplain visited us, he was kind and nice but sadly he couldn't stay long. Aunt Fanny [Carin's sister] and Aunt Erna were here too and brought me crayons and a coloring book and I was very happy. . . . Aunt Else brought me a few pictures, including one of you, that was the most beautiful present! . . . If only you could come here quickly and walk through the forest with me, how beautiful it would be!!! The forester's puppy is much bigger, I play with it all the time, it's so sweet.

Mama was sad she didn't hear you on the radio. I would have given up all my toys just to hear your voice. Mommy has told me she's going to be allowed to see you. I'd like to see you frightfully too. Can't I come as well? I'm sooooo fond of you and it's so awfully long since I saw you. Oh, Papa, if only I could come too!

Mommy has taught me almost the whole of [Friedrich Schiller's ballad] "The Bell," and I learned the rest by myself and recited it to Mommy and she was very pleased.

Aunt Thea sent us a packet with a bar of soap, two little candles, some cotton, four buttons, and a washcloth, we were very happy about that.

I promise you, Papa, that I always try to comfort Mommy and I'll always protect her. How much nicer it would be if you were there to protect us!!!

I pray every evening to dear God that Mommy and I can see you soon and give you a big hug.

Darling Papa, in my heart you are always right next to me and whenever I'm doing anything I tell myself you're looking on and that way I only do nice and good things.

Now I throw my little arms around your neck and give you a big kiss. Your Edda.

Emmy Göring implored the tribunal to let her see the imprisoned Reichsmarschall for a few minutes. "I haven't seen my husband for a year and a quarter," she wrote, "and I am longing so terribly for him that I don't see any way out. I need strength to carry on without my husband. A few minutes

June 1946

when I could see him and hold husband is very much worried at protection and help."

Softened by her solicitous fe But for several more weeks Co thinner, she was finally allowed 1946. Hermann sat on the other cuffed to a guard. He told her "Otherwise we will forget too i

Five days later little Edda wa years old now. "Stand on a cha "so I can see how you've grov learned, and a famous poem cont and true / And never, lips, be su softly interrupted, "Yes, remem "Papa," she squeaked, "whc your rubber medals in the bath l

He never saw Edda again. When the poison, later, she clasped her opened in the ceiling of his cell, heaven and gave it to him."

Since sentencing was postpone So near and yet, with the glass pl once what she did all day long (s smiled. "For twenty-three and a forward to seeing you." On Sept Nuremberg. "Don't you believe "that we three shall, one day, b "I beg of you," Göring repl "give up hope."

As the sentinel led him away anymore. I shan't either."

Judgment day, Tuesday, Oct generals—had demanded privilege. Jackson primly refused, arguing t be no death sentences whatever. published photographs of the ch Woods, fingering his heavy hemp hang Hermann Göring.

Fifteen miles away, out at Sac girls out to play in a forest glade radio set that an American girl ha

There, the president summed up

Probably
written
by
Emmy

She shook her head.

"They won't hang me," he assured her, choosing his words carefully. "Not that. It's *the Bullet* for me. They won't hang a Hermann Göring."

She was feeling faint. "Shouldn't I go now?" she asked. He smiled. "I'm quite calm, Emmy."*

He left, thinking most probably about that bullet. Since cameramen were waiting out front to film her sorrowing departure, the chaplain opened the back door and let her through behind the partition. She stroked the chairback where Hermann had been sitting, as they walked past—it was still warm.

Hermann had returned to his cell, in mental turmoil. As Dr. Pflücker came in with a sedative, the prisoner said, "I've just seen my wife for the last time, my dear doctor. Now I am *dead*. It was a difficult hour, but she wanted it. She bore up magnificently. She only faltered toward the end."

He looked at the sedative pills. Once, during the summer, he had casually asked Pflücker how many of these might be dangerous. The doctor had replied that even twenty or thirty would only induce a deeper sleep. "It isn't easy to die from sleeping pills," he said, reading the prisoner's mind.

They shook hands—the first time that the normally taciturn Reichsmarschall had done so with him. "If you had been with this man for fifteen months," the doctor reproached the Board of Inquiry, "you would understand."

Now Hermann Göring was isolated, except for his friendship with the Texas lieutenant. For a few days he waited to learn the outcome of Stahmer's unauthorized plea for clemency.

That outcome was not in any doubt. Fearing that the Allied Control Council in Berlin might make the wrong use of the powers granted under Section 29 of the London Charter of August 8, 1945, to "reduce or otherwise alter the sentences," the British Labour Cabinet decided late on October 7 to instruct the British member, Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, that "from a political point of view it would be an advantage if there were no alterations of the [Nuremberg] sentences." And so it came to pass. The Control Council met in Berlin on the ninth; they heard that Raeder, Göring, and Jodl had all asked for execution by firing squad. The American member briefly favored Jodl's petition, but in the end all were denied.

Göring somehow learned that newspapermen and photographers would be invited to watch the hangings; and it did not take an Albert Einstein to calculate that the hangings would probably take place on the sixteenth. These two pieces of information were vital to his plan.

There are certain extraordinary documents that suggest that somehow Gö-

*After a period of internment Emmy Göring was cleared by the denazification courts in Bavaria and her remaining property was restored to her; she died in 1974. Edda married a dentist and lives in Munich.

Oct 1946

ring had by now reassured him was still in his baggage—an promise from a third party to cell. These documents consist October 11, that he wrote, per would have risked leaving the their premature discovery wo his locked-away belongings. a a reasonable deduction that h they were also designed to r who would see that they were the last moment—two men w bullet from the baggage room. that the American officer was) the trusted hand was that of I

The letters still survive, in published here for the first tin pocket or very small envelope pompous little colonel's secur

Nuremb
To

I have always had the p delivery into imprisonment capsules. I left the *first* i inspection. I put the *seco* ing and retrieved it wh Mondorf and here in the *ough inspections* it could I kept it with me in my l

The *third* capsule is s; pot with the skin cream (i this twice at Mondorf if

None of those entruste would have been almost have been pure chance.*

*Andrus erroneously claimed in his had concealed the brass capsule "in his a phial subsequently found in the hand c corpse, the latter clearly came from hi inspection tentatively found fecal traces that he may have placed it briefly in his size (35mm long, 9mm caliber) he could examination showed his fingernails to b

1952 #

his voice was soft but the negligence was not always convincing. He seemed at winning his partner in a conversation. You had the impression that his voice liked this Walter Schellenberg, his intelligence, and whether he was still the man he had in the past. If he encountered himself capable of suddenly he started yielding to his opponent on terms which he tried to negotiate

aptiveness explains his unusual gift of doubt had been one of the secrets of assimilation ultimately produced an almost feminine sensibility made a guarantee of success.

in continual pain and deeply worried at his expenses, Herr Harpprecht began was the fact that no one any longer that the Italian police did not even he particularly resented the fact that it (the former chief of the German High Commission East) and not he who was invited to intelligence service against the Russians created his own world of making exiled heads of states, financial aid surveillance by English and French he took. Even a simple journey to a of mystery.

was natural that Schellenberg should memoirs, of which he had already made long. In reliving the triumphs of his the shabby obscurity of the present. the draft into order and help fill the already been interrupted by a visit he was reconciled to his old enemy, in Madrid) and it was now further in Schellenberg's health.

For some time Schellenberg had been aware that another operation was essential if he was to secure any relief from the disease of the liver from which he was suffering. He put off this operation too long, was admitted to hospital too late for the doctors to save his life and died in the Clinica Fornaca, Turin, on the last day of March 1952. — 41 years old

In the early summer of the same year Frau Schellenberg returned from Pallanza to Düsseldorf, taking with her the MS. of the memoirs. In Düsseldorf she met Dr Werner Best, who had once been a collaborator of her husband's in the SS and later became the German governor of Occupied Denmark. At that time Best was working in the offices of Dr Achenbach, one of the foreign policy experts of the present Free Democratic Party and the Ruhr lawyer who acted as defence counsel for Werner Naumann, Goebbels' former lieutenant, when the latter was arrested by the British occupation authorities, in January 1953.

On Best's advice Frau Schellenberg gave up the idea of publication through a Swiss firm and decided to offer the memoirs to a German publisher. In fact, all that appeared was a brief sensationalized account in the Munich illustrated magazine *Quick* (*Die Grosse Moerder-GmbH*) based on incidents in the memoirs without revealing Schellenberg's identity. The articles, which bore every sign of having been written-up by a 'ghost', were described as the reminiscences of a high-ranking SS officer, the mysterious 'Colonel Z'.

The reasons for this anonymity are not clear. It is possible that the publishers of *Quick* believed that the Swiss firm of Alfred Scherz might still possess some claim to the copyright or that Frau Schellenberg was influenced by threats against herself and her children. In the end the full MS. of the still unpublished memoirs was bought by the present publisher, Mr André Deutsch, from *Quick* Verlag in Munich.

When it reached London, packed in a large suitcase, the manuscript was in complete disorder. Mr Deutsch was able to check parts of it with material left by Schellenberg with the Swedish firm of Norstedt Verlag and to show it to Dr Goverts—a partner of Scherz und Goverts Verlag—who had been in touch with Schellenberg and his wife as early as 1950. Finally he invited Herr Harpprecht to come over to England and inspect the manuscript. Herr Harpprecht spent a week examining the material in detail. He was able to point to numerous notes on the MS.

re. A history professor who greatly developed awoke in me an interest in political and cultural currents that I was fascinated by the problems of peoples and nations and the political and economic relationship. My family's Luxembourg had also given me a matter, particularly with regard to

I entered the University of Bonn. I studied medicine and then changed to law and I agreed would serve as the official career or for a career in the law with my father's approval that instead of being a Catholic Student, I joined one of the many of them did, a code of honour

economic crisis had struck Germany and upon the German people affected by the financials had become increasingly difficult. Due to my studies I had been forced to find that there was no better after I had passed my law. Many it was customary to serve as a clerk or to that of an articulated clerk in a legal career. Government grants were given for purposes as this, and I applied for

In 1933, the year when Hitler came to power, with my application suggested that my income would increase appreciably if I joined the Party and of one of its formations

I did much attention to the political situation. I was certainly not unaware of the fact that there were now six million unemployed. There was no sign of any help coming from the government. I saw the democratic elements of the Nazis' rise to power, the mass of

the people came to believe that the more forceful approach of the new régime would lead to a solution of their internal problems as well as of the problem of Germany's position among the nations. It was my own financial difficulties, however, which decided me to join the Party, though I cannot say that I reached this decision with any great reluctance or difficulty. It was obvious that a vigorous programme was needed which would overcome the worst social injustices of the Weimar Republic and bring about equal status for Germany among the nations, as well as a revision of the Versailles Treaty. It seemed to me only just that Germany should strive for those rights which every sovereign nation, and especially France, has always fought to secure for themselves.

At this time thousands of people with widely differing backgrounds were rushing to join the National Socialist movement, though often for widely different reasons. I was certain, as were the majority of these people, that Hitler was a political realist and that having gained power he would now drop the more extreme and unreasonable aspects of his programme—such as the measures against the Jews. These might have been useful to gain adherents in the past, but they certainly could not serve as principles on which to run a modern state.

All young men who joined the Party had to join one of its formations as well. The SS was already considered an 'elite' organization. The black uniform of the Fuehrer's special guard was dashing and elegant, and quite a few of my fellow-students had joined. In the SS one found the 'better type of people' and membership of it brought considerable prestige and social advantages, while the beer hall rowdies of the SA were beyond the pale. In those days they represented the most extreme, violent, and fanatical elements of the Nazi movement.

I cannot deny that at the age of twenty-three such things as social prestige and, shall we say, the glamour of a smart uniform played quite a large part in my choice. However, I found the reality considerably less glamorous than I had imagined. The monotonous military drill that formed the chief activity of the ordinary SS did not appeal to me. We had to report for duty three evenings a week, and on Saturdays and Sundays there were long and arduous cross-country marches, often with a full pack.

These were supposed to temper the young Nazi manhood for the great tasks that lay ahead.

However, I soon managed to secure a more suitable form of activity. It had been realized that the SS would have to offer more to the students of a university town than merely marching and drill and I was presently assigned to the task of conducting indoctrination talks and giving lectures, mostly of an historical nature, dealing with the development of Germanic law and at the same time directly attacking the Catholic Church. These lectures were for both students and workers and soon became quite popular. It was my first lecture, to which I gave an outspoken anti-Catholic bias, that first aroused the attention of the chief of the SD, Reinhard Heydrich.

One evening I noticed at the back of the audience two older men dressed in SS uniforms without any special insignia. At the end of the lecture they introduced themselves: both were professors at Bonn University, one a philologist, the other an educationalist. They said they had found my lecture very interesting and wanted to talk to me about other fields of activity in the SS.

It was from these two professors that I first heard about the existence of the SD. Within it, they explained, there was the Internal Security section which concerned itself with matters inside Germany, and the Foreign Security section which dealt with information from abroad. Both were highly secret institutions and their function was to gather information that could help the government to form policy or to evaluate the results of policy decisions already taken.

They asked me whether I would like to join one of these departments, I having told them of my keen interest in foreign affairs and foreign policy. They explained, however, that before I could get into foreign secret service work I would have to put in a spell at the Ministry of the Interior. They suggested that I should continue with my legal career, my status with the SD remaining a purely 'honorary' one without obligations on either side, and meanwhile, I would be freed from all other duties for the SS. I had no hesitation in agreeing to join the SD and enrolled immediately. But I still had to do one last spell of duty as an SS guard, and a fateful and unforgettable one it turned out to be.

The date was June 30, 1934. We were at the Hotel Dreesen at Bad Godesberg. Rumours had reached my ears of plots, divisions in the Party, and I whispered that the highest leaders of the hotel and I was posted outside the hotel from the terrace to the dining-room look down over the valley of the Rhine. Inside the dining-room preparations were being made for the arrival of the guests, and before long 'they' arrived. In the dining-room were a number of the Nazi movement, among them Goebbels and Goering. I could see their chief movement of their lips, though I could not hear what they were saying.

Meanwhile, black clouds had been gathering and now the storm broke. As the rain fell, I went back into the shelter of the terrace. Across the sky, illuminating the scene, was a glow. From time to time Hitler would stand staring at the tempest with unlabouring under the burden of weight.

After dinner the meeting was resumed. With a brusque gesture Hitler brought the discussion to a close. At once the huge bland Hitler and his companions got up. Guards and we clambered inside, then the night towards the airport at Hahn. Waiting aircraft took off for Munich aboard.

The great purge of Roehm and his associates began.

Roehm's activities in setting up a new state constituted a threat to the state, but it was the monstrous blood-bath that Hitler ordered his own followers that night. The movement was the General Staff of the Wehrmacht. Goering into forcing a showdown. The action of the more unreliable elements a

grounding for it lay close to hand. "With the suppression of Bolshevism in Germany," Hitler began, "iron-fisted dictatorship must rule."⁴⁰ But then, in expounding the scheme, he reverted to his problematical "land and soil" premise of nineteen months earlier. Subsequently he buttressed this premise by considerations of the right of Germans to grow at others' expense. He promoted the eastern conquest on this basis beginning in *Mein Kampf*—routinely until a few weeks after the Nazis' electoral leap forward of September 1930, then guardedly in public, and yet quite starkly again in his political and military councils after his accession. To Reichswehr commanders on 3 February 1933, after four days in office, he foretold "the conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization."⁴¹ On 28 February 1934, before roughly the same group enlarged by SA and SS leaders, he pointed ahead to "creating living space" for Germany in the east.⁴² On 5 November 1937 he briefed his five top political and military assistants on his contingency planning "to solve the German space problem."⁴³ In a military conference of 23 May 1939 he held forth about "expanding our living space in the east and securing our nourishment."⁴⁴ And all along he kept the racial-ideological (anti-Semitic, anti-Communist) motive for war against Soviet Russia to himself—or almost. In *Mein Kampf* he cited Judeo-Bolshevism's mortal designs on Germany only as the last of many reasons for Germany not to ally with Soviet Russia.⁴⁵ In his secret book of 1928 he merely observed in an extraneous context that, populous as it was, the Soviet Union was not a military, but only an ideological, menace.⁴⁶ In his memorandum of August 1936 initiating economic mobilization, he cited separately the threat from international Jewry based in Russia and Germany's need of more living space for a "definitive solution" of its economic problems.⁴⁷ The Anti-Comintern Pact that Germany concluded with Japan in November 1936 and with Italy a year later carried a hint of secret aggressive designs. In reality it was spineless: the sham mutual defense was merely propaganda to justify German rearmament.⁴⁸ But the preliminaries did prompt Hitler to remark to the Japanese negotiators in June 1936 that he had "always seen Europe's sole salvation in

the
1930
men
Hitl
pect
free
with
ever
1922
that
betw
Barb
the
each
the
of a
ture
instr
tual
fore
instr
latio
Bols
T)
for r
conc
Ukra
neve
prev
argu
Ukra
of 19
pear
page
spee
May
then

1947

D

March 1941 to 200-250 high officers on their duties as ideological gunmen under Barbarossa went practically unheard²⁷ except, to be sure, by the inner ear.

The hold that Hitler gained over Germany was like a spell that began lifting piecemeal once the tide of conquest turned, then massively in the final debacle. That spell had been prophesied in 1932 as "a reign of the collective beast"²⁸ and decried as "a mass madness" in 1937 through a tale of Münster possessed by the Anabaptists.²⁹ Just such a spell was alleged afterward on all sides amid the rubble and ashes—and the exposed horrors—of Hitler's rule. Ribbentrop only went the limit when in captivity he "pleaded with everyone who came within earshot . . . to explain what had happened during the 'mass psychosis' of Hitlerism."³⁰ The intent of such post-Nazi talk was always at least a little apologetic.³¹ Yet the question did repeatedly arise whether that mass phenomenon was Hitler's creation or he its creature, whether it was a mass bewitchment or a mass seizure. In general it came off as a mix of the two in equal overdoses. Thomas Aich's *Massenmensch und Massenwahn* ("Mass Man and Mass Madness") of 1947 argued at once mass hypnosis by Hitler, a "mutual" "frenzy" between Hitler and his public, and a mediumistic pitch of Hitler's voice: "Out of it speaks the collective, the irrational, of the mass soul."³² "Frenzy" (Rausch) was the pat term: reminiscences of the Russian campaign could be marketed in 1948 under the title *Der grosse Rausch* ("The Great Frenzy") without fear that the reference would be missed. (The reference was supplied only incidentally in the work itself: "We were frenzied with the dream of power: the whole world."³³) The term was all too strong for the surface showing. The frenzy was not demonstrative the year round as if at a permanent Hitler rally.³⁴ It was rather a diffuse sense of empowerment through Hitler and of powerlessness against him. By the 1950s it was a dead memory.³⁵ And today's Germans ignore it in retrospect like some fanciful distraction from the objective terms of Hitler's appeal.³⁶

That is as if the Thebans of old had unlearned their lesson from Dionysus. In Euripides' awesome masterpiece, *The Bac-*

* what he called for - the absolute
contact of strength against weakness -
with only Calf-torn (Christ) as the
other half, and the D.K. had such

che
div
enc
lik
Th
str
No
the
l
to
wi
pri
arc
by
Ps
sul
of
ge
cal
Re
wa
Fr
vic
hi
ne
ps
hi
ba
lat
a
hi
to
of
to
te
to
sk

Sh
a
si
fr

choosing his words carefully. "I hang a Hermann Göring." "No?" she asked. He smiled. "I'm

bullet. Since cameramen were everywhere, the chaplain opened the door. She stroked the chairback as he walked past—it was still warm. In the turmoil. As Dr. Pflücker came in, "I've just seen my wife for the last time in a difficult hour, but she wanted to talk toward the end." "During the summer, he had casually said he was dangerous. The doctor had replied once a deeper sleep. "It isn't easy to read the prisoner's mind. At the normally taciturn Reichsmarschall had been with this man for fifteen years of inquiry, "you would under-

stand, except for his friendship with the doctor, to learn the outcome of Stahmer's

earing that the Allied Control Council had granted the powers under Section 29 of the 1945 to "reduce or otherwise alter the laws" decided late on October 7 to instruct Justice Douglas, that "from a political point of view there were no alterations of the laws to pass. The Control Council met to hear Göring, and Jodl had all asked for a member briefly favored Jodl's

spies and photographers would be allowed to take an Albert Einstein to the trial. They take place on the sixteenth. These are his plans.

ments that suggest that somehow Gö-

clearly by the denazification courts in Bavaria in 1974. Edda married a dentist and lives

ring had by now reassured himself that at least one lethal cyanide "bullet" was still in his baggage—and that somehow too, he had obtained a firm promise from a third party to smuggle one of these brass capsules into his cell. These documents consist principally of three taunting letters, all dated October 11, that he wrote, perhaps as a final prank. It is improbable that he would have risked leaving these letters lying around his cell for five days—their premature discovery would have resulted in the immediate search of his locked-away belongings and the painful frustration of his plan. So it is a reasonable deduction that he entrusted the letters to some officer whom they were also designed to reassure and protect: an American, no doubt, who would see that they were restored by trusted hand to the cell at literally the last moment—two men who would between them extricate the cyanide bullet from the baggage room, and smuggle it in to the prisoner. It is likely that the American officer was Lieutenant Wheelis (he died in 1954), and that the trusted hand was that of Doctor Pflücker (who is also now dead).

The letters still survive, in an American army safe in Berlin, and are published here for the first time. The first, cross-folded to fit into an upper pocket or very small envelope, was clearly intended to attract ridicule to the pompous little colonel's security measures:

*Nuremberg, October 11, 1946
To the Commandant*

I have always had the poison capsule with me, ever since my delivery into imprisonment. On delivery into Mondorf I had *three* capsules. I left the *first* in my clothing so it would be found upon inspection. I put the *second* under the clothes rack when undressing and retrieved it when dressing. I concealed it so well at Mondorf and here in the cell that despite *frequent* and *very thorough inspections* it could not be found. During the court hearings I kept it with me in my high riding boots.

The *third* capsule is *still* in my little toilet case, in the round pot with the skin cream (hidden in the cream). I could have taken this twice at Mondorf if I had needed it.

None of those entrusted with the inspections is to blame, as it would have been almost *impossible* to find the capsule. It would have been pure chance.*

*Andrus erroneously claimed in his memoirs that Göring admitted in this suicide note that he had concealed the brass capsule "in his anus and in his flabby navel." Since the capsule and enclosed phial subsequently found in the hand cream were identical to the capsule and phial found on his corpse, the latter clearly came from his baggage (and not from outside the prison). Laboratory inspection tentatively found fecal traces on the brass capsule taken from the corpse. This suggests that he may have placed it briefly in his anus—perhaps to confuse the investigation—but given its size (35mm long, 9mm caliber) he could not comfortably have retained it there for long. Postmortem examination showed his fingernails to be clean and free of odor.

Oct 1946

RELEASE

507

able for Göring to have secreted
claimed. The cell was liable
searched without warning. He
to carelessly. Besides, without
have revealed the *precise* hiding

Robert told me the Control Council
to firing squad!"

with the heading "The Reichs-
carefully dated this one too—

note:

Council

do further ado! But it is not
Reichsmarschall! I cannot permit
have no moral obligation to
have therefore chosen the
Hermann Göring.

on the back:

death sentence would be pro-
always regarded the trial as a
but I wanted to see this trial
did at least expect that I should
before God, my country, and my
be blame that an enemy tribunal

and enclosed it in an envelope with

Nuremberg, October 11, 1946

like this for political reasons. I
feel that I am doing the right
(me.) Please comfort my wife
suicide, and that she can
over me up in his great mercy.

more. Your Hermann Göring.

My only sweetheart!

Upon mature consideration and after profound prayers to my
God, I have decided to take my own life and thus not allow my
enemies to execute me. I would always have accepted death by
firing squad. But the Reichsmarschall of Greater Germany can
not allow himself to be hanged. Moreover, the killings were to
be carried out like a spectacle with the press and film cameras
there (I assume for the newsreel pictures). Sensation is all that
matters.

I however want to die quietly and out of the public eye. My
life came to an end the moment I said my last farewell to you.
Since then I am filled with a wondrous peace and I regard death
as the final release.

I take it as a sign from God that throughout the months of my
imprisonment He allowed me the means to free myself from this
mortal coil, and that this means was never discovered. In His
charity, God thus spared me the bitter end.

All my thoughts are with you, with Edda, and all my beloved
friends! The last beats of my heart will mark our great and eternal
love. Your Hermann.

When the American prison surgeon, Lieutenant Roska, came to his cell and
talked about literature, for want of any other topic, he remarked that Göring
seemed remarkably cheerful. Referring to the coming event, Göring remarked
that his father had once told him to do anything he wanted—but to do it
with a smile.

The psychiatrist Dr. Gilbert made his last visit to the condemned men on
the thirteenth. "Only Göring seemed to be deliberately holding out," he
reported to Andrus, "because he did not want to admit any more guilt than
had already been proven by the prosecution." The Reichsmarschall had
mentioned somewhat bitterly "that the Control Council might at least have
given them another method of execution."

That night, October 13–14, the condemned men heard heavy trucks back-
ing into the prison yard less than a hundred feet away—the gallows equipment
had arrived. Göring heard former Reich manpower commissioner Fritz Sauckel
screaming loudly, but there was nothing he could do to help. First Lieutenant
John W. West searched his cell, ransacked his belongings, and removed and
shook all the bedding while Göring talked volubly and "seemed very happy,"
as West later testified. He found nothing. Late on the fourteenth, as the
hammering from the gymnasium filled the cellblock two hundred feet away,
the chaplain came into the cell. Göring asked Gerecke if he knew the exe-
cution hour—Gerecke said he did not, and to Göring's distress also refused
him Holy Communion. "I refused him the Lord's Supper," the pastor tes-

tified a few days later, "because he denied the divinity of Christ who instituted this sacrament. . . . He became more discouraged because I insisted he couldn't meet Edda, his daughter, in heaven if he refused the Lord's way of salvation."

Thus the different men faced up to the last day in different ways. An enterprising American officer at Nuremberg issued a philatelic "first day cover" to mark the coming executions. Andrus ordered tanks and anti-aircraft units to guard the prison against last-minute liberation attempts. It was now October 15, 1946. At 8:30 A.M. Dr. Pflücker slipped into Göring's cell, checked his pulse while an American private looked on, and talked for ten minutes. Göring was seen reading out some papers to the doctor in German, and the two men laughed. An hour later the prison barber came, again escorted by a private. At 3:15 P.M., prison trusty Otto Streng brought Göring a book from the library—*With the Birds of Passage to Africa*. Göring also asked Streng to fetch some writing materials. At three-thirty, while he was writing, a white-garbed kitchen attendant came in with a mug of tea.

What was he writing? Among the letters found in the cell afterward was one undated item that appears to fit the bill:

I find it tasteless in the extreme to stage our deaths as a show for sensation-hungry reporters, photographers, and the curious. This grand finale is typical of the abysmal depths plumbed by court and prosecution. Pure theater, from start to finish! All rotten comedy!

I understand perfectly well that our enemies want to get rid of us—whether out of fear or hatred. But it would serve their reputation better to do the deed in a soldierly manner.

I myself shall be dying without all this sensation and publicity.

Let me stress once more that I feel not the slightest moral or other obligation to submit to a death sentence or execution by my enemies and those of Germany.

I proceed to the hereafter with joy, and regard death as a release.

I shall hope for my God's mercy! I deeply regret that I cannot help my comrades (particularly Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Jodl) to escape this public death spectacle as well.

The entire effort to stop us from doing harm to ourselves was never motivated by concern for our welfare, but purely to make sure that all would be ready for the big sensation.

But *ohne mich* [count me out]! Hermann Göring.

That afternoon Pflücker returned—he had just been told that the condemned men were to be awakened at 11:45 P.M. and notified that their execution was imminent. He was seen to give Göring a white pill—the usual sedative—and place a small white envelope on the table. Göring felt inside the envelope,

Oct 1946

then poured some white powder looking for was not inside it. (At dead hands. One, marked with his brass capsule and had had a corn existence—did it spell his name?

A few minutes before 6:00 P.M. one of the eight newspapermen p his editor in London: "Eight rep taken into prison whence I unper

The prison block was now a b was the big night. When the chap Reichsmarschall complained that Sauckel, to help him through the hanging, there was a silence. "I complete surrender of heart and s he was a Christian, but couldn't ac the hope that he could rest during

At 8:30 P.M. the guard changed. up his station at the peephole and wearing his boots, pants, and coat the prisoner got up, urinated, and times he went over to the table a he tidied the cell, moved his writir pajamas—pale blue jacket and bl the cot, pulled the khaki blankets

He had arranged his clothing i sleeveless woolen sweater, breech robe were folded under his pillow, on the floor.

The sentinel could see both arm scribed: his left arm stroking the v his forehead. At five past nine Dr. him later," he said, indicating No

First Lieutenant James H. Dow back, seemingly asleep. The eight a final peep at the condemned me reported an hour later to his news small iron cot, his heavy shoulder wall, reading a well-thumbed boo looking at Göring over shoulder of observe Göring constantly. . . . Wi watching him like a cat watches a Ley's act [i.e., suicide], even if b by the prisoner's "criminal feature

Taste,
like
justice,
lives
only
in the
eye of
the
kitchen.

Oct 1946

vinity of Christ who instituted
ged because I insisted he
he refused the Lord's way

t day in different ways. An
issued a philatelic "first day
ordered tanks and anti-aircraft
beration attempts. It was now
slipped into Göring's cell,
looked on, and talked for ten
pers to the doctor in German,
a barber came, again escorted
Streng brought Göring a book
to Africa. Göring also asked
thirty, while he was writing,
a mug of tea.
ound in the cell afterward was

our deaths as a show for
ers, and the curious. This
depths plumbed by court
start to finish! All rotten

enemies want to get rid of
ut it would serve their rep-
erly manner.
is sensation and publicity.
not the slightest moral or
olence or execution by my

I regard death as a release.
I deeply regret that I cannot
Marshal Keitel and Colonel
death spectacle as well.
ing harm to ourselves was
welfare, but purely to make
ig sensation.
Hermann Göring.

had just been told that the condemned
and notified that their execution was
g a white pill—the usual sedative—
table. Göring felt inside the envelope,

then poured some white powder from it into his tea. Perhaps what he was
looking for was not inside it. (At least two envelopes would be found in his
dead hands. One, marked with his first initial and name, contained the empty
brass capsule and had had a corner torn off; it is unfortunately no longer in
existence—did it spell his name "Goering," the American way?)

A few minutes before 6:00 P.M. *Daily Express* reporter R. Selkirk Panton,
one of the eight newspapermen privileged to watch the hangings, cabled to
his editor in London: "Eight reporters to witness hangings. Am now being
taken into prison whence I unpermitted file anything until hangings over."

The prison block was now a blaze of light; it was obvious that tonight
was the big night. When the chaplain came at seven-thirty that evening, the
Reichsmarschall complained that he had not been allowed to see poor Fritz
Sauckel, to help him through these days. After talking of the dishonor of
hanging, there was a silence. "I broke in to ask him once more about his
complete surrender of heart and soul to his Savior. [Göring] again claimed
he was a Christian, but couldn't accept the teachings of Christ." He expressed
the hope that he could rest during the evening—"Said he felt at ease."

At 8:30 P.M. the guard changed. Private First Class Gordon Bingham took
up his station at the peephole and noticed that Göring was lying on his cot,
wearing his boots, pants, and coat, reading the book. Twenty minutes later
the prisoner got up, urinated, and changed into his slippers. Two or three
times he went over to the table and looked inside the eyeglass case. Then
he tidied the cell, moved his writing materials to the chair, and changed into
pajamas—pale blue jacket and black silk pants. After that he lay back on
the cot, pulled the khaki blankets up to his waist, and appeared to doze.

He had arranged his clothing into neat heaps—the silken undershorts,
sleeveless woolen sweater, breeches, coat, and cap. His overcoat and silk
robe were folded under his pillow, his bedroom slippers and high dress boots
on the floor.

The sentinel could see both arms outside the blanket, as regulations pre-
scribed: his left arm stroking the wall, while his right hand once massaged
his forehead. At five past nine Dr. Pflücker made his third round. "I'll see
him later," he said, indicating No. 5—Göring's cell.

First Lieutenant James H. Dowd, passing by, saw Göring lying on his
back, seemingly asleep. The eight newspaper correspondents were allowed
a final peep at the condemned men. Kingsbury Smith, the only American,
reported an hour later to his newspaper that he saw Göring slumped on his
small iron cot, his heavy shoulders sagging against the bare whitewashed
wall, reading a well-thumbed book about the birds of Africa. "[I] stood
looking at Göring over shoulder of the prison sentinel whose duty it was to
observe Göring constantly. . . . With the eyes of an American security guard
watching him like a cat watches a rat, Göring had little hope of emulating
Ley's act [i.e., suicide], even if he had entertained such an idea." Struck
by the prisoner's "criminal features, the mean and mad face, the lips with

April 1946

Then followed this exchange with Dr. Gilbert.

GILBERT: Was Hitler crazy? At the end of his life?

VON RIBBENTROP: No. You can't say that.

GILBERT: Neurotics flare up when contradicted.

VON RIBBENTROP: Well, after I argued with Hitler in 1940, I never again had a calm discussion.³¹

Von Ribbentrop insisted that Hitler did not become rigid and fixated until the end of the war. After his escape of July 20, 1944, one of Hitler's eyes seemed cloudy, and his face and hands were pale. Was it lack of sleep? Or Morell's injections? Von Ribbentrop suggested these but had no sure answers.³⁴

The only time von Ribbentrop amused the court — involuntarily — was during cross-examination about the famous Berlin meeting with Czech President Hacha, during that snow-swept night early in 1939. Von Ribbentrop insisted that Hacha was never threatened. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe then asked, "How can you threaten a man beyond bombing his capital and invading his country?" Von Ribbentrop answered, "War, for instance."

The courtroom rang with laughter.

On April 2, 1946, to the hypothetical courtroom question "Would you have helped to assassinate Hitler if you had known the full content of the extermination camps?" Von Ribbentrop answered, "I could never have killed him. I could never repudiate him now or renounce him. I don't know why."³⁵

Dr. Gilbert brought up the famous personal argument with Hitler when the Führer nearly "had a coronary attack." Von Ribbentrop said it was about the Jewish question, and that it took more courage to face Hitler on the Jewish question than to face an atom bomb. On May 4 he said to Dr. Gilbert, "I told Hitler he was lining up yet another power against us, added to England, France, and Russia; [there] now [were] the Jews. As for world Jewry starting the war, that is nonsense!"

He was still puzzled that Britain would fight over "reasonable" demands for the return of Danzig from Poland and a right-of-way through the Corridor in exchange for certain concessions.³⁶

He also wrote, quite paradoxically, that he was "so sorry I never told Adolf Hitler what the British Empire meant. They say I gave him bad advice, that the British are weak and degenerate. The opposite is true! I always emphasized in my talks with Hitler the mighty power of their empire and the heroic attitude of their ruling circles."³⁷ Perhaps, since his memoirs were written in his jail cell, they reflect revisions of

some of his
never cor
Eventual
counts, a
thousand

1. His
2. His
3. His
4. His
hel
tio
the

On C
hanging.
Martin B
fore bein
lifetime in
defendan
acquitted
tenced in
and Scha
cally, bot
Fritsche,
pompous
bels's me
written in
There
the execu
Justice. A
by an eer

The
Texas in
cap with
rear-line
"latrine-l
any sleep
military

*The pr
archenemy

1946

1907
1932
1946
D

must have the courage to impose and enforce even decisions that themselves harbor dangers."¹¹⁶ In 1932 he declared in a similar context to the same effect: "Every plight has a root. So it is not enough . . . for me to doctor around its edges and try now and again to lop off the cancerous growth, but I must get down to its source."¹¹⁷

Iodoform absorbed into the system quickens the pulse and attacks the nerves and the brain, inducing restlessness, headaches, insomnia, fever, and—in severe cases—delirium with hallucinations.¹¹⁸ It also enters the saliva to bring on a burning thirst coupled with an inability to drink (things taste poisoned).¹¹⁹ Its sickening odor hangs heavy, and must have infested the tiny rooms in which Hitler nursed his mother during her protracted agony. Three close witnesses to that nursing gave congruent accounts of it in later years: Kubizek, Bloch, and Paula Hitler. "In these weeks it was as if my friend had all at once become an entirely different person," Kubizek related. "... He was exclusively his mother's loyal, helpful son." He took the housework upon himself, Kubizek specified, and rearranged the apartment "so that he would be close to his mother even at night. . . . Adolf read every least wish out of her eyes and fussed about her ever so tenderly. . . . In these weeks he forgot himself entirely and lived only in self-sacrificial concern for his mother."¹²⁰ As Bloch told it: "In most heartfelt love he clung to his mother, observing every one of her movements so as to be able to render her tiny services rapidly,"¹²¹ and again: "He slept in the tiny bedroom adjoining that of his mother so that he could be summoned at any time during the night. During the day he hovered about the large bed in which she lay."¹²² Paula for her part recollected in 1946 (in her interviewer's English): "... my brother Adolf spoiled my mother during this last time of her life with overflowing tenderness. He was indefatigable in his care for her, wanted to comply with any desire she could possibly have and did all to demonstrate his great love for her."¹²³ Klara Hitler died at 2 A.M. on 21 December 1907. "With his mother," as Kubizek remarked, "Adolf lost the one being on earth on whom his love was concentrated and who had returned it just as completely."¹²⁴ Bloch

NOV 1945 1947

uch as I strained my
ames on the list were
rt to make a choice.
oor of the Palace of
strong glasses and a
lawyer, if you agree.
He had friendly eyes
d various details of
onic attitude. Finally
onsider whether you
ere and then and did
proved to be a cir-
ore to me, he felt a
ten months of the
ted to this day.
ners were prevented
so that we crossed
could talk without
idity of the interna-
ce—again and again
e same subjects and
ound only one who
I could consider in
Inquart also showed
discussion was use-
ages.
ield divergent opin-
itler's rule for pur-
though he had had
regime, was all in
e held, was to use
at it was unethical
thought it danger-
future more diffi-
celerate the process
atives when he ob-
im but that within
arcophagus and he

would be celebrated by the German people as a national hero and martyr. Many of the prisoners had the same dream about themselves. On other subjects Goering's arguments were less effective. There were no differences among us, he said; we were all sentenced to death from the start and none of us had a chance. It was pointless to bother about a defense. I remarked: "Goering wants to ride into Valhalla with a large retinue." In actuality Goering later defended himself more stubbornly than the rest of us did.

At Mondorf and Nuremberg, Goering had undergone a systematic withdrawal cure which had ended his drug addiction. Ever since, he was in better form than I had ever seen him. He displayed remarkable energy and became the most formidable personality among the defendants. I thought it a great pity that he had not been up to this level in the months before the outbreak of the war and in critical situations during the war. He would have been the only person whose authority and popularity Hitler would have had to reckon with. Actually, he had been one of the few sensible enough to foresee the doom that awaited us. But having thrown away his chance to save the country while that was still possible, it was absurd and truly criminal for him to use his regained powers to hoodwink his own people. His whole policy was one of deception. Once, in the prison yard something was said about Jewish survivors in Hungary. Goering remarked coldly: "So, there are still some there? I thought we had knocked off all of them. Somebody slipped up again." I was stunned.

My vow to accept responsibility for the entire regime could not be kept without some severe psychological crises. The only way of getting out of it was to escape trial by suicide. Once I tried using a towel to stop the circulation in my sick leg, in order to produce phlebitis. Remembering from one of our lectures in Kramsberg that the nicotine from even a cigar, crumbled and dissolved in water, could be fatal, I kept a crushed cigar in my pocket for a long time. But from the intention to the deed is a very long way.

The Sunday divine services became a great support for me. Even as recently as my stay in Kramsberg I had refused to attend them. I did not want to seem soft. But in Nuremberg I threw aside such prideful feelings. The pressure of circumstances brought me—as, incidentally, it did almost all the defendants with the exception of Hess, Rosenberg, and Streicher—into our small chapel.

1947

M. J. B.

demned Hitler's "mass
 ies that filled him with
 d "shaken to the depths
 e had tried to prevent."
 e crimes that had been
 ared that "the power of
 Seyss-Inquart spoke of
 of five million people"
 the other hand they all

judicial guilt had been
 defendants. But during
 depravity had entered
 nny from all historical
 ly increase in impor-
 tive of a technocracy
 now-how in an assault
 lso to understand what

ip of an industrial state
 ship which employed to

order is, of course, not
 1 (U. S. Secretary of State
 1940-45) wrote an article,
 Affairs (1947) in which he

itions of life, science, and
 and that no one who joins
 o in a measure brutalized.
 method and the inevitable
 ay of the last two World
 ahumanity of the weapons
 d the victors. In order to
 niral Nimitz has stated, to
 are, not unlike that which
 try into World War I. In
 lives of hundreds of thou-
 We as well as our enemies
 al problem is war and not
 a all probability end with

perfection the instruments of technology to dominate its own people.
 . . . By means of such instruments of technology as the radio and
 public-address systems, eighty million persons could be made subject to
 the will of one individual. Telephone, teletype, and radio made it pos-
 sible to transmit the commands of the highest levels directly to the
 lowest organs where because of their high authority they were executed
 uncritically. Thus many offices and squads received their evil com-
 mands in this direct manner. The instruments of technology made it
 possible to maintain a close watch over all citizens and to keep criminal
 operations shrouded in a high degree of secrecy. To the outsider this
 state apparatus may look like the seemingly wild tangle of cables in a
 telephone exchange; but like such an exchange it could be directed by
 a single will. Dictatorships of the past needed assistants of high quality
 in the lower ranks of the leadership also—men who could think and act
 independently. The authoritarian system in the age of technology can
 do without such men. The means of communication alone enable it
 to mechanize the work of the lower leadership. Thus the type of un-
 critical receiver of orders is created.

The criminal events of those years were not only an outgrowth of
 Hitler's personality. The extent of the crimes was also due to the
 fact that Hitler was the first to be able to employ the implements of
 technology to multiply crime.

I thought of the consequences that unrestricted rule together with
 the power of technology—making use of it but also driven by it—might
 have in the future. This war, I continued, had ended with remote-
 controlled rockets, aircraft flying at the speed of sound, atom bombs,
 and a prospect of chemical warfare. In five to ten years it would be
 possible for an atomic rocket, perhaps serviced by ten men, to an-
 nihilate a million human beings in the center of New York within
 seconds. It would be possible to spread plagues and destroy harvests.
 "The more technological the world becomes, the greater is the danger.
 . . . As the former minister in charge of a highly developed arma-
 ments economy it is my last duty to state: A new great war will end
 with the destruction of human culture and civilization. There is noth-
 ing to stop unleashed technology and science from completing its
 work of destroying man which it has so terribly begun in this
 war. . . .²

"The nightmare shared by many people," I said, "that some day
 the nations of the world may be dominated by technology—that

March 12, 1947

rage Monthly Production

	1943	Nov. 1944
0	209,000	307,000
-	2,600	55,100
-	7,900	32,500
0	14,100	28,700
0	203,000,000	486,000,000
-	1,900,000	104,000,000
-	1,850,000	2,987,000
-	1,560,000	3,820,000
0	4,920,000	3,050,000
-	29,000	1,084,000

CHAPTER 23: Illness

1. See "Report to the Fuehrer," No. 1, January 25, 1944.
2. "Report to the Fuehrer," No. 5, January 29, 1944, includes twelve pages on the difficulties in my Ministry.
3. From the case history: "On admission, January 18, 1944, the patient appeared exhausted. . . . Extremely heavy drainage from the left knee joint." February 8, 1944: "After standing sudden onset of extreme pain in the extensor muscles of the back, left side, and the iliopsoatic muscle. Anteriorly radiating pain as in lumbago. Suggests acute muscular rheumatism. . . ." Yet Gebhardt's internist, Dr. Heissmeyer, had noted symptoms of pleurisy. Gebhardt ignored his findings in the treatment and clung to his wrong diagnosis.
4. From Dr. Koch's testimony, March 12, 1947 (Nuremberg Document 2602):

ping that with Himmler's and
ng reactivation of the Sauckel
rail motorcar to a conference
nd attended by Waeger (chief
(Department of Labor Mobi-
of the Planning Department).
was to have the final word on
Germany?"
(US Exhibit 225): "Minister
ditional one and half million
on whether it proves possible
. If this proves impossible, he
Sauckel stated that in 1944 he
a half and probably three mil-
n would decline. . . . Hitler's
r Assignment is to furnish at
he occupied areas."
deputy in Paris (Nuremberg
Sauckel, January 6, 1944 (O5
ibunal at Nuremberg declared
ese [restricted] factories were
and any worker who received
deportation by going to work
[As a mitigating circumstance]
arrangement kept many work-

In the course of the treatment differences arose between Gebhardt and me. I thought that the damp climate of Hohenlychen was affecting Speer's recovery adversely, and after I had examined the patient and concluded that he was strong enough to be moved, I suggested that he be taken south [to Meran]. Gebhardt opposed this suggestion violently. He took cover behind Himmler, with whom he discussed the matter over the telephone several times. All this struck me as very odd. I had the impression that Gebhardt was using his position as a doctor to play some political game. But I do not know what it was and I did not bother myself over it then; I wanted to be a doctor and nothing else. I then tried several times to persuade Gebhardt to change his mind. Finally, the whole business became too much for me, and I asked to speak with Himmler myself. In a telephone conversation that lasted a good seven or eight minutes I managed to persuade him to let Speer be moved to Meran. Even at the time it seemed very peculiar that Himmler should have the power of decision in a medical matter, but I did not let it disturb me, since I intentionally kept out of things which did not fall within the sphere of medicine. I should also like to mention that I had the impression Speer was greatly reassured when I was present and holding a protective hand over him.

In February 1945, when I had a minor collision with a truck in Upper Silesia and was slightly injured, Gebhardt immediately boarded

duction was 277 in 1944 (223 in 1943). In January 1945 it had dropped by 18 percent to 227, in February by 36 percent to 175, in March 1945 by about 50 percent to 145—and this with a ninth of the original transportation. In 1943 there were 225,800 metric tons (so-called Quartermaster-General tons) of munitions produced. In January 1945 this type of production still amounted to 175,000 tons, or 75 percent of the 1943 figure—although the nitrogen supply was only one eighth as large. In 1943 the average monthly delivery of tanks, tank destroyers, heavy artillery, and self-propelling guns was 1009; in January 1945 it was 1766. In 1943 there were 10,453 trucks and light tractors produced; in January 1945 there were 5089. In 1943 there were 1416 half-track tractors produced; in January 1945 there were 916—but only one fourth of the previous amount of fuel was available for running these vehicles. The disastrous developments in the chemical industry were thus the decisive factor in diminishing our combat readiness.

3. *Führerprotokoll*, October 12, 1944, Point 27.
4. In Hitler's opinion, only the death of Tsarina Elizabeth saved Frederick from tasting to the dregs a defeat that had already been decided.
5. *Führerprotokoll*, January 3–5, 1945, Point 23.
6. From the teletype message to Hitler, January 21, 1945, and the memorandum, January 16, 1945.
7. See Hitler's radio address, January 30, 1945.
8. The first quotation is from page 693, the second from page 104 of the 1935 edition of *Mein Kampf*. In my cell at Nuremberg I found the following quotation on page 780; it completes the two previous ones: "But then all those will be called before the judgment seat who today, in possession of power, trample on laws and rights, who have led our people into destitution and ruin, and who, when their Fatherland was suffering, valued themselves above the life of the community."

CHAPTER 29: Doom

1. I also left it to Saur to brief Hitler on the armaments situation. On January 20, according to the records, I had my last such conference with Hitler; after that he held the regular sessions on February 14 and 26 and on March 8 and 22 with Saur.
2. The draft of March 15, 1945, was prepared with the technical assistance of Colonel Gundelach, chief of staff to the Commanding General of the Army Engineers.

3. Instructions dispa
4. I quoted this rema
29, 1945. At that
you. . . ." But th
to pretend he had
marized the imp
words shook me
5. The Fuehrer's or
carried out in the

p 523

The struggle
seize any mea
enemy and pr
or indirect, to
emy's striking
believe that w
retrieve and
tion, and sup
been tempora
us only scorcl
fare of the p

Therefore,

1. All mili
food-supply
which the ene
future for cc

2. Those
mands for a
communicati
sioners for a
sources. Wh
the defense

3. These
commanders

This decree
March 18 mer
ritory, measur
to destroy in
other facilities
Demolition of

* D.T. I have
to this in
the earth!

July 1947

WALLACE, ARTHUR

INSIDE THE THIRD REICH 668 L

for demolition and evacuation it must be borne in mind that, with the exception of the instances treated separately under point 1, when lost territory is recovered these installations should be usable for German production.

Headquarters, April 7, 1945

Adolf Hitler

This decree had the following advantages: It could hardly be expected that the agencies involved would ever make the necessary evaluations in time. The orders to destroy railroad and communications facilities, locomotives and freight cars, and to sink ships, were now canceled. The threat of harsh penalties was restricted to the most important bridges, since the penalties did not apply to points 2 and 3.

12. On April 7, 1945, Keitel dispatched an "urgent" teletype message merely giving instructions for the total destruction of bridges important to military operations. He avoided any positive interpretation of the positive elements of Hitler's decree, thus sabotaging their effectiveness.

CHAPTER 31: The Thirteenth Hour

1. The first draft of this speech was written April 8, 1945; the draft softened for the benefit of the press is dated April 10, 1945.
2. Dr. Gerhard Klopfer declared in his affidavit of July 1947:

A short time later Speer requested Dr. Hupfauer to ask me how I felt about his intention to publicly defend Dr. Brandt during the proceedings against him. I thereupon informed him that I had the distinct impression that the proceedings against Brandt were also aimed against Speer himself. I asked him therefore not to appear in public, giving the originator of the proceedings [Bormann] the desired pretext for launching a possibly planned attack against Speer.

3. Hitler's air force adjutant, von Below, had taken care of this matter.
4. I had outlined these consequences to Hitler in my memorandum of March 15, 1945. See footnote on p. 517 in Chapter 29.
5. The complete text of this speech, written April 16, 1945, follows:

Never before in history has a civilized people been struck so hard; never have the destruction and war damage been so great as in our country, and never has a people borne the hardships of war with greater endurance, hardiness, and loyalty than you. Now all of you

669 Notes

are depressed, shaken endurance and hardi

This must not be. A determination which accorded the highest weep and mourn for enable us to bear our and soberly deciding

And here we find that that could rob the Germany ready so diminished. transportation network the feeding, clothing, prerequisite for preservation of the war, therefore, further damage on our

As the Minister responsible for the reconstruction of roads, waterways of transportation, I the authorities of the various

1. Destruction or crippling of road, or communication

2. All explosive charges, preparations for demolition. If a plant has already been returned.

3. Local measures to destroy communications network

4. These instructions occupied Norway, Denmark

5. Anyone who acts cowardly and intentionally inflicts becomes an enemy. The are hereby instructed to be dealt with all possible means

In not destroying bridges, are giving our enemies a reason, but more for the enemies to cease air raids. These contain installations: we must make arrangements

Post 1945

Post 1945 After war by year

The Ailing Empire

Germany from Bismarck to Hitler

by

SEBASTIAN HAFFNER

Translated by

JEAN STEINBERG



Fromm International Publishing Corporation
New York

Sebastian Haffner

THE RISE OF HITLER

1948

True, in 1945 the German Reich was under the jurisdiction of the four victorious powers, yet in a way it still existed as the object of that jurisdiction. Essentially, what happened in 1945 was to change the German Reich from a subject of political life into its object. It was the Wehrmacht, not the government, that had surrendered unconditionally. An unconditional surrender on the part of Germany itself, a formal handing over of power by the government to the three and later four victors, had never taken place because of a technical error, as it were.

Nonetheless, governmental power was handed over to the Allies, even though not quite as planned. It happened on May 23, 1945, when the rump government of Admiral Dönitz was arrested, and later, on June 5, when the victors unilaterally took over Germany's governmental powers. After that the German Reich existed as their object, as a four-power Reich under foreign control. The continued existence of that Reich, however, depended on the victors' adherence to their original plan of governing and administering the country as a unit, and that did not happen. As was to be expected, the only thing that had held the anti-Hitler alliance together was the fight against Hitler. Once Hitler was defeated, it took only three years for the alliance to fall apart. Still, some of the innovative measures taken during those three years have survived to this day. For example, the West and East zones were subdivided

into
new]
West;
Appa
these
less l
Germ
new]
weste
Repub
longer
T
back t
the fo
munis
and Cl
also th
of the
Th
public,
bannec
is no Sc
ocratic
munist
voice.
Comm
Chamb
Otl
power l
the thre
the labe

1949

ing. The postwar history of the German Reich is dotted with events that continued to whittle away at the essence of the Reich, until at the end nothing was left of it. I am referring to the years 1949, 1955, 1961, 1971-72, and finally, though some may find this surprising, 1975.

What happened in 1949? In my opinion, the German Reich underwent the greatest changes of all the postwar years. This was the year in which the two new German states, the German Federal Republic in the west and the German Democratic Republic in the east, the former Soviet zone of occupation, came into being.

The founding of the Federal Republic was not free of problems. The minister presidents of the West German *Länder* hesitated about convening the parliamentary council that was to draw up the new constitution—the present Basic Law of the Federal Republic. They were reluctant because they thought, and as it turned out rightly so, that this step would result in the creation of an East German state. They voiced their misgivings in the Preamble to the Basic Law to document their objections for the benefit of posterity. They really did not want a West German state. What they wanted was a unified German state, the German Reich, even if within the limited borders of 1945, and they said so in somewhat circuitous fashion by asserting that they were speaking also for those who were prevented from participating. They

called on
freedom.

This
Supreme
a call for
continuit
pretation
Preamble
all future
obligated
If the aut
so they w
vague app
their unit
German
now aske
to say the
trary. The
no longer
created, b
minate fu

And
of the Ger
unity is t
mention
referring
goes beyo
this interp
mestic po
gument, t

1952-54

and 1961, millions of people fled from East Germany—without, however, affecting East Germany's survival as a state.

There was another period in which reunification resurfaced as a political issue. In March 1952 Stalin indicated that he stood ready to nullify the agreement by which the two states had been formed. He proposed the reunification of Germany in free elections up to the Oder-Neisse Line, a peace treaty for the new all-German government, and its own army. Furthermore, he proposed the withdrawal of all occupation forces within a year, and—most important of all—a commitment by the victors not to seek any alliances with Germany, and a like commitment by Germany not to enter into any agreements with the victors. The offer was reunification for neutralization.

Stalin's proposal continued to be discussed for three years, and once, in Berlin in 1954, was debated by the foreign ministers of the four powers. The West, particularly the United States, was very suspicious of the offer, and interestingly enough the government of the Federal Republic also tended to play it down. There was some nationalistic opposition to the position of the Adenauer government, particularly in the public media, but it was rather feeble. Occasional voices were raised, the Social Democrats' among them, asking for more serious consideration of the Russian proposal, but it was not a popular position. As the elections of 1953 and 1957 showed, Adenauer's

1955

suspicious approach to the Soviet Union was supported by a majority of West Germans, and perhaps also by East Germans, even if it meant the death of reunification.

The fate of Stalin's proposal was not decided in Germany. In the final analysis it was up to the Allies. The West, under the leadership of the United States, might perhaps have agreed to the reunification of Germany, but neutralization, Stalin's primary objective, was completely out of the question. And, as it turned out, for good reason.

The neutralization of Germany would have meant that France would be the only NATO base on the continent. That would have been unacceptable even if France under de Gaulle had not pulled its military organization out of NATO. In the long run the neutralization of Germany might have compelled America to pull out of Europe, and that in turn would have resulted in Soviet hegemony over the entire continent.

In retrospect it must be admitted, even by people like myself who at the time did not agree, that Dulles and Adenauer were right to reject Stalin's offer. But regardless of the reasons, good or bad, the fact remains that Stalin's proposal, politically advantageous to Moscow and therefore presumably serious, was rejected. And the Soviets did not insist on its adoption. They were obviously ready to put the final stamp on the division of 1949 by integrating the GDR as firmly into their

1955

system of al
regard to the

This m:
in the histor
two states w
division was
opposing all

Still, the
dissolution o
the Federal R
Germany. Th
was the situa
open four-po
channel for
GDR to the
that the East
for much lon

If the W
should have g
it was obviou
be attacked.
the form of
turned out th
fense of the co
viet Union ga
factor that eve
of the two big
Prior to that
clear superior
the threat of

1958-1961 1955

system of alliances as was the West in 1955 with regard to the Federal Republic.

This makes 1955 the second important date in the history of the end of the German Reich. The two states were founded in 1949, and in 1955 the division was cemented by their integration into opposing alliances and military organizations.

Still, the hope for reunification, involving the dissolution of the GDR and its integration into the Federal Republic, continued to live on in West Germany. The only realistic basis for that hope was the situation of Berlin, which continued as an open four-power area, and thus the one remaining channel for the continuing migration from the GDR to the Federal Republic. It was predictable that the East was not going to tolerate this leakage for much longer.

If the West really set its hope on Berlin, it should have given thought to its defense, because it was obvious that one day Berlin was going to be attacked. The to-be-expected attack came in the form of the Berlin crisis of 1958-61, and it turned out that the West had no plans for the defense of the city. Moreover, in those years the Soviet Union gained nuclear parity with the West, a factor that ever since has colored the relationship of the two big powers and their respective blocs. Prior to that time the United States had enjoyed clear superiority in the field of nuclear arms. Now the threat of mutual annihilation limited the op-

1961

tions of both the powers. Neither could afford to start a war. This is the background against which the contest over Berlin was carried out, a power play which in 1961 ended in the erection of the Berlin Wall and the closing off of Berlin as an escape route.

That makes 1961 the third significant date in the history of the German Reich. The last hope that the two states would ultimately unite in a Western state was shattered. After 1961 it became clear that the two states were here to stay, that the great powers no longer seriously thought of breaking them up. What used to be called reunification no longer was in the cards. Any future effort to improve the German situation had to concentrate on the relationship between the now firmly established new German states. It took ten years for the Federal Republic to see this, and even when it did, the new *Ostpolitik*, like the Weimar Republic before it, stood on only one leg for another ten years. It was supported only by the Socialist-Liberal coalition that had come to power in 1969. The Christian Democratic opposition, which had voted against the ratification of the Eastern agreements in 1972, did not change its position and accept the Eastern policy of their predecessors until their victory in 1982, when they again took over the government.

Germany's new Eastern policy was spelled out in the Moscow and Warsaw treaties of 1970, and most importantly in the so-called Basic Agree-

ment of the GDR
ereignty
to the B

The
were in
ment co
powers,
sue still
Berlin—
and calca

The
Germany
jurisdicti
situation
state str
tional de
Berlin is
Berlin a
In the S
legal sta
Western
ern pow
under fo
powers, i
a part of
the Sovie
not only
lin, but
Republic
that the

Danque - no more pages!