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The Ailing Empire - Haffner
The life & death of A.H. - Pagan

The Swarm

her that she must depart; it compels her to bring her own rivals into the world, and rears them royally, protecting them from their mother's political hatred. So, too, in accordance with the generosity of the flowers, the age of the spring, and the probable dangers of the nuptial flight, will it permit or forbid the first-born of the virgin princesses to slay in their cradles her younger sisters, who are singing the song of the queens. At other times, when the season wanes, and flowery hours grow shorter, it will command the workers themselves to slaughter the whole imperial brood, that the era of revolutions may close, and work become the sole object of all. The "spirit of the hive" is prudent and thrifty, but by no means parsimonious. And thus, aware, it would seem, that nature's laws are somewhat wild and extravagant in all that pertains to love, it tolerates, during summer days

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The Young Queens

has become too weak to persist in her passion, they will themselves complete the massacre of the innocents; and the sovereign race, and their dwellings, will all disappear.

This is the terrible hour of the hive; the only occasion, with that of the more justifiable execution of the drones, when the workers suffer discord and death to be busy amongst them; and here, as often in nature, it is the favoured of love who attract to themselves the most extraordinary shafts of violent death.

It will happen at times that two queens will be hatched simultaneously, the occurrence being rare, however, for the bees take special care to prevent it. But whenever this does take place, the deadly combat will begin the moment they emerge from their cradles; and of this combat Huber was the first to remark an extraordinary feature. Each time, it would seem

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The Life of the Bee

her venomous weapon until the victim perish. She then becomes calmer, appeased by the death that puts a term to the hatred of every creature; she withdraws her sting, hurries to the adjoining cell, attacks it and opens it, passing it by should she find in it only an imperfect larva or nymph; nor does she pause till, at last, exhausted and breathless, her claws and teeth glide harmless over the waxen walls.

The bees that surround her have calmly watched her fury, have stood by, inactive, moving only to leave her path clear; but no sooner has a cell been pierced and laid waste than they eagerly flock to it, drag out the corpse of the ravished nymph, or the still living larva, and thrust it forth from the hive, thereupon gorging themselves with the precious royal jelly that adheres to the sides of the cell. And finally, when the queen

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The Young Queens

account of the weather unexpectedly becoming less favourable, or for some other reason we cannot divine, they will suddenly change their mind, renounce the cast that they had decreed, and destroy the royal progeny they had so carefully preserved. But at present we will suppose that they have determined to dispense with a second swarm, and that they accept the risks of the nuptial flight. Our young queen hastens towards the large cradles, urged on by her great desire, and the guard make way before her. Listening only to her furious jealousy, she will fling herself on to the first cell she comes across, madly strip off the wax with her teeth and claws, tear away the cocoon that carpets the cell, and divest the sleeping princess of every covering. If her rival should be already recognisable, the queen will turn so that her sting may enter the capsule, and will frantically stab it with

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* Alois describing the murder
death of ^{the} ~~princess~~ ^{princess}. Adolf
very taken by that murder is
one of the tests of nature's program

The Progress of the Race

creature, not even man, has achieved, in the centre of his sphere, what the bee has achieved in her own; and were some one from another world to descend and ask of the earth the most perfect creation of the logic of life, we should needs have to offer the humble comb of honey.

But the level of this perfection is not maintained throughout. We have already dealt with a few faults and shortcomings, evident sometimes and sometimes mysterious, such as the ruinous superabundance and idleness of the males, parthenogenesis, the perils of the nuptial flight, excessive swarming, the absence of pity, and the almost monstrous sacrifice of the individual to society. To these must be added a strange inclination to store enormous masses of pollen, far in excess of their needs; for the pollen, soon turning rancid, and hardening, encumbers the surface of the comb; and

~~Talk to bee about~~
~~their bad habits~~

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The Life of the Bee

of abundance, the embarrassing presence in the hive of three or four hundred males, from whose ranks the queen about to be born shall select her lover; three or four hundred foolish, clumsy, useless, noisy creatures, who are pretentious, gluttonous, dirty, coarse, totally and scandalously idle, insatiable, and enormous.

But ~~after the queen's impregnation~~ when flowers begin to close sooner, and open later, the spirit one morning will coldly decree the simultaneous and general massacre of every male. It regulates the workers' labours, with due regard to their age; it allots their task to the nurses who tend the nymphs and the larvæ, the ladies of honour who wait on the queen and never allow her out of their sight; the house-bees who air, refresh, or heat the hive by fanning their wings, and hasten the evaporation of the honey that may be too highly charged with water;

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In fact, there had been a Hotel Dreesen during the fabrications by Hitler as to spur him on

off from the Hangarar from Godesberg. The skies were clear. In his press chief; Viktor to replace Roehm; Schreck. There were

enfeld Airfield at four were chalky gray. Two field, together with a in Munich were in a in an armored car, came out openly in the to their barracks. Some the SS and the Reichs-house, but to make the

ed outside the Ministry with Adolf Wagner, from Berlin. Two of turned chauffeur and man of the early days as some significance in to be his companions

Munich was waking up re running, a few work- in the streets. Suddenly arrested August Schneid- Police in Munich and knew the name well, bers drawn up the pre- sident, Edmund Schmid, of the ministry. They them, Hitler went into her, tore off his insignia tailor, and then did the

same to Schmid. It was as though he felt the need to grapple physically with two men he had already sentenced to death.

Those who were standing around the office watched in stunned silence. They had all heard of Hitler's rages but had not believed it possible that the Fuehrer would personally attack two high-ranking members of the SA. Exhausted, Hitler waved his arm wearily and ordered the two SA officers held in the Stadelheim prison.

The time had come for what Hitler regarded as the most important part of his mission—the capture of Roehm, who was fast asleep in a lakeside hotel on the Tegern Lake. Trucks full of SS troops under Sepp Dietrich, having left Augsburg the previous night, had skirted Munich early in the morning and were already on the high road leading to the small town of Wiessee. They had orders to stop before they reached the town. There were about 100 troops belonging to the SS *Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler*, all of them picked men who had separately sworn allegiance to Hitler. They were to take cover in the woods near the approaches to the town and wait for Hitler's arrival. If Roehm offered any resistance, he wanted his own bodyguard to have the honor of attacking the hotel.

At six o'clock Hitler set out from Munich to the Tegern Lake. As usual, he was well-protected. He rode in an armored car in a long convoy consisting of six cars and four or five trucks full of armed soldiers. It was one of those beautiful summer days when the sky is high and the air is alive with colors washed in the night's rains. Everything happened according to plan. The SS *Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler* was exactly where it was supposed to be. Roehm had set up no guard posts along the road, and there was no evidence that he knew anything at all about this massive invasion of the lakeside hotel. The town of Wiessee was perfectly quiet and normal, and the lake shone placidly in the early morning sun.

What happened in the next few minutes has been related at considerable length by Otto Dietrich, Hitler's press chief, and by Goebbels in a speech delivered over the Berlin radio the following day. Hitler, too, gave his own version of these events to his chosen friends. There is no version from any of the SA officers who were spending the night at the Pension Hanslbauer, because most of them were shot and the few survivors were effectively silenced.

According to Hitler, the task of overcoming the SA officers was accomplished quickly and easily. Nearly everyone in the hotel was asleep. Hitler kicked open the door, marched into the vestibule, and surprised the few guards sitting in a small room off the vestibule. They were quickly disarmed by Schreck and placed under arrest. As Hitler turned back into the vestibule, Julius Uhl, a high-ranking SA officer,

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came down the staircase, having been awakened by the noise. He was about to draw his pistol when he was seized by a police official called Hohl, disarmed, and placed under arrest. Hitler turned to Julius Uhl and asked him where Roehm was. When he refused to answer, Hitler called the proprietor, who told him the number of the room. Hitler ran up the stairs, knocked on Roehm's door, and shouted: "News from Munich!"

"All right, come in!" Roehm replied.

Hitler marched in to find Roehm lying naked on the bed with a boy beside him.

"Get up and get dressed!" Hitler said. "You are under arrest, and there is no need to tell you why!" Then he turned to Hohl and said: "See that Roehm gets dressed and bring him downstairs."

One by one all the SA leaders in the hotel were arrested and taken under guard to the cellar. Only one of them, Edmund Heines, who was also in bed with a boy, put up any resistance, and he was subdued by Brueckner. Most of them imagined they would be shot in the cellar, but it was simply a convenient place to put them until the trucks, parked some distance away, arrived. The whole operation, as recounted by Hitler, was carried out by eight men: Hitler, Brueckner, Hohl, Schaub, Schreck, and three others.

According to this official story, Hitler had almost singlehandedly entered a nest of vipers and trodden them underfoot. The lakeside hotel was represented as the scene of wild homosexual orgies, and the SA leaders were represented as a small army of corrupt and ruthless men about to plunge the whole country into civil war. Nothing about the story rings true, least of all the confrontation between Hitler and Roehm in the hotel bedroom. Hitler had brought with him to Wiessee at least 200 heavily armed men, including a detachment of the *SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler* under Sepp Dietrich. He was in no mood to risk his life by entering a hotel that might, for all he knew, be heavily guarded, with only a handful of men at his side. What is much more likely is that the hotel was first stormed by Sepp Dietrich's troops, and Hitler strode in only when he received the signal that the SA leaders were under arrest.

The names of the SA leaders staying at the hotel are known. They were Roehm, Uhl, Heines, Bergmann, Count von Sprei, and Dr. Emil Ketterer, the officer in charge of SA medical services and Roehm's personal physician. The doctor was not on the death list, and Hitler specifically ordered that he not be arrested. According to Dr. Ketterer, no sexual orgies took place in the hotel, and Roehm, after receiving treatment from the doctor for his neuralgia, went to bed early to sleep off the effects of the injection. All together there were only six SA lead-

ers at the hotel, chauffeurs.

Edmund Heines, in the hotel cellar and shot, to be in bed together. They were shot immediately after they had been shot in the truck under arrest.

To kill two men in one tary expedition.

Everyone knew in the morning, at arrive early to take it happened that drove up to the hotel to Munich. Peter he had led his own later he had joined in a brawl or later Tall and thin, with a booter, and his regard for him, as ordered that a man named Heydebreck

According to his information from his person. His case him, armed only you with Roehm under arrest, order and Count von Sprei prison on the outskirts

Goebbels's accusation. He had to the culprits, even enters the bedroom disgusting that they threaten to will confess that represented as a man Wiessee, saved on these stories have cations. Hitler was safety.

became the Reichsmacht
after '34?

under the direct command of the new president,
in this case Hitler, for the head of state was also
the commander in chief of the armed forces.

The Reichswehr agreed to hand Hitler this all-
important prize if he in turn would rescind the
planned takeover of the army by the SA and refrain
from using the SA as his instrument of terror. That
put Hitler in a very difficult position. There is con-
siderable evidence to support the theory that he
had led the SA to believe that after Hindenburg's
death they would get a chance to carry out their
"second revolution," the military revolution. Hit-
ler saw only one way out of this dilemma: to mur-
der the leadership of the SA. And that is what he
did on June 30, 1934. One does not have to be
unduly sympathetic to the SA to be appalled by
what happened to them.

In anticipation of Hindenburg's expected
death, Hitler had granted the SA collective leave
for the month of July. At the same time he said
he wished to meet with its leadership at Bad Wies-
see on June 30 in order to make plans for the fu-
ture. The SA leaders arrived at Wiessee on June
29. Hitler was expected the next morning. How-
ever, he got to Wiessee sometime during the night
under heavy police escort, not with the intention
of holding a meeting but rather to have the assem-
bled leadership arrested and shipped off to Munich
or Berlin, where they were executed without trial
and without warning. He later claimed he had had
to act to prevent a planned putsch. And in fact

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history texts still speak of the so-called Röhm Putsch.

But there never was such a putsch. In planning the military coup, Ernst Röhm, the SA's chief of staff, thought he was carrying out Hitler's orders. Instead, he, along with most of the other leaders, was murdered in his sleep. A few days later the cabinet put its stamp of approval on the events of June 30 by saying that Hitler had acted in defense of the state. This was a foretaste of the murderous, arbitrary reign of terror that was to engulf Germany from 1938 to 1945.

The Reichswehr honored its agreement with Hitler. Hindenburg died on August 2, and on that same day Hitler named himself Hindenburg's successor. The Reichswehr swore allegiance to Hitler as their new commander in chief. With that, Hitler neutralized the military and turned himself into both the political and military center of power, something on the order of a supreme general, a new emperor.

On the whole, the German people and the old elite supported the horrifying murder of the SA leadership, perhaps not as unreservedly as they had approved of the elimination of the political parties, yet still with a measure of satisfaction and relief. The SA had not been very popular. The upper classes had looked on them as proletarian rabble, and the middle class had feared them because their unpredictable and brutal excesses affected all areas of life, including business. They welcomed

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the fact that the Führer had put a stop to all of this, that they could now look forward to a return to normalcy, never mind the methods used. And the fact that Hitler used the occasion to rid himself of a number of prominent conservatives, including his predecessor, General von Schleicher, and Schleicher's wife, also did not raise too many eyebrows. If one can speak of the collective guilt of the German people, then perhaps this is where it all began.

The two political upheavals of those early Hitler years, the one from March to July 1933 and the other from June to August 1934, were followed by a period of calm that lasted until the fall of 1938. They were the so-called "good" Nazi years. During that time the terror of the early years was more or less held in check. Of course, the concentration camps were still in operation, but their population decreased, more were let out than were sent in. Life appeared to be returning to normal.

At the same time, Hitler's economic miracle was taking off. The economy was reinvigorated. In the four years from 1933 to 1937 Germany went from mass unemployment to full employment. With this Hitler won the support of—or at least neutralized—the overwhelming majority of former Social Democrats and a large number of former Communists. It remains an open question, however, to what extent the German people really stood behind Hitler. He had never won an absolute majority in a free election, and the 99 percent he

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got in the various plebiscites and Reichstag elections between November 1933 and the spring of 1938 are meaningless. They were not real elections. The people had to vote if they did not want to call attention to themselves, and so they simply dropped their ballots in the box. It made no difference whether those ballots were blank or not. Still, no one who was there at the time can deny that by the end of 1933 or 1934 at the latest, Hitler was supported by the vast majority of the German people. They approved of his rule and of the results he got. The middle class liked his program of rearmament and his equally successful defiant stance in foreign affairs, and the workers liked the unexpected economic upturn and the jobs they won.

What kind of state was Germany during that time? Contrary to widely held beliefs it was not a one-party state, unlike today's German Democratic Republic or the Soviet Union, which are dominated by a highly structured political party. The National Socialist party had no central committee, no Politburo, and Hitler never convened executive committee meetings. The annual party congresses staged at Nuremberg with great fanfare were not the sort of congresses at which delegates meet to discuss issues and vote on programs. No such meetings were ever held. The Nazi party congresses were public displays of organizational muscle. Special days were dedicated to the various groupings: a Day of the SA, a Day of the SS, a Day of the Reich Labor Service, and after 1934 also a

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defence power

Day of the Wehrmacht (the new name of the German army after the introduction of universal military service). All organs, all segments of the state, were brought together for one huge, impressive demonstration at which Hitler, and only Hitler, addressed the masses. No one else spoke. It was not the party that dominated the state but Hitler who dominated everything, including the party.

Once all other parties had been eliminated the National Socialist party also ceased to play any meaningful role in Hitler's state. By now the names of almost all top regional and national officials, the party's highest functionaries, are forgotten, and even during the Third Reich they were largely unknown to the general population. Hitler's Third Reich was not a party state, it was a Führer state.

And contrary to popular belief, Germany also was not really a totalitarian state. Hitler's state, more than any other in the history of the German Reich, encompassed many different states. In his book *The Dual State*, the German émigré historian Ernst Fraenkel points out that the Third Reich was composed of at least two states: a state of arbitrary rule and terror alongside the old traditional, bureaucratic, even constitutional state. Civic disputes before the courts were handled as in the past. The same laws and the same legal procedures were followed, National Socialism notwithstanding. And the same holds true for many ministerial functions, where established

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procedures continued to be followed and where, particularly after 1934, when the terror of the SA had abated, a measure of normalcy was restored. Of course, it was a normalcy that could be interrupted any time the Führer chose to embark on a particular political campaign; he could always find the requisite instruments to carry out his will.

The Wehrmacht continued to function as a state within the state. The writer Gottfried Benn, who at the time returned to his original profession of military doctor, called it the aristocratic form of emigration.

Well, it was no emigration, and even the designation "aristocratic" is open to dispute. But it was a form of withdrawal, a retreat into a special niche, into a special state within the state, in which old traditions and customs continued to prevail. Thus, for example, the Hitler salute did not replace the traditional military salute until 1944.

The survival of such niches was by no means due to an oversight on the part of Hitler. The Nazis have been called a movement, but, strange as this may seem, after 1933 the only real movement was Hitler himself. Not only did he set the entire Reich and the entire population in motion, he never framed a new constitution, he never coordinated or integrated the numerous institutions and organizations he had created—and he did all this consciously, to keep everything in flux, because he did not look upon the German Reich as some-

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thing definitive, as a legacy that had to be preserved. For Hitler the Reich was a launching pad, the point of departure for territorial expansion, a new power structure with a fuzzy internal constitutional framework. That accounts for the internal chaos of the Third Reich.

How did Hitler nonetheless manage to govern this nontotalitarian, highly departmentalized state as a Führer state? Given this "authoritarian anarchy" (as it has been called), how was it possible for a supreme authority to impose its will wherever and whenever it chose? The explanation can be found in two words: propaganda and terror. These two instruments were Hitler's most important tools from day one to the very end. They set the Hitler state apart from any of its predecessors.

Let us examine the terror first. To begin with, there were the concentration camps. Citizens could be sent there arbitrarily, without arrest warrants, without legal recourse, without indictment, and once there they could expect the worst. After the fall of the SA the camps came under the control of Hitler's other terror instrument, the SS. On June 30, 1934, Hitler made a very clever move. He did not ask the Reichswehr to carry out the execution of the SA leadership. They were only too glad not to have to soil their hands with this dirty job. Rather, he used another special force, the SS, then the special paramilitary section of the SA.

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The requisite arms were furnished by the Reichswehr. With this single stroke the SS became both the new SA and something else as well. Unlike the SA, the SS was never a primarily political organization. From the very outset it was supposed to represent a sort of aristocracy among National Socialist organizations, a racially select troop with "clean" family trees going back all the way to 1800. And it also had a special function. The SA had hoped to become the Wehrmacht, and when it was denied that role it dwindled into insignificance. The SS had a different goal: It wanted to become Germany's police, and it did. In the early Hitler years the police were still under the jurisdiction of the individual states, but later were centralized under a new national department—the Central Reich Security Office. In no time at all it came under the total control of the SS whose top leaders took over the police, and police officials were given SS ranks. The SS and the police fused into a single entity, which made them an important new power in the state.

The SS continued to spread its wings. Their acts of terror, which were separate from their equally feared police functions, were carried out by special units, the so-called Death Head companies. They replaced the SA as the overseers and managers of the concentration camps and imposed a much more impersonal, more predictable, and more disciplined, though certainly not more hu-

re far harsher and more trivial infractions of the laws to death.

ed careful planning and SS was still relatively for them to turn into of power and terror of which needed time before the strong Reichswehr of which probably was somewhat powerful military machine

on of the terror and the same time, the years from the appearance of comparative of Hitlerism, which arose after 1938, was put on

Hitler's terror was Heinrich Himmler, the commander of the SS, Hitler's right hand. The main building block of Hitler's system was Joseph Goebbels, the minister of government, the minister of enlightenment and Propaganda. Hitler's invaluable left

the same sort of semi-power Himmler carved the course of time. He remained loyal, and unlike Himmler

he never played any role in policymaking, foreign or domestic. Still, Goebbels oversaw one of the most important states within Hitler's state. He had complete control over what nowadays is referred to as the public media, over all areas with the potential of influencing and shaping public opinion, above all the press and broadcasting, but also the stage, film, and to some degree publishing as well. Goebbels was a master of communication techniques.

Goebbels never tried to turn all Germans into National Socialists. All he did was use the media, and film in particular, to offer a view of a society whose health had been restored under the Führer. under National Socialism. His ministry made occasional propaganda films, but their number can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The films he sponsored were humorous, lighthearted, polished entertainments in which love conquered all and no one said "Heil Hitler" or mentioned the Third Reich. These movies gave the German people what they were looking for—escape.

Oddly enough, much of Goebbels's propaganda was made with the help of people who thought of themselves as anti-Nazis. Most of the working actors and directors were so-called Antis. By making pictures that more or less ignored the Third Reich, they managed to convince themselves that they were resisting. What they failed to see was that in making these seemingly harmless confections devoid of any hint of Nazi pro-

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press policy was not very different. the non-Socialist papers, only those democratic and Communist press. were allowed to continue. Nor can Goebbels actually Nazified them. journalists were put into editorial hdogs, so to speak, but as a rule ld key positions. Most of the edie major non-Socialist papers were : for Jewish journalists, of course. stayed on were expected to carry press of the Third Reich was still iders of Frankfurt's major daily d the same diet as those of the ly, and even that paper was not , the official organ of the monomite Streicher. The reader was he news was made palatable. intervention was unobtrusive. briefings of the Propaganda Min-

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istry were conducted by a subordinate, rarely by Goebbels himself. The papers usually sent a correspondent rather than the top editor to these briefings. The purpose of these sessions was to give so-called language guidance, not detailed directives or instructions. The papers were allowed, and even encouraged, to continue in their traditional style. The purpose of the directive was to let them know what not to emphasize or what to gloss over and what to feature prominently. In some rare instances they were told what editorial line to take. It would therefore be unfair to say that the press was completely coordinated. It remained diverse, but limits to what could be printed were set. Goebbels and Hitler achieved their objective of letting the non-Nazis know what they wanted them to hear in a way they could accept. By not overwhelming the public with ideas they felt it was not yet ready for, they succeeded brilliantly in manipulating public opinion and the public mood. Moreover, the propaganda machinery had a comparatively easy time between 1934 and 1938 because things were going well for Hitler. Even the non-Nazis were forced to concede that not only did Hitler know what he wanted, he also did what he wanted. After all, they said, just look at him. Let him be, he's making us rich and great and strong. He's showing the world that Germany again is a force to be reckoned with.

In those years Hitler scored three major victories. The first was full employment. Employ-

Goebbels to Goebbels

paganda, they were doing Goebbels's bidding and helping to cover over the reality. They were saying that things were only half as bad, that all in all life was really quite normal. I am not pointing a finger. Like anybody else, they had to make a living, and anyone who was making a living in the Third Reich was in one way or another helping it. My point is that for them to claim now that by not making propaganda they were part of a resistance movement, as some actors have implied, is not quite accurate.

Goebbels's press policy was not very different. He did not ban the non-Socialist papers, only those of the Social Democratic and Communist press. All the others were allowed to continue. Nor can it be said that Goebbels actually Nazified them. Of course, Nazi journalists were put into editorial offices, as watchdogs, so to speak, but as a rule they did not hold key positions. Most of the editorial staffs of the major non-Socialist papers were kept on—except for Jewish journalists, of course. And those who stayed on were expected to carry on as usual. The press of the Third Reich was still diverse. The readers of Frankfurt's major daily were not handed the same diet as those of the official Nazi daily, and even that paper was not like the *Stürmer*, the official organ of the monomaniacal anti-Semite Streicher. The reader was given a choice; the news was made palatable.

Goebbels's intervention was unobtrusive. The daily press briefings of the Propaganda Min-

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parts of his program were never completely
popular.

What about these other parts? From the very
beginning Hitler had relentlessly persecuted two
groups: the Communists and the Jews. In view of
the fact that by 1932 the Communists had become
a mass party and got six million votes, one might
have thought that his anti-Communist campaign
would not be all that popular. One may well ask
what happened to those six million votes after
1933. The answer is, nothing.

Even the non-Socialist and Socialist adversar-
ies of the Communists had secretly hoped that the
Communists would be able to mount some sort
of resistance against Hitler (something they them-
selves were no longer ready to undertake), that the
Communists would not let themselves be wiped
out by Hitler without a struggle. There even was
fear of something like a civil war breaking out.
However, nothing like that ever happened. After
the Reichstag fire the Communist leaders who had
not fled the country or gone underground were
arrested and sent to concentration camps. The
party offices were searched and closed, and the
staffs arrested. The Communist party was in effect
made illegal without an official ban. The tactic was
a complete success; there was no Communist re-
sistance worth mentioning.

A great many Communist voters and sup-
porters, probably a few million, deserted the party
in the following months. The non-Socialist par-

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ties, and to some degree also the Social Democrats who had waged a fraternal battle against the Communists, were not altogether unhappy with what was happening to them. It must be pointed out, however, that while the non-Socialist parties disappeared without a trace, and while the SPD had gone into exile, Communists inside Germany continued to risk their lives to maintain at least some cadres, some link between the most important party outposts. That sort of perseverance against all odds is more than admirable, although it must also be admitted that in all that time they accomplished nothing. Small Communist groups and grouplets formed and re-formed, and at times even managed to carry out some minor campaigns, like leaving leaflets in public buildings. The only thing they accomplished, however, was to create martyrs. At any rate, Hitler's anti-Communism had no adverse effect, neither on the ready acceptance of his policies nor on his enormous popularity.

Anti-Semitism was a different matter. Neither the German Reich of the Hohenzollern nor the Prussia of Hardenberg and Bismarck had been anti-Semitic states. The anti-Semitism of the German people was at most "conventional"; in the provinces Jews were not always liked and often socially isolated. There was some resentment against their attraction to certain professions (law, medicine, journalism, publishing, literature), but it was a social, nonviolent anti-Semitism. And it was not shared by the majority of the people.

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rites, as a result, many people that with this Hitler's anti- had reached its acme. Hence- themselves, the Jews would stood. True, they no longer some professions were closed ld no longer marry Gentiles th them, and, well, perhaps t far, but compared to all the was doing—jobs, rearmament, sses, the restoration of Ger- one could live with the Nu-

ce in the persecution of the to the acceptance of far more ith it the German people also er's crimes against the Jews, e obliteration of all demo- els they no longer were able ons or give them political

el it was possible to oppose ws. Even if Germans could hey could risk punishment iter, once the persecutions ould hide Jews or help them in some other way. And hat; not millions perhaps, ate. It was no longer pos- one wanted to, effectively : of Hitler's rule, such as

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his anti-Semitic regulations. Still, Hitler's anti- Semitism was the line that separated the loyal followers of the Führer—the majority of the peo- ple—and the not insignificant minority of Antis, people who in the privacy of their homes railed against Hitler and his party, and who were con- vinced that this proved their adherence to tradi- tional values even if they no longer dared to speak out, let alone act. There always existed a substan- tial number of Antis who later, after Hitler's fall, liked to describe themselves as the "inner emi- gration," or even as the resistance. I believe that both these labels should be used with great caution.

Resistance was limited to very small groups, and occasionally to groups that were officially part of the regime, particularly in the military; outside the official apparatus no effective resistance was possible. The resistance of some of the churches and of the Communists was ineffective because neither was in any position to affect the policies of the Führer state. In fact, there was only one group that had the necessary leverage: the General Staff of the army. There were two officers' plots, one in 1938-39, when war was imminent, and the other in 1943-44, when defeat was imminent. Only one of these plots was actually carried out: Count Stauffenberg's botched assassination of Hit- ler on July 20, 1944. Stauffenberg failed largely because he did not have the backing of the entire army command, only of a minority. Of this mi-

1933

reich, is another matter. At first it is to represent utter discontinuity, a precedent for one-man dictatorship, for the propaganda monopoly, the ending of all political parties. However, this may seem, all these innovatively accepted in 1933, as though men were waiting for them all along. And unprecedented measures, yet going in the background of the German way for them. Bismarck, yet in his early years he had of "his" Reich as autocratically as in its final phase. The legacy, fully or not, was a conscious or unconscious waiting for a leader. And the same people's distaste for political change and half of World War I as well as the days of the Weimar Republic, all rose to the surface, and both were the central figure symbols of the times. But Hindenburg never came into reality, neither before 1918 nor between 1930 and 1932. Instead, he acted promptly in 1933, and even outdid all the national community (and its grandeur—the ultimate and noble aspiration. Hitler's "You shall know that I am everything" had always been the lie of the political ideology

1934 ~~and~~ 38

and aspirations of almost all early national movements, and of the citizens of the German Reich. In that respect Hitler stands well within the continuity of German history, even if his methods put everything known or tried in the past into the shade.

Society in Hitler's Reich underwent a change, but in the final analysis continuity predominated. One might say continuity underwent a change. Politically the old ruling class was more or less stripped of power, but it retained its social status. The big landowners remained big landowners, the big industrialists remained big industrialists, and the intellectual and cultural elite, insofar as emigration had not thinned its ranks, also retained its position. What changed was the expansion of these ruling elites, for example the infiltration of the police by the SS, the infiltration of major economic enterprises by Nazi bigwigs, and the changes in press empires, many of which had been in Jewish hands. Society in the time of Hitler was upwardly mobile, as was also true, in a different sense, of the Weimar Republic, and as is still true of the two new German states. That does not mean that continuity had ended. The military's recapture of the social prestige and status it had temporarily forfeited in the Weimar Republic is part of this continuity.

The major element of discontinuity was Hitler's anti-Semitism, the biological race theory, a theory without credence in the former Reich, yet

At the beginning of the First World War Hitler, under the conditions of military service, acquired his first practical experience in leadership. His first political model was thus the company commander—sustained by the confidence of his men and demanding unconditional obedience. This officer's own responsibility was, in turn, equally simple: to act precisely in accordance with his orders, and to be prepared to react instantly to a new or unexpected situation. For the power struggle Hitler undertook when he entered the political arena, this military experience of elementary leadership was not sufficient.

The *Table Conversations* contain many revealing statements about the principles Hitler followed and the measures he took in building up his party, fighting his opponents, establishing a subservient press, and negotiating with the Reich Chancellery before coming to power.³ What we see is that the more Hitler, as a politician, outgrew the role of a company commander, the more he became like a *Landsknechtsführer* of the Thirty Years' War, like the captain of one of those mercenary bands who regarded any means as justified and was prepared to defend the most ruthless conduct of the men in his command.

In his conversations, Hitler was occasionally very candid in revealing details, such as tactical tricks employed in disrupting meetings and rallies of political opponents, or the systematic defamation of women who dared openly to oppose the National Socialists. But with all parties attempting to win over the masses, these details were apt to be similar, differing perhaps only in degree. In the context of political competition, Hitler and his party comrades were certainly not inclined to be fastidious in a moral sense. Later, after they had come to power, the fact that they were responsible for the Reich was no reason in their eyes to return to the conventional morality of civilian life or of the military, which was sheer hypocrisy so far as Hitler was concerned.

In the course of his struggle for power, Hitler accumulated a rich

³It should be noted, however, that in Hitler's memory things always got sorted out in such a way that they fitted in with his preconceptions. Thus Hitler the historian should be consulted as a witness to the facts only with the greatest care.

store of experience in methods with opponents and rivals in his even the example of the *Lam* bound to his men by reciprocal military. What guided Hitler was: old instinct, given clear theoretic hard to imagine that Hitler ever would not have had to in order even more a man of naked power Florentine himself, whose ideal moral inhibitions.

It was during the so-called ' that Hitler first demonstrated in having his opponents murdered sode, not only opponents and p become opponents were killed, l less even in the view of Hitler's or some other unfortunate erro Hitler's old comrade, a friend to one of very few with whom he ev Röhm. To have Röhm shot bef as a potential rival might be a point of view of naked Machiav however, is that neither at the slightest evidence of emotion or Röhm and other old comrades. l lutely unmoved and uninvolved over his lips," wrote Helmuth Hitler's circle of mealtime comp he had a warm or compassionate soul several strings were missin; and violent men can at least now we have already remarked, on expressions during the war was

⁴Greiner was Schramm's predecessor.—ED.

1934

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store of experience in methods of dealing with enemies as well as
with opponents and rivals in his own camp. He no longer followed
even the example of the *Landsknechtsführer*, who was at least
bound to his men by reciprocal loyalty and the ethical code of the
military. What guided Hitler was purely a sense of power, that age-
old instinct, given clear theoretical formulation by Machiavelli. It is
hard to imagine that Hitler ever read a line of *The Prince*, but he
would not have had to in order to become a master Machiavellian,
even more a man of naked power than was described by the great
Florentine himself, whose ideal ruler was really not devoid of all
moral inhibitions.

It was during the so-called "Röhm Revolt" of June 30, 1934,
that Hitler first demonstrated in public that he ~~did not shrink~~ from
having his opponents murdered. In the course of this bloody epi-
sode, not only opponents and persons who might conceivably have
become opponents were killed, but also individuals who were guilt-
less even in the view of Hitler's party, victims of mistaken identity
or some other unfortunate error. Among those gunned down was
Hitler's old comrade, a friend to whom he was much indebted and
one of very few with whom he ever stood on a first-name basis, Ernst
Röhm. To have Röhm shot before he could strengthen his position
as a potential rival might be an understandable motive from the
point of view of naked Machiavellianism. What remains astounding,
however, is that neither at the time nor later did Hitler show the
slightest evidence of emotion or concern about the separation from
Röhm and other old comrades. In this respect Hitler remained abso-
lutely unmoved and uninvolved. "I have never heard a word come
over his lips," wrote Helmuth Greiner, who occasionally joined
Hitler's circle of mealtime companions, "which even suggested that
he had a warm or compassionate heart."⁴ It was as though in his
soul several strings were missing which even in the most hardened
and violent men can at least now and then be heard reverberating. As
we have already remarked, one of his characteristic, often-used
expressions during the war was "ice-cold."

⁴Greiner was Schramm's predecessor as war diarist in Hitler's headquarters.
—ED.

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guarded turn of phrase: "And yet for a moment the situation almost permitted the hope of our holding out."¹⁴⁸ He added: "... Here 1918 must be a warning to us. In 1918 the pauses between successive attacks were much too long. . . ."¹⁴⁹ The next day he remarked at a military conference: "Something just occurred to me because people are always complaining they get reinforcements too late. We marched off for the second offensive in 1918 on the 25th [of May]. On the 26th we slept in a forest. . . ."¹⁵⁰ From then on, the strategist's planning of 1944-1945 was informed by the foot soldier's experiences of 1914-1918—with horses and bicycles, with artillery rationing, with transporting ten- and fifteen-centimeter howitzers in two loads each.¹⁵¹

Hitler rode his two political tracks together nonstop to their common terminus. Nothing could sidetrack him, not even another trauma. And he contracted one early along: at midday on 9 November 1923, when he collapsed with his Putsch under fire. The consulting physician at his prison certified that he had suffered "a dislocated left shoulder with the top broken, followed by a very painful traumatic neurosis,"¹⁵² and that "the pain in the injured arm . . . is to be traced back to a traumatic nervous ailment."¹⁵³ A trembling of the left arm resulted which subsided over the years. The nervous ailment—he himself called it "my nervous ailment"—resumed when Barbarossa was checked, which he knew meant defeat.¹⁵⁴ The trembling resumed during the Stalingrad disaster, then spread to the leg by association with his 1916 shrapnel wound in the left thigh.¹⁵⁵ It worsened steadily except when the Stauffenberg bomb blast halted it for some weeks.¹⁵⁶ As for the psychological trauma, he had meanwhile purged that through his Blood Purge of 30 June 1934.

The traumatic Putsch was charged with the tension that built up between Bavaria and Berlin when Stresemann, in late September 1923, called off passive resistance to the French occupation of the Ruhr. Bavaria had thereupon appointed a prime minister with dictatorial powers, Gustav von Kahr, to challenge Berlin while restraining the local paramilitary formations, among them

* But by then he had ¹¹⁰ learned that when speaking of grasping my belt handle with his left hand.

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Never be known as a man of letters. They know it already
Life 5 *1934*

had mood

It is unlikely that Hitler knew George's verses but he knew the widespread mood they expressed, and this acted upon him. Nevertheless the decision to be himself 'the Man' for whom all were waiting and of whom all were expecting miracles undoubtedly required a certain wild courage which no one other than Hitler had then or later. In the first volume of *Mein Kampf*, dictated in 1924, this decision is presented as fully matured, and when the Party was re-established in 1925 it was for the first time put into effect formally. In the new NSDPA there was, from the outset and once and for all, only one will - that of the Führer. The fact that his decision to be the Führer was subsequently realized on a far greater scale is, as far as Hitler's internal political development was concerned, a lesser leap than his original decision to venture it at all.

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The intervening period, according to how one calculates it, amounted to six, nine or even ten years, since, even in 1933, Hitler did not attain the complete omnipotence of the 'Führer' who is answerable to no one. This only happened after Hindenburg's death in 1934. Hitler was forty-five when he became Der Führer. This now raised the question for him of how much of his domestic and foreign policy programme he would be able to achieve within his lifetime; and he answered that question with the most extraordinary political decision of all, one that is still not universally known, and the first one he kept entirely secret. His answer was: the lot! And this answer implied a monstrosity, the subordination of his politics and of his political timetable to the presumable duration of his earthly life.

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It was, in the most literal sense, an unprecedented decision. After all, the life of man is short, that of states and nations is long. All constitutions, republican as well as monarchist, are based upon that fundamental fact as a matter of course. Even the 'great men' who want to 'make history' make allowance for it, either by reason or by instinct. Thus, none of the four men with whom we have compared Hitler postulated or practised his irreplaceability. Bismarck built himself a powerful but clearly defined post in a constitutional system planned to endure, and when he had to

Grant even larger garden area for a wild-walking sheep pen, maybe. They like that. I'd say, it's often no vice that's interesting with courage - which is even more

** P.T. We believed ¹⁷ I succeeded & die. Without me, the second half of the proposition would have been assumed. But that was*

1934

THE MEANING OF HITLER

vacate that post he did so, angrily but obediently. Napoleon tried to found a dynasty. Lenin and Mao organized the parties which they had founded also as nurseries for their successors, and these parties have indeed produced capable successors and – though often amidst crisis and bloodshed – eliminated incapable ones.

None of this applies to Hitler. He deliberately based everything upon his own irreplaceability, upon an eternal 'I or chaos'. One might almost say upon 'After me the Deluge'. There was no constitution, no dynasty – which, of course, would have been anachronistic, quite apart from Hitler's aversion to marriage and his childlessness – , but equally no truly state-supporting, solidly constructed party organization capable of surviving and reproducing leaders. To Hitler his party was merely the instrument of his own seizure of power. It never had a Politburo and he never allowed a crown prince to emerge. He refused to think beyond, or to make provision beyond, his own life-span. Everything had to happen through himself.

* With that decision, however, he placed himself under a time pressure that was bound to lead to precipitate and inappropriate political decisions. Any policy, in fact, is of necessity inappropriate if it is governed not by the circumstances and possibilities of a given situation but by the probable duration of an individual life. But that was just what Hitler's decision implied. More particularly it implied that his planned great war for 'living space' would have to be waged in his own lifetime and by himself. Naturally he never discussed that publicly. No doubt the Germans would have been a little alarmed if he had done so. But in the notes he dictated to Bormann in February 1945 he openly admitted it all. Having complained that he had started the war one year too late, in 1939 instead of in 1938 ('But I could not do anything since the British and French accepted all my demands at Munich'), he continued: 'I must now disastrously accomplish everything within the short span of a human life ... where others had an eternity at their disposal, I only have a few miserable years. The others know that they will have successors ...' But then he had himself seen to it that he would not have one.

* D.T. Because of me¹⁸ he had a clear sharp sense of how long his life would be – spent to saving it we know how much better without any.

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him that the composition of the coalition government would not be altered, whatever the results of the elections.

The next day, when Hitler saw Monsignor Kaas, he took good care that the negotiations with the Centre should fail. On the advice of Papen, Hindenburg agreed once more to sign a decree dissolving the Reichstag 'since the formation of a working majority has proved impossible'. The Centre Party protested to the President that this was not true, but the decree had been signed, the date for the new elections fixed and the first and most difficult of the obstacles to Hitler's success removed. Papen and Hugenberg had allowed themselves to be gently guided into the trap. Goebbels wrote confidently in his diary, 'The struggle is a light one now, since we are able to employ all the means of the State. Radio and Press are at our disposal. We shall achieve a masterpiece of propaganda. Even money is not lacking this time.'

In order to leave no doubts of the expectations they had, Göring summoned about twenty-five of Germany's leading industrialists to his palace on the evening of 20 February. After Hitler spoke, Göring bluntly appealed to them: 'The sacrifice asked for is easier to bear if it is realized that the elections will certainly be the last for the next ten years, probably even for the next hundred years.' It was agreed to raise an election fund of three million Reichsmarks to be divided between the partners in the coalition, but there was little doubt that the Nazis would get the lion's share.

Throughout the election campaign Hitler refused to outline any programme for his Government. At Munich he said: 'Programmes are of no avail, it is the human purpose which is decisive.' The Nazi campaign was directed against the record of the fourteen years of party government in Germany, which had 'piled mistake upon mistake, illusion upon illusion.' What had the Nazis to put in its place? He was no

Revolution after Power

democratic politician, Hitler trick the people into voting promises. 'I ask of you, Germany, you have given the others five, give us four.'

Hitler did not rely on the though the other parties were in a minority, their meetings were brutally assaulted and beaten, their papers continually suppressed. He admitted fifty-one people killed in the campaign and several hundred wounded. The Nazis did not mean to be scrupulous about fair play or fair play. Papen believed he had tied up the number of Cabinet members to a bare minimum, but the State—control of the Prussian State Administration, the Prussian Minister of the Interior, the system of dual government which this office carried out the work of thirds of Germany. In the end no man after Hitler played the Nazi revolution as Göring's ruthlessness, together with his indispensability to Hitler's success, would be restrained by the Government of Prussia proved ill-fated and enforced his will, possession of absolute power.

The moment Göring entered the Prussian State Administration, he gave particular attention to sweeping out the old officers, replacing them with new ones. In February, after urging them to the activities of 'organization'—that is to say, the Communist Party—Police officers who make us

coalition government the results of the elec-

aw Monsignor Kaas, he ations with the Centre of Papen, Hindenburg decree dissolving the of a working majority Centre Party protested not true, but the decree the new elections fixed of the obstacles to Hitler and Hugenberg had already guided into the trap. his diary, 'The struggle able to employ all the d Press are at our disservice of propaganda. is time.'

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ampaign Hitler refused or his Government. At es are of no avail, it is decisive.' The Nazi came record of the fourteen in Germany, which had, illusion upon illusion.' in its place? He was no

democratic politician, Hitler virtuously replied, to trick the people into voting for him by a few empty promises. 'I ask of you, German people, that after you have given the others fourteen years you should give us four.'

'Hitler did not rely on the spoken word alone. Although the other parties were still allowed to function, their meetings were broken up, their speakers assaulted and beaten, their posters torn down and their papers continually suppressed. Official figures admitted fifty-one people killed during the election campaign and several hundreds injured. This time the Nazis did not mean to be robbed of power by any scruples about fair play or free speech.

Papen believed he had tied Hitler down by restricting the number of Cabinet posts held by the Nazis to a bare minimum, but the real key to power in the State—control of the Prussian police force and of the Prussian State Administration—lay with Göring, Prussian Minister of the Interior. By the curious system of dual government which existed in Germany, this office carried out the work of administering two-thirds of Germany. In the critical period of 1933-4, no man after Hitler played so important a role in the Nazi revolution as Göring. His energy and ruthlessness, together with his control of Prussia, were indispensable to Hitler's success. The belief that Göring would be restrained by Papen as Minister-President of Prussia proved ill-founded. Göring issued orders and enforced his will, as if he were already in possession of absolute power.

The moment Göring entered office he began a drastic purge of the Prussian State service. He paid particular attention to sweeping out the senior police officers, replacing them with S.A. or S.S. leaders. In February, after urging the police to show no mercy to the activities of 'organizations hostile to the State'—that is to say, the Communists—Göring continued: 'Police officers who make use of fire-arms in the exe-

ing the federal States to the authority of the central Government. The State Diets were abolished; the sovereign powers of the States transferred to the Reich; and the Reichsstatthalter and State Governments placed under the Reich Government. This was the culmination of a year of *Gleichschaltung*, in which all representative self-government from the level of the States downwards through the whole system of local government had been stamped out.

The process of *Gleichschaltung* did not stop with the institutions of government. If Hitler meant to destroy Marxism in Germany he had obviously to break the independent power of the huge German trade-union movement, the foundation on which the Social Democratic Party rested. The Nazis cleverly camouflaged their intentions by declaring May Day a national holiday, and holding an immense workers' rally in Berlin which was addressed by Hitler. On the morning of the next day the trade-union offices all over the country were occupied by S.A. and S.S. troopers. Many union officials were arrested, beaten, and thrown into concentration camps. All the unions were then merged into a new German Labour Front, headed by Robert Ley.

Hitler gave assurances to the workers when he addressed the First Congress of German Workers on 10 May. But the intention behind his talk of honouring labour and abolishing the class war were not long concealed. Before the month was out a new law ended collective bargaining and appointed Labour Trustees, under the Government's orders, to settle conditions of work.

The Social Democrats attempted to carry on loyally for a time, but their efforts proved futile. On 10 May Göring ordered the occupation of the Party's buildings and newspaper offices, and the confiscation of their funds, and on 22 June banned the Social Democratic Party as an enemy of the people and State.

The remaining parties remained a problem, but this did not prevent their disappearance. Not even Hitler's personal enemies, the Nationalists, were spared.

On 14 July the Official German Government announcement, signed by Hitler, stated:

'The German Government has decided to suppress the law, which is herewith proclaimed as follows:

'Article I: The National Socialist German Workers' Party constitutes the only legal party in Germany.'

'Article II: Whoever undertakes to form a new political party or to join an existing one, or to assist in the formation or the maintenance of a political party, shall be punished with imprisonment up to three years, or with a greater penalty according to the circumstances.'

With the suppression of the coalition which had hitherto existed, the disappeared. As so often with Hitler, he resorted to his favourite method of doing just the things no one else would do, with a bland contempt. In a few weeks he had broken up the Social Democratic Party, the Centre and the Right-wing parties. Over the Stahlhelm and the most powerful organization contrary to all expectations, he had equal success. He had rights of the federal State. Sterilism applied to politics use of force in the first, produced startling results.

Any opposition in the face of the wave of violence which was the political landmarks in the history of Germany, shorn of his power as Russia, was a shrunken figure.

attention to the rule that the Vice-Chancellor must always be present when he saw the President; indeed, he rarely bothered to see the President at all, now that he had the power to issue decrees himself.

Thus by the summer of 1933 Hitler was complete master of a Government which was independent alike of Reichstag, President, and political allies. All Papen's calculations of January, his assurance that once the Nazi Party was harnessed to the State it would be tamed, had proved worthless. For Hitler had grasped a truth which eluded Papen, the political dilettante, that the key to power no longer lay in the parliamentary and presidential intrigues by means of which he had got his foot inside the door—and by means of which Papen still hoped to bind him—but, outside, in the masses of the German people. Papen, deceived by Hitler's tactics of legality, had never grasped that the revolutionary character of the Nazi movement would only be revealed after Hitler had come to power, and was now astonished and intimidated by the forces he had released.

For it is a mistake to suppose, as Papen did, that because Hitler came to power by the backstairs there was no genuine revolutionary force in the Nazi Party. The S.A. regarded Hitler's Chancellorship as the signal for that settling of accounts which they had been promised for so long. With the long-drawn-out economic depression and the accompanying political uncertainty and bitterness, the revolutionary impulse of the S.A. was bound to strike echoes in a large section of the German people. This wave of revolutionary excitement which passed across Germany in 1933 took several forms.

Its first and most obvious expression was violence. The violence of the period between the Reichstag Fire and the end of the year was on a different scale from anything that had happened before. The Government itself deliberately employed violence and intimidation as a method of governing, using such

agencies as the Gestapo (the Police established by Göring) camps opened at Oranienburg places. At the same time, the violence and order shown by the violently suppressed impulse for revenge. The traditional as the courts were withdrawn robbery to murder brazen. The only measure taken but issue amnesties for 'penal tional revolution'.

Violence, if it repelled, pecially among the younger a characteristic part of the 1933, like other revolution hopes, a sense of new possibility, the beginning of action and anticipation after years succeeded in releasing pent and in re-creating a belief man people. It is wrong element of coercion, and to Hitler commanded a genuine many. To suppose that the cured in his plebiscites cipally, due to the Gestapo camps is to miss what Hitler's menace attraction to the

Side by side with this violent accompaniment of all the rush to clamber on the bandwagon for jobs and advantages. The closing of the production of new posts in the business, whetted the appetite of the ambitious, and the end now held power in Germany the Nazis who had become

Vice-Chancellor must the President; indeed, President at all, now decrees himself.

3 Hitler was complete was independent alike political allies. All ry, his assurance that nessed to the State it rthless. For Hitler had d Papen, the political er no longer lay in the l intrigues by means nside the door—and by pped to bind him—but, German people. Papen, of legality, had never character of the Nazi ealed after Hitler had w astonished and in- l released.

ose, as Papen did, that by the backstairs there orce in the Nazi Party. Chancellorship as the counts which they had ith the long-drawn-out accompanying political the revolutionary im- strike echoes in a large This wave of revolu- sed across Germany in

xpression was violence. between the Reichstag was on a different scale ened before. The Gov- ployed violence and in- governing, using such

agencies as the Gestapo (the Prussian Secret State Police established by Göring), and the concentration camps opened at Oranienburg, Dachau, and other places. At the same time, the open contempt for justice and order shown by the State encouraged normally suppressed impulses of cruelty, envy, and revenge. The traditional sanctions of the police and the courts were withdrawn, and common crime from robbery to murder brazenly disguised as 'politics'. The only measure taken by the Government was to 'issue amnesties for 'penal acts committed in the national revolution'.

Violence, if it repelled, also attracted many, especially among the younger generation. It was indeed a characteristic part of revolutionary idealism. For 1933, like other revolutionary years, produced great hopes, a sense of new possibilities, the end of frustration, the beginning of action, a feeling of exhilaration and anticipation after years of hopelessness. Hitler succeeded in releasing pent-up energies in the nation, and in re-creating a belief in the future of the German people. It is wrong to lay stress only on the element of coercion, and to ignore the degree to which Hitler commanded a genuine popular support in Germany. To suppose that the huge votes which he secured in his plebiscites were solely, or even principally, due to the Gestapo and the concentration camps is to miss what Hitler knew so well, the immense attraction to the masses of force plus success.

Side by side with this went the familiar and seamy accompaniment of all revolutionary upheavals, the rush to clamber on the band wagon and the scramble for jobs and advantages. The purge of the civil service, the closing of the professions to Jews in 1933, the creation of new posts in government, in industry and business, whetted the appetites of the unsuccessful, the ambitious, and the envious. Most of the men who now held power in Germany and the thousands of Nazis who had become mayors of cities, deputies,

only the day before were allowed to continue with their jobs, while deserving *Alte Kämpfer* were left out on the streets. In characteristically elegant language the S.A. began to talk of clearing out the pigsty, and driving a few of the greedy swine away from the troughs.

While the S.A., which was a genuine mass movement with strong radical and anti-capitalist leanings, became restive, Hitler was as strongly opposed as ever to Röhm's inveterate desire to turn the S.A. into soldiers and to remodel the Army. There were particularly strong reasons why he wished to avoid alienating the Army leaders at this time. The willingness of the Army to see Hitler become Chancellor and the benevolent neutrality of the Army while he arrogated more and more power to himself were decisive factors in the establishment of the Nazi régime. The key figure in guaranteeing the friendly attitude of the Army was General von Blomberg, but Hitler also made a powerful appeal to the Army by two promises: German military strength would be restored by rearmament, and the Army would not be called upon to intervene in a civil war.

Hitler's relations with Blomberg became closer as he began to take the first steps in rebuilding the military power of Germany. Looking ahead, he recognized the importance of having the Army again on his side, if he was to succeed Hindenburg, and he was anxious that nothing should disturb the confidence of the Army leaders in the new régime.

Röhm took a different view. By the end of 1933 the S.A. numbered between two and three million men, and Röhm stood at the head of Laforce more than ten or twenty times the size of the regular Reichswehr. The S.A. leaders, ambitious and hungry for power, saw in their organization the revolutionary army which should provide the military power of the New Germany. They were contemptuous of the rigid

Revolution after Power

military hierarchy of the were avid for the prestige, would acquire by supplanting motives were as crude as deniably a number of the ability, and commanded by generals, however, were accepted the S.A. on an equal

Hitler went out of his way that he remained loyal to the S.A. remained. If it went into the Army, as Röhm wanted of it? The S.A. was the enemy years of struggle. In it fighters' who had been brawling, but for whom that when it came to power and disillusioned radicals, reconciliation with existing institutions had failed to get the jobs successful, who had no jobs

Thus relations between came a test case involving so-called Second Revolutionary revolution was to be halted of all revolutionary leadership, power, the liquidation of the past.

Hitler first attempted conciliation and compromise. December made Röhm and Cabinet. Röhm's appointment which had long been a gripe beginning of the New Year to Röhm of unusual friendship his 'imperishable services' friendship. More attention and grievances of the 'old

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military hierarchy of the professional Army and were avid for the prestige, power, and pickings they would acquire by supplanting the generals. Their motives were as crude as their manners, but undeniably a number of them were tough, possessed ability, and commanded powerful forces. The Army generals, however, were adamant in their refusal to accept the S.A. on an equal footing.

Hitler went out of his way to reassure the generals that he remained loyal to them, but the problem of the S.A. remained. If it was not to be incorporated into the Army, as Röhm wanted, what was to become of it? The S.A. was the embarrassing legacy of the years of struggle. In it were collected the 'old fighters' who had been useful enough for street brawling, but for whom the Party had no further use when it came to power and took over the State; the disillusioned radicals, resentful at Hitler's compromise with existing institutions; the ambitious, who had failed to get the jobs they wanted, and the unsuccessful, who had no jobs at all.

Thus relations between the S.A. and the Army became a test case involving the whole question of the so-called Second Revolution—the point at which the revolution was to be halted—and the classic problem of all revolutionary leaders once they have come to power, the liquidation of the Party's disreputable past.

Hitler first attempted to solve this problem by conciliation and compromise. A law promulgated on 1 December made Röhm and Hess members of the Reich Cabinet. Röhm's appointment repaired an omission which had long been a grievance with the S.A. At the beginning of the New Year Hitler addressed a letter to Röhm of unusual friendliness, thanking him for his 'imperishable services' and assuring him of his friendship. More attention was now paid to the needs and grievances of the 'old fighters', and members of

the Party or S.A. who had suffered sickness or injury in the political struggle for the national movement were granted State pensions.

Röhm, however, was not to be silenced by such sops. In February he proposed in the Cabinet that the S.A. should be used as the basis for the expansion of the Army, and that a single Minister should be appointed to take charge of the Armed Forces of the State. The obvious candidate for such a post was Röhm himself. The Army High Command presented a unanimous opposition to such a proposal and appealed to the President, as the guardian of the Army's traditions, to put a stop to Röhm's attempted interference.

Hitler declined to take Röhm's side in the dispute, and the plan was allowed to drop for the moment. Although temporarily checked, Röhm kept up his pressure on the Army, and his relations with General von Blomberg, the Minister of Defence, grew strained.

At the end of March Hitler and von Blomberg were secretly informed that President Hindenburg could not be expected to live very much longer. Within a matter of months, perhaps of weeks, the question of the succession would have to be settled. It had long been the hope of conservative circles that Hindenburg's death would be followed by a restoration of the monarchy, and this was the President's own wish. Hitler, however, was now opposed both to a restoration and to the perpetuation of the existing situation. So long as the independent position of the President existed alongside his own, so long as the President was Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and so long as the oath of allegiance was taken to the President and not to himself, Hitler's power was something less than absolute. He was determined that, when Hindenburg died, he and no one else should succeed to the President's position. It was

to Adolf Hitler that the Army new oath of allegiance. The step was to make sure of claimed to represent the nation independently of the movements and parties.

In the second week of April presented itself. On 11 April cruiser *Deutschland* to take y He was accompanied by General General Freiherr von Fr Chief of the German Army Raeder, the Commander-in-Navy. It is believed to have of this short voyage that H the generals: the succession for the suppression of Röhm's inviolability of the Army's force in the State. A conference under Fritsch's chair berg's decision in favour of after—the terms of the *De* communicated to them.

The news of Hitler's offer of the S.A., which leaked to Prague, sharpened the conflict the Army. Röhm had power Party as well as in the Army made a general by Hindenburg itated naturally towards the authority, and was on the Chief of Staff of the S.A. He had a full police force 'for special ready under his own hand: School near Berlin. On 1 April, already head of the *BA* führer of the black-shirted appointed by Göring as head Göring found in Himmler

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to Adolf Hitler that the Armed Forces should take the new oath of allegiance. The first and most important step was to make sure of the Army, whose leaders claimed to represent the permanent interests of the nation independently of the rise and fall of governments and parties.

In the second week of April an opportunity presented itself. On 11 April Hitler left Kiel on the cruiser *Deutschland* to take part in naval manoeuvres. He was accompanied by General von Blomberg, Colonel General Freiherr von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, and Admiral Erich Raeder, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. It is believed to have been during the course of this short voyage that Hitler came to terms with the generals: the succession for himself, in return for the suppression of Röhm's plans and the continued inviolability of the Army's position as the sole armed force in the State. A conference of senior Army officers under Fritsch's chairmanship endorsed Blomberg's decision in favour of Hitler after—but only after—the terms of the *Deutschland* Pact had been communicated to them.

The news of Hitler's offer to cut down the number of the S.A., which leaked out and was published in Prague, sharpened the conflict between Röhm and the Army. Röhm had powerful enemies inside the Party as well as in the Army. Göring, who had been made a general by Hindenburg, once in power gravitated naturally towards the side of privilege and authority, and was on the worst of terms with the Chief of Staff of the S.A. He began to collect a powerful police force 'for special service', which he kept ready under his own hand at the Lichterfelde Cadet School near Berlin. On 1 April 1934, Heinrich Himmler, already head of the Bavarian police and Reichsführer of the black-shirted S.S., was unexpectedly appointed by Göring as head of the Prussian Gestapo. Göring found in Himmler an ally against a com-

mon enemy, for the first obstacle Himmler sought to remove from his path was Ernst Röhm. Himmler and his S.S. were still a part of the S.A. and subordinate to Röhm's command, although the rivalry between the S.A. and S.S. was bitter, and Röhm's relationship with Himmler could hardly have been less cordial. Röhm's only friends in the Party leadership were Goebbels and—paradoxically enough—the man who had him murdered, Hitler.

The situation with which Hitler had to deal was produced by the intersection of the problems of the Second Revolution, of the S.A. and the Army, and of the succession to President von Hindenburg. It was the problem of the succession which introduced a note of urgency by making Hitler's own position vulnerable, for if he was to secure their support for his succession to the Presidency, the Army leadership was determined to exact in return the removal of the S.A. threat to take over the Army and renew the revolution.

Hitler chose to stand by his agreement with the Army and repudiate the Revolution, but he disguised his decision as action forced on him not by pressure from the Right, but by disloyalty and conspiracy on the Left.

On 4 June Hitler sent for Röhm and had a conversation with him which lasted for five hours. According to Hitler's later account, he warned Röhm against any attempt to start a Second Revolution. At the same time as he assured Röhm that he had no intention of dissolving the S.A., Hitler reproached him with the scandal created by his own behaviour and that of his closest associates in the S.A. leadership, who had become notorious for their disorder, luxury and sexual perversion. A day or two later Hitler ordered the S.A. to go on leave for the month of July, returning to duty on 1 August. During their

leave they were forbidden to take part in any demonstration announced on 7 June that he take a period of sick leave. H conference of S.A. leaders to the movement at Wiessee, ne It was a rendezvous which keep.

On 13 July Hitler gave hi pened between 8 June and 30 speech, Röhm had renewed General von Schleicher, and t on a concrete programme: the many could not be supported tional associations must be u under Röhm; Papen must be himself become Vice-Chancell

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which Hitler had to deal was the solution of the problems of the S.A. and the Army, and of General von Hindenburg. It was a decision which introduced a note of Hitler's own position vulnerable to their support for his success. The Army leadership was to return the removal of the Army and renew the

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leave they were forbidden to wear their uniforms or to take part in any demonstrations or exercises. Röhm announced on 7 June that he himself was about to take a period of sick leave. Hitler agreed to attend a conference of S.A. leaders to discuss the future of the movement at Wiessee, near Munich, on 30 June. It was a rendezvous which Hitler did not fail to keep.

On 13 July Hitler gave his version of what happened between 8 June and 30 June. According to his speech, Röhm had renewed his old relations with General von Schleicher, and the two men had agreed on a concrete programme: the present régime in Germany could not be supported; the Army and all national associations must be united in a single band under Röhm; Papen must be removed, and Schleicher himself become Vice-Chancellor.

Since Röhm was not sure that Hitler would agree, he made preparations to carry out his plan by a *coup*, the main role in which was to be played by the S.A. Staff Guards. To complete the conspiracy, Hitler continued, Schleicher and his former assistant in the Defence Ministry, General von Bredow, got in touch with 'a foreign Power' (later identified as France), and Gregor Strasser, who had retired into private life after Hitler's Chancellorship, was brought into the plot.

After his talk with Hitler on 4 June, Röhm—still according to Hitler's version—planned to take Hitler captive, hoping to use his authority to call out the S.A. and paralyse the other forces in the State. The action taken at the end of June was directed, Hitler claimed, to forestalling Röhm's putsch which was about to be staged in a matter of hours.

Part of this story can with some certainty be rejected as untrue from the beginning. On the very day he was supposed to be storming the Chancellery in Berlin, Röhm was seized in bed at the hotel in

Wiessee where he was taking a cure and awaiting Hitler's arrival for the conference they had arranged. Most of the other S.A. leaders were either on their way to Wiessee or had actually arrived. Karl Ernst, the S.A. leader in Berlin (whom Hitler represented as one of the most important figures in the plot), was taken prisoner at Bremen, where he was about to leave by boat for a honeymoon in Madeira. The whole story of an imminent *coup d'état* was a lie, either invented later by Hitler as a pretext for his own action, or possibly made use of at the time by Göring and Himmler to deceive Hitler and force him to move against Röhm. There is no evidence to support the claim that the conspirators of June 1934 were Röhm and the S.A. The plot was hatched by Göring and Himmler, the enemies of Röhm; the treachery and disloyalty were not on Röhm's side, but on theirs and Hitler's; and if ever men died convinced—not without reason—that they had been 'framed', it was the men who were shot on 30 June 1934.

Throughout June 1934 there was an ominous tension in Berlin, heightened by rumours and much speculation. At the end of May both Brüning and Schleicher were warned that, in the event of a purge, their lives were in danger. Brüning took the advice seriously and left for Switzerland; Schleicher went no farther than the Starnbergersee, and returned in time to be shot.

On 14 June Hitler flew to Venice for the first of many celebrated conversations with Mussolini. Mussolini, at the height of his reputation and resplendent with uniform and dagger, patronized the worried Hitler, who appeared in a raincoat and a soft hat. Mussolini was not only pressing on the subject of Austria, where Nazi intrigues were to lead to trouble before the summer was out, but frank in his comments on the internal situation in Germany. He advised Hitler to put the Left wing of the Party under

restraint, and Hitler return and irritable.

No part is more difficult story than that played by deed he played any part a victim. Hitler had appeared Strasser earlier in the 1930s. Strasser, Hitler offered Grational Economy before Hitler about the same time, Goebbels secretly.

These attempts to keep in one-time leader of the Left with Röhm, the leader of the was endemic, were evident still going on in Hitler's mind that he was eager to avoid the Party, by delaying action denburg might die suddenly way the crisis could be a decisions.

At this stage Hitler was the realities of the situation quarter. Papen had dropped the spring of 1933, but he and still enjoyed the special President. The divisions with a chance of re-asserting himself last time he made use of himself to stage a public protest; and, even more, against the events in Germany. The course of a speech at the 17 June and crystallized the ties of the whole nation. It was about the Second Revolutionary irresponsibly with such ideal a second wave of revolutionary third, and that he who

guillotine may be its first victim. . . . At some time the movement must come to a stop and a solid social structure arise. . . .'

Papen also discussed the shortcomings of Nazi propaganda, concluding, 'It is time to join together in fraternal friendship and respect for all our fellow countrymen, to avoid disturbing the labours of serious men and to silence fanatics.'

Hitler immediately made scathing references to 'the pygmy who imagines he can stop with a few phrases the gigantic renewal of a people's life'. But Papen's protest was not so easily brushed aside. Goebbels took immediate steps to ban its publication, but copies were smuggled out of Germany and published abroad, creating a sensation which did not fail to penetrate to Germany. When Papen appeared in public at Hamburg on 24 June he was loudly cheered. It was evident that he had spoken for a great part of the nation.

On 20 June Papen went to see Hitler and demand the removal of the ban on publishing his speech. In a stormy interview Papen threatened his own and the resignation of the other conservative ministers in the Cabinet. Hitler saw quite clearly that he was face to face with a major crisis. When he flew to Neudeck on 21 June to see the ailing President, he was met by General von Blomberg, with an uncompromising message: either the Government must bring about a relaxation of the state of tension or the President would declare martial law and hand over power to the Army. Hitler was allowed to see the President only for a few minutes, but the interview, brief though it was, sufficed to confirm Blomberg's message. The Army was claiming the fulfilment of its bargain, and by now Hitler must have realized that more was at stake than the succession to the Presidency: the future of the whole régime was involved.

It is impossible to penetrate Hitler's state of mind

Revolution after Power

in the last week of June. Obviously aware of the preparations well put in hand and have agreed yet to the very last day he is to take the final step. At this but Göring and Himmler were prepared to eliminate their rivalry. In the background the arrangements. On 25 June the General von Fritsch, placed alert, ordering all leave to be to be confined to barracks. (Officers' League expelled Röhl *Völkischer Beobachter* carried General von Blomberg, which coming purge had the Army'

While Hitler was convenient, Göring and Himmler commands and S.S. to hold them

Far away from the tension on the shores of the Tegernsee enjoy his sick leave with his men. So little was he aware of that he had left his Staff Guardlessness and confidence are in Berlin, the local S.A. leader, easily aware of something the Berlin S.A. on the afternoon far misled as to believe the the Right directed against it stood what had happened, ended shouting: 'Heil Hitler.'

On the 29th Hitler, still keen, made a tour of labour camps the afternoon stopped at a place where he brought himself Goebbels, who in the past dropped his contacts with that the Berlin S.A., although

Many of those murdered had little, if any, connexion with Röhm or the S.A., and fell victims to private quarrels. Kahr, who had played a big role in 1923, but had since retired, was found in a swamp near Dachau; his body was hacked to pieces. Father Bernhard Stempfle, who had once revised the proofs of *Mein Kampf*, was discovered in the woods outside Munich; he had been shot 'while trying to escape'. In Hirschberg, Silesia, a group of Jews was murdered, for no other apparent reason than to amuse the local S.S. A music critic named Willi Schmidt was shot mistakenly because he had the same name as someone else on the list.

In an effort to prevent too much becoming known, Goebbels forbade German newspapers to carry obituary notices of those who had been executed or 'had committed suicide'. The ban only led to exaggerated rumours and to the intensification of the feeling of horror and fear. Not until 13 July did Hitler appear before the Reichstag and reveal a part of the story.

Hitler began with a lengthy recital of the achievements of National Socialism, in defence of his policy as Chancellor. When he came to describe the events leading up to 30 June he threw the whole blame on Röhm, who had forced him to act against his own wishes. Hitler gave great prominence to the charges of corruption, favouritism, and homosexuality against Röhm's group, and went out of his way to represent them as betraying the ordinary, decent S.A. man. He spoke of those who had become 'revolutionaries who favoured revolution for its own sake and desired to see revolution established as a permanent condition.' But, Hitler replied, 'for us the Revolution is no permanent condition.' Finally he repeated the promise, which to the Army leaders was the covenant in which they placed their faith: 'In the State there is only one bearer of arms, and that is the Army; there is only one bearer of the political will, and that is the National Socialist Party.'

The Officer Corps, in its privileged position of what happened in Germany stopped short of the military, could see no further noses. The menace of it on the week-end of 30 far more dangerous of the Army was taking service in the Röhm given their independence rectly under Hitler's or führer S.S. At last Hitler wanted, an absolutely instrument of political to suffer so sharp a revolution the Army officers, who, tentatively held aloof many and expressed an Chancellor's quickness in Germany lay.

For anyone less blind in which Hitler dealt revolution must have been than satisfaction. Never his total indifference to manity, and his determination at any cost. Never had revolutionary character of the Revolution.

When President von Hindenburg on 2 August, all had come the announcement would henceforward Chancellor, and that Hitler of the State—as well as Chief of the Armed Forces signatures at the foot of

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The Officer Corps, intended only on preserving the privileged position of the Army, and indifferent to what happened in Germany so long as Nazification stopped short of the military institutions of the country, could see no further than the ends of their own noses. The menace of the S.A. was broken for good on the week-end of 30 June, but already a new and far more dangerous challenge to the autonomy of the Army was taking shape. As a reward for their service in the Röhm purge, Himmler's S.S. were now given their independence of the S.A., and placed directly under Hitler's orders with Himmler as Reichsführer S.S. At last Hitler had got what he had always wanted, an absolutely dependable and unquestioning instrument of political action. No group of men was to suffer so sharp a reversal of their calculations as the Army officers, who, in the summer of 1934, ostentatiously held aloof from what happened in Germany and expressed an arrogant satisfaction at the Chancellor's quickness in seeing where the real power in Germany lay.

For anyone less blind than the generals, the way in which Hitler dealt with the threat of a second revolution must have brought consternation rather than satisfaction. Never had Hitler made so patent his total indifference to any respect for law or humanity, and his determination to preserve his power at any cost. Never had he illustrated so clearly the revolutionary character of his régime as in disowning the Revolution.

When President von Hindenburg died on the morning of 2 August, all had been arranged. Within an hour came the announcement that the office of President would henceforward be merged with that of the Chancellor, and that Hitler would become the Head of the State—as well as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Reich. Among the signatures at the foot of the law announcing these

changes were those of Papen, Blomberg, and Schacht: the representatives of Conservatism acquiesced in their own defeat.

The same day the officers and men of the German Army took the oath of allegiance to their new Commander-in-Chief. The form of the oath was significant. The Army was called on to swear allegiance not to the Constitution, or to the Fatherland, but to Hitler personally.

Between March 1933 and August 1934 the balance of power in Germany had shifted decisively in Hitler's favour. In that year and a half he had mastered the machine of State, suppressed the opposition, dispensed with his allies, asserted his authority over the Party and S.A., and secured for himself the prerogatives of the Head of the State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Nazi revolution was complete: Hitler had become the dictator of Germany.

On 19 August the German people was invited to express by a plebiscite its approval of Hitler's assumption of Hindenburg's office as Führer and Reich Chancellor, the official title by which Hitler was now to be known. The Political Testament of President Hindenburg, much discussed but so far not discovered, was now conveniently produced. According to Papen, Hindenburg had decided to omit any reference to the restoration of the monarchy from his testament but to embody a strong recommendation of such a course in a separate letter to Hitler. Both documents were delivered to Hitler, but the letter was never seen again and no more was heard of a restoration. To remove any doubt, Colonel Oskar von Hindenburg was put up to broadcast on the eve of the plebiscite. 'My father,' he told the German people, 'had himself seen in Adolf Hitler his own direct successor as Head of the German State, and I am acting according to my father's intention when I call on all German men and women to vote for the handing over of my

father's office to the F

On the day of the plebiscite, forty-five and a half million and more than thirty-eight per cent of the votes cast had the courage to vote and seventy thousand signed.

It was an impressive rally. A rally was held at Nuremberg. Hitler was in benign mood. In a good deal about the Nazi revolution he announced, achieved in the future. 'Just as the world cannot live on revolution added, have always been of Nerves of the nineteenth century close with us. In the next no other revolution in Germany.

It was an ambitious e

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heard of a restoration. To nel Oskar von Hindenburg on the eve of the plebiscite. German people, 'had himself own direct successor as Head d I am acting according to en I call on all German men r the handing over of my

father's office to the Führer and Reich Chancellor.'

On the day of the plebiscite 95.7 per cent of the forty-five and a half million voters went to the polls, and more than thirty-eight million voted 'Yes', 89.93 per cent of the votes cast. Four and a quarter millions had the courage to vote 'No'; another eight hundred and seventy thousand spoiled their papers.

It was an impressive majority, and when the Party Rally was held at Nuremberg in September Hitler was in benign mood. In his proclamation he spoke a good deal about the Nazi revolution which had now, he announced, achieved its object and come to an end. 'Just as the world cannot live on wars, so peoples cannot live on revolutions. . . . Revolutions,' he added, 'have always been rare in Germany. The Age of Nerves of the nineteenth century has found its close with us. In the next thousand years there will be no other revolution in Germany.'

It was an ambitious epitaph.

nounced that Germany was driven, by the denial of equal rights, to withdraw from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. Germany had tried to cooperate, but had suffered a bitter disillusionment and humiliation. In sorrow, rather than in anger, he had decided to take this step, which was demanded by the self-respect of the German people.

The withdrawal from the League was not without risks, in view of Germany's military inferiority, and a secret directive was issued to the Armed Forces, in case the League should apply sanctions. It was the first of Hitler's gambles in foreign policy—and it succeeded. Events wholly justified his diagnosis of the state of mind of his opponents—their embarrassment in face of a case which they felt was not without justice; the divided public opinion of Great Britain and France; the eagerness to be reassured and to patch up a compromise, all those elements on which Hitler was to play with such skill time and again. He then issued a proclamation in which he declared force to be useless in removing international differences, affirmed the German people's hopes in disarmament and renewed his offer to conclude pacts of non-aggression at any time.

Hitler's cleverest stroke was to announce, on the same day as the withdrawal from the League, that he would submit his decision at once to a plebiscite. This was to invoke the sanctions of democracy against the democratic nations. All the long-pent-up resentment of the German people against the loss of the war and the Treaty of Versailles was expressed in the vote: 95 per cent approved of Hitler's policy.

Hitler had now manoeuvred himself into the strongest possible position in which to begin German rearmament. When the other Great Powers sought to renew negotiations, Hitler replied that disarmament was clearly out of the question. All that could be hoped for was a convention for the limitation of armaments, and Germany's terms for cooperation

would be the recognition of three hundred thousand fact already begun, while had placed themselves in tion, from which they were war, of asking the Germans he would accept to reduce

While these negotiations strengthened his hand in a feature of the Treaty of bitter feelings in Germany to the new State of Poland and Germany continued to was the rise to power of the alarm than in Warsaw.

It caused a diplomatic crisis on 26 January 1934, Hitler country with which Nazi Non-Aggression Pact was popular in Germany, but Hitler to make. Ultimately an independent Poland in could not move against Poland turned this situation to his ostentatious parade of his thus able to substantiate tentions, and the Pact was used in Hitler's 'peace' speech

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would be the recognition of her right to raise an army of three hundred thousand men. Rearmament had in fact already begun, while Great Britain and France had placed themselves in the disadvantageous position, from which they were never to recover until the war, of asking the German dictator what concessions he would accept to reduce his price.

While these negotiations continued, Hitler strengthened his hand in an unexpected direction. No feature of the Treaty of Versailles stirred more bitter feelings in Germany than the loss of territory to the new State of Poland. Relations between Poland and Germany continued to be strained, and nowhere was the rise to power of the Nazis viewed with more alarm than in Warsaw.

It caused a diplomatic sensation, therefore, when, on 26 January 1934, Hitler announced that the first country with which Nazi Germany had concluded a Non-Aggression Pact was Poland. The Pact was never popular in Germany, but it was an astute move for Hitler to make. Ultimately, there was no place for an independent Poland in Hitler's Europe, but Hitler could not move against Poland for years to come. He turned this situation to his advantage, and made an ostentatious parade of his enforced virtue. He was thus able to substantiate his claim to peaceful intentions, and the Pact with Poland was constantly used in Hitler's 'peace' speeches from 1934 to 1936.

But the importance of the Pact was greater than its value as propaganda. Poland was one of the bastions of the French security system in Eastern Europe, but the Poles were becoming restive at the casual way in which they felt they were treated by France. The Polish Government was beginning to turn towards an independent neutrality, in which it was hoped that Poland would be able to balance between her two great neighbours, Germany and Russia. The Nazi offer of a Ten-Year Pact fitted admirably into this new policy, and Hitler was thereby

D. T. G.
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The forty thousand part of the German lived and worked for could take place. Local propaganda campaign, of terrorism. Anyone in to the Munich of the support the m Germany. An attempt capture power by a

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ollfuss and her family the Austrian Nazis ery and shot Dollfuss, station and announced elen as Chancellor. on in Vienna had been t is unlikely that Hit- s was no time for for- the events of 30 June ndenburg still in the ounds, but the putsch

failed. The rebels in Vienna were quickly overpowered, and the leaders, followed by several thousand Austrian Nazis, only escaped by getting across the German frontier. Mussolini, furious at what he regarded as Hitler's bad faith, ordered Italian divisions to the Austrian frontier and sent the Austrian Government an immediate telegram promising Italian support in the defence of their country's independence.

The Nazis had over-reached themselves, and Hitler had promptly to repudiate all connexion with the conspiracy. The initial announcement of the official German News Agency, couched in enthusiastic terms, was hurriedly suppressed; the murderers of Dollfuss were surrendered to the Austrian Government; Hitler appointed Papen to go to Vienna as Minister-Extraordinary in order to repair the damage. The choice of Papen, a Catholic, a Conservative, and Vice-Chancellor in Hitler's Cabinet, was intended to conciliate the Austrians; at the same time it was a convenient way of getting rid of the man who had been lucky to escape with his life on the week-end of 30 June. These hasty measures tided over the crisis and preserved appearances. But it had been made plain enough to Hitler that the opposition to his schemes would have to be divided before it could be overcome.

For the rest of 1934 the unanimity of the other Powers in face of further German adventures was strengthened, rather than weakened, but the year ended not without some cause for congratulation on Hitler's part. On 9 October Louis Barthou, the energetic French Foreign Minister, who stood for a policy of firmness in face of Nazi demands, was assassinated at Marseille. His successor was Pierre Laval, a master of *combinazioni* and shady political deals. Despite appearances, Hitler held to his belief that behind the façade of unity the Powers lacked the will to oppose him or to combine together for long. In 1927 Hitler said to Otto Strasser: 'There is no solidarity in Eu-

* D.T.: Learn to use the people of clear and who hate you most, powerful images

rope; there is only submission.' It was the essential premise on which all his plans depended; the next year, 1935, was to show how just was his diagnosis.

From the summer of 1934 the principal object of the Western Powers' diplomacy was to persuade Germany to sign a pact of mutual assistance covering Eastern Europe. Just as the Locarno Pact included France, Germany, Belgium, Great Britain, and Italy, each undertaking to come to the immediate aid of France and Belgium, or Germany, if either side were attacked by the other, so this Eastern Locarno would include Russia, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the other states of Eastern Europe and would involve the same obligation of automatic assistance in the case of an attack.

Hitler had no intention of entering into any such scheme: it was not aggression that he feared, but checks upon his freedom of action. His opposition was powerfully assisted by that of Poland, whose policy of balancing between Moscow and Berlin fatally overestimated her own strength, and fatally underestimated the danger from Germany.

Hitler courted the Poles assiduously, constantly urging on them the common interest Poland and Germany had in opposing Russia. Göring was used by Hitler in the role of a candid friend of the Poles. In his talks with Polish generals and with Marshal Pilsudski in January 1935, he almost suggested a joint attack on Russia, implying that the Ukraine would become a Polish sphere of influence and North-western Russia would be Germany's. The Poles were wary of such seductive propositions, but during 1935 relations between the two governments became steadily closer. In May Göring visited Cracow for Pilsudski's funeral, and Hitler had a long conversation with the Polish Ambassador. The attention Hitler paid to Polish-German relations was to repay him handsomely.

Meanwhile, the British and French renewed their attempts to reach an agreement with Germany, proposing that the Locarno Pact be extended by the conclusion of an agreement to prevent unprovoked aggression from Germany, and by two similar pacts one dealing with Eastern Europe and one dealing with Western Europe.

Hitler faced a difficult decision. He had reached a stage where any agreement would prove a hindrance. It seemed that the Western Powers would not accept proposals that the Western Powers would waive their objections to Germany's return to Germany's accession to the League of Nations, strengthening and extending it. Hitler had to avoid tying his hands. He could provide some dramatic stroke to gratify the mood of nationalism in Germany. A bold unilateral repudiation of the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles would seem to him very much better than concessions in return for French security. Could he afford to take this step?

Hitler's first reply showed that he had come to the idea of extending the Locarno Pact to include attack from the East. He was evasive on the question of the Danubian Pacts. The German Government refused the British to continue discussion by the British Foreign Minister. It was arranged for 7 March. On 7 March the British Government published a statement of increased armaments, basing it on the Locarno Pact. Many were . . . rearming in spite of the provisions of Part V of the Locarno Pact. Great indignation was expressed in Germany, and Hitler contracted to postpone Sir

of the lakes, Dolln See, and sent an of a timber-hunting lodge that he had memory, he intended to make the new for endangered species—species like orse and, indeed, himself.

est of everything. He called in two Tutch, and gave them ten months to lly Carinhall would cost the taxpayer y by the Air Ministry and Prussian over the next twelve years an ex-, vulgar, and faintly ludicrous, in the ery detail of its design down to the rmiture, designed the green-and-gold ough back gaudy bric-à-brac from The buildings spread and multiplied p thatched roofs, fountains, statues, embellished with the costliest crystal iceless Old Masters. "Magnificent," an, by then a Panzer general, showing really am a Renaissance man. How I he visitor by the arm and led him to ertooms called the Gold and Silver al Göring by the judicious, the wise, display.

umors, abetted by Communist propa- cs would not go away. Prussian lawyer l him as though in a trance during one at explain the speed with which Göring olicted both gifts and bribes. Making 1923, the state of Bavaria had allowed lzberg mountain, right next to Hitler's 1945 was the deed of another plot of l, given him by Consul Sachs on Ba- he speed of his transformation from r" of January 1933 to the murderous, s friends' breaths away. Whatever the , embroidery, and furniture poured in ld and ivory, silver, and amber.

ematized the bribery. Fräulein Grundt- norns, dates, and occasion. Some were ildhood friends Erna and Fanny Graf; tent—presents from future allies and s (the British colonel Malcolm Christie a aristocrats and Reich ministers (for

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Christmas 1937 Rudolf Hess thoughtfully gave him a volume of Hess's own collected speeches). The Grundtmann lists record the donations of generals, directors, publishing moguls, industrialists; there were major corporations like C. & A. Brenninkmeyer,* Lufthansa, the Hamburg-Amerika Line, and I.G. Farben, and minor ones like the Fritz Siebel Aircraft Works, and the Ufa and Fox movie companies. North German Lloyd would give him three sea voyages. The Phillip Reemtsma Tobacco Company gave him a Spitzweg painting of "The Sunday Huntsman" (Göring marked it "Keep for the Führer"). Into the early Grundtmann lists crept names of future note—the Swedish businessman Birger F. Dahlerus, boss of Electrolux, is glimpsed giving him a dishwasher as early as 1936 (the name of Dahlerus would figure prominently in Göring's life and trial). In 1937 one Albert Speer, architect, donated a flower basket, followed in 1938 by a brass goblet.

Every municipality in Germany, from Aachen, Altena, Berlin, Cologne, Düren, and Düsseldorf through the alphabet to Zossen made regular gifts to him. There were presents from friends and relatives and in-laws—from both Carin's and Emmy's families—and from people Hermann did not regard as properly in his family at all—in 1937 his unwanted cousin, Herbert Göring, and his wife gave him two small Meissen hunting figurines and in 1938 a small bronze vase. The German Colonial Veterans League gave him a marble doorplate inscribed with his father's name. Baroness von Epenstein (his godfather's widow) gave him a door from Veldenstein, his childhood castle.

Invited to Göring's birthday on January 12, 1934, the banker Schacht had brought along a modest painting of a buffalo for him. In pride of place next to Göring, however, he found a publisher who had donated a complete shooting brake with four horses.

Soon the first stage of Carinhall would be ready, a simple timber lodge. Out here among the dark Satanic forests of pine, beech, and oak, Göring felt like a Teutonic knight of old. He would carry a spear, and command Robert to dress him in red top boots of Russian leather with golden spurs, in floor-length coats like a French emperor, in silk blouses with puffy sleeves.

Emmy or no Emmy, his waking thoughts were still overshadowed by the morbid memory of Carin. Her ghost haunted him more than ever now that the workmen were constructing Carinhall. Down by the lakeside, on the far shore, he ordered them to excavate a macabre mausoleum, with five-foot-thick walls of Brandenburg granite. In a few months' time it would be ready to receive the pewter sarcophagus from Sweden.

One day he expected to lie in it by his devoted Carin's side—to spend all eternity with her beneath these moaning pines.

*Their gift paid off. Göring's office files reveal that he authorized C. & A. to set up their big Leipzig department store despite the local gauleiter's protests that this violated Nazi vows to protect small traders.

March 1934

11 MURDER MANAGER

What were the factors that propelled Göring into the sink of criminality from which he would emerge, on the middle day of 1934, with the blood and gore of political murder clinging to his bejeweled hands? Self-preservation? Cowardice? Or the fatal arrogance inspired in leading National Socialists by the belief that their movement's undoubted achievements in the revival of Germany somehow put them above common law?

Like all bullies, and despite his *Pour le Mérite*, Göring was physically a coward. But Professor Hugo Blaschke, the Philadelphia-trained dentist who treated Göring, was struck by the general's quivering fear of pain. "You got the feeling," Blaschke recalled years later, "that you were dealing with a megalomaniac. Your own life was worth nothing."

There is also no doubt of Göring's belief in Nazi righteousness. On February 26, 1933, he had visited Dortmund to speak to fifty thousand working men in the election campaign and had seen the starving children with his own eyes. Returning (now) a year later, on March 17, 1934, to the same steel towns in his luxuriously appointed railroad coach, he saw children with pink in their cheeks and laughter in their eyes. The Nazis were succeeding

March 1934
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where Weimar had failed—prosperity, and employment.

Nobody was celebrated v Herbert Backe, the level-headed wife after touring eastern at Breslau wearing a white i cheers gave Göring the fee the law. The increasingly o of them designed for him b at heart almost a transvesti Backe wrote in her diary, "hall] he always has a spear

A few weeks later, on Jun friends and comrades, now along with scores of other re power in Germany.

Ernst Röhm, the pallid, staff—against whom Carin years earlier—had become Hitler revolution and with t million Brownshirts. Hitler his thugs during the last m refused to go back into the the constitutional forces of. He wanted to become defe Göring later, discussing thl to Hindenburg, as Röhm's p known." Röhm had no int cronies began muttering abo General von Schleicher wou air minister, and the SA as

Initially, Göring and Hitler 1933 Göring had allowed the *trage*) to his various offices appointed Röhm a Reich mī using the familiar *Du*—expre comrades." But then Röhm c ministry, and it became comm from abroad, although Hitler the Reichswehr, would be all coalition began to take shap assistant General von Reiche

where Weimar had failed—they had brought back national unity, economic prosperity, and employment, and they were feted everywhere they went.

Nobody was celebrated with greater enthusiasm than Göring. "Göring," Herbert Backe, the level-headed deputy to the minister of agriculture, told his wife after touring eastern Germany with the general in mid-May, "I arrived at Breslau wearing a white air-force uniform. The citizenry went wild." The cheers gave Göring the feeling of immortality: He was Germany—he was the law. The increasingly odd, sometimes even effeminate garments (many of them designed for him by Carin) were a part of his public image. He was at heart almost a transvestite, certainly an exhibitionist. "Herbert," Frau Backe wrote in her diary, "says that out in the Schorf Heath [around Carin-hall] he always has a spear with him."

A few weeks later, on June 30, Hitler and Göring liquidated their former friends and comrades, now deadly rivals, Ernst Röhm and Gregor Strasser, along with scores of other real or imagined obstacles to their retaining absolute power in Germany.

Ernst Röhm, the pallid, paunchy, scar-faced homosexual SA chief of staff—against whom Carin had so astutely warned Hermann Göring nine years earlier—had become increasingly dissatisfied with the character of the Hitler revolution and with the role assigned within it to himself and his two million Brownshirts. Hitler and Göring had willingly made use of Röhm and his thugs during the last months of the struggle, but now the violent genie refused to go back into the lamp. Röhm, with more men under arms than the constitutional forces of law and order, made no secret of his ambitions. He wanted to become defense minister himself. "It was obvious," said Göring later, discussing this, "that we could not have suggested his name to Hindenburg, as Röhm's private life and sordid proclivities were too well known." Röhm had no intention of taking this lying down. He and his cronies began muttering about staging a "second revolution"—after which General von Schleicher would replace Hitler, Theo Croneiss would become air minister, and the SA as a whole would replace the army.

Initially, Göring and Hitler saw no option but to appease Röhm. In October 1933 Göring had allowed the SA to attach "special agents" (*Sonderbeauftragte*) to his various offices and agencies; and on December 1, Hitler had appointed Röhm a Reich minister, and published a fulsome letter to him—using the familiar *Du*—expressing his gratitude to the SA, "my friends and comrades." But then Röhm casually posted an SA guard unit outside Göring's ministry, and it became common knowledge that the SA was buying up arms from abroad, although Hitler had ruled definitely that only the regular army, the Reichswehr, would be allowed to bear arms. At this point the anti-Röhm coalition began to take shape. General von Blomberg, his chief military assistant General von Reichenau, and the commander in chief of the army,

MANAGER

What were the factors that propelled Göring into the sink of criminality from which he would rise with the blood and gore of political events? Self-preservation? Cowardice? Or the National Socialists by the belief that the revival of Germany some-

four le Mérite, Göring was physically a general, the Philadelphia-trained dentist who had seen the starving children with his own eyes. The Nazis were succeeding

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know that they took a dim view of the coalition against Röhm. His ruthless ruthlessness, his gaze fell on the offensive-looking chief of the SS, personally sworn to Hitler's pro-Himmler, ten years younger than provincial schoolmaster. Ten years had carried Ernst Röhm's standard and left Göring with such a painful and every police force in Germany. So each man needed the other, and Göring wanted Himmler. He doubtedfully to Richard Walther. "You know Himmler," he said. When we get together he just talks about our peasant stock. I can't see of 1934, hesitated to join forces with the new Gestapo chief, until 1934 the Gestapo was running it, and seemed more and more to favor. In November 1933 he had accompanied the Communist murderer of a Nazi. After he had failed to uncover a ring—fortunately for the latter, Reinhard Heydrich, thwarted the men paranoid. Believing his life in danger and returned only when Göring obtained evidence that Diels was his minister warned him, "you're in cahoots with him?" The oily civil servant, "has his finger minutes later, however, he rose would have to lunch without him. "Losing my attention," he explained. The *Berliner Zeitung* announced that a new position offered to him by (Lieutenant) of Cologne. Hermann Göring's nieces. Later he

divorced her. Later still, he swore a stack of annihilating affidavits against Göring for the war-crimes tribunal, most of which must be read with the utmost caution, given the vulnerable position in which the first chief of Göring's Gestapo must have fancied himself. In one, he claimed that he and Göring took a dossier on SA atrocities down to Hitler on the Obersalzberg early in January 1934. "Herr Göring," exclaimed Hitler, "these are common knowledge. This entire clique around Röhm is rotten to the core. The SA has become a haven for riffraff and scumbags." Hitler, said Diels, had then instructed Göring to see that certain "traitors"—and he mentioned Schleicher and Strasser by name—vanished from the scene.

Oblivious of the closing ranks against him, Ernst Röhm tossed off during February 1934 several arrogant statements that alarmed the army and clearly explained why their top generals were conniving with Göring behind clubhouse doors. Röhm declared to Blomberg that Germany's defense was purely the SA's concern, and he lectured Fritsch that the future army would be restricted to training the SA for that job. Uneasy now, Hitler ordered Röhm to sign a document, dictated by the army, agreeing to restrict his SA to purely political tasks. Röhm signed but made scathing remarks in private, which Viktor Lutze, his sworn enemy within the SA, promptly repeated to Hitler. On March 22, Göring was among party leaders who heard Hitler vow never to let a "second revolution" occur of the sort that Röhm had in mind.

Thus the alliance between Himmler and Göring was consummated on April 20, 1934. Göring put on the blue-gray uniform that he had designed for his secret air force, marched into the Prussian Ministry Building with saber at flank at his side, and ceremonially handed over his Gestapo to Heinrich Himmler and the SS. No dullard in power politics, however, Göring retained one special unit of the green-uniformed *Landespolizei* for his own protection. From this tiny seed, in time, would grow the crack "Hermann Göring" Division and Panzer Corps.

It was going to be a long, sultry summer. Göring lingered at Carinhall, perspiring profusely in the Central European heat, bathing frequently in the marble baths, or submerging himself in the cool waters of Carin's lake.

On June 10, he invited forty foreign diplomats out to envy him. Their motorcade drove the fifty miles from Berlin along the Prenzlau highway until they reached the checkpoint that guarded access to his domains. The landscape was dotted with ponds and lakes, around which wound the eight miles of new tarmac road leading to Carinhall itself.

He met them at the southern edge of the Heath at the wheel of his two-seater sports car. He was dressed, according to British ambassador Sir Eric Phipps, in aviator's garb of India rubber, with high boots and a large hunting knife stuck in his belt. Oblivious of the snickering asides, he took a megaphone and launched into a lecture on the elks and other fauna that he had imported from East Prussia and elsewhere. He was particularly proud of his

persuade one bison to mate with the cow, had reservations of his yes.

himself, dressed now casually in curious eyes alighted on the shapely faced her to them as "my private tactitudes.

had begun acting as Hitler's alternate Rome in 1933 had not been wholly adored on October 11, 1933, Mussolini in general as "a former inmate of an og conducted what proved to be his free years. He had brought a private Mussolini that the Reich was willing to desire to annex Austria. Mussolini, in March 1934 he signed the Roman or Hungary, effectively guaranteeing what Hitler had wanted at all, and he ge of developing the Austrian affair. his attention to Poland and, later, d in both regions he scored personal

erlin, Józef Lipski, was a passionate an Göring cadged an invitation to the łowięża in March 1934. Enlarging his dictatorial powers in Prussia to do an nationalist killed the Polish minister in mid-June. Göring arbitrarily loaded ane back to Warsaw, an act of dubious claim from the Poles (and an annual until 1938).

natic style to the mineral-rich Balkans, d the foreign ministry, undertaking in ies of spectacular swings through the l that he was conveying special hand- at he was traveling on Hitler's per- ese smaller, half-forgotten nations but she regarded the Balkans as an Italian

May 15, 1934, General Göring set out ce Philipp of Hesse on a ten-day "va- ter tactlessly, he took along his (still- ann, causing scandalized comment that

June 1934

Goebbels was not slow to call to Hitler's attention. Even less tactfully, Göring had announced that the tour was to begin with Rome, then smugly announced just before takeoff that they would not be calling there after all, a calculated affront that left the Italian welcoming party empty-handed at the airport and Mussolini spluttering with anger.

To the delight of the Hungarians, Göring stopped briefly at Budapest instead, allegedly for technical reasons. On the sixteenth, further "technical reasons" caused him to dally in Belgrade, where he hinted that he would like to see the king (who was, however, genuinely absent). In ten days Göring succeeded in convincing all of southeastern Europe as far as Greece and the Aegean Sea that Nazi Germany (highly visibly personified by Hermann Göring) would not abandon them to Mussolini's Italy.

It was altogether an odd episode, for Hitler was due to pay his own first state visit to Rome in three weeks' time. Mussolini unleashed his newspapers on Germany, and he confidentially indicated to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin that Herr Göring would not be made welcome if he accompanied Hitler on the trip. It was a calculated affront, since Göring had, as Dr. Renzetti, the Duce's personal emissary to the Nazis, pointed out on the fourteenth, labored hardest since 1924 at German-Italian relations, "in conditions that were certainly not easy, and attracting the fury of many politicians."

Göring, anxious to demonstrate that his position had not slipped as the number-two man in the Reich, secured the Führer's personal attendance at a macabre ceremony at Carinhall immediately upon his return from Italy.

It was June 20, 1934, the day that Göring had appointed for the reburial of Carin's remains in the lakeside mausoleum he had built for her. Few pharaohs' wives can have been buried with more solemn ceremony. A special train bore the pewter sarcophagus across northern Prussia from the Swedish ferry to the railroad station where Göring and Hitler, both hatless and somber, awaited her arrival. At Göring's command, towns and cities along the train's whole route were cast into deep mourning. Teenage Hitler Youth units stood at attention on their local railroad platforms, the League of Maidens lined the bridges, saluting and showering flowers; flags were dipped as the train slowly passed, and thousands of women lined the railroad tracks to pay homage to their prime minister's long-dead wife.

The scene at Carinhall itself was like the setting for a Bayreuth opera—the thin summer mists steaming slowly off the still waters of the lake, the ranks of soldiers standing in motionless array, while Richard Wagner's rich funeral music throbbed and droned among the hazed conifers.

Göring had invited Carin's relatives, along with hundreds of diplomats and politicians, to witness this moving evidence of how beholden he still was to her memory. To the blare of hunting horns and trumpets and the answering bellows of Hermann's future trophies grazing in the forests, a dozen strong men groaned and strained to manhandle the sarcophagus down into the granite mausoleum. Afterward, Göring led Hitler down the steps

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alone. Both men had known Carin well, both were saddened that she had not lived to see the National Socialists triumphant. Göring's most intimate accomplices—Himmler and Körner—looked on. With him these two men were to become, in Darré's compelling phrase, the "managers" of the coming Night of the Long Knives.

In a secret meeting in the great hall of Carinhall, surrounded by the hunting trophies and Gothic furniture that he had already begun to assemble, Göring now persuaded Hitler to act against Ernst Röhm and the SA before it was too late. As a thousand hands slapped rifle butts in chiseled unison outside, and heels slammed together in salute, Göring escorted the Führer to his car. "The first revolution," he declared at the Prussian State Council's meeting the next day, June 21, "was begun by the Führer. If the Führer desires a second revolution, he will find us ready and waiting. If not, then we are equally ready and willing to act against any man who dares lift his hand against the Führer's will."

Scene
The confrontation with Röhm and the SA had drawn steadily closer. Heinrich Himmler was now a regular caller at Göring's villa in Leipziger Strasse. Göring applied Körner and the Forschungsamt to keeping Röhm under close surveillance. Meanwhile he drew up his own "hit list" for the day of reckoning, and he gave that to Körner for safekeeping. In his red linen-bound pocket diary Göring jotted sinister reminders: "Krausser [SA Gruppenführer Fritz von Krausser] on Röhm's staff. Extreme caution. Agitating particularly against me."

He had ordered the FA to tap the phones of other SA leaders, rebellious figures on the staff of Franz von Papen (still, in name, Hitler's vice-chancellor) and the former chancellor General von Schleicher. The FA, already routinely wiretapping French diplomats, had evidently found them conniving with Schleicher and his former military assistant Major General Ferdinand von Bredow, because Joachim von Ribbentrop, head of the party's private "Foreign Office," remarked to an aide as they visited Paris at this time, "The time has come to deal with them." (The aide was an anti-Nazi. He tipped off his friend, Deputy Foreign Minister Bernhard von Bülow, that Bredow and Schleicher were under Göring's surveillance. The naïve von Bülow immediately telephoned to warn them—and thus von Bülow's name too went onto a "hit list.")

For several more days the Berlin ministries and clubs crackled with the static electricity of rumor and counter-rumor. On June 23, the army instructed lower echelons to provide guns and transport to the SS for any coming operation against the SA. Göring, Himmler, and Heydrich instructed their police forces to go onto the alert.

Göring went about his affairs seemingly unconcerned. His private photo album shows him with Bodenschatz and Julius Streicher at a children's party at Dinkelsbühl on June 24, then holidaying briefly on the island of Sylt, where Emmy had a summer house, on the twenty-sixth. On the twenty-

1934

seventh, a photographer snapped the twenty-eighth, through the who had flown to Essen to a Terboven, the gauleiter and n. Viktor Lutze, who he intended to "pelled" Röhm from it. By then he knew of people who had seen good. Hitler decided on one last deputy, SA-Gruppenführer Fri to try and dispose of all these

Then the evidence against I a telephone call from Himmler room taking Göring and Lutze into the room, having just found evidence that seemed to clinch Milch that the evidence consisted and from surviving members of called Rudolf Popp later disclosed provided the Brown Pages, into commanders to meet him at a secret "I've seen enough," announce an example of them."

He flew to Munich that same Berlin with Körner immediately strike in Prussia, as soon as a "hummingbird"—to strike again

Not without prudent forethought posing Berlin villa in the center: "You go in through the entrance" and after being marched by so sentries find yourself in a garden his house stands." Here Göring prepare the massacre that was the Night of the Long Knives. It was like Oscar Night prizes in their gift.

The lists were taken out of the made—here an additional "non one list to a senior Gestapo office with a letter ordering SS-Gruppenführer, southeast" and one of the sheathed thugs—to stand by to

On Göring's orders Milch was secret air-force training at Jüterbo to guard the three airports and the

June 1934

What happened on the morning of June 30, 1934, in Bavaria is history. Hitler had moved the SS Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler," an elite unit of thirteen hundred men, to Bavaria, planning to rush them in the trucks provided by the regular army to Bad Wiessee, where Röhm and his henchmen were understood to have converged on an inn. From Berlin, Göring and Himmler prodded and cajoled their irresolute Führer along, by telephone, telegram, and courier. Wilhelm Brückner, Hitler's slow-witted but devoted adjutant, recalled later that their messages painted the crisis in "increasingly dark hues." By the time Hitler's plane landed at Munich, around 3:30 A.M., the word was that hundreds of Röhm's men had spent the early hours rampaging mindlessly around the city. Hitler decided to go on ahead to Bad Wiessee and have it out with Röhm then and there.

In Berlin, the whole area around Göring's villa had been barricaded and sandbagged by his troops. His personal Landespolizei-Gruppe "General Göring" were manning machine-gun positions in the streets.

At 8:00 A.M. Goebbels phoned from Munich with the code word, "*Kolibri*." For a moment Göring's actions were guided by compassion. He sent for his trusty henchmen, the "murder managers," but he also offered sanctuary to a little cluster of old friends and foes toward whom he bore no ill will. Wilhelm Frick was one—now Reich minister of the interior; he slunk into the villa that morning, "as pale as a vomited-up pea," as Göring uncharitably recalled. He also feared for Franz von Papen's safety; he had crossed the vice-chancellor's name off one "hit list," but sensing ill omens Göring ordered Karl Bodenschatz to summon Papen "on a matter of extreme state urgency." Failing to grasp the very real danger he was in, Papen dawdled at his office, and at 8:45 A.M. Göring had to phone him himself, telling him to come to the villa at once.

In his room [related Papen to a British officer in 1945] I meet him and Himmler. "Something very grave is happening in Munich," he says. "A revolution has broken out. The Führer has left me in complete charge here in Berlin."

"Herr Göring, I want to know what's going on—what counter-measures we're taking."

"I can't go into detail. Fighting has broken out."

"Then mobilize the army!"

"That has been done."

Papen snapped to Göring that he was Hitler's deputy, and not Göring.

"You'll have to leave me alone now," said Göring, indicating that their interview was at an end. "My head's bursting. We've got to see how we can crush this thing."

He whispered something to Himmler, who got up and left. As a *Landes-*

June 1934

polizei officer came in to escort shouting over a phone somewhere

All over Prussia, Göring's men that raided Berlin's SA headquarters

"I asked," he would relate, "I denied it, but then I glanced out our trucks being loaded with men

He never tired of relating this

I went to that SA captain
ons?" "Why no, Herr Politi-
cept the pistol for which you
an arsenal in the cellar big
Prussian police force!

"In a case like that," Göring bo-
thing to do: Execute!"

And execute they did. All day lo-
big enough to stage an Indian dur-
massive chunk of oak four inches
upholstered in cerise velvet, Gör-
enemies. He kept President Hinde-
the phone that there had been a p-
Schleicher chancellor. Thronging th-
unashamed relief at the destructio-
generals Fritsch and Reichenau; the
and Körner, and Staatssekretär Mil-
Airfield, where he was taking a flyin-
Blomberg himself appeared, hands-
sured him that Röhm and Schleicher

General von Schleicher was, how
Landespolizei to deal with the gene-
five assassins in plain clothes had t-
They had burst into the general's E-
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June 1934

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polizei officer came in to escort Papen home, Papen heard Himmler's voice shouting over a phone somewhere nearby, "You can go in now!"

All over Prussia, Göring's men were "going in." He himself led the party that raided Berlin's SA headquarters in Wilhelm Strasse.

"I asked," he would relate, "whether they had got arms. Their commander denied it, but then I glanced out of the window and saw with my own eyes our trucks being loaded with machine guns."

He never tired of relating this episode, although the details varied:

I went to that SA captain and said, "Do you have any weapons?" "Why no, Herr Polizeichef," the swine says. "None except the pistol for which you gave me a permit!" Then I found an arsenal in the cellar bigger than the whole armament of the Prussian police force!

"In a case like that," Göring boasted, smiling broadly, "there was only thing to do: Execute!"

And execute they did. All day long from his office at his villa—a chamber big enough to stage an Indian durbar—lolling behind a fifteen-foot table, a massive chunk of oak four inches thick, in an outsize gold-trimmed chair upholstered in cerise velvet, Göring presided over the liquidation of his enemies. He kept President Hindenburg *au courant* all day, shouting into the phone that there had been a plot to make Röhm defense minister and Schleicher chancellor. Thronging through Göring's palatial salons, displaying unashamed relief at the destruction of the SA, were the monocled army generals Fritsch and Reichenau; the air-force chief of staff, Wever; Himmler and Körner, and Staatssekretär Milch, who had hurried over from Staaken Airfield, where he was taking a flying lesson. Once or twice Defense Minister Blomberg himself appeared, handsome, upright, but unsmiling. Göring assured him that Röhm and Schleicher were to be arrested and tried for treason.

General von Schleicher was, however, already dead. Göring had sent his Landespolizei to deal with the general—but an unidentified "hit squad" of five assassins in plain clothes had beaten the green-uniformed police to it. They had burst into the general's Babelsberg villa at midday and shot the general to death in a hail of bullets—seven bullet wounds were found, and five cartridge cases. They had then slain the general's wife as well. Unabashed, Göring instructed his staff to describe the killing as a suicide. Down the tube into his private office, however, there rattled an FA intercept that scotched that plan. Using the dead general's own desk telephone (which the FA was tapping) an overzealous detective had reported to the ministry of justice (which was still in non-Nazi hands): "Former Reich Chancellor von Schleicher has been shot in a political assassination." Without faltering in his stride for an instant, Göring coolly phoned Franz Gürtner, the justice

June 1934

minister, and advised him that he planned to issue a wholly different official version—that General von Schleicher had been “shot resisting arrest.” Having propagated this fiction, Göring characteristically came to believe it, and would repeat it with wide-eyed innocence until the end of his life (although the truth is clear from the ministry files, beyond peradventure).

Throughout that Saturday, June 30, 1934, the lists shortened, the killings went on. Thirty men headed by three of Heydrich's Gestapo officers burst into the absent Papen's offices looking for his press chief, Herbert von Bose (who had been overheard, probably by the FA, plotting against the regime). They led him into an empty conference room, and his appalled colleagues heard ten shots fired in rapid succession, followed by an eleventh some moments later.

What does the board meeting of a Nazi “Murder, Inc.” look like? Milch saw it in session that afternoon and described it to this author: Himmler was slowly reeling off names from sweaty and tattered lists. Göring and Reichenau, the army's deputy chief of staff, were nodding or shaking their heads. Körner was carrying their duly considered “nominations” outside—with the addition of one ominous word, *Vollzugsmeldung* (“Report back!”). Rudolf Diels: Göring shook his head; Bernhard von Bülow: He vetoed that name as well. Somebody in this all-male company jested that they should nominate Baroness Viktoria von Dirksen while they could. At the mention of this, one of the more tedious females around the Führer, everybody heaved with nervous laughter.

It is not hard to recognize the “Oscars” that Göring himself awarded, or at least nodded to. Who else had any score to settle with Erich Klausener, whom Göring had sacked as head of the Prussian Police Department in February 1933? Who, other than Göring, would have ordered the pickaxe murder of seventy-one-year-old ex-dictator Gustav von Kahr and Munich journalist Fritz Gerlich? Kahr had betrayed the 1923 beer hall putsch; Gerlich had claimed that Göring broke his word of honor to escape: Göring had sued him for libel and lost. Now both those old scores were settled, permanently.

At 10:00 P.M. the day's bloody business came to an end. Himmler nonchalantly ordered all SS documents relating to the purge destroyed. Göring took Milch and Körner out to Tempelhof Airport in his black Mercedes saloon to await Hitler's return from Bavaria. As they waited, a Junkers 52 from Bremen touched down, and Karl Ernst, the Berlin SA commander, was led in manacles out of its corrugated fuselage. He had been aboard a ship about to sail from Bremen. Years later, still incorrigible, Göring would continue to maintain that Ernst had been “trying to abscond with eighty thousand Reichsmarks.” In truth, the unfortunate man had just set out on a belated honeymoon voyage with his wife. Now the baffled SA Gruppenführer was hustled away to a brief and merciless ceremony at Göring's old military academy at Lichtenfelde. Facing an SS firing squad was not a good start to anybody's honeymoon.

1934

Hitler's plane landed, and nervously complimented Göring picked air-force troops draw Luftwaffe uniform. “The me

At the Chancellery he took all Röhm's senior henchmen for old times' sake. Göring Sunday, July 1, he and Himmler to its ruthless and logical conclusion that Sunday afternoon, he four. Once, Hitler insisted on being Krausser (he had consulted the fore). Too late—on Göring's Lichtenfelde a few hours earlier from a leisurely sporting after the argument was over and the prison cell.

Eighty-four people were known course,” Göring airily conceals mistakes were made.” There gunned down in mistake for the Mérite holder Daniel Gerth, lieutenant was driven off, like up before the SS firing squad shot an hour later.

Tabula rasa, a clean sweep. It dawned only slowly on their duped their Führer completely was present as Himmler read the grief at some of the victims' names.

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Dr. & Lt. Col. Lebel receiving hosts. Spectators of.

1934

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Hitler's plane landed, and he emerged, deathly pale and grim-faced. He
nervously complimented Göring on the honor guard, of four hundred hand-
picked air-force troops drawn up on the tarmac, wearing their still-secret
Luftwaffe uniform. "The men are a good racial selection," he commented.

At the Chancellery he told Göring that he had ordered the execution of
all Röhm's senior henchmen but proposed to spare his longtime friend Röhm,
for old times' sake. Göring gagged on this sentimentality. All the next day,
Sunday, July 1, he and Himmler badgered Hitler to carry through the purge
to its ruthless and logical conclusion. When Darré arrived at Göring's ministry
that Sunday afternoon, he found Göring and Himmler still arguing with Hitler.
Once, Hitler insisted on being put through by phone to Röhm's former deputy,
Krausser (he had consulted this distinguished cavalry officer two nights be-
fore). Too late—on Göring's orders, Krausser had received his "Oscar" at
Lichterfelde a few hours earlier. By the time Milch arrived at the ministry,
from a leisurely sporting afternoon spent at Berlin's Karlshorst racetrack,
the argument was over and Röhm too had been shot to death in his Munich
prison cell.

Eighty-four people were known to have been liquidated in the purge. "Of
course," Göring airily conceded later, "in the general excitement some
mistakes were made." There was the unknown musician Willi Schmidt,
gunned down in mistake for Willi Schmid. And there was the air-force Pour
le Mérite holder Daniel Gerth, on whom Göring took compassion. This SA
lieutenant was driven off, like all the others, to Lichterfelde . . . propped
up before the SS firing squad . . . reprieved on Göring's orders . . . then
shot an hour later.

Tabula rasa, a clean sweep. Hitler was out of his league in such company.
It dawned only slowly on their private staffs that Göring and Himmler had
duped their Führer completely, in order to settle private scores. Brückner
was present as Himmler read out the final tally. Hitler was speechless with
grief at some of the victims' names.

With his accumulated enemies thus largely neutralized, Göring recom-
mended that the killings should stop. He would later suggest that he had to
share with Hitler all that Sunday:

Finally I hurried around to the Führer and begged him to put an
end to the shootings, as there was a danger of the thing getting
out of hand. The executions then halted, even though this meant
that two of the Führer's worst enemies—[Werner] von Alvens-
leben and [Dr. Leon Count] von Moulin-Eckart [Röhm's adjutant]
escaped with their lives.

A remorseful Hitler, bilious after the bloodletting, ordered compensation
paid for the "mistakes" and pensions for all next-of-kin. As for Göring, his
gargantuan appetite was unaffected. On Monday evening he organized a

It had developed the ego of a
requiring hostess. ~~the~~ Developed
spectrum of sublimated sublimation.

After that sack of raid
of the

7 2 1

celebratory crab feast and invited his fellow "managers" Blomberg, Himmler, Körner, and Milch to crack claws with him. A telegram came from the aged president, Hindenburg, congratulating him on his "energetic and victorious action," while a more chastened letter arrived from Franz von Papen, still believing himself under house arrest. Göring had quite forgotten him, and telephoned effusive apologies. "So sorry," he said. "Big misunderstanding. I only meant you to be given a guard for Saturday evening, until you were out of danger." (In Bucharest nine years later Papen would chance upon the Gestapo man assigned to assassinate him in 1934—"Göring prevented it," the man grumbled.)

By that odd inversion of public ethics that characterized the decade, the National Socialist regime emerged from the Night of Long Knives with its domestic popularity enhanced. Göring and Himmler would henceforth collaborate with a verve born of prudence and mutual respect.

By way of reward Göring invited the Gestapo to celebrate at his expense at the Hubertusstock, the old imperial hunting lodge around which Carinhall was taking shape, on July 7. A whole page of photographs in his private album shows him surrounded by Heydrich's staff, signing autographs for eager hands. Busloads of informers, jailers, and lawyers, with their female secretaries and girl friends frisking at their sides, debauched into the special beer garden that Göring jovially erected for them at Carinhall. But this was not Otto Horcher's gourmet restaurant, nor were these the dignified, middle-aged veterans of the Richthofen Squadron. The celebration deteriorated into an orgy. Across the lake, to Carin's silent mausoleum, drifted drunken cheers and the sound of breaking glass and furniture.

Göring may well have feared what Carin would have thought of his new friends—at any rate he discouraged future sightseeing excursions by Himmler's Gestapo to his hallowed heath. When he rewarded the Gestapo in the future—for instance, after what he called "an exceptionally important investigation" in 1942—he would send over an envelope containing one hundred thousand marks to be distributed to "particularly meritorious" officials.

OPEN TREASURY

four murders committed in the day. . . . After all, there was a whole point was to act fast, as

He resumed his posture of fe of the Malign. When Austrian N down Chancellor Engelbert Doll persuaded Hitler to dismiss the von Papen to Vienna as his personal stone.

Then he sent for Theo Cronei slunk in, with a pistol concealed father deposited in a safe place:

Göring rose to his feet. "I might a mocking bow. "You were to be allowed to return to his job by November 1942.)

Those who knew Göring believ

returning. Leading criminal lawyer Count von der Goltz met him one evening in July 1934 at a hunting festival in Pomerania and tackled Göring—who was wearing a white toga and a glazed, trancelike look—about the notorious criminality of the local Nazi gauleiter, the former lawyer Wilhelm Karpenstein.

"Karpenstein?" echoed Göring vaguely. "Out!" (That is, he was about to be arrested.)

"And Koch?" pressed Goltz. (Erich Koch was the notorious gauleiter of East Prussia.)

"Not yet decided," responded Göring. "Actually, the Führer wanted to have him bumped off too during the Röhm business, but others spoke up for him. . . ."

The choice of words shocked Goltz. Bumped off? Too? Göring drove him to Carinhall afterward, but the lawyer could not extract one coherent word from him. At the forest mansion Emmy Sonnemann was waiting for them.

"I'll make tea," she volunteered.

Göring grunted something and vanished, to reappear swathed in silence and a floor-length robe. He plodded off without a word toward his beloved lake and plunged in stark-naked. Throughout the drive back from Pomerania, Goltz realized, this prospect, of swimming in Carin's lake, had been obsessing Hermann Göring. He found himself somehow hurting for this melancholy widower.

On the day after Hindenburg died in August 1934, one hundred of Göring's officers were summoned to the Air Ministry. Göring marched into a little clearing in their midst, drew his sword, and announced that the armed forces were to swear their allegiance to Hitler, as Hindenburg's designated successor. (The old oath had been sworn to the Constitution, but nobody was given time for reflection.) Milch stepped forward and slapped his hand onto the blade of Göring's sword. Bodenschatz read out the words of the new oath, and the officers chanted it after him.

Later that month Göring and Milch went over the defense budget with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Hitler approved a total of 10.5 billion marks for the next four years, the lion's share of it going to the air force. He gave the job of raising these unheard-of sums to Dr. Hjalmar Schacht. "We're going to need thirty billion marks to complete our armament," he disclosed to Göring afterward, "but I didn't dare tell Schacht that. He would have fainted."

That October 1934, without asking Hitler, Göring decided to attend the state funeral of the murdered king of Yugoslavia, as representative of the German Wehrmacht (armed forces). He played his hand well. Knowing that there was worldwide speculation that Italian Fascists had been behind the assassination in Marseilles, Göring made a public declaration that no German hand was to blame: This attracted favorable comment in Belgrade—and

Aug 1934

OPEN DOOR 7

dismay in Rome. Göring arrive new airliner the Hindenburg, wreath he brought from the Gt as "their heroic former enemy viously that Göring had stolen Neville Henderson, agreed that cause simply by being the onl funeral procession.

The professional diplomats i the Balkans highly, looked dow didn't. By a secret law he now in the Reich, signing two decr nominated Göring his deputy "I of the offices of Reich presid person"; the other specified Gi

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In January 1935 he laid the cor occupy a four-hundred-thousanc Hitler personally checked each gitudinal block and side wings officers in its twenty-eight hund finest architects and sculptors chi Company," designed by Profe Academy of Fine Arts. The B extravagance—"Pure and simpl humble gold" was another.

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dismay in Rome. Göring arrived at Belgrade's airport in Lufthansa's imposing new airliner the Hindenburg, and allowed all Yugoslavia to learn that the wreath he brought from the German armed forces was inscribed to the king as "their heroic former enemy." The local German minister conceded enviously that Göring had stolen the whole show, while his British colleague, Neville Henderson, agreed that Göring had converted Belgrade to the German cause simply by being the only foreign dignitary to use an open car in the funeral procession.

The professional diplomats in the Wilhelm Strasse, who had never valued the Balkans highly, looked down their noses at Göring's methods, but Hitler didn't. By a secret law he now appointed Hermann Göring the second man in the Reich, signing two decrees to this effect on December 7, 1934. One nominated Göring his deputy "in the event that I am impeded in the execution of the offices of Reich president and Reich chancellor combined in my person"; the other specified Göring as his successor.

After this, Göring's megalomania knew few bounds. Thomas von Kantzow, his stepson, visiting him that Christmas at the Reichstag speaker's palace, heard about all the new buildings Göring was planning and warned him he was well on the way to becoming another King Ludwig II of Bavaria—"the mad king who had the idea," as Thomas noted in his diary on December 23, "of building one castle after another."

Hermann [he added] has already rebuilt the speaker's palace. The hall we were in before is now completely different. He went to the window and pointed to the Reichstag Building, and said he intends to build an Air Ministry five times as big, where airplanes can land and take off from the roof.

In January 1935 he laid the cornerstone of the new Air Ministry. It would occupy a four-hundred-thousand-square-foot site off the Leipziger Strasse. Hitler personally checked each façade in plaster miniature. Its central longitudinal block and side wings would house four thousand bureaucrats and officers in its twenty-eight hundred rooms. Throughout 1935 the country's finest architects and sculptors chiseled at heroic reliefs with motifs like "Flag Company," designed by Professor Arnold Waldschmidt of the Prussian Academy of Fine Arts. The Berliners made smug comments about this extravagance—"Pure and simple, and hang the expense!" was one; "just humble gold" was another.

Göring also became the leader in high society. His annual ball became the event of the winter season. But when the first was held, on January 11, 1935, in his State Opera House on Unter den Linden, Nazi purists wrinkled their noses. "Göring's Opera Ball," sneered Darré in his diary. "Wrong. The old Court Ball—do we have to put on airs like this?"

Those were the days when the Nazis were riding high. In Berlin Leni

* *Hindenburg was a master of the flamboyant*

1934

GETTING RE

13

GETTING READY IN FOUR YEARS

By the mid-thirties the authority of Hermann Göring was universally respected within the Reich. The gauleiters—Hitler's personal lieutenants throughout the Reich—and middle-ranking party officials saw him as a force to be reckoned with—as the “Man of Iron” (*der Eiserne*) upon whom their Führer relied. The people called him “Hermann,” and were indifferent to the murderous aura about him. His Falstaffian corpulence, his gold braid, his stylish airs, enhanced his popularity. When the Reich adopted the swastika as its official flag, General Göring brought forth his own personal standard—what the British embassy loftily termed “an heraldic salad” with only the tiniest Nazi swastika visible in each corner, and the main field dominated by the Prussian eagle with wings spread and his own Pour le Mérite. The public loved it. “Out front,” ran one popular jingle, “he’s tinsel and medals aflutter. At bottom he’s fatter and fatter and fatter.”

There were, of course, some critics. There was the Protestant Vicar Schulze of Beiersdorf, who publicly scoffed at “this dandy” having his wedding solemnized by the “parson in chief” Müller. Foolishly, as it turned out, Göring had the vicar prosecuted. The defense called Martin Niemöller, who testified that Göring himself had called Müller the “parson in chief” in

December 1934, and found it his beliefs, moreover, Göring had the superstition about Jesus of Nazareth abandoned the case against the vicar.

His wedding to Emmy aroused the cost of the nuptials “other than true Aryan.” But Hitler and required that she be addressed “ruthless prosecution” of every Gürtner warned assize judges in the state were systematically sp minister’s wife and untrue alle, previous marriage to a non-Aryan interior, and Gürtner on November had got off with a five-month prison “five years would have been more.”

It does seem that he was covering Milch that Emmy’s past was not photographs. The official genealogy published in 1936 would reveal Carl mention whatever of Emmy’s. So all of them untrue. “Since the day was shot,” Sir Eric Phipps informed I am told, unable to have children.

Göring accepted that this was telling Madame François-Poncet a godsend in troubled times. What might become of his children, care for.

Fueled by the hormone imbalance induced, his body had become caricature. Commissioning a homologue for Göring’s then-forthcoming funeral for the weavers to allow at least This manicured mountain of per for the state funeral of Marshal Roosevelt’s roving ambassador and German tenor playing Siegfried.”

He is [added Bullitt] at least flies. . . . In an attempt to get he wears two inches of padding carry with him a personal bear are almost as thick as they are

December 1934, and found it hard to take him seriously; scorning Christian beliefs, moreover, Göring had told Niemöller, "This two-thousand-year-old superstition about Jesus of Nazareth—it's going to have to go!" Göring abandoned the case against the vicar, and decided to go for Niemöller instead.

His wedding to Emmy aroused a few snide remarks. Joseph Goebbels totted up the cost of the nuptials and brooded over evidence that she was "other than true Aryan." But Hermann demanded absolute respect for her and required that she be addressed as *Hohe Frau* (My Lady). He insisted on "ruthless prosecution" of every libel on her person. Justice Minister Franz Gürtner warned assize judges in a September 1935 circular that enemies of the state were systematically spreading "spiteful remarks about the prime minister's wife and untrue allegations about her non-Aryan origin and a previous marriage to a non-Aryan." Talking with Frick, minister of the interior, and Gürtner on November 15, Göring complained that one offender had got off with a five-month prison sentence. "In my view," he grumbled, "five years would have been more appropriate."

It does seem that he was covering something. Years later he confided to Milch that Emmy's past was not entirely flawless, and he mentioned certain photographs. The official genealogical brochure on Hermann Göring published in 1936 would reveal Carin's first marriage and divorce, but make no mention whatever of Emmy's. Salacious stories continued to circulate, not all of them untrue. "Since the abortive putsch in 1923 when he [Göring] was shot," Sir Eric Phipps informed London in February 1936, "he is, so I am told, unable to have children."

Göring accepted that this was true but put a good face on his incapacity, telling Madame François-Poncet philosophically that being childless was a godsend in troubled times. While a Goebbels must worry all along what might become of his children, he and Emmy had only themselves to care for.

Fueled by the hormone imbalances that his injury and the morphine had induced, his body had become bloated to a size that invited but defied caricature. Commissioning a homespun woolen garment in September 1942 for Göring's then-forthcoming fiftieth birthday, Heinrich Himmler would order the weavers to allow at least three times the normal weight of wool.

This manicured mountain of perfumed flab swept into Warsaw's cathedral for the state funeral of Marshal Pilsudski on May 17, 1935—"late," as Roosevelt's roving ambassador described the entrance, "as if he were a German tenor playing Siegfried."

He is [added Bullitt] at least a yard across the bottom as the crow flies. . . . In an attempt to get his shoulders out as far as his hips he wears two inches of padding extending each one. . . . He must carry with him a personal beauty attendant, as his fingers, which are almost as thick as they are short, carry long, pointed, carefully

3 READY IN YEARS

By the mid-thirties the authority of Hermann Göring was universally respected within the Reich. The ants throughout the Reich—and middle-
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century wanted before it really knew for itself, and he possessed sufficient sagacity and decision to transform his perception into reality.

This prince — amiable and brutal, noble and vengeful, as only a cavalier of his day could be — had also, over and above these qualities, the discernment to see politics as the art of using forbidden methods and the system of unprincipledness. He accordingly followed totally different principles in his internal and his external diplomacy. Surely a more extraordinary cardinal has seldom been found under the red hat! It is he who is mainly responsible for the fact that the Thirty Years' War did not end with an Imperial victory; it was his doing that the leading Catholic power, Spain, sank to a second and even a third-rate position. He deprived the Huguenots of their fortress, it is true, but he granted them complete religious liberty and access to official posts; he suppressed the centrifugal ambitions of the Catholic clergy with equal severity, in accordance with his principle that the Church is within the State, not the State within the Church. Although the representative of power and the majority, he displayed what was for those days and in those circumstances an almost incredible religious tolerance, whereas the tolerated, strange to say, bore themselves very intolerantly. And he was equally "unprejudiced" in his interventions in the internal affairs of neighbouring states. It was only as a Frenchman that he championed the omnipotence of kings; for the rest he supported the Catalonian and Portuguese insurgents against Spanish rule, German princes against Emperor and Reich, and the Scots against the English throne. He was a thoroughly modern politician, too, in that he strove to play a powerful part in the colonization movements of the day. He founded the *Compagnie de l'Orient* for the purpose of gaining possession of Madagascar, though the venture met with only very partial success. Later Colbert founded the East India Company with the same intention, but it again was able to gain only a few marginal footholds. On the west coast of Africa, Senegambia, the land between Senegal and Gambia, was captured and Fort St. Louis erected. In South America, French Guiana came into existence, with Cayenne as its capital. But what held first place in the public interest was Canada, or *La France Nouvelle*, though it was not until the end of the century that Louisiana came into

French hands. On the small success as colonialistic system was to thrive under such a regime when all European piracy. In other words Colbert. He sought the flourishing cloth branches, encouraged by constructing models for all. We should do ver- mated him merely as manship he made diplomacy, but on the His principles were centration, breadth of his power he built the Royal, played so into of public opinion in the *Gazette de France*, in French language he then on remained speech, and through clarity, subtlety, and a certain mechanical the "three unities" drama produced a great at the cost of a sen life. It was under I opened. The house of de Rambouillet became of the aristocracy, nobility and literature for the next two "précieux" — the character and in manners — a these ideals degenerated temptuous connotation

D. T. Richelieu

During Richelieu's time in 1634

see p 23

To employ those methods, which are not allowed, and to employ them with such skill that their work was never noticed (until too late) was one of

the cardinal Richelieu and never before

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French hands. On the whole, the French of those days had but
small success as colonizers, for in this domain Richelieu's cen-
tralistic system was a failure; no manifestation of vigour could
thrive under such a handicap of state tutelage, especially in an
age when all European colonization was a superior form of
piracy. In other domains also Richelieu was the forerunner of
Colbert. He sought to protect home industries (in particular
the flourishing cloth-manufacture) by duties, established new
branches, encouraged agriculture, and improved communication
by constructing magnificent tree-bordered high roads which
became models for all Europe.

We should do very inadequate justice to Richelieu if we esti-
mated him merely as a politician. Like all great masters of states-
manship he made his mark not only on administration and
diplomacy, but on the whole intellectual and social life of the day.
His principles were the same here as in politics — intense con-
centration, breadth of outlook, order. To bear splendid witness to
his power he built the Palais Cardinal (which later, as the Palais
Royal, played so interesting a part in history). For the guiding
of public opinion he founded, and himself contributed to, the
Gazette de France, and for the purification and perfection of the
French language he created the Académie française, which from
then on remained the supreme arbiter of correct writing and
speech, and through which the language first attained its perfect
clarity, subtlety, and correctness — though at the cost of assuming
a certain mechanical regularity and fettered uniformity. Similarly
the "three unities" which he succeeded in imposing upon the
drama produced a greater precision and transparency of structure
at the cost of a sensible loss in colour, naturalness, and poetic
life. It was under Richelieu, too, that the first great salon was
opened. The house of the beautiful, witty, and amiable Marquise
de Rambouillet became the meeting-place of the intellectual cream
of the aristocracy, and thus the cradle of that sublime union of
nobility and literature which remained typical of French society
for the next two centuries. The ideal of this circle was "le
précieux" — the choice and the tasteful in speech, in thought,
and in manners — and out of it arose later, when the effort towards
these ideals degenerated into finicking and superior airs, the con-
temptuous connotation that the word "precious" now possesses.

The Hôtel
Rambouillet

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73.
the cardinal was politician, but in
Richelieu had learned that much
and now to settle his position
what his mind must I understand the
decision of that nation.

The Greeks' feeling for language as a musical phenomenon is proved by their amazing feeling for false pronunciation or emphasis or order, which is recorded in many episodes and has an analogy only in the delicate sense of Italian audiences for errors in singing. This was, in fact, the secret of the Greek style; they had been trained by centuries of organized listening and seeing to the highest sensibility and discrimination.

We mentioned just now the central rôle played in Greek life by its erotic. But we must not think in terms of modern or mediæval love. There were two cardinal differences: the first was an absence of sentimentality, though it is doubtful how far this absence is to be equated with naïveté. Freud, in his work on sexual aberration, says: "The most fundamental difference between the loves of the Ancients and our own lies in the fact that the Ancients put the emphasis on the urge itself, and we on its object. The Greeks honoured the feeling and were prepared to glorify even a second-rate object by it, while we depreciate the impulsive activity in itself and only excuse it by the virtues of its object." This is the reason, also, why in Antiquity unhappy love existed only as a pathological phenomenon (the Greeks regarded the rare cases of it that occurred much as we do an infectious disease), since such love must be centred on a definite object, whereas the "impulse" itself never fails and never deceives; thus the two chief sources on which the complex of unhappy love is nourished did not exist.

Far more important, however, is the fact that the erotic of the Greeks was almost entirely restricted to homosexual affection. The reason for this has been attributed to their splendid, but almost madly exaggerated, cult of the body in everlasting gymnastics, riding, boxing, wrestling, races, and discus-throwing. Perhaps the powerful influence of the East might also have counted. Be this as it may, pæderasty reached an unparalleled extension and intensity with the Greeks. With the Dorians, in Sparta and Crete it was literally a part of public education; in Athens it was punished with *atimia* (that is, deprivation of civil rights) only if it was a matter of assault or rape: that is, under conditions in which the normal sex-act would also be counted as disgraceful. There were public male-prostitutes, and they even paid taxes as such. Since the murder of the Athenian tyrant Hipparchus by Harmodius and Aristogiton, who were lovers, pæderasty acquired

Greek
erotic

Roche!

Rocher

an almost heroic glamour. Alexander's love for his Hephæstion, taken from him in the flower of youth, was clothed in an atmosphere of poesy. At the courts of the Diadochi it was viewed with disfavour, not on moral grounds, but only because any association of men was thought to veil a conspiracy. In battles these pairs of lovers were of the highest value, and they formed, as it were, the smallest tactical unit. The famous Sacred Band at Thebes, which counted as the finest force in Greece, consisted entirely of pæderasts. Not only were almost all famous Greeks, from Solon to Alcibiades, homosexuals, but many of the gods and heroes, such as Apollo, Poseidon, Heracles, and Ganymede were regarded as such. But most conclusive is the fact that the Greek art and philosophy play round this theme so fondly. "Right it is," says Pindar, "to cull love's blossom in due season, in life's prime; but whosoever has seen the rays flashing from the eye of Theoxenus and does not swell with longing, his black heart was forged of steel and iron at a frozen flame, and Aphrodite honours him not. Either he is busy with all his might about gold, or else, sacrificing his heart to woman, is borne along every path. But I, for the goddess's sake, waste away like wax of holy bees under the heat of the sun, when I look at the young blooming limbs of boys." Note that love of woman is here put on a par with love of gold, which was always despicable and especially so for the aristocratic Theban, and that Aphrodite is regarded as the goddess of love of boys! The feminine antithesis to Pindar is Sappho. She too prays to Aphrodite for help in the hardness of her love for a girl, and paints for her beloved her own passion in contrast with the unemotional coolness with which a man hears the sweet voice and dear laughter of his bride: "My heart beats, my voice fails, fire runs beneath the skin, the eyes see not, the ears buzz, sweat flows off me, trembling seizes me, and, fading like withered grass, I am as one dead." The notorious "Platonic" love, too, is a super-sensual sublimated love — our use of the phrase is quite correct — but it is exclusively homosexual. "There are two goddesses of love," says Pausanias in the *Symposium*, "and, therefore, also two forms of Eros. The Eros of the earthly Aphrodite is earthly, universal, common, and casual. And everything common worships her. Both sexes, man and woman, had part in the creation and birth of the earthly Aphrodite. The higher love comes from

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THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

The magic of his appeal is best remembered by an American journalist who saw him enter Nuremberg one September day in 1934:

Like a Roman emperor Hitler rode into this medieval town at sundown today past solid phalanxes of wildly cheering Nazis who packed the narrow streets that once saw Hans Sachs and the *Meistersinger*. Tens of thousands of Swastika flags blot out the Gothic beauties of the place, the facades of the old houses, the gabled roofs. . . . About ten o'clock tonight I got caught in a mob of ten thousand hysterics who jammed the moat in front of Hitler's hotel shouting: "We want our Führer." I was a little shocked at the faces, especially those of the women. . . . They reminded me of the crazed expressions I saw once in the back country of Louisiana on the faces of some Holy Rollers who were about to hit the trail. They looked up at him as if he were a Messiah, their faces transformed. . . .¹

As Sir Alan Bullock has noted in his superb biography, no statesman ever showed greater understanding of the irrational and emotional factors in politics or exploited them more masterfully. Few have had clearer insights into the weaknesses of opponents or greater ability to turn them to personal advantage. Hitler was adroit in the manipulation of his own charisma and used personal appeal with consummate artistry. As the occasion or audience demanded, he could be charming or brutal, generous or vicious. He was adored by housewives and artists, peasants and architects, professors and plumbers, children and generals. He was a ruthless opportunist with an almost perfect sense of timing, knowing instinctively the precise moment to strike.

Hitler was also a man with a faith that moved mountains. Like all really great political leaders, he combined political realism with unshakable belief in his historic destiny. Above all else, he had the capacity to make men want to follow him. David Lloyd George, himself a notable practitioner of the political arts, stood in awe of Hitler and, after an extensive visit in Germany, proclaimed him to be one of the truly great men of the ages:

The old trust him; the young idolize him. It is not the admiration accorded to a popular Leader. It is the worship of a national hero who has saved his country from utter despondency and degradation. . . . He is as immune from criticism as a king in a monarchical country. He is something more. He is the George Washington of Germany—the man who won for his country independence from all her oppressors. To those who have not actually seen and sensed the way Hitler reigns over the heart and mind of Germany, this description may appear extravagant. All the same, it is the bare truth.²

The Image and the Man

1934

Winston Churchill was also impressed. In *his* accomplishments and called them "among the whole history of the world."³

Hitler's rise had indeed been one of historical stories. The unknown and uneducated commoner who had been a failure in all his undertakings in 1933 in a country that despaired of solving problems. Within five years he had given his nation a grateful people hailed him as the leader who had ended unemployment, stabilized their current effective social legislation, and given millions of vacations. He had sent the youth of the land down sunlit roads; he had forged a new common people; he had built magnificent freeways and to every laboring man; he had humbled the world wiped out their treaty, which all Germans call. In a series of brilliant and bloodless coups, he had Greater Germany, proud and strong, remilitarized annexed Austria and Czechoslovakia.

If only he had died before World War II, many a man historian. Hitler might well have been remembered as "Adolf the Great, one of the outstanding history."⁴

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Any attempt simply to describe Adolf Hitler—and personal interests—immediately confronts the man. We look at his unimpressive, even ludicrous how it was possible for a great nation to hail a savior; we are perplexed by his preoccupation with fingers, the width of his nostrils, the shape of his eyes. His personal habits also seem so simply note some of his most striking characteristics: behavior, along with the themes which keep him and spoken words. Later on, we must respond to obvious as they are difficult: Why was he so specific things—why so disturbed by such trivial preoccupations and idiosyncrasies reveal about affect his personal life and public career?

Physically, Hitler did not seem well cast for hero and historic force. He looked rather like a

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

of a [racial] community of physically and psychically equal living beings. This very preservation comprises first the racial stock." Hitler was impatient with those who talked either about economic or political revolution: "There is absolutely no other revolution but a racial revolution. There is no economic, no political, no social revolution. There is only the struggle of lower races against the dominant, higher races."

Art too was racial: to those who talked about the international nature of art, or of national art, Hitler replied, "Everything you say only proves that you have no understanding of art. There is in art absolutely no such thing as modern art or ancient art. . . . Dutch art, Italian art. . . . There is absolutely only one art, namely Greco-Nordic Art."⁷⁴

Basic to his thinking—and hence to Nazi practice—was his conception of one pure racial community [*Volksgemeinschaft*] which absorbed all individuality. This community of the *Volk*, like the idea of the *Führer*, was ultimately a mystery. When Hitler tried to talk about the mystical sense of community and the sacred union of *Führer* and *Volk* before 200,000 Party leaders at a Nuremberg rally on 7 September 1934, he was overcome with emotion. Once again he evoked his personal mandate from God and spoke of a mystery:

And it was no earthly superior who gave us that command [to lead the *Volk*]; that was given us by the God Who created our *Volk*. . . .

To others it seems a riddle, a mystery—this force that ever unites these hundreds of thousands, that gives them the strength to endure distress, pain and privation. They can conceive of this only as the result of an order issued by the State. They are wrong! It is not the State which gives its order to us, but we who give orders to the State! It is not the State which has created us; but we fashion for ourselves our State. For one we may appear to be a Party; to another an organization; to a third something else. But in truth we are the German *Volk*. . . . Let us pledge ourselves at every hour, on every day, only to think of Germany, of *Volk* and *Reich*, of our great nation, our German *Volk*. *Sieg Heil!*⁷⁵

The massed ranks of the faithful, eyes aflame with passion, roared back the mindless chant, *Sieg Heil! Ein Volk! Ein Reich! Ein Führer!*

Hitler's racial policies all rested on the theory that there was only one truly creative force in all human history: the Aryan race. This leitmotiv was sounded through a hundred speeches and public statements: "What we see before us of human culture today, the results of art, science and techniques, is almost exclusively the creative product of the Aryan. But just this fact admits of the not unfounded conclusion

The Intellectual World of Ad

that he alone was the four prototype of what we und sity to play variations on i 1927 in Munich:

We see before us the all culture, the true r in the field of transc particular race. Our the work of the Nor Richard Wagner are France. Do not say th and the jazz band are everything that is of and to one race wh Take away the Nor dance of apes.⁷⁶

As there was only one Hitler's disjunctive way o: and destructive race: the actually true that his poli against the "Jewish Peril," ended all civilization.

In a letter dated 16 S "the first piece of writing goal as "ruthless interve from Europe."⁷⁷ In this in emphasize that his comm tion or sentiment. Rather, Hatred of the Jews is a p based on purely emotiona sion in the form of progr must lead to the systema must unalterably be the e of his career, when he people, the last word of t else I charge the leaders o of the racial laws and poisoner of all nations, ir die does not dissimulate. had meant it all along.

The psychological f anti-Semitism will be dis Here we must examine tl to state policy and the rai

Hitler used many phrases which were the same as or very similar to ones used by Lanz many years earlier. In a pamphlet of 1913, Lanz spoke of "The Holy Grail of German Blood that must be defended by the new Brotherhood of the Templars." In a conversation of 1934, Adolf Hitler said, with reference to his elite order of the SS: "The problem is this: how can we arrest racial decay . . . shall we form an Order, the Brotherhood of Templars round the holy grail of the pure blood?" And again: "The eternal life granted by the grail is only for the truly pure and noble!"⁹⁴

Lanz spoke—as Hitler later would—of the "Hyra-headed Jewish Conspiracy." Hitler said that racial mixture was "the original sin"; Lanz, in a pamphlet of 1911, had called it "the crime of crimes, the sin which must not be sinned . . . the sin." Lanz seems to have coined the word *Rassenschande*—Racial Outrage, a term Hitler made current in his Reich. Thirty years before Hitler's racial laws, Lanz had spoken of the *Mischlingsbrut* (mongrelized brood) of the *Rassenminderwertiger* (racially inferior) who threatened German purity. Lanz clearly foreshadowed Hitler's genocide: "Bring sacrifices to Frauja, ye sons of the Gods, arise and bring Him the *Schrättlingskinder*! . . . by rooting out the original *Untermenschen* the higher heroic race arises from out the grave of racial degeneration and ascends to the heights of humanity, immortality and divinity. . . ."

Hitler's later thinking paralleled Lanz's attitude to sex and marriage. In the number of *Ostara* he called "Happy Marriage," Lanz urged men to be brutal in a physical "as well as a psychic and ethical sense." Women, he admonished, must always be treated as what they really are, "grown-up children." One is reminded of Hitler's definition of ideal women as "cute, cuddly, naïve little things."

Hitler's fury at the thought of women's liberation and participation in politics may have been inspired by Lanz's pamphlet of 1909 entitled "The Dangers of Women's Rights and the Necessity for a Masculine Morality of Masters," in which he insisted that "every world historical mistake has been caused by liberated women" and warn that "anyone who preaches women's rights and wants to view women as the equal of men commits a crime against nature." Thus, he saw women in much the same ambivalent way as did Hitler: they were as easily dominated as children, yet they posed a dangerous threat to a masculine world. In the realm of sex, as in politics, the "Dark Forces" were at work, and Lanz saw them—as would Hitler—in control of prostitution and white slavery for the diabolical purpose of polluting and dragging down the master race.

Hitler's concern about homosexuality was shared by Lanz, who concluded in a pamphlet of 1911 that homosexuality is caused by "Odylic" influences and "over-exertion of the brain." Hitler must have been greatly relieved to learn that so many of his heroes of history were—according to Lanz—practicing homosexuals. His long list included Julius Caesar, Frederick II (Hohenstaufen), Joseph II of Austria,

Frederick the Great, Will Charles XII of Sweden, I and so forth." Lanz wa haunted Hitler: castration

Hitler, as we have i and fascinated by the pov 1911 which Hitler almost the human eye, writing t force for people of the hig again that "heroic eroticis

The shape of a perso cinated both Hitler and his subject, Lanz discussed th ing educational idiots and women's skulls show a li skulled, dark-pigmented j blond long-heads. Detailed vided as evidence.

Lanz's influence on I When Hitler settled in M Italian café in the Schelli and again, even though h He did not much like Itali exception of Mussolini—o to the Osteria-Bavaria—ev Prinzregentenstrasse. All t the same café. Here, hot lemonade or tea, beguiled ladies who, like Unity Mit Führer. (After the fall of Italiana, but one could stil to the wall in "Hitler's Plac

There may, of course, café was such a favorite of given his compulsions and nally attracted because th consciously or unconscio been so important to him a:

GUIDO VON LIST

Lanz's racist colleague contributed to Hitler's thin reinforced each other. Lanz reciprocated by joining Lan

Whereas Lanz defined Dark Ones," List was more

1934

HIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

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The Child As Father to the Man

Stempfle's story of Hitler's perversion. In June 1934, during the so-
called Blood Purge, when Hitler settled his accounts with people who
were in a position to embarrass him politically, Father Stempfle was
found dead in the forest of Herlaching near Munich, with three shots
through his heart³⁰¹

The idea that Hitler had a sexual perversion particularly abhor-
rent to women is further supported by a statistic: of the seven women
who we can be reasonably sure, had intimate relations with Hitler, six
committed suicide or seriously attempted to do so. Mimi Reiter tried to
hang herself in 1928; Geli Raubal shot herself in 1931; Eva Braun at-
tempted suicide in 1932 and again in 1935; Frau Inge Ley was a suc-
cessful suicide, as were Renaté Mueller and Suzi Liptauer. Unity
Mitford's attempted suicide seems clearly to have been prompted by
political reasons.

But these are only shreds of evidence, insufficient in themselves to
support a conclusion that Hitler had a masochistic, coprophilic perva-
sion. Equally important to this conclusion is a different kind of historic
fact: he displayed other behavior patterns thoroughly consistent
with this kind of perversion, which is quite well reported in the
literature.³⁰²

Specialists in these matters have shown, first, that sadomasochistic
traits are a prerequisite for such a perversion. Indeed Phyllis Green-
acre has concluded that they "are characteristic of all perversions."³⁰³
Hitler's sadism scarcely requires further documentation. What is less
widely recognized is that from adolescence on he displayed moods of
deep depression and self-loathing which indicate masochistic feelings.
As his worried friend August Kubizek noted, he would "torment himself"
and wallow "deeper and deeper in self-criticism . . . and self-accusa-
tion," until finally, after his mother's funeral, he lacerated himself with
the most awful punishment he could devise: he said that he would "give
up Stefanie!"—that is, he would give up his fantasies about her.³⁰⁴

As we noted in discussing his latent homosexuality, Hitler showed
a tendency to stereotype male and female traits which is a complement
of sadomasochistic impulses. In private conversation and public
speeches he revealed how constantly his mind swung between mas-
ochism (weakness, submission) and sadism (brutality, strength, mas-
tery). He would speak, typically, of the necessity to exalt "the victory
of the better and the stronger and to demand the submission of the
worse and weaker."³⁰⁵

When told of Hitler's infatuation with the movie *King Kong*, an
experienced analyst found that fact to be a revealing expression of
Hitler's sadomasochism: "The image for me that is the most startling is
King Kong. It's easy to read Hitler as the huge gorilla—but he was only
that in part. He was also, at the same time, the helpless, sweet little
blonde. He was so infatuated with the image because he yearned to be
helpless (masochistic), to be overwhelmed by the powerful (sadistic) ape

And, miraculously, it came! For on 12 April there was suddenly announced the death of Franklin Roosevelt. Champagne corks popped in Berlin and Hitler's entourage rejoiced with their Führer; for just as Frederick in his extremity in 1762 was saved by the sudden death of the Tsarina Elizabeth, Hitler too had received deliverance through the death of his enemy.

Besides identifying with the beleaguered Frederick of the Seven Years War, Hitler believed that he and the great Prussian king had many other things in common. Both men as children had good reason to respect and to despise fathers who had hurt and humiliated them.* Both rulers, Hitler was convinced, had strikingly similar skull measurements and hand structures. He also thought that their eyes were very much alike; in 1934 he bought Anton Graff's portrait of Frederick in a powder blue uniform which set off "the startling clear blue of his eyes." Hitler took the portrait with him as a kind of talisman wherever he set up residence and gave specific orders at the close of his life that all his personal effects should be destroyed, but not the portrait of Frederick the Great.¹⁸

Hitler was also persuaded that he and the Prussian king were alike in other respects: they shared the same attitude toward Jews; both showed a mastery of the arts of politics, music, and war. And—according to Hitler—they had strikingly similar intellectual capacities. "Over and over again," Hitler remarked, he was delighted to find that his own ideas "were so very similar to the thought processes of *Der alte Fritz*." As an example, Hitler noted that he too was really a very tolerant person who believed in the candid give-and-take of ideas and was convinced that truth would ultimately prosper. In a passage in the *Tischgespräche* which reads like Frederick—and even more like J. S. Mill's *Essay on Liberty*—the Nazi dictator observed:

I do not believe that the truth can be suppressed for any length of time. Truth must in the end be victorious! . . . I foresee a time of absolute tolerance. I can only say [with Frederick the Great] that everyone should be permitted to save himself according to his own fashion.

The man who established one of the most extensive and heinous secret police systems in history said that he was very like Frederick

* Frederick the Great never forgot one childhood incident which was typical of the way his father had treated him. Frederick William, before retiring for the night, would line up his family and order them to kiss him. One day the little prince, who had just been brutally and unjustly whipped by his father, demurred. The king grabbed him by the hair, threw him to the floor, and ordered him to kiss the royal boot. As an adolescent and young man, the son was publicly whipped, imprisoned, and forced to watch his closest friend beheaded at his father's orders. An additional turn of the screw was given when the king ordered that the decapitated body be left where it fell from eight in the morning until two in the afternoon. Fritz stood and gazed at the corpse for hours.

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* Hitler masturbates to the image. Might start as a tale told to his nephew Gerd

1934

The Past As Prologue: Hi

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THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

phors and turns of phrase indicate something very personal: that he transferred his love for his own mother to Germany and saw himself as the savior of a Motherland menaced by the "Jewish peril." Thus he projected his infantile desire—greatly intensified by the primal scene experience—to rescue his mother from being debased by a lecherous father, and to possess her himself. Germania to him was living flesh which, like his mother's, had been lacerated and torn:

Could anyone believe Germany alone was not subject to exactly the same laws as all other human organisms?

An attempt to restore the border of 1914 would lead to a further bleeding of our national body.

The Polish Corridor . . . is like a strip of flesh cut from our body.

France was tearing piece after piece out of the flesh of our national body.³¹

He saw her ill and dying. Both in *Mein Kampf* and in later speeches he repeated the image of himself as a surgeon operating on his Motherland, who, like Klara Hitler, was dying of cancer. For a time, like his mother, she seemed to recover, but then she "obviously languished more and more." Only drastic measures by Surgeon Hitler could save her, for "brutal determination" was needed in "breaking down incurable tumors." No one else was capable of "combating . . . malignant cancers" or of "lancing the cancerous ulcer."

Other metaphors used by Hitler support the conjecture that Hitler, quite erroneously, may have believed that his mother's cancer had been treated by iodoform in an effort to burn out the disease (see Chapter 3, p. 189). In a speech at Stuttgart of 15 February 1933, Hitler set his task after coming to power by saying "we want to *burn out* the symptoms of decomposition . . . in our whole culture; we want to *burn out* this whole poison which has flowed into our lives." And in a wild harangue before the Reichstag on 13 July 1934, he sought to justify the Röhm Purge by saying:

I further gave the order to *burn out down to the raw flesh the ulcers* of this poisoning of the wells of our domestic life.³²

Young Hitler's reaction to his mother's death was of direct importance to his ideology about the German nation. Just as he raged against her dying, so he raged against Germany's, insisting that both must live on or—if they had already died—that both must be resurrected. He was unable to save his mother's life, but when, in Koenigsberg's phrase, he "relocated his mother in Germany," his conviction had consequences. He would prevent the death of the Motherland by utterly

~~1934~~, 1934

From Private Neurosis to P

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He would root them out.

Therefore let no one
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ADOLF HITLER

From Private Neurosis to Public Policy

destroying those who sought to injure, poison, and kill her—the Jews. He would root them out. Germany *must* be saved:

Therefore let no one object, "But this is impossible." That no one can—no one dare—say to me! . . . It must be possible, for Germany must live!

He would perform great miracles to keep Germany alive—or to resurrect her. It is surprising how often it was necessary to repeat the resurrection after he had already saved her in 1933. Thus, two years later, in February 1935, he said:

We celebrate the proud *resurrection* of Germany.

In September 1935:

Through us and in us the nation has *risen again*.

In September 1937:

Today Germany has in truth *risen again* and *risen again* as our work.

Again in October 1938:

It is like a miracle that in so few years we should be able to experience a new German *resurrection*.

And yet again in November 1940:

I am convinced that Providence has led me here and has preserved me from all dangers so that I could lead . . . *a new resurrection* of our people . . . We shall reestablish a Germany of power and strength and glory. Germany must *rise again*. One way or another! ³³

As we have seen, Hitler's racial theory seems to have been engendered, at least in part, by the primal scene trauma of infancy and later fantasies of his mother being attacked by a Jew or a part-Jew. Over and over again he used sexual images in speaking of his Motherland's being raped, or he attributed alleged female qualities of submissiveness and acquiescence to the nation or to the masses. "By what wiles," he asked, "was the soul of Germany *raped*?" Or he commented bitterly that "our German pacifists will pass over in silence the most bloody *rape* of the nation." The masses are always seen as weak; they are a woman who yields to a strong and audacious male. Like a woman—and

the young Nazi manhood for the

secure a more suitable form of the SS would have to offer more than merely marching and to the task of conducting lectures, mostly of an historical nature, of Germanic law and at the Catholic Church. These lectures were soon and soon became quite popular, to which I gave an outspoken and attracted the attention of the chief of

back of the audience two older without any special insignia. At the end themselves: both were prone a philologist, the other an I found my lecture very interesting in other fields of activity in the SS. I first heard about the, they explained, there was a section which dealt with were, highly secret institutions for information that could help to evaluate the results of policy

I like to join one of these departments keen interest in foreign affairs, however, that before I could work I would have to put in a spell they suggested that I should continue status with the SD remaining a obligations on either side, and from all other duties for the SS. to join the SD and enrolled in one last spell of duty as an SS suitable one it turned out to be.

The date was June 30, 1934. We were sent to guard the fashionable Hotel Dreesen at Bad Godesberg. All day strange and disquieting rumours had reached my unit. There were said to be plots, divisions in the Party, and impending disasters. It was whispered that the highest leaders of the Party were coming to the hotel and I was posted outside the French windows that led from the terrace to the dining-room, from which point I could look down over the valley of the Rhine to the mountains beyond. Inside the dining-room preparations had been made for a conference, and before long 'they' arrived: it seemed the rumours were true. In the dining-room were assembled the highest leaders of the Nazi movement, among them I recognized Hitler, Goebbels and Goering. I could see their changes of expressions and the movement of their lips, though I could not hear what they said.

Meanwhile, black clouds had been gathering over the valley and now the storm broke. As the rain poured down, I pressed myself back into the shelter of the building. Lightning forked across the sky, illuminating the scene with a weird and frightening glow. From time to time Hitler would come to the window and stand staring at the tempest with unseeing eyes. He was clearly labouring under the burden of weighty and difficult decisions.

After dinner the meeting was resumed, then finally with a brusque gesture Hitler brought the discussion to an end: a decision had been made. At once the huge black Mercedes cars drove up and Hitler and his companions got in. Trucks arrived for the guards and we clambered inside, then roared after the cars into the night towards the airport at Hangelar near Bonn, where waiting aircraft took off for Munich as soon as the leaders were aboard.

The great purge of Roehm and his followers in the SA had begun.

Roehm's activities in setting up a private militia may have constituted a threat to the state, but this was only the pretext for the monstrous blood-bath that Hitler's orders let loose among his own followers that night. The moving force behind the scenes was the General Staff of the Wehrmacht. They had manoeuvred Goering into forcing a showdown. Their purpose was the elimination of the more unreliable elements among the Nazis, in particu-

lar the radical wing led by Gregor Strasser, who took the socialist aspect of National Socialism too seriously. General Schleicher, however, who had preceded Hitler as Chancellor, was in no way connected with Roehm or Strasser, and really had nothing to do with the affair. He was shot on the express orders of Hitler himself because he knew too much of the shady financial transactions by means of which Hitler came to power.

In the ambitious Himmler, and the still more ambitious Reinhard Heydrich, Hitler found willing executioners, each of whom seized the opportunity to build up his own power. June 30 marked the ascendancy within the Nazi structure of the SS, whose black uniform with the death's-head insignia I now wore. It was also a crucial step upwards for Heydrich. The ruthless cruelty displayed by him that night filled even the most hardened of the Nazi veterans with fear.

I soon started my secret work for the SD. The information I had to obtain concerned academic matters and political and personal relationships at various universities. I was told to go to the lodgings of a Professor H—, a professor of surgery at the University, who would personally hand me my orders. They came in sealed green envelopes directly from the central office of the SD in Berlin. I never received any acknowledgements, however, of my written reports and was left with a feeling of working in the dark; the whole thing began to appear mysterious and unreal.

All the same, I much enjoyed the long conversations with Professor H—, whom I had to visit once or twice a week. Often we talked until late at night. He was an erudite man with a remarkable store of general knowledge and had collected a magnificent library, especially of literature dealing with secret service work.

Sometimes I received orders from a gentleman who looked like a commercial traveller and who always received me in a small hotel. I also established contact with a Mr K— S—. He was a highly gifted man who had formerly been a Jesuit Father, and impressed me as the most able and intelligent of these three men. He never asked me for written reports, but sought by questioning and conversing with me to form his own picture of the information I brought him.

1934

After a while, Professor N—, the one who had recruited me into the SD, called on me and said I should move to Frankfurt to continue my Law Examination at the Police Headquarters. This occurred in 1934, brought with it a new stage. At Frankfurt I always seemed to be dealing with interesting and important cases, and I was always being plotted against. I had to investigate the highest Party administrative misconduct. Twice I was reported in person to the Minister of Justice, who supplied me with the necessary documents to defend myself against the Gauleiters—the district leaders.

Violent quarrels were raging at the time. Guertner, who was Minister of Justice, had been sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for having ordered a Jew with a hammer to be killed. The other was innocent, as apparently he had been sentenced to ten years' imprisonment without knowing for what. I therefore went into the prison one night to see the man in the cell so that he could escape. The Minister of Justice to Reichstag was Streicher.

Presently, without any warning I was called to Paris, with orders to discover the person who was the professor at the Sorbonne, whom I had met in Berlin. Shortly after my return from Paris I was reported to the Personnel Bureau of the Ministry of Justice to see Dr Schaefer, the Personnel Director. He handed me a meticulous printed schedule of my activities, including all the places I should visit for instruction and information.

It was an extremely interesting period. The people at these levels were most friendly and courteous. I was opened to me as though some unseen power had opened the complex channels of this hierarchy.

Gregor Strasser, who took the socialist too seriously. General Schleicher, Hitler as Chancellor, was in no way Strasser, and really had nothing to do on the express orders of Hitler himself of the shady financial transactions me to power.

and the still more ambitious Rein-willing executioners, each of whom build up his own power. June 30 the Nazi structure of the SS, whose head insignia I now wore. It was for Heydrich. The ruthless cruelty killed even the most hardened of the

for the SD. The information I had matters and political and personal ties. I was told to go to the lodg-essor of surgery at the University, my orders. They came in sealed the central office of the SD in Ber-nowledgements, however, of my a feeling of working in the dark; r mysterious and unreal.

ged the long conversations with visit once or twice a week. Often He was an erudite man with a wledge and had collected a magni-ture dealing with secret service

from a gentleman who looked like o always received me in a small with a Mr K— S—. He was a merly been a Jesuit Father, and d intelligent of these three men. ports, but sought by questioning his own picture of the informa-

After a while, Professor N—, the educationalist who had recruited me into the SD, called on me again and suggested that I should move to Frankfurt to continue my training for the State Law Examination at the Police Headquarters. This move, which occurred in 1934, brought with it considerable financial advantages. At Frankfurt I always seemed to be assigned to the most interesting and important cases, and I got the impression that my movements were being plotted as though by an unseen hand. I had to investigate the highest Party functionaries suspected of administrative misconduct. Twice I went to Berlin to make reports in person to the Minister of the Interior, Dr Frick, who supplied me with the necessary documents to enable me to assert myself against the Gauleiters—the district bosses.

Violent quarrels were raging at this time between Frick, Guertner, who was Minister of Justice, and the Gauleiter, or District Chief, of Nuremberg, Julius Streicher. Two SS men had each been sentenced to ten years' imprisonment because one of them had killed a Jew with a hammer. I was convinced that the other was innocent, as apparently he had only lent the hammer to the first man without knowing for what purpose it was wanted. I therefore went into the prison one night and unlocked the door of the man's cell so that he could escape. This 'breach of the law' caused the Minister of Justice to remonstrate violently with Streicher.

Presently, without any warning I was sent to France for four weeks, with orders to discover the political views of a certain professor at the Sorbonne, whom I had once mentioned in one of my reports. Shortly after my return from France I was called to Berlin to continue my training in the Ministry of the Interior. I reported to the Personnel Bureau of the Ministry, and was directed to see Dr Schaefer, the Personnel Director of the Gestapo, who handed me a meticulous printed schedule of my future work and activities, including all the places I should have to visit for further instruction and information.

It was an extremely interesting period for me. Officials at all levels were most friendly and courteous and every door was opened to me as though some unseen power was working silently through the complex channels of this huge machine.

One day I was told to report to SS Oberfuehrer Dr Best, Chief of Departments I and III of the SD, and afterwards to go and see the Chief of Department II [Secret Political Police], SS Oberfuehrer Mueller.

Dr Best was an extremely able administrative official. As Chief of Department I, he was in charge of all personnel, administrative and legal work, and as Chief of Department III, in charge of counter-espionage abroad. We had a lively conversation about professional matters, especially administrative jurisprudence, and about the new police code and various problems of counter-espionage. Finally Dr Best said, 'I don't know what Heydrich has in mind for you, but one day he will probably tell you himself.'

Immediately after this first visit to Dr Best, I went to see SS Oberfuehrer Mueller, who was virtually chief of the Gestapo. The contrast between the personalities of Best and Mueller was most striking. Best was a cultivated man, tending almost too much towards the intellectual, while Mueller was dry and laconic. Short and broad, with the squarish skull of a peasant and a jutting forehead, he had tense, narrow lips and penetrating brown eyes, hooded by nervously twitching eyelids. His hands were wide and massive, with fingers as square as a matchbox.

This man, who had started his career as an ordinary detective in Munich, was to play a very important role in my life. Although he had worked his way up to the top, he could never forget his origin. He once said to me in his crude Bavarian accent, 'One really ought to drive all the intellectuals into a coal mine and then blow it up.' Any form of real conversation with him was almost impossible; it consisted on his part almost entirely of coldly-phrased questions and was largely an interrogation. Yet all the while he sought to establish an atmosphere of frankness, and by his broad Bavarian speech to suggest a natural geniality. Our first conversation ended by his saying, 'Heydrich likes your reports. You've only been sent to us as a matter of routine. Actually you'll work in the main office of the SD, which comes under the Party rather than the government. A pity—I could make better use of you in my department.' In spite of the friendly gesture with which he said goodbye, his eyes and expression remained quite cold. At

that time I did not know the extent of SD.

At last some light had been thrown on the matter. Both Best and Mueller had been interested in me. So the dreaded, unseen force guiding me through all the channels of the Nazi system.

The next day I presented myself at SD. An SS Oberfuehrer whom I had explained to me the mission of the SD, the chief organ of the information service to inform the top Party leaders of all forces at home and abroad. It covered Party, industry, the theatre, journalism was no sphere that was not under the place where it did not seek out the first movements or individuals hostile to the Party.

This tremendous administrative problem was solved by Oberfuehrer Dr Mehlhorn, and in the chiefly with him. He came from a we merly been a lawyer in one of the large Unimpressive in appearance, almost un ordinary intelligence with a tremendous His main fault was a lack of decision people, his chief tactical mistake that he the SS against Heydrich, who at once elimination and soon brought about his

Mehlhorn was certainly not a Nazi absolute loyalty to the ideas of Nation by the Party. Later, when I knew him better, one of our long conversations: 'Nations many passing developments in the history It is simply the form in which the eternal presses itself today. Whether this new successfully or not, no one can tell. How thousand years' Reich' is simply absurd.' horn dismissed one of Hitler's favourites.

This man had built up for Heydrich the

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SS Oberfuehrer Dr Best, Chief of the SD, and afterwards to go and see [Secret Political Police], SS

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that time I did not know the extent of his resentment of the SD.

At last some light had been thrown on the mystery of my advancement. Both Best and Mueller had said it was Heydrich who was interested in me. So the dreaded chief of the SD himself had been the unseen force guiding me like a pawn on a chessboard through all the channels of the Nazi secret police service.

The next day I presented myself at the Central Bureau of the SD. An SS Oberfuehrer whom I had already met in Frankfurt explained to me the mission of the SD and its aims. The SD was the chief organ of the information service of the Party. Its task was to inform the top Party leaders of all opposition movements and forces at home and abroad. It covered the administration, the Party, industry, the theatre, journalism, the police—in fact there was no sphere that was not under the watchful eye of the SD, no place where it did not seek out the first signs of opposition among movements or individuals 'hostile to the state'.

This tremendous administrative problem was the concern of SS Oberfuehrer Dr Mehlhorn, and in the ensuing period I worked chiefly with him. He came from a wealthy family and had formerly been a lawyer in one of the large industrial cities of Saxony. Unimpressive in appearance, almost ugly, he combined an extraordinary intelligence with a tremendous capacity for organization. His main fault was a lack of decision in his dealings with other people, his chief tactical mistake that he tried to manoeuvre within the SS against Heydrich, who at once started to work for his elimination and soon brought about his downfall.

Mehlhorn was certainly not a Nazi in the sense of professing absolute loyalty to the ideas of National Socialism, as required by the Party. Later, when I knew him better, he said to me during one of our long conversations: 'National Socialism is only one of many passing developments in the history of the German people. It is simply the form in which the eternal German idealism expresses itself today. Whether this new development will end successfully or not, no one can tell. However, to talk of a "One thousand years' Reich" is simply absurd.' With these words Mehlhorn dismissed one of Hitler's favourite ideals.

This man had built up for Heydrich the machinery with which

here of German life. The material by the SD district organizations, administrative divisions of the country. 'Secret' agents—trusted informants of life, in every profession and of wide experience in their own line to furnish very valuable information to reports on public opinion and other measures taken by

by situation report was prepared give the leaders of Germany a public opinion. Individual whose name appeared cross-indexed against their subject was constructed on which the files were periodically driven and by pressing a control could bring any one of up to this time only the information many had been organized so

Best and Mehlhorn during the time for Heydrich's power. It was of Heydrich's character would have served their purpose. While until 1940, Heydrich instigated before a 'Court of Honour' in the service. However, he was and given the task of reporting. His reports on the Far Eastern had lasting value to the political situation and on trends in the United States that an entirely wrong picture had been given to Hitler.

II

UNDER HEYDRICH'S ORDERS

Impressions of Heydrich—The case against General von Fritsch—Himmler the mystic—Heydrich's position endangered—'Salon Kitty'—My relations with Frau Heydrich—Her husband's attempts to trap me—My marriage 'assisted'

NOT LONG after I had begun my work at Headquarters I was called to my first interview with Heydrich, the formidable chief of the SD. It was with considerable apprehension that I walked over to the Gestapo building where he had his office. Now perhaps I would find out what plans he had for me.

When I entered his office Heydrich was sitting behind his desk. He was a tall, impressive figure with a broad, unusually high forehead, small restless eyes as crafty as an animal's and of uncanny power, a long predatory nose, and a wide full-lipped mouth. His hands were slender and rather too long—they made one think of the legs of a spider. His splendid figure was marred by the breadth of his hips, a disturbingly feminine effect which made him appear even more sinister. His voice was much too high for so large a man and his speech was nervous and staccato and though he scarcely ever finished a sentence, he always managed to express his meaning quite clearly.

My first interview was fairly easy going. He began by speaking about my family and then about music—Heydrich himself was an accomplished violinist and often gave evenings of chamber music at his home. He asked me many questions about my legal training, and in particular whether I still intended to try to become an associate of X—, a noted barrister in Düsseldorf. He thought this a good idea and said it was important that trained lawyers, less 'fossilized' than those of the previous generation and with open minds towards the new state, should enter public life. But this was only a conventional introduction to our talk, and when he began to speak of the organization and extension of the counter-espionage system in Germany and the political secret service

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be better able to advise

There were three other men
their Führer to formulate
policy: one was an inter-
another was Putzi Hanf-
the associate Alfred Rosen-

and an adventurous life as a
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Ribbentrop's son, Rudolf,
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for the unofficial post of
Alfred Rosenberg. Born in
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National Socialist creed. His
jumble of racist philoso-
bible of National Social-
Kampf.) To Rosenberg,

National Socialism became an embracing religion. He was the only senior Nazi who objected to the 1939 Soviet pact on ideological grounds ("a betrayal of the National Socialist Revolution"). He had studied in Riga and Moscow, was an expert on Russia, and had witnessed the Russian revolution. His contacts among White Russian émigrés were worldwide. It was he who "unearthed" once more the oft-discredited and poisonous *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, the slanderous anti-Jewish fraud that "exposes" Jewish "plans for world domination." He brought them to the attention of his idol, Adolf Hitler. Although even Hitler was inclined to dismiss Rosenberg's theories about the world of superior Aryans and inferior non-Aryans, he agreed with certain of Rosenberg's basic contentions about the "inferiority" of certain "bloods."

Rosenberg had his chance at foreign policy. In 1933 he was sent to England by the party, at his own suggestion. He promised he could "forge certain links" for his Führer and convince leading British circles that Germany's fight against Communism would benefit all Western civilization.

He was invited by F. W. Winterbotham, who was actually a British Intelligence agent,³⁴ and met Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald's secretary, as well as Lord Hailsham, the secretary of war, and some senior RAF people. Toward the end of his trip, Rosenberg placed a wreath at the foot of the Cenotaph, London's main war memorial. Unfortunately, the wreath was bedecked with swastika pennants. It was soon snatched from the memorial by a British officer and thrown into the Thames. The officer was fined forty shillings and was delighted to pay the fine.

Rosenberg's mission to London had turned into a debacle. He neither made friends nor influenced anyone, and he caused much laughter because of the anti-Nazi incident. Of course, he had no idea that he was being used by British Intelligence.

A reluctant von Ribbentrop, at Hitler's request, had helped Rosenberg formulate ideas for the London trip. With Rosenberg's failure, von Ribbentrop at last seemed to have the field to himself. He was given rooms in the offices of the Führer's party deputy, Rudolf Hess, across the street from the Chancellery. So began the Ribbentrop Büro (office), on April 24, 1934. It was financed by the party and was responsible only to the Führer. For the next four years it would plague Foreign Minister von Neurath and his ministry.

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BÜRO TO EMBAS

8

BÜRO TO EMBASSY 1934-1936

*The German People's
Supreme Judge*

AS LATE AS DECEMBER 1933, at a dinner given by François-Poncet, von Ribbentrop complained that he still had no job in government.¹ He even expressed some doubts about the Nazi Party's future.

But the Büro's small beginnings changed all that. The new "adviser to the Führer" had to take into account that Adolf Hitler was a man of action, often precipitous action. Since February 1933, Hitler had shown his anger at the lack of progress made at the Geneva Disarmament Conference since the departure of the German delegate, General von Blomberg, now Reichswehr minister. General von Blomberg's former aide in Geneva told friends that his general was not a great Hitler enthusiast and had accepted the ministry only because of von Hindenburg.²

Two party bigwigs had come to Geneva to attend the conference as part of the German "team." One of them, Reinhard Heydrich, appeared with the "simulated" SS rank of major general. At first he kept quiet, but he grew more presumptuous as the days passed. He even insisted that a swastika flag be raised over the hotel where the delegation was housed. Rudolf Nadolny, the Foreign Ministry official who headed the German mission, put Heydrich in his place, and the SS "general" soon left Geneva. Nadolny reported the contretemps to Berlin and was told that Hitler approved of his actions. Then Nazi leader Robert Ley and Danzig Gauleiter Albert Forster appeared in Geneva. Ley was often drunk and behaved badly. When the South Americans would not accept his credentials, he called them monkeys.

But this time Hitler's plans be accepted, demands came to Gen-dwarf." He faked in Geneva and the them. Then he scre-telling him it was a

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But this time Hitler stuck with his man. He insisted that Ley's credentials be accepted, and Ley returned to Berlin in triumph. Next, Goebbels came to Geneva. The delegation came to call him the "tricky dwarf." He faked a Berlin press dispatch of his supposed statements in Geneva and then yelled at a Berlin reporter for having published them. Then he screamed with laughter at the man's discomfort before telling him it was a hoax.

One of Goebbels's aides was fired when he got drunk, and someone faked a police telegram to collect the aide's body at the morgue.

Obviously the party did not intend to take the Geneva Disarmament Conference seriously. Nevertheless, Hitler stated publicly on May 17 that he did "not aim to change the face of Europe by force." The French proposed a probationary period during which an international team would inspect German arms facilities, and the next meeting of the conference was scheduled for October 18, 1933. Four days earlier, Germany withdrew from the conference and, on the nineteenth, from the League of Nations. Hitler declared that the conference's proposal for international inspection was "against Germany's national honor." The sudden withdrawals sent shock waves throughout Europe. Nor were they greeted with joy by von Neurath at the Foreign Ministry or General von Blomberg at the Reichswehr Ministry.³ As if to advertise his disdain for the League of Nations, Hitler urged von Neurath to initiate and conclude a German-Polish treaty of nonaggression on his own. Ambassador François-Poncet told this story: During 1934, a group of ambassadors, led by François-Poncet, held monthly dinners at Horcher's, Berlin's leading restaurant. The diplomats were shocked when Josef Lipski, the new Polish ambassador, told everyone on January 25 that some rumored Polish-German discussions were "only of an economic nature"; the following morning, the Polish-German nonaggression pact was announced. Lipski was never again invited to the ambassadorial dinners. The ten-year nonaggression treaty, concluded secretly, outside the League of Nations and behind the back of Poland's ally, France, brought western distrust for Colonel Josef Beck, the Polish foreign minister. It is even more ironic in the light of events in 1939, when Beck's actions were a factor that prevented the Russians from closing a treaty with the French and British. The Poles refused to allow the Russians into their country in case of a German attack on Poland, and it was this which opened the door for the German-Soviet Pact, which soon destroyed Poland.

Hitler decided the time had now come for von Ribbentrop to "go on patrol" for his Führer. On February 2, 1934, von Neurath advised

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the German ambassadors in Paris and London ("in strictest confidence") to receive a gentleman named Joachim von Ribbentrop, at the suggestion of Chancellor Hitler.⁴ A few days after, the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir Eric Phipps, wrote to his foreign minister, Sir John Simon, about von Ribbentrop. "No doubt the man is a friend of Hitler's. However, I doubt if he has the influence he claims. Ribbentrop and his wife are self-promoting people, nationalists who deserted the sinking ship of the Republic and in 1933 [sic] joined the party just in the nick of time." Phipps's view was no doubt colored by von Neurath's telling him, on February 5, that von Ribbentrop was "insufficiently acquainted with our policy to speak with authority."⁵

During that month, however, von Ribbentrop met with Ambassador Phipps to propose various plans for armaments and troop parity. There was to be an army of three hundred thousand men but a limit of fifty thousand Storm Troopers. The German Air Force was to be gauged against the size of the combined French and British air forces. A naval agreement was to allow thirty-five tons of displacement to each hundred British tons.

Von Ribbentrop continued to dabble. On March 7 the German ambassador in Paris reported that the puzzled French foreign minister, Jean Louis Barthou, had met on Sunday, March 4, with "a Herr von Ribbentrop," introduced by a mutual friend. Von Ribbentrop was charming, knowledgeable about music, and had tried to initiate matters of diplomacy.⁶ Barthou, who wanted clarification of von Ribbentrop's role, had suggested that these questions be handled through normal diplomatic channels. The German ambassador asked for instructions from his chiefs at the Foreign Ministry. State Secretary von Bülow said in reply that von Ribbentrop was "an old party member, a special intimate of the chancellor with wide international connections who was traveling with the knowledge of the ministry to clarify the position of the German government." He explained that, "historically, such agents had been used in the past," although he admitted that President von Hindenburg "had not found it advisable."⁷ Von Ribbentrop got an equally tenuous reception in London. Through Ernest W. Tennant, a Berlin-based British businessman and friend of von Ribbentrop's, he met with the influential Stanley Baldwin. Meanwhile, Barthou, who had been sarcastic to von Ribbentrop, nevertheless sent him a book on Richard Wagner, inscribed, *En mémoire d'une conversation dans laquelle Wagner a joué le rôle de rapprochement*. (To remind us of a conversation in which Wagner played the role of peacemaker). But von Ribbentrop considered Barthou a bitter foe of Germany.

Only a few weeks in Paris that von Ribbentrop invited Barthou to German and French missions in London and Paris.

(Before assuming his some preparatory work had breakfasted with him again in the afternoon Ramsay MacDonald sized Adolf Hitler's view that Baldwin's speech had been favorably having persuaded Hitler's paper *L'Information* von Ribbentrop was giving up German credit had spent so much on.

On April 20, 1934, Hindenburg appointed him "minister"; he was usually, von Ribbentrop now had his official status.

By getting him out of his typical maneuvering Ministry, startled for ties of the ambitious his special regard for crimes.

Adolf Hitler's position was unique. The old But Otto von Meissner military family.⁸ The

The diplomats who chess move of their own men, the thirty-one-year-old to act as their liaison, suspicious von Ribbentrop perhaps he realized he was von Ribbentrop wide

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on May 20. What were

the feelings at the Foreign Ministry among the professionals who were being bypassed by this new "shadow" ministry backed by the Nazi chancellor and his Nazi cabinet ministers? Kordt wrote, "They are highly critical of the Nazis, but mostly they are loyal officials." Also, a few real Nazis had recently joined the ministry, and one needed to be careful of them: That most descriptive of attitudes, "inner emigration," now began. For the next thirteen years people would speak of the way people hid within themselves, withdrew, and became silent.

The first true Nazi in the ministry was Prince Josias zu Waldeck und Prymont. He was assigned to the personnel department. This gave him dangerous control over those to be hired, fired, or jailed. There was also an old department called Referat Deutschland, originally the liaison between ministry and the political parties, so innocuous it was manned by one official. It was now expected to monitor the ministry's political activities and to spy on it. Its new head, protesting this unsavory mission, was denounced by Prince Waldeck und Prymont and was arrested by the Gestapo on June 30, 1934. When he was freed, he was "cured" of any further urge to criticize.

Von Ribbentrop, not an old party comrade or part of the establishment, made sure to stay close to the Reichs Chancellor and to Adolf Hitler. By 1934, a bizarre court had developed around the person of Adolf Hitler. Kordt, who visited the Chancellery frequently, wrote these impressions:

To enter the Chancellery, one had to pass police, Army guards, then SS guards. One finally entered a big anteroom, which was constantly filled with twenty or thirty hangers-on and permanent private emissaries from the various top Nazis like Göring. [Otto] Dietrich, the press chief of the Chancellery, was always there. Some people were waiting for special audiences. Everyone mumbled in subdued, respectful tones or read the blue *Auswärtiges Amt* reports, which contained the foreign news not published in the press. These reports were known as the Blue Plague. Then a voice boomed, "*The Führer is coming!*" and silence would fall and certain gentlemen who had been loitering would disappear in a hurry.¹¹

Hitler loved to keep people waiting in order to humiliate them. Some people waited for days in that anteroom, gradually losing prestige in the eyes of the others.

Von Ribbentrop developed into a skilled anteroom "waiter." He listened to Hitler's statements, repeated by people who had just seen the Führer, and then reported arrogantly, or resignedly, what Hitler had said about this or that. If people agreed with Hitler and things

June 1934

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went wrong, said Kordt, Hitler never got angry. He assumed there was no solution except his own. Professional "yes-men" were usually happy. If you disagreed or failed to agree with him and things went wrong, then he slashed at you.

On June 5 a sudden rumor made the rounds that Ernst Röhm, head of the Storm Troops, tired of the Reichswehr's conciliatory attitude toward the Geneva arms talks, wanted to take over the Army with his SA and install himself as Reichswehr minister. General von Blomberg, who held that post, and the top Army and Navy people were "ready to shoot." Erich Kordt and his brother, Theo, met two of von Blomberg's aides at a friend's house. One of them, the naval aide, voiced his hope that there would soon be a test of strength.

In mid-June 1934, von Ribbentrop made his own attempt to convince the French to change their stance on the harsh disarmament terms of the Versailles Treaty. Several important French, Belgian, and Luxemburg industrialists and bankers were in Berlin for a conference. He invited them all to a dinner, using the connections of Reichsbank president Hjalmar Schacht and the prestige of Count Schwerin von Krosigk, the minister of finance, both of whom were asked to attend. The guests were senior people from Arbed, the French-Belgian-Luxemburg steel company, and from the Banque d'Industrie et du Commerce. Using these contacts and additional ones, including Lazard Frères, he went to Paris on June 16 and was introduced to the influential French politician Edouard Daladier, under the sponsorship of the pro-Nazi Fernand de Brinon. Daladier said that French-German relations were "*dans un état lamentable*." After all, on June 6 Hitler had ordered the tripling of the Reichswehr from 100,000 to 300,000 men. Von Ribbentrop also met again with Barthou, the foreign minister, at the Quai d'Orsay. However, a meeting with the prime minister, former President Gaston Doumergue, was not as simple. Protocol demanded a formal diplomatic introduction, and von Ribbentrop was below ambassadorial rank. Embarrassingly, he had to turn to the German ambassador, who gleefully prepared the audience and sent along an embassy official as chaperone. In Doumergue's anteroom, the rumor was that the "mystery visitor" was Kurt von Schuschnigg, the Austrian politician, since von Ribbentrop left his Austrian-made Habis hat in the cloakroom during the meeting.¹²

A cascade of events would soon make it difficult to explain Germany to foreign observers. It began on June 16, when Franz von Papen, the vice chancellor, raised some eyebrows.

In an uncharacteristically open speech at Marburg University in Hesse, he lamented the suppression of German Christianity and called

the single-party system Germany expected to come from the realm of Christ the self-seeking arrogant were behind this German

At the time, Edgar who had written the story murdered by the SS. And by the SS and the Gestapo shot at his desk. This

Rumors that should focused on Röhm, on comrades. Röhm had openly. He despised it and its compromises with aristocracy. He visualized a revolutionary people's army, from the National Socialist theoreticians and "old" and he had even made young Reichswehr officers over to him and his staff and on February 28 Hitler would be the nation's and after they served it shouted that he would that "the corporal who there with him, we'll go

One of his top aides to Himmler, head of the Himmler turned to Heydrich, cashier of honor, had enrolled Geneva Disarmament Conference, most brutal man in

Röhm and Hitler's party newspaper, *Völkischer Beobachter*. Röhm had to take several Wiessee, and the entire

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the single-party system only a temporary necessity. He asked how Germany expected to fulfill its mission in Europe by removing itself from the realm of Christian nations. He hinted at the lack of character, the self-seeking arrogance, the vulgarity, and the untruthfulness that were behind this German revolution.¹³

At the time, Edgar Jung, one of von Papen's associates and the man who had written the speech, had only thirteen days left to live. He was murdered by the SS. Von Papen's office in the Voss Strasse was raided by the SS and the Gestapo, and his press aide, Herbert von Bose, was shot at his desk. This was only the beginning.

Rumors that shook the Nazi regime and sent shock waves abroad focused on Röhm, one of Adolf Hitler's closest friends and long-term comrades. Röhm had made his complaints and ambitions known openly. He despised the "decay" of the National Socialist revolution and its compromises with "reactionary elements" in the Army and the aristocracy. He visualized a new, aggressive Germany led by a revolutionary people's army, under the command of men who had emerged from the National Socialist "gut" of Germany. He despised the Army's theoreticians and "old fogies."¹⁴ He commanded 500,000 SA men, and he had even made an appeal to a small group of opportunistic young Reichswehr officers. In February 1934 Röhm confronted General von Blomberg, demanding that all national defense be turned over to him and his Storm Troops. Von Blomberg appealed to Hitler, and on February 28 Hitler negotiated a compromise. The Reichswehr would be the nation's only Army, but the SA would train men before and after they served in the Reichswehr. After leaving the room, Röhm shouted that he would never "stick to this ridiculous agreement," and that "the corporal would now have to go on leave. If we can't get there with him, we'll get there without him."¹⁵

One of his top aides, SA General Viktor Lutze, denounced Röhm to Himmler, head of the SS and one of Röhm's oldest Nazi comrades. Himmler turned to Heydrich, one of the new young SS leaders, who eventually carried out the brutal plan for removing Röhm and his group. Heydrich, cashiered by the Navy for offenses against its code of honor, had enrolled in the SS. He had already shown his style at the Geneva Disarmament Conference and would soon become the coldest, most brutal man in the cold and brutal SS. Himmler also convinced Röhm's rival, Göring, to cooperate.

Röhm and Hitler had further stormy meetings. On June 8 the party newspaper, *Völkischer Beobachter*, suddenly announced that Röhm had to take several weeks' sick leave at a Bavarian spa, Bad Wiessee, and the entire SA would go on one month's furlough, begin-

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ning July 1. Röhm seemed beaten. This squelched Heydrich's plan to accuse Röhm and his SA leaders of insurrection and then to slaughter them.

Until the Röhm trouble, Hitler had been playing his usual hand. He wanted the SA to act as a counterbalance to the Army, and he wanted the Army to keep Röhm in check. This was no longer possible. The Army was fed up, and Hitler could wait no longer. The SS Leibstandarte's chief, Sepp Dietrich, a street brawler turned SS general, drew weapons from the acquiescent Army for his SS men. Hitler ordered all SA chiefs to meet him on June 30 for a special conference at Bad Wiessee.

After he was fed two false rumors that an SA insurrection was scheduled for that very day, a nervous, shaking Hitler flew to Munich. Munich's SA chiefs were immediately arrested. Hitler drove on to Bad Wiessee through the early morning mountain mist. At 6:30 A.M. he entered the inn where Röhm and his men were staying, pushed his way past a startled, awestruck innkeeper, and burst into Ernst Röhm's room, gun in hand, backed by SS and police. He ordered Röhm arrested.

Other SA chiefs, one with his male lover, were dragged out of their beds, ordered to get dressed, and were sent to Stadelheim jail in Munich. The SS now embarked on a bloody campaign of terror all over Germany. Six senior SA leaders were immediately shot in the Munich prison yard. Several senior civilian officials in Munich were also murdered. Anyone who had ever been an enemy or a seeming enemy, anywhere in Germany, was shot. This included the former chancellor General von Schleicher and his wife, dozens of senior SA leaders, Gregor Strasser, Hitler's old comrade and rival, and even Captain Ehrhardt of the Kapp putsch.

Afraid that Göring and Himmler would become too powerful without Röhm, Hitler almost spared the SA chief, but Göring and Himmler both insisted on Röhm's death. (On June 29 in Dahlem, during dinner, Annelies von Ribbentrop had asked Heinrich Himmler what ever happened to Röhm; she had not seen him around Berlin. Himmler told her that Röhm was "as good as dead."¹⁶)

The half-naked, sweating Röhm was finally shot in his Munich cell by three minor SS officers after scorning the chance to kill himself. In all, eighty-three people were murdered.¹⁷ Hitler told the Reichstag, "In this hour I was the German people's supreme judge."

Later, besides accusations of treason and sedition, there was a flood of Hitler's "righteous disgust" about Röhm's homosexuality.

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Hitler had known since the early Nazi days that Röhm was a homo-
sexual. In 1925 Röhm had sued a Berlin gigolo for theft. The man
claimed he had refused Röhm when the Nazi chief wanted to perform
homosexual acts. He did "steal" a suitcase from Röhm that contained
compromising love letters.¹⁸ In 1932 a Munich newspaper, the *Mün-
chener Post*, published a story stating that Röhm was a homosexual.
The Nazis did not sue. They knew they had no chance.¹⁹ In 1934, the
Cardinal of Cologne confronted Hitler with an account of Röhm's
homosexuality. Hitler denied it and called it a malicious lie.²⁰ Until
June 30, 1934, Hitler said that Röhm's preference was a "private
matter," but it was not, because the SA chiefs supplied their com-
mander with young men. Among SA headquarters troops, Röhm's
sexual appetites were a very public matter.

Foreign newspapers headlined these events in Nazi Germany. The
cruelty of the bloodbath, the display of Hitler's callousness toward his
former comrades, the murder of the von Schleichers and of Gregor
Strasser, who were all known among influential foreigners, caused
waves of revulsion abroad. German diplomats in London, Paris,
Rome, and Washington suddenly confronted a frigid world. Those
foreigners who had shown sympathy for the "new" Germany now
kept an embarrassed silence.

For the second time since the 1933 anti-Jewish boycott, Joachim
von Ribbentrop was face to face with events that went against his
nature. He was a rational, conventional man of conservative back-
ground, an international businessman who cared about his own and
his family's place in German and foreign society. He had always
worried about the reputation of his country among other nations;
Annelies was a lady of good family and careful upbringing.

The mass murders of Hitler's former Nazi associates and friends
and of the von Schleichers could not have been part of the normal
world of the von Ribbentrops, and one can imagine how these things
were seen by the Henkells in Wiesbaden, or for that matter by the von
Ribbentrops' friends in Paris and London.

Then, as if to shake off any doubts he may have had, Joachim von
Ribbentrop made a potent symbolic gesture: Erich Kordt reported
that June 30, the day of the Röhm affair, was the first time he had
seen von Ribbentrop dressed in full SS uniform. The die was cast. It is
inconceivable that Annelies von Ribbentrop had failed to approve.

Germans were presented with several *faits accomplis*. The *Völk-
ischer Beobachter*, dateline Munich, July 1, 1934, ran these front-
page headlines:

Jug '34

RÖHM ARRESTED AND DEPOSED
THOROUGH CLEANSING OF THE SA.
THE SA SPIRIT IS VICTORIOUS.
RÖHM EXCLUDED FROM PARTY.
THE FÜHRER ORDERS LUTZE TO BECOME THE SA'S NEW
CHIEF OF STAFF.

There was no explanation for Röhm's fall, but one of the newspaper articles implied that Röhm's "unfortunate tendencies" had brought about the Führer's "crisis of conscience."

Elsewhere in the paper were articles about the "harsh treatment of Austria's workers by their government," a report of "deep right- and left-wing conflicts" inside France, and, ominously, a piece about the "cruelty of Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss's police." These were typical Goebbels signals of things to come.*

Should the Goebbels message of July 1 have failed to penetrate, the July 14 edition, dateline Berlin, carried the following headline:

DEATH IS CERTAIN FOR ANYONE WHO RAISES HIS HAND
AGAINST THE STATE

(Es soll jeder wissen dass wenn er die Hand zum schlage gegen den
Staat erhebt der sichere Tod sein Los ist).

Subheadlines said:

THE GERMAN REICH IS NO LONGER A GEOGRAPHIC TERM BUT
A POLITICAL UNIT.

A WAR WE HAVE BEEN FIGHTING FOR ONE AND A HALF YEARS.
THE WHOLE PEOPLE STANDS BEHIND THE FÜHRER.

THE ONLY ONES TO CARRY ARMS IN THE REICH ARE THE
ARMED FORCES, AND THERE IS ONLY ONE CARRIER OF
POLITICAL IDEAS: THE PARTY.

HE BROKE HIS FAITH WITH ME, AND I HAD TO MAKE HIM PAY
THE CONSEQUENCES.

In effect, the entire newspaper was filled with these statements from Hitler's speech to the Reichstag of Friday, July 13, 1934. There was no mention of the murders of the von Schleichers, Gregor Strasser, or von Papen's assistant, Jung, although men in von Ribbentrop's position could not but know all these facts and Berlin gossip was

*Among the advertisements was a half page from Horn's, a Munich men's clothing store, offering SA uniform shirts in "first-class poplin with two spare collars, color SA brown, fadeproof, for 5.25 Reichsmarks" and breeches "in the new SA olive brown or in black, 9.00 Reichsmarks."

rampant. As François-Danger excites them. I they love to gossip."

The *Völkischer Beobachter* Nazis in attendance at among them. In 1934, The other top Nazis were Heinrich Himmler of the Berlin "society bureau" he created von Ribbentrop, taking advantage of the victory wearing his black uniform. Wiessee, Hitler had eleven

On July 24, William guest in Dahlem. The followed would have given had to deal with the German

Engelbert Dollfuss, birth, was so tiny that Millimeternich. To counter Austrian appetites, he pushed representative government based on close friendship with Italy. Dollfuss had arranged major loans tied to Franco-British independence of Germany. seemed to militate against lead to unification with

But on July 25, 1934 Despite instant denials of the German ambassador world blamed Adolf Hitler. An astonishing comedy Germany is a story told for in name, but total versial Marburg speech He and his son, at their knock on the front of their pistols, opened the SS men.

July 34

rampant. As François-Poncet pointed out: "Germans are talkative. Danger excites them. Despite censorship, police, and denunciations, they love to gossip."

The *Völkischer Beobachter* of July 14, 1934, listed the senior Nazis in attendance at the Reichstag, but von Ribbentrop was still not among them. In 1934, he was nowhere near the party's top echelon. The other top Nazis were unimpressed by him, with the exception of Heinrich Himmler of the SS; he wanted to enlist the cooperation of the Berlin "society businessman" who appealed to Hitler. In May 1934 he created von Ribbentrop a colonel in the "weekend" SS. Von Ribbentrop, taking advantage of Himmler's friendship, declared himself part of the victorious and newly powerful fraternity by frequently wearing his black uniform. To reward the SS for its actions in Bad Wiessee, Hitler had elevated it to independent status.

On July 24, William Dodd, the new American ambassador, was a guest in Dahlem. The von Ribbentrops tried to reassure him, but what followed would have given serious pause to any foreign diplomat who had to deal with the German government.

Engelbert Dollfuss, chancellor of Austria, the country of Hitler's birth, was so tiny that he was known among Vienna wags as the *Millimeternich*. To counteract the Nazis and still satisfy conservative Austrian appetites, he banned the Communist Party, virtually abolished representative government, and introduced a pseudofascist regime based on close friendship with Austria's big neighbor, Mussolini's Italy. Dollfuss had begun to heal Austria's ailing economy by arranging major loans from France and Britain, but the money was tied to Franco-British understanding that Austria would remain independent of Germany. Dollfuss's party, the Vaterländische Front, seemed to militate against a takeover by Austrian Nazis, which could lead to unification with Germany.

But on July 25, 1934, Dollfuss was murdered by Austrian Nazis. Despite instant denials from Berlin and the immediate recall and firing of the German ambassador to Vienna, Dr. Kurt Rieth, the western world blamed Adolf Hitler for Dollfuss's murder.

An astonishing commentary on the way Adolf Hitler had changed Germany is a story told by Franz von Papen, then still vice chancellor in name, but totally estranged from Hitler after his controversial Marburg speech and the murder of his speechwriter, Jung.²¹ He and his son, at their country estate, were summoned by a sharp knock on the front door. Expecting to be arrested, they drew their pistols, opened the door — and were not surprised to find three SS men.

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"Herr von Papen, the Führer wishes to speak to you on the phone at once. He is in Bayreuth." Von Papen thought he might get shot while he was on the phone, but, instead, was given an immediate phone connection with Hitler, who came straight to the point: "I want you to go to Vienna as ambassador." Von Papen, who knew nothing about the Dollfuss murder, asked why Hitler had called him after all that had happened between them. A nervous Adolf Hitler told him about Dollfuss and said, "You must go to Vienna. Rieth has behaved in an impossible manner and should actually be put before a military tribunal. You are the only man for the job." Von Papen asked how he could be expected to accept the assignment after the events of June 30, but, typically, did not say no to the Führer. Von Papen always landed like a cat.

Most western diplomats and journalists were sure that the Dollfuss murder had been engineered in Berlin. Although the June 30 SA purge might have been considered "an internal matter," a Berlin-directed murder of Dollfuss could not be so construed. Reports in the French and British press ranged from dismay to condemnation, and there was anger in Rome. Mussolini had been repelled by the June 30 massacre.²² He called Hitler a "cruel and ferocious character, an Attila." The Dollfuss murder brought a much harsher reaction, because Austria was Mussolini's ward. He wanted to preserve an independent Austria.²³ On July 28, Rome's newspaper *Il Messaggero* wrote, "Only fools fall into the same trap twice," referring to Mussolini's earlier show of trust for Hitler. Italian troops were rushed to the Austrian border. Mussolini guaranteed Austrian independence to the right-wing Prince Starhemberg, Austria's vice chancellor. Mussolini was bitterly disappointed when France and Britain failed to do the same.²⁴ Nevertheless, Hitler seemed in retreat. He even fired Theo Habicht, the Nazi Party's chief in Austria.

Although von Ribbentrop assumed that German embassies everywhere were bound to report negative reactions to the Foreign Ministry, he made it his business to calm the Führer; that was exactly what Adolf Hitler wanted and needed. Even though the disarmament plenipotentiary's voice was not a major one, at least it was positive. Adolf Hitler often grasped at the straws of pleasant fiction in an ocean of unpleasant truth.

On August 3, Hitler closed the Austrian branch of the Nazi Party. Two days later he gave an interview to George Ward Price, senior correspondent of London's *Daily Mail*, in which he tried to calm the troubled waters: "No colonies . . . no thought of Austrian An-

schluss . . . possible psychosis."²⁵

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The last brake on his arbitrary ways was about to be released. On August 1, unwilling to wait for the actual event, the cabinet decided that the offices of President and Chancellor would be combined after von Hindenburg's death. In the future, Hitler would not need presidential approval for any of his acts. The law was to take effect a day after the old President's death.

And on the following day, von Hindenburg died. Always prepared to clothe the unconstitutional in respectability, the government "put to the popular vote" the unification of President and Chancellor two weeks later. On August 19 the German people approved the measure, predictably, by 89.9 percent.

For two weeks, no last will of von Hindenburg's could be located. On August 15, Oskar von Hindenburg "found" an envelope with five red seals and gave it to von Papen. He, in turn, brought it to Hitler at the Berghof. It contained a "will," in which the old Junker praised Hitler and put the fate of Germany into the hands of the man he had often disdainfully called the "Austrian corporal." It was generally considered bogus, a fabrication of von Papen, Oskar von Hindenburg, and State Secretary Meissner.²⁶ A grateful Hitler rehabilitated von Papen and promoted Oskar von Hindenburg to general. Meissner remained state secretary to the Führer and chancellor.

Another act of obedient surrender took place when Reichswehr Minister von Blomberg ordered that the Reichswehr take the oath of allegiance not to the German Reich, but to the person of Adolf Hitler. Unlikely though it may seem today, in later years many disgusted and disillusioned German officers shied away from assassinating Hitler precisely because of this personal oath.

Later in August, von Ribbentrop was invited to England by Lord Rothermere, the publisher of the *Daily Mail*. The invitation impressed Hitler, and von Ribbentrop's stock rose still higher. He now became Adolf Hitler's advance man in the battle for an alliance with Britain. Other clever men in Hitler's circle might have been assigned more strategic work, but von Ribbentrop was given a very specific task to go with his title. He was to begin by signing some form of arms agreement with Great Britain and was to continue to enlist sympathetic British men of influence. The arms agreement could be focused on land, sea, and air.

It was unusual for Hitler to assign one task to one man. Often several competitors were assigned the same job. Each thought he had

1934

racy. In 1932, H. G. Wells wrote the pessimistic *After Democracy*; in 1933, the Socialist Harold Laski wrote *Democracy in Crisis*; J. R. B. Muir in 1934 wrote *Is Democracy a Failure?*

As Griffiths noted, many new nondemocratic governments had emerged:

Mussolini in Italy in 1922.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey in 1923.

Admiral Horthy in Hungary in 1920.

Pilsudski in Poland in 1926.

In Spain, between 1920 and 1930 Primo de Rivera.

Japan was run by decree.

Salazar's Portugal was a dictatorship.

These were all non-Communist countries, friendly with the western democracies. At first the emergence of Hitler's Nazi government following Germany's "incompetent republic" seemed natural. But after Nazi brutalities like the 1933 anti-Jewish boycott, the 1934 blood purge of Röhm, and the 1934 murder of Dollfuss, many profascist British conservatives began to draw a distinction between "constructive" fascism and the "animal brutality" of the Nazis. The fascists were "moral and upright"; the Nazis were "brutal and barbarian."

In 1934, von Ribbentrop could nonetheless count on the pacifism and isolationism of a Britain that had shed so much blood in the trenches of the Great War. The well-meaning seekers after some new form of "moral" government, and those who believed in "peace at any cost," were joined by the many who shrugged off reports of Nazi cruelties with "What concern is it of ours?"

Von Ribbentrop's efforts and even his early blunders were treated generously by many of Britain's upper class, even though they were not Nazi sympathizers. British hunger for peace misled both von Ribbentrop and his master until five minutes before midnight.

The list of those Britons whose sympathies were available to von Ribbentrop in 1934 was immensely varied. At one end stood the lunatic fringe, the racists, the chauvinists, the haters. Most successful of these was Sir Oswald Mosley, originally a man of great charm and imagination, who began his political life as a Conservative MP, but on October 1, 1932, founded the British Union of Fascists, with all the black-shirted, arm-raising, "thunder and lightning" trappings. Mosley's attitude was that the "drama was necessary and efficient" and the working classes had no sense of the ridiculous.

By 1934, the BUF had lost many of its intellectuals but attracted some upper-middle-class conservatives and some working-class mem-

bers. By 1934, when Britain, the BUF still "too barbaric and f-

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bers. By 1934, when von Ribbentrop made his first real efforts in Britain, the BUF still tended to separate itself from Nazism, which was "too barbaric and pagan."³²

On June 7 the BUF held a major rally in Olympia, using it as a London *Sportpalast*. Violence broke out between BUF and its opponents in the hall, and the BUF goon squads duplicated the worst of the SA's brutality. This finished the union for many, who now saw it as nothing but a British Nazi Party.³³ It also brought an end to any support from Lord Rothermere's papers, and many earlier Mosley supporters defected, in part because of Mosley's ranting attacks on Jews. To conservative fascists, however, these were more a matter of style than of content.

In 1934 some right-wingers formed the January Club, led by Sir John Squire, an editor and writer and an admirer of Mussolini. It began as a study group of "men interested in modern systems of government." It gave a largely upper-class platform to the fascist and corporate-state points of view and also gave fascists the chance to listen to those who were not fascist. Among the speakers were contributors to the *English Review*, known for fascist views.

The BUF still attempted to seem "respectable," but it decided not to accept Jews as members and claimed it was "under attack from an international conspiracy."³⁴ On July 14, 1934, Lord Rothermere finally declared himself in the *Daily Mail*. In an open letter to Mosley he said he was against fascism, dictatorship, the corporate state, and anti-Semitism. Other conservatives agreed.

British anti-Semites ranged from those who believed in a "conspiracy theory" to those who practiced the banal sort of social ostracism and stereotyping. Typical expressions were T. S. Eliot's poem "*Bleistein with a Cigar*," whose subject was a "Chicago Semite Viennese," and the popular Bulldog Drummond books by Sapper (Cyril McNeile), in which a particular villain's "hooked nose proclaimed his race."³⁵ The "international Jewish conspiracy" group was headed by Mrs. Nesta Webster, an amateur historian, whose name was prominent in British fascist circles until the war. She maintained that Bolshevism was the creation of German Jews. The main publication that gave a platform to anti-Semites like Nesta Webster was the small newspaper *The Patriot*.

A much stranger publication was *The Aeroplane*, basically a magazine for amateur pilots. Its editor, C. G. Grey, used it to deliver himself of astonishing theories about "good" and "bad" Jewish tribes, even trying to point at the "bad" Japhetic Jewish Communist influence on Welsh miners.³⁶ The anti-Semitic writer Gordon Bolitho said

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in 1934 that the "reason we hear Jews first is that they wail more loudly," and Percy Wyndham Lewis, a warm Nazi sympathizer, wrote in 1931 that anti-Semitism is a "mere bagatelle," which must stand in no one's way. These were only a few of the many Nazi apologists. Rolf Gardiner wrote in his book, published in Berlin in 1933, that the "smell of Asia was in Ghetto beards" and that every country "had the Jews it deserved."

At the absolute extreme end of the British Nazi scale stood the Imperial Fascist League, headed by a surgeon, Arnold Leese, a war veteran. He turned down an invitation to join with Mosley's BUF because he claimed Mosley's first wife, Cynthia Curzon, was the granddaughter of Levi Leiter, a Jewish grain dealer from Chicago. Leese even proposed a gas chamber solution to end the Jewish problem.

At that time the British royal family was still firmly under the command of its paternal monarch, King George V, who would soon chastise his heir Edward, the Prince of Wales, for delivering a speech friendly to the German war veterans in June 1935. The speech contained the sort of ideas von Ribbentrop still held in 1936, when he became ambassador to Great Britain. He was never able to shake his schoolboy view of Britain, almost unchanged since his boyhood visit to London, or his Ottawa-born theories about the British Empire and the political power of its aristocracy. Among the influential members of "society" was the eccentric, American-born Emerald Lady Cunard, who conducted a potent society salon. It was she who introduced Wallis Simpson to the Prince of Wales. The witty, flirtatious Emerald Cunard saw Joachim von Ribbentrop as a delicious "real, live Nazi" to be served on a platter to her friends, ironically not unlike the von Ribbentrops' own Nazi presentations in Dahlem in 1932.

For many British society people, Nazi Germany was the latest tourist attraction, where "one was invited and escorted everywhere by uniformed Nazis." They told exciting tales of being received by von Ribbentrop and then meeting Hitler. A thrilling safari into deepest Naziland.

Harold Nicolson described the syndrome, and the salons at which it flourished. "The harm which these silly, selfish hostesses give is immense. They convey to foreign envoys the impression that foreign policy is decided in their own drawing rooms. They convey an atmosphere of authority and grandeur when it is only flatulence of the spirit!"

As 1935 came, so did the next Hitler "shock." On January 13, the Saar region, which had been under French mandate, voted by 90.67

percent to return decided that the new foreign minister Laval, who cons an agreement with Ethiopia, though George Ward, Pr Hitler threatened into thorns and decided to lift th admitted to own

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most startling reactions
Seneš, the Czechoslovak

president, said, "I'd rather see the Germans in Vienna than the Haps-
burgs."¹⁷

Ambassador Sir Neville Henderson, the man so often accused of
Nazi sympathies, now wanted to make a gesture of protest against the
invasion of Austria. He decided to boycott the annual Heroes' Me-
morial Day Parade in Berlin, the March 13 ceremony usually attended
by all ambassadors and foreign envoys. Instead, with Union Jacks
flying from the embassy's Rolls-Royce, he had himself driven to the
Austrian Mission in a show of British sympathy. He could have saved
himself the trouble. The Austrian minister, in full diplomatic uniform,
was on his way to attend the ceremonies, where he saluted with "Heil
Hitler!"¹⁸

During the first days of the Anschluss, much of Austria's popula-
tion went on a rampage of antidemocratic, anti-Communist, antireac-
tionary, anti-Semitic "revenge." Many Austrians now insisted that
they had been Nazis all along. Not only did they, in the words of Dr.
Joseph Goebbels, "wish to go home to the Reich," but they delivered
themselves of a shamefully amplified imitation of the wildest SA
debauches of 1934. In Währing, a prosperous section of Vienna,
wealthy Jewish women were forced to scrub the street while wearing
their fur coats. Some of the spectators then urinated on their heads.¹⁹
(Jews who were arrested by the Gestapo were forced to sign papers
before they were released attesting to the good treatment they had
received. Dr. Sigmund Freud wrote, "I am happy to give the Gestapo
my best recommendation." Eleven hundred Viennese Jews killed
themselves after the Anschluss.

While the Viennese were committing their *vox populi* street perva-
sions, the German SS and the Gestapo's leather-coated agents roamed
throughout Austria as Himmler's angels of death, seeking anyone who
had ever opposed the Anschluss or wished to protect and preserve
Austria's independence as a Christian democratic nation. Even those
who had compromised their democratic principles by backing the
rightist regime of Dollfuss now became targets for the Gestapo.

This SS-Gestapo sweep produced one murder that benefited the
von Ribbentrop family and was counted in their disfavor by many
Austrian and German nobles. The SS took over a charming lakeside
castle called Fuschl, near Salzburg, after arresting its owners, the von
Remitz family. Herr von Remitz, an Austrian patriot of the highest
order, was sent to Dachau and executed. Fuschl was handed over to
Joachim von Ribbentrop.

Over the following years, Annelies, Joachim, and the children used

ed parties
on me

1909, 1918, (1934)

1938

gling quackery."¹³⁰ Consciously Hitler bore Bloch no grudges, quite the contrary, from the hand-painted card he sent Bloch from Vienna with "the most cordial New Year's wishes"—presumably for 1909—"from your ever grateful Adolf Hitler"¹³¹ to the request, after the Anschluss of 1938, for Bloch to be photographed in his consulting room in Linz¹³² and a decree granting Bloch "all possible alleviations, including monetary."¹³³ Even unconsciously he exonerated Bloch again and again from his own unconscious charges against him. Thus he answered for a political bloodbath of 1934 by telling Germany: "I... gave the order to burn out the abscesses of our inner well-poisoning and of the foreign poisoning down to the raw flesh."¹³⁴ Decoded, this cleared Bloch in respect of the breast cancer ("inner well-poisoning") and the iodoform treatment ("I... gave the order") while also blaming him for them through a dissymmetrical phrase covering both at once ("of the foreign poisoning").¹³⁵ Abusing "the Jew" was for Hitler a means of abusing Bloch while knowing better. This supercharged conceptual device, "the Jew," shaped up and developed latently with Hitler over the decade before it surfaced in October 1918. For in those years he was motivated against a run of evils and evildoers that were disconnected except in having been linked to Jewry in the Austrian and German anti-Semitism of the time. In the men's hostel in Vienna in early 1913 his two cues for fury were "ever and again... the Reds and the Jesuits";¹³⁶ in a letter of 5 February 1915 to an acquaintance in Munich he looked ahead to a victorious Germany rid of "foreignism" and "internal internationalism";¹³⁷ in his last days at the front he would scream like crazy against "pacifists and shirkers."¹³⁸ Again, he conspicuously avoided naming Jews when, in his first years in his regiment, he "would rail against the Dual Monarchy, in which every Czech, every Hungarian, every Pole, Croat, and Bosnian, counted for more than a German."¹³⁹ The anti-Semitic subliterature that proliferated in Hitler's Vienna must have prompted his choice of "the Jew" as a fall guy for Bloch, what with its big themes of parasitism, poison, and concealed malevolence.¹⁴⁰ This was the truth to his untruth that he left Vienna "as an

D

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his resolve in anticipation of the worms of death

tt It was there along w ~~the~~ opposite sentiments.

June 1934

Tension between the Army and the SA continued to build up in the early summer. But on 7 June, following a long interview with Hitler, Röhm published the following announcement. Though it showed distinct signs of belligerence, it nevertheless seems to indicate that, despite Hitler's later allegations, Röhm had no plans for a putsch during this period.

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I have decided to follow the advice of my doctors and take a cure in order to restore my energies which have been severely strained by a painful nervous complaint. My place will be taken by the Chief of the Leadership Office, Oberguppenführer von Krausser.

1934 will require all the energies of every SA fighter. I recommend, therefore, to all SA leaders to begin organising leave already in June.

Therefore, for a limited number of SA leaders and men, June, and for the majority of the SA, July, will be a period of complete relaxation in which they can recover their strength.

I expect the SA to return on 1 August completely rested and refreshed in order to serve in those honourable capacities which nation and fatherland expect of it. If the enemies of the SA live in hope that the SA will not return, or will return only in part, from its leave, we will allow them this brief pleasurable anticipation. They will receive the appropriate reply at the time and in the manner appearing most suitable.

The SA is and remains Germany's destiny.

During June, the crisis was deepened by two further developments. It became clear the Reich President, Hindenburg, had not long to live, which raised the matter of the succession. If Hitler wished to combine the offices of Chancellor and President and avoid a new Conservative President being imposed on him, he would need the approval of the Army.

Secondly, Papen became the spokesman of conservative circles in the bureaucracy and business who were discontented at the excesses of the SA and concerned about talk of a second revolution. On 17 June, Papen articulated this discontent in a speech at the University of Marburg, the reporting of which Goebbels promptly banned:

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...It is certainly obvious that the bearers of the revolutionary principle should initially occupy also the positions of power. But once the revolution has taken place, the Government must represent the people as a whole, and must on no account be the exponent only of particular groups; otherwise it would fail in its attempt to construct the national community. We must also get away from false

It is influencing Hitler.

romantic notions which are not appropriate to the twentieth century. We cannot, for example, consider dividing the nation after the manner of the ancient Greeks into Spartans and helots. The final outcome of that development was that the Spartans had to concentrate on repressing the helots, thereby weakening the diplomatic strength of Sparta. In a state where there is a true national community, the domestic political war-cries must finally cease. There must certainly be a process of selection. But the natural criterion for the selection of people for appointments cannot be replaced by that of membership of a particular organisation, so long as the motives for such membership cannot be analysed....

I have defined the problems of the German revolution and my attitude towards them particularly sharply because there appears to be endless talk of a second wave which will complete the revolution. Anyone who irresponsibly toys with such ideas should not deceive himself about the fact that a second wave can easily be followed by a third, that he who threatens the guillotine is the first to come under the knife. Nor is it clear in what direction this second wave is meant to lead. It is true that there is much talk about future socialisation. Have we experienced an anti-Marxist revolution in order to carry out the programme of Marxism? For any attempt to solve the social question by collectivising property is Marxism. Will the German people become richer, will its national income grow bigger, will anybody be better off, except possibly those who smell the possibility of plunder in such a raid? There is certainly a social problem caused by economic and demographic processes. But these can be mastered only if property is once more made aware of its responsibilities, not by raising collective irresponsibility to a principle. A form of economic planning which moves further and further away from personal initiative and responsibility must not be made into a principle. For anyone who has not observed that every form of collectivism leads to ineradicable corruption has been going about the world with his eyes shut.

No nation that would survive before history can afford a permanent uprising from below. At some stage the movement must come to an end; at some point there must emerge a firm social structure held together by a legal system secure against pressure and by a State power that is unchallenged. A ceaseless dynamic creates nothing. Germany cannot be allowed to become a train hurtling into the blue with no one knowing where it will stop. History flows of its own accord, it does not need to be constantly driven forward. If, therefore, a second wave of new life is to sweep through the German revolution, then it must do so not as social revolution, but as the creative completion of work already begun. The statesman is there to create forms, his sole concern is for State and people. The State is the sole power and the final guarantee of that which every citizen can claim—iron justice. In the long run, therefore, the State cannot tolerate any dualism, and the success of the German revolution and the future of our nation will depend on the discovery of a satisfactory solution for the dualism between Party and State.

The Government is well aware of the selfishness, the lack of principle, the insincerity, the unchivalrous behaviour, the arrogance which is on the increase under the guise of the German revolution. Nor has it any illusions as to the threat to that reserve of public confidence on which the Government can draw. If it is desired to achieve an intimate and friendly relationship with the people, then their intelligence must not be underestimated, their trust must be reciprocated and there

1934

must be no continual attempt to browbeat them. The German people recognise the gravity of the situation, they feel the economic crisis, they have a keen awareness of the weak points in some of the laws that this crisis has produced, they are acutely sensitive to violence and injustice, clumsy attempts at deceiving them with false optimism merely make them smile. In the long run, no organisation, no propaganda, however good, can alone retain their confidence. My interpretation, therefore, of the propaganda campaign against 'carpers' is different from that of others.⁶² Confidence and willingness to cooperate will not be furthered by incitement, particularly incitement of the young, nor by threats against the defenceless classes of the community, but only by discussion based upon mutual confidence. The people know that great sacrifices are expected of them. They will shoulder them and follow the Führer with unshakeable loyalty, provided they are allowed to have a share in the making and carrying out of decisions, provided every word of criticism is not immediately interpreted as malicious, and provided that despairing patriots are not branded as traitors.

It is time to come together in brotherly love and respect for every citizen, to cease obstructing the work of those who are in earnest, and to silence doctrinaire fanatics...

There was clearly a danger that the Army would combine with the conservative elements in the bureaucracy and business to veto Hitler's succession to Hindenburg, either by persuading Hindenburg before he died to nominate someone else, or by carrying out a coup on his death. Hitler might be able to counter such a coup with the aid of the SA, but this would make him prisoner of the SA, force him into a revolution, thereby jeopardising all his diplomatic and military objectives, to which the collaboration of business and the professional Army were essential. A period of peace and quiet was needed in order to restore the economic situation dominated by a foreign exchange crisis, and to avoid diplomatic complications in view of the weakness of Germany's diplomatic situation in 1934. All this was threatened by the SA with its demands for a second revolution, its ambition to usurp the role of the Army, and its flagrant contempt for the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty. The SA, which had been very helpful in the acquisition of power, was now a grave embarrassment under the leadership of the ambitious Röhm and his associates.

In the meantime, another organisation had come to play an independent role in the crisis—the SS. During 1933-34, Himmler, the head of the SS, had taken over the political police departments in every state in the Reich, including the Prussian Gestapo. Nominally, the SS was still a part of the SA, and the SA with its huge membership and ambitious leadership was now the main obstacle to the ambitions of the SS. The SS therefore began

⁶²On 11 May, Goebbels had launched a campaign against 'grumblers and carpers', aimed primarily at Conservatives.

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to warn Hitler and the Army of the intentions of the SA. These rumours prompted the Army to take action which antagonised the SA and this in turn gave rise to more suspicion on the part of Hitler and the Army. This encouragement by the SS of mutual suspicion between Army and SA was described after the war by Field-Marshal von Kleist, from whose testimony it appears that General Reichenau, the right-hand man of Blomberg, the Minister of Defence, was also involved:

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Round about 24 June 1934, I as the army commander in Silesia was warned by the Chief of the General Staff [*Heeresleitung*] that an attack by the SA on the Army was imminent and that I should unobtrusively keep my troops on the alert.

During the tense days following, I received a flood of reports and information which gave a picture of feverish preparations on the part of the SA. This information came from the most varied sources (the troops, the SA, old Stahlhelm types, SS, civilians and government authorities). Despite the very reserved attitude adopted by the troops, a dangerous state of tension developed in the garrisons between them and the local SA. Only a spark was needed to touch off the explosion.

In this situation, I considered that bloodshed could only be avoided by a man-to-man talk.

On the afternoon of 28 June, therefore, I asked SA Obergruppenführer Heines⁶³ to come and see me; I told him to his face that I knew of his preparations and I gave him a warning.

He replied that he knew all about my measures and had thought that they were preparations for an attack on the SA. He had only put the SA on the alert in order to resist an attack. He gave me his word as an officer and SA leader that he had not planned or prepared any surprise attack upon the Army.

During the night of 28-29 June, he rang me up again. He said more or less that as far as he was concerned the situation had changed. He had just learned that not only the Army in Silesia, but from 28 June the Army throughout the Reich, was on the alert for an SA putsch. He was going to fly to Munich early on the 29th to see Röhm. Whereupon I also flew on 29 June to Berlin and reported to Colonel-General Freiherr von Fritsch and General Beck about my conversation with Heines. I added: 'I have the impression that we—Army and SA—are being egged on against each other by a third party.' By that I meant Himmler and that much of the information came from him. Thereupon, Colonel-General Freiherr von Fritsch summoned General von Reichenau and asked me to repeat to him what I had just said. Reichenau replied, 'That may be true, but it's too late now.'

As tension built, Hitler decided to act. On 29 June he summoned a meeting of SA leaders for the following day at Wiessee in Bavaria. The Army and

⁶³Police-President of Breslau.

June 30, 1934

SS were put on the alert and Göring was given the responsibility of carrying out the action in Berlin. Then, on learning that the SA in Munich had been put on the alert, Hitler flew to Munich in the early hours of the 30th. After the war, Kempka, his chauffeur, described the events of 30 June:

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...It is already dawn when we land at the Munich airport, Oberwiesenfeld. During the flight, there had been a light shower and the grass at the airport is sparkling in the morning light. When Hitler jumps out of the machine, two officers of the Reichswehr report to him. He takes them aside and gives them their orders.

Outside the reception building three cars are waiting which have been ordered by wireless from the garage of the Reich Party headquarters in Munich. Some old friends of Hitler's from the early days of the Party are standing by them. Hitler goes up to the cars and orders the hands to be raised. I am struck by the harshness of his voice. His face is even more serious than during the flight. I am already at the wheel when he sits down beside me: 'Kempka, we're going to the Ministry of the Interior first.'...

[At the Ministry Hitler arrested the Police-President of Munich, SA Oberguppenführer August Schneidhuber.]

Hitler sits down beside me and gives the order: 'To Wiessee, as fast as possible!'

It must have been about 4.30 a.m., the sky has cleared up, it is nearly bright daylight. We meet watering carts and people on their way to work... Hitler sits beside me in silence. From time to time, I hear Goebbels and Lutze talking in the back.

Just before Wiessee, Hitler suddenly breaks his silence: 'Kempka,' he says, 'drive carefully when we come to the Hotel Hanselbauer. You must drive up without making any noise. If you see an SA guard in the front of the hotel, don't wait for them to report to me; drive on and stop at the hotel entrance.' Then, after a moment of deathly silence: 'Röhm wants to carry out a *coup*.'

An icy shiver runs down my back. I could have believed anything, but not a *coup* by Röhm!

I drive up carefully to the hotel entrance as Hitler had ordered. Hitler jumps out of the car, and after him Goebbels, Lutze and the adjutants. Right behind us another car stops with a squad of detectives which had been raised in Munich.

As soon as I have turned the car so that it is ready to leave in a moment, I rush into the hotel with my gun at the ready. In the hall I meet Standartenführer Uhl, the leader of Röhm's staff guard. Hitler's chauffeur, Schreck, is taking him at gunpoint down to the laundry room which for the next hour serves as the first prison for the arrested SA leaders. In passing, Schreck calls out to me: 'Quickly! Run up to the boss! He needs you!'

I run quickly up the stairs to the first floor where Hitler is just coming out of Röhm's bedroom. Two detectives come out of the room opposite. One of them

reports to Hitler: 'My Führer...the Police-President of Breslau is refusing to get dressed!'

Taking no notice of me, Hitler enters the room where Oberguppenführer Heines is remaining. I hear him shout: 'Heines, if you are not dressed in five minutes I'll have you shot on the spot!'

I withdraw a few steps and a police officer whispers to me that Heines had been in bed with an 18-year-old SA Obertruppführer. At last Heines comes out of the room with an 18-year-old fair-haired boy mincing in front of him.

'Into the laundry room with them!' cries Schreck.

Meanwhile, Röhm comes out of his room in a blue suit and with a cigar in the corner of his mouth. Hitler glares at him but says nothing. Two detectives take Röhm to the vestibule of the hotel where he throws himself into an armchair and orders coffee from the waiter.

I stay in the corridor a little to one side and a detective tells me about Röhm's arrest.

Hitler entered Röhm's bedroom alone with a whip in his hand. Behind him were two detectives with pistols at the ready. He spat out the words: 'Röhm, you are under arrest.' Röhm looked up sleepily from his pillow: 'Heil, my Führer.' 'You are under arrest' bawled Hitler for the second time, turned on his heel and left the room.

Meanwhile, upstairs in the corridor things are getting quite lively. SA leaders are coming out of their rooms and being arrested. Hitler shouts at each one: 'Have you had anything to do with Röhm's schemes?' naturally, they all deny it, but that doesn't help them in the least. Hitler usually knows about the individual; occasionally, he asks Goebbels or Lutze a question. And then comes the decision: 'Arrested!'

But there are others whom he lets go. Röhm's doctor SA Gruppenführer Ketterer comes out of a room and to our surprise he has his wife with him. I hear Lutze putting in a good word for him with Hitler. Then Hitler walks up to him, greets him, shakes hands with his wife and asks them to leave the hotel; it isn't a pleasant place for them to stay in that day.

We follow Hitler into the yard and here he tells his chauffeur, Schreck, to charter a bus as quickly as possible to take the SA leaders who are in the laundry room to Munich. How slowly the minutes pass! More and more SA leaders arrive from outside and are brought into the laundry room. I stand at the hotel entrance and hear Röhm order coffee from the hotel manager for the third time.

Suddenly...there is the sound of a car arriving! At first I thought it was the bus chartered by Schreck but instead, to my horror, a lorry full of heavily armed SA men rattles into the yard. Now there'll be some shooting, I think to myself. I can see Brückner negotiating with the Sturmführer of the SA. The man seems to be refusing. Walking backwards, he tries to get to his lorry...At this moment Hitler goes up to him: 'Drive back to Munich immediately!' he tells the puzzled fellow. 'If you are stopped by SS on the way, you must let yourselves be disarmed without resistance.'

The Sturmführer salutes and jumps into the lorry, and the SA men leave again. No shot, no sign of resistance. All this time, Röhm is sitting unsuspectingly drinking his third cup of coffee. Only a single word from him, and the whole thing

would have worked out differently...

Now the bus arrives which has been fetched by Schreck. Quickly, the SA leaders are collected from the laundry room and walk past Röhm under police guard. Röhm looks up from his coffee sadly and waves to them in a melancholy way...

At last Röhm too is led from the hotel. He walks past Hitler with his head bowed, completely apathetic. Now Hitler gives the order to leave. I sit at the wheel of the first car with Hitler beside me and our column, which in the meantime has grown to about twenty cars, starts moving...

After the war, the governor of the Stadelheim⁶⁴ prison recorded:

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...Nobody was allowed to leave the prison that night either. Next morning (Sunday 1 July 1934) two SS men asked at the reception desk to be taken to Röhm. Zink, who was at the entrance, in view of the strict instructions he had been given, refused. It was about 9.30 a.m. When the two tried to force their way in, Zink alerted the prison governor and the green police [state police], who at once occupied the corridors and prevented any intrusion. The governor ascertained that neither of the SS men had proper authorisation. It therefore took hours of telephoning to check their papers; even the Reich Chancellery was rung up. When at last it became clear that they had an order from Hitler, the two murderers had to be taken to Röhm in the new building.

There they handed over a Browning to Röhm, who once again asked to speak to Hitler. They ordered him to shoot himself. If he did not comply, they would come back in ten minutes and kill him.... When the time was up, the two SS men re-entered the cell, and found Röhm standing with his chest bared. Immediately one of them from the door shot him in the throat, and Röhm collapsed on the floor. Since he was still alive, he was killed with a shot point-blank through the temple. The bullet not only penetrated his skull, but also the ceiling of the cell below...

Six of the other SA leaders arrested at Wiessee, were executed by an SS firing squad at Stadelheim Prison. The rest of the executions were carried out in the Berlin barracks of Hitler's bodyguard. In Berlin the purge was under Göring's direction. The following description by a police official gives a sense of the atmosphere of the occasion:

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...Suddenly there are loud shouts in the large room next door. It is Göring's study, where the executive committee is meeting. From time to time Gestapo messengers come rushing in bringing small white pieces of paper. Through the door one can see

⁶⁴The prison in Munich.

Göring, Himmler, Heydrich and little Pilli Körner, Göring's State Secretary in the Minister-Presidency, putting their heads together. Of course it is impossible to hear what they are talking about. But things are happening devilish fast. Occasionally we hear an inarticulate sound like 'Off!' or 'Aha!' or 'Shoot!' or simply raucous laughter. In any case they don't seem in a bad mood.

Göring even exudes an air of well-fed comfort. He gives the impression of being in his element. He strides round his room. He struts to and fro, an unforgettable picture: with his flowing head of hair, his white tunic, his grey-blue military trousers, his white boots with their high flaps reaching up over the knees of this unwieldy pot-belly. A comparison springs to my mind: there goes Puss in Boots!...

But, as I said, things suddenly begin to get very noisy within. Police Major Jakobi rushes out of the room in great haste with his helmet on and his chinstrap under his red face. Göring's hoarse voice booms after him: 'Shoot them down...Fetch a whole company...Shoot them down...Shoot...Shoot at once...Just shoot them down...Shoot...!' One can't begin to describe the blatant bloodthirstiness, the savage fury, the hideous vindictiveness, and yet at the same time the terror, the craven terror shown in this scene. Everyone senses, Someone has escaped who must not be allowed to escape, someone whose escape will undo the whole day's work....

The man thought to have got away was Gregor Strasser, Hitler's old colleague and rival. The rumour was untrue; Strasser was murdered all right. The purge was used by the Nazis to pay off a number of old scores. The former Bavarian State Commissioner, Gustav von Kahr, who had thwarted Hitler at the 1923 putsch, was murdered; so was General von Schleicher, who had tried to split the Nazi Party with the help of Strasser in 1932. Hitler also struck at his conservative and Catholic opponents. Papen himself was only placed under house arrest, but the author of his Marburg speech, the writer Edgar Jung, was murdered and so was his press officer, von Bose. The exact number of those murdered was probably not less than a hundred, and may have run into hundreds. It included Wilhelm Schmidt, the music critic of the Munich paper, *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, mistaken by the SS assassins for someone else.

The Army played a significant role in the affair. Not content to look on benevolently, it had actually provided arms and transport for the SS squads and had made preparations to counter any SA resistance. When it was all over, Blomberg, the Defence Minister, on 1 July publicly thanked Hitler in the name of the Army:

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The Führer with soldierly decision and exemplary courage has himself attacked and crushed the traitors and murderers. The Army, as the bearer of arms of the entire people, far removed from the conflicts of domestic politics, will show its

July 1934

gratitude through devotion and loyalty. The good relationship towards the new SA demanded by the Führer will be gladly fostered by the Army in the consciousness that the ideals of both are held in common. The state of emergency has come to an end everywhere.

The President also sent his good wishes by telegram on 2 July with a similar telegram to Göring. He was no longer capable of making an independent assessment of the situation. That he was prepared to lend his prestige to the purge was of considerable help to Hitler who had the task of persuading public opinion that it had been essential for the security of the State:

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I note from the reports I have received that through your decisive intervention and your courageous personal commitment you have nipped all the treasonable intrigues in the bud. You have saved the German nation from serious danger and for this I express to you my deeply felt gratitude and my sincere appreciation.

The Cabinet then retroactively legalised the purge:

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At the meeting of the Reich Cabinet on Tuesday 3 July, the Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, began by giving a detailed account of the origin and suppression of the high treason plot. The Reich Chancellor stressed that lightning action had been necessary, otherwise many thousands of people would have been in danger of being wiped out.

Defence Minister General von Blomberg thanked the Führer in the name of the Reich Cabinet and the army for his determined and courageous action, by which he had saved the German people from civil war. The Führer had shown greatness as a statesman and soldier. This had aroused in the hearts of the members of the Cabinet and of the whole German people a vow of service, devotion, and loyalty in this grave hour.

The Reich Cabinet then approved a law on measures for the self-defence of the State. Its single paragraph reads:

'The measures taken on 30 June and 1 and 2 July to suppress the acts of high treason are legal, being necessary for the self-defence of the State.'

Reich Minister of Justice Dr Gürtner commented that measures of self-defence taken before the imminent occurrence of a treasonable action should be considered not only legal but the duty of a statesman.

On 13 July 1934 Hitler justified his action in the Reichstag with a fictitious story of a plot:

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...Without once informing me and at a moment when I had no thought of any such action, Chief of Staff Röhm entered into relations with General Schleicher through an utterly corrupt and dishonest go-between, a certain Herr von A.⁶⁵ It was General Schleicher who spelt out the secret aims of Chief of Staff Röhm. It was he who gave concrete form to the ideas of the latter and maintained that:

1. The present regime in Germany is not to be tolerated.
2. Above all, the Army and all national associations must be united in a single band.
3. The only man to be considered for such a position is Chief of Staff Röhm.
4. Herr von Papen must be removed and he himself would be ready to take the position of Vice-Chancellor; moreover, further important changes must be made in the Cabinet of the Reich.

As usual in such cases, there began then the search for the men to form the new Government, always with the understanding that I myself should, at least for the time being, be left in the position which I now hold.

The carrying out of these proposals of General von Schleicher was bound, as soon as Point 2 was reached, to come up against my unalterable opposition. Considering either the facts or his personal character, I could never have consented to a change in the Reich Ministry of War or to the appointment of Chief of Staff Röhm to that Ministry.

Firstly: consider the facts. For fourteen years I have stated consistently that the fighting organisations of the Party are political institutions and have nothing to do with the Army. On the facts of the case I should consider it a disavowal of my own convictions and of my fourteen years of political life if I were now to summon the leader of the SA to the command of the Army. In November 1923 I proposed as the head of the Army not the man who was then leader of my SA, Captain Göring, but an officer.

Secondly: consider the question of human character. On this matter I could never have concurred in General von Schleicher's proposal. When these plans became known to me my view of Chief of Staff Röhm's personal worth was already such that as a man of conscience and for the sake of the Army I could then under no circumstances even think of admitting him to that post: the supreme head of the Army is none other than the Field-Marshal and President of the Reich. As Chancellor I have given my oath into his keeping. For all of us his person is inviolate. The promise I gave him that I would preserve the Army as a non-political instrument of the Reich I hold as binding, both from my innermost conviction and also from my pledged word. Furthermore, considering my personal relations with the Defence Minister of the Reich, any such act would have been impossible. Not only I myself but all of us are happy to recognise in him a man of honour from the crown of his head to the soles of his feet. He reconciled the Army with those who were once revolutionaries and has linked it up with their Government today and he has done this from his own deepest convictions. In the most genuine loyalty he has made his own the principle for which I myself will stand to my last breath.

⁶⁵ Werner von Alvensleben, an associate of Schleicher's.

July 20, 1934

In the State there is only one bearer of arms—the Army; there is only one bearer of the political will—the National Socialist Party...

In the meantime, Frick, the Reich Minister of the Interior, had seized his opportunity to eliminate the influence of the SA on the administration. This had been exercised officially through the special SA delegates (*Sonderbevollmächtigte*) appointed to supervise the various levels of administration under an order issued by Röhm on 12 May 1933. On 4 July 1934 Frick wrote to the new SA Chief of Staff, Viktor Lutze:

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Some time ago, the previous Chief of Staff ordered the appointment of special SA delegates and representatives to the State Governments and their subordinate offices. This institution has not proved in the least beneficial. The delegates and representatives have in many cases claimed powers to which they were not entitled and have interfered with and impeded the orderly conduct of business by the State apparatus. I therefore request that you recall the special delegates and representatives at once.

The State Governments have received a copy of this letter.

Less than a week later, on 10 July, Lutze abolished the institution of SA delegates to the State administration.

However, this victory of the State authorities in their battle to retain their authority and independence was to prove only temporary. A far greater threat to their power had emerged out of the Röhm 'putsch'—the SS. On 20 July 1934 Hitler repaid his debt to the SS for their role in the affair by separating them from the now emasculated SA and granting them the status of an independent organisation. The SS were to provide the regime with a much more effective weapon for social control. Whereas the SA terror had been spontaneous, arbitrary, crude and disruptive, the SS were to make use of techniques which were far more coordinated, systematic and sophisticated; in the service of the regime they were to make terror a bureaucratic weapon. Furthermore, whereas the SA had embarked on a fruitless attempt to control the State administration (from a position outside the bureaucracy) through the SA delegates, the SS had from the start adopted a policy of infiltrating the bureaucracy and taking over segments of the State apparatus, beginning with the political police. This tactic was to prove itself infinitely more successful:

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In view of highly meritorious service on the part of the SS, especially in connexion with the events of 30 June 1934, I elevate it to the status of an independent organisation within the NSDAP. The Reichsführer SS is therefore, like the Chief of Staff [of the SA], directly subordinate to the Supreme SS Führer. The Chief of Staff and the Reichsführer SS are both invested with the Party rank of Reichsleiter.

On 2 August 1934 President Hindenburg died. Immediately, the following law dated 1 August was promulgated. The Army and the Conservatives had repaid their debt to Hitler, who had saved them from the SA. Hitler had sacrificed the 'old fighters' to his major objective—internal mobilisation, to which political stability and economic recovery were essential. He was now officially Führer not only of the Party but also of the German people.

132

The Reich Government has enacted the following law which is hereby promulgated.

Section 1. The office of Reich President will be combined with that of Reich Chancellor. The existing authority of the Reich President will consequently be transferred to the Führer and Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler. He will select his deputy.

Section 2. This law is effective as of the time of the death of Reich President von Hindenburg.

The absolute control which Hitler now exercised over the State was reflected in the following oaths, introduced on 20 August. Significantly, they were taken to Hitler not as Head of the State, but as 'Führer of the German Reich and people', a totally new form of authority. The first stage in the 'seizure of power' was complete.

133

Article 1. The public officials and the soldiers of the armed forces must take an oath of loyalty on entering service.

Article 2.

1. The oath of loyalty of public officials will be:

'I swear: I shall be loyal and obedient to Adolf Hitler, the Führer of the German Reich and people, respect the laws, and fulfil my official duties conscientiously, so help me God.'

Aug 20, 1934

2. The oath of loyalty of the soldiers of the armed forces will be:

'I swear by God this sacred oath: I will render unconditional obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Führer of the German nation and people, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and will be ready as a brave soldier to risk my life at any time for this oath.'

Article 3. Officials already in service must swear the oath without delay according to Art. 2, number 1.

Hitler sent von Blomberg a message of thanks dated 20 August 1934:

134

Now, after the confirmation of the Law of 2 August by the German people, I wish to express my gratitude to you and through you to the Wehrmacht for your oath of loyalty to me as your leader and Commander-in-Chief. Just as the officers and men of the Wehrmacht pledge themselves to the new State in my person, so shall I always regard it as my highest duty to support the continued existence and inviolability of the armed forces in compliance with the testament of the late Field-Marshal [Hindenburg] and faithful to my own will to establish the Army firmly as the sole bearer of arms in the nation.

The attitude of the population to the Röhm affair varied. Some of the more educated people, particularly those with foreign sources of information, were horrified at what had happened. The propaganda of the Left in exile also made capital out of the crushing of the 'revolutionary' wing of the Nazi movement, though Nazi propaganda cleverly emphasised the involvement of 'reactionary elements' and made it appear as if it was these which had been crushed. The majority of people seem to have been relieved by what they saw as a timely lesson to the most undisciplined section of the Nazi movement. Hitherto they had comforted themselves with the belief that the Führer was not aware of the actions of these local Nazis and would not have approved if he had been. Now Hitler's measures over the Röhm affair seemed to confirm this judgement and they hoped that he would continue the purge through other Party organisations.

The following report of the Harburg-Wilhelmsburg Gestapo office of 5 July 1934 throws light on the attitude of the population to the purge:

135

In the month covered by this report the 30th of June naturally has pride of place. The measures proceeded smoothly in this area... Among the population at large, confidence in the Führer has been consolidated by his energetic action. There are, however, increasing requests for further energetic measures to be taken in the

1933

various Party organisations right down to the lowest levels, and in particular there are demands for liberation from 'the local Mussolinis'. If all the [Party] formations restricted themselves to the tasks delegated to them by the Führer instead of giving orders to the governmental authorities, the whole population could long ago have been filled with the spirit of National Socialism—in particular, with a sense of responsibility, cleanliness and discipline. It is essential that the Führer's announcement regarding the purging of the SA⁶⁶ should be acted upon by all Party organisations...

One hard core SA man later reflected on his post-January 1933 experience of the events as follows:

136

That was not an SA any more. All those with money or a degree went into the SS and all the rest came into the SA on the basis of the motto: I must join otherwise... This dilution was terrible. Ernst Röhm was stupid in thinking after 1933 that he now had a tremendous power base. The SA had swollen enormously and he relied on that—but it could not be effective...

We were only waiting for Röhm to carry on the revolution, the social revolution... We thought: we created that, we prepared the way, why shouldn't we carry on with it. We were strong enough in those days to influence the party. We simply laughed at the party members running around in their uniforms after 1933. The 'officials' or whatever they called themselves—we didn't take them seriously. The politicians, these party functionaries were not at all popular with us. Party politics were suspect. And they made such a big thing of themselves: 'We define the political objectives'. We couldn't take that. A twit running around in a brown uniform and he is to define our political objectives and we are to carry out his political will!

We were the *fighting troop*. And we didn't want anyone to take over from us. In May, six weeks before the 'Röhm putsch' Röhm was here in Hamburg—there was a big parade—he made a very clever speech: 'They shouldn't imagine they will escape the night of the long knives', he said. *Röhm*

After the disgusting events at Wiessee that was the end of it for me. And not only for me. It had become pointless. Earlier on we had the Strassers, in Berlin we had Stennes and at the end we put our faith in Röhm...

What I can't understand is that after the murders in Wiessee the SA let itself be stripped of power so easily. Simply fizzled out. But by then most of the SA had got jobs. The hunt for jobs was on: an SA man could become a gas man, a state employee. One got a job with the Welfare Office, another with the Job Centre. Many had been unemployed and now they had work... Most of them lost much of their revolutionary élan. The real revolutionaries drew the consequences and got out. Resigned to it...

⁶⁶ This announcement of 2 July 1934 consisted of twelve points laid down by Hitler for the reorganisation of the SA.

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Goebbels 1934

approaches, he rents a secluded, idyllic little property at Cladow on the Wannsee lakeshore.²⁶ She often accompanies him to lunch with Hitler now, and the Führer is a surprisingly frequent visitor to her in the clinic. Goebbels meanwhile pursues his old ways, inviting Hela Strehl and Petra Fiedler on boating jaunts on the city's lakes and waterways, and taking them back to the cottage for late-night private film showings.²⁷ On April 12 after a farewell meal with him Magda is taken off to the clinic for the birth of their second child. 'Hope it's a boy,' prays Dr Goebbels, only to open the next day's entry with a surly outburst: 'It's a girl and her name's Hilde. At first it brought disappointment, but then joy and happiness. . . . Once more the Führer has proven right. It's a little girl.'²⁸ The unhappy task of breaking the news to Goebbels has fallen to his adjutant, Prince Schaumburg-Lippe. 'If fate thinks it can play silly pranks on me,' snaps the minister, stalking up and down in irritation, 'it's got another think coming!' He hurries over to the clinic and finds Magda lying flushed but happy surrounded by pillows and flowers.

The rows resume. 'Armed truce with Magda,' Goebbels laconically notes in his diary after one two-day tiff which ends with him going for a little drive-around.²⁹ Documenting her irritation with him, Magda stays on with Ello at Dresden after he leaves. Out at Cladow on June 2 he plays with Helga, his favorite daughter, but his pleasure is alloyed by the presence of Magda's very plebeian mother. 'I'm cheesed off by all this,' he notes in his diary. 'I'm often very depressed. I've got to work harder.'³⁰ He falls seriously ill with worry, and there are more almost suffocating rows with Magda—a certain countess is the cause of some of them.³¹ On Wednesday June 20 the entire Reich government has been summoned out to Göring's new estate on the Schorf Heath, Carinhall, to witness the solemn reburial—'with much Twilight of the Gods and Tally-Ho,' as Goebbels sardonically puts it—of Carin Göring's remains, which have been violated in Sweden.³² Late that evening he is confronted by Magda with an ugly scene—perhaps about the countess. He puts a spin on it in his diary: 'In the evening I learn something awful from Magda. It's midnight, but I drive out to Cladow. Frightful scene. I am quite shattered.' The next day he keeps thinking of Magda: 'I'm fit to burst. Awful mental agonies.' Magda joins him later and dissolves into tears and hysterics. 'Au fond,' he writes, setting the scene for future readers, 'she is good. I bear much of the blame too. A bitter pill to bite. A gray, rainy day today. Deep down, we have separated.' On Friday the twenty-third, a nervous wreck, he has a long, late discussion with the lovely Hela Strehl, then settles his differences with Magda. 'She finds her way back to me. But I am more than a little to blame myself.' History would of course like to know more about these differences: his infidelities? hers? We do not know and cannot speculate: But one lesson is that the Goebbels Diary is becoming more tricky as a source with each year that passes.

POLITICALLY too his quagmire deepened. Those who offended the minister joined Ehm Welk in concentration camp: There was Dr Jacob

April 12

June 20.

23.

1934

May 19

Wassermann, the Jewish nephew of the onetime director of the Deutsche Bank, sent to Oranienburg camp for slandering Goebbels and Magda; there was an engineer who remarked casually that Goebbels was 'Germany's hoodoo'; there was a former Stahlhelm official, convicted for insulting Goebbels.³³ 'Anybody may grumble,' mocked *Angriff* on May 18, 'if he's not afraid of the concentration camp.' Operating primarily from the safety of Prague, the émigrés around Dr Bernhard ('Isidor') Weiss orchestrated a raucous outcry about alleged Nazi atrocities: They claimed that two Jews had died in a pogrom at Gunzenhausen, and that the former Social Democrat deputy Heilmann was being maltreated in concentration camp. The stories were fictional, but fact would inevitably follow fiction.³⁴ Ingeniously, the émigrés paraded a live Nazi 'victim' in Prague for pathologists to see his 'strangulation' marks. The Czech newspapers headlined this gruesome stunt 'ENTER A HANGED MAN.' (The Gestapo finally identified the alleged victim as a notorious communist confidence trickster.)³⁵ Goebbels reprimanded the Czech envoy, and Prague promised to silence the émigrés.³⁶

Goebbels was aware that even his powers were limited. When a Mrs Ebeling asked him to get somebody out of prison, he refused. 'I'm not going to burn my fingers,' he noted privately.³⁷

THROUGHOUT this time he had turned a deaf ear to the growing internal unrest generated by the inequities of the Nazi revolution. The S.A. were once again in revolutionary ferment, and he broadly sympathized. But Hitler needed the regular armed forces more than he needed the S.A., the party's two-million-strong Brownshirt army. Not caring to offend the stormtroopers he was putting out ambiguous signals which Goebbels was not alone in misinterpreting. Hearing Hitler declare to the assembled gauleiters in Berlin in February 1934 that there were still 'fools' around who argued that the revolution was not yet complete,³⁸ Goebbels nodded approvingly; he did not realize that Hitler was talking about the S.A.

1934

To Goebbels, the unseen enemy throughout the first six months of 1934 was the diehard *Reaktion*, a word which embraced the conservative politicians, journalists, intellectuals, reserve officers, and the catholic clergy but never, it must be pointed out, the S.A.³⁹ 'The *Reaktion*,' he told a working-class audience in Berlin's Lustgarten, 'are putting on airs right across the country. But if they imagine we captured these high offices for *them*, or that we're just keeping them warm for them, they're very much mistaken.'⁴⁰

The young minister found strong support in the now expanding armed forces. Impressed by an ideological lecture in the defense ministry at the end of November 1933, the new minister General Werner von Blomberg had persuaded Goebbels to address officers based at Jüterbog; the official record shows that his remarks were greeted with 'storms of applause, ending with a hooray for the minister.'⁴¹ He spoke too to officers at Dresden, Hanover, Kiel, and Wilhelmshaven.⁴² As tensions grew between the army and the S.A., particularly in Silesia, Blomberg asked Goebbels

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In all these s that only the r Germany.⁴⁵ Bu command as we had he appoint For all his profe to get along with Heines, the poli Reichstag fire tri roaring with lat Count von Hellc companion abor presided over a banners and uni to believe,' he in That all this wa: whom we owe th

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to arrange a second tour; but when he spoke in the Silesian capital Breslau on March 15 he insisted on the presence of the local S.A. and S.S. officers as well.⁴³ His fame spread among the army officers. In April he spoke in Frankfurt-on-Oder and Stettin. General Walther von Brauchitsch, the commanding general in Königsberg, persuaded him to address seven thousand of his officers and men too. To all of these audiences Goebbels explained the party's ideology, the nature of revolutions, the Jewish problem, and the relationship between the party, army, and state.⁴⁴

In all these speeches, slavishly adhering to Hitler's line, he confirmed that only the regular soldier had a 'sovereign right' to bear arms for Germany.⁴⁵ But he had nursed his own relations with the S.A. high command as well—ever since the Stennes putsch of 1930. Not for nothing had he appointed an S.A. officer, Schaumburg-Lippe, as his adjutant. For all his professed loathing of the homosexual cliques, he had learned to get along with Ernst Röhm and with S.A. Obergruppenführer Edmund Heines, the police chief in Breslau; indeed, he had testified during the Reichstag fire trial that he had spent a recent election evening with Heines roaring with laughter about the lies about them in the *Brown Book*.⁴⁶ Count von Helldorff, now police chief in Potsdam, was a regular cruising companion aboard his yacht.⁴⁷ On February 24 a glowing Dr Goebbels presided over a Sport Palace display by the Berlin S.A. at which the banners and uniforms of the prohibition era were paraded. 'Is the world to believe,' he intoned in his speech, 'that we have forgotten all of this? That all this was for nothing? No! The Führer knows, as do we all, to whom we owe this Third Reich.'⁴⁸

And why should he not utter sentiments like these? Hitler too was still fraternizing closely with Röhm. He had appointed him to Cabinet rank in December, written cordial New Year's greetings to both Goebbels and Röhm, and shared with both men his innermost thoughts on foreign policy during a train journey to Munich on January 1, 1934. If anything, Goebbels was marginally more critical of Hitler—impatient at his continued lethargy in foreign affairs and Reich reform. 'We're not making any headway at all,' he wrote in March. 'Hitler doesn't want to hurt anybody. But there's no other way.'⁴⁹ On the eve of Hitler's birthday in April, however, Goebbels privately prayed: 'God save our Führer. He's everything to us. Happiness, hope, and future.'⁵⁰ Goebbels could not overlook Hitler's infatuation with Röhm—perhaps his only protection in the increasingly shark-infested waters of the Third Reich. Goebbels used more old-fashioned methods to win Hitler's affection too: He donated 'a wonderful Bechstein' piano to him for his new official residence⁵¹ and brought him all the latest American movies, particularly those starring John Barrymore.⁵² Visiting Dresden for the national theater week at the end of May 1934 with his own new female outside interest, the beautiful dark-blond Baroness Sigrid von Laffert, Hitler would invite only the Goebbels couple to share dinner with them at the Bellevue hotel, and they stayed up until three A.M. talking politics.⁵³

March 15

Jan 2,
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May
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May (1934)

Goebbels had seen nothing wrong in fraternizing with Röhm. When a wrangle had developed that spring between Magda and ex-husband Günther Quandt over the custody of Harald,⁵⁴ he canvassed Röhm's backing as well as Hitler's and Göring's, and he noted one evening, 'Röhm makes a magnificent speech about the S.A.'⁵⁵ He had obviously still not singled out any one enemy. Late in April he tilted briefly at the catholic church, warning its functionaries in a speech to eighty thousand people in Düsseldorf: 'You gentlemen should not believe that you can deceive us by wearing the mask of piety. We've seen right through you.'⁵⁶ Visiting Hitler with Himmler and Pfeffer on April 27, Goebbels was interested only in securing decisions in his fight against 'sabotage' by the church; he got Hitler to authorize a fight against the opposition Emergency League of Clergymen on Friday May 4.⁵⁷ But Hitler's heart was not in it, and when Hindenburg now fell ill he urged Goebbels to go easy on the church, as it would only cost the Nazis public sympathy.⁵⁸

On May 5 however he noted for the first time in his unpublished diary that the S.A. were causing trouble in Berlin and elsewhere. He felt that they lacked a clear objective.⁵⁹ Visiting Hitler on May 17 to discuss film business, he found himself taken aside to listen to Hitler griping about Röhm and his personnel policies. Hitler mentioned too the homosexual scandals. Puzzled by this shift in emphasis to the S.A., Goebbels noted afterward: 'Disgusting! But why isn't anything done about it?' Still floundering, he went on to warn Hitler about monarchists. A few days later Count von Helldorff brought him more worries about the S.A.. 'Röhm's not doing too well,' wrote Goebbels. 'He's causing too many conflicts. He's not on such good terms with the Führer either.' Goebbels decided—at least for his diary's eyes—to stand by Hitler: 'He is our bulwark. We must not despair.' On May 21, 1934 he mentioned his worries to Magda—'About the situation and public mood. Neither all that rosy. Magda,' he continued, 'is very shrewd and loyal to me.'⁶⁰ Twice in May he had talks with Gruppenführer Karl Ernst, the doomed S.A. commander in Berlin: After running into him on the seventh he noted, 'He acts very nice'—the emphasis being on the verb;⁶¹ on the twenty-sixth, after Ernst came to complain about friction with the regular armed forces, Goebbels recorded: 'I don't trust him any longer. He's a bit too friendly.'

In Dresden the S.A. had staged a magnificent march-past for Hitler and Goebbels.⁶² But Hitler had already resolved to purge the S.A. leadership. Goebbels saw him on June 1. 'He no longer really trusts the S.A. leadership,' he recorded. 'We must all be on our guard. Don't start feeling too secure. Be prepared at all times. Nothing escapes the Führer's notice. Even if he doesn't say anything. Röhm [is] the prisoner of the men around him.'⁶³

Goebbels opted for neither side. His own position was precarious. Unlike Himmler or Göring, he had no private army; he also had no real friends. While in 1932, at a typical get-together of battle- and bottle-scarred party veterans in Berlin, Count von Helldorff's arrival had been

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May/June 1934

greeted with silence, a 'storm of applause' had gone up before Goebbels could get inside the hall.⁶⁴ But his popularity now was substantially less. The Nazi minister of agriculture wrote scathingly of him in private as did Alfred Rosenberg, who noticed how the other gauleiters hated the commercial success of Goebbels' *Kaiserhof*.⁶⁵ Nobody liked his methods. Rosenberg wrote to Hess protesting that Goebbels would not allow him to broadcast, and was muscling into culture, which had been Rosenberg's territory for fourteen years.⁶⁶ On May 1 Hitler upset them both, by appointing the former gauleiter of Hanover, the suffocatingly narrow-minded Bernhard Rust, as minister for science, culture, and public education. Creating such rivalries was precisely the way that Hitler instinctively worked.

During June these rivals jockeyed for allies. Goebbels made common cause with Göring. He had noted that on New Year's Day Hitler had not written to the general at all ('out with him!' he had gloated).⁶⁷ He had also heard Hitler crack jokes at Göring's expense behind his back.⁶⁸ But now Hitler advised him to patch up his differences with Göring; he had read the proofs of *Kaiserhof*, and advised Goebbels to tone down one or two passages and insert a paragraph praising the general. 'It will be worth your while,' advised Hitler cynically.⁶⁹ Evidently touched by the (published) references in *Kaiserhof*, Göring now wrote a conciliatory letter to Goebbels, offering him his friendship again.

A STIFLING gray uniformity had descended by now on the abashed and apprehensive German press. Acres of space were devoted to the obligatory reporting of Dr Goebbels' aimless and opaque speaking campaign during May 1934 against 'grouzers and fault-finders, rumor-mongers and dead-beats, saboteurs and troublemakers.'⁷⁰ He flailed against ill-defined enemies in a speech delivered to fifty thousand Silesians at Gleiwitz on June 6, talking of the 'cowardly carpers at their beer tables,' and about 'the heroes who today are too elegant to go marching with an S.A. Sturm themselves, but stand on the curbside registering all their petty misdemeanors and excesses.'⁷¹ Among other specific enemies identified by him were the Center politicians and militant churchmen.

His campaign blundered on toward its climax—coincidentally set for June 30. His speeches still ignored the S.A., on the party's left, and lambasted only the *Reaktion* on the right, the churches, the conservative elite, the exclusive Herrenklub and its principal member the vice-chancellor Baron Franz von Papen. 'The Nazis,' wrote one shrewd American correspondent, seeking to rationalize Goebbels' puzzling campaign, 'know that they cannot stand still. Their movement is like a bicycle—if it stands still it falls.' He deduced that the Goebbels campaign was a smoke screen to cover a gradual cutback in the two million S.A. stormtroopers.⁷²

This was close to the mark. By early June Ernst Röhm was fostering talk of a 'second revolution.' Hanfstaengel would comment on how Goebbels had recently declared that the Nazi revolution was by no means

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over, and that 'reactionaries' would be swept away by the will of the masses.⁷³ Perhaps Goebbels was hedging his bets—half conniving with Röhm, as once he had with Captain Stennes in Berlin. According to Otto Strasser, never the most reliable of sources, at some time during June 1934 Goebbels had a private rendezvous with Röhm in his 'local,' the Munich Bratwurstglöckl tavern; Strasser's only evidence for this was however the liquidation of Karl Zehnter, the bar's owner, in the coming purge. Goebbels certainly spoke in Munich's Künstlerhaus on June 4, but his diary makes no mention of Röhm or the tavern.⁷⁴ The ubiquitous Bella Fromm also claimed that Goebbels met with Röhm that day.⁷⁵ British diplomats went further: They learned late in June that Goebbels had been backing an attack by Röhm on the armed forces clique, hoping that Göring might 'finally be eliminated.' Later however he had backtracked, fearing to jeopardize his relations with Hitler.⁷⁶

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ONE small episode during June 1934 showed that Goebbels was still anxious to enlarge his personal reputation. Envious of recent visits by Göring to Italy and the Balkans, Goebbels secured an invitation to stage the first visit by a member of Hitler's cabinet to Poland, although Poland's great game reserves would have made the huntsman Göring the more obvious choice.⁷⁷ His diary shows that Hitler was seriously alarmed by the prospect that an 'intransigent' France might invade Germany to prevent further violations of the Versailles treaty; Germany needed to ensure that Poland and Italy stayed out.⁷⁸

June 13.

Goebbels flew to Poland for two days on the thirteenth to a chorus of protests from the country's socialist and Jewish newspapers (Jews made up one-tenth of Poland's and one-third of Warsaw's population). Lecturing an invited audience including the Polish prime minister, his Cabinet, and many ambassadors, Goebbels reassured them that National Socialism was not for export, and repeated that Germany desired rapprochement.⁷⁹ He had consulted Hitler and foreign minister Baron Konstantin von Neurath closely on the text of this speech.⁸⁰ Afterward he drove round Warsaw, and saw the Jewish quarter ('stinking and filthy. The eastern Jews. There they are.') He had meetings with Marshal Piłsudski and foreign minister Beck, then flew on to Kraków. At the same time Hitler had been to Venice to meet Mussolini on a similar mission.

Back in Germany Goebbels resumed his round of 'grouser' speeches—in Freiburg ('I get quite nostalgic. Here I lived, loved, and suffered') and Gera.⁸¹ At Gera Hitler confided to him the outcome of his first talks with Mussolini:

1. Austria. Out with Dollfuss! New elections under a neutral man of confidence. Influence of Nazis depending on number of votes. Economic issues to be resolved jointly by Rome and Berlin. Both are agreed. Dollfuss will be notified.

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2. Disarmament: Mussolini fully endorses our position. 'France has gone mad.' He'll back us.

3. The East: we must build further on friendship with Poland. (*Vide* my visit). Seek a *modus vivendi* with Russia.⁸²

Hitherto unpublished entries like these give the Goebbels diaries a historical importance that far transcends their narrower biographical value.

On their return to Berlin that evening Goebbels learned that Vice-Chancellor von Papen had delivered an amazing speech attacking him at Marburg university; Papen also spoke of the public's revulsion at the S.A., expressed veiled support for a monarchy, and sided with those whom Goebbels called the 'whiners and whiners.' 'A genius,' said Papen, in a pointed criticism of Goebbels himself, 'is never created by propaganda.' A transcript of Papen's words reached Goebbels' villa that evening. His adjutant found him in a blue dressing gown and a tantrum, hurling clothes-hangers downstairs. 'I'll teach this scoundrel a lesson,' he was screaming. 'Humiliating me like this!' On Hitler's instructions—or so he claimed in his diary—he ordered the speech suppressed at once. It was almost too late, as his ministry's foreign desk had already released it and the *Frankfurter Zeitung* had already plated it up. Annoyed that a junior minister had suppressed his speech, Papen threatened to resign. Hitler undertook to censure Goebbels.⁸³

The Papen speech was a slap in the face for Goebbels. On June 21 he presided over the monthly tea party for the foreign press and listened in delight to the Reichsbank governor Dr Schacht's witty speech; his grin vanished as Papen arrived uninvited, nonchalantly planted himself in Schacht's vacant chair just to his left, and sat nodding affably to the journalists.⁸⁴ He repaid Papen at his gau's midsummer festival that night in Neukölln, delivering another speech against the ludicrous armchair critics who had been too weak to seize power themselves.⁸⁵ Although he mentioned by name the Crown Prince, whose hand he wrongly suspected behind the Marburg speech, the foreign journalists recognized his real target as Papen. Hitler told him on the twenty-second that he had seen through his vice-chancellor: 'He's caused himself a heap of trouble.'

For the next week Goebbels continued to fulminate about Papen and the Marburg speech—to Ruhr coalminers, to Berlin civil servants, and to his diary. Papen enjoyed every minute of Goebbels' discomfiture. Sunday June 24 found them both at the Hamburg Derby. According to Papen's account, when the more expensive racegoers sighted him, sporting a light gray top hat, there were cheers of 'Heil Marburg!' Goebbels, pink-faced and piqued, flaunted himself before the cheaper galleries; the workers' applause turned to cheers when they sighted Papen however. 'This fellow Papen,' Goebbels told his deputy gauleiter Görlitzer, 'is getting too big for his boots.'⁸⁶ Thus Papen's account; Goebbels' unpublished diary puts a very different spin on the episode: 'Derby. One

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24.

big mess. Public sharply against Papen. Hard put to avoid a scandal. Ambassadors there. Embarrassing scene. At the end together with Papen. Public totally on my side. I walk right into their midst. These ovations! Poor Herrenklub, if it ever comes to the crunch.⁸⁷ Licking his wounds and seeking scapegoats, the next day Goebbels had the entire racecourse management sacked.⁸⁸

On June 22 he had delivered his stock speech against the *Reaktion* to a gigantic audience of two hundred thousand in Halle.⁸⁹ He repeated this theme at Duisburg and Essen on the twenty-fourth. 'There are,' he explained at Essen, 'the *reserve officers*, the *intellectuals*, the *journalists*, the *clergymen*. You need a sharp eye to detect this type of person. . . . The public has got to see through this clique.'⁹⁰ These words caused uproar among those classes thus branded by Goebbels. After the coming bloody events showed that he had been way off-target, he was forced to issue what he called an 'unabridged' text of what he had said, making plain he was referring only to those who *put on the airs* of reserve officers, intellectuals, journalists, and clergymen; he had not been referring to those worthies themselves. He had had no intention of attacking the actual people named, only the renegades whom they had already cast out of their ranks.⁹¹ If all of this verbiage proved anything, it was that Goebbels still had no idea of which of many windmills he was supposed to be tilting at.

HITLER had his sights on clearly defined if very different prey. Deferring to the regular army generals, he had decided to decapitate the S.A. On June 22 he summoned Viktor Lutze by plane from Hanover, swore him to secrecy, and told him that the Gestapo had informed him that Röhm was plotting against the 'reactionary' Reichswehr on the pretext that it was conspiring against the Führer and the S.A. He was going to retire Röhm, he said; Lutze, a reliable if colorless S.A. commander, was to stand by for orders.⁹²

Goebbels knew nothing of any S.A. 'plot.' His target was still Franz von Papen.⁹³ 'There is a ferment afoot,' he wrote on June 27. 'The Reichswehr is not quite clean. Führer's too good-natured. Hess has made a good broadcast, against revolution. Siding strongly with Führer, veiled attack on Papen. Latter's calmly carrying on his intrigues. His [Marburg] speech was drafted by E[dgar] Jung.' Compromising letters, Goebbels learned, had been found. 'We must watch out. If things get critical, then hit hard.'⁹⁴ Lunching at the chancellery on June 26 he found Hitler on the alert too.⁹⁵

After gossiping with Hitler on Wednesday June 27, Goebbels left for engagements in Kiel. He was still none the wiser. Writing that Friday he would recall vaguely that the situation had deteriorated. 'The Führer must act. Otherwise the *Reaktion*'—which he still did not identify—'will get out of hand.'⁹⁶ In Kiel he found 'universal concern about the *Reaktion*,' and 'embitterment within the Reichswehr.' The public, he felt, was waiting for them to do something. Flanked by his adjutant Schaumburg-

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Lippe, himself an S.A. Sturmführer, Goebbels delivered his stock 'whinger' speech to eighty thousand people in and outside the North Baltic Hall in Kiel.⁹⁷

Back in Berlin later that Wednesday he again noted that Papen's seditious Marburg speech had been written for him by Jung, whom the Gestapo had now arrested.⁹⁸ Later Karl Hanke brought him the latest equally seditious catholic pastoral letter. 'Now,' wrote Goebbels, still wholly misjudging Hitler's intentions, 'let's go for them.'⁹⁹

Hitler had gone to Essen for Gauleiter Terboven's wedding to Ilse Stahl, an old flame of Goebbels'. He was on the brink of committing his first mass murder. On Thursday Goebbels took the afternoon off at Cladow. 'Gloomier and gloomier,' he recorded, adding the vague and helpless comment: 'The *Reaktion* is at work everywhere.' After a cruise with Magda and the children out on the summery lake, he went downtown to speak at Spandau. 'Talked tough and grim,' he said. 'The people understand.' He drove back out to Cladow. 'How much longer?' he exclaimed in his diary, writing the next day as the uncertainties suddenly began to clear.¹⁰⁰

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To consolidate his absolute authority, Hitler was about to become a murderer, and Goebbels would finally cast his lot in with him. They suddenly needed each other urgently: Hitler feared that Goebbels might yet rally the S.A. against him—for they were indeed plotting an uprising, though not yet; Goebbels for his part had so many enemies that he felt safe only at his Führer's side.

In Essen strange things were happening that Thursday June 28, 1934. Lutze saw Hitler called away from the wedding feast to the telephone. A clammy atmosphere, an atmosphere of mistrust, descended on the festivities. Lutze felt that people were setting Hitler up.² More phone calls came, from Himmler, from the Gestapo, and from Paul Körner in Berlin (Körner presided over Göring's nationwide telephone-tapping monopoly, the Forschungsamt).³ Hours later, dapper and businesslike, Körner arrived in person, bringing more reports. These indicated that Röhm and the S.A. were planning to putsch at four P.M. on Saturday.⁴ Hitler snapped: 'I'm going to make an example of them!'⁵ He phoned Röhm's adjutant at Bad Wiessee, and ordered a meeting there at eleven A.M.

With Hitler in the Ruhr, Dr Goebbels felt very vulnerable, but the Führer had not forgotten him. On Friday morning June 29, 1934 he phoned Dr Goebbels from Essen and summoned him to the Hotel Dreesen at Bad Godesberg that evening. ('Thus,' sneered Alfred Rosenberg a few days later, 'he was allowed to join the big boys.')

'So—it's on,' Goebbels wrote, probably quoting Hitler's words, though still in the dark about precisely what it was.⁷ 'In God's name!' he added. 'But anything is better than this awful waiting.'⁸ Hitler also ordered his new private secretary, Christa Schroeder, twenty-five, to fly west to Godesberg in Goebbels' plane.

Goebbels, wearing a lightweight white summer coat, was met by the local Nazi gauleiter Grohé at the airfield. 'We've got to act,' agreed Goebbels—whose unpublished diary of these days' grim events has now been obtained by this author from the secret Moscow archives: it shows him taking a detached interest in the massacre, thrilled to be so close to the killing though relieved not to have wielded the murder instruments himself. Goebbels drove to the Hotel Dreesen, followed by Hitler ('he is very grim') at four P.M. Shortly, Viktor Lutze also arrived. Lutze and Goebbels had been friends since the early days in the Ruhr. Other veteran

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June 30, 1934

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Nazis gradually crowded onto the hotel terraces. Hitler, noted Goebbels, told him in detail what was going on. To his astonishment he learned that the Führer was about to act the next day, Saturday, not against the conservative *Reaktion*, but against Röhm and his Brownshirt rebels. Not for a moment did he betray his dismay that Hitler was proving more reactionary than the *Reaktion* itself. 'Drawing blood,' recorded Goebbels approvingly: 'Gotta realize that mutiny costs them their neck. I agree with this. If do it you must, then ruthlessly. Proofs that Röhm was conspiring with [the French ambassador] François-Poncet, Schleicher, and Strasser. So, action!'⁹ Goebbels recalled: 'After reaching his decision the Führer is very calm. We pass the hours in discussions. Nobody must notice a thing. Talk with Lutze, the new [S.A.] chief of staff. He's very good.' For a while they watched a tattoo by the Labour Service. As six hundred torchbearers marked out a fiery swastika on the far bank of the Rhine, they watched the sun set, and waited in Hitler's suite. 'The Führer,' noted Goebbels, 'is tense but very firm. We all keep silent.' Toward midnight there was a phone call from Berlin—both Lutze and Goebbels recorded it. 'The rebels are arming themselves,' wrote Goebbels. 'Not a moment to be lost.' Hitler went pale, and announced: 'We're on our way.'¹⁰ Goebbels sent a message to Magda to take the children from the Cladow cottage to the safety of their ministerial villa in Berlin; he ordered police protection for them.

It was now June 30, 1934. Shortly before two A.M. their plane took off for Munich. The broad outline of subsequent events that Saturday is well known. Hitler informed Goebbels of his intention to arrest Ernst Röhm and the mutinous S.A. commanders; Goebbels, prudently, decided to say nothing on their behalf. After touching down at Oberwiesenfeld airfield at four A.M., Hitler received further alarming reports from the army and S.S.—Röhm's rivals for power—that in Munich and Berlin S.A. units had been alerted hours before and had ordered a full mobilization for that afternoon. Panicked by these (probably exaggerated) reports Hitler took his party to the Bavarian ministry of the interior building. Here he stripped two sleepy-eyed S.A. generals of their badges and sent out S.S. squads to pick up other S.A. commanders from their hotels and trains on their arrival. Gripped by paranoia he announced that he proposed to set off at once to arrest Röhm. In three open Mercedes limousines the size of small trucks, provided by Gauleiter Wagner, he and his posse sallied forth at five-thirty A.M.—Hitler, Lutze, and Hess riding in the first car, a bunch of detectives in the second, and Goebbels and one of Wagner's men in the third.

Out at Wiessee Röhm was vacationing in the lakefront Hotel Hänselbauer. He was awakened in his Room 21 by Hitler himself, a loaded pistol gripped in his hand, screaming: 'You are a traitor!' Goebbels and Lutze said nothing as Röhm, ashen-faced, was led away. They found Edmund Heines, aged thirty-six, sharing Room 31 with a youth, which made it easy for Goebbels to draw odious conclusions. ('May I be excused,' he would say in his broadcast the next day, 'from rendering a

description of the loathsome and almost nauseating sights that met our eyes.) He wrote in his diary: 'The chief was brilliant. Heines pitiful. With a rent boy. Röhm remained calm. Everything went off very smoothly.' As Heines too was dragged away, he appealed: 'Lutze, I've done nothing! Help me!'

A chartered omnibus took away the arrested S.A. officers. Hitler's limousine convoy followed, making a prudent detour to the south in case the S.A. had summoned help. Safely back at party HQ in Munich, Hitler ordered the codeword phoned through to Göring in Berlin to trigger the purge in Prussia. Later that morning, addressing a bewildered audience of middle-ranking S.A. officers, he laid it on thick about Röhm's murky financial dealings, his opulent HQ in Berlin, and his treacherous dealings with an unnamed 'foreign power.' To those around him he revealed that some of the arrested men were to be shot. The Gestapo showed Lutze a list of names; Lutze thoughtfully noticed that several were already marked *. Hitler proposed however to spare Röhm, a former close friend. Hess argued that there was no justice in sparing Röhm if others were to be executed. Lutze, asked his view, evaded clear comment.¹¹ Röhm's was however the only one not checked on the list of seven names which Hitler handed at five P.M. to Sepp Dietrich, commander of his S.S. bodyguard. The six others faced a firing squad at Munich's Stadelheim prison later that day.

Goebbels' contribution to these shocking events is not recorded. They had been mirrored in Berlin. Operating from Göring's villa, Himmler, Göring, and the army's general Walter von Reichenau had settled many old scores while Blomberg and General Werner von Fritsch looked in from time to time. Franz von Papen had been spared—to Goebbels' annoyance—but he learned that afternoon that Papen's speechwriter Edgar Jung and his senior aides Herbert von Bose and Erich Klausener had been shot in cold blood and that Berlin's S.A. commander Karl Ernst had been shot by firing squad. The orgy of murder had embraced even General Kurt von Schleicher, Hitler's predecessor as chancellor, and Gregor Strasser, once Goebbels' most powerful rival in Berlin.¹² 'Strafgericht,' was his only terse comment: judgment day. At eight P.M. he flew back to Berlin with Hitler. Witnesses said that he looked like death as their Junkers plane landed at Tempelhof airfield two hours later. Göring met them and nonchalantly told Hitler he had somewhat expanded on the original hit list. Hitler was not pleased by this. 'Göring reports that all went to plan in Berlin,' recorded Goebbels. 'Only cock-up: Mrs Schleicher bought it too. Tough, but can't be helped.'¹³

Back at the chancellery, Hitler vanished to take a bath, after which he revealingly told his secretary, 'Now I feel clean as a new born babe again!'¹⁴

THE NEXT DAY, Sunday July 1, 1934 Goebbels found that Hitler's reputation had soared.¹⁵ But over lunch he found the Führer pale and consumed by bitterness. 'Göring tenders his report. Executions almost over.

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A few still needed. It's tough but necessary. Ernst, Strasser, Senle [Stempfle?], Detten †. One final sweep and we're through the worst. It's tough but can't be avoided. For twenty years there must be peace. He spent the whole afternoon with Hitler. 'I cannot leave him on his own,' reported Goebbels. 'He's suffering badly, but hanging tough. The death sentences are pronounced with the utmost gravity. Around sixty all told.'

Yielding to his more bloodthirsty colleagues' pressure Hitler ordered his friend Ernst Röhm—still in a Munich prison cell—added to the list. 'Twice,' recorded Goebbels, 'Röhm is given twenty minutes alone with a pistol. He doesn't use it and is then shot. With that, it's all over.'

That evening Goebbels broadcast his own version worldwide for twenty minutes his own version of the purge. In the script he placed himself carefully right at the Führer's side throughout—in intimate, unchallengeable proximity. He spared no nasty detail about Röhm & Co. They had brought discredit to 'our S.A.' indeed: 'They were about to bring the entire party leadership into disrepute by their sordid and disgusting sexual abnormality.' Hitler had lanced the abscess, he said; nor did he stint his praise for the S.S.¹⁶ 'The Führer was very nice to me and Magda,' observed Goebbels in his diary. 'As was Göring, who was around all day.'

A stream of fresh news. [Sepp] Dietrich reports on the executions. A bit white about the gills. 'We're not cut out to be executioners.' On Monday July 2 Hitler told him the final toll of executed was sixty—'terrible losses,' wrote Goebbels, without explaining the adjective; Hindenburg however had sent a 'fabulous' telegram, congratulating Hitler on having saved Germany. 'For God's sake,' recorded Goebbels, 'let's have an end to the shooting. And the S.A. must not be too humiliated, above all not by the police.'¹⁷ He returned to this theme, his concern about the S.A., several times in his diaries.¹⁸ Relaxing with Count von Helldorff later that evening at the Goebbels villa, Hitler sighted Goebbels' adjutant Prince Schaumburg-Lippe in his S.A. uniform and asked curiously: 'And where did you spend Saturday?' The prince replied that he had been on duty at the ministry. 'You're lucky,' remarked Hitler. 'I doubt I could have spared you otherwise.'¹⁹

In Cabinet on Tuesday July 3 Hitler explained that firm action had been necessary, and took full responsibility for 'forty-three' executions. General von Blomberg, speaking for all of them, welcomed his action. Goebbels said nothing.²⁰ Papen arrived halfway through, belatedly released from house arrest—'quite broken,' observed Goebbels without sympathy, 'pleads for mercy. We all expect him to resign. His men have all been shot. Edgar Jung too. He had it coming to him.' They enacted thirty-two laws that day, all garbage in his view, and a mockery under the circumstances.²¹

He traveled to Kiel and told audiences of gauleiters, naval officers, and sailors what he knew about the Röhm affair—which was not much. Back in Berlin on the sixth, Hitler told of his visit to the ailing president. Hindenburg, recorded Goebbels, had been a real sport. Papen was to stay in office until September 15, and then be turfed out (abgemeinert)—

Goebbels
Göring
+ Hindenburg

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July 6, 1934

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July 6.

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'There must be no suggestion he was one of Röhm's men.'²² He kept hearing fresh details about the death roll. '[Karl] von Wechmar was shot too,' he wrote indignantly on July 6, referring to the S.A. Brigadeführer in Breslau. 'Terrible! A lot of things happened that did not entirely accord with the Führer's will. Fate! Victims of the revolution! You learn to think little of human life, once it gets lost like that.'²³

Hitler flew down to the Obersalzberg. In his absence wild rumors swept Berlin and the foreign press. According to one of them Goebbels had ordered five young S.A. men executed in his ministry garden and had directed his staff to watch.²⁴ Less implausible was the story that Goebbels had had Röhm's villa raided and staged an exhibition of the spoils in his ministry—delicately holding up silk lingerie and perfume sprays for his staff's inspection. One rumor had Goebbels personally ordering Strasser's murder. The gullible foreign journalists named thirty-nine other victims who were, as Reinhard Heydrich indignantly protested later to Goebbels, still very much alive, including Helldorff, Alvensleben, Manfred von Killinger, Lossow, Seisser, and the widow of Karl Ernst.²⁵ (Goebbels offered Helldorff command of Berlin's S.A. but warned him to stop putting on airs.) As the foreign press hysteria grew louder, Goebbels noted nervously: 'High time that the Führer speak and announce that the lists of those shot and the heaps of documentary evidence are being checked and will be publicized. Meanwhile: Turn a deaf ear, and keep our nerve.'²⁶ Since Hitler delayed speaking, Goebbels broadcast a diatribe against the British, French, and Russian newspaper stories—the direst kind of revolver-journalism,' he exploded, drawing on his characteristically inventive vocabulary.²⁷ Stung by his language, at their next ministerial tea party the normally hard-bitten foreign journalists in Berlin wept into their teacups with rage and, as Louis Lochner put it, nobody minced their language in speaking to Goebbels. 'I don't think he'll invite us to teas hereafter!'²⁸

GOEBBELS rejoined Magda out at their lakeside cottage at Cladow. She was plagued by fears of assassination.²⁹ Both needed a vacation. Hitler too came out to Cladow several times that week. 'He now sees things quite clearly,' recorded Goebbels cryptically, adding: 'Lutze has become suspicious too.'³⁰ Did this mean that Hitler now believed that he had been manipulated, as he had, by Göring, Himmler, and the armed forces?³¹ On July 7 Goebbels and Helldorff made a Sunday day trip up to Heiligendamm.³² On the thirteenth Hitler spoke to the Reichstag about the purge. Goebbels, Göring, Hess, Lutze, and their respective wives gathered round the exhausted Führer that evening and congratulated him.³³ The next day Goebbels and Hitler drove up to Heiligendamm. 'Putzi' Hanfstaengl, who had just returned from America, found them there. 'Hitler,' he wrote years afterwards, 'had a flushed, evil look, as though gorged on the blood of his victims.' It was not a pleasant vacation. The crowds gawked and cheered them wherever they went, and they had to break off their stay.³⁴ Later that year Magda invited the

July 7.

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widows of all the S.A. victims of the purge to bring her their Christmas lists; one widow wrote a touching thank-you: 'The Führer loves justice,' she wrote. 'So he will look after us too.'³⁵ His conscience troubled, Hitler ordered generous pensions paid to them.

HITLER had begun to plot against his neighbor, Austria—he mentioned it at lunch on July 10.³⁶ Although he would protest his innocence in later years, there is no doubt that he was fully apprised of the coup being prepared by Austrian Nazis under Theo Habicht. Habicht claimed army backing for a plot to replace the dictatorial chancellor Dr Engelbert Dollfuss with Dr Anton Rintelen, a prominent right-wing politician. Goebbels' unpublished diary shows that he considered Habicht a hothead whom Hitler, with characteristic indecisiveness, was hanging on to far too long. When Habicht brought the latest news on Austria on April 10, Goebbels again decided 'He's obviously not up to the job.'³⁷ After discussing Austria with Habicht and Haegert two weeks later Goebbels noted: 'We'll be intervening there more strongly now. Otherwise dilettantism rules.'³⁸ Intervene—but how?

July 10.

Attending Bayreuth for the annual Wagner festival on Sunday July 22, he found Hitler conferring secretly with Habicht, Rosenberg, General Walther von Reichenau, and the former S.A. commander Franz von Pfeffer. They had decided to stage a coup in Vienna. In his diary Goebbels inked the terse comment: 'Will it come off? I'm very skeptical.'³⁹ For three days they went their normal ways: Hitler entertained Goebbels and the others by reading from his Landsberg prison notes, and talking of the past; once they all went for a picnic in the forests. Back at the Wagner household, Goebbels had a little scene with Magda, whom he caught 'snooping' through his mail.⁴⁰

22.

The coup was to take place the next day, Wednesday July 25. General Wilhelm Adam, army commander in Bavaria, was ordered to report at nine A.M. on Wednesday morning to Bayreuth, where Hitler boasted to him that the Austrian army was going to overthrow the Dollfuss government that day: Adam was to arm all the Austrian Nazis who had fled to Germany. The army general was also deeply skeptical.⁴¹

July 25.

Goebbels was with Hitler as the first reports came in from Vienna. Things were soon going badly wrong just as he had feared: 'Big rumpus. Colossal tension. Awful wait. I'm still skeptical. Pfeffer more optimistic. Habicht too. Wait and see!'

The word was that Habicht's Nazis had seized Dollfuss and his minister of the interior Emil Fey in a scuffle. Hitler put through endless phone calls to Berlin, because lines to Vienna were dead. At three P.M. he phoned General Adam: 'Everything is going according to plan in Vienna,' he lied. 'The government building is in our hands. Dollfuss has been injured—the rest of the news is confused as yet. I'll phone again.' He never did; he and Goebbels listened to Wagner's *Rhinegold* that afternoon with only half an ear. Then came uglier news: Dollfuss had been shot dead, and the rebels were pulling out. 'Habicht was all talk,' decided an

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outraged Goebbels. 'I just manage to suppress a crazy communiqué by Pfeffer.'

Pfeffer and Habicht were very mute after this. Goebbels switched the propaganda ministry over to emergency damage control. The foreign ministry in Berlin blamed the German ambassador in Vienna and recalled him. 'Führer remains quite calm,' observed Goebbels. 'Casting new plans. Dollfuss is out: That's a serious blow to the Austrian regime.' They tore up their remaining Wagner tickets and returned to Berlin the next day.⁴²

Mussolini—who had secretly approved the idea of ousting Dollfuss—was infuriated by the murder, and moved his army to the Austrian frontier. The Italian press waded into the Nazis. Goebbels ordered his press to hit back. Hitler was angry that Mussolini had changed his tune. 'It's all over with Italy,' Goebbels decided. 'The same old disloyalty. The Führer has washed his hands of them.'⁴³ As a blood bath began in Austria, he persuaded Hitler to dismiss the bungling, cynical dilettante Habicht, if not actually shoot him; Papen was sent as special ambassador to Austria. The assassins would be publicly hanged in Vienna.

Meanwhile, on July 27, Hitler spoke to Goebbels about the future: 'He has a prophetic vision,' wrote the minister. 'Germany as master of the world. Job for a century.'⁴⁴

LATE on July 30 word came that President von Hindenburg was dying. Hitler and Goebbels discussed what to do. 'Immediately he dies,' recorded Goebbels, 'R.W. [armed forces] and Cabinet will appoint the Führer as successor. Then Führer will appeal to the public.'⁴⁵ The Cabinet agreed this late on August 1; Goebbels co-signed the decree.⁴⁶ Early that day Hitler had gone to take leave of the aged field marshal and he had phoned that afternoon as Goebbels was planning the state funeral. He had found Hindenburg still alive—the president had recognized the chancellor, spoken of his gratitude and affection, then mistaken him for the Kaiser and referred to himself as 'your reverent and humble subject'.⁴⁷ Goebbels broadcast news of Hindenburg's death on August 2.⁴⁸ Listening to the chaplain's endless eulogy at the funeral ceremony in Tannenberg, Goebbels decided: 'No parson will ever speak at my grave.'⁴⁹

Hitler's appointment was to be confirmed by a plebiscite on the nineteenth. Goebbels reveled in controlling the giant new propaganda machine, but found the results disappointing. Some thirty-eight million Germans, just under ninety percent nationwide, with rather less in Berlin, had endorsed Hitler as head of state.⁵⁰ The Catholics had let them down; the murder of Klausener had alienated many Catholics, but Goebbels blamed Rosenberg and his tactless anti-Catholic effusions of late.⁵¹ In his imagination Goebbels saw the 'missing ten percent' glaring at him, and for the next three months he dined into his staff the need to win them over too—all, that is, except the 'anti-social dregs and professional bleaters' who were incurably hostile to the regime anyway.⁵²

Broad sections of the S.A. were deeply disaffected by what Hitler had

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July 30.

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done. S.A. brigadier Richard Fiedler, Horst Wessel's old comrade in arms, pleaded that the party had got the S.A. all wrong.⁵³ Goebbels hardened his heart against them. Twice that summer, addressing them in Berlin, he justified the 'radical cure',⁵⁴ the 'purgative'⁵⁵ which had been necessary among their leaders. But both he and Hitler were long racked by remorse after the massacre. Hitler suffered from insomnia and a ringing in his ears which he attributed to those killings, and he ordered generous pensions for the purged men's next of kin.⁵⁶ Goebbels took up the cause of the S.A. men who had died in earlier years, protesting to Martin Bormann, who ran the party's benevolent fund, that some S.A. men's widows were drawing pensions of only seventeen marks (four dollars) per month, while Geyer's widow had received nothing at all.⁵⁷

His own finances were in better shape. At the end of October 1934 he paid cash for a swanky new five-liter Daimler-Benz tourer.⁵⁸ His ministry's budget for fiscal 1934 projected a revenue of 22,341,250 marks from radio license fees, against outgoings of 27,545,300 marks. His own pre-tax salary and allowances would total 72,900 marks (around \$18,000).⁵⁹ And why not? He had worked hard that autumn, limping around the country addressing uniformed farmers (seven hundred thousand of them arrayed like soldier-ants on the slopes of the Bückeberg for the Nazi annual harvest festival), uniformed roadbuilders (who serenaded him with their specially composed Ballad of the Spade), uniformed Hitler Youth, and uniformed Nazi maidens with blonde pigtails and uniformly glistering eyes.⁶⁰

In Hitler's new Reich everything was uniform, especially the press, and Goebbels knew it. Lecturing journalists in November he mocked at their monotonous output and lack of courage, as though he himself were in no way to blame.⁶¹ Captain Wilhelm Weiss, deputy editor of the *Völkischer Beobachter* and head of the Press Association, would explain later that it was Goebbels' own draconian press laws that had reduced its fifteen thousand journalist members to gibbering servility.⁶² The fire had gone out of the media. It needed an identifiable, flesh-and-blood enemy. With the Jews now fled or fleeing, the protestant church emerged slowly to fill the role. One village church had disobeyed Goebbels' order for bells to toll when Hindenburg died. The pastor had told local party officials, 'I don't take orders from Joseph the catholic.'⁶³ This attitude was symptomatic of the church problem. 'A nation of sixty-six millions,' said Goebbels at Stettin, 'cannot afford twenty-eight different churches.'⁶⁴

Speaking at Trier a few days later he suggested that only National Socialism had a truly Christian program, as witness its Winter Relief fund.⁶⁵ He had launched this Winterhilfswerk fund in September 1933; after glowering at the sumptuous farewell repast for guests at Bayreuth that summer he had there and then decided that millions of Germans could easily forego one meal each month and donate the proceeds to a national fund to feed and clothe the poor.⁶⁶ Only the churlish would deny the real benefits that this WHW fund brought to the hungry and unemployed. In the winter of 1933-34 it had raised 358,136,040-71

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* D.T. word came from the O.C.
"He is certainly not hard enough yet."

1934-35

marks, and helped 16,617,681 needy Germans, almost a quarter of the population.⁶⁷ His motives were of course partly political. Émigrés, he warned party officials in Cologne, were banking on the collapse of the regime during the coming winter.⁶⁸

Dec 13

Goebbels had cast his lot permanently with the Führer. Hang together or be hanged separately: The saying is much the same in German. On December 13 his pathological dependence on Hitler was documented again when Hans Frank told him that Hitler believed he might be dying, and caused the Cabinet that same afternoon to pass a law allowing him to name a successor.⁶⁹ 'He thus seems to be assuming the worst,' recorded Goebbels, shocked. 'I am very downcast. I go home weighed down with worries. . . . We've got to find a good doctor. The Führer must be brought back to good health. The people around the Führer are too lackadaisical.' At Bremerhaven the next evening however he found Hitler looking well. Words failed him, he was so relieved. 'Our Führer! Long, long may he live!'⁷⁰ On the nineteenth Hitler nominated Göring as his successor, but kept it to himself and a few others—not including Goebbels. A few weeks later, discussing how to compensate Göring for taking the Reich reform program away from him, Hitler told Goebbels he was 'thinking' of nominating Göring as his successor. Goebbels could not even bear to think of that sad eventuality. 'Hitler's got to outlive us all,' he pleaded in his diary. 'We need him like our daily bread.'⁷¹ That Christmas Hitler wrote to Goebbels, telling him how dear he and Magda were to him.⁷²

WHAT of Goebbels' private life during that turbulent year, 1934? As minister, he is a magnet for Berlin's nouveau-chic society; he is a host to dazzling starlets, and less frequently their male counterparts. His motor yacht cruises the Wannsee with Magda and a glittering array of twittering females of stage and screen in its well, like Renate Müller, Lil Dagover, Jenny Jugo, Gretl Slezak, Maria Andergast, and Magda's sister-in-law Ello, who says she's being dragged through a messy divorce by her husband's cunning Jewish lawyer.

Sept

Ello is all eyes and ears. Once that September her friend Maria Strehl makes a bitchy comment in Magda's hearing about Petra Fiedler, another of the minister's friends. 'Female hysteria,' he scoffs guiltily in his diary. The ensuing row with Magda leaves him aggrieved and sleepless for days afterward.⁷³ For a while Magda shuts her ears to Ello's gossip, mindful perhaps of her eccentric pre-nuptial bargain with Joseph. In his official villa their separate bedrooms are divided by an ante-room and bathroom. One night that autumn she hears a door banging in the wind; going to close it, she finds the connecting bathroom inexplicably locked. Toward morning she hears Joseph softly unlocking the door. She makes no scene; she tells Ello, and over breakfast she icily informs his house guest, a certain countess, 'My car will be taking you to the station in half an hour.'⁷⁴

Jan 1.
1935

She punishes him in a subtle but cruel way. To see in the New Year, 1935, she drags him down to the Black Forest—on a skiing holiday. She

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Nov

WHEN you drive through Germany today,' Goebbels had said at the end of November 1934, 'you hear the hammering of the machinery and the singing of the sirens, you see the cargo ships once more majestically gliding down the rivers and the heavy-laden freight trains, and you notice how the country lanes are being widened and the new autobahns laid down. . . . These are great times that we have created.'¹ Before a different audience he emphasized Germany's 'absolute desire for peace,' a theme to which he returned in his New Year's broadcast—the coming international plebiscite on the disputed Saar territory would allow Germany to arrive at a lasting peace with 'the great French people.'²

Hitler had faced the New Year with a collapse of self-confidence. Recalling Goebbels back from his Black Forest vacation, he demanded he do something. Foreign newspapers were full of lies about fresh plots against him. Hitler ordered the entire German leadership to hear him speak in the state opera house on the third. Together, Goebbels and Göring—now thick as thieves again—drafted a declaration of loyalty for Hitler to read out to Hitler. It went down well.³ At one point Hitler threatened to put a bullet in his own brains if his subjects refused to work in harmony.⁴ Goebbels was worried by all this. He felt that Hitler was still unwell, and decided to find a doctor for him. 'I think he needs me now,' he told his unpublished diary.

With Magda staying down in the Black Forest, he stayed up until two A.M. after the Hitler speech entertaining Ello Quandt; on the following day, January 4, he took Hitler out to Babelsberg to tour the Ufa studios. For a while he, Hitler, and Streicher strayed around the lavish set built for 'Barcarole,' a romantic film located in Venice at the turn of the century. The top Nazis were all eyes—not for Germany's leading heart-throb Gustav Fröhlich, but for the actress playing opposite him, a Czech girl of twenty, Lida Baarova.⁵

Hitler took an immediate shine to her; he persuaded himself that she looked like Geli Raubal and invited her to tea at the chancellery.⁶ She arrived with tear-streaked cheeks. Gustav Fröhlich, her lover in real life as well as on the screen, a jealous and possessive thirty-two-year-old, had instructed her to phone him every fifteen minutes from the Führer's chancellery, and that put paid to that. Hitler asked Lida why she did not take up German citizenship. Her reply was simply, 'Why should I?'

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Himmler

III

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During the period he was gradually increasing the range of his power and influence, Himmler had realized it was no longer either proper or practical for him to continue as a farmer. The small-holding in Waldtrudering had been sold, and he had removed his wife and family, who now included an adopted boy called Gerhard as well as his five-year-old daughter Gudrun, to Lindenfycht at Gmund at the head of the beautiful lake of Tegernsee, some twenty-five miles from Munich.¹ When he took control of the Gestapo in April 1934, he moved his official residence to Berlin and settled in a villa at Dahlem, a fashionable suburb where Ribbentrop also lived. His headquarters in Berlin were at the Prinz Albrechtstrasse, where Göring had established the Gestapo; Heydrich's headquarters were set up near-by in the Wilhelmstrasse.

Himmler's domestic life was meagre. He had no strong feeling for the woman he had married; his passionate devotion was to his work in Berlin, and this led to a gradual separation which, although it was never made formal, was none the less real.² Marga stayed in Gmund, and this remained to the end of Himmler's life his solidly bourgeois family home. Marga's frequent letters, no longer sentimental as they once were, are full of domestic chatter about the weather, her husband's clothes, the losses and gains in the vegetable and fruit garden and complaints of his infrequent visits: 'We look forward to your visit . . . Don't bring along so many files and other things to read. We want a bit of your attention too.' From as early as 1931, she began to address him in her letters as '*Mein Lieber Guter*', and when he is away she seldom fails to remind him, as always, that the housekeeping money is due. Marga was undoubtedly a good and frugal housewife, scraping the last penny of value out of the money her husband gave her, but her husband's long absences

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his agent. After Heydrich's assassination in 1942, Kaltenbrunner was to take over the responsibilities Heydrich had exercised in Berlin.

Now that the S.S. was an entirely independent force, responsible through Himmler only to Hitler himself, Himmler became absorbed in consolidating its membership and carrying still further his growing obsession with their racial purity and their loyalty to his idea of establishing them as a special Order in the Party and the State. His concern was more for the quality of the S.S. than for their numbers. As we have seen, he had already begun, before 30 June, to remove those men who had been too hurriedly recruited after the seizure of power and who failed to pass his stringent tests. According to Eberstein at Nuremberg, during the period 1934-5 some 60,000 men were released from the S.S. Nevertheless, the S.S. was kept at a strength in the region of 200,000 men and represented a formidable force which made the Army, already divided in its attitude to Hitler, increasingly anxious. But Himmler's natural caution always made him wary of stirring up trouble. He preferred to work in secret, though he was always prepared to make public statements about the high standards he exacted from the S.S. and its undying dedication to Hitler.

From 1934 the S.S. was forbidden to take part in any troop manoeuvres with the Army, although some of its members were Army reservists, nor did its members openly receive a specifically military training. Nevertheless they were armed with small-calibre rifles and were trained to shoot. They were now vigorously selected for their Nordic excellence. As Himmler put it, the S.S. was to be 'a National Socialist Soldier Order of Nordic Men'.

As Gisevius said when giving evidence at Nuremberg,⁷ 'The members had to be so-called Nordic types . . . if I am not mistaken, the distinguishing characteristics of men and women went as far as underarm perspiration. The moral deception involved in recruitment was, Gisevius claimed, often irreparable; men joined frequently out of an honest desire to assist a force dedicated, as it seemed, to order and decency in contrast to the degenerate hooliganism of the S.A., only to find themselves later involved in the criminal practices imposed on them by Heydrich and Himmler. Large numbers of the S.S. were part-time men who pursued their normal activities, except for special occasions and national emergencies, giving only spare time to their S.S. duties. The oath taken by every man on entering the S.S. was: 'I swear to you, Adolf Hitler, as Führer and Reich

1934

Chancellor, loyalty and bravery. I vow to you, and to those you have named to command me, obedience unto death, so help me God.⁷⁸

Heydrich had in 1932 founded a leadership school at Bad-Toelz in Bavaria, a centre for training which was to be maintained, with considerable variation in its curriculum, until well into the years of the war. Heydrich was as much concerned with the intelligence as he was with the physique of the S.S. leader. Sport, gymnastics and other activities that imposed the meaning of discipline on the students were the basis of their education, together with the Nazi version of history, geography, militarism and racial consciousness.

Himmler was determined to establish a centre for the S.S. leadership which would be worthy of the racial purification they represented. Though Himmler's mind had moved far from the Catholicism in which he had been brought up, the self-dedication of the Catholic monastic orders influenced him in devising his plans for this centre. Even Hitler compared him with Ignatius Loyola. Walter Schellenberg, who had studied both medicine and law at the University of Bonn and was one of the bright young intellectuals who joined Heydrich's S.D., was later to become one of the inner circle of men who made a study of Himmler and learned how to control him. In his *Memoirs* he writes: The S.S. organization had been built up by Himmler on the principles of the Order of the Jesuits. The service statutes and spiritual exercises presented by Ignatius Loyola formed a pattern which Himmler assiduously tried to copy.⁷⁹ The Jesuitical ideal in Himmler's mind merged with his medieval vision of the Teutonic knights, whose combination of religious observance and brutalized chivalry inspired him to found a similar S.S. Order of Knights in a Germanic castle of their own.

The Order of Teutonic Knights founded at the close of the twelfth century with the combined aim of conquest and conversion, had its centre in the castle of Marienburg, which became the residence of the Grand Master of the Order. The Teutonic Knights boasted alike of their valour and their statesmanship, their self-denial and their skill as administrators, and at the height of their power in the fourteenth century they stretched their conquests through Poland as far as the Baltic States. The image of the Grand Master became a part of Himmler's obsession, but his mind, incapable of largeness of thought or inspiration, could only absorb simplified concepts from past history out of which he attempted to create dogmas for the present. He began to see himself as Grand Master of a modern

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Teutonic order designed to rid Nordic German society of degenerate infiltration by Jewish blood. Like the medieval Teutonic Knights, he also looked east towards that other great threat to German purity, the inferior Slav races with their evil communist doctrines. As he put it himself in 1936: 'We shall take care that never again in Germany, the heart of Europe, will the Jewish-Bolshevistic revolution of sub-humans be kindled either from within or through emissaries from without.'¹⁰

For inspiration he founded the new Teutonic castle of Wewelsburg in the forests near Paderborn, an ancient town in Westphalia with historic associations that went back to Charlemagne. Wewelsburg was built on the foundations of a medieval burgh; it was designed for him by an architect called Bartels and took a year to construct, at a cost of some 11 million marks.

According to Schellenberg, the castle was run like a monastery and a hierarchic order of leadership after the pattern of the Catholic Church was imposed on those members of the S.S. privileged to visit Wewelsburg for the regular retreats organized by Himmler, who was, in Jesuitical terms, General of the Order. Each member of the secret Chapter had his own chair with a silver name-plate, and 'each had to devote himself to a ritual of spiritual exercises aimed mainly at concentration', the equivalent of prayer, before discussing the higher policy of the S.S.¹¹

Wewelsburg was Himmler's only indulgence in the kind of luxury with which most of the Nazi leaders were surrounded. The castle was as magnificently appointed in the medieval manner as Carinhall, Göring's vast residence north of Berlin which he was extending and reconstructing at the same time as Himmler was building Wewelsburg. The design and association of the rooms were supposed to conjure the spirit of Germany's greatness; each was named after an historic figure such as Frederick the Great, and a collection of relics of the past was assembled in the castle's museum. Himmler's own room was named after Heinrich I, Henry the Fowler, the king who a thousand years before had been the founder of the German Reich.

The S.S. leaders, whether they were intellectuals or not, had to submit to these historical charades in order to please Himmler, who gave more and more of his time to the detailed study of such useless history as his power increased. Himmler had in him the makings of a recluse, a ruthless anchorite devoted to his studies and determined to remake mankind in the particular image conjured

1934

The National Socialist financial backers now also came forward with their claims; the rich people who had supported the party during hard times and had helped the party leaders in many a financial strait, often enough by methods which involved cheating the state of taxes. Several big firms were threatened with proceedings for tax frauds; but now it turned out that the little favors done for Göring had been a good investment. The businessmen came to him complaining: of course, they had defrauded the state, but only in order to save their enterprises and give their workers a livelihood. Göring listened to them without wincing and wrote to Kerrl, his Minister of Justice, that in former times in business actions were committed 'which, although they violated penal law, were not inspired by selfish motives. The Bolshevistic taxes of the democratic state often compelled people, in the interest of preserving their enterprises, to enter upon paths which were not permissible from a legal point of view, but which are comprehensible in the light of the conditions prevailing at that time, especially as the rigorous economic conceptions of National Socialism had not yet become the common possession of all circles of our nation. The indiscriminate prosecution of such offenses might often affect persons who, imbued with the spirit of the National Socialist revolution, are now willing to collaborate in the development of our economy.'

In thus breaking the law and saving millions for the big businessmen at the expense of the state, Göring again collected his share of the booty in the form of tens and hundreds of thousands of marks. From a large department store with a Jewish name he bought old furniture and precious rugs without ever paying for them; a Jewish super-market enjoyed the dubious privilege of delivering wines and delicacies to him gratis for years. In 1935, when he married, he said in an affable way to one of the best-known German industrialists that the Prussian state manufacture of porcelain had a valuable table service worth sixty thousand marks for sale, and that it would really be a nice gesture if this industrialist presented it to him as a wedding gift. The man thus called upon to make a princely gift was not particularly surprised; two years earlier, during a conversation about the new Minister, Göring, he had heard a business acquaintance whisper rapturously, 'He accepts gifts!' The sixty thousand marks' worth of porcelain was bought and given.

As for Hitler, he bought his house and estate with his own funds, so to speak, acquired from *Kampf*—even though the largest part of his income originated in the fact that the German people had *Kampf* whether they liked it or not. But Göring have his own estate in close proximity to his Führer of the Bavarian state to give him a piece of land, meters square, about a hundred yards above Hitler. In matter of principle, he did not spend any money on German soil. In Prussia, which he ruled personally, for his own use the state hunting grounds of Schorlin; and where a modest hunting lodge of the German formerly stood, he erected a sumptuous villa. He inherited of his dead wife from Sweden and named the villa in honor, 'Karin hall.' However, he was considered to declare all this magnificence his formal property. In the Prussian budget contained an item showing that the hunting grounds of Schorfheide, the private residence of the main of Prime Minister Göring, were maintained at a million marks out of the taxpayers' pockets.

The corruption of the Third Reich is connected with the of 'great men,' which is a sort of religious principle of the state. According to this principle, the people owe their great men to give them rich gifts. German industry had to do this, or, more accurately, his son, with the estate and helped him to pocket the inheritance tax. Late in 1934, he received from him an additional gift of almost half a million marks. He might lack nothing on the estate. But Göring was a gentleman a much more magnificent gift by present again, more accurately, his son—with the government neighboring estate of Langenau along with the state of Tannenberg. Fittingly enough, this was done on August 1st, the anniversary of the Battle of Tannenberg (1914), which had been won by Generals Hoffmann, von François, and Ludendorff. A few days later, the German people learned that Hindenburg had accepted the gift of his [Captain Göring's] distinguished service.

* D.T. what a cop!

ocialist financial backers now also came forward the rich people who had supported the party during had helped the party leaders in many a financial way by methods which involved cheating the state. Big firms were threatened with proceedings for tax if they did not turn out that the little favors done for Göring were an investment. The businessmen came to him, of course, they had defrauded the state, but only in order to get a license and give their workers a livelihood. Göring without wincing and wrote to Kerrl, his Minister of Justice, that former times in business actions were committed which they violated penal law, were not inspired by the Bolshevistic taxes of the democratic state often in the interest of preserving their enterprises, to which were not permissible from a legal point of view. These are comprehensible in the light of the conditions of the time, especially as the rigorous economic concept of Socialism had not yet become the common possession of our nation. The indiscriminate prosecution of the night often affect persons who, imbued with the ideas of the Social Revolution, are now willing to contribute to the development of our economy.

By the law and saving millions for the big business of the state, Göring again collected his share of the form of tens and hundreds of thousands of marks. In argument store with a Jewish name he bought old Persian rugs without ever paying for them; a Jewish Jew used the dubious privilege of delivering wines and spirits gratis for years. In 1935, when he married, he said to one of the best-known German industrialists that the state manufacture of porcelain had a valuable piece of sixty thousand marks for sale, and that it would be a pleasure if this industrialist presented it to him as a gift. He man thus called upon to make a princely gift was very surprised; two years earlier, during a conversation with the new Minister, Göring, he had heard a business man whisper rapturously, 'He accepts gifts!' The sixty thousand marks worth of porcelain was bought and given.

As for Hitler, he bought his house and estate at Berchtesgaden with his own funds, so to speak, acquired from the sale of *Mein Kampf*—even though the largest part of his income as an author originated in the fact that the German people had to buy *Mein Kampf* whether they liked it or not. But Göring, who wished to have his own estate in close proximity to his Führer, got the cabinet of the Bavarian state to give him a piece of land ten thousand meters square, about a hundred yards above Hitler's residence; as a matter of principle, he did not spend any money for this piece of German soil. In Prussia, which he ruled personally, he appropriated for his own use the state hunting grounds of Schorfheide near Berlin; and where a modest hunting lodge of the German Kaiser had formerly stood, he erected a sumptuous villa. He imported the body of his dead wife from Sweden and named the whole estate in her honor, 'Karinahall.' However, he was considerate enough not to declare all this magnificence his formal property. Year after year, the Prussian budget contained an item showing that the state hunting grounds of Schorfheide, the private residence and hunting domain of Prime Minister Göring, were maintained at a cost of a million marks out of the taxpayers' pockets.

The corruption of the Third Reich is connected with the worship of 'great men,' which is a sort of religious principle of the new state. According to this principle, the people owe it to its great men to give them rich gifts. German industry had presented Hindenburg, or, more accurately, his son, with the estate of Neudeck and helped him to pocket the inheritance tax. Later, it had given him an additional gift of almost half a million marks in order that he might lack nothing on the estate. But Göring gave the old gentleman a much more magnificent gift by presenting him—or again, more accurately, his son—with the government-owned neighboring estate of Langenau along with the state forest of Reusenswald. Fittingly enough, this was done on August 27, the anniversary of the Battle of Tannenberg (1914), which had actually been won by Generals Hoffmann, von François, and Ludendorff; the gift was made 'in fulfillment of the duty of national gratitude.' Four days later, the German people learned that Hindenburg, 'in recognition of his [Captain Göring's] distinguished services in war and

Success was won

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peace, had granted him the status of infantry general with the right to wear the army uniform.'

Thus they handed each other public property or plundered great private properties. This armed Bohemia managed to make itself both agreeable and frightful to organized wealth and justified Machiavelli's saying that soldiers are stronger than money, for soldiers can always find money, but money does not always find soldiers. The mass of rank-and-file National Socialists, however, who had no share in this cool plunder, boasted of their revolutionary purity and called Göring and his clique 'reactionaries,' more out of envy than political conviction. The kernel of the 'old fighters' among the three million S.A. men still fared as they had in 1923, when Wilhelm Brückner described their desperate gamble: they had staked their poverty and their lives on the great political undertaking in order to find jobs as paid soldiers or officers in the future German army; and they had been waiting too long according to their lights. When Hitler wrangled with England and France over the size of the future army, he was, in the eyes of the 'old fighters,' fighting for their most important personal interests. For the time being, despite all the Führer's warning speeches, they still stuck to the belief that within a short time they would be that army—from the plain S.A. man up to the Obergruppenführer who had the rank of a commanding general and who, according to an order issued by Blomberg, was tactfully to be saluted like a general by the Reichswehr soldiers.

On June 2, when Hitler gathered the S.A. leaders in Reichenhall and once more forbade them in sharp terms to continue the revolution, he also hammered into them the idea that 'only the army of the Reich is the weapon-bearer of the nation.' Several of the brown chieftains comforted themselves with the thought that their Führer spoke thus only because he was afraid of Hindenburg and Blomberg; but Röhm certainly knew that Hitler had never spoken or thought otherwise. His promise that the S.A. would 'form a Guard and be the unshakable bearers of our ideological values' meant little; the term 'ideological values' had to be translated for these veteran mercenaries before they could understand it. With their 'ideological values,' Hitler said, they would 'penetrate the en-

tire nation,' and as their reward 'the German revolution the face of the future for centuries.' These were the S.A. leaders wanted big remunerations. In the tober, Röhm had complained to a Dutch newspaper two million S.A. men were forced 'to continue in they were barely reimbursed for the expenses of Party Day in Nuremberg. In his public speeches explained that the S.A. should not demand any great privilege of these embittered men was, on a model of self-sacrifice and renunciation, for right to expect that its leaders will be just as heroic that the people be.' He knew that he was addressing rarely gone far in their civilian careers; men 'with and economic origin mostly occupied a suboquently low, rank.' In compensation he tried to call 'at some future day they would represent the nation.'

But this was precisely their trouble—they represent which they were not; what they had perhaps been but what they had now ceased to be. They were to lead the nation; and Hitler, who at the bottom well aware of this unfitness, only hesitatingly for like 'ideological values' and 'future leadership of them so.

These veterans of the civil war, these armed men years had been and still were bohemians, were not the seasoned and useful soldiers they believed themselves. Older men among their leaders had left the army of lieutenant, captain, or sometimes even major; had for a time served in the police force; one or another calculated that with luck he would have been a colonel or major-general if he had been able to remain in reality these people frequently could not be used as tenants and captains they had been before. In their marches and meeting brawls, these political soldiers in contact with the genuine modern soldiers who were military ideas. For the most part they were simple posts to which they aspired.

the status of infantry general with the right to

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tire nation,' and as their reward 'the German revolution would mold the face of the future for centuries.' These were big words; but the S.A. leaders wanted big remunerations. In the beginning of October, Röhm had complained to a Dutch newspaperman that nearly two million S.A. men were forced 'to continue in their professions'; they were barely reimbursed for the expenses of their trip to the Party Day in Nuremberg. In his public speeches Hitler repeatedly explained that the S.A. should not demand anything at all; the great privilege of these embittered men was, on the contrary, to be a model of self-sacrifice and renunciation, for 'the people has a right to expect that its leaders will be just as heroic as they demand that the people be.' He knew that he was addressing men who had rarely gone far in their civilian careers; men 'who in their social and economic origin mostly occupied a subordinate, and frequently low, rank.' In compensation he tried to convince them that 'at some future day they would represent the leadership of the nation.'

But this was precisely their trouble — they represented something which they were not; what they had perhaps been for a short time, but what they had now ceased to be. They were completely unfit to lead the nation; and Hitler, who at the bottom of his heart was well aware of this unfitness, only hesitatingly found euphemisms like 'ideological values' and 'future leadership of the nation' to tell them so.

These veterans of the civil war, these armed men who for ten years had been and still were bohemians, were not even any longer the seasoned and useful soldiers they believed themselves to be. The older men among their leaders had left the army with the ranks of lieutenant, captain, or sometimes even major; several of them had for a time served in the police force; one or another might have calculated that with luck he would have been a colonel or perhaps major-general if he had been able to remain in the service. In reality these people frequently could not be used even as the lieutenants and captains they had been before. In their demonstration marches and meeting brawls, these political soldiers had lost contact with the genuine modern soldiers who were developing new military ideas. For the most part they were simply unfit for the posts to which they aspired.

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More generally they were unfit to occupy any responsible position; — and their supreme leader knew this. When Hitler was still engaged in his struggle against the state, he had appealed to the 'Uprooted and Disinherited' and praised them as his best troops. Later, in his speech of justification for the events that were to follow, he contemptuously told these S.A. leaders, now for the most part dead, that they were people 'who in 1918 had been shaken in their former relation to the state and uprooted, and had thereby lost all inner contact with a human social order.' They were people, 'who without realizing it had found their profession of faith in nihilism. Incapable of any real co-operation, ready to oppose any order, filled with hatred for any kind of authority, their excited and restless minds were appeased only by constant intellectual and conspiratory preoccupation with the destruction of existing institutions. These were Hitler's own words about his faithful, to whom he had to be unfaithful, because power cannot be established without a breach of faith — a breach of faith both to people and to ideas.

For a few months these men had been admired by the nation as the sinister embodiments of a mysterious but indisputably impressive political force; as a Viking army which had suddenly emerged into the present from legendary times; as the host of freedom seeking the light, which they themselves thought they were. But gradually the character of these heroes became better known, and what scoundrels many of them were was demonstrated in a thousand individual cases to be. Frightening reports also trickled through from the concentration camps, and the public began obscurely to realize that the Führer's picked troops had organized artificial hells in Dachau near Munich, in Oranienburg near Berlin, in Duerrgoy near Breslau, and in Boergermoor in northwestern Germany; hells which surpassed in horror the former slave camps in Belgian Congo or Bolshevik Russia. It became known that in Oranienburg cement cells were built in which camp inmates were kept standing for many hours, sometimes days, in the darkness — upright standing stone coffins. It became known that in all the concentration camps flogging had been officially introduced as a punishment for light offenses; that for relatively innocuous violations of rules the penalty was execution by hanging — officially this was

designated, not as a penalty, but as a disciplinary measure. It was pined that prisoners employed in road-building thrown into the rotating barrel of a concrete-mixer kept there until their bones were crushed. It happened that a torturer with a sense of humor burned, with a cigarette, the bare chest of his victim to make them look like tons. To throw prisoners into sewers or drains 'by also considered a permissible pastime. The most gruesome were often those in which outwardly nothing seemed to happen. Prisoners were compelled to stand erect for many hours in the torrid sun; they were forbidden to make the slightest movement, even a quiver of a limb. Cases were reported of those inflicted on hundreds of people for as long as eight days. It happened that people were locked up in boxlike cells, fed with salted herrings, and left without water or a chance of course death was the result.

These atrocities revealed the depravity of the 'old' gave the more cool-headed National Socialists a new thought. Frick and Epp occasionally tried to stop call their perpetrators to account. Now and then intervened, and Hitler himself doubtless realized the to his own popularity by these crimes. After the enthusiasm over the magnificence and energy of the movement had somewhat subsided, the cries of the martyred were distinctly. Röhm admitted publicly that these things were unbearable to many people, but said that he saw no reason to change them. 'Many complaints are being lodged concerning the excesses of S.A. men,' he declared in a statement, 'seemed witty to him; but 'if the supreme leadership investigated each individual complaint, its staff would be increased tenfold and a skyscraper erected over the (August, 1933).

A curious thing happened: the S.A. began to feel Germany they dominated. The brown figures in uniform seemed to behave like conquerors and masters who could shoot, and, in general, act as they pleased; but the moment they reached where pride turned into doubt and brutality

* Drunk, fuck-up, lumpen love
 + O.P.: The aim was to attract exercise
 exercise A. H.'s unbelievable gift for the political dialectic. The path to success was to ask the opposite of what he had asked of the year before.

→ H.'s unbelievable gift for the political dialectic.

unfit to occupy any responsible position. When Hitler was still against the state, he had appealed to the 'ed' and praised them as his best troops. Justification for the events that were to follow these S.A. leaders, now for the most part people 'who in 1918 had been shaken in the state and uprooted, and had thereby a human social order.' They were people, had found their profession of faith in a real co-operation, ready to oppose any kind of authority, their excited and sed only by constant intellectual and con- the destruction of existing institutions. words about his faithful, to whom he had power cannot be established without a of faith both to people and to ideas.

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*Lefts, Lunsford, Lovers
into a state of*

designated, not as a penalty, but as a disciplinary measure. It happened that prisoners employed in road-building were 'for fun' thrown into the rotating barrel of a concrete-mixing machine and kept there until their bones were crushed. It happened that one torturer with a sense of humor burned, with a cigarette, holes in the bare chest of his victim to make them look like uniform buttons. To throw prisoners into sewers or drains 'by oversight' was also considered a permissible pastime. The most gruesome tortures were often those in which outwardly nothing seemed to happen. Prisoners were compelled to stand erect for many hours under a torrid sun; they were forbidden to make the slightest motion, not even a quiver of a limb. Cases were reported of this torture being inflicted on hundreds of people for as long as eighteen hours. It happened that people were locked up in boxlike wooden closets, fed with salted herrings, and left without water or any other drink; of course death was the result.

These atrocities revealed the depravity of the 'old fighters,' and gave the more cool-headed National Socialist leaders food for thought. Frick and Epp occasionally tried to stop the horrors or call their perpetrators to account. Now and then even Göring intervened, and Hitler himself doubtless realized the injury caused to his own popularity by these crimes. After the initial noisy enthusiasm over the magnificence and energy of the new government had somewhat subsided, the cries of the martyred were heard more distinctly. Röhm admitted publicly that these things seemed unbearable to many people, but said that he saw no reason for stopping them. 'Many complaints are being lodged concerning the alleged excesses of S.A. men,' he declared in a statement which probably seemed witty to him; but 'if the supreme leadership of the S.A. investigated each individual complaint, its staff would have to be increased tenfold and a skyscraper erected over the Brown House' (August, 1933).

A curious thing happened: the S.A. began to feel afraid in the Germany they dominated. The brown figures in the streets still seemed to behave like conquerors and masters who could say, strike, shoot, and, in general, act as they pleased; but the limit had been reached where pride turned into doubt and brutality into cow-

*A. H.'s unbelievable gift for
the practical deal. The path to*

Success was not and for the first time, a path of violence

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ardice. Röhm sent out memoranda to the other National Socialist leaders, pointing out that the S.A. were practically 'defenseless' in the hands of the 'commune of murderers,' since they had been sent home and forced to turn in their revolvers. In July, 1933, in order to reassure the trembling heroes, Hess warned: 'We are far from intending to treat the enemy with mildness'; and as Hess was a specialist in handling hostages and had often said that in political struggles ten innocent people had to suffer for one guilty one, he proclaimed now: 'that every murder of a National Socialist committed by a Communist or Marxist would be expiated tenfold by Communist or Marxist leaders.'

The widening gulf between the S.A. and the people became particularly apparent during the elections, when the National Socialist propaganda tried to blur the differences between the party and the masses as much as possible. Hess denied in moving tones that 'Germans who did not belong to the National Socialist Party must be considered second-class Germans.' Then, as though frightened by his own daring, he immediately corrected this statement, admitting that a category of Germans existed 'which deserved particular recognition: the category of old fighters.' These old fighters, he said, had risked death for their Führer year after year and 'played the same part in the domestic struggle as the front-line soldiers in the World War.' The other National Socialists must not imagine that they are as valuable, must not demand 'to be put on the same level as the old fighters and raised above their fellow countrymen.' Hess went so far as to grant that people who had not joined the party after the seizure of power because they did not want to seem to be jumping on the bandwagon 'were not among the worst.' But then he was again frightened of having perhaps said too much, and added hastily: 'I do not mean at all to accuse all those who joined the National Socialist Party after January 30, 1933, of lack of character and foolish opportunism.'

Because these men of 'after January 30,' men of normal usefulness and efficiency, to some extent had again taken the reins into their hands, the S.A. grumbled about a second revolution, although Hitler had forbidden his partisans even to use the term 'revolution.' On November 5, 1933, before fifteen thousand National Socialist

officials gathered in the Sportpalast in Berlin renewed insolence of the reactionaries: 'One of the bourgeois camp to the effect that the S.A. for being.' But this is what he wanted to say the bureaucratic spirit, which had barely changed in 1933, 'must still be changed in a gentle, or, in a gentle, manner.' By no means could the Nation be regarded as completed. At this there pause. Then Himmler appeared before the claimed that 'revolutions are triumphant only sent to a post considers himself, not an official the revolution. And so must it be today in the revolution.' Again there was thunderous applause. Goebbels came forward and cautiously tried to previous speakers, saying that the revolution in Germany; that the period of domestic politics and that the time had come to settle matters with 'we could do this only if the people are behind was much weaker.

Important elements in the party leadership he against stopping the revolution; and the wrath gotten men was stronger than Hitler's will. Goebbels made to the 'old fighters.' By a law promulgated December and entitled 'On the Unity of the Reich' the chief of staff of the S.A. was made a member of the cabinet with the rank of Minister; thus the behavior of the S.A., the disdainful treatment of Röhm, was removed. At the same time, the Führer's deputy given the rank of Minister.

This late and hasty honor was conferred upon him when the S.A. was suddenly and unexpectedly. The 'reactionaries' had indeed gained ground when former Kaiser Wilhelm wrote, from Berlin, to President Hindenburg, that the time had come for the reconstruction of Germany by the restoration of the monarchy. The personal relations between Wilhelm and Hitler were tense; the former Kaiser believed that his

D.T.
* weaving all over the place.
What to do w Röhm?

memoranda to the other National Socialist of the S.A. were practically 'defenseless' in the hands of murderers, since they had been sent in their revolvers. In July, 1933, in order to inspire the heroes, Hess warned: 'We are far from being a party with mildness'; and as Hess was a stages and had often said that in political life people had to suffer for one guilty one, he very much enjoyed the murder of a National Socialist comrade or Marxist would be expiated tenfold by the death of the others.'

Between the S.A. and the people became part of the elections, when the National Socialist differences between the party and the people. Hess denied in moving tones that the members of the National Socialist Party must be Germans. Then, as though frightened, he immediately corrected this statement, adding that Germans existed 'which deserved the category of old fighters.' These old fighters, faithful for their Führer year after year and in the domestic struggle as the front-line soldiers. The other National Socialists must be regarded as valuable, must not demand 'to be put in the front line' and raised above their fellow members so far as to grant that people who had not taken part in the seizure of power because they did not belong to the bandwagon 'were not among the old fighters' and was again frightened of having perhaps been misled hastily: 'I do not mean at all to accuse the National Socialist Party after January 30, 1933, of treachery and foolish opportunism.'

After January 30, men of normal usefulness to some extent had again taken the reins into their own hands. It seemed as if a second revolution, although it was not a revolution, is partisans even to use the term 'revolution,' before fifteen thousand National Socialist

officials gathered in the Sportpalast in Berlin, ~~Röhm~~ attacked the renewed insolence of the reactionaries: 'One often hears voices from the bourgeois camp to the effect that the S.A. have lost their reason for being.' But this is what he wanted to say to these gentlemen: the bureaucratic spirit, which had barely changed after January 30, 1933, 'must still be changed in a gentle, or, if need be, in an ungentle, manner.' By no means could the National Socialist revolution be regarded as completed. At this there was thunderous applause. Then Himmler appeared before the footlights and exclaimed that 'revolutions are triumphant only if every man who is sent to a post considers himself, not an official of the state, but of the revolution.' And so must it be today in the National Socialist revolution.' Again there was thunderous applause. However, when Goebbels came forward and cautiously tried to contradict the two previous speakers, saying that the revolution had only one slogan: Germany; that the period of domestic political activity was over and that the time had come to settle matters with the world, but that 'we could do this only if the people are behind us,' the applause was much weaker.

Important elements in the party leadership had here taken a stand against stopping the revolution; and the wrath of these now forgotten men was stronger than Hitler's will. Great concessions were made to the 'old fighters.' By a law promulgated in the middle of December and entitled 'On the Unity of the Party and the State,' the chief of staff of the S.A. was made a member of the Reich cabinet with the rank of Minister; thus the burning grievance of the S.A., the disdainful treatment of Röhm, was at least outwardly removed. At the same time, the Führer's deputy, Rudolf Hess, was given the rank of Minister.

This late and hasty honor was conferred upon Röhm at a moment when the S.A. was suddenly and unexpectedly needed again. The 'reactionaries' had indeed gained ground. This became apparent when former Kaiser Wilhelm wrote, from his exile in Holland to President Hindenburg, that the time had come for crowning the reconstruction of Germany by the restoration of the monarchy. The personal relations between Wilhelm II and Hindenburg were tense; the former Kaiser believed that his field marshal had

End of 1933

scene

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ause of his overthrow; but Hindenburg doubtless
 ea that the National Socialist period would not last
 any. The National Socialists got wind of the con-
 cer and replied with a cry of fury, 'We will not tol-
 erance of the High Gentleman of Doorn,' as Goer-
 's closest collaborator, put it. When a group of
 emen belonging to Berlin high society organized a
 on of the ex-Kaiser's birthday (January 27, 1934),
 broke into the hall and dispersed these faithful fol-
 -lows. Earlier than this, Hitler had made it plain
 intend to restore the monarchy. 'What is past does
 . . . The wheels of history cannot be turned back—
 would not be desirable at all. . . . The dynasties
 ces, he had said, had often 'given only mediocrities
 or, 'Republic versus monarchy—a serious issue?—
 at it.' He had promised a great deal to credulous
 observers had regarded Hitler as the herald of a
 and did not realize how serious he was when—
 -he had declared that 'today the German no longer
 archy, but only for Germany's freedom.'
 chstag assembled on the anniversary of the 'seizure'
 took the opportunity to declare that the achieve-
 -ment of the German princes had been 'almost exclusively the selfish
 ruthless power politics in favor of their own dynas-
 -ties. The policies of the German princes 'did not definitely
 'as a nation, this was not the merit of the authors.
 . . . Therefore, I should like to register my protest
 tly reaffirmed thesis that Germany could be happy
 'her hereditary princes.' The future head of Ger-
 -many may be, 'will be called to that office by the Ger-
 -man people. It will be obligated to it alone and exclusively.'
 at the future form of the German government
 ined by the National Socialists, by the dictator-
 -ship plebiscite; and to remove the last doubts about
 roposed at the same Reichstag session which gave
 ment the important right—and thereby deprived
 —'to promulgate new constitutional legislation.'

that is to say, to give the country a new constitution. This 'is per-
 haps the most important law for Germany's future,' said Göring,
 the President of the Reichstag; and so it was. After the National
 Socialist deputies had passed this revolutionary law in less than
 three minutes, there was, according to the official record, 'a move-
 ment of cheerful satisfaction with this quick work throughout all
 the rows.'

On the same day Hitler wrote Röhm a letter full of strikingly
 cordial phrases intended to honor and pacify the man he had so
 often disdained. Expressing his desire 'to thank you, my dear Ernst
 Röhm, for your unforgettable services,' he assured the homosexual
 murderer that he was extremely 'grateful to destiny for having
 given me the right to call a man like you my friend and comrade-
 in-arms. In cordial friendship and grateful respect, your Adolf
 Hitler.'

And on February 2, Frick once more sent a telegram to the states,
 this time ordering his officials immediately to dissolve all the organ-
 izations working for the monarchy. The Weimar Republic had left
 a few quaint privileges of the former princes undisturbed. Thus,
 the birth, marriage, and death records of the Hohenzollern family
 were not kept in the public registrar's offices, but in a private office
 which was called the 'Ministry of the Royal House'; Frick gave
 orders that this practice be stopped and that the Hohenzollern fam-
 ily records be transferred to the public offices, like those of any
 other Prussian citizen.

Urged on by Röhm and Hess, the all-powerful government now
 saw to it that the Uprooted and Disinherited were treated by all
 public agencies and particularly by the treasury on an equal footing
 with World War veterans. In February, 1934, it adopted a law with
 the clear, unadorned title: 'Concerning provisions for the fighters of
 the national movement.' These fighters—that is, members of the
 National Socialist Party and the Steel Helmets—upon request, were
 to be granted damages to the same amount as victims of the World
 War for sickness or injuries 'which they had suffered before Novem-
 ber 15, 1933, in connection with the political struggle for the na-
 tional movement'; thus, a National Socialist office clerk could say
 that he had got stomach trouble as a result of excessive work for

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the party. In the past, Hitler had often publicly declared to his S.A. men that they should not think too much about the hardships of their struggle, for every minute at the front in the World War had been a thousand times worse. Now, Hess's law proclaimed: The German people 'owe the old fighters the same gratitude and recognition for their heroic achievements as they owe their fellow countrymen who sacrificed their health and lives for the fatherland.'

In the struggle against the reactionary conservatives and the monarchists, the S.A. was once again given a task. Goebbels, who, as late as November, had tried with anxious words to talk the revolutionaries out of their impatience, suddenly became bold and radical, and this was surely not without Hitler's explicit approval. The S.A. with their greedy grumbings were right; he had often heard it said, he declared in an address to the S.A. *Standarte VIII* in Berlin, 'that old party comrades and S.A. men could not be used in government offices and departments because they had not taken any examinations. If so, I must say that while the stay-at-homes passed their examinations, we saved the Reich'—that is to say, marched through the country as armed bohemians. 'We consider it intolerable,' he continued, 'that the Old Guard should silently give way after having conquered the Reich. . . . It won't do to put our old vanguard fighters in a lower category than the home-birds or to place the home-birds above them.' 'The National Socialist struggle,' he said in another speech, 'has been a socialist revolution; it has been the revolution of a workers' movement, and those who have made it must today also be its spokesmen.' The workers—he explicitly addressed them—should trust the leaders of the revolution, because 'if these leaders are now looking on and are not taking any steps against the reactionary machinations throughout the country, it is only in order better to know the reactionaries.' Then Goebbels drew a truly Oriental picture of whimsical government: 'If one wants to catch mice,' he said, 'one does not strike at them constantly, but only from time to time, for otherwise they would creep into their holes. One strikes once, then one waits for a while till the mice become insolent again, and when they feel safe, one strikes them for the second time.' Fortunately, he thought, the people refused to have anything to do with these mice, rats, stay-at-homes, and reactionaries.

This was objectively false. The people were beginning to see the achievements of the régime which they had admired and even to see its drawbacks. True, the unemployed continued to decrease; in March, Hitler announced that 2,700,000 out of 7,000,000 jobless had been employed. But once the miracle of decreasing unemployment was recognized and accepted, the people felt even more still wretchedly low wages. Hitler, who a year ago had reproached von Papen for expecting the workers of a hundred marks a month, was now forced to raise wages of too many workers were still around the Reich, always open-hearted, called some of the German workers 'wages'; but, he added, for the moment otherwise.

At this point Hitler and Goebbels had the means to use more abuse, ridicule, and persecution of the dissidents to prove the popular mood and at the same time give a line to the party which had become purposeless against the so-called 'bleaters, alarmists, and professional protesters' opened in May. Hitler shouted: 'Only those have the right to solve a problem better. But we have the solution of the German problem better than our past and our critics of today.' Goebbels echoed the National Socialists are convinced that we are right, and anyone beside us who declares that he, too, is right. Röhm, before his assembled sub-leaders, promised in a tart tone that the S.A., because they were disciplined in every task given them by their Führer, Adolf Hitler, in an exemplary fashion.'

The dissatisfied classes of the population were aware of their insignificance and the S.A. of their inferiority. If anyone dared to say a deprecatory word in order on a street corner, life was made hard for him at least. In a village near Mainz a housewife said that actually nothing had as yet improved in Germany since the 19th century. She was forced, for many months, to appear at party headquarters and say in a loud voice: 'Things are improved and even more will be improved in Germany.'

Hitler had often publicly declared to his S.A. not think too much about the hardships of minute at the front in the World War had worse. Now, Hess's law proclaimed: The old fighters the same gratitude and recogni- hievements as they owe their fellow coun- their health and lives for the fatherland.' t the reactionary conservatives and the mon- nce again given a task. Goebbels, who, as ried with anxious words to talk the revolu- npatience, suddenly became bold and rad- not without Hitler's explicit approval. The grumblings were right; he had often heard 1 address to the S.A. *Standarte VIII* in Ber- rades and S.A. men could not be used in departments because they had not taken y, I must say that while the stay-at-homes ns, we saved the Reich'—that is to say, ountry as armed bohemians. 'We consider ued, 'that the Old Guard should silently onquered the Reich. . . . It won't do to put rs in a lower category than the home-birds irds above them.' 'The National Socialist ther speech, 'has been a socialist revolution, n of a workers' movement, and those who y also be its spokesmen.' The workers—he n—should trust the leaders of the revolu- aders are now looking on and are not tak- e reactionary machinations throughout the ler better to know the reactionaries.' Then Oriental picture of whimsical government: nice,' he said, 'one does not strike at them m time to time, for otherwise they would ne strikes once, then one waits for a while solent again, and when they feel safe, one :cond time.' Fortunately, he thought, the nything to do with these mice, rats, stay-at-

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At this point Hitler and Goebbels had the unfortunate idea that more abuse, ridicule, and persecution of the dissatisfied might im- prove the popular mood and at the same time give a new goal and line to the party which had become purposeless. A campaign against the so-called 'bleaters, alarmists, and professional critics' was opened in May. Hitler shouted: 'Only those have a right to crit- icize who can solve a problem better. But we have attacked the solution of the German problem better than our opponents of the past and our critics of today.' Goebbels echoed him: 'As we Na- tional Socialists are convinced that we are right, we cannot tolerate anyone beside us who declares that he, too, is right. . . .' On May 2, Röhm, before his assembled sub-leaders, promised in his customary tart tone that the S.A., because they were disciplined, would 'fulfill every task given them by their Führer, Adolf Hitler, in thorough and exemplary fashion.'

The dissatisfied classes of the population were to be reminded of their insignificance and the S.A. of their importance and superi- ority. If anyone dared to say a deprecatory word about the new order on a street corner, life was made hard for him, to say the least. In a village near Mainz a housewife said to her milkman that actually nothing had as yet improved in Germany; as a pun- ishment she was forced, for many months, to appear every morn- ing at party headquarters and say in a loud voice: 'Much has been improved and even more will be improved in Germany.'

This campaign against the alarmists was an enterprise of exceptional shortsightedness on Hitler's part. The masses of the people grew so embittered that in the middle of June even Göring, in an address to his Prussian Council of State, admitted that 'the mood was deteriorating and dissatisfaction had broken out here and there.' Nor were the S.A. chieftains happier now that they were once again being called on to stand by and help while the 'philistines' were admonished, just as they had done for years. Everyone felt that the final decision concerning the leadership and the form of the new state was still pending.

If Hitler really had been the conscious framer of political plans that he seemed in his own and the world's eyes—the great strategist of the revolution, as Hess once called him, who 'acts after ice-cold reflection'—he would have begun his preparations for the inevitable struggle for power at that very moment. It lies in the nature of things human that unused power passes imperceptibly from idle hands into more active ones; it was in the nature of this state that various ambitious absolute powers should struggle over its only half-used power; it was characteristic of Hitler to watch the ebb and flow of power and the struggle for it until a sudden danger cleared the situation like a flash of lightning and precipitated a decision. Thus groups arose in the National Socialist Party which prepared themselves for the bloody break-through to full, unrestricted domination, and all of them counted on carrying Hitler with them. Outwardly, the greatest force among these planners and makers of preparations was Röhm; he gathered around him a staff of people who were particularly devoted to him, not all of them among the oldest party members, but certainly all old Free Corps fighters, especially from the Rossbach unit. This group had personal points of support scattered throughout Germany: There was Count Wolf Helldorf, the leader of the Berlin-Brandenburg Obergruppe (that is, an organization of about a hundred thousand men) and, at that time, chief of police of Potsdam; there was Karl Ernst, Helldorf's friend and immediate subordinate, the Group Leader of Berlin, who came from the dregs of the lower classes just as Helldorf came from the dregs of the upper classes; there was the murderer, Edmund Heines, in Breslau; there was

Fritz Krausser, a friend of Röhm's, who had been King of Bavaria for outstanding bravery in the War; members of the group were Manfred von Killinger, Minister of Saxony; ex-Colonel August Schneidhuber in Munich, and Reiner and Count Spreti, Röhm's

It was a group which fully deserved the epithet Disinherited. Helldorf was perpetually bankrupt; he rowed money from a certain Steinschneider who was a Jewish money-lender. This man was probably of Jewish origin and earned money in theaters as a 'clairvoyant' under the pseudonym 'Sen'. In April, 1933, by order of Helldorf, he was a theater entrance and murdered in a woods near Bell, a former intimate friend of Röhm's who had fled to Austria and from there threatened concerning the Reichstag fire. By order of Röhm by a group of assassins who discovered him in a hotel room. The ideas of these men can hardly be better described than by the words in his *Banquet* put into the mouth of one of them: 'possible to form a state or an army exclusively these men would direct all their emulations toward going into battle with such a spirit would, even were small, conquer the entire world.'

A curious appendage to this group was Goebbels. He had an old habit, was always on the side of the dissatisfied; he believed that in the end Hitler would do what he wanted. With Helldorf he formed a kind of political leadership around Röhm; he gave Röhm publicity; he gave him a chance to speak before foreign diplomats; he put the S.A. complaints into words more eloquent than Röhm himself could do; he praised him in speeches and writings. In his so-called diary he still gave Röhm credit for his contribution to the 'seizure of power.'

Should it ever come to a revolutionary settlement, the party would need troops ready to strike at a moment's notice. To move quickly, this force must not be numerous; to be numerous; for the party which, within a short

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been the conscious framer of political plans in his own and the world's eyes—the 'great nation,' as Hess once called him, who 'acts in'—he would have begun his preparation: struggle for power at that very moment. If things human that unused power passes its hands into more active ones; it was in the various ambitious absolute powers should all-used power; it was characteristic of Hitler's flow of power and the struggle for it until the situation like a flash of lightning and. Thus groups arose in the National Socialist themselves for the bloody break-through to nation, and all of them counted on carrying forwardly, the greatest force among these preparations was Röhm; he gathered around him were particularly devoted to him, not all the best party members, but certainly all old especially from the Rossbach unit. This group of support scattered throughout Germany; Helldorf, the leader of the Berlin-Brandenburg, is, an organization of about a hundred that time, chief of police of Potsdam; there was his friend and immediate subordinate, the one, who came from the dregs of the lower class, came from the dregs of the upper classes; Dr. Edmund Heines, in Breslau; there was

April '33

Fritz Krausser, a friend of Röhm's, who had been ennobled by the King of Bavaria for outstanding bravery in the World War. Other members of the group were Manfred von Killinger, Prime Minister of Saxony; ex-Colonel August Schneidhuber, chief of police in Munich, and Reiner and Count Spreti, Röhm's aides-de-camp.

It was a group which fully deserved the epithet of Uprooted and Disinherited. Helldorf was perpetually bankrupt and had borrowed money from a certain Steinschneider who wanted his favor. This man was probably of Jewish origin and earned a great deal of money in theaters as a 'clairvoyant' under the pseudonym of Hanus. In April, 1933, by order of Helldorf, he was kidnapped from a theater entrance and murdered in a woods near Berlin. Georg Bell, a former intimate friend of Röhm's who had broken with him, fled to Austria and from there threatened to make revelations concerning the Reichstag fire. By order of Röhm he was pursued by a group of assassins who discovered him in a border village and murdered him in his hotel room. The ideas and aims of these men can hardly be better described than by the words which Plato in his *Banquet* put into the mouth of one of their ilk: 'If it were possible to form a state or an army exclusively of homosexuals, these men would direct all their emulations toward honors, and going into battle with such a spirit would, even if their numbers were small, conquer the entire world.'

A curious appendage to this group was Goebbels, who, from an old habit, was always on the side of the dissatisfied S.A. so long as he believed that in the end Hitler would do what they wanted. With Helldorf he formed a kind of political leadership of the bloc around Röhm; he gave Röhm publicity; he gave him opportunities to speak before foreign diplomats; he put the S.A. leaders' complaints into words more eloquent than Röhm himself could have done; he praised him in speeches and writings. In the April edition of his so-called diary he still gave Röhm credit for the chief contribution to the 'seizure of power.'

Should it ever come to a revolutionary settlement, such a clique would need troops ready to strike at a moment's notice. In order to move quickly, this force must not be numerous, nor did it have to be numerous; for the party which, within a short time, could lay

* Röhm's favorite quote

its hands on the geographical key points of government authority (government office buildings, centers of communication), would thereby enjoy the benefits of securing legality and power and draw the masses to its side. For that reason the National Socialist leaders had so-called 'staff-guards' around them. Hitler had his 'body-guard'; Göring kept a particularly formidable group near Berlin half-concealed in a building where he had been trained as an officer in his youth: this was a police group of several thousand men, formed 'for special services,' and called the Landes-Polizeigruppe General Göring. They were commanded by a certain Major Wecke who was quartered in the former Cadet School at Lichterfelde.

All these groups were silently supervised by a kind of armed 'black cabinet' which constantly kept the entire movement under control; it was composed of the most unostentatious high party officials and was completely in Hitler's hands. The leading personalities in this group were Rudolf Hess, Heinrich Himmler, and former Major Walter Buch, chairman of the Party's Control Committee.

Since 1920, when Hess joined Hitler, his job had been to spy on the party and keep it in order. For the supervision of the S.A. he had a particularly suitable human instrument, a certain Martin Bormann, an 'old fighter,' who was endowed with all the qualities and experience of the armed bohemians, including a year spent in prison for participation in a political murder. Bormann had been Captain von Pfeffer's right hand when the latter was the supreme leader of the S.A. When in 1930, Pfeffer was crowded out by Röhm's clique, Bormann left the leadership of the S.A., but remained director of the 'Relief Fund,' an institution which could also be called the bribe fund. At its headquarters the lamentations and grievances of the malcontents which the leadership would not listen to were loudly reiterated; and Bormann, full of bitter resentment against the 'gang of fairies' around Röhm, collected heaps of material. Its content was communicated to Hess; and Hess began to din into Hitler's ears that the conditions created by Röhm's male harem within the S.A. were gradually becoming unbearable. A similar complaint was brought by Walter Buch: he claimed that Röhm had built up around himself a peculiar staff, completely de-

* scene

voted to him personally, but dubious, to say the least of view of the party and its Führer. What seemed objectionable was that Röhm's collaborators were known in the movement; that their patron had personal reasons, and that therefore they placed their loyalty to him above everything else. Actually Göring had always done the same thing—it would have been able if they had done otherwise; even Hitler himself, thus, in April, 1934, he had got Hindenburg to a dictator, Joachim von Ribbentrop, 'deputy in disarmament,' thus making him, over Rosenberg's head, the first expert on foreign politics.

At first, as he himself later admitted, Hitler ignored the accusations. But the S.A. themselves suffered from the wedge which Hitler had deliberately driven into their beginning—and now this was to prove one of his most far-reaching measures. Outwardly, the S.A. remained subjected to Röhm's supreme command; among the S.S. Himmler still appeared as one of the S.A. leaders. The old fighters grumbled and threatened publicly, but they were not disturbed until well into May; it was as though they had triumphed—and perhaps they had when, at the end of April, Göring was forced to dismiss Werner Dietrich from the secret state police, and once a very useful traitor to him by Heinrich Himmler. Himmler was already the 'political police' in all the German states while still the leader of the S.S.; now he was given the strongest position in the Reich and he merged it, with the help of Reinhard Heydrich, with the police organization of the German states. Staffed by selected S.S. men, permeated with silent arrogance and cold indifference toward humanity, the body gradually became the most frightful organization in modern history.

The meaning of such shifts of power as Himmler's to the post of chief of the Gestapo is rarely as clear as to the persons most closely involved as it is later

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At first, as he himself later admitted, Hitler ignored all these accusations. But the S.A. themselves suffered from the widening wedge which Hitler had deliberately driven into them from the beginning—and now this was to prove one of his shrewdest and most far-reaching measures. Outwardly, the Black S.S. was still subjected to Röhm's supreme command; among the S.S. leaders Himmler still appeared as one of the S.A. leaders; and when the old fighters grumbled and threatened publicly, Himmler was among the loudest of them. This situation continued seemingly undisturbed until well into May; it was as though the old fighters had triumphed—and perhaps they had when, at the beginning of April, Göring was forced to dismiss Werner Diels, his chief of the secret state police, and once a very useful traitor, and replace him by Heinrich Himmler. Himmler was already chief of the 'political police' in all the German states while remaining Reich leader of the S.S.; now he was given the strongest police machine in the Reich and he merged it, with the help of his collaborator, Reinhard Heydrich, with the police organizations of the other German states. Staffed by selected S.S. men, permeated with their silent arrogance and cold indifference toward humanity, this police body gradually became the most frightful organization of its kind in modern history.

The meaning of such shifts of power as Himmler's promotion to the post of chief of the Gestapo is rarely as clear at the moment to the persons most closely involved as it is later to outside ob-

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servers. This is because those who act rarely know exactly what they want. Only three months later, it looked as though Himmler had been bought by Göring in April and thus detached from Röhm; but Röhm himself may have believed at that time that the growing power of Himmler, whom he had first elevated and who was his subordinate, would be his own power, too. Moreover, he knew that his own humiliation and dissatisfaction were the humiliation and dissatisfaction of the party; when he grumbled and made demands, he did it at bottom for Hitler; even if he was troublesome, it was only—as he saw it—because of excessive zeal and excessive loyalty. Even if Hitler sometimes liked to scold him, there was nothing to show that he would eventually 'trample him' as Hess had prophesied.

But in May, it became clear that Hindenburg would not live much longer. Increasing senility had even earlier gradually removed the eighty-seven-year-old man from the actual business of government. This left the National Socialists more freedom than they would have obtained from the President in his better days. But his imminent death put them in the greatest embarrassment: the problem of his succession had to be solved.

Strangely enough, it did not occur to many well-informed people that his successor could be Hitler. This idea was farthest removed from the President himself. At the beginning of May, he wrote a political testament which later, after its publication, bore the date of May 10; in it he cast a retrospective glance over his life; he declared that the Empire had to be restored; referring to the immediate present, he gave 'my Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, and his movement' high praise for their achievement, but explicitly avoided designating the Führer as his successor. More than that, the whole tenor of the document clearly gave the impression that Hindenburg did not wish Hitler to be the future President of the Reich—nor did Hitler later call himself President. The writer of this testament may have been even more explicit about this in passages which were suppressed before its publication.

Soon rumors began to circulate that Hindenburg wanted a 'Reich Regency' after his death, a régime with a leader of greater authority than Hitler had. It was said that the Regent should be a

Hohenzollern prince, and the most benevolently of the National Socialists thought of August Wilhelm, Hitler with reverence as 'My Führer.' Others mentioned English Prince von Cumberland, former Duke of I the ex-Kaiser's son-in-law. Still others—who had tomed to an old Marshal—staked their bets on August von Mackensen, an illegitimate offspring of lerns, who, during the World War, had been built burg's rival by the jealous Kaiser. At bottom all tastes, without any serious basis; but they showed circles which secretly manufactured a good part of the lic opinion, Hitler was not envisaged as Hindenburg

Within a short time Hitler would thus be confronted with the task of overcoming the resistance of his dead predecessor, much alive public opinion, especially the resistance of the upper crust whose influence had always been excessively great, of uncertainty, and of making himself head of the Reich. But where was this force? Röhm could point at his side. Here it is; the same could be said by Himmler of even Göring of his 'police groups'; but Hitler knew that the Reichswehr wielded real power. 'If the Reichswehr on our side in the days of the revolution,' he used to say, 'not be here.' But the Reichswehr—more accurately and Reichenau—had supported him because they believed that a majority of the people supported him or, at any rate, would support him within a short time. Could he still count on the people when trying to become head of the German Reich? He would need a majority of fifty-one per cent of the votes, which he certainly would not get, especially by forbidding any dates to run, would not be satisfactory; ninety-nine per cent required in order to enable his régime to represent the people to represent: the unity of the German people. It was achieved only if all resistance were silenced or put on and for this Hitler needed the collaboration of the force in the state.

At that very moment Röhm began a dispute with Reichenau; more accurately, he resumed the old dispute

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At that very moment Röhm began a dispute with Blomberg and
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June 30

of which he had been driven out of the Reichswehr ten years before, and which, since that time, had stood like a black cloud between the S.A. and the Reichswehr and kept even the relations between Röhm and Hitler in a state of constant although silent tension; the dispute over the question of whether the S.A. should form the bulk of the future army. Von Schleicher, as Minister of the Reichswehr and Chancellor, had envisaged such a plan when he wanted to surround the small professional army with a mass 'militia' and use the S.A. and Steel Helmets for this purpose. As a private citizen, he had continued to regard the Reichswehr as his own affair and his own creature; the plan for a mass militia obviously seemed to him an ideal solution at the moment when the negotiations with the Western powers about the increase of the Reichswehr came to a deadlock. Whether it is true — as Hitler maintained — that he intended to appoint Röhm Minister of the Reichswehr and himself Vice-Chancellor, and then brilliantly solve the problem of German rearmament by introducing his militia, is still impossible to verify; but he doubtless played with many projects, possibly with this one, too.

Röhm, as a member of the Reich cabinet, now raised his voice and demanded that the S.A. be made a part of the Reichswehr. Even if only a fraction of the three million S.A. men, most of whom were engaged in civilian activities, could become soldiers, as many S.A. leaders as possible were obviously to become officers, and this with a rank more or less corresponding to their S.A. rank. Thus, one fine morning these armed poultry farmers or department store porters would wake up with the rank of general or at least colonel, just because they had won the titles of S.A. group or brigade leaders as a result of various scuffles in beer-cellars or back alleys. Blomberg sharply rejected Röhm's demands.

By his aggressive move, Röhm gave the 'enemies of the S.A.' their long-desired occasion to blame and deride what almost everyone in Germany knew about the S.A. and their degenerate leaders; they particularly attacked Röhm's newly organized Berlin headquarters as the scene of extravagant and obscene orgies. At the beginning of June, Hitler, according to his own account, had a five-hour conversation with Röhm, from the afternoon until past mid-

night, in which he submitted to him the com-
Hess and Buch, demanded the liquidation of him
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From Hitler's subsequent explanations, it ap-
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a driven out of the Reichswehr ten years before, at time, had stood like a black cloud between Reichswehr and kept even the relations between a state of constant although silent tension; the question of whether the S.A. should form the bulk of the Reichswehr, as Minister of the Reichswehr envisaged such a plan when he wanted to surmount the army with a mass 'militia' and use the Reichswehr for this purpose. As a private citizen, he regarded the Reichswehr as his own affair and his plan for a mass militia obviously seemed to him the moment when the negotiations with the Reichswehr came to a close — as Hitler maintained — that he in his position as Minister of the Reichswehr and himself then brilliantly solve the problem of German unification, his militia, is still impossible to verify; but with many projects, possibly with this one,

of the Reich cabinet, now raised his voice and the S.A. be made a part of the Reichswehr. Of the three million S.A. men, most of whom were in civilian activities, could become soldiers, as many of them were obviously to become officers, and this was less corresponding to their S.A. rank. Thus, the armed poultry farmers or department store clerks with the rank of general or at least colonel, won the titles of S.A. group or brigade leader in the scuffles in beer-cellars or back alleys. Blomberg's demands.

Above, Röhm gave the 'enemies of the S.A.' the occasion to blame and deride what almost everyone knew about the S.A. and their degenerate activities: they attacked Röhm's newly organized Berlin section of extravagant and obscene orgies. At the time, according to his own account, had a five-day party, from the afternoon until past mid-

night, in which he submitted to him the complaints gathered by Hess and Buch, demanded the liquidation of his male harem, and, more generally, a complete change in his system of leadership. From Hitler's subsequent explanations, it appears that Röhm refused to be intimidated, that he contradicted him stubbornly, and that his attitude was not respectful. Probably the conversation went far beyond the points Hitler mentions; Hitler must have demanded that Röhm show greater complaisance with regard to the Reichswehr and discussed with him the grave dangers created by Hindenburg's imminent death. Röhm may have replied that this very fact offered the historical opportunity for which the S.A. had been built through long years of work; but Hitler's conviction that he could achieve supreme power only with the help of the Reichswehr was unshakable.

From that moment on the fate of the S.A. and their leaders was sealed from an historical point of view; Hitler had to separate himself from them, 'trample them to dust,' if he were to become supreme chief of the Reich. Röhm was suddenly isolated, his entourage of followers, advocates, and companions quickly disintegrated; Goebbels and Himmler, who only recently had called for a new revolution or the continuation of the old one, grew silent. On June 7, Röhm took a furlough which was certainly a real sick-leave; he went for treatment to Wiessee in Upper Bavaria, where he lived in the 'Hanslbauer' sanatorium; Heines, too, went there, to restore his apparently failing health. Röhm could prove that he had really put himself in the hands of physicians; but obviously Hitler had insisted that he disappear from Berlin for some time. Before leaving, Röhm wrote a farewell message to the S.A. announcing that his S.A. men should take a four weeks' furlough on July 1; as for the 'enemies of the S.A.,' who circulated the rumor that this meant the disbandment of the brown army, 'they would be given a suitable answer in due time and in whatever form is necessary.' This warning was followed by an equally threatening concluding sentence: 'The S.A. is and remains Germany's destiny.' There was no 'Heil Hitler'; the Führer was not mentioned at all.

Hitler was in a difficult position, made even more difficult by Röhm. His Austrian policy was being criticized with increasing

* Heines, the murderer.

* Röhm's right: The S.A. was Germany's destiny and in 1945, eleven years after their destruction, Germany was destroyed.

sharpness from many sides; without doubt, National Socialism had stupidly driven Germany's sister-country, Austria, once so close and friendly to the Reich, into the arms of the Italians. Among the critics of Hitler's Austrian policy was Röhm; in fact, he went beyond criticism and made it known in Vienna that he disapproved of Hitler's attacks on Austria. From this point on, Hitler evidently began to feel that Röhm was betraying him.

Amidst all the plans, conspiracies, and armed preparations carried on in various places and more and more clearly orientated toward the expected great event, the death of the old man of Neu-deck, there were opportunities for dubious actions, actions that were treasonable or at least bordered on treason. Von Schleicher, a good friend of François-Poncet, the French ambassador, had already under Brüning used his good offices to prepare Paris for the coming change in Germany, and Hitler was certainly acquainted with these questionable activities because he himself had drawn the greatest advantage from them. Now it became known that during a session of the League Council in Geneva, Louis Barthou, the French Foreign Minister, had said in a private conversation that it was futile to negotiate with the present German government because it would soon be replaced by another. It was easy to draw conclusions from such a report, although difficult to check, let alone prove them — and Hitler never gave a single piece of evidence for the accusations he made in connection with the events that were to follow. True, some people involved in the affair admitted that during the month of May, François-Poncet met a varied group of German politicians in the home of a Dutch financier: but subsequent events showed that this meeting was harmless.

One of the German politicians present had been von Schleicher, who did not need any Dutchman to introduce him to François-Poncet; another was Gregor Strasser, who had been out of politics for a year and a half and was active as an adviser on labor relations for a chemical company and — a point which was not immaterial to him — earning much more in this capacity than ever before in his life. The third politician present had been Röhm. The meeting seems to have been imposed on all these three men rather than desired by them. Strasser had been compelled to promise his em-

ployers that he would no longer dabble in politics; was generous enough to make him keep this promise; and two sons and did not carry much life insurance. He had asked his host to see to it that nothing leaked, a meeting which he had not desired; he seemed deliberately spoken about unimportant matters — at least that is what Poncet later told the Foreign Office. After the events, Hitler kept the French ambassador in Berlin for and treated him with conspicuous kindness, which would have been the case if this Frenchman, forgetting his diplomatic duties, had been involved in a conspiracy against the government he was accredited. A commission of German officers investigated the matter and established that von Schleicher had not committed treason. But Hitler laid out his motives as follows: when three traitors meet as ambassador of a foreign power and conceal the fact from me, then I give orders to have these men shot, even shot at such a meeting, hidden from me, only the weapons, and similar subjects were discussed.

Hitler made this declaration in cutting tones on July 1, 1934, when he spoke in the Reichstag; but in the same speech he said that he had not thought of the shootings until late in the night of July 1, that is to say, at a time when he must have known of the meeting with François-Poncet for a long time. This was one of the incidents in which his intelligence service got wind of part of a very important incident, but failed to get hold of the decisive part of it which was later falsely added by inference. What is characteristic of Hitler's methods in this affair is that such pieces of information, once obtained, were not used as a basis for preventive measures, but for the most far-reaching decisions concerning the life and death of hundreds of people and the fate of the entire nation. On June 30, says Hitler, he resolved to take extreme measures only at the last minute, under the pressure of extreme danger — after having said that he took these measures because the meeting with François-Poncet had aroused his suspicions. These two declarations are inconsistent — but actually the explanation of the events described below is inconsistent.

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ployers that he would no longer dabble in politics, and his salary was generous enough to make him keep this promise; he had a wife and two sons and did not carry much life insurance. Von Schleicher had asked his host to see to it that nothing leaked out about this meeting which he had not desired; he seemed deliberately to have spoken about unimportant matters — at least that is what François-Poncet later told the Foreign Office. After the events we are studying, Hitler kept the French ambassador in Berlin for many years and treated him with conspicuous kindness, which would not have been the case if this Frenchman, forgetting his diplomatic duties, had been involved in a conspiracy against the government to which he was accredited. A commission of German officers later investigated the matter and established that von Schleicher had acted honorably and had not committed treason. But Hitler later summed up his motives as follows: when three traitors meet with an ambassador of a foreign power and conceal the fact from him, Hitler, 'then I give orders to have these men shot, even should it be true that at such a meeting, hidden from me, only the weather, ancient coins, and similar subjects were discussed.'

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June, '34

tradictory on essential points, is based on thoroughly implausible assertions, and even the plausible ones remain unproved.

If a net of dangers was really being woven around Hitler, he obviously failed to discover it until the end of June. On June 14, he felt secure enough to leave Germany and visit Mussolini; this trip to Italy had been prepared by Ribbentrop, who had gone to Rome toward the end of May. For the first time the 'great man of the south' and his northern admirer met: the herald of *Europa Fascista* beheld the prophet who called upon Aryans of all nations to unite. The ostensible purpose of the meeting was to settle the question of Austria, over which National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy had been wrangling. The real purpose, at least as far as Hitler was concerned, was to explore the possibilities of a close understanding between the two countries. Hitler landed from his plane in Venice, dressed as a civilian in an unpretentious raincoat; Mussolini received him in his gold-braided uniform, with a dagger at his side. As Hitler walked toward him, the Italian dictator is alleged to have said: '*Non mi piace.*' The visit lasted two days. Important matters were discussed in *tête-à-tête* conversations, and Mussolini politely made use of his fairly fluent German.

Despite Hitler's zealous wooing of the Italian dictator, his visit failed to create a cordial personal relationship between the two men. However, they had an extremely frank exchange of views; the premises of their ideas were so similar that they could not conceal much from each other. No concrete results were achieved, nor had Hitler expected any; Mussolini, who wanted to receive reassuring promises about Austria, got what he wanted. It would have been surprising if Hitler had refused to give a promise so earnestly desired by his respected host, especially as he knew at bottom that a statesman can always find an adequate excuse for breaking his word under compelling circumstances.

Mussolini frankly told his guest that the persecution of the Jews made it difficult even for him to be completely friendly toward Germany and tried to prove to Hitler that his anti-Jewish paranoia was unjustified. A leading Jewish-Italian rabbi, Mussolini said, had asked him not to rebuff Hitler, but on the contrary to cultivate the best possible relations with him, because Italy might thus have an

opportunity to ease the sufferings of the German Jew. Doubt that Mussolini, older, successful for a long time, and undoubtedly still more powerful than Hitler, told him this in the new Germany. The maxim that a great usurper even upon his friends probably was invoked. In his Italian dictator had written that 'normally, a revolution can be channeled into legality only by measures, directed, if necessary, against the person of the ruler. . . . At certain historical hours, the sacrifice of the deserving lieutenants of yesterday might become necessary for the supreme interest of tomorrow.'

Hitler left Italy with the feeling that he had seen the climax of his power, but that his rival had seen his entanglement in the most inextricable difficulties, whose strength was still too strong and whose own friends were disloyal. Though to confirm this impression, upon his return on June 17, he was given the text of a speech in which the same day, had unsparingly attacked the Nazi régime before an audience of professors and students of the University of Marburg; von Papen made only slight criticism of his speech as a friendly criticism. The campaign against the 'enemies' had taken on repulsive forms and filled many with indignation; at times it degenerated into murder against the two Christian churches. The man largely responsible for this was Alfred Rosenberg whom Hitler had appointed on January 31) 'to supervise all the spiritual and philosophical education of the party,' in order to compensate for political disappointments. Now National Socialism, being forcibly hammered into the minds of the youth at the universities, young S.A. or S.S. men gave so much trouble on philosophy (*Weltanschauung*) which the students were compelled to attend. Doors were locked, nobody could lecture, then the youthful teachers, who were often completely inexperienced, demanded that the students memorize bloody gibberish following verses:

Wetzt die langen Messer an dem Buergerstei
dass sie besser flutschen in der Pfaffen Leib!

* A sketch of Mussolini looking Hitler over.
"Second-rate, scruffy, scrawny. A clerk full of hatred. A man unworthy of the summit."

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demanded that the students memorize bloody gibberish such as the
following verses:

Wetzt die langen Messer an dem Buergersteig,
dass sie besser flutschen in der Pfaffen Leib!...

* D.T. I had him study these remarks

Und kommt die Stunde der Vergeltung,
Stehn wir zu jeden Massenmord bereit.¹

Before the students of Marburg, von Papen declared threateningly that the question whether the German Reich would be a Christian state or not was still to be fought out. The everlasting lecturing of the people must stop, he said. The situation was serious, the laws were defective, the people were suffering from economic distress, they were tired of hearing everything painted in glowing colors! Propaganda, he went on, does not create great men, nor is propaganda alone sufficient to maintain the confidence of the people; the absolute rule of one party could only be a transitional state of affairs.

Von Papen's speech aroused Germany as no other speech had aroused her for a long time; it expressed what millions were feeling and what even Hitler himself had to recognize at the bottom of his heart. True, on the same day, in a speech before his followers in the city of Gera, he abused von Papen (although without mentioning his name) as a worm and ridiculous dwarf whom the Führer 'would crush with the fist of the entire German nation' if he engaged in serious sabotage; but there was nothing serious in these grumblers who believed that they could slow up the gigantic renaissance movement of the people with a few figures of speech; 'this state is in its first youth, and you may be sure that in a thousand years it will still stand unbroken.' But it could not be denied that von Papen had spoken the truth and that, once more, he had proclaimed publicly what Hitler himself knew was true. And von Papen had received a congratulatory telegram from Hindenburg.

It would have been more than a miracle if after von Papen's speech, Röhm and his friends had not begun preparing for the great settling of accounts or at least for a decision in the near future. When Hitler spoke in Gera he still believed that the decision, which in fact had been made, would not look like a decision; he thought that his cheated followers would accept the fraud and that the politically killed, just to please him, would pretend they were still alive. But

¹ Sharpen the long knives on the sidewalks, so that they can cut the clergy-men's bodies better. . . . When the hour of retribution strikes, we will be ready for mass murder.

* Possible title - Massenmord

possible title - The Monarch of Massenmord
The Monarch of Massenmord

* a scene where Hindenburg reads the speech. "It is well-put, it is so well-put."

they did not. After the Gera speech, the higher S. to have discussed at great length Hitler's irresolute insight. Doubtless, Röhm and his comrades thought compelling their Leader to make a decision; as Röhm they would not be satisfied with 'Adolf's tears.'

The strife between the armed gangs not only set from the rest of the National Socialist party, it also c themselves into a group gathered under Röhm's pec and other slighted and dissatisfied groups which we always morally better. Among these latter elements gruppenführer of Hanover, a certain Viktor Lutz severely wounded in the World War and one-eyed intimate friend of Goebbels's who had brought H his home. Another malcontent was Count Helldorf intimate friend of Röhm's, who had since quarrelled cause Röhm had not sufficiently protected him from publicity which followed the murder of Hanussen reports brought to Hitler by Lutz and Helldorf w only of secondary importance will perhaps be set a future date; at any rate, among Röhm's intimates, H only one to have survived him and to have even honorable promotion.

When these groups got ready for the fight, this r other things—that they had drawn up lists of 'liquidated' the moment action began. During the years of struggle before 1933 there had been time t lists. The various fractions of the party had noted addresses of their enemies, and the enemies of one, necessarily the enemies of another; the enemies of th leadership were not necessarily those whom Reinhard singled out in the name of the S.S. Reich leadership staff' and Göring had quite different lists of their pfates bloodthirsty fanatics had compiled endless list in others, following orders from above, only a few tims had been designated. Personal feuds often prov were lists of various kinds, of persons to be elimin circumstances and of persons to be eliminated only

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to have discussed at great length Hitler's irresolution and lack of
insight. Doubtless Röhm and his comrades thought about ways of
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The strife between the armed gangs not only separated the S.A.
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themselves into a group gathered under Röhm's peculiar leadership
and other slighted and dissatisfied groups which were by no means
always morally better. Among these latter elements was the Ober-
gruppenführer of Hanover, a certain Viktor Lutze, an ex-officer
severely wounded in the World War and one-eyed. Lutze was an
intimate friend of Goebbels's who had brought Hitler himself to
his home. Another malcontent was Count Helldorf, that former
intimate friend of Röhm's, who had since quarrelled with him be-
cause Röhm had not sufficiently protected him from the unfavorable
publicity which followed the murder of Hanussen. Whether the
reports brought to Hitler by Lutze and Helldorf were of major or
only of secondary importance will perhaps be established at some
future date; at any rate, among Röhm's intimates, Helldorf was the
only one to have survived him and to have even been given an
honorable promotion.

When these groups got ready for the fight, this meant — among
other things — that they had drawn up lists of persons to be
'liquidated' the moment action began. During the long-drawn-out
years of struggle before 1933 there had been time to prepare such
lists. The various fractions of the party had noted the names and
addresses of their enemies, and the enemies of one group were not
necessarily the enemies of another; the enemies of the supreme S.A.
leadership were not necessarily those whom Reinhard Heydrich had
singled out in the name of the S.S. Reich leadership; Hess's 'liaison
staff' and Göring had quite different lists of their own. In some
places bloodthirsty fanatics had compiled endless lists of proscripts;
in others, following orders from above, only a few inevitable vic-
tims had been designated. Personal feuds often proved fatal. There
were lists of various kinds, of persons to be eliminated under any
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* with Polém gone, the fear of
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a secret or an overall play of
whoever on which lists. The
pleasure of drawing up the lists.
The heavy engagement of the
demons in the war of the demons,
"let mine — how dare you?" The
arguing of the Polém demon who has
been ordered to withdraw by the O.D.

circumstances; also purges of different degrees had been provided for: some in which the victims were to be killed at once, some in which arrest would be sufficient. This criss-cross system of lists and purges of various types seemed to work out on paper; but in reality bloody confusion was almost inevitable, especially when former executioners were suddenly to be designated as victims.

This mass of stored-up murder considerably added to the bloody confusion of the subsequent events; persons fell who had absolutely nothing in common with Röhm and his circle, and against whom there existed no tangible suspicion, let alone an accusation calling for the death penalty. Furthermore, the whole idea of a Schleicher-Strasser-Röhm conspiracy was little more than an invention, and the empty and embarrassed words which Hitler later used to describe this alleged plot suffice to prove this. True, the dissatisfaction of the S.A. and their readiness to go into action were much more serious; but all the facts later revealed by the victors or made known against their will show that on June 30 no immediate danger threatened. The brutal repression which inevitably caused the death of many innocent people was thus unnecessary and unjustified.

On July 1, the S.A. were supposed to take a furlough; the supreme leadership issued orders to this effect and even transmitted them to the press. During this furlough they were forbidden to wear uniforms and to organize meetings, even private meetings; so-called 'celebrations' were also forbidden, and lower officials were advised to avoid, as far as possible, sending written reports to their superiors during that period. Whether this very thoroughness aroused the suspicions of the opposing groups or whether they had better reasons to be suspicious, on June 25, Blomberg proclaimed a so-called 'little' state of alarm to the Reichswehr, which meant that every soldier had to be at the army's disposal, even if he were on leave. The same kind of state of alarm was proclaimed by Himmler for the S.S. troops. Karl Ernst, group leader of Berlin, twice telephoned Göring inquiring whether this state of alarm meant anything. Twice received 'No' for an answer.

It is certain that on June 25, when the state of alarm began, Hitler already envisaged the deposition of Röhm; but it is unlikely that

this perpetually wavering will already had taken sion on that day. On June 26, through Hess, he to forgive Röhm his indiscipline, abuse of power, and scandalous behavior — provided he renounced d lution.' Such revolutions, Hess said in a speech at not be made in Germany 'after the model of the an lutions in small exotic republics,' referring to Röhm Bolivian army. But no bad feelings! 'An old Nationa Hess, 'must be generous toward human peculiarities: in National Socialist leaders if these go hand in h achievements. And because of the great achieveeme give the little weaknesses.'

Röhm was still with Heines, Count Sperti, and a fe in the Hanslbauer at Wiessee; not in a fortified head ing, but in a wing of a hotel accessible to anyone by physicians. For the most part the guests were volved in politics. Röhm was even without his ush which was quartered in Munich. He had invited a r leaders from various parts of the Reich to Wiessee June 30, for a so-called 'leaders' conference' and ha the staff guard to come on this occasion. Hitler pected to come, although Röhm desired his pres ordered a Hungarian artist in Munich to prepare a be he intended to present to Hitler on the next approp it showed the book *Mein Kampf* with a sword o clasped hands above the book and the sword.

This conference at first does not seem to have ar suspicions. Far worse was the fact that Röhm had let offer unanswered. In Hitler's eyes Röhm's principal e haps that during these feverish days when Hitler ex fying explanation, Röhm just did nothing, said nothi vague partisan utterances of his victorious adversarie reliably established whether or not, at the last mome desperate attempt to strike back; but it is certain that moment all the first steps had been taken by his enen

Toward the end of June, Hitler said later, he decid end to an intolerable situation,' that is to say, to c

* The machines of paranoia were humming,

res of different degrees had been provided victims were to be killed at once, some in sufficient. This criss-cross system of lists types seemed to work out on paper; but in was almost inevitable, especially when suddenly to be designated as victims.

up murder considerably added to the subsequent events; persons fell who had common with Röhm and his circle, and ted no tangible suspicion, let alone an each penalty. Furthermore, the whole idea Röhm conspiracy was little more than an and embarrassed words which Hitler later egged plot suffice to prove this. True, the and their readiness to go into action were all the facts later revealed by the victors or it will show that on June 30 no immediate brutal repression which inevitably caused ent people was thus unnecessary and un-

e supposed to take a furlough; the supreme o this effect and even transmitted them to irlough they were forbidden to wear uni- meetings, even private meetings; so-called rbidden, and lower officials were advised ; sending written reports to their superiors ether this very thoroughness aroused the g groups or whether they had better rea- June 25, Blomberg proclaimed a so-called the Reichswehr, which meant that every army's disposal, even if he were on leave. of alarm was proclaimed by Himmler for st, group leader of Berlin, twice telephoned er this state of alarm meant anything. n answer.

e 25, when the state of alarm began, Hitler position of Röhm; but it is unlikely that

this perpetually wavering will already had taken the final decision on that day. On June 26, through Hess, he made an offer to forgive Röhm his indiscipline, abuse of power, evil intentions and scandalous behavior — provided he renounced the 'second revolution.' Such revolutions, Hess said in a speech at Cologne, could not be made in Germany 'after the model of the annual little revolutions in small exotic republics,' referring to Röhm's career in the Bolivian army. But no bad feelings! 'An old National Socialist,' said Hess, 'must be generous toward human peculiarities and weaknesses in National Socialist leaders if these go hand in hand with great achievements. And because of the great achievements he will forgive the little weaknesses.' *

Röhm was still with Heines, Count Spretti, and a few other friends in the Hanslbauer at Wiessee; not in a fortified headquarters building, but in a wing of a hotel accessible to anyone and supervised by physicians. For the most part the guests were people not involved in politics. Röhm was even without his usual staff guard which was quartered in Munich. He had invited a number of S.A. leaders from various parts of the Reich to Wiessee on Saturday, June 30, for a so-called 'leaders' conference' and had also ordered the staff guard to come on this occasion. Hitler was not expected to come, although Röhm desired his presence. He had ordered a Hungarian artist in Munich to prepare a bookplate which he intended to present to Hitler on the next appropriate occasion; it showed the book *Mein Kampf* with a sword on it, and two clasped hands above the book and the sword.

This conference at first does not seem to have aroused Hitler's suspicions. Far worse was the fact that Röhm had left Hess's peace offer unanswered. In Hitler's eyes Röhm's principal crime was perhaps that during these feverish days when Hitler expected a satisfying explanation, Röhm just did nothing, said nothing. From the vague partisan utterances of his victorious adversaries it cannot be reliably established whether or not, at the last moment, he made a desperate attempt to strike back; but it is certain that until this last moment all the first steps had been taken by his enemies.

Toward the end of June, Hitler said later, he decided 'to put an end to an intolerable situation,' that is to say, to depose Röhm,

* Röhm — "That faggot Hess is his tongue up Adolf's ass. These last ten years will forgive my little weaknesses? My nose has many times sniffed a little shit from time to time, but my cock has ten times more to say on the subject. Thus Franklin D. Roosevelt!"

whom, according to these words, he still could not reproach with anything definite. Even if this step was exaggerated, it would be fully justifiable as a preventive measure; the only thing that can be said against it is that it was not carried out. If during these days of June 26 to June 28, Hitler had performed the normal duties of a statesman; if he had openly intervened and deposed, arrested and legally prosecuted the real or alleged rebels, the whole affair would probably have been significant historically, but not dramatic or even repulsive. He did the exact opposite: he buried himself in an inspection tour of the labor camps in northwestern Germany, 'in order to lull the rebels into security,' as he later boasted.

The rebels were those who even as late as June 26 were accused only of 'little weaknesses and peculiarities'! It is almost certain that a few hours before the catastrophe, the most serious element in the alleged state of danger was the rulers' fear of their own following. 'Working had become almost impossible,' Göring later said in the Reichstag, 'because at almost every moment we had to fear that we might be kidnapped by a gang of rebels.' Hitler's restless trips from one end of Germany to another — on June 25, he was in Bavaria, near the southern German border, inspecting a new Alpine road; two days later, he was almost in the extreme northwest — represent his attempt to conceal from himself the decision which events had already taken for him.

Up to the last minute he was not clear in his mind about his purpose nor the means of achieving it. According to one of his own statements he had ordered Göring, who was in Berlin, to proceed with 'analogous' measures at his, Hitler's, 'cue.' This 'cue,' as can be inferred from another of his utterances, was simply the report made to Göring that he, Hitler, was now striking out. The strength and extent of the blows to be delivered were not yet determined even after blood had been shed. On June 28, Göring and Himmler made preparations as for a civil war; they ordered their police commandos and their S.S. special troops to hold themselves in readiness. On June 29, Karl Ernst, the S.A. group leader in Berlin, seems to have got wind of these preparations; from a private report of one of Röhm's followers it appears that he interpreted them as a sign that the 'reactionaries' were making ready for the long-expected

decisive blow against National Socialism; obvious to him that Hitler himself desired this blow; he believed that his Führer would be the first reason, on the afternoon of June 29, he proclaimed for the Berlin S.A.

While this went on — toward the evening of June 29, he stopped at Godesberg on the Rhine. He sat on the lawn which belonged to a personal friend of his, a form named Dreesen. On the lawn in front of the he labor service organized a torch procession in his thousand of them stood there, forming a gigantic b

By that time Goebbels had arrived from Berlin bringing reports about the S.A.'s activities; probably he latest ones from Helldorf. The following day, he posed to go on furlough; allegedly Goebbels and his 'alarming' that for the time being they were still Lutze was summoned from Hanover by wire; a decision was made during consultations with him, Otto Dietrich, the 'press chief.' Hitler finally made to go personally to Wiessee on the following day and his staff at noon, but for the time being not to hisishment upon him. He wired Röhm that he was a Röhm seems to have felt glad and honored; simultaneously ordered most of the high party officials to be in M day; obviously he was planning a kind of party trial his followers.

This was the political decision that had become choice Hitler was compelled to make between the Reichswehr, which he had for a long time tried to have now made. It was also the end of a friendship, which foundered because one of the two friends refused to elevation of the other to a godlike status, because he main on an equal footing with him, made him feel and repeatedly displayed his own self-confident strong offensive manner. Whether Röhm still believed that was loyal to Hitler, perhaps even more loyal than I was beside the point; he certainly was disobedient i

* D.T. - the paranoia had become intense

→ D.T.'s state - In killing, unobscured phase

these words, he still could not reproach with even if this step was exaggerated, it would be a preventive measure; the only thing that can be it was not carried out. If during these days of Hitler had performed the normal duties of a openly intervened and deposed, arrested and real or alleged rebels, the whole affair would significant historically, but not dramatic or did the exact opposite: he buried himself in an labor camps in northwestern Germany, 'in into security,' as he later boasted.

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decisive blow against National Socialism; obviously it did not occur to him that Hitler himself desired this blow; on the contrary, he believed that his Führer would be the first victim. For that reason, on the afternoon of June 29, he proclaimed a state of alarm for the Berlin S.A.

While this went on — toward the evening of June 29 — Hitler stopped at Godesberg on the Rhine. He sat on the terrace of a hotel which belonged to a personal friend of his, a former war comrade named Dreesen. On the lawn in front of the hotel, men of the labor service organized a torch procession in his honor. Some thousand of them stood there, forming a gigantic blazing swastika.

By that time Goebbels had arrived from Berlin bringing disquieting reports about the S.A.'s activities; probably he had heard the latest ones from Helldorf. The following day, the S.A. were supposed to go on furlough; allegedly Goebbels and Hitler thought it 'alarming' that for the time being they were still at their posts. Lütze was summoned from Hanover by wire; the momentous decision was made during consultations with him, Goebbels, and Otto Dietrich, the 'press chief.' Hitler finally made up his mind to go personally to Wiessee on the following day and arrest Röhm and his staff at noon, but for the time being not to inflict any punishment upon him. He wired Röhm that he was on his way, and Röhm seems to have felt glad and honored; simultaneously Hitler ordered most of the high party officials to be in Munich the next day; obviously he was planning a kind of party trial of Röhm and his followers.

This was the political decision that had become inevitable, the choice Hitler was compelled to make between the S.A. and the Reichswehr, which he had for a long time tried to avoid and which he now made. It was also the end of a friendship, which had really foundered because one of the two friends refused to recognize the elevation of the other to a godlike status, because he wanted to remain on an equal footing with him, made him feel his weaknesses and repeatedly displayed his own self-confident strength in the most offensive manner. Whether Röhm still believed that at bottom he was loyal to Hitler, perhaps even more loyal than Hitler himself, was beside the point; he certainly was disobedient in refusing to

→ D. T.'s state - In killing Röhm, the unbreakable friend of Hitler.

He felt he would have to stay in Berlin. He was just a little more of the new, it was not long.

be the victim of Hitler's Reichswehr policy; it is true that he had been disobedient in this sense again and again in the course of the last fifteen years.

But Hitler's decision implied more than this personal settling of accounts. He put an end to the weakness in himself, the weakness of having a friend who considered himself the Führer's equal; by a deed which went beyond normal human standards he definitively raised himself above normal human beings. His belief that he was a sort of Providence given to his people in human form was no trifling matter; his sincerest admirers took this belief in deadly earnest. Baldur von Schirach, the leader of the 'Hitler-Youth,' declared that his altar was not the church, but the steps of the *Feldherrnhalle* drenched in blood in 1923, and he indicated that in his opinion this was the altar where Hitler had made his divine appearance. Only a few days before, Hess had once again proclaimed: 'We believe that the Führer follows a higher call to shape the destiny of Germany. . . . He has always been right, he always will be right.' A man as mundane as Göring, speaking on Hesselberg mountain in Franconia, an old pagan place of worship, before thousands of people, shouted contemptuously in the face of the churches: 'When was there ever deeper and more passionate faith in Germany than there is today? What faith was ever aroused more strongly than our faith in the Führer? Never has a greater miracle happened than in our time. The Almighty made this miracle through Adolf Hitler!' At the beginning of 1934, when Hess swore in the entire party to Hitler in a mass spectacle which brought millions of people in thousands of German towns and villages to the microphones, he said to them, before administering the oath: 'By this oath we again bind our lives to a man, through whom — this is our belief — superior forces act in fulfillment of Destiny. Do not seek Adolf Hitler with your brains; all of you will find him with the strength of your hearts. Adolf Hitler is Germany and Germany is Adolf Hitler.' — And, in Hitler's own words, 'Germany is our God on this earth.'

Twelve years earlier, when he had to serve a month in prison, he had said that he went to his place of punishment like Christ to Golgotha. Now he had gone farther than Golgotha, farther than

Christ. In his own lifetime he had become a faith millions; they demanded greatness, and he was this was not just a fantasy of his: the forest of raised heads, the sea of ecstatic faces, had confirmed its reality a hundred times.

This piece of divine will staring at the blazing sky terrace at Godesberg was now doomed to do so because he had for months neglected to do what he should have done. Accustomed to considering himself extraordinary, he had interpreted contradiction, let alone resistance, as a sign of weakness which had only itself to blame if it was destroyed. Everything he did was right, because the faith of millions could not be mistaken. Once a foreign diplomat asked Göring to which Hitler might have objected, and the great Führer answered: 'The foreigner asked: "Are you really afraid of thought for a while and said: "Yes, I think so. . . . I think so!"' him!'

Soon after midnight new reports arrived from the Reich capital in a disquieting state of alarm in the S.A. A similar report came from Munich; Hitler should have been struck by the fact that of alarm in the two cities were separated by several hundred miles. No reports of this kind had come from other cities. At this moment what was going on in Wiessee, he was forced to doubt that Röhm had planned and prepared for the directed rebellion of the S.A. Röhm was still in the city without troops, almost without arms; he expected to appear the following day. A banquet had been ordered in the city for the Four Seasons, and a vegetarian menu for Hitler had been forgotten; on this occasion Röhm intended to present his bookplate. To an industrialist whom he consulted about questions and who came to see him that day — Fickler — he said good-naturedly: 'Why don't you stay until tomorrow morning, too.' The industrialist did not stay, which was lucky for him.

For the day after the leaders' conference, a Sunday, he reserved a steamship for an excursion on the Ammersee between Munich and Wiessee; Hitler was to spend the day there amidst his faithful. It was possible that

* D.T.'s crowning achievement
D.T.'s mission

Hitler's Reichswehr policy; it is true that he had in this sense again and again in the course of the

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*knowing achievement
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Christ. In his own lifetime he had become a faith and comfort for millions; they demanded greatness, and he was this greatness. This was not just a fantasy of his: the forest of raised hands, the endless sea of ecstatic faces, had confirmed its reality a hundred times.

This piece of divine will staring at the blazing swastika from the terrace at Godesberg was now doomed to do something horrible because he had for months neglected to do what was necessary. Accustomed to considering himself extraordinary, Hitler interpreted contradiction, let alone resistance, as a sign of depravity which had only itself to blame if it was destroyed on the spot; and everything he did was right, because the faith of millions could not be mistaken. Once a foreign diplomat asked Göring for a favor to which Hitler might have objected, and the great man hesitated. The foreigner asked: 'Are you really afraid of him?' Göring thought for a while and said: 'Yes, I think so. . . You don't know him!'

Soon after midnight new reports arrived from Berlin about the disquieting state of alarm in the S.A. A similar report came in from Munich; Hitler should have been struck by the fact that the states of alarm in the two cities were separated by several hours and that no reports of this kind had come from other cities. Had he seen at this moment what was going on in Wiessee, he would have been forced to doubt that Röhm had planned and prepared a centrally directed rebellion of the S.A. Röhm was still in his sanatorium, without troops, almost without arms; he expected Hitler's visit the following day. A banquet had been ordered in the Munich hotel, the Four Seasons, and a vegetarian menu for Hitler had not been forgotten; on this occasion Röhm intended to present Hitler with his bookplate. To an industrialist whom he consulted on economic questions and who came to see him that day — Friday — he said good-naturedly: 'Why don't you stay until tomorrow, the chief is coming, too.' The industrialist did not stay, which was perhaps lucky for him.

For the day after the leaders' conference, a Sunday, Heines had reserved a steamship for an excursion on the Ammersee, a lake between Munich and Wiessee; Hitler was to spend a few pleasant hours there amidst his faithful. It was possible that during this trip,

which, despite the small distance involved, would have cut the company off from the world for a few hours, something might have happened in the rest of Germany. It is very likely that Hitler had given this interpretation to the plan; the excursion looked extremely like a temporary arrest. It has never become known whether the suspicion was justified; for all Hitler's dislike of exact facts, it is hardly credible that he would have concealed such a picturesque and convincing detail, when he later attempted to describe the 'plot' in a public speech. Actually he did not go beyond vague, even though hair-raising, insinuations. But it is conceivable that the report of the planned steamship trip clinched the matter in his mind: he was in personal danger; they wanted to capture Germany, perhaps even kill the great faith of our time.

By one o'clock, Hitler was finally convinced, as he put it later, that 'only ruthless and bloody blows might still succeed in throttling the extension of the rebellion.' At that moment, he said, he had no need 'to investigate if all or some of these conspirators, inciters, wreckers, and well-poisoners of public opinion might suffer too hard a fate,' for 'at all times rebellious divisions have been brought back to order by decimation.' Decimation meant, as Rudolf Hess explained in a speech made about the same time, 'that every tenth man, without any investigation, whether innocent or guilty, was struck by a bullet.'

With this bloody decision in his heart, at two past midnight Hitler flew from the Hangelar airdrome near Bonn to Munich in order personally to direct the decimation. He had made up his mind that 'only one man could and had to confront the chief of staff. He had broken faith with me, and I alone had to call him to account for it.' But the great secret of Hitler's political method, which he had only occasionally hinted at in words—the fact that the vaster the politician's field of action, the more he can expect one difficulty to be superseded and thus solved by another—was now to prove hideously true.

For even before Hitler appeared on the scene, the opposing forces had clashed. In Munich, Walter Buch and Minister of the Interior Adolf Wagner had formed an action group, to which belonged Christian Weber and Emil Maurice as well as Joseph Berchtold,

Hitler's old friend and shock troop leader. But I general and governor, Röhm's old superior, did something. From Hitler's account it can be inferred that such as these in Munich acted on their own initiative. Göring received at least a hint that he now should please and proceed to put his death lists into Wagner in Munich, even before he had received Hitler, he summoned Schneidhuber, the Obergruppenführer, S.A. and chief of police, along with his assistant, W to the Ministry of the Interior, that old building above cases and corners, situated on the Odeonsplatz; it suddenly surrounded by a bunch of gunmen, among Weber and Emil Maurice; Wagner informed his were under arrest. At first they thought it was a mistake. Schneidhuber had just attended a vaude question remains to what extent the whole report at S.A. was true at all.

At four o'clock Hitler landed at the Oberwies near Munich. He was accompanied by Goebbels and Otto Dietrich.

Hysterical scenes followed. Hitler wept on the friend, Joseph Berchtold, and bewailed Röhm's brother he called it, and the end of their fifteen years of cooperation he rushed upon Schneidhuber and Schmidt and torments. Schneidhuber cried excitedly that Hitler could like, but that he should keep his dirty fingers off. flyer Ernst Udet, chief of the S.A. air force, was arrested; he ran up to Hitler and asked him in a fierce he was not enough of a soldier to know the meaning. How could he punish soldiers for obeying the superiors?—and until now Röhm was still their superior spared.

At seven in the morning, Hitler and his party in a long column of automobiles, in the direction of Lutz, Dietrich, and Buch were with him; the fat brawler and murderer in his black S.S. uniform, with his sinister skull and crossbones, was there, too, as well.

* The Molotov knowledge. Connections at this moment are worth nothing, Prager in Lebanon & Grenada.

all distance involved, would have cut the world for a few hours, something might have happened in Germany. It is very likely that Hitler had agreed to the plan; the excursion looked extremely good. It has never become known whether the reason for all Hitler's dislike of exact facts, it is probable he would have concealed such a picturesque scene when he later attempted to describe the 'plot'. Usually he did not go beyond vague, even evasive explanations. But it is conceivable that the relationship trip clinched the matter in his mind; perhaps they wanted to capture Germany, perhaps faith of our time.

He was finally convinced, as he put it, 'that bloody blows might still succeed in the rebellion.' At that moment, he said, 'I figure if all or some of these conspirators, all poisoners of public opinion might suffer all times rebellious divisions have been decimated.' Decimation meant, as Rudolf Hess made about the same time, 'that every investigation, whether innocent or guilty,

was done in his heart, at two past midnight he flew in a regular airdrome near Bonn to Munich in time for the decimation. He had made up his mind he could and had to confront the chief of the S.S. with me, and I alone had to call him to the great secret of Hitler's political method, which he had only hinted at in words—the fact that the result of action, the more he can expect one to do, and thus solved by another—was now

appeared on the scene, the opposing forces were Walter Buch and Minister of the Interior Hermann Goebbels, an action group, to which belonged also Emil Maurice as well as Joseph Berchtold,

Hitler's old friend and shock troop leader. But Franz von Epp, general and governor, Röhm's old superior, did not suspect anything. From Hitler's account it can be inferred that local groups such as these in Munich acted on their own initiative; had so to act. Göring received at least a hint that he now should do what he pleased and proceed to put his death lists into effect. As for Wagner in Munich, even before he had received an order from Hitler, he summoned Schneidhuber, the *Obergruppenführer* of the S.A. and chief of police, along with his assistant, Wilhelm Schmidt, to the Ministry of the Interior, that old building abounding in staircases and corners, situated on the Odeonsplatz; there they were suddenly surrounded by a bunch of gunmen, among them Christian Weber and Emil Maurice; Wagner informed his prisoners they were under arrest. At first they thought it was a joke, and later, a mistake. Schneidhuber had just attended a vaudeville show; the question remains to what extent the whole report about the Munich S.A. was true at all.

At four o'clock Hitler landed at the Oberwiesenfeld airdrome near Munich. He was accompanied by Goebbels, Viktor Lutze, and Otto Dietrich.

Hysterical scenes followed. Hitler wept on the bosom of his old friend, Joseph Berchtold, and bewailed Röhm's breach of faith, as he called it, and the end of their fifteen years of comradeship. Then he rushed upon Schneidhuber and Schmidt and tore off their epaulettes. Schneidhuber cried excitedly that Hitler could shoot him if he liked, but that he should keep his dirty fingers off his person. The flyer Ernst Udet, chief of the S.A. air force, was among those arrested; he ran up to Hitler and asked him in a fierce bellow whether he was not enough of a soldier to know the meaning of discipline. How could he punish soldiers for obeying the orders of their superiors?—and until now Röhm was still their superior. Udet was spared.

At seven in the morning, Hitler and his party sped southward in a long column of automobiles, in the direction of Wiessee. Goebbels, Lutze, Dietrich, and Buch were with him; Christian Weber, the fat brawler and murderer in his black S.S. uniform with its sinister skull and crossbones, was there, too, as well as Emil Maurice

with his black hair and lurking black underworld look. According to Goebbels's account, Hitler was silent; but, according to the same account, if during the trip from Bonn to Munich the feeling of a real danger had allegedly weighed upon the little group of airplane travelers, now, after Hitler had stared into the faces of the first arrested victims, this feeling apparently yielded to one of omnipotence. 'In those hours, the supreme tribunal of the German nation — myself . . . ' — thus Hitler later described his rôle and feelings. If this *coup* succeeded — actually it had already succeeded — the silent man even now wielded more power than the old man of Neudeck, whose imminent demise had been the cause of this whole undertaking. The man who now made this death-dealing pilgrimage had traveled a long and sinister road since the day, only eighteen months before, when he was forced to look on impotently while Gregor Strasser almost destroyed the party. He had grown so big now that he had an antidote for every difficulty, even if the name of this antidote was murder. An armored Reichswehr car was in the column; nor had Hitler forgotten to bring his press agent, Dietrich, who was to describe the planned blood-bath.

Against a background of dark green mountains shone the placid surface of the Tegernsee, illuminated by a gold-blue morning sky. In the wing of the Hanslbauer, Röhm lay wrapped in deep sleep. Hitler and suite entered, deliberately silent, almost on tiptoes.

Count Spretti was the first prisoner to be brought in. He made a gesture which Hitler interpreted as an attempt to reach for his gun. The Führer hit him on the head with the iron end of his heavy whip, and kept hitting the young man's face and skull until he collapsed. Then he hammered at Röhm's door with his fists, shouting to him to open up. Röhm's sleepy voice was heard: 'What, you here already?' According to Dietrich's account, Hitler entered the room alone; Röhm submitted to his arrest and listened to Hitler's furious abuse without uttering a single word. Other accounts tell of a great scene between the two and of Röhm's rage; according to them, Hitler personally pressed a gun into Röhm's hand and invited him to commit suicide — at the obvious risk that Röhm would shoot him. This is scarcely credible.

'Heines's room, directly adjoining Röhm's,' says Dietrich's ac-

count, 'presented a disgraceful picture. Heines is homosexual boy. The disgusting scene which took place at the arrest of Heines and his friend defies description. Major Buch 'ruthlessly to exterminate this' pe Heines and his companion were dragged out and Maurice and Weber: they were the first dead.

They were literally buried in mud. A storm of violence descended upon these dead men, which defied natural tendencies with the most loathsome details; the propaganda made it almost their principal crime that the Führer's pure movement with their dirty practices. four days earlier Hess had termed 'little weakness' went back to Munich ordering Röhm's staff guard. This guard had appeared shortly after the arrest. It did not make any attempt to free him — at least the troops were not prepared for a rebellion. On his way back, Hitler intercepted car after car full of men on their way to the conference at Wiessee; he ordered them to follow him and signified to others that they were not to resist. Followed by a large number of dismayed prisoners and frightened henchmen, he returned to Munich.

As Hess later suggested, these arrests were fairly chiefly on the basis of feeling — and Hitler's frequently to have been based on a suspicion that they had homosexual tendencies. This suspicion, however, was not always justified and some of the arrests were 'tragic entanglements,' that is to say, the victims were not guilty of the speech which Hitler made before the non-arrested at noon on June 30, he chiefly accused Röhm and his loose or depraved conduct and declared that for his part he deserved to die. To Lutze, whom he had appointed successor, he sent an order comprising twelve points most exclusively with parties, drinking bouts, squandering and unnatural lewdness indulged in by the gang — and stressed the necessity of putting an end to it.

For the space of ten years he had known and

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 vent demise had been the cause of this whole
 n who now made this death-dealing pil-
 long and sinister road since the day, only
 , when he was forced to look on impotently
 almost destroyed the party. He had grown
 an antidote for every difficulty, even if the
 as murder. An armored Reichswehr car was
 l Hitler forgotten to bring his press agent,
 lescribe the planned blood-bath.
 l of dark green mountains shone the placid
 , illumined by a gold-blue morning sky. In
 uer, Röhm lay wrapped in deep sleep. Hit-
 deliberately silent, almost on tiptoes.
 first prisoner to be brought in. He made a
 epreted as an attempt to reach for his gun.
he head with the iron end of his heavy whip,
ing man's face and skull until he collapsed.
 Röhm's door with his fists, shouting to him
 epy voice was heard: 'What, you here al-
 Dietrich's account, Hitler entered the room
 to his arrest and listened to Hitler's furious
 single word. Other accounts tell of a great
 and of Röhm's rage; according to them,
 l a gun into Röhm's hand and invited him
 the obvious risk that Röhm would shoot
 :dible.

ly adjoining Röhm's,' says Dietrich's ac-

count, 'presented a disgraceful picture. Heines lay in bed with a
 homosexual boy. The disgusting scene which took place during the
 arrest of Heines and his friend defies description.' Hitler ordered
 Major Buch 'ruthlessly to exterminate this pestilential tumor.'
 Heines and his companion were dragged out and shot in a car by
 Maurice and Weber: they were the first dead.

They were literally buried in mud. A storm of public defama-
 tion descended upon these dead men, which described their un-
 natural tendencies with the most loathsome details; Goebbels's prop-
aganda made it almost their principal crime that they had defiled
the Führer's pure movement with their dirty practices — which only
four days earlier Hess had termed 'little weaknesses.' Hitler hastily
 went back to Munich ordering Röhm's staff guard to precede him.
 This guard had appeared shortly after the arrest of their leader and
 did not make any attempt to free him — another sign that at
 least the troops were not prepared for a rebellion against Hitler.
 On his way back, Hitler intercepted car after car full of S.A. leaders
 on their way to the conference at Wiessee; he ordered some of them
 to follow him and signified to others that they were arrested —
 and no attempt to resist was reported. Followed by a long file of
 dismayed prisoners and frightened henchmen Hitler returned to
 Munich.

As Hess later suggested, these arrests were fairly arbitrary, made
 chiefly on the basis of feeling — and Hitler's feeling seems fre-
 quently to have been based on a suspicion that the person concerned
 had homosexual tendencies. This suspicion, Hess admitted, was
 not always justified and some of the arrests were the result of
 'tragic entanglements,' that is to say, the victims were innocent. In
 the speech which Hitler made before the non-arrested party leaders
 at noon on June 30, he chiefly accused Röhm and his men for their
loose or depraved conduct and declared that for this alone they
deserved to die. To Lutze, whom he had appointed Röhm's suc-
 cessor, he sent an order comprising twelve points, which dealt al-
 most exclusively with parties, drinking bouts, automobile trips,
 squandering and unnatural lewdness indulged in by Röhm and his
 gang — and stressed the necessity of putting an end to all that.

For the space of ten years he had known and tolerated these

things, publicly branded them as lies, admitted them among his intimates, excused and justified them—and the fact that Röhm had compelled him to do this was probably his most heinous crime in Hitler's innermost thoughts. He, the 'miracle,' 'the instrument of higher powers,' was dishonored by his own instrument—this was probably the treason which Hitler could not forgive his chief of staff.

Dishonored by his instrument? Actually he was dishonored by himself. True, Hitler had not shared Röhm's particular depravity in a physical sense, but he had been the chosen leader of these depraved men; to them he owed his greatness. Yes, he was the product and the creature of decay and degeneration, a flame kindled from foul gases. These had been his 'élite.' And it was the painful memory of his own weakness, now doomed in the person of Röhm and his arrested clique, that he ordered sent to the Stadelheim prison near Munich.

On the morning of the same June 30, Göring and Himmler struck in Berlin. The police commandos for special services, led by Wecke, thundered on motorcycles and trucks—making a detour to mislead the adversary—from Lichterfelde via Tempelhof into Berlin, surrounded the S.A. headquarters and penetrated inside without encountering resistance. A few minutes later, when Göring arrived, he found the S.A. leaders standing with arms upraised in front of Wecke's riflemen; he ran through the rooms on every floor, pointing at individuals and shouting: 'Arrest him . . . arrest him . . . arrest him. . . . ' Those whom he did not point out were free and returned to life. The arrested men were taken to Lichterfelde in Wecke's trucks. In the course of the morning approximately one hundred and fifty prisoners were herded there.

Within the walls of Lichterfelde and Stadelheim, and to a lesser extent at several other places, there now began a massacre which surpassed in horror the May, 1919, executions in Munich, which Hitler had helped to organize; it was probably the most hideous incident in modern German history. In Munich, Walter Buch directed the executions. He shouted: 'The Führer wills it. Heil Hitler! Fire!' A fourfold salvo thundered, and against the wall fell: August Schneidhuber, ex-Colonel, now Obergruppenführer and

chief of police in Munich; Fritz von Krausser who Bavaria had ennobled for bravery; Hans Hayn, a fighter from the Rossbach unit, one of Röhm's friends; Peter von Heydebreck, who had lost an arm in the War, later fought against the Poles in Upper Silesia; of whom a Silesian city had been named Heydebreck; Group Leader Wilhelm Schmidt; Staff Adjutant Reiner; Koch; Group Leader Lasch, Brigade Leader K. Leader Uhl . . . and many many others.

The endless salvos under which his friends fell doubtably the last thing of which Röhm was conscious in the second time in eleven years he was locked up in Stadelheim prison. He had spent a short time there in 1930 when he had planned and led a military mutiny and so caused many fatal casualties; but his life had not then, he was sure of that. To dispel the boredom—the worst feature of that imprisonment he had written letters; one of these was dedicated to Ernst Gumbel, chauffeur, whose sister, Jenny, had been deserted after a long-drawn and tender affair. Possibly because he had been upset about this, Röhm exhorted him:

Always be faithful to Adolf Hitler, our friend and
Let the cowards trample you; our triumph will be!

Now he was reaping the fruits of his loyalty: in Stadelheim, and his prospects were much more terrible than in the first time. The death which Röhm now faced was undeniably his own work on which he had spent a great deal of his daring, cunning, energy, blood-thirstiness, and faith—the purpose for which he had originated the armed forces, given it his soldiers and weapons, won the favors of the Führer, pushed him into a decisive step before the *putsch*! This was the purpose for which he had collapsed and the long years of painful failures, he had triumphed—'Brown Popular Army,' without which Hitler would not have triumphed—to be murdered in an obscure cell! A creature, had given orders to leave a gun on the table

them as lies, admitted them among his intensified them — and the fact that Röhm had done this was probably his most heinous crime in his life. He, the 'miracle,' 'the instrument of destiny' ignored by his own instrument — this was what Hitler could not forgive his chief of

instrument? Actually he was dishonored by the fact that he did not share Röhm's particular depravity in that he had been the chosen leader of these degenerate and deposed his greatness. Yes, he was the product of decay and degeneration, a flame kindled from the gutter, been his 'élite.' And it was the painful knowledge, now doomed in the person of Röhm, that he ordered sent to the Stadelheim

the same June 30, Göring and Himmler with police commandos for special services, led motorcycles and trucks — making a detour — from Lichterfelde via Tempelhof into the S.A. headquarters and penetrated inside the prison. A few minutes later, when Göring and A. leaders standing with arms upraised in the courtyard; he ran through the rooms on every floor, and shouting: 'Arrest him . . . arrest him' those whom he did not point out were free and the arrested men were taken to Lichterfelde in the course of the morning approximately one hundred prisoners were herded there.

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He shouted: 'The Führer wills it. Heil Hitler' salvo thundered, and against the wall fell: ex-Colonel, now *Obergruppenführer* and

chief of police in Munich; Fritz von Krausser whom the King of Bavaria had ennobled for bravery; Hans Hayn, old Free Corps fighter from the Rossbach unit, one of Röhm's most intimate friends; Peter von Heydebreck, who had lost an arm in the World War, later fought against the Poles in Upper Silesia and in honor of whom a Silesian city had been named Heydebreck; Group Leader Wilhelm Schmidt; Staff Adjutant Reiner; Group Leader Koch; Group Leader Lasch, Brigade Leader Kopp, *Standarte* Leader Uhl . . . and many many others.

The endless salvos under which his friends fell dead were probably the last thing of which Röhm was conscious in this world. For the second time in eleven years he was locked up in a cell in Stadelheim prison. He had spent a short time there in 1923-24, because he had planned and led a military mutiny and street fight which caused many fatal casualties; but his life had not been at stake then, he was sure of that. To dispel the boredom which was the worst feature of that imprisonment he had written poems in hexameters; one of these was dedicated to Ernst Haug, Hitler's chauffeur, whose sister, Jenny, had been deserted by the Führer after a long-drawn and tender affair. Possibly because Haug had been upset about this, Röhm exhorted him:

Always be faithful to Adolf Hitler, our friend and great leader!
Let the cowards trample you; our triumph will be the brighter.

Now he was reaping the fruits of his loyalty: he was again in Stadelheim, and his prospects were much more terrifying than the first time. The death which Röhm now faced with certainty was undeniably his own work on which he had spent a life marked by daring, cunning, energy, blood-thirstiness, and faith. So this was the purpose for which he had originated the armed political party, given it his soldiers and weapons, won the favors of the powers that be for its leader, pushed him into a decisive position shortly before the *putsch*! This was the purpose for which, after the first collapse and the long years of painful failures, he had rebuilt his 'Brown Popular Army,' without which Hitler would never have triumphed — to be murdered in an obscure cell! Adolf Hitler, his creature, had given orders to leave a gun on the table of his creator,

* *new*
for him to commit suicide with — he had been given ten minutes to do this. Röhm declared that 'Adolf himself should do the dirty work,' and let the ten minutes pass. Then the door opened, and from outside bullets were pumped into the cell until Röhm was dead. He was buried in the prison yard; the exact spot is unknown.

While this went on, about one hundred and fifty top S.A. leaders awaited their death at Lichterfelde. They had been locked up in a coal cellar of the Cadet School; one of them who escaped by accident has provided us with an account of the events, from which the following details are drawn.

At intervals of about fifteen minutes, four names were called out; this meant death for the four men named within a few minutes. The mood of the prisoners was not really dejected. Most of them realized that these were definitely their last hours of life. The whole thing lasted twenty-four hours, and there was a night's pause. It took all that time to slay the hundred and fifty men, except for five or six who were pardoned at the last minute. Many of them tried to be gay, and sometimes succeeded; at certain moments the whole group was in a solemn frame of mind; but with one exception there were no nervous breakdowns.

secret
The prisoners had a completely false idea of the general situation and the reasons for which they were being murdered. It did not occur to them that they were to be shot by Hitler's orders; on the contrary, they believed that their supreme Leader was imprisoned like themselves, perhaps already dead, a victim of the 'reactionaries' among whom they counted Göring and Goebbels.

These doomed men in their coal cellar had a curious instinct for destiny. Whose name would be called out next, whose turn was it to be slaughtered? They tried to guess; in three or four cases they guessed right. From a window in the cellar those who still remained behind saw their comrades being led to a wall across the yard. Those who were being marched away kept their eyes on the window. The men in the cellar looked into the eyes of their departing comrade; this was a last charitable service which they rendered each other by silent agreement, a comforting exchange of glances during the last two minutes that separated life from death.

The victims were stood in a row against the wall. An S.S. man

opened their shirts over their chests and drew at the left nipple with a piece of charcoal: this was six yards from the wall stood eight S.S. men with rifles were allegedly loaded with blank cartridges knew whether his bullet was the deadly one.

Then the order to fire rang out. Here, too, it wills it. Heil Hitler! Fire!

Among the men stood against the wall at Lie Ernst. When he left the cellar he was still firm as his comrades were, that Hitler himself was what he heard, understood, and believed the order, never be able to say. At any rate, he threw up his 'Heil Hitler!' He died with his Führer's name.

The shots, from a distance of five to six yards of the victims. Especially the spot where the bullet under the left shoulder was transformed into a hole, bullets dragged out parts of the body. The observer could see bloody pieces of flesh stuck to the wall had dropped, and the darker heart fragments were discernible. The wall was not cleaned in the executions; hence, after a short time, it was covered with blood and human flesh.

Among the men in the cellar was Standartenführer Gehrt, as our account calls him. In the World War he was a captain in the air force; he had been decorated with the Prussian order, 'Pour le Mérite'; during the last war he had belonged to the Richthofen squadron command.

Gehrt's name was called out and he left the cellar. It was not taken to be executed. Had Destiny intervened in that moment? Those remaining inside assumed that the friendship had saved him. But two hours later the door of the cellar, completely broken, and told the following.

An S.S. officer told him: 'Go home, wash your gala uniform with all your medals, and register Göring!' Gehrt left the barracks. He was saved by this apparent last-minute escape, he went home, been told, washed, shaved, put on his gala uniform.

* *The fear of the executioners that Röhm would fire at them.*

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opened their shirts over their chests and drew a black circle around the left nipple with a piece of charcoal: this was the target. Five to six yards from the wall stood eight S.S. men with rifles. Four of the rifles were allegedly loaded with blank cartridges so that no one knew whether his bullet was the deadly one.

Then the order to fire rang out. Here, too, it was: 'The Führer wills it. Heil Hitler! Fire!'

Among the men stood against the wall at Lichterfelde was Karl Ernst. When he left the cellar he was still firmly convinced, just as his comrades were, that Hitler himself was a prisoner. Whether he heard, understood, and believed the order to fire, no one will ever be able to say. At any rate, he threw up his arm and shouted 'Heil Hitler!' He died with his Führer's name on his lips.

The shots, from a distance of five to six yards, tore out the flesh of the victims. Especially the spot where the bullet left the body under the left shoulder was transformed into a gaping hole, and the bullets dragged out parts of the body. The observers in the cellar could see bloody pieces of flesh stuck to the wall after the victims had dropped, and the darker heart fragments were clearly discernible. The wall was not cleaned in the intervals between the executions; hence, after a short time, it was completely covered with blood and human flesh.

Among the men in the cellar was *Standartenführer* Gehrt — 'little Gehrt,' as our account calls him. In the World War he had been a captain in the air force; he had been decorated with the highest Prussian order, 'Pour le Mérite'; during the last years of the war he had belonged to the Richthofen squadron commanded by Göring.

Gehrt's name was called out and he left the cellar, but apparently was not taken to be executed. Had Destiny intervened at the last moment? Those remaining inside assumed that Göring's personal friendship had saved him. But two hours later, Gehrt returned to the cellar, completely broken, and told the following story:

An S.S. officer told him: 'Go home, wash and shave, put on your gala uniform with all your medals, and report to Prime Minister Göring!' Gehrt left the barracks. He was free. Overwhelmed by this apparent last-minute escape, he went home, did as he had been told, washed, shaved, put on his gala uniform with all his

medals, and reported to Göring's headquarters in Prinz Albrecht Street. It took some effort on his part to get through all the guards, but he was stubborn and finally reached his old comrade-in-arms whom he wanted to thank warmly for his release.

Göring received him surrounded by his staff. He approached Gehrt, tore off his 'Pour le Mérite' decoration, tore off his other medals, and said to the people around him: 'I gave orders that this filthy pig be brought here because he once belonged to my squadron. Take him away!'

Gehrt was taken back to the coal cellar. After that, our informant tells us, he collapsed, allegedly the only man who did not keep up his nerve. He had to be pushed to the wall.

Most of those who fell during this slaughter were little known to the world. Very few people outside the S.A. had ever heard of Group Leader Georg von Detten or his life; but whatever could be said of him, good or bad, during his lifetime, in the hour of his death he made an extraordinary impression on his comrades in the cellar. He delivered a farewell speech which opened—as our report puts it—a gate into a world they had never known. The path that they had taken, he said, was false. What must and would come about had a significance far greater than Germany's fate alone; a league of the thousand best men of all nations, classes, and creeds, who would take the fate of the world into their hands and give peace to the earth. To our informant his words seemed great, but so new and strange that it occurred to him that Detten must have secretly been a Freemason. Actually his words contained a faint reminiscence of 'Aryans of all nations, unite!' But Hitler had no room in Detten's last thoughts; he referred to the Führer as a disappointment and spoke of him 'with contempt.' This did not prevent his listeners from being thrilled by his speech. The account tells of a solemn mood, which descended upon the men and made death easier to bear for many.

Our informant insists that almost all the victims went to their death calm and dignified. Goebbels maintained the opposite: in a confidential communication to the S.A. he said that the 'rebels' were led to the wall pale and trembling. Our account indignantly attacks this assertion. But, according to it, the nerves of the S.S. firing

squads could not stand the strain very long; it frequently changed; and after each change, the show was the first time, but at the second or third execution wide of the mark. The victims lay on the ground alive; the commanding S.S. officer had to finish the revolver shot in the head.

From time to time a horse-drawn tin-lined truck belonged to a butcher and served for transport to the yard. The corpses were thrown into this truck.

How many such corpses had been carried away never known. In his Reichstag speech Hitler said which means nothing: he said that there were seven. There were certainly many hundreds. Executions at Stadelheim and Lichterfelde also took place in Breslau, and other cities. But not everywhere. Victims were dragged to the slaughterhouse. Many victims, individually, and more than one man in those given the advantage of the general freedom to shoot in private hatred, lust for revenge, and sometimes murderous instincts. There is no doubt that the six assassins in mufti who on the morning of April 30, 1945, rang the bell, quickly killed the former Chancellor in front of his wife and died on the spot. He had reached for his gun, and had killed him in self-defense—this was the version tried to circulate; but later Hitler in his Reichstag attempt to maintain it. One bullet, allegedly by Elisabeth von Schleicher, who died half an hour later, drove away in their car one minute after the end of their mission.

Göring took advantage of the vagueness of the confused state of the death lists to slaughter a number other than the rebellious S.A. leaders, but he acted against Hitler's intentions in doing this. For in Hitler's direct orders, people were murdered in common with Röhm. To justify these criminal 'reactionary' plot was put into circulation, a plot

DER FUEHRER

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THE BLOOD PURGE

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squads could not stand the strain very long; they had to be frequently changed; and after each change, the shooting was accurate the first time, but at the second or third execution many shots went wide of the mark. The victims lay on the ground, but were still alive; the commanding S.S. officer had to finish them off with a revolver shot in the head.

From time to time a horse-drawn tin-lined truck, which obviously belonged to a butcher and served for transporting meat, entered the yard. The corpses were thrown into this truck and carted away.

How many such corpses had been carried away by July 1 was never known. In his Reichstag speech Hitler mentioned a figure which means nothing: he said that there were more than seventy-seven. There were certainly many hundreds. Executions like those at Stadelheim and Lichterfelde also took place in Stettin, Dresden, Breslau, and other cities. But not everywhere were such masses dragged to the slaughterhouse. Many victims were hunted down individually, and more than one man in those gruesome days took advantage of the general freedom to shoot in order to satisfy his private hatred, lust for revenge, and sometimes the most hideous murderous instincts. There is no doubt that Göring himself sent the six assassins in mufti who on the morning of June 30 appeared at von Schleicher's villa, rang the bell, quickly broke in, and shot the former Chancellor in front of his wife and niece. Von Schleicher died on the spot. He had reached for his gun, and the six assassins had killed him in self-defense—this was the version Göring at first tried to circulate; but later Hitler in his Reichstag speech made no attempt to maintain it. One bullet, allegedly by mistake, hit Frau Elisabeth von Schleicher, who died half an hour later; the six murderers drove away in their car one minute after they had carried out their mission.

Göring took advantage of the vagueness of Hitler's orders and the confused state of the death lists to slaughter a number of enemies other than the rebellious S.A. leaders, but he certainly did not go against Hitler's intentions in doing this. For in Munich, too, where Hitler gave direct orders, people were murdered who had nothing in common with Röhm. To justify these crimes, the story of a 'reactionary' plot was put into circulation, a plot which was even

more incredible than the alleged revolt of Röhm. General von Bredow, a friend of von Schleicher's, was dragged out of his apartment at night and apparently shot in his abductors' car; Gregor Strasser, arrested at noon on June 30, fell like Röhm under bullets fired through the window of a prison cell. The reason for these murders was not only a reason of state, but probably also a personal one; Göring bitterly hated von Schleicher and Strasser. He would have gladly dispatched a third enemy, von Papen; but von Papen was not only 'Vice-Chancellor,' he was also a personal friend of Hindenburg's, who at least in the flesh was still alive. So, Göring summoned von Papen on the morning of June 30 and told him to stay at home and above all not to show himself in his office, for decisions concerning the fate of the nation and the Reich would be carried out on that day. Von Papen remained at home; whether he could not or would not warn his assistants is uncertain. At any rate, three S.S. men appeared at the Vice-Chancellery where von Bose, von Papen's unsuspecting aide, was engaged in a conversation with two industrialists from the Rhineland. Von Bose was politely asked to step into the adjoining room. The visitors heard shots. The three S.S. men departed. Von Bose was dead.

Toward noon, two S.S. men broke into the office of Erich Klausener of the Ministry of Communications and declared him under arrest. Klausener, a leader of the 'Catholic Action,' founded by Pope Pius XI, willingly followed them, certain that the obvious misunderstanding would presently be dispelled. No sooner had he walked two steps than two bullets hit him in the nape of the neck. The heavy-set man fell on his face and lay there with his hat on until he bled to death.

In Munich, seventy-three-year-old Gustav von Kahr, who eleven years earlier had crushed Hitler's putsch and had lived in retirement since then, was dragged out of his home; a few days later, his horribly disfigured corpse was found in a swamp near the Dachau concentration camp. Kahr was not shot; he was hacked to death with pickaxes.

Fritz Beck, director of the Munich Students' Welfare Fund, a Catholic like Klausener and von Bose, was taken out of his apartment by two S.S. men, on June 30; two days later, his naked corpse

was found in a woods near the town of Pasing, by a papal medal he wore around his neck; his face was mass.

Father Bernhard Stempfle lay with a broken bullet in his heart in a woods near Harlaching, a friend of Willy Schmidt, the music critic, died only because Willy Schmidt; the murderers confused him with huber's assistant, Wilhelm Schmidt. The fiancée, Berlin attorney who was Gregor Strasser's counsel, the police to find her vanished lover; they replied, 'think he is still alive?'

People were murdered whose only crime was that a quarrel over a copyright with Max Amann, a friend of people were murdered to whom Hitler had promised protection. Among those who were saved by a minute was Manfred von Killingen.

These murders extending beyond the S.A. could have been impossible if Hitler had not been absolutely sincere and Reichenau's personal devotion. With von Se, the sharpest critic and opponent; and Reichenau's joy proved a few days later when he declared that he long ago ceased to be a soldier, that he was a bore had sunk so low that he even had relations with those who would have approved anything that Hitler did; those who admired the Führer. And so it was not surprising when Hitler reported to the cabinet on the evening of June 30, that Gürtner, his eternal silent guardian angel, who earlier had been unable to discover the political meaning of the day, stated now that there had been no murders; he had introduced a law, immediately adopted by the cabinet, that the deeds of June 30 were 'justified as a measure of defense.' A congratulatory telegram arrived from

The following story was told about one of Gregor's friends, a Frenchman living in the neighborhood, who was acquainted with the family, met him a few days after the purge, his father and could not resist asking him what he thought of Hitler—who, by the way, was the boy's godfather.

swallowed, and staring ahead of him said: 'He is still our Führer!'

Thus the prophets' words had at last come true. The Führer had 'trampled on the bodies' of his best friends; along with his enemies he murdered these friends in the most criminal and the most frivolous fashion; and for that very reason he was admired by the people—including those of his victims who escaped death. Once again greatness had come cheaply as soon as he could bring himself to be great; and the mass character of the horrors silenced the question of good and evil, justice and injustice, in men's souls, leaving them only with the feeling that a hideous necessity had worked itself out. By his gruesome deed of June 30, 1934, Hitler, in the eyes of the German people, definitely assumed the dimensions of an historical, superhuman being, whose rights and reasons could no longer be questioned. 'There won't be another revolution in Germany for the next thousand years,' he proclaimed.

The belief in the necessity of evil, which slumbers in the lowest depths of the human soul, had been awakened by Hitler as by no other man in the history of Europe; the fact that he could do what he had done seemed like a confirmation of Hess's fanatical words; that through Hitler higher powers were fulfilling man's destiny. Hitler now began to do frightful things easily, and the more frightful they were, the more easily he did them. He discovered the secret law of history which has made all bloody figures like himself bigger than life-size when the times were favorable: the law by which the most horrible deeds become less heavy to bear, the more monstrous and numerous they are, because in the end each horror wipes out its predecessor in the minds of the people.

Hitler had known this for a long time; his own career, the deeds that had raised him to leadership, had proved it to him many years before. The piles of corpses on June 30, 1934, must have given him the final proof that since 1919 his path of murder and violence had been the right path to greatness.

A few days after June 30, at midnight, Hitler, exhausted and disheveled, appeared at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin and shouted: 'I must work until tomorrow at noon, and I must not be disturbed!' He locked himself up in his room. A quarter of an hour later, his voice was heard again: he wanted a plane. At almost the

same hour as a few days before in Bonn, he left break, his car took him from the Oberwies Brown House in Brienner Street. Impetuously steps to the Hall of Honor, hung with banner the 'bloody banner' of November 9, 1923. Sil banners for a while, then ran down the steps, hurried back to the airport.

Postscript

This book has related from its beginnings to yet come to an end.

In it, I have shown—or tried to show—and the growth of that sinister philosophy of at one time, almost destined to overshadow

There is a double question this book has to sort of people were they who were capable crimes here described; and (even more ur, people were capable of submitting to them?

The question cannot be answered with a de Great events can be understood only when rienced or suffered, at least in spirit; and to k is to experience it. This book has attempted the experiences of a generation; its story is th

The ending I have given it—the days u gave Hitler absolute mastery of his party and arbitrary than may, perhaps, appear. For by was set and the weapon forged. Having ens. Hitler was ready to use the techniques he h have here analyzed—to enslave the contine Stadelheim Prison were the first shots of the

Hitler was able to enslave his own people

** the passion among the people to find greatness in their leader is more powerful than any greatness the leaders possess.*

ahead of him said: 'He is still our Führer!' words had at last come true. The Führer had 'of his best friends; along with his enemies in the most criminal and the most frivolous that very reason he was admired by the of his victims who escaped death. Once cheaply as soon as he could bring himself character of the horrors silenced the quest-justice and injustice, in men's souls, leaving ling that a hideous necessity had worked me deed of June 30, 1934, Hitler, in the ple, definitely assumed the dimensions of in being, whose rights and reasons could "There won't be another revolution in Ger- and years," he proclaimed. sity of evil, which slumbers in the lowest d, had been awakened by Hitler as by no of Europe; the fact that he could do what a confirmation of Hess's fanatical words: er powers were fulfilling man's destiny. ightful things easily, and the more fright- sily he did them. He discovered the secret made all bloody figures like himself bigger nes were favorable: the law by which the e less heavy to bear, the more monstrous ecause in the end each horror wipes out ds of the people. or a long time; his own career, the deeds dership, had proved it to him many years s on June 30, 1934, must have given him 919 his path of murder and violence had atness.), at midnight, Hitler, exhausted and dis- rich Chancellery in Berlin and shouted: row at noon, and I must not be dis- f up in his room. A quarter of an hour gain: he wanted a plane. At almost the

same hour as a few days before in Bonn, he left for Munich. At day-break, his car took him from the Oberwiesefeld airport to the Brown House in Brienner Street. Impetuously he leaped up the steps to the Hall of Honor, hung with banners and flags, including the 'bloody banner' of November 9, 1923. Silently he stared at the banners for a while, then ran down the steps, entered his car, and hurried back to the airport.

Postscript

This book has related from its beginnings a story which has not yet come to an end.

In it, I have shown—or tried to show—the roots of Hitlerism and the growth of that sinister philosophy of force which seemed, at one time, almost destined to overshadow the earth.

There is a double question this book has tried to answer: What sort of people were they who were capable of committing the crimes here described; and (even more urgently) what sort of people were capable of submitting to them?

The question cannot be answered with a definition or a formula. Great events can be understood only when they have been experienced or suffered, at least in spirit; and to know something deeply is to experience it. This book has attempted to let the reader share the experiences of a generation; its story is the reader's own.

The ending I have given it—the days when the blood purge gave Hitler absolute mastery of his party and of Germany—is less arbitrary than may, perhaps, appear. For by that time, the pattern was set and the weapon forged. Having enslaved his own people, Hitler was ready to use the techniques he had learned—which I have here analyzed—to enslave the continent. The shots in the Stadelheim Prison were the first shots of the Second World War.

Hitler was able to enslave his own people because he seemed to

*beginning of possible
the people*

give them something that even the traditional religions could no longer provide; the belief in a meaning to existence beyond the narrowest self-interest. The real degradation began when people realized that they were in league with the Devil, but felt that even the Devil was preferable to the emptiness of an existence which lacked a larger significance.

The problem today is to give that larger significance and dignity to a life that has been dwarfed by the world of material things. Until that problem is solved, the annihilation of Naziism will be no more than the removal of one symptom of the world's unrest.

possible
espionage

Index

AD: ADOLF HITLER

ment of a vast Aryan
the Germans as slave

techniques for enforc-
e Le Bon's influential
le book appeared in a
le der Massen and was

plagiarism. Time after
Mein Kampf he took
One can surmise that
a, Hitler had a friend
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which served both as
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The successful leader
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and the signs, symbols,
n, German racists, and
s used as a racial sym-
e prior to World War I.
their steel helmets in
by old English melody,

Hitler could not have been
a translated into German."
the 1908 translation, there
ged edition in 1919, and a
1938 and 1939.)

The Intellectual World of Adolf Hitler

When the men of the Ehrhardt Brigade later joined Hitler's movement, they took their song with them and simply substituted "*Sturmabteilung Hitler*" for "*Die Brigade Ehrhardt*." ¹⁷²

The runic symbols, , as we have seen, were of much in-
terest to Guido von List as the secret sign of an elite racist group.

Hitler's indebtedness to Mussolini was particularly great. From him he acquired the use of uniform colored shirts and the arm-extended salute. One of his symbols, in addition to the lictor's bundle, was the death's head. Hitler's *Sturm-Abteilungen* (Storm Troops) had a direct predecessor in Mussolini's *Squadristi*. The personal oath was sworn to the Duce before it was sworn to the Führer. Hitler's district leaders for the Party, called *Gauleiter*, were very similar to Mussolini's *Federale*. Mussolini had preceeded Hitler in consecrating flags and preserving the names of the fallen in quasi-religious ceremonies. He had also organized women and youth into separate political organizations and had established secret police. ¹⁷³

What is true of Hitler's party organization, symbols, and practices is also true of his political thought: there is not one concept that can be called his own, not a single major idea that he did not take from someone else. Hitler's strength lay not in the originality of his thinking but in his political acumen and the overwhelming magnetism of his personality. Through the alchemy of his charisma he transmuted the shoddiest racist ideas into a powerful political program and made people believe that he was their savior.

The fact that his ideas had great historical impact would in itself be reason enough to study them. But we have had a particular reason for looking into his peculiar mental world. We seek to understand his personality, and one way of doing so is to see how his psychopathology was reflected in the distorted world of his ideas; another way is to study his personal life directly. We now turn to his development from infancy, stressing those psychological experiences which helped form his personality and shape his political career.

1934

by
von Thunberg

GOD: ADOLF HITLER

new capital of Germania than a civic building. The Dome of St. Peter's Speer has noted, "It was such cult significance the have been senseless and

ideas that had influenced deal from Marxist terror and from the Freemasons. ed from the Jesuit order." the Führer was strikingly swear to the Pope. More the sacred symbol and he also ordered SS officers of Loyola for training in

at to God and the sacred description of public oath- deutscher Beobachter:

the religion of the blood in was sworn his oath of al- unto death to this sublime

Obama which Hitler hurled unlike those of a Gregory

people have sinned . . . cle of faith that Germany it is the duty of the Party fession of faith [Glaubens- our holy [heiliges] sign of

prophets, saints, and mar- tel during the Beer Hall memorial, that their death flection of their people . . . small water of the Third

use, containing the sacred martyrs of 9 November could perform the priestly ards of the Brown Shirts.

The Image and the Man

1934

Hitler substituted Nazi high holy days for traditional religious holi- days. The Nazi holidays included 30 January, the day he came to power in the year he referred to as "the holy year of our Lord 1933," and 20 April, his own birthday and the day when the Hitler Youth were con- firmed in their faith. The holiest day, and the one which served as a kind of Nazi Good Friday, was 9 November, celebrated as the Blood Witness [Blutzeuge] of the movement.

Hitler also provided the holy scriptures for his new religion, and Mein Kampf, instead of the Bible, took the place of honor in the homes of thousands of German families. With a lack of humor typical of the regime, the Nazis chose this title to replace the prayer book as the appropriate wedding gift for young couples.

The parallel between Hitler and the Messiah was made explicit in German schools. On 16 March 1934 children wrote out the following dictation approved by Hitler's Ministry of Enlightenment and Prop- aganda:

Jesus and Hitler. As Jesus freed men from sin and Hell, so Hitler freed the German people from destruction. Jesus and Hitler were persecuted, but while Jesus was crucified Hitler was raised to the Chancellorship. . . . Jesus strove for Heaven, Hitler for the German earth.

The League of German Girls developed a new version of the Lord's Prayer which was a supplication not only for the Führer but to him as a deity:

Adolf Hitler, you are our great Leader. Thy name makes the enemy tremble. Thy Third Reich comes, thy will alone is law upon earth. Let us hear daily thy voice and order us by thy leadership, for we will obey to the end even with our lives. We praise thee! Heil Hitler! ⁸⁴

And smaller children were taught to use this grace before meals:

Führer, my Führer, sent to me from God, protect and maintain me throughout my life. Thou who hast saved Germany from deepest need, I thank thee today for my daily bread. Remain at my side and never leave me, Führer, my Führer, my faith, my light. Heil my Führer! ⁸⁵

Hitler's disciples seem to have been less successful in their efforts to popularize these new words for the favorite Christmas hymn of the German people:

Silent night! Holy night!
All is calm. All is bright.

* D. T. I insisted on that.

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

of a [racial] community of physically and psychically equal living beings. This very preservation comprises first the racial stock." Hitler was impatient with those who talked either about economic or political revolution: "There is absolutely no other revolution but a racial revolution. There is no economic, no political, no social revolution. There is only the struggle of lower races against the dominant, higher races."

Art too was racial: to those who talked about the international nature of art, or of national art, Hitler replied, "Everything you say only proves that you have no understanding of art. There is in art absolutely no such thing as modern art or ancient art. . . . Dutch art, Italian art. . . . There is absolutely only one art, namely Greco-Nordic Art."⁷⁴

Basic to his thinking—and hence to Nazi practice—was his conception of one pure racial community [*Volksgemeinschaft*] which absorbed all individuality. This community of the *Volk*, like the idea of the *Führer*, was ultimately a mystery. When Hitler tried to talk about the mystical sense of community and the sacred union of *Führer* and *Volk* before 200,000 Party leaders at a Nuremberg rally on 7 September 1934 he was overcome with emotion. Once again he evoked his personal mandate from God and spoke of a mystery:

And it was no earthly superior who gave us that command [to lead the *Volk*]; that was given us by the God Who created our *Volk*. . . .

To others it seems a riddle, a mystery—this force that ever unites these hundreds of thousands, that gives them the strength to endure distress, pain and privation. They can conceive of this only as the result of an order issued by the State. They are wrong! It is not the State which gives its order to us, but we who give orders to the State! It is not the State which has created us; but we fashion for ourselves our State. For one we may appear to be a Party; to another an organization; to a third something else. But in truth we are the German *Volk*. . . . Let us pledge ourselves at every hour, on every day, only to think of Germany, of *Volk* and *Reich*, of our great nation, our German *Volk*. *Sieg Heil!*⁷⁵

The massed ranks of the faithful, eyes aflame with passion, roared back the mindless chant, *Sieg Heil! Ein Volk! Ein Reich! Ein Führer!*

Hitler's racial policies all rested on the theory that there was only one truly creative force in all human history: the Aryan race. This leitmotiv was sounded through a hundred speeches and public statements: "What we see before us of human culture today, the results of art, science and techniques, is almost exclusively the creative product of the Aryan. But just this fact admits of the not unfounded conclusion

The Intellectual World of Ad

that he alone was the four prototype of what we und sity to play variations on i 1927 in Munich:

We see before us the all culture, the true i in the field of transp particular race. Our work of the Nor Richard Wagner are f France. Do not say th and the jazz band are everything that is of and to one race wh Take away the Nor dance of apes.⁷⁶

As there was only one Hitler's disjunctive way of and destructive race: the actually true that his poli against the "Jewish Peril," ended all civilization.

In a letter dated 16 S "the first piece of writing goal as "ruthless interver from Europe."⁷⁷ In this in emphasize that his comm tion or sentiment. Rather, Hatred of the Jews is a p based on purely emotiona sion in the form of progr must lead to the systema must unalterably be the e of his career, when he people, the last word of t else I charge the leaders o of the racial laws and poisoner of all nations, ir die does not dissimulate. had meant it all along.

The psychological f: anti-Semitism will be dis Here we must examine tl to state policy and the rai

ation, the state's attorney declared her a
rt said the bullet had entered the chest
d penetrated vertically to the heart, a
of suicide. In Vienna where she had
is buried in the Central Cemetery. A
riend of the family blessed her remains.
rch does not do this in the case of sui-
ception — where there is a likelihood
a state of mental confusion. It was a
egor Strasser later claimed that for two
of his sight, fearing that he might do
a government granted Hitler special per-
. A week after Geli's death, he spent an
ling many tears.

Raubal died? Was it suicide? Was it
at was the reason? To a close friend her
der, or else suicide under compulsion or
not accuse Hitler; on the contrary, she
elf was determined to marry Geli. She
Himmler.

atter can only be presumed. The men-
entire circle justifies the most hideous
ie thought it his duty to free his Führer
But the circumstances do not point very
rrupt as the Bavarian administration of
er the leadership of Franz Gürtner—it
have hushed up a murder, even though
matter quiet on the ground that suicide

tory explanation for suicide. An out-
Close friends insisted that the merry,
wn any such propensities. If we are to
hints of her mother, we might piece to-
ompatible with the spiritual twilight of
mmmler, calling at a late hour; explaining
ed the man who was her guardian, her
ne. According to National Socialist con-

ceptions, there was only one way of making good such a betrayal.
To be sure, she was a woman, but at the same time, in a special and
eminent way, she was a member of a kind of aristocratic order with
strange concepts of honor. We may ask what Himmler hoped to
gain by the inevitable scandal; but a worse scandal was to be feared
if Geli went to Vienna and began to talk, ultimately to the press.
But again: these are pure conjectures, though they do possess a cer-
tain inner plausibility.

At all events, Geli Raubal died under strange circumstances. As
for Adolf Hitler, life here played a cruel trick on an idol unfit to
be a man. The story as it is related here was told by Stempfle to a
friend who had already learned a great deal from Geli herself.
And probably Stempfle talked to other people, too; perhaps in re-
taliation because Hitler ignored him after coming to power. One
thing is certain: on June 30, 1934, when Hitler settled accounts
with hundreds of enemies and former friends by mass murder,
Pater Bernhard Stempfle was killed by three shots in the heart in the
Forest of Harlaching near Munich, by a murder gang led by Emil
Maurice.

1934

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

The magic of his appeal is best remembered by an American journalist who saw him enter Nuremberg one September day in 1934:

1934
Like a Roman emperor Hitler rode into this medieval town at sundown today past solid phalanxes of wildly cheering Nazis who packed the narrow streets that once saw Hans Sachs and the *Meistersinger*. Tens of thousands of Swastika flags blot out the Gothic beauties of the place, the facades of the old houses, the gabled roofs. . . . About ten o'clock tonight I got caught in a mob of ten thousand hysterics who jammed the moat in front of Hitler's hotel shouting: "We want our Führer." I was a little shocked at the faces, especially those of the women. . . . They reminded me of the crazed expressions I saw once in the back country of Louisiana on the faces of some Holy Rollers who were about to hit the trail. They looked up at him as if he were a Messiah, their faces transformed. . . .¹

As Sir Alan Bullock has noted in his superb biography, no statesman ever showed greater understanding of the irrational and emotional factors in politics or exploited them more masterfully. Few have had clearer insights into the weaknesses of opponents or greater ability to turn them to personal advantage. Hitler was adroit in the manipulation of his own charisma and used personal appeal with consummate artistry. As the occasion or audience demanded, he could be charming or brutal, generous or vicious. He was adored by housewives and artists, peasants and architects, professors and plumbers, children and generals. He was a ruthless opportunist with an almost perfect sense of timing, knowing instinctively the precise moment to strike.

Hitler was also a man with a faith that moved mountains. Like all really great political leaders, he combined political realism with unshakable belief in his historic destiny. Above all else, he had the capacity to make men want to follow him. David Lloyd George, himself a notable practitioner of the political arts, stood in awe of Hitler and, after an extensive visit in Germany, proclaimed him to be one of the truly great men of the ages:

The old trust him; the young idolize him. It is not the admiration accorded to a popular Leader. It is the worship of a national hero who has saved his country from utter despondency and degradation. . . . He is as immune from criticism as a king in a monarchical country. He is something more. He is the George Washington of Germany—the man who won for his country independence from all her oppressors. To those who have not actually seen and sensed the way Hitler reigns over the heart and mind of Germany, this description may appear extravagant. All the same, it is the bare truth.²

Image and the Man

Winston Churchill was also impressed. In his accomplishments and called them "among the whole history of the world."³

Hitler's rise had indeed been one of historical stories. The unknown and uneducated commoner had been a failure in all his undertakings in 1933 in a country that despaired of solving problems. Within five years he had given his nation a grateful people hailed him as the leader of an effective social legislation, stabilized their current unemployment, and given millions of vacations. He had sent the youth of the land down sunlit roads; he had forged a new common people; he had built magnificent freeways and to every laboring man; he had humbled the wicked wiped out their treaty, which all Germans call. In a series of brilliant and bloodless coups, he had Greater Germany, proud and strong, remilitarized annexed Austria and Czechoslovakia.

If only he had died before World War II, many a man, historian. Hitler might well have been remembered as "Adolf the Great, one of the outstanding history."⁴

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Any attempt simply to describe Adolf Hitler—and personal interests—immediately confronts man. We look at his unimpressive, even ludicrous how it was possible for a great nation to hail savior; we are perplexed by his preoccupation fingers, the width of his nostrils, the shape of of his eyes. His personal habits also seem to simply note some of his most striking character behavior, along with the themes which keep in and spoken words. Later on, we must respond obvious as they are difficult: Why was he so specific things—why so disturbed by such trivial preoccupations and idiosyncrasies reveal about affect his personal life and public career?

Physically, Hitler did not seem well cast hero and historic force. He looked rather like a

①

1934

1938


created us. No! We are The
earthly power but those of God
depends the state!"

between Mussolini and Hitler, or
National Socialism. In the
said, "It is not the people who
the people."* Mussolini was
campaigning against the individu-
al tried to institutionalize and
ual to the state—harking back,
the state of the Italian Renais-
sance" as an adjective. Yet his
other than totalitarian, and not
the monarchy, the church, and
Fascist "totality." To describe
the forms of Fascism, as
imprecise and mistaken leftist
Fascist" to all movements and

Realism compelled him to con-
sider many an occasion. Already in
relations with Mussolini above
Austrians and South Germans to
South Tyrol, which the Paris
Treaty had some trouble convincing
Hitler not to imperil his poten-
tial he admired and respected
Hitler as well as realistic. I find
Hitler's presence in his occupation of

Austria in March 1938 perhaps more significant: "Mussolini, I shall
never forget this!" Hitler fired this emotional, and revealing, mes-
sage to the Duce when the latter had accepted the Anschluss,
meaning also the presence of a Greater Germany at the crest of the
Alps. That was months, even years, after Mussolini had proclaimed
a Rome-Berlin Axis and his friendship for Hitler, and after a large
accumulation of most reliable evidence of Mussolini having written
off the independence of Austria. Yet Hitler was relieved. He had
feared that, after all—or in the end, or at the crucial moment—
Mussolini's Italian *Staatsräson*, *raison d'état*, would kick in, more
important than their ideological comradeship.

It was to solidify his position and authority within the German
state (even more than within the National Socialist Party) that
Hitler moved against Röhm in the brutal coup of June 1934—after
which he made one of his few speeches sanctifying the cause of
the state: "The nation must know that its existence—and this will
be guaranteed by its internal order and security—will not be en-
dangered with impunity by anyone! And everyone must know for all
the future that if he raises his hand to strike at the state, then certain
death is his lot."* There was—obviously—some political calculation
behind such a statement, but it was not altogether contrary to his
own realistic beliefs. Bullock was astute in writing that Hitler's
"originality lay in his realization that effective revolutions, in modern
conditions, are carried out with, and not against, the power of the
State: the correct order of events was first to secure access to that
power and then begin his revolution."† But already in 1932 Ernst



1934

Manfred Funke, ed., *Deutschland und
Reich*, p. 817.

misleading than to call Hitler a Fas-
cist the term "Fascist" in F, on occasion;
view of F, this happened seldom, and
according to which Hitler, unlike other
dictators, but worked for revolutionary

*Cited by Fest, F, p. 644. He adds: "Repellent as the circumstances of the murder
of Röhm are, we may yet ask whether Hitler had any other choice at all. . . ."
Hitler's successor Dönitz did not comprehend this well enough. In 1945 (in capi-
tivity), he said that in June 1934 Hitler had to navigate between two opposites:
According to the radical Nazis (Röhm), the National Socialist revolution had not
gone far enough; according to the conservatives (Papen), it had gone too far. But
there was more than this kind of calculating navigation in Hitler's mind. As long as
Röhm was alive, Hitler could not count on the unquestioning obedience of the
leaders of the army, which was the only strong element in the structure of the state
that was not yet entirely subordinated to him.

†BU, p. 257.

to the fore in 1930 and after
man nationalism*—among all
se who were worst affected by
woes. "The workingmen have
not have been more wrong—
in 1914, and even more in the
endable for having recognized
uddenly became part of every-
ommunists began to speak in
happened in Germany in 1933
quality of Proudhon's insight

episode in Heiden, HD, pp. 231-32. In
mukeller in Munich, a good speech. A
shouting, and then began to sing
the chairman of the meeting stood
with fury at the cowardice of this
ear later he died. "The meeting was
nizers. . . . When Stresemann con-
fess Minister, one had to show these
Instead of having shown them the
to a ruffian, they abandoned their
ould Hitler come to power."

there were still some Social Demo-
applauded Hitler's foreign-policy
probably sincerely, and not because

1988, p. 25: Germany was different
by largely democratic means. "His-
tracher's seminal work—worked out
1933, illuminating the responsi-
Contributing essentially to [the his-
On the other hand it did not
to be found among the Papens, etc.,

ple responsible for their regimes? In
majority. In 1917, the Bolsheviks in
ere not. But Hitler had a large plu-
matter of fact, the July 1932 elec-
cept for Hindenburg's temporary

over that of Marx—that people respond not to social contracts but
to realities of power.*

Hitler understood that thoroughly. Kershaw noted: "Only one of
the four general plebiscites to take place during the Third Reich did
not follow a major foreign-policy triumph. Externally, the Western
powers had not merely missed an opportunity of halting German
expansion: they had to witness the enormous popularity boost which
[the Rhineland occupation] had given Hitler."† One cannot, and
should not, blame the German people for being impressed with
how foreign statesmen treated and praised Hitler in the 1930s. At
the same time their mute acceptance—indeed, their approval—of
Hitler's brutal mass executions in June 1934 shocks us in retrospect.
As Haffner put it, "if one can speak of the collective guilt of the
German people, then perhaps this is where it all began."

"What kind of state was Germany during that time? Contrary to
widely held beliefs, it was not a one-party state, unlike the German
Democratic Republic or the Soviet Union, dominated by a highly
structured political party. The National Socialist Party had no Cen-
tral Committee, no Politburo, and Hitler never convened executive
committee meetings. . . . It was not the party that dominated the
state but Hitler who dominated everything, including the party."

Again Haffner, HF/AT, pp. 185-86: "The Germans in the Thirties became a
politically unified nation. It is a process that is still not fully understood, probably
because people like to forget that in the spring and early summer of 1933 some-
thing like a national coming together was indeed taking place, not necessarily behind
the National Socialist Party, but behind Adolf Hitler, behind the Führer as he was
beginning to be called." Also M. Broszat, *Nach Hitler*. Der schwierige Umgang mit
unserer Geschichte (M, 1986), p. 164: "The . . . populist attraction of National Social-
ism was more important than its ideological indoctrination of the masses."

"Or consider that Ferdinand Lassalle, the founder of German Socialism, told
Bismarck in 1863: "a secret . . . that the working class has an instinctive inclina-
tion to accept dictatorship." In Reinhold Schneider, *Der Balkon* (Frankfurt, 1959),
p. 120: "an insight of immense significance, that of the guilt and shame of twelve
years. . . ." Or Julius Fröbel, a German Liberal, in 1848: "The German nation had
enough of principles and doctrines, of literary reputations and a life devoted to
theory. What it wants is power, power, power; and who gives it power will be
revered, more than it dreams of."

TKER, p. 105. This was already so well before 1936: Hitler's rejection of the
League of Nations, or the Saar plebiscite, for example.

* D. K. I did not need the O. O. to tell me
that the moment was ripe. The people loved
Hitler and wanted more of him — when

1933

1934

that
stand in the
way

people would more of
them. They will ignore
any thing that is not
done by Hitler

Sense?

(1934) linguistic, and even religious elements;* and (3) that nationalism, more than racism, is a modern, and populist, phenomenon.

Modern, and populist. When Samuel Johnson made his celebrated pronouncement "Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel," he meant *nationalism*, since that word did not yet exist in English. Patriotism (as George Orwell noted in one of the few essays extant on its distinction from nationalism) is defensive, while nationalism is aggressive; patriotism is rooted in the land, in a particular country, while nationalism is applied to the myth of a people (indeed, to a putative majority); patriotism is traditionalist, while nationalism is populist. Populism is folkish; patriotism is not. This phenomenon—or, rather, tendency—is almost universal in the twentieth century. The nineteenth century was full of liberal nationalists, some of them inspiring and noble figures. In the twentieth century this has seldom been so. One hundred years before, Orwell's (1943) distinction between nationalism and patriotism would have seemed labored, it would have made relatively little sense. Even now nationalism and patriotism often overlap within the mind and the heart of the same person. Yet we must be aware of the differences between them—because of the phenomenon of populist nationalism, which, unlike old-fashioned patriotism, is inseparable from the myth of a people. One can be a patriot and, at least culturally, cosmopolitan. But a populist is inevitably a nationalist of sorts. Patriotism, too, is less racist than is populism. A patriot will not exclude a person of another race from the community where they have lived side by side and whom he has known for many years; but a nationalist will always remain suspicious of someone who does not seem to belong to his kind of people—or, more likely, to his way of thinking. "The jingo nationalist"—Alfred Duff Cooper said it well—"is always the first to denounce his fellow countrymen as traitors."

This difference between patriotism and nationalism Hitler exemplified. About its meaning he was explicitly clear. Early in his youth, as he put it in *Mein Kampf*, "I was a nationalist, but not a patriot."

*Few, otherwise racist, Southerners would deny that American-born blacks are Americans; many German Nazis denied that German-born Jews were Germans. (Other examples: Ulster, Yugoslavia.)

He desired to unite him Greater Germany, at the Habsburg imperial state thoped this theme often. Th 6 April 1927, reported in c later, "Nationalism and Pa A few excerpts: "We are n "A decisive settlement of : the German Bürgertum th young and socialistic natio older outdated patriotism. have a true national goal. absolutely different things. allow the past to continue career Hitler was aware of t He made good use of it. He and the occasional oppositi clergy, and lay people to N racial institutions when at t their unqualified nationalist

Patriotism is not a subst alism often is; it may fill t spiritual—needs of people. Quint made telling observ impulse [Ausgangspunkt] . his movement, which grew

*The subtitles of the lead articl his speech: "The curse of the sma guilt of the Bürgertum—The inte sand—The nationalist state."

†Example: In the mostly Catho cent of the vote, while in 1935— union with the Third Reich. In A Eichmann, Globocnik, Kaltenbrur the *Austrian* National Socialist Le also be telling that in 1940 Hider United States as "radical nationalists

‡See chapter 2 for a discussion

134 "Foreigners may say that the state created us. No! We are The State! We follow the orders of no earthly power but those of God who created the German people! On us depends the state!"

Here was one of the differences between Mussolini and Hitler, or between Italian Fascism and German National Socialism. In the Fascist Manifesto of 1932 Mussolini said, "It is not the people who make the state but the state that makes the people."* Mussolini was a populist, but less so than Hitler. Campaigning against the individualism of the Italian people, Mussolini tried to institutionalize and enforce the submission of the individual to the state—harking back, at least in some ways, to the ideal of the state of the Italian Renaissance. He occasionally used "totalitarian" as an adjective. Yet his Italian regime was authoritarian rather than totalitarian, and not only because of his acceptance of the monarchy, the church, and many other minor exceptions to Fascist "totality." To describe Hitler and National Socialism as one of the forms of Fascism, as Ernst Nolte did, is wrong—as is the imprecise and mistaken leftist practice of applying the adjective "Fascist" to all movements and regimes of the radical right.†

At the same time, Hitler's political realism compelled him to consider the primacy of state interests on many an occasion. Already in 1926, he put the necessity of good relations with Mussolini above the nationalist desires of many Austrians and South Germans to reclaim the largely German-inhabited South Tyrol, which the Paris peace treaties had awarded to Italy. He had some trouble convincing some of his followers of this. The decision not to imperil his potential relationship with Mussolini, whom he admired and respected at that time, may have been ideological as well as realistic. I find Hitler's reaction to Mussolini's acquiescence in his occupation of

*Cited in a study by Horst Zimmermann in Manfred Funke, ed., *Deutschland und die Mächte. Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des III. Reiches*, D, 1977, p. 817.

†Haffner, *HF/AN*, p. 60: "Nothing is more misleading than to call Hitler a Fascist." Fest, who was sympathetic to Nolte, used the term "Fascist" in *F*, on occasion; but as Bracher wrote in his complimentary review of *F*, this happened seldom, and it had no influence on Fest's interpretation, according to which Hitler, unlike other "Fascists," did not depend on historical reminiscences but worked for revolutionary change.

1934
Austria in March 1938 p. never forget this! Hitler sage to the Duce when meaning also the presence Alps. That was months, e a Rome-Berlin Axis and I accumulation of most reli off the independence of . feared that, after all—or Mussolini's Italian *Staats* important than their ideol
It was to solidify his pc state (even more than wi Hitler moved against Röhm which he made one of hi the state: "The nation mu be guaranteed by its interi endangered with impunity by the future that if he raises h death is his lot."* There wa behind such a statement, b own realistic beliefs. Bullo "originality lay in his realizat conditions, are carried out v State: the correct order of e power and then begin his re

*Cited by Fest, *F*, p. 644. He add of Röhm are, we may yet ask wh Hitler's successor Dönitz did not c tivity), he said that in June 1934 I According to the radical Nazis (Rö gone far enough; according to the t there was more than this kind of calt Röhm was alive, Hitler could not e leaders of the army, which was the o that was not yet entirely subordinated †BU, p. 257.

1934

cited his speech in Munich in November 1934: "In Germany bayonets do not terrorize a people. Here a government is supported by the confidence of the entire people. . . . I have not been imposed by anyone upon this people. From this people I have grown up, in the people I have remained, to the people I return. My pride is that I know no statesman in the world who with greater right than I can say that he is representative of the people."^{*} Fest's insight is considerable: "Hitler never wanted to establish a tyranny [Gewaltherrschaft]." And: "A mere hunger for power is insufficient to explain the Hitler phenomenon, which cannot be studied as [yet] another form of modern tyranny."[†] We have seen that Hitler himself said that he was not a dictator and did not wish to be one. Kershaw expressed this, in a judicious sentence: "To suggest that Hitler's power rested on 'totalitarian terror'—leaving aside difficulties with the concept of 'totalitarianism'—is to state only a partial truth."[‡] In *HF/AN*, Haffner made the bold suggestion that at least until 1938 the Third Reich was not a totalitarian but an authoritarian state, thus at least comparable to other dictatorships in the Europe of the 1930s, including Italy.

THERE IS (OR, RATHER, WAS), of course, a difference between "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" regimes, between, say, Hitler's on the one hand and Franco's or Salazar's or Pilsudski's or Metaxas's on the other—a difference that is more than one of nuances. Most of these dictators did not intend to maintain total control over personal and family lives. But by fixing our attention on *the state*, we miss the essential difference that separates Hitler's vision—and his intentions—from that of all other contemporary dictators, including Mussolini and Stalin.

Consider that the state, as we know it, was a creation of the so-called Modern Age, arising first in Renaissance Italy and then in Western Europe about five hundred years ago; in an age marked by the roiling and evolving mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, democ-

^{*}BU, p. 404.

[†]F, p. 571; also p. 572.

[‡]KER, p. 62.

racy—and that Hitler's vis-à-vis radical break with the insular have agreed with Tocqueville, racy was now irreversible. sumption of power, Tocqueville peculiar to the democratic perhaps peculiar to Hitler—much of but *through* a major the security of the state—world, even in Stalin's Soviet already in *Mein Kampf*, Hitler means to the end" ["Der Staat mit all of the compromises state—he remained consistent March 1929, he said: "For the idea of the state." On 10 March regions are more stable than it tersely in a speech in Salzburg and only then came the Reich in the Platterhof in May 1934 work" [eine Zwangsform].]

^{*}Zitelmann (ZIT/B, p. 85) cite there existed a widespread feeling democracy." He adds: "Hopes for utopian aspirations for a better paradoxical: but the end of [parliamentary] beginning of true popular rule."

[†]The term *the state*, originally a become sacrosanct in the Soviet Stalin's 1936–39 purges signified a cracy into a state bureaucracy.) Lenin, was not a revolutionary but of the state at the very time when dated—another example of the birth with Hitler's National Socialism.

[‡]Jäckel (JHW, p. 99) also cites a state . . . is not of principal importance Haffner (HF/AN, p. 86) goes further significance that "in Hitler's political

1934

O

and German Christianity of their doctrines within very significant that, as the more decisive than ideology. In him, Proudhon had seen and wrote, react less to ideas of power. Two episodes, I think, considerable the aggressive minority of which, it is remarkable that Democrats did anything: Leftist uprising anywhere more significant, to me, was with their majority of anti-news of Hitler's pact with single resignation from the oval from the conservatives, 1933 and after had sided with n. To the contrary, there felicitation at that unques-tionable. (The same was true of throughout the world.) This at a worldwide were experiencing (yes, compared with commu-nal popular.

interview with Eva Braun's sister: their suicide. Here the perceptive [er] was, in spite of his customary 'mighty,' not only irreligious himself tion can mean to others" (not so). k with Churchill, August 1942; also church.) Hitler was no atheist. Here of half-truths, and perhaps also the Antichrist would not appear as one who in many ways acts and pre-further discussion, see chapter 9.) ll Putsch, Princeton, 1972, pp. 407-8,

ALLOW ME NOW TO RETURN to Tocqueville (whom Hitler had surely not read, and who would have been anathema to him). Three principal elements in Tocqueville's vision and in his writing, are relevant to our theme here. The first is Tocqueville's prophetic perception of a new kind of tyranny peculiar to the coming democratic age, the tyranny not of a minority but of a majority; a tyranny not only established with the consent of but exercised by the majority on occasion. That new kind of "Caesarism" (as Tocqueville at times put it) was already apparent, here and there, in the nineteenth century, though not in Germany. Twenty years after Tocqueville first wrote about it in *Democracy in America*, it came to France through the plebiscitary triumph of Louis Napoleon. But the semi-authoritarian regime of Napoleon III was still very different from that of Hitler. In the Third Reich, the majority gave not only its passive but its active consent to the Führer. Hitler was more of a populist (and, in the broadest sense of the term, more of a democrat) than Napoleon III, more so than other dictators, such as those in South America or Mussolini or Kemal. As a matter of fact (as he himself said), Hitler was not really a typical dictator—but this was not, as some of the Functionalist historians argue, because he was hesitant, circumscribed by his bureaucracy, or "weak." He was more than a dictator; he was something else. "The old tyrants," Chesterton said, "invoked the past; the new tyrants will invoke the future."

The second element of Tocqueville's vision is his startling statement, again made first in *Democracy in America*, that the age of great revolutions may be a thing of the past, because in a democratized society the majority of people do not wish to be disturbed by revolutionary ideas, though they are wont to accept the presence of a vast bureaucracy in their everyday lives. Again, this applies to Hitler—though only to some extent. His 1934 statement to the effect that there would be no revolutions in Germany for a thousand years was more than an assuaging of the latent fears of German conservatives and ordinary people. From time to time, he still employed the adjective "revolutionary" in a positive sense—in the sense that what he established was a revolutionary "New Order," as opposed

(2)

1935 Aug 1939
~~1945~~

Czechia" became a Ger-
mania-Moravia, and Slo-
servient to him. A. J. P.
tion between Germany
nted a Poland that was
Germany, without any
as of a Hitlerian Real-
es. All over Europe (for
omania, and in a few
ational Socialist leaders
d not support them and
ferred to work with the
h provinces and states.
in Romania in January
list Iron Guard (whose
rhaps the most fanatic
with the nationalist and
whom Hitler respected
broke out between the
ians unequivocally sup-
pporter, on occasion with

war lasted, he needed
satellites—a kind of sta-
onary experiments, and
ary material supplies to
h allied chiefs of state—
Hungary, King Boris of
holly loyal or uncondi-
ny. Still, it is significant
give the slightest indica-
s after the war, his for-
eir rewards.* In sum, a
German foreign policy

of them in 1944, when his
at was no longer important.

was a must, while a perfect conformity with the ideology and prac-
tices of German National Socialism was not—except in the case
of Jews.

THIS DISCREPANCY between ideology and statesmanship is most
startling when we observe Hitler's views and expressed opinions of
Stalin. Hitler respected (and, later, increasingly admired) Stalin.*
There are many recorded expressions of Hitler in that regard,
before the war and in many instances during it.† Yet none of this
can be found in his public speeches, or in the official propaganda
of the Reich as directed by Goebbels. The unavoidable struggle
against "Jewish Bolshevism" was the main theme, and the main jus-
tification of the war against Russia, as presented to the German
people and to the rest of the world until the end, with no diminution
or alternation in tone. There were many people outside Germany
who did not believe this, or did so only with reservations. Yet it had
lasting effects within Germany, as may be seen in the approval of the
war against Russia even by such anti-Nazi or non-Nazi personages
as Bishop (later Cardinal) von Galen in 1941, or by the continued
evocation of the "Bolshevik" terminology by the Dönitz govern-
ment and by German generals even after Hitler's suicide. But there
is a good deal of evidence that Hitler himself did not believe this.‡

*In August 1939, he ordered his photographer Heinrich Hoffmann (whom he
also entrusted with a special personal message to Stalin) to retouch the photo
showing Stalin with a cigarette in his left hand. Gisevius (61, p. 449) cites Hoff-
mann, who recalled Hitler's words: "The signing of a pact between two great
nations is a solemn act; one does not do that with a cigarette between one's fingers!
Such a picture does not show seriousness enough."

†Hitler to Mussolini in January 1940: "... since Stalin's final triumph Russia has
been experiencing a change from the Bolshevik [ideology] to a more nationalist
Russian way of life." Conversely, there is evidence of Stalin's admiration for Hitler
(as late as December 1944, he made a sympathetic remark about Hitler to de
Gaulle). There is also some reason to believe that Stalin's purges of some of his fol-
lowers, beginning in 1935, were influenced by his perception of Hitler's liquidation
of Röhm in 1934.

‡Speer, *SP*, p. 319: As the war went on, Hitler "spoke of Stalin with full acknowl-
edgment; he especially emphasized the parallel with Stalin's resolution in the face

1939

1935

1945

* P.T. I did not have the answer
but I had to wonder whether

Stalin's treason trial purges of the
old Bolsheviks had been stimulated
by the ^{murders} execution of Röhm.

①

1935

1945

There were many com-
ts among his early allies
; the higher members of
ler, were numerous and
o the establishment of
re Himmler's "primitive
Schramm noted that he
ation of the early period
f his followers."* Speer
ialist mysticism: "What
eaves mysticism behind,
We might as well have
a at least." A number of
fred Rosenberg seriously
 Rosenberg's cloudy book
eer, Hitler said, "A step
er cited one of Hitler's
s pleasure with Cardinal
erg's screed.†

atements about races are
national characteristics.
as is true of almost every
were not biological. He
g the German people to
ms by Rosenberg and
ity where and when they
ultural rather than racial,
s and delicacy which lies
ins) a superficially slight
a folkish and a racist type
wished to evoke was the
And that reflected, too,

the evolution—if that is what it was, if not a gradually hardening recognition—of his own beliefs.

In May 1944, to officers in a remarkable speech at the Platterhof, Hitler said: "We have this people of ours that is not to be identified with a race, and this is now clear to millions. . . . But when I began [speaking] about twenty-five years ago this was not so. I was told by [counterrevolutionary-bürgerlich] circles: Yes, Volk and Race are one and the same! No! Volk and race are not the same. Race is a component of blood, a hematologic (*blutmässig*) kernel, but the Volk is very often composed not of one race but of two, three, four or five different racial kernels. . . . Each of these racial kernels possesses particular talents."* And in the Bormann records, on 13 February 1945, Hitler said: "Pride of race is a quality which the German, fundamentally, does not possess. We use the term of Jewish race as a matter of convenience, for in reality and from the genetic point of view there is no such thing as the Jewish race." *There is no such thing as the Jewish race.* . . . †

1945

NATIONALISM AND RACISM are not easily definable terms. (Nor is there a first-rate general history of either nationalism or of racism. One reason for this is that nationalism may differ from country to country more than internationalism or socialism does.) And this is not the place to expatiate on their differences or on their origins, except to emphasize three matters: (1) that Adolf Hitler was more of a nationalist than a racist; (2) that nationalism can be even more exclusionary than racism—mostly because of its attribution of cultural,

1935

*Speech of 26 May 1944, published and annotated by Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, in *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, 1976 (2), pp. 149–50. In this speech Hitler did not insist on the superiority of the Nordic racial "kernel": "The strongest of these racial kernels, with a commercial but no creative talents, would have been the Jews among us, in the long run, and with the difference that this Jewry would not have been absorbed racially by the German people but that it would have destroyed the German Volk gradually, step by step."

†*The Testament of Adolf Hitler*. The Hitler-Bormann Documents, I, 1961 (hereafter AH/V). In these last recorded monologues, Hitler also referred to Jews as "a spiritual race."

* 1945

* The question grew greater as

461 I look back
to be there always
to assure him
that of a
certainty there
were the tools and
a pawn of the devil

his body became more moribund.
began to betray more and more.
Each time he failed (doubtless, because
of his spirit) he thought contemptuously
him continuing remains that even Jews
were a spiritual race for that even the
next generation - like a kind of spiritual
race. Did they belong to some other kind of

(7)

1938
1944

e soldiers, workers, and
and lower-middle-class
n to Hitler. All of those
f the creation of a new
mong his original ideas,
of the movement which
masses of the cities."*
century who had
twentieth century have
antry and the land. The
al Socialist propaganda
nd agriculture. Heiden,
ng city people. . . .† to
, and began to appeal to
r 1928, during the great
1923), Hitler said: "For
ded than an economic
o become free, it needs
and once again hate."
reds, he projected them
tionalism and racism.‡
Chesterton knew when
al and particular, it is

winist" designations ex-
survival of the Strongest,

feriority (or, more precisely,
expressions. (Churchill was
See also Hitler's speech in
that our Western opponents
or . . . I do not suffer in the
190.) His remarks (9 January
New Chancellery, cited by
store the self-respect of each
ferior, to the contrary we are
"Hitler's gigantic buildings
"

but was there anything new in that? The principle of the triumph of the Tough over the Weak goes back even beyond Machiavelli, perhaps to Cain and Abel themselves.* Hitler understood that people respond to—indeed, that they will respect—the realities of power.† Moreover, unlike many Social Darwinists, Hitler was not a materialist, convinced as he was of the power of ideas.

He was an extreme nationalist—perhaps the most extreme nationalist of all the principal figures of the twentieth century. And while nationalism is atavistically human, deeper, and stronger than class consciousness, the trouble is not only its latent inhumanity but the, perhaps surprising—abstractness of its assumption about human nature itself. "Love of the people": but who are the people? Nationalism is both self-centered and selfish, because human love is not the love of oneself, it is the love of another. Patriotism is traditional and not merely biological, because charitable love is human and not merely "natural." Nature has—and shows—no charity.‡ That Hitler believed. He also believed that charity does not have a function in the history of mankind. Whether that amounted to his belief in Social Darwinism is arguable. What is not questionable is that his hatred for his opponents was both stronger and less abstract than was his love for his people.** That was (and remains) a distinguishing mark of the mind of every extreme nationalist.

*Zitelmann—as well as others—overemphasized Hitler's Social Darwinism. Hitler often made references to Marx but seldom, if ever, to Darwin.

†In February 1924, before the court: "The psyche of the people is such that it respects the existence of power, first of all." (ZIT/A, p. 47.)

‡It is therefore that the dignity of human life must proceed from a denial of Darwinism, and from the recognition that, no matter how biologically small, there is an essential difference between human beings and all other living beings. Both Christianity and Western civilization are humanist in that sense, in the sense of their requisite denial of the survival of the fittest as a principle governing humanity.

**And yet consider: Hatred is a human inclination, as is love. Just as human love is something more and different from an animal's instinctive affections, hatred in humans is something different from the "red tooth and claw" of nature. And while human love is always a love for another, human hate is inevitably self-centered; for we often hate in others something that we hate in ourselves. (That, too, is true less of racism than it is of nationalism.) And what did Hitler hate in himself? That is a secret that he died without divulging.

Survival of the fittest destroys the potentiality of the weak

1935
Rohm
My strength is also my weakness. D.C. This too, I had to accept from the beginning 1944

Inmediocrity

(1935), 1937-38

because of their anticommunism and perhaps even because of certain racial sympathies.* Beneath this coursed his fundamental conviction of his ability to recognize and to profit from the weakness of his opponents. And so he was able to achieve something even greater than Bismarck and, unlike Bismarck, without war: the Saar, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the incorporation of Austria, and the Sudetenland, creating a Greater German Reich such as the world had never seen. Even before he changed the map of Europe, even before he flung his armed power beyond the German borders for the first time in March 1938, he had already achieved a Diplomatic Revolution. He had, as yet, no fixed alliances—only a few treaties of nonaggression or friendship or anticommunism. At the same time, France had political and military alliances with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, even Soviet Russia. Yet these no longer amounted to much; most of them were useless paper. That was a diplomatic revolution without precedent in the modern history of Europe.

But then, in the winter of 1937-38, there came a change. It was not a change in his objectives, or a result of his changing view of the European situation. It was a change within the man himself. He had convinced himself that he might not have long to live, that time was working against him—and, thus, against Germany. There is a concordance of evidence for this, ranging from changes in his personal and physical habits and his dictation of a private will and testament (in early May 1938), to his decision to appoint Ribbentrop as his foreign minister and dismiss General Fritsch as commander in chief of the army while he himself assumed the functions of minister of war and supreme commander of the Wehrmacht. Much has been

*Zitelmann, too (especially in ZIT/A), is mistaken about Hitler's foreign policy. He overemphasizes Hitler's affection for England, suggesting thereby that the British were responsible for not responding to that adequately. Other German historians have inclined to this, including Hillgruber, who respected Chamberlain but not Churchill. Also, Zitelmann explains Hitler's decision to move into the Rhineland in March 1936 as a reaction to the French Chamber of Deputies' ratification of the 1935 Franco-Soviet Pact "that Germany considered as a break of the Locarno Treaty." Not Germany: Hitler, who used it as a pretext.

written about the so-called 1937, when Hitler, for the first time, prepared for an eventual war. It was an admonition to the generals: "in the near future. Hitler's move against Czechoslovakia included a conflict between Germany and France, for example. Because this was what followed in real life." "Hitler's exposition was in fact a matter in the conference his opportunity arose, for Britain, almost certainly, to go off the Czechs and were re Germany would be cleared. It was an accurate statement of what happened less than a year later.

But there is another element in this Nazi move—an element which received the attention it did because of no reference at all to Russia in the event of war over Czechoslovakia with Japan (which was true). "Poland—with Russia in 1939—engage in war against a victor. Poland were to move against Poland. Here was something which was a collusion against Poland in

*A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, pp. 367-74. The conference was a maneuver which some of Taylor's works were in later editions of his work, pp. 367-74. The conference was in view of Taylor's 1937 has been a subject of considerable record (like the record of another 22 August 1939) was not an exact

*D. I. I was there to convince him that he had not long to live + must speed up his plans. This

was sheer obedience on my part. I did not understand why, but the O.O. was insistent. He wanted war, that was obviously part of his largest plan.

1935

that other traditionalist and public: the army. Only one or two foreign service after 1933 is ideology remained fundamental that he had subordinated his of the state (something that never, misunderstood by anti-ideology, could be more accurate to say in light of ideological convictions and to the very end—a contradiction.†

who have felt compelled to regard his first six years as a statesman and mostly on his domestic policy. Since the two were not separating of a German national moves had to depend, on as steadily enhanced by his policy, which had led to such a

Frederick von Roehrs

the Papen, for whose political ideas he served Hitler well (at least until July 1940) when he refused to hear him out. LEW, p. 334, forbade members of the ministry —yet Papen continued to function

image of the party struggles [of the Weimar Republic] never realized that domestic and foreign policy were inseparable. But are they? In this respect telling (1/2, p. xxiii): "In Hitler's political strength too low in their political unity; on this stable foundation that base in turn he built up the foreign policy."

great rise of German power and prestige abroad. Yet again, it would be erroneous to assert that before 1939 Hitler's statesmanship was, by and large, successful, because he had not yet broken with Realpolitik; and that thereafter the war and its catastrophes were the results of ideology overwhelming whatever "realpolitical" talents for statesmanship he may have possessed.* Ideology, even in the 1930s, was not something apart and different from his cold calculations, but part and parcel of them. Thus, for example, in his most difficult year, 1934, when National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy seemed, at least for a while, to oppose each other, Hitler knew that this would not continue. His first meeting with Mussolini in June 1934 may have been inconsequential; but, contrary to the views of some of his biographers, it was not altogether a failure. It may have, at worst, delayed the pronouncement of a Rome-Berlin Axis that Mussolini would then declare in 1936, but it neither compromised nor obstructed its eventual development.† A compound of ideology and statesmanship governed Hitler's decision to actively support Franco in the Spanish Civil War, and also Germany's relationship with China and Japan.‡ It is true that both in *Mein Kampf* and in his 1928 "book" he had emphatically defined his realistic calculations, a German Reich needing good relations with England and Italy. But it was more than realistic calculation that made him arrive and rejoice at a naval treaty with England in 1935. He thought (and he had some evidence to that effect) that people in the governing circles of England would acquiesce in the rise of a new Germany

1935

*Thus Fest, F, p. 836: "After 1939 Hitler departed from 'Politik' and he never returned to it." This is very debatable.

†Fest is not correct about Mussolini, "who, more than others, insisted on resisting Germany's further advance" at Stresa, in 1935. (F, p. 673.) He also exaggerates Hitler's Realpolitik during the Spanish Civil War. F, p. 685: "... here again he was a tactician and showed a cold rationality that was entirely [?] free of ideology: for years he did nothing to promote Franco's victory and wanted rather to keep [the civil war] going."

‡Toland, TO, p. 401: Hitler's persuading Japan to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936: "Admittedly spineless, the agreement was important as a propaganda ploy to justify German rearmament." It had nothing to do with rearmament, and everything to do with his calculation about the advantageous use of anticommunism.

1995?

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Reac.

artistic and cultural policies of the Third Reich, Hildegard Brenner: "During the years 1934 to 1940 . . . one cannot deny the 'historical uniqueness' . . . in architecture. In this field National Socialism succeeded in reaching a form of self-expression that cannot be doubted."* (In support of this summary statement, Brenner also cites Bruno Zevi, *Poetica dell'architettura neoplastica* [Milan, 1953], and Nikolaus Pevsner, *Europäische Architektur* [M., 1957], two of the most eminent European architectural historians, both of whom, incidentally, were serious and respected scholars of Jewish origin.)

It is in Hitler's artistic preferences and appetites—more than in his ideological and even literary preferences—that we may detect both bourgeois-conservative and modern-revolutionary elements. Especially in his preferences in music and painting, besides sculpture and architecture. This duality is there in his very statements. In his speech at Nuremberg on 1 September 1933: "It is better to imitate the good things than it is to produce new bad things." (Note, however, that this was the political period, when he found it necessary to appeal to German conservatism.) At the same time, there was his respect and admiration for supermodern technology. To Speer he said that the autobahns would be his Parthenon.† Again to Speer: "The popes of the Renaissance and the rulers of the Baroque era considered buildings as pastimes. For [Hitler] it was part of the political will of the National Socialist movement."‡ He thought that he and his architects might achieve a new kind of architectural unity of what was best in the old and in the modern. Hence his preference for the neoclassicism of the architects Tessenow and Troost and Speer, different and better than the neoclassical architectures of Mussolini or Stalin: "It had been the declared will of Hitler and

*Hildegard Brenner, *Die Kunstpolitik des Nationalsozialismus*, Hamburg, 1963, p. 118.

†"Road-building had always been the sign of powerful governments, he said, from the Romans and the Incas down to Napoleon." (i/w, pp. 22-23)

‡Krier, K., p. 213, citing Speer. About the autobahns-Parthenon analogy, see F., p. 527 *et seq.* Also, Hitler to Abel Bonnard (a French intellectual admirer of his) in 1937: "A man must be considered anew, spiritually and not only professionally. . . . It is not enough to build him a house but to have a light shine out from it." (HR, p. 319)

Speer not to copy historic styles itself to become historical."* V rival and competitor) presented central Munich (Speer's grand Berlin), Hitler said that he saw nology of our times—and I add Avenue] . . . will be the most foresaw the need to avoid ma: underground parking garages. (subway) in Munich was begun in a modern public-transportati Europe today). Hitler often us According to Maser, there is Stalin, Hitler did not dismiss Maser does not produce such ev right: "Not in every field of cr and traditionally bound."†

Hitler's duality was appare thinking. About women, for exa traditional practices of Germar differences between women anc ority of the latter in certain are promotion of the physical educa boys; of their modern and spor war, Goebbels proposed the to Hitler was reluctant; he did nc rejected elements of the Prussia the center of his political career of the Bavarians, though his id Prussianism were not the mode Nor was his frequent dismissal

*K., p. 226.

†M/A, p. 103.

‡Wolfgang Wippermann, "Nation (26 December 1981), p. 127. "In this he and Protestant conservatives of the W.

their daily worries will to a the who said that one must have the possible. Any ideal able, if it is not to be pro-

the early 'twenties and the prophet and a priest, between years he was the articulate ions of his dead comrades hey had fought. There was

I write revivalist, because s, but anyone who studies find many parallels to the archy was organized after which one can see again the created by the Jesuits. Blind net of both organizations n of Hitler at the centre, ls, as general of the order, ded the next link in the

powers as an orator which nasses. He knew that in a as a relatively insignificant life was that he was not a when confronted by indie knew he had nothing to ge to win the approval of the female partner he never the counterpart of sexual ck's comb or the wattles of that he became formidable ver he thought the same for many years it did, only side world was not subject ly in the atmosphere which tic crescendos of Wagner's

music. He could immerse himself in this torrent of sound and become what he could allow himself to be in no other circumstances — nothing, a neuter.

People often ask if Hitler was nothing but a demagogue. I have tried to show how much more there was to him than that, but he did possess to a remarkable degree the gift of all great demagogues, that of reducing complicated issues to fiery catch-phrases. He was a great admirer of British propaganda methods in the war, which the Germans with their long statements signed by fifty professors had never remotely matched. The danger of course lay in the fact that in the end he did not realize he was indulging in over-simplification. The shades of grey in an argument or situation naturally seeped into him, but what came out was always jet black or pure white. To him there was only ever one side of a question. Rosenberg, his most dangerous mentor, had developed the dilettantist theory of the superiority of the Nordic race to the point of caricature. Nevertheless, its directness appealed to Hitler and he swallowed it whole. My fight with him over the years was basically an attempt to prove that things were not simple but complicated. I used one simile, when I first started playing the piano for him, that it would be hopeless to try and play his beloved *Liebestod* using only the white keys. He looked at me half-amused and half-disconcerted, but the phrase stuck, and I used it from time to time over the years, when my advice became less and less welcome.

Hitler was not so much a distiller as a bar-tender of genius. He took all the ingredients the German people offered him and mixed them through his private alchemy into a cocktail they wanted to drink. If I can mix my metaphors he was a tight-rope walker as well, maintaining until he had beaten down all possible sources of opposition, a precarious balance between their conflicting demands. His so-called intuition was nothing but a camouflage for awkward decisions which might offend one or the other faction. His greatest strength lay in his one-track mind. A lot of us could become famous or illustrious or powerful if we only did what Hitler did. On Tuesday he did what he had made up his mind to do on Monday, and the same on Wednesday, all through the week and through the months and years. He got there, with all the mistakes and drawbacks such

an attitude embodies. The rest of us form a resolution over the weekend, wake up on Monday undecided, next day change our mind again and more or less undo what we did yesterday by a little inconsistency tomorrow or the day afterwards. Hitler kept to his course like a skyrocket, and got there.

It may be a source of astonishment, but Hitler's secret idol was Pericles. One of Hitler's many frustrations was his failure to become an architect, and the great Greek architect-politician was a sort of adolescent hero to him. I knew most of the books Hitler had read in his early days and one of them was a hundred-year-old tome called *Historische Charakterbilder* by A. W. Grube. It used to lie in the jumble of his Thierschstrasse flat, and he knew many of the details of this potted history by heart. To Hitler the council of the elders on the Areopagus hill, which Pericles had stormed, represented the corrupt bourgeois forces the Nazis had sworn to liquidate. In his blind devotion to symbols, Hitler could not even see that the parallels became pathetic. I suppose Anaxagoras, Pericles' mentor, was funny little Professor Poetsch, who had given Hitler instruction in Linz. If Phidias was Heinrich Hoffmann, then Zeno, the dialectician, was presumably Rosenberg. And there of course you ran out of names, for Hitler the Pinchbeck Pericles had no Aspasia.

Because Pericles carried thunder on his tongue, and the goddess of persuasion resided on his lips, Hitler thought words were all that Pericles had ever used and saw in himself the reincarnation of the rebellious agitator-soldier. But in his case the tragedy of an orator became the tragedy of his hearers.

WILDERNESS A

*Unacknowledged banishment—
von Schirach—No bed of my own
telephone—A mission to Spain—
Goering's plot frustrated—A race
birthday of a fugitive—Unity Mi
joke on a pa*

I CARRIED ON. It was neither her inertia. In due course my office was another building farther up the W Unter den Linden, opposite the Ad taken over by Ribbentrop, now eme in the foreign affairs field. Hitler n banished, and word that I was no l penetrate outside the inner circle. I c and, occasionally, Goebbels and cou foreign press office kept going of it interviews through Lammers and Fu did my best to keep my foreign dipl was going on, always in the hope, i situation would at long last settle dow

The unrealities and shifts to wh anomalous situation were legion. I nothing had changed. When Edda C "Where is our old friend Hanfstaen, invite me to the luncheon he gave l home at Schwanenwerder. I, in my t still a member of the inner circle in use me as a channel for some commun some remnant of old cordiality remai face one day in 1935 for raiding Germ and *objets d'art* for his sumptuous

able-decker affair, with his
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 ated to the second division.
 completely. When my old
 I had accompanied in an
 of 1934, sent his London
 I had to back down. The
 beginning of 1935, when
 disputed territory would be
 in the rest of Germany.
 ion could be used to obtain
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 o Hitler through Brückner,
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 our, the ineffable Schaub
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ry I heard from Rolf Hoff-
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 owed only too clearly the
 sent a copy of this to Hoff-
 e wall of his office. One day
 ame in. Hitler made a sign
 sation and then stood for at
 t my photograph from not
 tion was so intense and the
 hat Hoffmann became dis-
 the telephone down it was
 away, but then he made no
 d only some banal message.
 mood that when I was in
 on one side and warned me
 ant was afoot.

1935

The campaign to neutralize me was not without its ludicrous aspects. I had gone down to Nuremberg for the 1935 Party rally and tried to get the foreign press away from the prevailing atmosphere by holding a reception for them at the Germanisches Museum. I had put together a speech with which I was rather pleased. After all, it was my own subject. "Gentlemen," I said, "I am delighted to greet you in the city of that great painter Albrecht Dürer. . . ." What happened by the time Goebbels' ministry finished truncating its report? The passage read: "Dr. Hanfstaengl, the foreign press chief, yesterday welcomed journalists to the city of the Führer. . . ."

Out of sheer cussedness I renewed contact with some of the old Party stalwarts of the early years. Anton Drexler, disregarded and forgotten, was almost a cripple. His whole ambition was centred on a little invalid-car, which the grateful Party never saw fit to give him. He was in despair at the turn events had taken, but was wholly without influence. Hermann Esser had at last managed to find a sinecure as a Bavarian State minister, and I used to see him whenever I was in Munich. It was he who brought me up to date on the Eva Braun situation. She had gone to school with his second wife and they saw a lot of each other. It was clear that Eva was no more than a piece of domestic decoration in the dream world in which Hitler now lived. She could hardly leave Munich without Hitler's or Bormann's permission and one day appeared in tears at the Essers' to complain of her serf-like existence: "I am nothing but a prisoner," she blubbered, and then volunteered the telling information, "*Als Mann habe ich von ihm überhaupt nichts*" - "As it is I have nothing from him as a man."

Nevertheless, Hitler repaid her presence with his protection. She turned up unobtrusively at the Nuremberg Party rally in 1935 in a very expensive fur coat. Magda Goebbels, who thought she was the one woman to whom Hitler ought to pay attention, was ill-advised enough to make some disparaging remark, which aroused Hitler to a fury. Magda was forbidden to enter the Chancellery for months and went round imploring people to put in a good word for her, instigated doubtless by her husband, who could not bear to think of his hold over Hitler being diminished in any way. In the end she was received again, but there was always a rivalry between

* On the day of their death, that day
 are, Magda and Eva, each knowing
 that both would die in much the same
 hour.

* Magda - she looks like a little yap-yap
 dog who is wearing a bigger dog's coat.

It was a lesson
 enough of Eva
 who knew to see
 the hand behind of
 how others looked
 at her.

1934

1936

1948

the two women. One would not have to be a very good playwright to dramatize the emotions which led each of them to stay until the last in the besieged Führer-bunker as long as the other was there.

In 1936 I lost another early link with Hitler. My wife divorced me. Her distaste for Hitler and his followers had long preceded mine, although he continued to send her flowers on her birthday until she left Germany for the United States, where she spent the war years. Long absences and increasing incompatibility made our break inevitable.

My position in Berlin became more and more insecure. My staff at the office were being spied on and questioned about my general attitude to events. The Party organization challenged me to produce a genealogical tree to prove that with a grandfather named Heine I was not partly Jewish—yet another example of their purblind obsessions. Friends would try and warn me that my uninhibited comments were running me into trouble. I remember Martha Dodd telling me as early as 1934: "Putzi, your crowd doesn't trust you any more." A more direct warning now came from Rosalind von Schirach, Baldur's sister. She and her father were increasingly opposed to the brother's behaviour and she took her courage in both hands to come and see me. She recounted how Baldur had drunk a little too much at their home in Bavaria one evening and had told her to keep away from me as I was on the black list and would not be around very much longer. I began to see the writing on the wall and, at the suggestion of another friend, started to smuggle out gold and platinum objects to London to be ready for all eventualities.

I continued to intervene with Himmler when I could on behalf of individuals who had fallen foul of the Nazi system, and, at the instance of her American mother, managed to get a girl named von Pfister out of a concentration camp in Saxony, where she had been confined for making disparaging remarks about the régime. I railed against the turn of events to everyone who would listen, and one of my friends at the time, Edgar von Schmidt-Pauli, author of the book *Men Around Hitler*, testified for me in 1948 that it was more than anyone's life was worth to walk along the street with me and listen to my comments. It is a compliment I am happy to accept.

Everything I had believed in had been betrayed, but at least I was

not alone. Frau Bechs before, who had received her birthday, went up in sort of Chancellor' to progressively more unning of 1937 I remember where I talked for a while who was at that time 1939 became commembers of his family determined opponents early days of power Go We talked, probably war-clouds. Hitler had Civil War had broken side of Franco. "This *Reichswehr* can now stand

This sort of behaviour staengl mood in the During the year I had tion of another film to London again at the end the permanent head of conversation with him he showed signs of settling objection to discussing It had seemed to me to countrymen in a reason more dangerous venture

The film was an attack by Hans Grimm, the publisher of *Schacht*. I should have the accumulated venom Goebbels banned the film to discredit me, persuade in expenses during it reported to me was that

1934

Mussolini nodded. "That I understand. It is not easy. But Herr Hitler is a superb organizer and must tame his party zealots. You cannot allow *soldateska* to run a nation's foreign politics. A State means law and order and where there is a leader there must be discipline. There are always people who are useful in making a revolution, but when victory has been achieved they are dangerous and they have to be got rid of." I wondered if he was thinking of Roehm.

In his fluent but fascinatingly accented German, Mussolini was being very frank and saying just the things I wanted to hear. I decided to come to the point. "Your Excellency, it seems to me essential that you and Herr Hitler should meet. You are both admirers of Wagner and that will give a common starting-point. Think what it would mean if you invited him to the Palazzo Vendramin in Venice where Richard Wagner died. He would gain the benefit of your long experience and obtain much-needed insight into the problems of Europe as seen from outside Germany." To my delight Mussolini accepted the idea and I undertook to win Hitler over. I could hardly believe my good fortune. At last Hitler would hear from an equal some of the political facts of life he did not seem prepared to grasp. Moreover, he would hear them in his own language and they could meet alone. It would not even be necessary to have an interpreter.

As I got up to leave I asked Mussolini if he would sign a photograph, to which he agreed in high humour. Then I slid him a second one. He hesitated a moment, "Who is this one for?" he asked suspiciously. "It would help if I could take your greetings to Herr Hitler," I said. He bent over again and wrote: "*A Adolfo Hitler - Benito Mussolini, Roma, Febbraio 1934.*" I slipped open my briefcase again and brought out a copy of a short memorandum I had written—no diplomat could have worked on this plan more carefully than I had—which contained suggested arrangements for the meeting. "I will give the other copy to Herr Hitler when I get to Berlin," I said. "When are you leaving?" Mussolini asked. "As soon as possible," I replied, eager to attack the other half of the problem. "*Va bene dottore,*" Mussolini saluted me, "give the Führer my best wishes."

I was still in a state of euphoria when I got back to Munich, only

to be brought back to for a taxi to take me h into two old friends wh "Thank heaven you'r over the German-Amei to make a Hitler You Poor Dr. Pfeiffer is at to help him." Oh! my worse than ever. I pron and found my taxi. In to stop. I got hold of N this would have on Ge rescinded. The directo people I helped in thes who not only did not trouble. On my return my break with Hitler made to seize the Uffing entirely thanks to Dr. I see reason.

As soon as I got hon I left for the capital the first person I saw, tive as ever and on the did not like the sound I had been up to, why was so booked up that private. Fortunately, a self came in. He seem staengl, where have yo news for you, Herr Hit shutters narrowed perc tell you." I could see "Well, what is it, then? "Herr Hitler, I really well, then, if it is so imp the corridor with me to

1934

CHAPTER XIII

A MURDERER'S WELCOME

Palm Court interlude—Disguised departure—Shock on the high seas—Harvard, class of '09—The liquidation of Roehm—Assassin at bay—The mad hatter's lunch party—The Flying Dutchman.

IF HITLER did not want to tell you anything, wild horses would not drag it out of him. During the spring I tried several times to find out what his intentions were concerning the proposed trip to Italy, but he always found some airy circumlocution. I did not even know whether he had written a letter of thanks for the photograph. Not only was there no sign of any decrease in the hostility and suspicion in Germany's European neighbours, but there was a general, indefinable rise in the internal temperature. The jealousies and conflicts between the Party leaders grew more acrid and seemed to polarize round Roehm and Goebbels on the one hand, with their constant demands for greater rewards for the old Party fighters and S.A., and Goering and, to a certain extent, Himmler on the other, who represented the group more satisfied with their share of the spoils.

I was sitting in my office one afternoon when Otto Dietrich came on the line: "Hanfstaengl, you must come over to the Kaiserhof at once. There is no one to have tea with 'him'. Everyone else is away somewhere and I simply cannot make it." I groaned. It seemed that I had sunk to the position of Reichs stop-gap. I found Hitler sitting in his favourite palm court corner, not far from the pseudo-Hungarian orchestra. I assumed he wanted to be entertained, so we sat and talked about Wagner and Ludwig II, Strauss waltzes and what a pity it was he had never learned to dance, while Hitler beat time to some of the melodies. The lounge had in the meantime filled up. Word that Hitler was in the hotel always got around quickly and I believe more than one waiter even earned extra tips for spreading the news by telephone.

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1934

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I cannot say that the public was of the best class. There would be a few provincial visitors, who doubtless carried a highly coloured tale home with them, but most of the clientele seemed to consist of overdressed women, not entirely *demi-monde* and not entirely respectable, either, who flounced in with furs and just that too much French perfume. You did not see any of the women, often of quite good family, who had identified themselves, from idealistic motives, with the Hitler movement during the last couple of years before it came to power. The Kaiserhof parade was made up of that fickle and feckless strata of society which always finds it convenient to associate itself with success. I thought back on his propaganda catch-words about the spartan life and how the true German woman was the home body who did not smoke, drink, or use cosmetics. The reality had proved otherwise. Hitler looked up at these women as they walked by with eyes that would have been lecherous if there had been any capacity to back them up.

"*Die blonde Front* is well represented today," I remarked rather sourly. The place looked like a metropolitan version of the Venusberg. Hitler snapped back into his tragic Tannhäuser role: "Mein lieber Hanfstaengl, I have ceased to have a private life," he said. More is the pity, I thought. There was certainly no evidence that his tastes had become any less bizarre. It was around this time, or maybe somewhat later, that Party intimates were beginning to talk about two little ballet-girls, introduced by the egregious Goebbels, who from time to time were let out of a back gate of the *Reichskanzlei* in the early hours of the morning. They were sisters and always together, and the stories concerning them certainly did not indicate that Hitler was becoming normal, quite the contrary. Later, about the time I escaped, he developed a taste for watching the female cabaret artistes and acrobats at the Scala music-hall, and the less clothing they wore the better Hitler was pleased. I met one of them during my exile in London, of whom the best description would be that she was an experienced cynic: "You know, your Mr. Hitler is just an old voyeur," she said with a grimace.

My remark seemed to have brought him back to his public personality again. It seemed a good opportunity to bring up the subject of Venice. I could get little response. "I don't see how anything can

* a disquisition on looking and looking
at the exterior of the interior of women.

A. H. "What was Adolf to when
he made these saginas?" But he was
thrilled, as thrilled as if God were on
his knees beside him, both of them
studying and sniffing the intimate
folds of the door to the mystery.

D.T.
*

1934

come out of the idea, Hanfstaengl. I have too much to do here and cannot possibly get away. The way things are building up. . ." He broke off in mid-sentence. What has he got on his mind, I wondered. He gave no further sign and started to turn absent-mindedly the pages of one of the illustrated papers. I decided to broach another problem of my own: "If that is the case, Herr Hitler," I said, "you will not be needing me here. Have you any objection to my taking a short trip to the United States?" Hitler looked at me suspiciously: "What do you want to do there? Sell that film of yours?" "No," I answered, "this year is the twenty-fifth reunion of my Harvard class and it is more or less a point of honour to attend. It would be a good opportunity to talk to old friends; some of them are very influential by now. I may even see President Roosevelt." Hitler put on his mock sleepy act, rubbing his eyes with his knuckles: "Well, yes, as far as I am concerned. I have no objection." No messages, no instructions, nothing but a feigned disinterestedness.

My acceptance of the invitation leaked to the press in the States, and many of the newspapers conducted something of a campaign against my visit. I was sitting at home in Munich practising a Chopin *étude* which has always eluded me, when our dyed-in-the-wool Bavarian cook knocked on the door of the studio and announced: "*Herr Dokta, Botsdam* is on the line." I was cross at being interrupted, the more so because I suspected the call was not even for me. We had had Prince Auwi staying with us for a few days and he had only just left, so I assumed that this was one of his contacts a bit behind the times. Instead, a female voice said through a cloud of atmospherics: "This is Boston. Is that Dr. Hanfstaengl?" She put me on to Elliott Cutler, our class president, who had very kindly rung me up to warn me about the press campaign. When I said that it would probably be better if I did not come after all, he would not hear of it, but suggested that it would be better if I came in a purely private capacity without too much fuss.

To camouflage my departure I held a garden-party at my Pariser Platz house in Berlin the day before I left. Everyone who was anyone in the capital was there, with the exception of Hitler, Goering and Goebbels, although the wives of the last two put in a formal appearance. The big Nazi trio cried off rather ostentatiously, with Hitler

making up some coc promising himself if c would then probably home. He was partici sign.

The next morning I glasses, turned up the where I had arranged the last batch of ma European port of call have saved myself the at the last moment, v knew I was there. I Roach, Harvard roon hold of the fact.

That was relatively the steward brought in June 14. This mornin airport. It was met by The swine, I thought, weeks, waits until my gestion when he know along the right lines. their official capacities one to intervene in o even taken Goering v a measure of common Brückner, Otto and S Mussolini as if he wa was a near fiasco. E about the necessity of to have, before the m one I had intended.

My arrival in New just beyond the docl shouting only barely c to chance, as they we

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1934-1932

P 246 at least

General von Reichenau: "Tell that friend of yours that he is a swine" was more or less the tenor of his remarks. "He has got Hitler on his side and does nothing but threaten me and the S.A." "Perhaps he is afraid of the effect of so many S.A. demonstrations on international and particularly French public opinion," I tried to interject. This brought another outburst. "But what does that matter? It is time the French learnt their place," he shouted. He was raving like a maniac. "For God's sake, Roehm, watch what you are saying," I implored, and in the end managed to extricate myself and take my leave. I could make neither head nor tail of what he had been saying and wondered what dark game was going on behind the scenes.

Now Roehm was dead. I managed to get rid of my newspaper acquaintance and his colleagues in some way by declaring in all honesty that I had not the faintest idea what had happened. The reports of an intended uprising made no sense at all, and made even less when further names were added: Schleicher, Strasser, Bose in Papen's office. The thing did not add up at all. I wondered for a moment whether I should return, but my family was still there, so I sent a guarded message to Neurath through the German Consul-General in New York and he indicated in reply that I should come back at all costs. The sailing dates so coincided that I found myself on board the *Europa* again.

In the English Channel we heard on the wireless Hitler's apologia before the *Reichstag* for the action he had taken. As probably the only man on board with real inner knowledge I was totally non-plussed and more angry than ever. The most extraordinary aspect was Hitler's claim to have been surprised and disgusted by the evidence of Roehm's homosexuality. This I knew to be a flat lie. As far back as the summer of 1932, in the middle of the *Reichstag* election campaign, a journalist named Bell, who had ingratiated himself with Roehm, had produced very precise details of the life the S.A. chief was leading, which had been splashed all over the opposition papers. I remember Hitler sitting on a folding chair in some beer-garden or other looking stonily at these reports and biting his small finger-nail, the sure sign of an impending storm.

We had all gone on to the Brown House, where Roehm was waiting, and the two of them disappeared into Hitler's office. The row

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said the only too well-known voice, and there was the little cripple in flannels, for all the world like a rich paterfamilias greeting an old family friend. I must see Hitler, I thought, or I shall go mad.

"If you can come up now, Herr Doktor, the Führer can see you," the manager said on my return to the hotel. It was not a private interview. As usual, we were interrupted by the continuous to-and-fro of his ubiquitous immediate entourage. But for our greeting we were alone. He was sitting by the window, turning over mechanically the sheets of the daily press report that Goebbels now prepared for him. He looked up at me with a hostile glance and said—psychologists please note: "*Da sind Sie ja, Mister Hanfstaengl! Hat man Sie denn noch nicht totgeschlagen?*"—"So there you are. Haven't they done you in yet?" He pronounced my name in the High German fashion, with 's' like an English 's'. This was always a storm signal. If he used the normal German 'sh' sound I knew that things were more or less normal.

I really think I got black spots before the eyes. There was the 'Mister', too, a deliberately offensive reference to my Anglo-Saxon outlook. It was one of those moments when the impressions of a lifetime flash across one's inner mind like a speeded-up film. I suddenly saw a picture of his untidy little flat in the Thierschstrasse and the haggard-looking orator of genius who stood there in the hall, hungry for the beauties and success of life. The long years in between dissolved again into the livid face in front of me. I realized it was the contorted face of a murderer defiantly at bay, a pathological murderer who had tasted blood and acquired an appetite for more. Through the window came the vague and familiar sounds of a seaside resort. I pulled myself together with a shudder. What does one answer in such circumstances? I decided to put on a bold front.

"No, Herr Hitler, the Communists in New York did not get me after all," I answered, handing him over a bunch of press photographs and news clippings. Hitler seemed to take a moment to readjust himself. "Oh, that," he said. "I cannot believe that was so dangerous. We did away with that sort of demonstration in Germany some time ago." He flipped idly through the pictures and stopped at the one showing me with the Jewish judge at Harvard:

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"Nice friends you have," he commented. "What sort of propaganda is that for the Party when the foreign press chief fraternizes with a Jew?" I tried to explain that the Jewish population in America was very large and that they were respected members of the community, but he cut me off short.

There was a moment's pause. "Hanfshtaengl [that started to sound a little better], you ought to have been there." What was he trying to say? He had used the more familiar pronunciation of my name, but what was he getting at? That I should have been on the June 30 list? "Have been where . . .," I stammered. "In Venice, of course. Mussolini would have been pleased to see you again." His bad conscience has caused him to improvise a crass lie, although the old catch-phrase made it clear that the meeting had been a failure. "Well, that was hardly my fault," I answered heatedly. "I kept in touch with you about it right up until the moment I left. . . ." "I know, I know," he said, "but it was all arranged in a hurry at the last moment and by that time you had gone." Who on earth is he trying to fool, I thought.

It was quite clear he was not going to allow me to bring up the matter most on my mind. The door started to open and shut, his people came in and out, and soon we all moved in a body down to the dining-room. It was really like something out of Lewis Carroll, a mad hatter's luncheon party. With the whole of Germany groaning under this atmosphere of murder, fear and suspicion, there was Magda Goebbels doing the honours in an airy summer dress, with several other young women at the table, even one or two from the aristocratic families for whom Heiligendamm had always been the summer resort.

Hitler had undergone a sea-change. He was the jovial, light-hearted charmer, the man of affairs relaxing away from the cares of the world. I was still shaken to the roots by the greeting I had received and responded but dully to his chatter about 'here is our Hanfshtaengl again', as if the years had rolled back and I was still the personal friend who had opened for him the doors to the world of art and society. I looked round at the other guests in the room and thought how they would be writing home: "Our table was quite near the Chancellor's. His guests were always in high spirits and all

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Goebbels sat across brought up the subject. Hanfsstaengl. You must munist demonstration o I knew it, I said to mys no mood for trifling. "I I was to get through th the country and had t authorities had arrange "Well, no one can say t World caused a very he have forgotten what g campaigns to drive thro I retorted tartly. Somec any case, I was only wa fied as expendable, an u mind was to be system lunch he had returned arrival in New York as front of the enemy. He the challenge and tric shrugged his shoulders. relations with which tl selves on the world.

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He was the jovial, light- ing away from the cares of ots by the greeting I had chatter about 'here is our rolled back and I was still him the doors to the world e other guests in the room ome: "Our table was quite ways in high spirits and all

this talk about a crisis in the Party must be complete nonsense. Even Dr. Goebbels is enjoying himself and is out on the beach every day with his wife and children."

Goebbels sat across the table from me, and when someone brought up the subject of my trip to the States he was ready: "Yes, Hanfstaengl. You must tell us how bravely you avoided that Communist demonstration on the pier," he said with his mock gay laugh. I knew it, I said to myself; he has been at Hitler about this. I was in no mood for trifling. "Herr Doktor," I said, "how do you imagine I was to get through that mob alone? In any case, I was a guest in the country and had to conform to the security precautions the authorities had arranged for me." He was not to be put off so easily: "Well, no one can say that your arrival in the Jerusalem of the New World caused a very heroic impression," he went on. "You seem to have forgotten what great care you took during all the election campaigns to drive through back streets and avoid the Communists," I retorted tartly. Someone smoothed over the imminent quarrel. In any case, I was only wasting my breath. By now I was firmly classified as expendable, an unwelcome conscience against whom Hitler's mind was to be systematically poisoned. I learned that after the lunch he had returned to the subject with Hitler and described my arrival in New York as showing a lack of Party spirit and courage in front of the enemy. He even suggested that I should have accepted the challenge and tried to fight my way through. Hitler had just shrugged his shoulders. Such were the conceptions of international relations with which the Nazi leadership sought to impose themselves on the world.

During the afternoon I wandered round disconsolately. Clearly I had reached the point of no return. My last illusions were shattered. Instead of regenerating Germany, we had brought to power a bunch of dangerous gangsters who could now only survive by maintaining the momentum of their ceaseless radical agitation. What on earth were people like me to do? I was a German. My family and my whole thread of life was bound up in its future fate. Did the solution lie in exile or must I still stick with this thing and see if there was any way of applying the brakes? At this time the worst of Hitler's Germany still lay in the future: the concentration camps in

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CHAPTER XIV

THE LAST CHORD

Aftermath of a purge—What happened at Wiessee—Austrian misadventure—Short shrift at Neudeck—A wheel comes full circle—Funeral March farewell—Analysis of a medium—The prophet and the caliph—The militant revivalist—Pinchbeck Pericles—The tragedy of an orator.

THE NEXT morning, when I got up early, the storm had cleared and I wandered down to the beach for a breath of air before driving to catch the train. On the boat pier about a hundred yards from the hotel I found Princess Viktoria Luise of Brunswick, the daughter of the Kaiser and sister of Auwi. "Your Highness, I must talk to you," I said. So we walked to the end of the pier and sat there for nearly half an hour, while I told her of my complete disillusionment and my conviction that the only thing left was for people of our conservative temperament to dissociate ourselves from this bunch of assassins.

She by no means shared my preoccupations: "Things will calm down again," she answered. "This is probably a turn for the better. At least we have avoided civil war and got rid of those dangerous brownshirts." That, of course, is why Hitler got away with what he had done. A great many people came to believe his explanation that civil war had been avoided. The Army and Right-Wing elements were prepared to overlook the defiance of law and the peripheral deaths of Schleicher and other non-Nazis because the bulk of the victims had come from the feared and radical S.A.

The same atmosphere greeted me on my return to Berlin. 'It was high time—a house-cleaning was necessary—the whole S.A. leadership was corrupt' were the sort of remarks I heard, and not only from Nazis. I was convinced the régime would never recover the prestige and international standing it had lost through its complete disregard of legal processes, whatever the crimes ascribed to the

victims. I fully intended Schacht, Neurath, his S and continue to try to voices of reason. Politics ment ran. The wind can if you have jumped out a decisive touch to the I who had much to ans because he was afraid th over his Ministry and th is no good, Hanfstaengl "Now this is over we m

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victims. I fully intended to resign my post, but was implored by Schacht, Neurath, his State Secretary Bülow and others, to remain and continue to try to use my position near Hitler as one of the voices of reason. Politics is very much like a sailing-race, their argument ran. The wind can change from one moment to the next and if you have jumped out of the boat, you are no longer there to give a decisive touch to the helm. Even Gürtner, the Minister of Justice, who had much to answer for in his attitude, hung on to office because he was afraid that if he left, one of the wild men would take over his Ministry and the whole judicial system would collapse. "It is no good, Hanfstaengl, we have got to be patient," he said to me. "Now this is over we must just try to put the pieces together again."

I made a thorough nuisance of myself everywhere, trying to compile a proper list of the victims in an attempt to classify them between those for whose death there had been some sort of authority and those who had just been murdered out of personal spite or revenge. I pestered the other people in Hess's liaison office, talked to Körner, Goering's State Secretary, and tried to put my point over to all the old Party members I knew. All I got was disinterested shrugs or brazen effrontery. The survivors were not in the least ashamed of what had been done. I heard Amann boasting at table in the Chancellery: "Well, we cleaned that lot up all right," and even suggesting that Hühnlein, head of the Nazi motor corps, had been lucky to escape as he did. That was the atmosphere.

I even attempted to enlist the assistance of François-Poncet. We found ourselves at lunch together with Sir Eric Phipps at the British Embassy and I accompanied him on his afternoon constitutional to the end of the Unter den Linden and back. "Your Excellency," I said, "this matter has got to be cleared up. You are quite obviously referred to in connexion with Roehm in Hitler's radio speech. Why do you not get your Government to demand an explanation? Hitler would then have to put his cards on the table and we would know what is true and what isn't." He was far too old and wise a hand to give me any immediate encouragement, but he must have done something of the sort, although the only result was a statement by the German Government that investigation had shown he was not, in fact, implicated.

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I had several talks with von Reichenau and his *Reichswehr* colleagues, under the impression that the death of Schleicher would produce on their part a demand for a full inquiry. But even they were prepared to be put off, or put me off, by assurances that all illegal acts during the purge would be brought before the courts. We waited for weeks and months and, of course, nothing ever materialized. I thought Helldorf might be a possible ally and pulled him into my office once out of the corridor to ask what he knew. I told him how in America I had read in the first reports that he was one of the victims. Helldorf was a good friend of mine and one of the more reasonable Party people, as his tragic rôle ten years later in the July 20 plot was to prove. At this earlier juncture he preferred discretion, and a warning, "Let me give you some advice, Hanfstaengl," he said. "Stop being so confoundedly inquisitive. People are beginning to resent it. I will tell you something more. I saw one of those lists they drew up. Your name was on it!"

As I recall, I only saw Hitler once in Berlin during July. He had gone straight from Heiligendamm to Berchtesgaden and was keeping well away from the capital until some of the dust had settled. He slipped in one evening and I managed to catch him the next day after lunch. "Well, Hanfstaengl," he said with a sort of mock joviality, "all this uproar in the foreign press seems to be dying down a bit." "That may be so," I replied, "but I can tell you that their correspondents are still in my hair day and night. Unless you let me give them the true facts and proper justification for all that has happened, the outcry will go on. You must not forget that many of them have been here for a long time. They knew many of the people involved and will continue to draw their own conclusions."

"I ought to send the whole bunch of them packing," Hitler exploded. "They have plenty of dung-heaps to rake over in their own countries and have to turn every mole-hill in Germany into a mountain. They are nothing but a danger to us." I was not going to let him off so lightly and returned to the attack: What was the truth about Roehm's foreign connexions? Who was the ambassador to whom he had referred? In the end he lost his temper. "*Die Akten über den Fall Roehm, mein lieber Hanfstaengl, sind längst geschlossen*"—"The files on the Roehm affair have long been

closed," he shouted, and Strasser had been Prince Starhemberg, tl

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them packing," Hitler s to rake over in their e-hill in Germany into to us." I was not going attack: What was the ho was the ambassador lost his temper. "Die anfsstaengl, sind längst ffair have long been

closed," he shouted, and apart from vague accusations that Roehm and Strasser had been plotting with Schleicher and the Austrian Prince Starhemberg, that was all I ever got out of him.

* * *

There is still, twenty-odd years later, so much conjecture concerning the background to and details of the Roehm purge that a first-hand version I heard quite recently may not be without interest. As far as I know practically no documentary evidence has survived, but my account comes from Dr. Emil Ketterer, who was a *Gruppenführer* in charge of the S.A. medical services and Roehm's personal physician at the time. He had been a close associate since the Ludendorff Putsch days, when he had been a member of the *Reichskriegsflagge*.

During the period preceding his death Roehm was receiving treatment for a severe form of neuralgia from which he was suffering. This consisted of a course of injections and on the evening of June 29, 1934, Ketterer arrived at the Pension Hanslbauer in Wiessee, where Roehm was staying, to give him the last injection of the series. Ketterer, Roehm and S.S. *Gruppenführer* Bergmann had dinner together and then settled down until about 11 o'clock at night to play Tarok, the Bavarian three-handed card game. Roehm then went to bed, was given his injection and Ketterer was about to return to Munich when Bergmann suggested that he should stay the night.

There was, as Ketterer recalls, to be a meeting of S.A. leaders the following day, to be attended by Hitler, at which Roehm was to give an address on the subject of turning the brownshirt formations into a militia as a *Reichswehr* reserve. This plan had already been discussed at a previous meeting of the S.A. leaders in February 1934 at Friedrichsroda in Thuringia. However, at a conference shortly thereafter in the Propaganda Ministry with Goebbels and Roehm, Hitler had turned it down. He gave as his reason the undisputed right of the *Reichswehr* to organize the coming expansion in the German armed forces, and their military authority to do so was to remain unimpaired.

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Roehm had been greatly incensed, had refused to drop the idea and told his brownshirt leaders that if Hitler refused to accept even a modified form he would resign his post and emigrate to Bolivia again. The plan was one which he had discussed with Hitler in outline over a number of years and he attributed Hitler's unexpected opposition to the influence of Blomberg, Reichenau and the *Reichswehr* officers. The meeting planned for June 30 was designed as an attempt to oblige Hitler to change his mind under the combined influence of all the senior members of the S.A. If this had failed, and Roehm had resigned, the bulk of them, led by *Gruppenführer* Willy Schmidt, who had formerly been the chief of the personnel division, were prepared to resort to force and obtain their demands by means of a second Putsch. They wanted the S.A. to be divorced from the Party and, with their formidable strength in the country, could probably have carried the day, forcing Hitler's resignation if necessary. How far the action was intended to be imminent is, of course, not clear, but both Roehm's state of health and his declared intention to resign hardly suggest that he was preparing an immediate coup.

Ketterer was found a bed in the adjutants' room on the first floor, but he remained in the lounge until about one o'clock in the morning. Half an hour earlier *Obergruppenführer* Heines arrived from Breslau and wanted to see Roehm, but Ketterer prevented him by saying that he should be allowed to sleep off his injection. Ketterer also flatly contradicts the stories that the Hanslbauer was the scene that night of a homosexual orgy. Count Spreti, who was Roehm's acknowledged boy friend was staying in the *pension*, but apart from Heines, Bergmann and the two adjutants and two drivers, there was no one else in the place.

About five o'clock in the morning, Ketterer was awakened by general shouting and uproar and shortly afterwards found two civilians by his bed whom he describes as plain-clothes detectives. A little later S.S. *Standartenführer* Höflich, the adjutant of Gauleiter Wagner of Bavaria, an opponent of Roehm, came in to tell the two detectives that they could leave, as, by the order of Hitler, Ketterer was not to be arrested. He got up, put on his uniform, went down the stairs in some agitation and at the bottom saw Hitler and Lutze,

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who succeeded Roehm in speaking to Hitler when he told him that Roehm was ill vigorously, and then afterwards never saw his patient again.

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The Roehm business in summer. On July 25 the Austrian Chancellor met the local Nazis. Hitler was at the teleprinter in the liaison office immediately. Special plans were made again," I said to myself and then when they occurred and show my decent face.

I was caught up in the excitement of running with engine running and exhortations to hurry, and in the excitement of the culties. We tore through the streets of Otto Dietrich, who was in the German press: "The capacity. The news has been elsewhere. . . ." You certainly thought. Out on the left, the left, and at the far left, Goering and the very right.

I had known Prokscen means one of the wild over and said in his letter here, *Herr Doktor*, whenever every day and time was — "they have to send down powers from Hitler. T

President's death would cause another crisis, with the monarchists, probably led by von Papen, making a last effort to stake their claims. The same thoughts may have been running through Hitler's mind: "Of course there is no question of Rieth returning to Vienna as Minister," he was musing and then, in a sudden flash: "I have it! Papen is the man. What was it you called him two years ago, Hanfstaengl?—*Ein Luftikus*—And Catholic into the bargain. He would talk his way round those priests and nuns in Vienna until they didn't know whether they were going or coming."—"A fine idea," Goering chimed in. "It would get him out of Berlin too. He has only been in the way since the Roehm business."—And let no one imagine that I have invented that conversation.

Meissner's news was that the President's health had taken a final turn for the worse. Leaving the Austrian situation to take care of itself, Hitler and his staff flew to East Prussia. Within a week Hindenburg was dead. This was to be the last major political event with which I was associated as Hitler's foreign press chief, but I have little to add in the way of new evidence. I do not know to what extent Hitler's mind was clear as to the steps he should take to meet this eventuality. If he had any plans they were not discussed in my presence, and I strongly suspect that the final consolidation of his power that followed was the result of purely pragmatic decisions. The question of the succession was taboo in his inner circle. Some of the Nazis were talking in terms of General von Epp as President, and conservative and monarchist circles were advocating the election of one of the royal princes. It was only on our return to Berlin that I first heard bruited the idea that the offices of Chancellor and President should be combined.

Our first reception at Neudeck, the President's estate, in the last days of July, was chilling. Only Hitler and Brückner, as his adjutant, were invited into the house and I can remember Otto Dietrich and myself sitting on a bench near the outbuildings without the slightest suggestion of hospitality being offered to us or indeed to anyone else. This, on an East Prussian estate with a feudal tradition of at least formal welcome and refreshment to travellers and visitors, was an indication of the mood in the President's entourage. Hitler was tight-lipped and uninformative as he came out and gave no hint later of

what had passed. I estate of Count D romance with Count intact; but Hitler al

The inevitable was dissolved in tears. I President lost consciousness. "His heart can give back to Bayreuth a reached us. Back was silent, distrustful crowd of S.S. men guarding the behaviour of Hitler to the last, used his and then tried to set market prices. It could even had Goebbels welshed when the came point at my expense foreign press too ze

My next problem concerning the exit press, Hindenburg before Hitler, Goering Chancellery. Hitler until the documents gesting that the workers care what that pack to satisfy them," photographed and and I can get the work." Hitler looked Mister Hanfstaengl thing wrong. I caught Goebbels and Goering Chancellery, the subject had the feeling that

1934

nation. No single aspect of his temperament was so firmly developed that it was possible in the long run to use it as a channel to influence his mind. He could sprawl for hours like a crocodile dozing in the Nile mud or a spider immobile in the centre of its web. He would chew his nails, look boredly into space and sometimes whistle. As soon as some person of interest—and there was no one he did not find interesting for a time—joined his company, you could almost see him mobilizing his internal machinery. The asdic pings of inquiry would go out and within a short time he had a clear image of the wavelength and secret yearnings and emotions of his partner. The pendulum of conversation would start to beat faster, and the person would be hypnotized into believing that there lay in Hitler immense depths of sympathy and understanding. He had the most formidable powers of persuasion of any man or woman I have ever met, and it was almost impossible to avoid being enveloped by him.

It is popularly supposed that Hitler addressed everyone as if they were at a mass meeting. This is only partly true. It is predominantly true of the period after 1932, when he started to use a microphone for his speeches. He became drunk with the metallic boom of his own voice, which of course was not his own voice. The loud-speaker amplifies the human organ of speech, but it completely denaturalizes it into the tones of a bull-frog. Then, when he came to power, the final deification of the Führer cult fed his paranoia to the point where he was incapable of carrying on a conversation as between equals. None of this was true of his early years, when he still retained the capacity to harness people as individuals and awaken in them the conviction that he was appealing to their best instincts.

Even so his power was the power of speech. He thought that if you talked long enough and vehemently enough, repeated your arguments a dozen times in a dozen forms, there was no obstacle, human or technical, which could not be overcome. The Nazi movement was a movement of orators, except for essential administrators like Himmler and Bormann, and people were useful to Hitler in direct proportion to their ability to move a mass audience to hysteria. No one without this gift ever played more than a secondary part in his régime. He thought the whole world was a slightly larger Hofbräuhäus or Sportpalast and could in the end be moved by the same

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D.T. Now his voice was mine.

* D.T. One could not be an effective deal without possessing immense fund of sympathy and understanding. It was just that we were never loyal to them. They were no more attached to the party of our spirit than a hand-tool is locked to the frame of the body.

1935

Books in this file

The Rising Empire - HATTNER

Life & Death of A.H. - Pj

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Fair-haired, blue-eyed, with a rippling laugh and a quietly determined manner, she resembled even in her movements the dead Geli Raubal but was quieter and less moody. She had no ambition to be a singer, or indeed to be anything at all except his mistress. She was self-effacing and discreet, but she did not always obey Hitler's order that she divorce herself completely from politics, for she sometimes interceded with him on behalf of Jews she had known. Her difficult task was to be his mistress while remaining invisible, and she succeeded so well that very few people outside Hitler's immediate circle knew of her existence.

Twice at least she broke under the strain. In November, 1932, she attempted to shoot herself, and in May, 1935, she attempted suicide with an overdose of sleeping pills. Both attempts were due to her belief that Hitler was having affairs with other women. Later she accepted the fact that she could live with him only on his own terms. In March, 1936, he gave her a small villa at 12 Wasserburgerstrasse in Munich, where she installed herself with one of her sisters, and a Mercedes-Benz, which she never learned to drive. It was during this period that Hitler's house, the Berghof at Obersalzberg, was being rebuilt. Soon she had an apartment at the Reich Chancellery and another in the Berghof. She was an agreeable and expensive luxury

Many of Eva Braun's letters, the diary she wrote before her second suicide attempt, and her home movies have survived. All together there are four and a half hours of her home movies in the possession of the Library of Congress. We see her swimming and exercising on the parallel bars, climbing mountains, playing with animals, or strolling along forest pathways. We see her standing with Hitler on the balcony of the Berghof, gazing at the distant mountains, or walking by his side. What is strange is that there is nothing strange in these movies. She might be any young woman endowed with an athletic body, quick to smile, and conscious that she is admired. In her presence Hitler completely loses his daimonic quality and might be taken for any small-business man taking a holiday in the Bavarian mountains. It was not that he had changed his character. It was simply that in her presence he no longer needed to wear the iron mask of authority.

In May, 1938, he wrote a will and placed her first in the list of beneficiaries after leaving the greater part of his estate to the party. He appointed Franz Xavier Schwarz, the party treasurer, as his executor. There seems to have been no particular reason why he should have written the will at this time. Such a will was long overdue, and he had long ago accepted the fact that he was living dangerously and might be assassinated. The will began in the customary way, with instructions for the disposal of his body. He asked that it should be brought to Munich, and the lying in state should be in the Feldherrn Hall, and that

he be laid to rest November, 1923. similar annuity was the same amount an outright bequest detested his half-long been forgotten Hitler, who wrote he denounced his live in poverty. T beer hall and restaurant Hitler were received nephew as being

The remaining mind working or attempting to assassinate loyal to him. He inherited 1,800 mark 1,200 marks, while Julius Schaub, his the early party donor of 6,000 marks. more distant relations Austria, and he paid out at the room in the Prinz had killed herself memory, were left his art collection made an exception should be examined were to be destroyed Angela and Paul. the will. Significant Himmler, or any

The 1938 will an electrician who fall of Berlin. They reveal what he had therefore sewed into wife that she would

The will reflecting for his family

1935

EVA BRAUN'S DIARY

Some twenty-two pages of Eva Braun's 1935 diary, hurriedly scribbled in pencil, were found after the war. They are given here because they show the quality of her mind and Hitler's rather casual attitude toward her in the early stages of their friendship. Later his affection for her deepened, and the relationship became more stable. The diary begins on February 6, her birthday.

I think this must be the right day to begin this extra-special diary. I have now reached the happy age of 23. No, happy is not quite the right word. At this particular moment I am certainly not happy.

The truth is that I have rather large ideas about the importance to be attached to this day. If I had a dog I would not feel so lonely, but I suppose that is asking for too much.

Frau Schaub came as an ambassador bringing flowers and telegrams. The result is that my whole office resembles a flower shop and smells like a cemetery chapel.

I suppose I am ungrateful, but I did want to be given a dachshund. And I just don't have one. Perhaps I'll get one next year, or much later, when it will be more appropriate for a budding old maid.

What is important is not to give up hope. I should have learned to be patient by now.

Today I bought two lottery tickets, because I had a feeling that it would be now or never—they were both blanks. So I am not going to be rich after all. Nothing at all to be done about it.

Today I was going to Zugspitze with Herta, Gretel, Ilse, and Mutti, and I should have had a wonderful time, for it is always most enjoyable when other people are enjoying themselves, too. But nothing came of it. This evening I am going to have dinner with Herta. What else can you do, when you are a little single woman of 23? So I shall end my birthday "with gluttony and drunkenness." I think this is what he would want me to do.

February 11, 1935

He came to see me, but nary a sign of a dog or a chest of drawers. He did not even ask me what I wanted for my birthday. So I bought some jewelry for myself. A necklace, earrings, and a matching ring, all for 50 marks. All very pretty, and I hope he likes it. If he doesn't, then he should choose something for me himself.

February 15, 1935

The idea of going to Berlin seems to be coming off, that is, I won't believe it until I am really in the Reich Chancellery. Let's hope it all turns out well.

It is a pity that Herta cannot come with me instead of Charly. With Herta I could be sure of a few happy days. I imagine there will be a good

deal of bickering, and I hope the nice side of his character.

I'm not going to get excited. It will be wonderful. I hope

Yesterday he came quite late. The nicest thing is that he but I had better not get excited. I simply mustn't let myself have to open the door to shoppirl. Dear God, grant me time, but soon.

Poor Charly is ill and perhaps that is best after all that would make her even more

I am so infinitely happy I always be like this. It won't

I am so terribly unhappy serve as the receptacle of my

He came on Saturday. Frau Schwarz gave me a box. Well, I spent a few wonderful and then with his permission

On Sunday he promised. I left a message with Werlin simply went off to Feldafing and dinner. I suppose they wanted to be alone with D. know. At Hoffmann's I finally arrive every moment.

In the end we went to the would have to go. We were disappearing. Once again, couldn't even say goodbye to hope I am, but he is not. I'll be miserable and restless. me. Perhaps it is because of

I am racking my brains to me.

The Hoffmanns have given, but I am not going. I am

There is only one thing I want

deal of bickering, and I don't believe Brueckner will show Charly the nice side of his character.

I'm not going to get excited about it, but if everything turns out all right, it will be wonderful. I hope all goes well.

February 18, 1935

Yesterday he came quite unexpectedly, and we had a delightful evening. The nicest thing is that he is thinking of taking me from the shop and—but I had better not get excited about it yet—he may give me a little house. I simply mustn't let myself think about it. It would be marvelous. I wouldn't have to open the door to our "beloved customers," and go on being a shopgirl. Dear God, grant that this may really happen not in some far-off time, but soon.

Poor Charly is ill and won't be able to come with me to Berlin. But perhaps that is best after all. Br. can be very rude to her sometimes, and that would make her even more unhappy.

I am so infinitely happy that he loves me so much, and I pray that it will always be like this. It won't be my fault if he ever stops loving me.

I am so terribly unhappy that I cannot write to him. These notes must serve as the receptacle of my lamentations.

He came on Saturday. Saturday evening there was the Town Ball. Frau Schwarz gave me a box, so I absolutely had to go after I had accepted. Well, I spent a few wonderfully delightful hours with him until 12 o'clock and then with his permission I spent two hours at the ball.

On Sunday he promised I could see him. I telephoned to the Osteria and left a message with Werlin to say that I was waiting to hear from him. He simply went off to Feldafing, and refused Hoffmann's invitation to coffee and dinner. I suppose there are two sides to every question. Perhaps he wanted to be alone with Dr. G., who was here, but he should have let me know. At Hoffmann's I felt I was sitting on hot coals, expecting him to arrive every moment.

In the end we went to the railroad station, as he suddenly decided he would have to go. We were just in time to see the last lights of the train disappearing. Once again Hoffmann left the house too late, and so I couldn't even say goodbye to him. Perhaps I am taking too dark a view, I hope I am, but he is not coming again for another two weeks. Until then I'll be miserable and restless. I don't know why he should be angry with me. Perhaps it is because of the ball, but he did give his permission.

I am racking my brains to find out why he left without saying goodbye to me.

The Hoffmanns have given me a ticket for the Venetian Night this evening, but I am not going. I am much too miserable.

March 11, 1935

There is only one thing I want. I would like to be seriously ill, and to hear

1935

nothing more about him for at least a week. Why doesn't something happen to me? Why do I have to go through all this? If only I had never set eyes on him! I am utterly miserable. I shall go out and buy some more sleeping powder and go into a half-dreamlike state, and then I won't think about it so much.

Why doesn't that Devil take me away with him? It would be much better with him than it is here.

I waited for three hours in front of the Carlton, and had to watch him buying flowers for Ondra and inviting her to dinner. (That was just my mad imagination. March 16th.)

He only needs me for certain purposes, otherwise it is not possible. This is idiocy.

When he says he loves me, it only means he loves me at that particular instant. Like his promises, which he never keeps. Why does he torment me like this, when he could finish it off at once?

March 16, 1935

He has left for Berlin again. If only I didn't go mad when he sees me so rarely. After all, it is quite obvious that he is not really interested in me when he has so much to do in politics.

Today I am going to the Zugspitze with Gretel, and perhaps my insanity will then leave me.

In the past everything turned out well, and it will be the same this time.

April 1, 1935

Yesterday he invited us to dinner at the Vierjahrenzzeiten. I sat with him for three hours and we did not exchange a single word. At the end he handed me, as he had done before, an envelope with money in it. It would have been much nicer if he had enclosed a greeting or a loving word. I would have been so pleased if he had. But he did not think of it.

Why isn't he going to dine with the Hoffmanns? If he did, I would at least have had him to myself for a few minutes. I hope he doesn't come any more until his house is ready.

April 29, 1935

I am in great trouble, very great trouble. I keep on saying to myself, like Coué, "I am getting better and better," but it is no use. The house is ready, but I am not allowed to see him. Love has been temporarily excluded from his plans. Now that he is in Berlin again, I have thawed a little. There were days last week when I burst into tears over tiny things. Especially because I stayed at home alone during Easter.

I am saving and scraping. I get on everyone's nerves because I want to sell everything I have. Beginning with a dress, a camera, and down to a theater ticket.

Anyway, things w

As Frau Hoffman now found a replac she looks like, inclu if she is really like like Charly, the mor only stimulate her af

If Frau H's infor say nothing to me a realize that I would his heart belonged of his.

I shall wait until last meeting. Then I a modest demand?

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How can he have s to strangers.

Man proposes, etc. it is nice to put the b everything will taste s

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So he has had a he: relaxed a little. Wha him a lot of problems

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I am afraid there i lutely not.

Maybe it is anothe believe. But there are s

Is there any other ex

Anyway, things will get better. My debts are not very big, after all.

May 10, 1935

As Frau Hoffmann so affectionately and tactlessly informed me, he has now found a replacement for me. She is called Valkyrie, and that's what she looks like, including her legs. He likes measurements of this kind, but if she is really like that, he will soon make her thin with vexation unless, like Charly, the more worries she has, the fatter she gets. Charly's vexations only stimulate her appetite.

If Frau H's information is correct, I think it is terrible that he should say nothing to me about it. After all, he should know me well enough to realize that I would never put anything in his way if he suddenly discovered his heart belonged to someone else. What happens to me is no concern of his.

I shall wait until June 3d, when three months will have passed since our last meeting. Then I will ask for an explanation. Will anyone say this is not a modest demand?

The weather is so wonderful, and I, the mistress of the greatest man in Germany and in the world, am sitting here and gazing at the sun through a window.

How can he have so little understanding as to let me remain here, bowing to strangers.

Man proposes, etc. And as one makes one's bed . . . It is all my fault, but it is nice to put the blame on others. The time of fasting will end, and then everything will taste so much better.

It is a pity it is spring.

May 28, 1935

I have just sent him the crucial letter. Question: will he attach any importance to it?

We'll see. If I don't get an answer before this evening, I'll take 25 pills and gently fall asleep into another world.

He has so often told me he is madly in love with me, but what does that mean when I haven't had a good word from him in three months?

So he has had a head full of politics all this time, but surely it is time he relaxed a little. What happened last year? Didn't Roehm and Italy give him a lot of problems, but in spite of all that he found time for me.

Maybe the present situation is incomparably more difficult for him, nevertheless a few kind words conveyed through the Hoffmanns would not have greatly distracted him.

I am afraid there is something behind it all. I am not to blame. Absolutely not.

Maybe it is another woman, not the Valkyrie—that would be hard to believe. But there are so many other women.

Is there any other explanation? I can't find it.

BG, 1935

cast its shadow over the new Reich—that is, the possible coalition of France, England, and Russia. Despite all its power, the German Reich could not risk such a coalition by going beyond what had been won in 1871.

Bismarck was deeply offended. In making his threatening gestures he believed himself to be on the defensive, not the offensive, and he reacted with bitterness to the English and Russian statesmen, particularly Russia's chancellor, Prince Alexander Gorchakov. But, more importantly, after the "war in sight" crisis of 1875, Bismarck's "nightmare of the coalitions" gave way to the "nightmare" of French revenge. That was the beginning of Bismarck's active pursuit of a peace policy—one that equated the interests of the German Reich with the prevention of a war between the European big powers. And on this policy rests Bismarck's posthumous reputation. Yet it must also be noted that he did not succeed in keeping Germany out of dangerous entanglements.

Bismarck laid out the principles of his peace policy in the famous Kissingen proclamation of 1877, in which he said: "The vision I have is not of the acquisition of some territory but of a total political situation in which all powers except France need us and are deterred from forming coalitions against us because of their relationship to one another." A brief explanation about his reference to France is needed here. In 1860 Bismarck had written a letter to his mentor Leopold von

BG
1935

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Military reasons seem more compelling. The military saw the fortresses Strasbourg and Metz as keys to the new South German regions of the Reich. As a rule Bismarck did not bow to military arguments. If he did so now, it was probably because he expected a French war of vengeance—"What they will never forgive us is our victory," he was heard to say repeatedly in 1871—and therefore military arguments had to be taken into consideration. Immediately after 1871 Bismarck's nightmare probably was not so much one of possible coalitions as of a possible French war of revenge. That became clear during the first foreign crisis of Bismarck's Reich. In 1875, France, which had rapidly recovered from war and reparations, strengthened its armies. In response, Germany, at first only unofficially, took a threatening stance. The lead editorial in a Berlin paper asked, "Is War In Sight?"

BG
1875

Bismarck always denied that he wanted a second, preventive war against France. That may well be so. He believed he would be able to prevent a French war of retaliation through intimidation. But now something unexpected happened. England and Russia, neither of which had intervened in the war of 1870—Russia had even assumed a position of benevolent neutrality toward Prussia and the emergent German Reich—now intervened in Berlin. They declared that they could not stand idly by while France continued to be weakened. For the first time the possibility of a future war

cast its shadow over possible coalition of. Despite all its power, risk such a coalition been won in 1871.

Bismarck was de- threatening gestures l the defensive, not th with bitterness to the men, particularly R Alexander Gorchakov after the "war in sight" "nightmare of the co" "nightmare" of French ginning of Bismarck's policy—one that equa man Reich with the p the European big power Bismarck's posthumou also be noted that he Germany out of dange

Bismarck laid out policy in the famous 1877, in which he said of the acquisition of so political situation in France need us and are alitions against us beca one another." A brief erence to France is need had written a letter to

onial fallout with England
: that he himself—and to
—was irreplaceable.

was neither a dictator nor
but a Prussian minister
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due entirely to the aston-
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II's assumption of the
ion depended on the good
1884 Emperor William I
vas to be assumed that he
d by Crown Prince Fred-
to England by marriage.
d by his wife and made no
or a more liberal domestic
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marck decided to fan anti-
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l things up by his colonial

is also borne out by the
30s, when contrary to all
peror lived to be almost
n prince became mortally
e colonial policy like a hot
of a German Gladstonian

cabinet thus warded off and his position assured,
Bismarck's interest in German colonies died down
as quickly as it had flared up. Bismarck's most
famous comment against colonialism was made
in 1888, when he told a visiting colonial enthu-
siast who showed him a map of Africa and pointed
to all the hidden riches there: "Your map of Africa
is very nice, but my map of Africa is in Europe.
Here is Russia, and here, France, and we are in the
middle. That is my map of Africa."

Germany's "social imperialist" hopes for a
place among the world powers were by no means
dead; however, they really flourished only after
Bismarck's departure from the scene. On the
whole, Bismarck himself, despite his aberration of
1884-85, was a man of colonial restraint. He re-
peatedly stressed that the race for colonies and
world power was not for Germany, that Germany
could not afford it, that it should content itself
with preserving and safeguarding its position in
Europe.

Nonetheless Bismarck's Germany got into dif-
ficulties in Europe soon after the Kissingen pro-
clamation of 1877. The slow disintegration of the
Ottoman empire, and the growing pressure of its
Christian, largely Slavic, populations in the Bal-
kans to break away, had created a festering prob-
lem along Europe's southeastern borders.

The Russians supported the anti-Turkish lib-
eration movements of the Balkan peoples for two
reasons, the first ideological—namely the incipi-

1988
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cruises

36-39

as under the aegis of a state within
 under Hitler's personal auspices. It
 the domain of Hjalmar Schacht, a for-
 tic party politician. At first he was
 state Bank, and later he became the
 ler's Economic Ministry. Schacht
 the economy through rigidly com-
 d domestic economic measures—
 ts without immediately felt infla-
 quences. The years from 1936 to
time of unimagined well-being in
ies, business and labor, were pros-
ifferent from the crisis days of Brü-
not underestimate the effects of the
political climate. In those Hitler
her was benign.

big success Hitler scored in those
decision to rearm. It helped him
misgivings the Reichswehr might
red. Nor should one underestimate
al and personal benefits rearma-
to the officers' corps of the old
the new big army promotions pro-
nants became colonels, colonels
als field marshals. In short, every-
g well, not only materially but
they were finally again allowed to
y could do; they were part of an
ary apparatus. Under these cir-
ould be foolish to go into oppo-
easier to swallow all sorts of

1935

distasteful decrees, such as the introduction of the
 Aryan Paragraph in 1935. Of course, the Reichs-
 wehr had never had all that many Jewish officers
 to begin with, but it did have quite a number with
 a Jewish grandparent, for intermarriage between
 the military aristocracy and the Jewish finance
 aristocracy had not been all that rare. The unfor-
 tunate offspring of these unions were now forced
 to leave the Reichswehr. This caused some ripples
 and some bad feeling, but it was accepted. What
 mattered most was that the army was becoming
 strong, a powerful weapon, just as in the good old
 days of the kaiser.

Hitler's third success, which Goebbels's
 skilled salesmanship also impressed on the Ger-
 man people, was his defiant foreign policy, very
 different from that of Stresemann and the repub-
 lic's. Although these governments had also been
 revisionist, and successfully so, they had stressed
 accommodation and conciliation. Not so Hitler.
 His method was success through defiance.

He had started out on that road in 1933, when
 Germany demonstratively slammed the door on
 the League of Nations, which it had joined only
 seven years earlier. Hitler very skillfully made his
 disaffiliation the occasion for his first plebiscite,
 which he won almost unanimously. Then in 1935
 came the reintroduction of universal military ser-
 vice, his avowal that Germany would expand its
 standing army to thirty-six divisions—not a word
 about the Versailles Treaty and its 100,000-man

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34-38

the degree also the Social Democrats
 a fraternal battle against the Com-
 not altogether unhappy with what
 to them. It must be pointed out,
 while the non-Socialist parties dis-
 out a trace, and while the SPD had
Communists inside Germany con-
their lives to maintain at least some
link between the most important

That sort of perseverance against
 than admirable, although it must
 that in all that time they accom-
 g. Small Communist groups and
 d and re-formed, and at times even
 y out some minor campaigns, like
 n public buildings. The only thing
 ed, however, was to create mar-
 e, Hitler's anti-Communism had
 t, neither on the ready acceptance
 or on his enormous popularity.
 sm was a different matter. Nei-
 n Reich of the Hohenzollern nor
 ardenberg and Bismarck had been
 es. The anti-Semitism of the Ger-
 at most "conventional"; in the
 vere not always liked and often
 . There was some resentment
 action to certain professions (law,
 lism, publishing, literature), but
 onviolent anti-Semitism. And it
 y the majority of the people.

1935

Popular attitudes toward the Jews fell into
three categories. First there was the one that ap-
proved of Jewish emancipation and equality under
the law, in line with Hardenberg's dictum of 1911:
"Equal rights, equal duties." The second differ-
entiated between converts and nonconverts, or be-
tween old residents and newcomers. The former
 were accepted and the latter were kept at arm's
 length. And then there were the rabid anti-Semites
 who would have liked to deprive the Jews, or at
 least all nonconverts and recent arrivals, of their
 civil rights. The extremists among these even
 wanted to deprive Jews of their citizenship. But
none, not even the most vehement, ever advocated
the extermination of the Jews. This idea, part and
 parcel of Hitler's ideology which he ultimately
 turned into horrible reality, had never even been
 hinted at in pre-Hitler Germany.

Hitler led up to this part of his program step
 by step. First he merely closed certain positions
and professions to Jews, and even then veterans
and the children of war heroes were exempted.
 Then the proscription was extended to more and
 more professions, after which he took the first
 truly momentous step: the proclamation of the
Nuremberg Laws of 1935, which deprived Jews of
all civil rights and forbade intermarriage and sex-
ual relationships between Jews and non-Jews. This
 was a significant and not particularly popular
 move. Still it was accepted, probably also because
 it institutionalized the most radical proposals of

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1935

the rabid anti-Semites; as a result, many people chose to believe that with this Hitler's anti-Semitic campaign had reached its acme. Henceforth, so they told themselves, the Jews would know where they stood. True, they no longer had any civil rights, some professions were closed to them, they could no longer marry Gentiles or have affairs with them, and, well, perhaps this was going a bit far, but compared to all the good things Hitler was doing—jobs, rearmament, foreign-policy successes, the restoration of Germany's self-esteem—one could live with the Nuremberg Laws.

This acquiescence in the persecution of the Jews ultimately led to the acceptance of far more terrible things, and with it the German people also became guilty of Hitler's crimes against the Jews, even though after the obliteration of all democratic political channels they no longer were able to voice their objections or give them political force.

On a personal level it was possible to oppose Hitler's anti-Jewish laws. Even if Germans could no longer marry Jews, they could risk punishment and live with Jews. Later, once the persecutions began in earnest, one could hide Jews or help them escape or assist them in some other way. And many people did just that; not millions perhaps, but thousands at any rate. It was no longer possible, however, even if one wanted to, effectively to fight specific aspects of Hitler's rule, such as

his anti-Semitism followers—people—and people w against F vined th tional val out, let al tial numl liked to c gration," both the caution.

Resis and occas of the regi the officia possible. and of the

neither w of the Fül group that Staff of th one in 193 other in 1 Only one Count Statler on July because he army comi

* Should the US²⁰⁸ have an affair with a German girl?

nority only a few escaped Hitler's vengeance. They deserve respect, but they too accomplished nothing.

The "internal emigration" is another matter. There was of course an actual emigration, but emigration was not all that simple. The world was in the grip of economic crisis, and very few countries were ready to admit immigrants and allow them to work. Many Germans undoubtedly would have liked to withdraw into an inner emigration, but strangely enough that was not possible. Let me cite the example of Heinrich Lübke, the future president of the Federal Republic.

Lübke, a former leader of the Center party, had not capitulated to the Nazis in 1933, and consequently a political career was closed to him. He decided to fall back on his original profession, civil engineering, a completely nonpolitical vocation. Perhaps this may be seen as an act of inner emigration. By trading in his promising political career for an anonymous middle-class position, Lübke voluntarily accepted the loss of prestige as the price for living up to his beliefs. But can this really be called an act of inner emigration? As a civil engineer he had to work for the Reich, for example to help build camps for slave laborers, which was one of the (I believe unfair) charges later leveled against him. At any rate, Lübke has more right to consider himself part of the inner emigration than many an Anti who helped Goebbels carry out his program in the press, radio, theater, or literature.

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Let me get back to literature, because it was the least controlled medium. Many prominent German writers had emigrated. Still, in the Third Reich books continued to be written by Antis who circumvented official controls by writing romantic trifles, adventure stories, and similar confessions. Their readers knew that these authors wished to distance themselves from the Nazis. But might it not be said that they, by showing that such an escape hatch existed, were actually playing the game? Everyone who worked under Goebbels, regardless of any self-bestowed anti-Nazi credentials, played an instrument in Goebbels' orchestra. All those romances, those old-fashioned tales, everything that was part of so-called normal life, without directly challenging the Third Reich, was part of the grand scheme.

I would like to close this chapter with a frequently asked yet still unanswered and unresolved question: Did the Third Reich represent continuity in the history of the German Reich or did it depart from the beaten path? The simple answer is that it contained elements of both continuity and discontinuity, and that continuity predominated. As we shall see, Hitler adopted the "world power or collapse" alternative of the late Wilhelmine Empire and of World War I, and in that respect his foreign policy fell completely within a continuity that had been forcibly interrupted by the lost war.

→ Hitler's domestic policy, the actual consti-

1933-38, 1935

As he wrote in *Mein Kampf*: "It seems as though fate itself wanted to point the way. The vast Eastern empire is on the verge of collapse."

Hitler also recognized that England was largely responsible for Germany's defeat in the West and that the war against England might perhaps have been avoided. There were many similarities between the events leading up to World War I and those leading up to World War II. Bethmann Hollweg had been eager to keep England neutral in the event of a continental war against France and Russia, a war he believed was sure to come, and Hitler too made every effort to keep England neutral, or better still to have England on his side. He also thought he knew the reason for the earlier failure to keep England neutral: because Germany, although hemmed in on the continent by France and Russia, persisted in beefing up its fleet. This had needlessly challenged England to a contest over hegemony outside Europe. Hitler wisely decided not to make the same mistake: no fleet buildup, no world politics, but, rather, concentration on the war against Russia, possibly after a short war against France to protect the rear. It is remarkable, and probably no accident, that this logical plan, so carefully worked out between 1933 and 1938, failed.

In 1935 Hitler signed a naval pact with England in which he agreed to limit the German fleet to a third of Britain's, which was not all that painful a concession considering that Germany had

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1935

emites; as a result, many people
 ve that with this Hitler's anti-
 gn had reached its acme. Hence-
 old themselves, the Jews would
 ey stood. True, they no longer
 its, some professions were closed
 ould no longer marry Gentiles
 with them, and, well, perhaps
 bit far, but compared to all the
 r was doing—jobs, rearmament,
 cesses, the restoration of Ger-
 n—one could live with the Nu-

ence in the persecution of the
 d to the acceptance of far more
 with it the German people also
 itler's crimes against the Jews,
 the obliteration of all demo-
 nels they no longer were able
 ctions or give them political

evel it was possible to oppose
 laws. Even if Germans could
 s, they could risk punishment
 Later, once the persecutions
 could hide Jews or help them
 in some other way. And
 that; not millions perhaps,
 rate. It was no longer pos-
 if one wanted to, effectively
 ts of Hitler's rule, such as

208
 have an affair
 -girl

1938, 1944

his anti-Semitic regulations. Still, Hitler's anti-
 Semitism was the line that separated the loyal
 followers of the Führer—the majority of the peo-
 ple—and the not insignificant minority of Antis,
 people who in the privacy of their homes railed
 against Hitler and his party, and who were con-
 vinced that this proved their adherence to tradi-
 tional values even if they no longer dared to speak
 out, let alone act. There always existed a substan-
 tial number of Antis who later, after Hitler's fall,
 liked to describe themselves as the "inner emi-
 gration," or even as the resistance. I believe that
 both these labels should be used with great
 caution.

Resistance was limited to very small groups,
 and occasionally to groups that were officially part
 of the regime, particularly in the military; outside
 the official apparatus no effective resistance was
 possible. The resistance of some of the churches
 and of the Communists was ineffective because
 neither was in any position to affect the policies
 of the Führer state. In fact, there was only one
 group that had the necessary leverage: the General
 Staff of the army. There were two officers' plots,
 one in 1938-39, when war was imminent, and the
 other in 1943-44, when defeat was imminent.
 Only one of these plots was actually carried out:
 Count Stauffenberg's botched assassination of Hit-
 ler on July 20, 1944. Stauffenberg failed largely
 because he did not have the backing of the entire
 army command, only of a minority. Of this mi-

SMOKE GETS IN YOUR EYES - FROM ROBERTA

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Smoke Gets in Your Eyes

eventually you'll need the credits

Written by Jerome Kern (music) and Otto Harbach (lyrics) for the musical "Roberta" in 1933

Recording by The Platters was a # 1 hit in 1959

Remade in 1973 by Blue Haze, it hit # 27

They, asked me how I knew,
My true love was true,
I of course replied, something here inside,
Can not be denied.

*Free Press
because*

They, said some day you'll find,
All who love are blind,
When you heart's on fire, you must realize,
Smoke gets in your eyes.

*Early?
1935?*

So I chaffed them, and I gaily laughed,
To think they would doubt our love,
And yet today, my love has gone away,
I am without my love.

Now laughing friends deride,
Tears I cannot hide,
So I smile and say, when a lovely flame dies,
Smoke gets in your eyes,

Smoke gets in your eyes.

Return to Songlist

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Artist Index Lyrics Index Album Index

Artist: Tony Bennett

Buy Tony Bennett's CD

Tea For Two

Tony Bennett

(Irving Caesar/Vincent Youmans)

I'm discontented with homes that are rented so I have invented my own.
Darling this place is a lover's oasis where life's weary chase is unknown.
Far from the cry of the city, where flowers pretty caress the streams,
Cozy to hide in, to love side-by-side in. Don't let it abide in my dreams.

Picture you upon my knee, just **tea for two** and two for tea,
Just me for you and you for me, alone!
Nobody near us, to see us or hear us,
No friends or relations on weekend vacations,
We won't have it known, dear, that we have a telephone, dear.
Day will break and you'll awake and start to bake
A sugar cake for me to take for all the boys to see.
We will raise a family, a boy for you, a girl for me,
Oh, can't you see how happy life would be?

You are revealing a plan so appealing I can't help but falling for you,
Darling, I planned it; can't you understand it is yours to command it, so do.
All of your schemes I'm admiring, they're worth desiring but can't you see,
I'd like to wait there for some future date dear;
It won't be too late, dear, for me.

Picture you upon my knee, just **tea for two** and two for tea,
Just me for you and you for me, alone!
Nobody near us, to see us or hear us,
No friends or relations on weekend vacations,
We won't have it known, dear, that we have a telephone, dear.
Day will break and you'll awake and start to bake
A sugar cake for me to take for all the boys to see.
We will raise a family, a boy for you, a girl for me,
Oh, can't you see how happy life would be?

1932?

One of her
favorite songs

TOUT VA TRES BIEN (Madame la marquise) - Ray Ventura et les Collégiens

Paroles : Paul Misraki & Bach et Laverne

Musique: Paul Misraki

1

Allô ! Allô ! James ! Quelle nouvelle ?

Absente depuis quinze jours,

Au bout du fils je vous appelle.

Que trouverai-je à mon retour

refrain

Tout va très bien ,

Madame la Marquise

Tout va très bien, tout va très bien

Pourtant il faut,

Il faut que l'on vous dise,

On déplore un tout petit rien,

Un incident,

Une bêtise,

La mort de votre jument grise.

Mais à part ça ,

Madame la Marquise

Tout va très bien, tout va très bien

2

Allô ! Allô ! James ! Quelle nouvelle ?

Ma jument grise morte aujourd'hui?

Expliquez-moi, valet fidèle

Comment cela s'est-il produit ?

refrain

Cela n'est rien,

Madame la Marquise

Cela n'est rien,

Tout va très bien.

Pourtant il faut,

Il faut que l'on vous dise,

On déplore un tout petit rien.

Elle a péri

Dans l'incendie

Qui détruisit vos écuries

Mais à part ça ,

Madame la Marquise

Tout va très bien, tout va très bien

3

Allô ! Allô ! James ! Quelle nouvelle ?

Mes écuries ont donc brûlé ?

Expliquez-moi, valet modèle

Comment cela s'est-il passé ?

*One of Eric Brown's
favorite songs.**Early version?
Dec 1941?*

refrain

Cela n'est rien,

Madame la Marquise

Cela n'est rien,

Tout va très bien.

Pourtant il faut,

Il faut que l'on vous dise,

On déplore un tout petit rien.

Si l'écurie brûla, madame

C'est que le l'château était en flamme

Mais à part ça ,

Madame la Marquise

Tout va très bien, tout va très bien

4

Allô ! Allô ! James ! Quelle nouvelle ?

Notre château est donc détruit ?

Expliquez-moi, car je chancelle.

Expliquez-moi, valet fidèle

Comment cela s'est-il produit ?

refrain

Eh bien ! voilà madame la Marquise.

Apprenant qu'il était ruiné,

A pein' fut-il rev'nu de sa surprise

Que m'sieu l'marquis s'est suicidé

Et c'est en ramassant la pell'

Qu'il renversa tout's les chandell's

Mettant le feu à tout l'château

Qui s'consuma de bas en haut.

Le vent soufflant sur l'incendie

Se propagea sur l'écurie,

Et c'est ainsi qu'en un moment

On vit périr votre jument,

Mais à part ça ,

Madame la Marquise

Tout va très bien, tout va très bien

rope; there is only submission.' It was the essential premise on which all his plans depended; the next year, 1935, was to show how just was his diagnosis.

From the summer of 1934 the principal object of the Western Powers' diplomacy was to persuade Germany to sign a pact of mutual assistance covering Eastern Europe. Just as the Locarno Pact included France, Germany, Belgium, Great Britain, and Italy, each undertaking to come to the immediate aid of France and Belgium, or Germany, if either side were attacked by the other, so this Eastern Locarno would include Russia, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the other states of Eastern Europe and would involve the same obligation of automatic assistance in the case of an attack.

Hitler had no intention of entering into any such scheme: it was not aggression that he feared, but checks upon his freedom of action. His opposition was powerfully assisted by that of Poland, whose policy of balancing between Moscow and Berlin fatally overestimated her own strength, and fatally underestimated the danger from Germany.

Hitler courted the Poles assiduously, constantly urging on them the common interest Poland and Germany had in opposing Russia. Göring was used by Hitler in the role of a candid friend of the Poles. In his talks with Polish generals and with Marshal Pilsudski in January 1935, he almost suggested a joint attack on Russia, implying that the Ukraine would become a Polish sphere of influence and North-western Russia would be Germany's. The Poles were wary of such seductive propositions, but during 1935 relations between the two governments became steadily closer. In May Göring visited Cracow for Pilsudski's funeral, and Hitler had a long conversation with the Polish Ambassador. The attention Hitler paid to Polish-German relations was to repay him handsomely.

Meanwhile, the British and French renewed their attempts to reach an agreement with the Germans, proposing that the Locarno Pact be renewed by the conclusion of a new agreement to prevent an unprovoked aggression from Germany. This was supported by two similar pacts with France and the United Kingdom dealing with Eastern Europe and Central Europe.

Hitler faced a difficult decision had reached a stage which would prove a hindrance. It was proposals that the Western Powers return for Germany's accession to strengthening and extending Hitler had to avoid tying his hands. He provide some dramatic strokes to gratify the mood of nationalism. A bold unilateral repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles clauses of the Treaty of Versailles was very much better than concessions in return for French agreement. Could he afford to take

Hitler's first reply showed that he had accepted the idea of extending the Munich Pact to include attack from the east. He was evasive on the question of the Danubian Pacts. The German Government asked the British to continue discussion of the Danubian Pacts by the British Foreign Minister. This meeting was arranged for 7 March. On 7 March the British Government published a statement that increased armaments, basing the statement on the many was . . . rearming open defiance of the provisions of the Locarno Pact. Great indignation was expressed in Germany, and Hitler contracted to postpone Sir

March 1935

Chancellor, 1933-9

the 9th the German Government officially notified foreign governments that a German Air Force was already in existence. This seems to have been a kite with which to test the Western Powers' reaction. As Sir John Simon told the House of Commons that he and Mr. Eden were still proposing to go to Berlin and nothing else happened, it appeared safe to risk a more sensational announcement the next week-end. On 16 March 1935, the German Government proclaimed its intention of building up a peacetime army of five hundred and fifty thousand men.

Four days before, the French Government had doubled the period of Army service and reduced the age of enlistment to make good the reduced birth-rate of 1914-18. This served Hitler as a pretext for his own action. Germany, Hitler declared, was the one Power which had disarmed; now that the other Powers, far from disarming themselves, were actually beginning to increase their armaments, she had no option but to follow suit.

The announcement was received with enthusiasm in Germany, and on 17 March, Heroes Memorial Day, a brilliant military ceremony in the State Opera House celebrated the rebirth of the German Army. In this first open breach of the Treaty's provisions, Hitler had anticipated protests from abroad; what mattered was the action with which the other signatories of the Treaty proposed to support their protests.

The result more than justified the risks he had taken. The British Government, after making a solemn protest, proceeded to ask whether the Führer was still ready to receive Sir John Simon. The French appealed to the League, and an extraordinary session of the Council was at once summoned. But the French Note, too, spoke of searching for means of conciliation. This was not the language of men who intended to enforce their protests. When Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden at last visited Berlin at the end of March they found Hitler polite, even charming, but perfectly

The Counterfeit Peace, 1:
sure of himself and firm any pact of mutual assistance. It was the English ask for cooperation and a advantageous position of being having anything to ask in of the British representative nouncement of 16 March, plomacy.

In the weeks that followed continued to make a display formally at least, was more 11 April 1935, the British governments condemned Germany their loyalty to the Locarno declaration on Austria in the Council of the League of Nations. In May, the French Government Soviet Union by which each to the aid of the other in tack. This treaty was far cluded at the same time, by most reliable ally, Czechoslovakia.

Yet, even if Hitler was of this belated reaction, and Czech-Russian treaty with awkward new possibilities own tactics was never so the strength of this new-long to show its weakness.

On 21 May Hitler proposed Defence Law which placed economic preparations for war in the hands of the armed forces. Commander of the Wehrmacht face that Hitler showed the same day, he appeared a long and carefully

policy. In it are to be found most of the tricks with which Hitler lulled the suspicions and raised the hopes of the gullible. His answer to the censure of the Powers was not defiance, but redoubled assurances of peace, an appeal to reason, justice and conscience. The new Germany, he protested, was misunderstood, and his own attitude misrepresented.

No man ever spoke with greater feeling of the horror and stupidity of war than Adolf Hitler. Despite the failure of the other powers to disarm, Germany was still prepared to cooperate in the search for security. But she had rooted objections to the proposal of multilateral pacts, for this was the way to spread, not to localize, war. Moreover, Hitler declared, there was a special case, Bolshevik Russia, pledged to destroy the independence of Europe, a State with which a Nationalist Socialist Germany could never come to terms.

In place of the 'unrealistic' proposal of multilateral treaties, Hitler offered the signature of non-aggression pacts with Germany's neighbours. Germany's improved relations with Poland, he did not fail to add, showed how great a contribution such pacts could make to the cause of peace: this was the practical way in which Germany set about removing international misunderstandings.

Hitler supported his offer with the most convincing display of goodwill. The fact that Germany had repudiated the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles did not mean that she had anything but the strictest regard for the Treaty's other provisions—including the demilitarization of the Rhineland. She had no intention of annexing Austria and was perfectly ready to strengthen the Locarno Pact. She was ready to agree to the abolition of heavy arms; to limit the use of other weapons—such as the bomber and poison gas—by international convention; indeed, to accept an over-all limitation of armaments provided that it was to apply to all the Powers. Hitler

laid particular stress on man naval power to 35 the British Navy. He er faith in peace. 'Whoever Europe can wish for not live in the firm convict fulfilled, not the decline West. That Germany m: tribution to this great our unshakable belief.'

Hitler's mastery of unequalled. He understo peace, the idealism of science of the liberals, mass of their peoples to affairs. At this stage tl the uncompleted panzer he was still building, a same skill he had shown ances and illusions.

Although Hitler's a modified later by growi of her policy and the the idea of an allia throughout his life. Si Hitler's view, be made cepted the prospect of Continent and left Ger it. No British Govern prepared to go as far yet there was a section sufficiently impressed attracted to the idea, a cessful for a time in Great Britain to the re icy of appeasement rep British Government, at of what British policy

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laid particular stress on his willingness to limit Ger-
man naval power to 35 per cent of the strength of
the British Navy. He ended with a confession of his
faith in peace. 'Whoever lights the torch of war in
Europe can wish for nothing but chaos. We, however,
live in the firm conviction that in our time will be
fulfilled, not the decline, but the renaissance of the
West. That Germany may make an imperishable con-
tribution to this great work is our proud hope and
our unshakable belief.'

Hitler's mastery of the language of Geneva was
unequaled. He understood intuitively the longing for
peace, the idealism of the pacifists, the uneasy con-
science of the liberals, the reluctance of the great
mass of their peoples to look beyond their own private
affairs. At this stage these were greater assets than
the uncompleted panzer divisions and bomber fleets
he was still building, and Hitler used them with the
same skill he had shown in playing on German griev-
ances and illusions.

Although Hitler's attitude towards Britain was
modified later by growing contempt for the weakness
of her policy and the credulity of her governments,
the idea of an alliance with her attracted him
throughout his life. Such an alliance could only, in
Hitler's view, be made on condition that Britain ac-
cepted the prospect of a German hegemony on the
Continent and left Germany a free hand in attaining
it. No British Government, even before the war, was
prepared to go as far as an alliance on these terms,
yet there was a section of British opinion which was
sufficiently impressed by Hitler's arguments to be
attracted to the idea, and Hitler was remarkably suc-
cessful for a time in weakening the opposition of
Great Britain to the realization of his aims. The pol-
icy of appeasement represented the acceptance by the
British Government, at least in part, of Hitler's view
of what British policy should be.

G 188 May 1935

Chancellor, 1933-9

The speech of 21 May 1935 had been intended to influence opinion in Great Britain in Hitler's favour. The quickness of the British reaction was surprising. During his visit to Berlin in March Sir John Simon had been sufficiently impressed by a hint thrown out by the Führer to suggest that German representatives should come to London to discuss the possibility of a naval agreement between the two countries.

* Early in June Joachim von Ribbentrop, whom Hitler now began to use for special missions, flew to London. He returned with the British signature of a naval pact which bound the Germans not to build beyond 35 per cent of Britain's naval strength, but tacitly recognized Germany's right to begin naval rearmament and specifically agreed that Germany should have the right to build up to 100 per cent of the submarine strength of the British Commonwealth. The affront to Britain's partners, France and Italy, both of whom were also naval powers, but neither of whom had been consulted, was open and much resented. The unanimity of the Powers' condemnation of German rearmament was destroyed. The British Government, in its eagerness to secure a private advantage, had given a disastrous impression of bad faith and had accepted Hitler's carefully calculated offer without a thought of its ultimate consequences.

In September the Führer attended the Party's rally at Nuremberg, where for the first time detachments of the new German Army took part in the parade. The Reichstag was summoned to Nuremberg for a special session, and Hitler presented for its unanimous approval the Nuremberg Laws directed against the Jews, the first depriving Germans of Jewish blood of their citizenship, the second forbidding marriages between Germans and Jews and the employment of German servants by Jews. These laws, Hitler declared, 'repay the debt of gratitude to the movement

The Counterfeit Peace, 193

under whose symbol [the swastika emblem] Germany has reco

The same month, while I was in power to gratify his ha

rel began at Geneva which

the opportunity to extend h

man frontiers of 1914.

After the murder of Dolfus, outspoken in his dislike of the barbarians' north of the Alps, with the other Powers in the many's unilateral decision, however, had long been content for his régime in Abyssinia by French and British pressure to reararmament to carry out h

Abyssinia had appealed. In September the British Government made a sensational gesture many by the Naval Treaty for the second time mandating the imposition of The Baldwin Government on both worlds. By insisting that Great Britain made destroyed all hope of a unaggression. By her refusal of sanctions, in face of the authority of the League, she gave a fatal blow, and destroyed in collective security an united front of the Great aggression.

The ultimate beneficiary was not Mussolini, but Hitler, who derived from the quarrel between the Powers did not escape development of the dispo

* ~~His fault~~ British faith in Hitler comes from his capturing of his own destiny.

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under whose symbol [the swastika, now the national emblem] Germany has recovered her freedom'.

The same month, while Hitler was making use of his power to gratify his hatred of the Jews, a quarrel began at Geneva which was to provide him with the opportunity to extend his power outside the German frontiers of 1914.

After the murder of Dollfuss, Mussolini had been outspoken in his dislike and contempt for the 'barbarians' north of the Alps, and he had cooperated with the other Powers in their condemnation of Germany's unilateral decision to rearm. Mussolini, however, had long been contemplating a showy success for his régime in Abyssinia, and he hoped to profit by French and British preoccupation with German rearmament to carry out his adventure on the cheap.

Abyssinia had appealed to the League in March. In September the British Government, having just made a sensational gesture of appeasement to Germany by the Naval Treaty of June, astonished the world for the second time by taking the lead in demanding the imposition of sanctions against Italy. The Baldwin Government thus made the worst of both worlds. By insisting on the imposition of sanctions Great Britain made an enemy of Mussolini and destroyed all hope of a united front against German aggression. By her refusal to drive home the policy of sanctions, in face of Mussolini's bluster, she dealt the authority of the League as well as her own prestige a fatal blow, and destroyed any hope of finding in collective security an effective alternative to the united front of the Great Powers against German aggression.

The ultimate beneficiary of these blunders was, not Mussolini, but Hitler. The advantages to be derived from the quarrel between Italy and the Western Powers did not escape Hitler, and the further development of the dispute only gave him greater

Dec 1934

193

murder Goltz met him one evening
Pomerania and tackled Göring—who
angelic look—about the noto-
riety, the former lawyer Wilhelm

"Out!" (That is, he was about

which was the notorious gauleiter of

Actually, the Führer wanted to
business, but others spoke up

Gesellschaft
humped off? Too? Göring drove him
could not extract one coherent word
von Spinnemann was waiting for them.

and, to reappear swathed in silence
without a word toward his beloved
without the drive back from Pomerania,
coming in Carin's lake, had been ob-
himself somehow hurting for this mel-

August 1934, one hundred of Göring's
Ministry. Göring marched into a little
and announced that the armed forces
was Hindenburg's designated succe-
the Constitution, but nobody was given
ward and slapped his hand onto the
read out the words of the new oath,

He went over the defense budget with
moved a total of 10.5 billion marks for
of it going to the air force. He gave
to Dr. Hjalmar Schacht. "We're
complete our armament," he disclosed
dare tell Schacht that. He would have

Hitler, Göring decided to attend the
of Yugoslavia, as representative of the
He played his hand well. Knowing that
Italian Fascists had been behind the
made a public declaration that no German
favorable comment in Belgrade—and

dismay in Rome. Göring arrived at Belgrade's airport in Lufthansa's imposing
new airliner the Hindenburg, and allowed all Yugoslavia to learn that the
wreath he brought from the German armed forces was inscribed to the king
as "their heroic former enemy." The local German minister conceded en-
viously that Göring had stolen the whole show, while his British colleague,
Neville Henderson, agreed that Göring had converted Belgrade to the German
cause simply by being the only foreign dignitary to use an open car in the
funeral procession.

The professional diplomats in the Wilhelm Strasse, who had never valued
the Balkans highly, looked down their noses at Göring's methods, but Hitler
didn't. By a secret law he now appointed Hermann Göring the second man
in the Reich, signing two decrees to this effect on December 7, 1934. One
nominated Göring his deputy "in the event that I am impeded in the execution
of the offices of Reich president and Reich chancellor combined in my
person"; the other specified Göring as his successor.

After this, Göring's megalomania knew few bounds. Thomas von Kant-
zow, his stepson, visiting him that Christmas at the Reichstag speaker's
palace, heard about all the new buildings Göring was planning and warned
him he was well on the way to becoming another King Ludwig II of
Bavaria—"the mad king who had the idea," as Thomas noted in his diary
on December 23, "of building one castle after another."

Hermann [he added] has already rebuilt the speaker's palace.
The hall we were in before is now completely different. He went
to the window and pointed to the Reichstag Building, and said
he intends to build an Air Ministry five times as big, where
airplanes can land and take off from the roof.

In January 1935 he laid the cornerstone of the new Air Ministry. It would
occupy a four-hundred-thousand-square-foot site off the Leipziger Strasse.
Hitler personally checked each façade in plaster miniature. Its central lon-
gitudinal block and side wings would house four thousand bureaucrats and
officers in its twenty-eight hundred rooms. Throughout 1935 the country's
finest architects and sculptors chiseled at heroic reliefs with motifs like "Flag
Company," designed by Professor Arnold Waldschmidt of the Prussian
Academy of Fine Arts. The Berliners made smug comments about this
extravagance—"Pure and simple, and hang the expense!" was one; "just
humble gold" was another.

Göring also became the leader in high society. His annual ball became
the event of the winter season. But when the first was held, on January 11
1935, in his State Opera House on Unter den Linden, Nazi purists wrinkled
their noses. "Göring's Opera Ball," sneered Darré in his diary. "Wrong.
The old Court Ball—do we have to put on airs like this?"

Those were the days when the Nazis were riding high. In Berlin Leni

Hitler was a master of the flamboyant

Riefenstahl's spine-chilling film of the party rally, *Triumph of the Will*, was packing movie theaters. A thrill of military awakening was surging through the Reich. "We have a vital task before us," Blomberg told fellow generals one day after Göring's winter ball. "For the moment we are just erecting the scaffolding." Everybody understood that. Milch's papers show him building aircraft factories and aircraft-engine factories, expanding pilot training; commissioning synthetic-rubber and gasoline plants, and planning smoke-screens for the Ruhr. Addressing gauleiters early in 1935, Göring bragged that in two years he had turned a once-defenseless country into a major power. "Germany," he concluded, "will possess by this coming autumn the most powerful air fleet in the world." Soon they could start doing deals with their neighbors. Milch learned the planning figures and jotted them in his diary: "[German] navy: thirty-five percent of the British. Air: one hundred percent, assuming British Air Force equals French. We are banking on British—against Russia."

That was Hitler's ultimate intention, to expand northeastward, with Poland's connivance, into Soviet territories. He gave to Göring the job of wooing the Polish government. When Marshal Józef Piłsudski, the Polish dictator, invited Göring to hunt wolves at Białowieża later that January, Hitler briefed him in secret on the twenty-fifth to tell his hosts that Germany was

willing to recognize by treaty that the [Polish] Corridor question was not a bone of contention between our two countries. . . . Germany can expand, in collusion with Poland, to the east: Poland would have the Ukraine as its sphere of interest, and Germany the northeast.

In quiet intervals during the four days of strenuous hunting in Poland, Göring outlined this cynical German offer. Praising Poland's "strength and dynamic force," he scoffed at any notion that Hitler might ever do a deal with Stalin at Poland's expense. "A common German-Russian frontier," he assured the Poles, "would be highly dangerous to Germany."

Piłsudski, however, demanded a German guarantee of noninterference with Danzig—which he did not get—before he would agree to any summit meeting with Hitler.

Neither Hitler nor Göring would ever abandon these long-term strategic aims. After one internal conference in the Behren Strasse Air Ministry Building, ex-naval aviator Friedrich Christiansen confided to his fellow officers, raking one hand across the map of Central Europe, that Hitler had plans to expand in 1938 eastward into Galicia and the Ukraine. "We must be so powerful by then," said Christiansen, "that nobody dares to oppose us. We'll square things with Britain—they'll give us a free hand in the east, and in return we'll drop our claim to our former colonies." Russia would just disintegrate, Hitler had said. "And then," Christiansen continued, his

hand sweeping over all the court all of these too."

The new secret German Air Force nobleman brought to him by the that yes, he had built an air force should call little." A few days later Group Captain Frank Don: By "I bombers. It was a shameless ex chair.

"There will be calls for an in "I should welcome any incre to the interpreter's recollection. by side to save Europe from cor .He bade the attaché a court Captain!" he said.

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He announced her change of st dinner party on March 15, held in villa. Sir Eric Phipps was amon were the Joseph Goebbelses and diplomatic corps. "I am only m Lady Phipps, "at the behest of bachelors among us Nazi high-up bachelor commander in chief, Ba with his monocle palely reflecting ing above the invisible string ord travagances in the villa, like the 15 and after dinner he showed off th the Kaiser-Friedrich Museum to j grinned, "but I threatened to take over here first thing in the morn watch two "stag movies"—the fil Göring briefly discovered by the c and brandishing a harpoon in the

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hand sweeping over all the countries north of the Black Sea, "we'll inherit
 all of these too."

The new secret German Air Force was cautiously unveiled. To an English
 nobleman brought to him by the British air attaché, Göring blandly admitted
 that yes, he had built an air force. "One," he added flirtatiously, "that I
 should call little." A few days later he enlarged on that concept to the attaché,
 Group Captain Frank Don: By "little," he meant a first line of fifteen hundred
 bombers. It was a shameless exaggeration, but the officer nearly fell off his
 chair.

"There will be calls for an increase in the RAF," he said.

"I should welcome any increase," responded Göring evenly, according
 to the interpreter's recollection. "In the next war we shall be fighting side
 by side to save Europe from communism."

He bade the attaché a courteous good-bye. "Mark my words, Group
 Captain!" he said.

At about the same time Hitler dropped broad hints that it was time for Göring
 to make an honest woman of Emmy Sonnemann, whose divorce had now
 come through. One day in February 1935, Göring suggested a quiet weekend
 in Weimar, and sent her on ahead with a note, which he instructed her not
 to open before getting there. He had written: "Will you marry me at Easter?
 The Führer will be our witness."

He announced her change of status from "private secretary" at a "little"
 dinner party on March 15, held in the white marble dining hall of his rebuilt
 villa. Sir Eric Phipps was among the forty guests Göring had invited, as
 were the Joseph Goebbelses and the Heinrich Himmlers and most of the
 diplomatic corps. "I am only marrying her," he explained disarmingly to
 Lady Phipps, "at the behest of the Führer. He feels there are too many
 bachelors among us Nazi high-ups"—and he glanced across at the army's
 bachelor commander in chief, Baron von Fritsch, standing alone and frigid
 with his monocle palely reflecting the illuminated tapestries. His voice boom-
 ing above the invisible string orchestra, Göring mentioned some of the ex-
 travagances in the villa, like the 150-foot swimming pool that he was building;
 and after dinner he showed off the Old Masters that he had prevailed upon
 the Kaiser-Friedrich Museum to lend him—"The director did object," he
 grinned, "but I threatened to take twice as many if these were not brought
 over here first thing in the morning." After that he invited the guests to
 watch two "stag movies"—the films showed only stags, apart from a General
 Göring briefly discovered by the cameras at Carinhall, wearing a leather suit
 and brandishing a harpoon in the Wotan-style living room.

What he felt for Emmy was probably not physical attraction. At the end
 of 1935 he would reveal to Staatssekretär Milch his belief that the groin
 injury had left him impotent. Probably he regarded his blond fiancée as
 merely another dazzling bauble for his collection.

His lust for precious stones and metals was notorious, and he had begun to adorn himself liberally with jewel-encrusted artifacts. Darré once witnessed him preparing to receive a Balkan minister. The valet brought in a cushion on which twelve rings were arrayed—four red, four blue, four green. "Today," the great man mused, "I am displeased. So we shall wear a deeper hue. But we also desire to show that we are not beyond hope. So we shall wear the green."

His private staff turned a blind eye on these eccentricities, but not those whom he affronted. Schacht would regale friends with the image of Göring in thigh-length boots, leather jerkin, and billowing white sleeves, with a Robin Hood hat and a man-sized spear. "His greed was boundless," he testified, "his lust for jewelry, gold, and silver plate unimaginable." One lady invited to tea found him wearing a toga and jewel-studded sandals, while his fingers were heavy with rings and precious stones, and his lips seemed to have been rouged.

The palace at No. 11a Leipziger Platz in Berlin was a dramatic example of his extravagance. He had purchased from former Crown Prince Wilhelm a large, valuable rug and had to order one of the rooms enlarged to fit it. As this work progressed, he decided on still more modifications until the final bill came to seven hundred thousand Reichsmarks (in addition to the 1933 renovation). The Prussian minister of finance, Johannes Popitz, approved without demur—not for nothing had Göring ordered the Finance Ministry alone preserved after the laws unifying the rest of the Reich. The building was later destroyed, but the architect's plans have survived and show the palace to be a rambling edifice with drinking and smoking rooms, several suites of kitchens, and a den for his pet lions at mezzanine level, while circular dining rooms, conservatories, drawing rooms, ambassadorial reception rooms, and hunting-trophy rooms took up the ground floor, along with Göring's cavernous, colonnaded study.

The same extravagance was evident in his expanding collection of medals. It was Göring who had proposed in the Cabinet (on April 7, 1933) the reintroduction of honors and distinctions: "The Weimar Republic," he argued, "went under precisely because of its dearth of honors and medals." At the time, Hitler agreed with him; but as Germany's misfortunes grew, the Führer's patience would wear thin. Ten years later he would ask Göring's heavy, brilliantined adjutant Dr. Ramon von Ondarza to remove himself from the bunker, loudly calling him "a perfumed sink of corruption"—while fastening his glare on Göring. It was like accusing the house dog of flatulence, while glaring at a guest. But that was a decade hence, and in 1935 the silent-hatred phase between the two men had yet to begin.

For the new air force Göring had designed a uniform that was almost as baroque as his palaces. Deciding upon the trinkets of rank, his imagination had run wild, and he ordained that the ceremonial parade uniform of air-

force officers would include two ingly, of much use in modern new general a fine sword, signé corrupt in his own image. Ribal of two starving jungle lions: On and returned to the forest, paun to hang around the Air Ministry got yourself a fine fat-Arsch of

Most dazzling of all the sword: to commemorate his marriage i Solingen steel was engraved wit ITS COMMANDER on one side, ar REICH on the other. The pommel crest; the scabbard was covered

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On the morning of April 10, 1935 and all Berlin was halted to cele Thirty thousand troops lined the r with narcissus and tulips. Associe wrote to his daughter: "You had t "A visitor to Berlin," echoed the F gallery facing the floodlit marble he had stumbled upon preparation

Insensible to Nazi party feeling: mony (although he granted the Re his sermon). The wedding album him in the cathedral, his postman beside him, his hands clasped in th Göring's hair was neatly smoothed saucer-sized medals covering his cl cathedral, two hundred planes flew by an irreverent Richthofen Squad

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force officers would include two-handed sabers and daggers—neither, seemingly, of much use in modern air-to-air combat. Göring presented to each new general a fine sword, signed by himself. The generals became rich and corrupt in his own image. Ribald fighter pilots would tell each other the tale of two starving jungle lions: One left to seek his fortune in the Reich capital and returned to the forest, paunchy and licking his chops. "You just have to hang around the Air Ministry," he growled. "It isn't long before you've got yourself a fine fat-Arsch of a general to sink your teeth into."

Most dazzling of all the swords was the one that his generals commissioned to commemorate his marriage to Emmy Sonnemann. The blade of finest Solingen steel was engraved with the words FROM THE REICH AIR FORCE TO ITS COMMANDER on one side, and FAITHFUL TO THE FÜHRER PEOPLE, AND REICH on the other. The pommel featured his Pour le Mérite and the Göring crest; the scabbard was covered with sharkskin of air-force blue.

He was a rare bird in the Berlin of 1935, and this was his real value to Hitler. He did not even have any function in the party. "I was never particularly interested in the party," he said, "just in the state. I used the one to attain position in the other. A person of my upbringing," he added loftily, "did not really fit into the party."

On the morning of April 10, 1935, massed bands serenaded the Göring villa, and all Berlin was halted to celebrate his wedding to Emmy Sonnemann. Thirty thousand troops lined the route as he drove past in an open car awash with narcissus and tulips. Associated Press correspondent Louis P. Lochner wrote to his daughter: "You had the feeling that an emperor was marrying." "A visitor to Berlin," echoed the British ambassador, sitting in the diplomatic gallery facing the floodlit marble altar, "might well have thought . . . that he had stumbled upon preparations for a royal wedding."

Insensible to Nazi party feelings, Göring had insisted on a religious ceremony (although he granted the Reich bishop, Müller, only five minutes for his sermon). The wedding album shows Hitler standing bareheaded behind him in the cathedral, his postman's hat nonchalantly upended on the floor beside him, his hands clasped in their familiar station below his belt-buckle. Göring's hair was neatly smoothed back, a broad sash dividing the areas of saucer-sized medals covering his chest. As the newlyweds emerged from the cathedral, two hundred planes flew overhead, followed by two storks released by an irreverent Richthofen Squadron veteran.

At the modest wedding breakfast at the Kaiserhof Hotel the world's society reporters glimpsed among the 320 friends and supplicants, Swedish in-laws and German relatives, princes and princesses, field marshals and lieutenants, gauleiters and manservants. There was Viktoria von Dirksen, whom Göring's fellow "managers" had yearned to nominate for extermination ten months before. There was Fritz Thyssen, whom he would shortly commit to prison

for high treason, and Rudolf Hess, who would enter upon forty-six years of incarceration just as Thyssen was leaving it in 1941. After the feast Göring drove out to Carinhall and vanished into the lakeside mausoleum for an hour.

The climax [wrote correspondent Lochner to his daughter] was yet in store for me. When I arrived at the palace of the Minister-Präsident [Göring, the next day], I found, in the first place, that this attractive building had once again been rebuilt to suit Hermann's by no means cheap taste. . . . He has had a modern Wurlitzer organ built in so that he can have his own talkies at his home and have an organist play for the overture. . . .

Then Hermann himself turned up. "Gentlemen," he said, "I have asked you to come here in order that I may show you the gifts my people have given me."

They filled two rooms, including a Lenbach portrait of Bismarck from Hitler and a solid-silver schooner from the City of Hamburg, which Emmy had often ogled on school trips to the City Hall. Göring was unlikely to be troubled by the ethics of it all. He was forty-two, and the treasure-houses of the Reich were opening to him. The Reichsbank had given him the famous Breslau Castle dining service in Royal porcelain (Göring's office had the effrontery to ask later for two candelabra missing from the inventory). The Reich Board of Guilds had furnished an exquisite drawing room for the Görings. Czar Boris of Bulgaria had given a medal to Hermann and a sapphire bracelet to Emmy. Kings and emperors, ambassadors and ministers, the Labor Front and chambers of commerce—all had deemed it prudent to bestow gifts on him.

In Germany his popularity was zooming. "Göring," reflected Louis Lochner, "is a type of fellow whom one cannot be mad at. His vanity is so obvious and his love of pomp so naïve that one simply laughs, and lets it go at that." Göring had easily won over the ambassadors who found the more radical Nazis unpalatable: André François-Poncet, the papal nuncio, and Phipps all found him a good conversationalist and approachable in matters that went against the Nazi grain. The Polish ambassador, Lipski, and Göring were now as thick as thieves. (Göring, charged by Hitler to take special care of German-Polish affairs as from April 20, had invited Lipski to a shoot that month and once more hinted that Poland should join an alliance against the Soviet Union.) Roosevelt's urbane roving ambassador, William C. Bullitt, took a strong dislike to the general, however, calling him "quite the most unpleasant representative of a nation that I have ever laid eyes on."

Unofficial British visitors came to the same conclusion. Learning that the Prince of Wales—shortly to become King Edward VIII—had urged closer links between the British Legion and comparable German ex-servicemen's organizations, Göring cabled him from Berchtesgaden: "As a front-line sol-

April 1935

OPEN DOOR T

dier I thank Your Royal Highness and chivalrous words . . . Wittmann Göring." He received the Legion delegation did come to N impressed by Adolf Hitler and talked to them only about himself Hawes, RN, who had been naval and pomposity."

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dier I thank Your Royal Highness from the bottom of my heart for the upright
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mann Göring." He received the prince's "warm thanks," but when a British
Legion delegation did come to Nazi Germany that July, they were profoundly
impressed by Adolf Hitler and not at all by Göring. Out at Carinhall he
talked to them only about himself. "He can be described," reported Captain
Hawes, RN, who had been naval attaché in Berlin, "as a mountain of egotism
and pomposity."

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April 1935

May 1935

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This was probably the last occasion on which his neighbors could have cheaply forestalled Hitler, but the bluff came off. "I don't think," Milch later wrote, "that either Hitler or Göring were fully aware of just how weak we were, particularly in the Luftwaffe." The air force had three squadrons (*Gruppen*) of fighters—I /JG2 commanded by Major Wieck at Döberitz; II/JG2 at Jüterbog under Major Raitzel (operating the obsolete Arado 65 and Heinkel 51 planes respectively); and Bruno Loerzer's III /JG2, flying Arado 68 biplanes at Bernburg-an-der-Saale. Only one of these squadrons was actually operational, and its guns had not been calibrated. Göring ordered these ancient biplanes to be flown in a circus around the Rhineland airfields, painting fresh insignia on them between each showing to create an illusion of armadas.

Göring knew that a war of imperial conquest in the east would have to be prefaced by years of solid rearmament. Recognizing that imported raw materials like oil, rubber, and iron ore would be the strategic bottlenecks, he had signed a synthetic-gasoline contract with Dr. Carl Krauch of I.G. Farben as early as December 14, 1933, and in the spring of 1935 Hitler gave him control of both the gasoline and the synthetic-rubber production efforts. His profile as the Reich's leading political economist was further enhanced by the specific task that Hitler gave him in August 1935, to arbitrate between Darré and Schacht and the competing interests of agriculture and industry. In the spring of 1936 Göring adopted the title of Hitler's "fuel commissioner," and then went all out to become the Reich's economic overlord.

Ironically, both Blomberg and Schacht gave him the final boost into this impregnable position. On April 3, the defense minister invited Göring to become "inspector general of the German petroleum economy," and on the same date Schacht, anxious to harness Göring's prestige in the party, asked him to accept responsibility for the Reich's foreign-exchange reserves. The result was a secret decree, which Hitler signed the next day, appointing Göring "commissioner for foreign exchange and raw materials."

In this we can see the embryo of the future monolithic Reich agency known as the Four-Year Plan. Both Blomberg and Schacht had ingenuously seen the general as some kind of buxom, popular figurehead to adorn their own offices. But no sooner had Hitler signed that secret decree than the figurehead came alive, clambered on board, and seized the helm. Secret though the decree might be, Göring had it published and, to the chagrin of the other ministries concerned, he set up a new agency called "Prime Minister General Göring's Raw Materials and Foreign Currency Unit." It will be noted that he had subtly dropped the words "of Prussia" after "Prime Minister."

There is no doubt that if he had the choice, he would have elected to be remembered as the executor of Hitler's Four-Year Plan. Flattered by American financial interrogator Herbert Dubois in 1945, who told him that the plan was regarded as a "very interesting institution," Göring beamed.

"I have never been a businessman," he avowed nostalgically. "And this was something completely new to me. My job was to organize the German economy, and my energy was harnessed to get things started. Over the years I learned a lot. My main task was to safeguard the food supply . . . and to make Germany self-sufficient. The most important items were iron, petroleum, and rubber."

He was innocent of any formal training in economics, but he soon got the hang of things and shortly bragged to Hitler that Dr. Schacht's preserve was not the holy mystery he had made out. Schacht found his sacred economic theories overridden and ignored, and a wall of hostility arose between the two men. In the first of a series of "foreign-exchange" conferences called during May and June of 1936, Göring pushed and inveigled. Schacht, his vanity affronted, refused even to attend the first one, held on the morning of May 12, and forbade any of his departments to help the new "dictator." Schacht, however, found few allies, and he condescended to put in an appearance that afternoon at Göring's "Little Cabinet"—as the Prussian Council of Ministers was becoming known—where he brandished a new Führer directive, which, he claimed, superceded Göring's. But Schacht had to listen impassively (and silently) as his rival preached his new economic gospel—putting exports first to earn foreign currency, then projects designed to meet the Reich's raw-materials needs from its own native resources. The implication was obvious. Göring was hatching a siege economy for a future war, and Schacht did not like it.

The raw-materials bottlenecks would have to be tackled now. On May 26, Göring harangued the biggest names in industry—Flick, Thyssen, and Vöglar among them—about the raw materials likely to prove scarce in wartime. He listed flax, jute, copper, metal scrap, and manganese among them, but identified particularly oil and rubber. "When war comes," he hammered into them, "we won't get a drop of oil from abroad." The same held true for rubber, so they had to expand synthetic-production capacity now. Using arguments of unmistakable bellicosity at a conference on the last day of June, he referred to two major tasks facing them, one being to feed the nation and the other to arm it for when it would be forced to "sally forth for freedom's last fight."

It must have been a novel, even distasteful, experience to be lectured by former Air Force Captain Hermann Göring on basic economics. But these industrialists had no choice. "The special powers given me by the Führer," he importantly explained, "have coerced me into this totally new field of endeavor. It has only recently dawned on me that this is vastly more important than those that the Führer has entrusted to me hitherto."

There were those in later years who called him lazy, and he hated the epithet. His diary would meticulously record the hours at which he rose, worked, relaxed, and retired to bed. While Schacht's civil servants went on summer

May 1935

furlough, Göring stayed in I rounded himself with his own unobtrusively usurping broad Reich Cabinet now rarely in Bormann specifically remarked Prussian Cabinet in its place; ministers to meetings as he said.

By July 1936 his staff was Air Ministry, and his Prussian agencies regardless of party called Göring the task of reviving Germany. He selected the pragmatic Heinrich Brüning, saying, "I have to handle foreign exchange, Will Loh was temporarily shifted from

Göring's methods were introduction by tax incentives, the products like gasoline and margarine for farmers. He negotiated ten-year agreements with Yugoslavia, bartering his (already scarce) foodstuffs; he would negotiate with Finland for tungsten, chromium, and other minerals.

The Four-Year Plan idea remained as usual on the drawing boards. The rebuilt villa, had just been handed over to his economists, Wilhelm Keppler, and the controversial divisions of responsibility. Hitler's sanction for a "cautious" policy in September, warning against exchange, and stockpile raw materials. The Führer's ten-day visit to the end of July.

There was one minor interlude in the consequences for the Luftwaffe in 1935, bringing a letter from Spa to enable him to ferry his insurgent Me 109s to overthrow the far right. Göring concurred, and the next day—was put in charge. The first eighty-six Luftwaffe were the Junkers 52 transport planes.

Upon his return from Bayreuth, the most famous aviator, Charles Lindbergh, to see anything he wanted an

THE GOD: ADOLF HITLER

with her first man is for a revelation that a soldier
died.¹⁵⁰

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worked violently.¹⁵³

The Image and the Man

He was intrigued by women's deaths. As we have noted, he approved when they committed suicide; he also approved of their murder. He did not often show clemency in capital cases—for which he had reinstituted death by decapitation—but during the single year 1935 he pardoned six condemned murderers. Five of the six had been found guilty of killing their wives. Subsequent statistics on his pardons are not available because as the German press announced in the fall of 1935, henceforth "mercy acts" of the Führer would not be publicized.¹⁵⁴

In a favorite metaphor, Hitler compared women to the masses, both of whom were to be dominated by the audacious man of passion and power. In lines notable for sadistic overtones and exaltation of brutality, he said:

Like a woman whose psychic feeling is influenced less by abstract reasoning than by undefinable sentimental longing for complementary strength, who will submit to the strong man rather than dominate the weakling, thus the masses love the ruler rather than the suppliant. . . . They neither realize the impudence with which they are spiritually terrorized nor the outrageous curtailment of their human liberties, for in no way does the delusion of this doctrine dawn on them. Thus they see only the inconsiderate force, the brutality and the aim of its manifestations to which they finally always submit.¹⁵⁵

At another time, Hitler compared the masses to wild horses; he was the stallion who could control them. He also thought of women as a circus audience: juvenile, naive, and susceptible to thrills. He concluded that "Someone who does not understand the intrinsically feminine character of the masses will never be an effective speaker."¹⁵⁶

He often said that he was never so happy or fulfilled as after giving a successful speech. On these occasions he would leave the stage soaked with perspiration, physically and emotionally spent. The written text of his speeches cannot possibly convey the intimacy he felt between himself and his audience. His speeches began as he stood very erect, rocking back and forth slowly on his heels, his voice carefully modulated and deliberately low. After a period of gentle introductory foreplay, he would move with mounting excitement toward the climax. The last five minutes have best been described as an "orgasm of words." He once told an intimate of the very great importance he attached to the delicate matter of sensing the precise climactic moment, which, he said, must be mutually shared between himself and his audience. "By feeling the reaction of the audience, one must know exactly when the moment has come to throw the last flaming javelin which sets the crowd afire."¹⁵⁷

That the masses were for him a sexual substitute to be conquered

Nov 1935

AD: ADOLF HITLER

The Intellectual World of Adolf Hitler

other titles." The title upon him by admiring he told his entourage:

As for the expression of women."⁶³

of the leader was not scism. Mussolini's Duce Hitler was a great deal in the Third Reich who ership of the state was term in Nazi Germany. m properly advanced a the "impersonal state" dolf Hitler.⁶⁴

er was a mystical and e. He was the *Volksgeist*. alist theory of the state d conception. . . . He is in a mandate; he is the only through his inter- alization of itself. This faithful summary, not of id legal opinion as it was Third Reich." Germany's d a more succinct sum- r."⁶⁵ ile with their leader was ths to him. Training for d age learned the follow-

at the age of ten the

represents our Führer, I strength to the savior of

our country, Adolf Hitler. I am willing and ready to give up my life for him, so help me God. One Volk, one Reich, one Führer.

Confirmation of the oath was made upon entering the Hitler *jugend* at the age of 14. The ceremony was held on the anniversary of the Führer's birth:

I consecrate my life to Adolf Hitler; I am ready to sacrifice my life for Hitler; I am ready to die for Hitler, my savior, the Führer.⁶⁶

When the boy grew up, more oaths confirmed his boyhood experience. If he became an educator, he joined all other teachers in Nazi Germany in swearing to be "loyal and obedient to Adolf Hitler." Similarly, every member of the German armed forces was required to take an oath unique in the history of national armies in the modern era—an oath to one man:

I swear by God this sacred oath, that I will render unconditional obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Führer of the German Reich and people, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and will be ready as a brave soldier to risk my life at any time for this oath.⁶⁷

Hitler insisted that the only alternative to the *Führerprinzip* was the chaos of democracy. In a public speech he put the matter without undue modesty: "It is madness to think and criminal to proclaim that a majority can suddenly replace the accomplishment of a man of genius."⁶⁸

Drumberg '35

Hitler's concept of leadership placed his political theory on a different plane from that of any other authoritarian system, including Stalin's. Royal absolutism, for example, had been based not on the person of the ruler but on the institution of monarchy. "The King is dead, long live the King!" was a cry and a concept impossible among the Nazis. Hitler and only Hitler could be the Führer. Stalin, it is certainly true, exerted enormous personal power. But he was really not supposed to, and some Marxist theorists have decried his regime as the "cult of personality." That is a key difference: Nazism was nothing without the cult of Hitler's personality. Moreover, Stalin felt obliged to justify his dictatorship by claiming that it was consistent with an explicit, rationally accessible corpus of ideas: Marxism-Leninism. Hitler needed no such sanction. He was not the interpreter of an ideology; he was the Idea made incarnate. *He was Nazism*. He and he alone was the ultimate arbiter of all matters political, social, aesthetic, cultural, moral. His whim, quite literally, became the law of the land. The final sanction for his action lay in the myth and mystery of the rationally incomprehensible—and untranslatable—chant of the Nazis: "Ein Volk! Ein

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

my *Patscherl*, eat this little morsel that is good for you.'"²⁰⁰ Eva's own feelings about Hitler were revealed in a private diary and in letters which were discovered after the war.* The diary is that of an immature and limited young woman whose love for Hitler is unmistakably sincere.

As the years passed, Hitler too felt more and more bound to Eva. During the war he telephoned her almost every night, and we have a letter he wrote to her just after the attempt on his life in the "Bomb Plot" of 1944. The letter, pecked out on a typewriter and pocked with errors, contains awkward and stilted phrases of the kind Hitler had used 35 years before in his correspondence with Kubizek. One must conclude that while it may not have been possible for Hitler to love anyone, he did, after his fashion, feel genuine and tender concern for Eva Braun:

Mein liebes Tschapperl,

Don't worry about me. I'm fine though perhaps a little tired. I hope to come home soon and then I can rest in your arms. I have a great longing for rest, but my duty to the German people comes before everything else. Don't forget that the dangers I encounter don't compare with those of our soldiers at the Front. I thank you for the proof of your affection and ask you also to thank your esteemed father and your most gracious mother for their greetings and good wishes. I am very proud of the honor—please tell them that—to possess the love of a girl who comes from such a distinguished family. I have sent to you the uniform I was wearing during the unfortunate day. It is proof that Providence has protected me and that we have nothing more to fear from our enemies.

From my whole heart, your A.H.

He enclosed in the letter a sketch he made of the barracks after the explosion.

We also have Eva's reply:

Geliebter,

I am beside myself. I am dying of anxiety now that I know you are in danger. Come back as soon as possible. I feel as if I am going insane.

The weather is beautiful here and everything seems so peaceful that I am almost ashamed of myself [for enjoying such tranquillity]. . . . You know I have always told you that I would die if

* There are two versions of the diary. One is a fraud. An authentic, unpublished version is deposited in the National Archives. This diary covers only the period from 6 February to 28 May 1935, the time when Eva's attraction for Hitler was ripening into love. Eva's younger sister, Ilse Fucke-Michels, has vouched for its authenticity. See Appendix, "A Note on Spurious Sources."

1935

The Child As Father to the Man

anything happened to promised myself to follow know that I live only for

In the end, as we shall see, : man she loved. Amid the b shelter, while others faced panic, and histrionics, Eva B quiet inner strength. Even s at the end that "she attained vanities and frivolities of the

Affairs with Other Women

Though he could not possess with beautiful young claimed, Hitler apparently had experiences during the years Braun.

A German film director who had helped supply Hitler had been infatuated with the who filmed both the Berlin propaganda film *The Triumph*, later denied having anything Führer. The Italian foreign mate relations with a Sigrid v old with "beautiful quiet eyes dence of intimate affairs with and Haue.²⁷³ Ernst Hanfstaer in his home one evening, he upon an awkward scene. Hi Hanfstaengl's beautiful wife, her, saying that it was a shame free and declaring himself he in Berlin to one of the daughter his knees in front of the emba

According to another int married woman, Suzi Liptauer: to hang herself in a Munich Labor Front, Frau Inge Ley, having an affair with him. T killed herself, reportedly after him.²⁷⁵ Hitler himself claimed mad about him, and that she had entreated the Führer to be

From Private Neurosis to Public Policy

insists that, apart from certain eccentricities indulged in by all great and gifted men, Adolf Hitler was perfectly normal until he fell into the clutches of the diabolical Morell, who slowly destroyed him through bizarre and irresponsible medication. And indeed, any responsible physician must be shocked by the drugs Morell prescribed. Over a stretch of years from 1935 to 1945 they included massive doses of vitamins and sex hormones; some 3,000 injections of simple syrup; huge daily dosages of stimulants and sedatives; thousands of "Dr. Köster's Anti-Gas Tablets" (prescribed for the Führer's chronic flatulence), containing a mixture of belladonna and strychnine; and a potency pill which Morell concocted out of "pulverized bull testicles," apparently designed to counteract the prescription of female hormones. Thus, the argument goes, Germany might well have won the war and held back the Communist menace to Europe had not Hitler been incapacitated by Morell.¹⁵

The author of a popular German biography of Hitler is also convinced that his subject underwent a sudden personality change during his mid-50s. He had been quite normal and sensible until on or about 1942, when "within a very short time, he [became] quite literally a different person." Dr. Morell's pernicious medications contributed to this miraculous metamorphosis, but the chief etiological factor, we are told, was "a bad head cold" (*eine schwere Kopfgrippe*). As a result of this monumental cold, Hitler and history were transformed: all at once the Führer became "suspicious and distrustful"; suddenly he "began to repeat himself"; he started to concoct "fantastic, unreal projects"; he now reacted "obstinately to situations that displeased him." This was also the time he gave orders for the massacre of the Jews, and "now, too, occurred the catastrophe of Stalingrad." ¹⁶

It is quite possible that Morell's medications contributed to his patient's physical and emotional deterioration; it is unlikely that his troubles can all be traced back to a head cold—no matter how severe.

A diagnosis which must be taken seriously is suggested by Hitler's medical records and the affidavits of his physicians collected after the war by U.S. Military Intelligence and now in the National Archives. These reports, which include four electrocardiograms dated 9 January 1940, 14 July 1941, 11 May 1943, and 24 September 1944, show clearly that Hitler suffered from "rapidly progressive coronary arteriosclerosis." ¹⁷ This medical evidence suggests another explanation for the descriptions of Hitler provided by eyewitnesses, for generalized arteriosclerosis can produce tremors, insomnia, slowness of motion, and confusion of thought. It can also produce personality changes. Hitherto psychologically stable persons may begin to exhibit delusions of grandeur, paranoid tendencies, and moral aberrations. ¹⁸

Heinrich Himmler and others in the immediate entourage favored a different explanation. They suspected that their Führer's deteriorating condition was caused by the ravages of syphilis, which he had contracted either as a youth in Vienna or during World War I. According to Felix Kersten, Himmler's Swedish masseur and father-confessor, a

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From Private Neurosis to Public Policy

some German specialists physical condition was due to (1935), an illness of uncertainty typically produces insomnia, speech impairment. Delusional paranoid 1945 a noted "nerve spe- having heard reports of graphs of him, diagnosed 1940 After the war, the direc- essor Hans Berger-Prinz, never ill "in a psychiatric offered from Parkinson's led "not only with prob- from Parkinsonism. This kable changes in Hitler's he political and military

Hitler had the illness but ed originally by epidemic ggests that young Hitler id, who died of measles is the disease lay dormant 1914 to 1918 and intermit- te out later as fully devel- 1 authority on epidemic as placed the onset of the 1916. Like his German col- lad a remission until the is *agitans*, which caused in a way which led to the

toms that might indicate others. Most notably, the s was not progressive; it leg had trembled, but the in 1943 the same symp- : came on strong in June he planned the Ardennes it intermittent; it is "re- were noted in the move- humbs—and no evidence of the illness.¹⁴ tion for Hitler's physical malpractice of his quack- 1940: *Die Zerstörung einer Personality*), a physician

insists that, apart from certain eccentricities indulged in by all great and gifted men, Adolf Hitler was perfectly normal until he fell into the clutches of the diabolical Morell, who slowly destroyed him through bizarre and irresponsible medication. And indeed, any responsible physician must be shocked by the drugs Morell prescribed. Over a stretch of years from 1935 to 1945 they included massive doses of vitamins and sex hormones; some 3,000 injections of simple syrup; huge daily dosages of stimulants and sedatives; thousands of "Dr. Köster's Anti-Gas Tablets" (prescribed for the Führer's chronic flatulence), containing a mixture of belladonna and strychnine; and a potency pill which Morell concocted out of "pulverized bull testicles," apparently designed to counteract the prescription of female hormones. Thus, the argument goes, Germany might well have won the war and held back the Communist menace to Europe had not Hitler been incapacitated by Morell.¹⁵

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1935

one wanted stability. Both the Nazis and the Communists promised political and economic solutions, but the Nazis looked for support from Germany's powerful middle and upper class by playing on their fear of Bolshevism. Many Germans, unskilled in self-determination, were fearful of a democratic system that gave the ultimate responsibility to the individual citizen. Britain and France were long accustomed to the laborious movement of the wheels of representative government, and the United States had never known any other system. But in twentieth-century Germany, an immature, forty-three-year-old Bismarckian empire had been replaced by an even less mature republic. Germans who felt betrayed by the Kaiser did not yet trust their new government. They were accustomed to leaders who were strong and decisive, who embodied the "soldierly qualities." As it said in the old cavalry song: "On the field of battle man still has worth" (*Im Felde, da ist ja der Mann noch was wert*).

Can one generalize about the Germans of those decades? And yet many a German university graduate proudly wore his dueling *Schmiss*, the facial scar attesting to supposed "courage when faced with cold steel," a barbarous anachronism of German university life. University dueling (*Schlagen*) was conducted in an almost token manner so that only the cheeks could get scarred. Fighting stopped at first blood, and cuts were specially treated to produce scars. The dueling societies were *Brüderschaften*, fraternities. This form of Teutonism also appealed to certain German Jews. Many Jewish university graduates had scarred cheeks.

In its most extreme form, it even produced bitter anti-Semitism among Jews. A Berliner named Max Naumann, a decorated World War officer and a Jew, was a member of the DNVP (the same nationalist organization as von Ribbentrop).²⁶ He agitated for the total assimilation of Jews into the body of Germany — if they were pure German Jews. He formed an organization called the League of Jews of German Nationality, which advocated the expulsion of "eastern" Jews from Germany as "harmful bacteria in the body of the nation." In 1935, the Gestapo eliminated his organization as "enemies of the state." Naumann died in Berlin in 1939.

The Berlin of 1931 in which the von Ribbentrops were advancing to prominence was now the seat of the Brüning government. Heinrich Brüning was a controlled, introverted man who headed the Catholic Center Party. Von Hindenburg unrealistically expected that Brüning could block the Nazis while holding off the Communists. Abroad, Brüning was supposed to arrange an end of the heavy Versailles reparations. Economically, Brüning was expected to stem the shock

wave of the 1929 era would have been equally unemotional and rationalism. To stem the emergency steps, but the economy, he reduced the fixed-income, lowered the farmers. Count He wanted to break up holdings into smaller, landed gentry who we could not last, and he c

For the 1932 presidential election, a German citizen, on the field marshal.* Von Hindenburg. The slim margin of many of the same rigid between the liberals and allies these were for von unemotional intellectual. The Nazis won major president would no longer resigned.

The great French strike was then the French am

Brüning's errors were praise he got abroad re to what pitch of blind frenzy too fierce to be He tried the velvet glove was repelled by the d saved him. He had tw they were twice discovered and plans But Brüning would not

General Wilhelm Groves. He persuaded the

*The province of Brunswick him citizenship.

1935

②

that they wait more
sympathizer, wrote
which must stand in
Nazi apologists. Rolf
in 1933, that the
very country "had the

Nazi scale stood the
Arnold Leese, a war
with Mosley's BUF
ibia Curzon, was the
dealer from Chicago.
to end the Jewish

still firmly under the
ge V, who would soon
for delivering a speech
1935. The speech con-
held in 1936, when he
never able to shake his
since his boyhood visit
the British Empire and
the influential members
Emerald Lady Cunard,
as she who introduced
itty, flirtatious Emerald
licious "real, live Nazi"
ally not unlike the von
em in 1932.

Germany was the latest
escorted everywhere by
being received by von
ling safari into deepest

and the salons at which
selfish hostesses give is
impression that foreign
They convey an atmo-
only flatulence of the

ck." On January 13, the
mandate, voted by 90.67

percent to return to Germany. On January 17, the Saar's citizens decided that the reunion would take place on March 1, 1935. France's new foreign minister, following Barthou's assassination, was Pierre Laval, who considered the Saar's defection legal. He had just signed an agreement with Mussolini clearing Italy's "economic way" into Ethiopia, though this would eventually not be enough for Mussolini. George Ward Price of the *Daily Mail* wrote an interview in which Hitler threatened that anyone who tackled Germany "would reach into thorns and thistles." To put some force behind his words, he decided to lift the cover of secrecy from his new Luftwaffe. Germany admitted to owning twenty-five hundred planes.

The British government soon published a White Paper accusing Germany of secret rearmament. Probably as a result of this official blast, Foreign Minister von Neurath informed the British government early in March that a planned visit to Berlin by Sir John Simon, the foreign secretary, and Anthony Eden, Lord Privy Seal, would have to be postponed. More pressure, although the official explanation was that the Führer "had a cold" and had to "recuperate in Bavaria."

France lengthened its time for compulsory military service from one to two years to bolster the size of its military. The very next day, Hitler reintroduced compulsory military service to Germany, which until then had only the professional 100,000-man Reichswehr.* The plan was to raise an army of 580,000 men. On March 18 the British protested this new breach of the Versailles Treaty; on March 21 the French and Italians made their own protest. But there was no doubt: Hitler was raising the stakes.

On March 25, despite the postponement by Hitler, Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden arrived in Berlin to discuss the state of armament with Hitler, von Neurath, and von Ribbentrop. Hitler told them that Germany now had air parity. His *faits accomplis* taught von Ribbentrop lessons in modern statesmanship, conducted the Nazi way.

On April 11 in Stresa, Britain, France, and even Italy condemned German rearmament, conscription, and other treaty breaches.† And then the League of Nations issued a similar protest. Von Ribbentrop could well gloat over his Führer's string of successes, despite the Stresa condemnation. It seemed that Germany's best diplomacy was indeed the mailed fist.

The time had come to modify the Nazi "blood" laws for diplomatic convenience. Probably with Japan in mind, the German Minis-

*Officially. It was actually larger.

†Italy was trying to protect its godchild Austria.

April '35

①

try of the Interior, which administered the racial laws, issued a decree on April 18 that, provided they were not Jews, those who were of foreign blood could be treated as "Aryans" and exempted from the racial laws if it was found "in the interest of foreign policy."

Two economic agreements were signed by Germany in April 1935, one with Soviet Russia, giving the Russians long-term credit, and one with Italy, relating to foreign currency. Von Ribbentrop was learning further lessons, though the ones relating to Britain must have been almost painful for so devoted an anglophile. A man does not like to discover the clay of his heroes' feet. It also must have cost him some embarrassment, after his tales of admiration, to admit to Adolf Hitler that the British were "just another weak democracy."

Doubts must surely have assailed the conventional von Ribbentrops from time to time; no matter how often he wore his black SS uniform, Joachim von Ribbentrop must have been aware of the contradiction of his upbringing. During these early Nazi times his untitled father was a silent and probably disapproving spectator. Colonel Richard Ribbentrop's natural loyalties were to the senior Army officers whose few dissenting voices were among the first of any consequence to be heard. As for the Henkells of Wiesbaden, they kept a deep silence. Otto Henkell's respected brother-in-law Opfermann, a Jew, had recently committed suicide in sorrow over the Nazis.³⁷

But whatever doubts von Ribbentrop may have had quickly seemed to vanish when he was named Extraordinary Ambassador of the German Reich on Special Mission. The pompous title was bestowed for several reasons. Von Ribbentrop had often complained that his lack of ambassadorial rank impeded his dealings with foreign ministers. Also, he was frequently snubbed by Germany's ambassadors in London and Paris. He could no longer tolerate these humiliations and bitterly complained to his Führer, who then consented to award the rank of ambassador. Von Ribbentrop had also won the right to bypass the conventional Foreign Office channels. Usually, ambassadors reported to the foreign minister, von Neurath. Von Ribbentrop could now report directly to Hitler while submitting a parallel "courtesy" report to von Neurath. Von Ribbentrop retained this status and arrangement until 1938, when he himself became foreign minister. But until that time, all of his dispatches were addressed to "Führer and Foreign Minister." It was part of Hitler's system to duplicate missions and foster rivalries.

The main purpose of the appointment was to arm von Ribbentrop with rank for his London negotiations of the Naval Agreement of 1935. The British signaled that the treaty was acceptable. Only the

actual numbers were come as no surprise been openly mentioned von Ribbentrop. An official, both von N Hösch in London had they would never be Ribbentrop could do before the actual signal ball in London, hear firm that the deal was

At this time two of the British prime ministers were of entirely different fast; Laval was forever

On May 2, 1935, signed, giving Hitler texts for sudden acts in Munich on June 8 once German and Hitler the war. The participants Schacht, and the two Arthur Greiser. With was once more on his tions. He climbed into was to be his private in other planes, were Foreign Ministry's brother Schmidt was a minister the man whose face with foreign dignitaries Italian. In the case of mon alternative language Japanese.

However, he was in memory. He had to know they could rely oral record. Schmidt in von Ribbentrop's g

³⁷ He was actually *Gesellschaft* high rank for an interpreter

June '35

tain Kiderlen, and Dr. Ernst Woermann, the "British" expert in the ministry.

Others came several plane-loads later, forty in all. They took two floors of the Carlton House Hotel, and five Mercedes cars were shipped over for them. Von Ribbentrop insisted that the swastika flag be hoisted over the Haymarket entrance of the hotel, causing no small sensation. The treaty had already been prepared down to the smallest detail by Captain Wassner, the naval attaché, whom some considered the real architect of the agreement.

First, however, came the celebrations for the Silver Jubilee of King George V and Queen Mary. Each man in the delegation had been issued white tie and tails for the many London Silver Jubilee balls, including one at Londonderry House.

Dr. Paul Schwarz described a party to watch the Jubilee Parade given by Ambassador von Hösch on the terrace of the German Embassy, which had the best view in London, overlooking Pall Mall. There was also the magnificent parade for Trooping the Colours. Three distinct groups had formed: British society guests, then von Hösch, his staff, and Diplomatic Corps friends, and finally the von Ribbentrop delegation. The German visitors around von Ribbentrop raised their arms in the Hitler salute for the passing of the royal family. Although there was obvious dislike between von Hösch and von Ribbentrop, the latter carefully made some friendly gestures, which paid dividends. The mollified von Hösch later arranged that von Ribbentrop be invited to a dinner of Emerald Cunard's, where he was introduced to the Prince of Wales and Mrs. Simpson. Leopold von Hösch was a wealthy, witty, and charming bachelor who was much liked by London society.³⁸ He and the prince both loved jazz, and the two had good rapport. Von Ribbentrop, after having met Wallis Simpson, made it a custom to send her seventeen roses. No one ever knew why. Diplomats gossiped and even Hitler asked but got no explanation. The recipient seemed equally perplexed. It certainly was not a matter of romance.

Immediately following the great parade on June 3, treaty discussions began at the London Foreign Office. Von Ribbentrop was blunt. He began by saying that the Führer had instructed him to insist on the 35-100 formula without any further negotiations. According to the interpreter, Schmidt, these were the actual words: After stating that Germany wished 35 tons to Britain's hundred, von Ribbentrop continued, in Schmidt's translation, "If the British government does not accept this at once, we see no purpose in continuing these discussions.

We must ask for taken back by teristically ang After returning sisted that all at the center planted in pair The next d: Carlton House ten the next m then be a lun Germans were Admiralty, wh ralty and their Next to the Fi with a sort of n Once upon a t time of crisis. von Ribbentro deemed accept The British scuttling part Erich Kordt, a furious. He be been given suc Treaty, Germa crude new Na: trop's honor a Baldwin, Nevil Eyres Monsel professional G ing of everythi the success of Von Ribbei table, "take it Schmidt wrote often rememb

The 35-100 immediate buildi inum tonnage.

June '35 93

"British" expert in the

all. They took two Mercedes cars were that the swastika flag hotel, causing no small down to the smallest whom some considered

Silver Jubilee of King delegation had been on Silver Jubilee balls,

with the Jubilee Parade of the German Em- overlooking Pall Mall.

Trooping the Colours.

society guests, then von

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around von Ribbentrop

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We must ask for an immediate decision." Sir John Simon was clearly taken aback by this undiplomatic opening. Red-faced and uncharacteristically angry, he excused himself before the end of the meeting. After returning to the hotel, the ever-suspicious von Ribbentrop insisted that all Carlton House conversations be held in a whisper and at the center of each room to avoid any microphones supposedly planted in paintings or mirrors by the wily British Secret Service.

The next day Sir Robert Craigie of the Foreign Office came to the Carlton House and invited the delegation to meet at the Admiralty at ten the next morning, June 5, for "a pleasant surprise." There would then be a luncheon at 10 Downing Street. The next morning the Germans were conducted into the legendary Board Room of the Admiralty, where for hundreds of years the First Lords of the Admiralty and their associates had made their most important decisions.³⁹ Next to the First Sea Lord's high-backed chair was an ancient map with a sort of needle that told the direction of the wind in the Channel. Once upon a time this was the deciding factor for the island nation in time of crisis. The First Sea Lord, Sir Bolton Eyres Monsell, informed von Ribbentrop that the proportional strength of 35 to 100 tons was deemed acceptable.*

The British cabinet had agreed after a short discussion, thereby scuttling part of their Stresa protest of six weeks earlier. Privately, Erich Kordt, who predated the Nazis in the Foreign Ministry, was furious. He believed that if Brüning, the old Weimar chancellor, had been given such quick acceptance of any breaches of the Versailles Treaty, Germany would have remained a democratic republic. The crude new Nazi tactics were confirmed by a luncheon in von Ribbentrop's honor at 10 Downing Street, attended by the cabinet members Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Sir John Simon, Sir Samuel Hoare, Eyres Monsell, Eden, and others. Kordt, Schmidt, and the other professional German diplomats must have been shaken by the discarding of everything they deemed acceptable international custom and by the success of the Hitler style of diplomacy.

Von Ribbentrop soon got into the habit of putting his cards on the table, "take it or leave it." He was now convinced Hitler was right. Schmidt wrote, "Perhaps von Ribbentrop's rough methods worked. I often remembered that later whenever I had to translate certain dis-

*The 35-100 proportion of tonnage (rather than ships) led Hitler to order the immediate building of two "pocket" battleships with maximum armament on minimum tonnage.

Sept '35

tasteful statements made by Hitler or von Ribbentrop that would once have been considered a slap in the face by our pre-1933 diplomats."

D-AMY flew von Ribbentrop directly to Munich to report his triumph to his Führer at Berchtesgaden's Haus Wachenfeld, as the Berghof was still called. This was where he had first met Hitler. The chalet's front door became one of the most famous photographic "sets" of the Hitler era. Neville Chamberlain, the Duke of Windsor, and David Lloyd George were all photographed stepping out of a 7.7 litre *Grossen* Mercedes and climbing up these stairs with their SS guard. The step on which Hitler stood to greet them denoted his respect for the visitor. If he descended the entire flight and stood at the bottom, the visitor was of great importance to him. After waiting for a day in Munich, von Ribbentrop and his group were invited to proceed to Berchtesgaden and were greeted as returning heroes. The delegation then returned to London to complete the Naval Agreement, which was signed on June 18. From London, von Ribbentrop flew to meet Hitler in Hamburg, where he assured his delighted Führer that a wider Anglo-German treaty was now feasible. Twenty million marks were allotted as a reward to the Ribbentrop Büro, which then officially became the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, the Ribbentrop Agency, although everyone still called it the Büro.

There were instant protests from France about the Naval Agreement. Laval complained that the Versailles Treaty seemed to have become a private matter between Germany and England. Eden had to go to Paris to soothe the ruffled feelings. Meanwhile, Mussolini had his own surprises for the world. He decided to expand Italy's influence in Africa and threatened war in Ethiopia.

July 1935 was a glorious month for von Ribbentrop. He basked in his success and became Hitler's star adviser in all matters of international diplomacy. Annelies was six months pregnant, and Adolf Hitler had promised to be godfather. The next child, born on September 2, 1935, was named Adolf.

At a July 3 meeting in Berlin with Colonel Josef Beck, Poland's foreign minister, officially listed in order of attendance were Ribbentrop, Göring, von Neurath, and Josef Lipski, the Polish ambassador. Also on July 3, von Ribbentrop stated that from then on he would be responsible for the conduct of colonial policy. On July 11, von Ribbentrop met with U.S. Ambassador Dodd about German-Japanese relations. Von Ribbentrop's star was on the rise. He was involved in meetings that were once reserved for von Neurath. The rumor that he

had Hitler's ear caused many channels.

That July a group of V. by Adolf Hitler. It was von contacts, arranged this visit men would be used for N. Following a visit to the "sailer was host at a "small fair

The Dachau concentration camp, a crematorium-equipped hel demonstration facility for (we re-educate our criminals)

Sometimes that backfire known as sympathetic to a Dachau, he wrote, "There thing against which my so who was apologetic about that he "admired Dachau's notion is the statement by him, was ascetic, poor, lived by the press. Lawrence died

The tenth of September rally in Nürnberg. Looming war in Ethiopia; the League of Nations. But for Adolf Hitler's Nürnberg and that vast par Freedom. In ironic contrast racial laws, technically known as the Law for the Defense of German Blood and German Honor (Gesetz zur Verteidigung der deutschen Ehre). The laws as the Nürnberg Laws, although the Interior Minister Dr. Frick

The original version was a mixture of race with that of black Nazi style sounds equally clear

German blood does not (people is composed of the all of these races have in compatible, and that a mixture

Dr. T. we began the word for the feeling our blood is



that are not of a related sort, will not cause any inhibitions or tensions.*

This avoided the untenable notion of a "pure" German race and, instead, spoke of compatible "German bloodedness" (*Deutschblutigkeit*). The laws could specifically be pointed at Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, Semites (Arabs), Africans, Orientals, Mongolians, and anyone whose blood was "not akin (*artverwandt*) to German bloods."⁴²

The original laws claimed they were so structured that they excluded Jews without "causing hardship." But, of course, the lawyer, architect, government official, or businessman who could not be accredited or licensed by the state was facing extreme hardship.

Here is the original explanation of the laws given in 1935 by Reichsminister Frick:

The Reichscitizenship Law and the Law for the Protection of the Blood as well as the attached regulations shall not have the purpose of lowering the standing of members of the Jewish people because of their [exclusion from] membership in the national community. Instead, the exclusion of Jews from official German life and the prevention of racial mixing are imperatively necessary to secure the continuation of the German people's existence. Jews in Germany shall not be prevented from pursuing a livelihood. However, the fate of Germany shall in the future be solely in the hands of the German people.⁴³

These original regulations were endlessly changed, modified, and brutalized during the coming years. They became unspeakably cruel in major matters, and were also seeded with endless chicanery in minor matters. For instance, three years later, on September 30, 1938: "In conformity with Paragraph 3 of the Reichscitizenship laws of 1938, certification of all Jewish physicians shall be canceled as of September 30, 1938." This eliminated the nine thousand Jewish doctors, of whom 3152 still practiced in Germany in 1938. Seven hundred and nine of them, all decorated for gallantry in the World War, retained a form of temporary certification as "medical practitioners," with permission to treat Jews and certain non-Jews. These racial laws, which ruined so many lives and cost so many more, seeped into the most unlikely quarters and even in their least virulent form destroyed human decencies.

As an example, a young Foreign Ministry official, an honorary SS officer named Eberhard von Thadden, wished to marry. He came from a distinguished, titled military family and had been assigned his SS

*Translation by the author.

rank by decree. In the SS found that maternal side. The proceedings to thron career in the foreign was really the illeg and was therefore Thadden could not ironically, in the Jew

In the Third Reich be of distinguished t Actually, von Thadden stein, was great-uncle who was Hermann scent. It was Göring These were the first that was to follow an

Meanwhile, Joachim September 27, 1935, gium. He met with formed him that Ger Eupen, two towns the also assured the Bel against Communism, pected answer. Van Z there is a decreased d do that." They also ta colonies then under Be

Next, the "strange into play."⁴⁵ Von Ribbentrop plans; he made friends ant Colonel Hiroshi O of Japan. The first flick on the horizon.

Von Ribbentrop ha Naval Agreement, and notice. He was aware, t disdain for the slow, Foreign Ministry in its Hitler they seemed infling. On the twenty-fift by the ancient Teuton



the next *leitmotif* of every conversation held by von Ribbentrop in France or Britain as justification for the new Luftwaffe and the introduction of conscription. Did the Führer not warn the French in his February 21 interview with Bertrand de Jouvenal of *Paris Midi* to consider the consequences of their Soviet pact? There was "no arch enmity between Germany and France." The journalist had asked, "What about your anti-French statements in *Mein Kampf*?" and Hitler replied, "I'll correct those in the great book of history."

On April 10 D-AMY and von Ribbentrop bounced their way back across the Channel to London. This time the Extraordinary Plenipotentiary was carrying a full peace plan to be handed to Anthony Eden. This was Hitler's way: hit them and then propose peace. The proposal contained nineteen points, among them a twenty-five-year nonaggression pact with France and Belgium, reinforcement of the troops now in the Rhineland, no gas warfare, no bombing of open cities, the scrapping of tanks. The proposals went on and on. Eden promised to "study them carefully."⁴⁸

Nevertheless, the General Staffs of Britain, France, and Belgium held a joint conference, which von Ribbentrop had hoped to see postponed because of Hitler's peace offer, and there was no immediate response to the proposals. Furious, von Ribbentrop climbed into D-AMY and returned to Berlin.

One month later, on May 7, Sir Eric Phipps, His Majesty's ambassador in Berlin, handed the Foreign Ministry a lengthy questionnaire asking for clarification of many details of the Hitler proposals. Hitler probably deemed it a typical exercise in British sarcasm. He called it "an insult" and ignored it. The British questionnaire was indeed ironic and terse; the easily affronted Hitler was not amused.

But Adolf Hitler had occupied the Rhineland, and explanations, such as they were, had to be tendered to the League of Nations and the signers of the Locarno Pact. A conference was convened in London to demand clarification from Germany. Von Ribbentrop was chosen to represent his country.

In London, there already existed a degree of understanding. After all, some people said, the Rhineland is German, and Baldwin and Eden calmed the House of Commons. This, they explained, was no hostile move. While the French shared a common frontier with Germany, Britain did not.

The French saw things differently. The Rhineland had been demilitarized so that no surprise attack could ever again be launched into France. The Locarno Pact signatories of the League of Nations had

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bers of the public who had to buy their tickets for hard cash. Only then was the "atmosphere" as encouraging and the applause as hearty as Hitler required.

Late at night I would return from my rounds to the Hotel Deutscher Hof, which had been reserved for Hitler's staff and for the Gauleiters and Reichs leaders. In the hotel restaurant I usually found a group of old Gauleiters waxing boisterous over their beer as they denounced the party's betrayal of the principles of the revolution and betrayal of the workers. Here was a sign that the ideas of Gregor Strasser, who had once led the anticapitalist wing within the NSDAP, were still alive, though reduced to mere bombast. Only in alcohol could these fellows resurrect their old revolutionary élan.

In 1934 some military exercises were performed for the first time at the Party Rally, in Hitler's presence. That same evening Hitler officially visited the soldiers' bivouac. As a former corporal, he seemed thrown back into a world that was familiar to him. He mingled with the soldiers at the campfires, was surrounded by them, tossed jokes back and forth with them. He returned from this episode in a relaxed mood, and during a late snack, described it all with a good many telling details.

The high command of the army, however, was by no means overjoyed. Army Adjutant Hossbach spoke of the soldiers' "breaches of discipline." He insisted that such familiarities must be prevented in the future, since they infringed upon the dignity of the Chief of State. Hitler privately expressed annoyance with this criticism, but was ready to comply. He was astonished at his almost timid attitude in the face of these demands. But he must have felt he had to be careful of the army and have been still shaky in his role as Chief of State.

During the preparations for the Party Rallies I met a woman who had impressed me even in my student days: Leni Riefenstahl, who had starred in or had directed well-known mountain and skiing movies. Hitler appointed her to make films of the rallies. As the only woman officially involved in the proceedings, she had frequent conflicts with the party organization, which was soon up in arms against her. The Nazis were by tradition antifeminist and could hardly brook this self-assured woman, the more so since she knew how to bend this men's world to her purposes. Intrigues were launched and slanderous stories carried to Hess, in order to have her ousted. But after

the first Party Rally film skill as a director, these:

When I was first introduced to the Party Rally film, she said. Why in the world I thought at the time part. . . . In one of my

I recall, incidentally, in the sessions of the 1934 Reichstag, I recall Hitler's suggestion that I should be in the studio. I was called to the Kongresshalle, as lectern. I had spotlight around—while Streicher, going up and down with their parts. Hess arrived exactly as he had done. Congress, he solemnly ardor, he turned precisely sitting, snapped to attention in the name of the Party. The Fuehrer speaks!"

He did it all so convincingly so sure of the genuinely excellent performances of the gifted actors. I was, on the other hand, thought the taxation.

By this time I thoroughly feel his way during his: the first great storm of demagogic element; in the arrangements. Nevertheless the feelings of the speakers: discovery, that day in: could be represented "an

the first Party Rally film, which convinced even the doubters of her skill as a director, these attacks ceased.

When I was first introduced to her, she took a yellowed newspaper clipping from a little chest. "Three years ago, when you reconstructed the Gau headquarters, I clipped your picture from the newspaper," she said. Why in the world had she done that, I asked in astonishment. "I thought at the time that with your head you might well play a part. . . . In one of my movies, of course."

I recall, incidentally, that the footage taken during one of the solemn sessions of the 1935 Party Congress was spoiled. At Leni Riefenstahl's suggestion Hitler gave orders for the shots to be refilmed in the studio. I was called in to do a backdrop simulating a section of the Kongresshalle, as well as a realistic model of the platform and lectern. I had spotlights aimed at it; the production staff scurried around—while Streicher, Rosenberg, and Frank could be seen walking up and down with their manuscripts, determinedly memorizing their parts. Hess arrived and was asked to pose for the first shot. Exactly as he had done before an audience of 30,000 at the Party Congress, he solemnly raised his hand. With his special brand of ardor, he turned precisely to the spot where Hitler would have been sitting, snapped to attention and cried: "My Leader, I welcome you in the name of the Party Congress! The congress will now continue. The Fuehrer speaks!"

He did it all so convincingly that from that point on I was no longer so sure of the genuineness of his feelings. The three others also gave excellent performances in the emptiness of the studio, proving themselves gifted actors. I was rather disturbed; Frau Riefenstahl, on the other hand, thought the acted scenes better than the original presentation.

By this time I thoroughly admired the art with which Hitler would feel his way during his rallies until he had found the point to unleash the first great storm of applause. I was by no means unaware of the demagogic element; indeed I contributed to it myself by my scenic arrangements. Nevertheless, up to this time I had believed that the feelings of the speakers were genuine. It was therefore an upsetting discovery, that day in the studio, when I saw that all this emotion could be represented "authentically" even without an audience.

D.T.?

77 L Architectural Megalomania

certainly have telephoned ahead by now." Sure enough, when we arrived, the streets were full of cheering people. The village policeman was doing his best, but the car could advance no faster than a walk. Even after we had worked our way out, a few enthusiasts on the open highway let down the railroad barrier in order to keep Hitler among them a while longer.

In this way we made slow progress. When it was time for lunch, we stopped at a small inn in Hildburgshausen where years before Hitler had had himself appointed police commissioner in order to acquire German citizenship. But no one mentioned this. The innkeeper and his wife were beside themselves with excitement. After some difficulty, the adjutant managed to elicit from them what they could serve: spaghetti with spinach. We waited for a long time; finally the adjutant went to take a look in the kitchen. "The women are in such a state that they can't tell whether the spaghetti is done."

Meanwhile, thousands of people were gathering outside chanting calls for Hitler. "If only we were out of this," he commented when we emerged from the inn. Slowly, under a rain of flowers, we reached the medieval gate. Juveniles closed it before our eyes; children climbed on the running boards of the car. Hitler had to give autographs. Only then would they open the gate. They laughed, and Hitler laughed with them.

Everywhere in the countryside farmers left their implements, women waved. It was a triumphal procession. As the car rolled along, Hitler leaned back to me and exclaimed: "Heretofore only one German has been hailed like this: Luther. When he rode through the country, people gathered from far and wide to cheer him. As they do for me today!"

This enormous popularity was only too easy to understand. The public credited Hitler and no one else with the achievements in economics and foreign policy of the period. They more and more regarded him as the leader who had made a reality of their deeply rooted longings for a powerful, proud, united Germany. Very few were mistrustful at this time. And those who occasionally felt doubts rising reassured themselves with thoughts of the regime's accomplishments and the esteem it enjoyed even in critical foreign countries.

During these stormy scenes of homage by the populace, which certainly affected me as well, there was one person in our car who refused to be carried away: Hitler's chauffeur of many years, Schreck.

1935

dred twenty-five feet long. Only then came Hitler's reception hall. To be sure, it was architecture that reveled in ostentation and aimed at startling effects. But that sort of thing existed in the baroque period, too—it has always existed.

Hitler was delighted: "On the long walk from the entrance to the reception hall they'll get a taste of the power and grandeur of the German Reich!" During the next several months he asked to see the plans again and again but interfered remarkably little in this building, even though it was destined for him personally. He let me work freely.

The haste with which Hitler was urging the building of the new Chancellery had a deeper cause in his anxiety about his health. He seriously feared that he did not have much longer to live. Since 1935 his imagination had dwelt increasingly on a stomach ailment which he tried to cure by a self-imposed regimen. He thought he knew what foods harmed him and in the course of time was prescribing a starvation diet for himself. A little soup, salad, small quantities of the lightest food—he no longer ate anything substantial. He sounded desperate when he pointed to his plate: "A man is supposed to keep alive on that! Look at it. It's easy for the doctors to say that people ought to eat what they have an appetite for." Hardly anything is good for me nowadays. After every meal the pain begins. Leave out still more? Then how am I going to exist?"

He often interrupted a conference because of his gastric pains and withdrew for half an hour or more, or did not return at all. He also suffered, so he said, from excessive formation of gas, cardiac pains, and insomnia. Eva Braun once confided that he had said to her—this before he was fifty: "I'll soon have to give you your freedom. Why should you be tied to an old man?"

His physician, Dr. Brandt, was a young surgeon who tried to persuade Hitler to undergo a thorough examination by a first-class specialist in internal medicine. All of us supported this proposal. The names of celebrated doctors were mentioned, and plans made for carrying out an examination without creating any stir, for instance at a military hospital, since secrecy could be most easily maintained there. But in the end, again and again, Hitler repulsed all such suggestions. He simply could not afford to be regarded as sick, he said. It would weaken his political position, especially abroad. He even refused to have a specialist come to his home for a preliminary

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Hitler was persua result surprised us a of a doctor's import; and precisely what is that I have the great tions to the letter." suffered from compl ell attributed to the were cured, all the ever, wished to acc vitamins, hormones, a year; only partial

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examination. To my knowledge he was never seriously examined at the time, but experimented with treating his symptoms by his own theories—which accorded, incidentally, with his inveterate bent for amateurish activities.

On the other hand, when he suffered from increasing hoarseness he consulted the famous Berlin throat specialist Professor von Eicken. He underwent a thorough examination in his apartment in the Chancellery and was relieved when no cancer was detected. For months he had been referring to the fate of Emperor Frederick III, who died of cancer of the throat. The surgeon removed a harmless node. This minor operation also took place in Hitler's apartment.

In 1935 Heinrich Hoffmann fell critically ill. Dr. Theodor Morell, an old acquaintance, tended him and cured him with sulfanilamides³ which he obtained from Hungary. Hoffmann was forever telling Hitler about the wonderful doctor who had saved his life. Undoubtedly Hoffmann meant well, though one of Morell's talents was his ability to exaggerate immoderately any illness he cured, in order to cast his skill in the proper light.

Dr. Morell alleged that he had studied under the famous bacteriologist Ilya Mechnikov (1845-1916), Nobel Prize winner and professor at the Pasteur Institute.⁴ Mechnikov, he claimed, had taught him the art of combating bacterial diseases. Later, Morell had taken long voyages on passenger liners as a ship's doctor. Undoubtedly he was not an out-and-out quack—rather a bit of a screwball obsessed with making money.

Hitler was persuaded to undergo an examination by Morell. The result surprised us all, for Hitler for the first time became convinced of a doctor's importance. "Nobody has ever before told me so clearly and precisely what is wrong with me. His method of cure is so logical that I have the greatest confidence in him. I shall follow his prescriptions to the letter." The chief finding, so Hitler said, was that he suffered from complete exhaustion of the intestinal flora, which Morell attributed to the overburdening of his nervous system. If that were cured, all the other complaints would fade away. Morell, however, wished to accelerate the restorative process by injections of vitamins, hormones, phosphorus, and dextrose. The cure would take a year; only partial results could be expected in any shorter period.

The most discussed medicine Hitler received henceforth consisted of capsules of intestinal bacteria, called "Multiflor" which were,

in all the work that had been put into him!

1935

Goebbels

goes off skiing all day, leaving her lame husband with the infants and a nanny at the hotel.

to keep him company Hitler's press chief sent down to the Feldberger Hof hotel a senior journalist, Dr Alfred Detig, with instructions to let him win every hand at cards. Detig's newspaper, the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, had just carried a critique by Furtwängler of Goebbels' recent persecution of the composer Hindemith.⁷⁵ 'Do you know,' snapped Goebbels arrogantly, 'why we allow the *DAZ* to keep publishing? It's because if you've got a plague of rats you always leave one or two holes open to see which rats peep out. That way you can trash them better.'

He was facing, unfortunately, a man with literally a better hand of cards than his. By lunch time Detig had taken him to the cleaners. As the gong sounded and Goebbels made to leave, Detig detained him. 'Minister,' he said, holding out his hand, 'gambling debts are always settled on the nose.'

Goebbels forgave him—temporarily. While Magda went off skiing, he took his friends down into Freiburg to see his old university. He refreshed nostalgic memories of Anka and Castle Hill, of Dattler's, and Berlinger's coffeehouse. In one lecture theater he pointed out a limerick he had carved into a bench fifteen years before: 'The maiden and the inkpot / Get their rims wet quite a lot. / What's the source of all that damp? / All that dunking—scamp!'

Smirking naughtily he went off to record his New Year's Eve broadcast. Years later, Detig would ponder upon the minister's tortured psyche: For the two hours that they had trailed this little cripple around with them he had taken such pains to convince them that while at university here he had been a real 'Inkpot Hero' too. How much was true, and how much propaganda? As for the Furtwängler incident, Goebbels had Dr Detig arrested by the Gestapo for sedition and he spent several months in their Munich prison cells.⁷⁶

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Upstairs in his private quarters a few days later, Hitler moped until three A.M. about how lonely and joyless his life now is—'Without women,' observed Goebbels, 'without love, still filled with memories of Geli.'⁸

DISCUSSING foreign policy after that visit to the film studio on January 4, 1935, Hitler predicted to Goebbels that France would start turning the screw on Germany if and when she lost the Saar. They had a tough year ahead.⁹ Goebbels adopted honeyed language. 'In rapprochement lies order,' he lectured, opening the Saar exhibition in Berlin on the sixth. 'In war lies only ruin and destruction. For Europe there can be no third way.'¹⁰

The historic plebiscite on the future of the Saar would be held one week later. His opponents, a clamoring ragbag of communists, Jews, freemasons, and disgruntled émigrés, were no match for him. His propaganda line was clear—the Saar was tied by blood to the German fatherland. To abide by the international rules, a local *ad hoc* 'German front' had to fight the campaign. Goebbels provided a weekly illustrated magazine, telling the catholic Saar electorate that the bolsheviks were the sworn enemy of God. In neutral Geneva his ministry's anti-Comintern unit set up a religious front, Pro Deo, which formally received the anti-bolshevik exhibition that he had prepared in Berlin and sent it on to the Saar camouflaged with Swiss certificates of origin.¹¹ In the Saar, the catholic clergy publicized the exhibition from their pulpits. 'The Saarbrücken clerics never guessed whose errands they were running,' wrote Eberhard Taubert.

His opponents warned the Saar, 'A vote for Germany is a vote for Hitler!' This slogan backfired badly, because over 90·5 percent voted just that way. Hitler telephoned Goebbels from Berchtesgaden, saying he sincerely hoped this meant peace with France. Goebbels had all Germany decked out with flags in an instant. That evening, January 15, he took Generals Blomberg and Fritsch back to his villa, and they all phoned Hitler again. Afterward, they all discussed Germany's long-range foreign policy.¹² Word reached London a few days later that Goebbels had said on this occasion that the overwhelming Saar vote virtually obligated Hitler to bring back *all* the scattered German peoples into the Reich. Goebbels had particularly indicated Memel and Austria. 'We've got everything ready in the propaganda ministry,' he was quoted as saying.¹³

The Saar plebiscite was proof of what could be achieved bloodlessly, by propaganda alone. On Sunday January 20 Hitler again had lengthy confidential discussions with Goebbels, mapping out his next moves: 'First project concerns Britain,' recorded the diarist Goebbels. 'Guard their empire, in return for thirty years' alliance.'¹⁴

At the time such a deal seemed quite possible. There was a mutual fascination between Britain's old, and Germany's new, rulers. In December 1934 Goebbels and Hitler met Lord Rothermere at the Ribbentrops'. The British newspaper baron was already a convinced admirer of Hitler. 'A real Englishman,' Goebbels described him. 'John Bull.

Jan 4.
1935

Really wonderful opinions. If only all the English thought the same way,' Rothermere applauded Hitler's rearmament and demand for colonies, and criticized Versailles and diplomats. Britain's ambassador in Berlin, the hard-drinking Sir Eric Phipps, almost swooned with rage. After Goebbels got to work on him, Rothermere pronounced him 'the greatest propagandist in the world.' 'If you get tired of Germany,' Rothermere boomed, 'I'll engage you at ten times the salary.' 'I'm not for hire,' responded Goebbels, and reported the remarks to Hitler.¹⁵ The Führer threw a glittering party for his lordship on the nineteenth. Magda was the star attraction. From Rothermere's remarks, it was plain he was totally won over to the Nazi cause.¹⁶ Traveling down to Munich on January 25 Hitler repeated to him that the cornerstone of his foreign policy was an alliance with Britain. 'We shall be supreme on the ground, and they at sea, and we'll be equals in the air.' What then? The fact that Hitler talked of wooing Poland—that would now be Göring's task—indicated expansion to the east.¹⁷

Jan 25.

Febr. 24.

Speaking to eighty-seven thousand Nazi officials on February 24, Goebbels boasted: 'If the great powers ... now treat Germany as a sovereign nation again, don't think for an instant, my comrades, that this means the world has come to its senses! No, it's thanks to our tenacity, our resolution, and—I shall be blunt—our newfound *Macht*, our power, alone.'¹⁸

Rosenberg choked on that word *Macht*. He, Rosenberg, was head of the party's office of foreign policy, he complained that this 'saber-rattling' by Goebbels contradicted Hitler's own theme, the desire for peaceful coexistence.¹⁹ Hitler however trusted Goebbels. When Sir John Simon, the British foreign secretary, announced a visit to Berlin Hitler asked Goebbels as well as Ribbentrop to supply a character study on him.²⁰ Increasingly sure of himself, the propaganda minister saw no need to curry favor. He dominated Hitler's lunch table with cruel banter and mimicry—imitating Robert Ley or Otto Meissner, then saying with a disarming chuckle: 'But we've got to be kind to poor old Meissner—he did so much to help us into power.'²¹ Some found Goebbels infuriating. 'His smirking superficiality gets *physically* on my nerves,' wrote Darré after one such chancellery luncheon.²² At times Goebbels even gunned for Göring—nagging about the new general's indiscreet fling with the actress Emmy Sonnemann until Hitler coerced them into marrying that May, and then revealing the staggering cost of the nuptials to Hitler, before whispering around the diplomatic community that Emmy's Aryan pedigree was debatable.²³

THE armed forces, Germany's muscles, were now beginning to show. Goebbels' unpublished diaries, recently discovered in the Moscow archives, narrate Hitler's next crucial decision:

March 16.

MARCH 16, 1935 (Saturday). On Friday the Führer suddenly returned. Say he wants to proclaim general conscription today ...

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[Prime minister Pierre-Etienne] Flandin has spoken against Germany in the chamber; two-year national service accepted in France. Disarmament? We too have to create *faits accomplis*. Hitler is right. I shall fortify him in his intent. . .

MARCH 18, 1935 (Monday). Discussions all Saturday morning. Führer argues with Blomberg over the number of divisions. Gets his own way: thirty-six. Grand proclamation to the people: Law on rebuilding the armed forces; conscription. To put an end to the haggling, you've got to create *faits accomplis*. The other side aren't going to war over it. As for their curses: Stuff cotton wool in our ears.

Cabinet 1:30 P.M. Führer sets out situation. Very grim. Then reads out the proclamation and law. Powerful emotions seize us all. Blomberg rises to his feet and thanks the Führer. Heil Hitler, for the first time in these rooms. With one law, Versailles is expunged. Historic hour. Frisson of eternity! Gratitude that we are able to witness and take part in this.

March 18.

'So once more we are a great power,' concluded Goebbels. At four P.M. that afternoon he broadcast the proclamation over the radio.²⁴ The foreign press displayed consternation and panic as Germany announced the reintroduction of conscription. Rome and Paris bleated protests. 'Let them curse,' wrote Goebbels smugly; 'we rearm . . . and put on a brave face meanwhile.'²⁵ Speaking in Danzig, he bragged openly that the Nazis had torn up the treaty of Versailles.

Sir John Simon hurried to Berlin with Anthony Eden, Minister for the League of Nations, to ascertain the German government's intentions. Goebbels attended the banquet thrown in their honor, and found Simon congenial but Eden cold and arrogant, as he had already warned Hitler from his own sources (contradicting Ribbentrop).²⁶ 'Immediately afterward with the Führer at the Reich chancellery,' narrated Goebbels in his unpublished diary. 'Göring and Blomberg too. Führer reports; he has given the British a few figures: we want an army of half a million, and we've already achieved parity with the British in the air.' (This was bluff.) 'Huge astonishment at that. Führer spoke out against Russia. Has laid a cuckoo's egg which is intended to hatch into Anglo-German entente.'

Eden had silkily suggested that the 'bolshhevik world revolution' was a Goebbels fiction, and promptly flew on alone to Moscow, which rather devalued his talks with Hitler.²⁷ Unabashed, Goebbels printed a special horror-magazine, *The Red Army*, and had it smuggled onto the desks of every delegate to the League of Nations in Geneva.²⁸

For a few days Hitler feared that Eden might pull together his own eastern pact, signing up Moscow and Warsaw against Germany.²⁹ He remarked to Goebbels that he found foreign affairs pure torture. Strolling in the garden on April 3 he told the propaganda minister that he did not believe there would be war. 'If it came it would be frightful. We have no raw materials. We're doing everything to pull through this crisis. . . We've got no choice but to keep our nerves. Poland has stood fast. No question

April 3.

1935

of [Eden's] eastern pact. . . . Führer says, let's just hope nobody jumps us.³⁰ Goebbels was alarmed that irresponsible elements were speaking of war as though it was a bagatelle. Aided by Hitler's adjutants Fritz Wiedemann and Julius Schaub he saw to it that Hitler was left in no doubt; General von Fritsch also instructed his adjutant Major Fritz Hossbach to brief Hitler about their army's true weakness.³¹ Speaking in Frankfurt however Goebbels gloated over the fact that Germany had 'rearmed secretly, cunningly, and unknown to the world outside,' as the British consul reported on April 11. The minister left this diplomat with the unedifying impression that 'a homicidal lunatic, with winks and whispers and sudden shouts, was propounding his dark schemes to a somewhat bovine but gleeful audience.'³²

Goebbels was beginning to take on the great names in German culture. He forced Wilhelm Furtwängler to eat humble pie and concede publicly the state's right to control art.³³ After Rosenberg had bombarded him with letters for a year complaining that composer Richard Strauss had used the libretto of Stefan Zweig, a Jew, for his latest opera, Goebbels had to dismiss Strauss as president of the chamber of music.³⁴ He absented himself from the opera's première, and had it taken off the program at Heiligendamm where he was on summer vacation.³⁵

He was also increasingly sensitive to criticism. In May 1935 the Gestapo drew his attention to one cabaret, the Catacombs, in Luther Strasse. Agents reported the subversive sketches of comedian Werner Finck, but Reinhard Heydrich reminded S.S. chief Heinrich Himmler that their own *Völkischer Beobachter* had only just praised this act, and that Finck had been a star performer at Goebbels' recent film ball. Goebbels sent his own adjutant to spy on Catacombs and a similar establishment, Tingel-Tangel, in Kant Strasse, and closed them down a few days later.³⁶

GOEBBELS gets to know Magda better; she tells him about her life, much of it like a stage play.³⁷ Pregnant again, in January 1935 she takes their two children out to Cladow.³⁸ Late in March he begins a costly five-month reconstruction of his official residence at taxpayers' expense. Only the finest craftsmen are employed.³⁹ At the same time he carps about the lavishness of the Göring wedding staged on April 10. 'Two events make the world hold its breath,' he mocks in his unpublished diary on the wedding eve: 'the conference at Stresa, and Göring's wedding. The world of reality, and the world of fantasy. Let's hope the fantasy-world one day stands up to the blows dished out to it by the real one.' It is as though he can see Göring's hour of failure coming. As Berlin goes crazy next day, with thirty thousand troops lining the streets and throngs cheering the wedding couple, Goebbels turns melancholy thoughts back to his own little country wedding at Severin: He is not envious at all, he decides, but happy as can be. Unable to get Carin Göring out of his mind, he accompanies Magda to the nuptials and the following seven-course banquet ('an impressive picture for the starving') through whispering

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Magda G grumbles or too.⁴³ He tal her in Berli: Elster (Helli Ever presen: Strehl. 'Bot: good-looker: Magda comc in his diary t scene about: has little bra more charm: went up to l secretaries— From what o outlet now c and departe: Goebbels we:

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1935

and finger-pointing crowds; the embarrassment is just one more cross he has to bear.⁴⁰

Magda is momentarily quiescent, sunning herself in the Führer's affections. Hitler often comes out to Cladow and goes cruising with the minister across the lake to see Potsdam's trees in blossom, listening absently to Goebbels' litanies against their turbulent priests and their arrogant Jews. Hitler finds it hard to get worked up about the Jews now that he is in power.⁴¹ Another times the Cladow villa is filled with brainless chatter as Goebbels invites over actresses like Angela Sallocker and again the gorgeous Jenny Jugo, currently filming the Elisa Doolittle role in George Bernard Shaw's *Pygmalion*.⁴²

Magda Goebbels' family world revolves around her children—Joseph grumbles once that she has forgotten to make Easter a bit nicer for him too.⁴³ He takes a month-long seaside vacation at Heiligendamm, leaving her in Berlin. Indifferent to her feelings, he invites stage actress Else Elster (Helldorff's mistress) and film starlet Luise Ullrich to join him.⁴⁴ Ever present is Ello Quandt, who arrives with her nubile friend Hela Strehl. 'Both very nice,' Goebbels records circumspectly, 'and clever and good-lookers too.'⁴⁵ When Hitler joins this beach party for two days Magda comes too—only to return to Cladow abruptly.⁴⁶ Goebbels writes in his diary the words 'fond farewell' but there has in fact been a ghastly scene about which Hela at once advises diarist Bella Fromm: 'She [Hela] has little brains and even less gumption,' records Fromm, 'but all the more charms for Mr Goebbels which she readily displays to him. She went up to Heiligendamm with him, his wife and children and female secretaries—of which two or three are always among his lady friends. From what one hears,' recorded this Jewish gossip-writer, her newspaper outlet now capped, 'Frau Goebbels did not know about it beforehand and departed suddenly after a violent row—not that either Hela or Goebbels were the least upset.'⁴⁷

Goebbels' diary is not surprisingly oblique about these goings on. He returns to Cladow on July 30. The mood is hostile. 'Magda is crying,' he tells his diary. 'I can't help it.' Magda, now very heavily pregnant, puts him through the wringer. Goebbels enters into a discussion of 'this disagreeable topic' and at once regrets it. 'She's never going to change,' he notes mysteriously.⁴⁸ A few days later, he tackles her again and she promises to watch her tongue in future, particularly in the presence of Ello, who 'squawks' far too much in his view. The matrimonial tussle continues all summer, his diary seesawing between references to Magda and three-year-old Helga as 'both so sweet,' and entries like: 'Talked things over with Magda. We don't really see eye to eye any more. But things will probably get better after the birth.'⁴⁹

Her confinement lasts for two weeks, while her jealous sister-in-law feeds her details of Joseph's alternative pursuits, i.e. Hela Strehl. He takes Ello sharply to task. 'I rebuked her to her face about her loose tongue and she felt very small,' he writes, and adds the significant conclusion: 'Now it's all over between us. Never mind!'⁵⁰ Even at the maternity clinic

1935

there is another colossal row with Magda about Hela—he blames Ello—but they kiss and make up. A few days later when he takes the unquestionably beautiful Baroness Sigrid von Laffert back home to the now refurbished villa, he finds Magda there—unwilling to stay at the clinic, although her labor begins the next day.⁵¹

Oct 2.

On October 2, 1935, she gives birth to a boy. She calls him Hellmut after her tragic love, Günther Quandt's firstborn son. 'A real Goebbels face!' triumphs Dr Goebbels—as though there might be some doubt.⁵² In fact his paternity as the years pass is undeniable—the flattened temples, the receding forehead, and even the hint of an overbite. Hellmut Goebbels grows to a solemn, slow-witted mutt of nine, 136 centimeters (four feet six inches) tall, with no greater recorded ambition than to become a Berlin subway driver, a source of constant worry to his father, who can see how his sisters—eventually there are five of them—are spoiling him.⁵³

Oct 22.

True, Hellmut's arrival does restore matrimonial peace, but only for three weeks. After a protracted session with actress Jenny Jugo on October 22, 1935, the diary records Goebbels as working late; he is accordingly subjected to an 'endless parlaver [*sic*]' by Magda, 'who puts to me,' he wearily writes, 'her views on marriage and family.'⁵⁴ One Tuesday a month later the same diary glimpses Miss Jugo wailing that one of her lesser films is likely to be canned. On Wednesday he liaises with her. 'Perhaps her film can still be saved,' he records afterwards.⁵⁵

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His lifestyle is decorated, if not enriched, by this chattering throng of women passing through his portals, not all of whom are even pretty. 'A young poetess Käthe Summer,' he remarks to his diary after she leaves, adding the scandalous generalization: 'Why do brainy women all have to be so plain?'⁵⁶ Of his own good looks he has no doubt. He willingly allows photographers, artists, and sculptors to portray, paint, and cast his own likeness, 110 pound, five-foot-four frame, immaculately uniformed, for posterity.⁵⁷

Image is everything and Goebbels, the only Nazi leader with a family, works hard on his. It is his daughter Helga who hands Hitler the posy of flowers on his birthday. Twice in 1935 she is cover girl on illustrated magazines. A week after Hellmut's birth Goebbels speaks at the Harvest thanksgiving festival at Bückeberg in the Harz. Three hundred thousand farmers' throats roar their congratulations—or so it seems to his diary.⁵⁸ Less cordial receptions are not recorded for posterity. He finds himself booed and hissed by Berlin's discarded S.A. veterans, invited to meet him at the Friedrichshain halls, scene of many a pitched battle. He begins jovially, 'I hope I've not blundered into a meeting of émigrés by mistake,' but the whistling only gets worse and he orders the radio microphones switched off.⁵⁹

Dec

Shining through his diary's pages is his affection for his eldest daughter Helga. December 1935 finds them both rattling Winter Relief collection boxes for the assembled media outside the Adlon hotel.⁶⁰ He dutifully spends Christmas with the family at the Oberhof ski paradise; he does not omit to send gifts to Anka, but increasingly he prefers escorting more

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* It has been the longest journey of his life, but he has succeeded. He now believes he is irresistibly attractive to women.

1935

exotic women like Hela Strehl, Ello Quandt, and Jenny Jugo to the opera and theater.⁶¹ In January 1936 he makes this note: 'I want to find a role for Miss [Ilse] Stobrowa'—an up-and-coming Berlin actress. These are trivial and no doubt innocent pursuits, but they bring problems in train which he talks over exhaustively with Magda.⁶² There is a clue to what kind of problems when he complains to Hitler about Himmler's secret police: 'This loathsome snooping has got to stop,' he writes. 'Above all into one's most private affairs.'

Jan
1936

Hitler promises to ask the minister of posts whether any Reich ministers are being wiretapped, against his orders, and to prohibit check-ups on hotel rooms.⁶³ But it will take more than the Gestapo to stay Goebbels' roving eye. A batch of new secretaries is introduced to him that March. 'One of them,' he adds laconically, 'is usable.'⁶⁴

A LENGTHY mid-life crisis was beginning. One day in 1935 death knocked loudly on his door. At midday on August 20 he heard a rumble from where a subway tunnel was being excavated just outside his villa. Before his eyes the crane and several trees on the far side sank out of sight and the excavation caved in amid blues flashes from short-circuiting cables. Goebbels phoned Hitler and had the site managers arrested. He spent many hours watching the rescue operations and brooding about the nineteen missing workers, trapped 'cold and rigid' below ground. Several of the bodies were laid out in his garden—a sight he would not easily forget.⁶⁵

He asked Göring to look into his own pension rights. Looking at the cracks wrought in his own walls by the cave-in, he had seen the first fissures in his own immortality.⁶⁶

HUGE sums of money were now at his disposal. The ministry's revenues were swollen by the box-office receipts from the opera house in Charlottenburg.⁶⁷ He took a firmer hand in the struggling film industry and particularly in expanding its domestic market. Film exports had previously covered forty percent of production costs, but now, with the increasingly effective worldwide Jewish boycott, barely seven percent.⁶⁸ He accepted without rancor that American productions were often superior. The Americans had Greta Garbo, and his passion for her had not dimmed. But he now had directors like Leni Riefenstahl—'A woman,' he gasped, reeling from their latest encounter, 'who knows what she wants!'⁶⁹ Her international award-winning documentary of the chilling, spectacular, drum-thumping 1934 Nuremberg rally, *Triumph of the Will*, had been premiered in Munich in March and would go on to become one of the greatest propaganda films of all time.⁷⁰ Goebbels set aside 1.5 million marks to finance a Riefenstahl epic on the approaching Olympic Games. The 1936 Games, he decided, should become a showcase for National Socialism.⁷¹

His propaganda techniques were subtle and oblique. He directed that films were to convey no explicit party message: merely portraying happy family life in Nazi Germany would suffice. Musicals proliferated. 'Operate

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seemingly without purpose,' he directed Hadamowsky, criticizing the government radio's obtrusive politicking: 'That's far more compelling.'⁷²

This being so, his continued indulgence of Julius Streicher, publisher of the crude tabloid *Stürmer*, is hard to understand. The party and Rudolf Hess demanded a ban on the newspaper. But Streicher enjoyed Hitler's personal backing, which gave him immunity from the normal press sanctions—until he published a scurrilous item about Emmy Göring. Then Hitler ordered *Stürmer*'s suspension. 'At last,' rejoiced Goebbels.⁷³ But after Streicher delivered a particularly crude speech in the Sport Palace that August he decided that he was 'a great guy' after all. The newspaper was frequently 'pure porn,' he agreed, but Streicher himself, gauleiter of Nuremberg, was 'a character and man of principle.'⁷⁴

Stürmer's favorite ploy was to publish items exposing people who had done favors for Jews.⁷⁵ If anything redeemed Streicher in Goebbels' eyes, it was this antisemitic crusade: It made him a useful ally at a time when, as the Nazis felt, the Jews were beginning to throw their weight around again. In mid-July 1935 reports reached him at Heiligendamm that Jews had actually staged a demonstration outside a Berlin cinema showing an antisemitic film. In consequence, Jews had been manhandled in Kurfürstendamm—the foreign press spoke loosely of a pogrom.⁷⁶ Hitler had long wanted to replace the capital's police president, Admiral Magnus von Levetzow. Goebbels suggested that his friend Count von Helldorff replace him.

It was a further indication of the decline in his moral probity. By this time the allegations against Helldorff—even within the Nazi party—filled seven pages. His gambling debts ran into the hundreds of thousands; he was in arrears with his rent; he had borrowed heavily from Jews; he smoked expensive cigars; he had bought a heavy Mercedes in which to swan around the countryside with a Mrs von B.; he had been turfed out of the feudal Union Club for dishonorable conduct.

The ugliest allegation concerned the death of the famous Jewish clairvoyant Erik Jan Hanussen (alias Steinschneider): Late in 1932 Hanussen, currying favor with the Nazis, like many Jews at that time, had offered to donate 150 new uniforms, boots, and cash to the Brownshirts, and he had been seen at Hedemann Strasse early in 1933 handing over money to Helldorff. In February 1933 a Berlin gossip columnist reported that Helldorff had attended a Hanussen seance in full uniform along with Marx, Jewish general manager of the Scala strip-club, and the purported Grand Duchess Anastasia.⁷⁷ As the count dodged and weaved to evade bankruptcy action, an arrest warrant was issued but never acted on. In March 1933 he nonetheless became police chief of Potsdam. Frantically covering the tracks of his earlier misdeeds, Helldorff told his then chief of staff Karl Ernst to have the Jew Hanussen liquidated.⁷⁸ The Jewish clairvoyant was arrested on March 24, 1933 and found soon after shot in the back of the head. The papers relating to his donations vanished.⁷⁹ After Ernst in turn was shot during the Röhm purge a year later police searched his house and found an envelope marked 'Count von Helldorff'

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behind a cupboard, containing receipts for the money paid over by Hanussen to Helldorff.⁸⁰

Early in 1935 Berlin's deputy S.A. commander discussed this scandal with Dr Goebbels. Goebbels ignored it and on July 18 persuaded Hitler to promote Helldorff to be the new police chief of Berlin. It was an unpopular choice. The very next day S.A. chief Lutze suspended Helldorff from the S.A. and took away his right to wear its uniform. Both Goebbels and Hitler continued to protect him however and a few months later all legal action against him was halted.⁸¹

What Helldorff had going for him was that, like Streicher, he was a vicious antisemite. Summoning him to Heiligendamm, Goebbels swore that between them they would 'clean up' the capital. It was time, he announced two weeks later, to tell the Jews 'thus far and no further.' In recent months eighteen thousand more Jews had actually poured into Berlin. Speaking in Essen on August 4, he announced threateningly that the Germans had put up with provocations from their Jewish 'guests' for two years. The émigrés abroad retaliated with fresh horror stories about persecution. The *Manchester Guardian* published a wholly untrue story about East Prussian mills denying flour to Jewish bakers, and about food stores and pharmacists refusing to serve Jews. A Warsaw-based United Jewish Committee against Anti-Jewish Persecution in Germany appealed for world action.⁸²

Aug 4.

Goebbels plotted his revenge. In his calculus, the Jews and bolsheviks went hand in hand. That August he read with fascination the typescript memoirs which Ernst Torgler had written in concentration camp.⁸³ The revelations came at an opportune time, because Goebbels had persuaded Hitler to give the upcoming seventh Nuremberg rally a pronounced anti-communist favor. Goebbels' great Nuremberg speech, later published as 'Communism with the Mask Off,' was a chilling indictment of the methods of the Moscow Jews, which did not stop short, he again alleged, of deliberate starvation and mass murder. He stated that the Hungarian communist exile Béla Kun (whom he 'unmasked' as Aaron Cohn) had ordered sixty thousand men machine-gunned in the Crimea in one year in the Twenties. Among the 1.8 million liquidated by the bolsheviks in the first five years of their reign had been teachers, doctors, officers, and policemen, and also 815,000 peasants. Who was behind this genocide? The answer, shrieked Goebbels, was the Jews. 'Cooperation with bolshevism,' he concluded, 'is possible neither on a political nor on a philosophical basis.'⁸⁴

FOR the next nine years Goebbels was the motor, goading his reluctant Führer into ever more radical actions against the Jews.⁸⁵ He sharpened the anti-Jewish provisions of the Reich chamber of culture.⁸⁶ Meeting in special session at Nuremberg the Reichstag that September 1936 passed a set of laws circumscribing the rights of Jews and half-Jews in Germany. Goebbels took no part in their drafting, but he welcomed these Nuremberg laws.⁸⁷ Subsequently he demanded a more rigorous interpretation

of them. In April 1936 he would exclude from the chamber of culture even quarter-Jews and those people married to a half-Jew. Eugenie Nikolajeva had one Jewish parent; as a favor, Goebbels secured for her Hitler's permission to perform. Marianne Hoppe had a Jewish fiancé. She promised to dump him. His struggle to aryanize the chamber would continue for four more years.⁸⁸

Sept 17
economics

To Goebbels' ill-concealed irritation, Hitler leaned toward leniency in applying these new laws. On September 17 he heard the Führer telling the gauleiters that 'above all' there must be no excesses against the Jews.⁸⁹ A week later he heard Hitler reiterate this point to the gauleiters in Munich's city hall. 'No [persecution?] of "non-Aryans,"' Goebbels scribbled afterward—the word is illegible but the sense is clear—and described Hitler's speech as one long repudiation of Rosenberg and Streicher (both of whom nevertheless loudly applauded).⁹⁰ He tried to talk Hitler round one Sunday at the end of September. 'Jewish problem still not resolved even now,' he recorded. 'We debated it for a long time but the Führer still can't make his mind up.'⁹¹

Sometimes moderate attitudes did surface in Goebbels too. Curiously, he had argued against overdoing the restrictions on marriages where congenital deformities were involved.⁹² When over-zealous Nazis erased Jewish names from war memorials his diary displayed real irritation.⁹³ But such insights were rare.

The murder of Wilhelm Gustloff, the party's representative in Switzerland, by a Jewish medical student in February 1936 at Davos brought to Goebbels' attention a shadowy, well-funded World League against Racism and Antisemitism (LICA) dedicated to attacking Hitler's Germany. After scanning Emil Ludwig's gloating book on the case Goebbels remarked in his diary: 'It would convert anybody who wasn't one already into an antisemite.' More ominously he added, 'This Jewish plague must be eradicated [ausgeradiert]. Totally. Nothing must be left.'⁹⁴ In LICA he had momentarily found a worthy enemy. He staged a great funeral ceremony in Schwerin, Gustloff's home town, and when Switzerland put the assassin David Frankfurter on trial he pulled whatever strings he could from Berlin; LICA contributed its vice-president Dr Léon Castro as the assassin's lawyer and portrayed the self-confessed murderer as a martyr.⁹⁵ Frankfurter stated that he had hoped that Hitler would die of the throat cancer falsely reported in the press, and when this happy event failed to occur he had intended to bump off Göring or Goebbels; denied that opportunity, he had shot Gustloff instead. The court handed down an eighteen-year sentence. 'Now we have to unmask the camarilla behind him,' wrote Goebbels.⁹⁶

Uncomfortably conscious that LICA might have put out a contract on his life too, he warmed toward Julius Streicher again. He decided in one indulgent diary entry that the gauleiter always would be an *enfant terrible*.⁹⁷ 'I have been told that the Jews are getting uppity again,' he intoned on his tenth anniversary as Berlin's gauleiter. 'In the past I over-estimated their intelligence. They are neither intelligent nor clever. If they were

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intelligent they would either disappear or play possum.' The excessively gentle voice in which he pronounced these lines, which were later omitted from the official text, struck his British listeners as being 'the very refinement of cruelty.'⁹⁸

How much more exhilarating it was to mastermind this ancient feud with the Jews than to pursue his humdrum ministerial routine—the receptions for gaggles of giggling maidens in regional costumes, the speeches to international penal experts,⁹⁹ the lectures to Wehrmacht officers.¹⁰⁰

HITLER freely discussed his strategic intentions and timetable with Goebbels. Debating the political situation with Goebbels, Göring, and Ribbentrop on May 14, 1935, two days after Marshal Pilsudski died, taking with him the hopes of a fruitful alliance with Poland, Hitler had predicted that the years 1936 and 1937 would hold particular dangers for Germany. 'Rearm, rearm!' wrote Goebbels afterwards.¹⁰¹ Mussolini, running into snags in Abyssinia, was warming toward the Nazis again.¹⁰² Even when unable to speak after a throat operation, Hitler still sent for Goebbels, and told him of his worries, writing them down on paper for him.¹⁰³

Vacationing in August 1935 with Goebbels at Tegernsee the Führer repeated that his foreign policy was based on an alliance with Britain and an entente cordiale with Poland. 'Meanwhile, expansion in the east,' recorded Goebbels afterward. 'The Baltic states belong to us.' Peering into the future Hitler envisaged Britain fighting Italy over her invasion of Abyssinia and, a few years later, Japan fighting Russia. 'Then our great historic hour will come,' wrote Goebbels, deeply affected. 'We must be ready then. A grandiose prospect.'¹⁰⁴ He foresaw complications for Hitler over his support for Mussolini since this would be treading on Britain's toes; he briefed his editors accordingly, and Hitler also addressed his ministers and generals on the danger that Britain might include Germany in any sanctions against Italy.¹⁰⁵ 'All of this,' Goebbels realized, 'is coming three years too soon for us.'

Although the Nazis' rearmament program was far from complete, Hitler decided early in 1936 to risk a new coup. In violation of the Locarno pact, Paris was negotiating a treaty with Moscow which Hitler deemed to justify him in moving troops back into Germany's Rhineland provinces, demilitarized since the Versailles treaty. For a while however he bided his time. 'We are trying to overcome our difficulties,' declared Goebbels, speaking in Berlin on January 17, 1936, 'with the cunning of the serpent.' He added in a pointed reference that was withheld from most of the German press, 'If a treaty has become intolerable there are higher laws than those which are written in ink.'¹⁰⁶ Three days later Hitler notified him in strict confidence that he was contemplating reoccupying the Rhineland suddenly, as soon as Italy's war in Abyssinia ended.¹⁰⁷

Goebbels could scarcely keep the secret. In the Rhineland he spoke threateningly of both the League of Nations and the Jews, and advised Americans to tackle their own 'gangster problems' before meddling in

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some German specialists physical condition was due to an illness of uncertain origin, an illness of uncertain origin typically produces insomnia, speech impairment, delusional paranoid ideas. In 1945 a noted "nerve specialist" having heard reports of graphs of him, diagnosed him as "paranoid." After the war, the director Hans Berger-Prinz, never ill "in a psychiatric sense," offered from Parkinson's disease "not only with probability from Parkinsonism. This probable changes in Hitler's political and military

Hitler had the illness but it was originally by epidemic suggests that young Hitler, who died of measles, the disease lay dormant from 1914 to 1918 and intermittent later as fully developed authority on epidemic as placed the onset of the illness. Like his German colleague a remission until the illness, which caused in a way which led to the

symptoms that might indicate others. Most notably, the illness was not progressive; it began had trembled, but then in 1943 the same symptoms came on strong in June when he planned the Ardennes attack intermittent; it is "repeated" were noted in the movements—and no evidence of the illness.¹⁴

Attention for Hitler's physical malpractice of his quack physician (Die Zerstörung einer Persönlichkeit), a physician

1935

insists that, apart from certain eccentricities indulged in by all great and gifted men, Adolf Hitler was perfectly normal until he fell into the clutches of the diabolical Morell, who slowly destroyed him through bizarre and irresponsible medication. And indeed, any responsible physician must be shocked by the drugs Morell prescribed. Over a stretch of years from 1935 to 1945 they included massive doses of vitamins and sex hormones; some 3,000 injections of simple syrup; huge daily dosages of stimulants and sedatives; thousands of "Dr. Köster's Anti-Gas Tablets" (prescribed for the Führer's chronic flatulence), containing a mixture of belladonna and strychnine; and a potency pill which Morell concocted out of "pulverized bull testicles," apparently designed to counteract the prescription of female hormones. Thus, the argument goes, Germany might well have won the war and held back the Communist menace to Europe had not Hitler been incapacitated by Morell.¹⁵

The author of a popular German biography of Hitler is also convinced that his subject underwent a sudden personality change during his mid-50s. He had been quite normal and sensible until on or about 1942, when "within a very short time, he [became] quite literally a different person." Dr. Morell's pernicious medications contributed to this miraculous metamorphosis, but the chief etiological factor, we are told, was "a bad head cold" (*eine schwere Kopfgrrippe*). As a result of this monumental cold, Hitler and history were transformed: all at once the Führer became "suspicious and distrustful"; suddenly he "began to repeat himself"; he started to concoct "fantastic, unreal projects"; he now reacted "obstinately to situations that displeased him." This was also the time he gave orders for the massacre of the Jews, and "now, too, occurred the catastrophe of Stalingrad."¹⁶

It is quite possible that Morell's medications contributed to his patient's physical and emotional deterioration; it is unlikely that his troubles can all be traced back to a head cold—no matter how severe.

A diagnosis which must be taken seriously is suggested by Hitler's medical records and the affidavits of his physicians collected after the war by U.S. Military Intelligence and now in the National Archives. These reports, which include four electrocardiograms dated 9 January 1940, 14 July 1941, 11 May 1943, and 24 September 1944, show clearly that Hitler suffered from "rapidly progressive coronary arteriosclerosis."¹⁷ This medical evidence suggests another explanation for the descriptions of Hitler provided by eyewitnesses, for generalized arteriosclerosis can produce tremors, insomnia, slowness of motion, and confusion of thought. It can also produce personality changes. Hitherto psychologically stable persons may begin to exhibit delusions of grandeur, paranoid tendencies, and moral aberrations.¹⁸

Heinrich Himmler and others in the immediate entourage favored a different explanation. They suspected that their Führer's deteriorating condition was caused by the ravages of syphilis, which he had contracted either as a youth in Vienna or during World War I. According to Felix Kersten, Himmler's Swedish masseur and father-confessor, a

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This would ~~have~~ cause beneficial tension throughout the world — a

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preparation for the earthquake of civilization.
amount of restrictive civil legislation could solve the "Jewish problem."
As Hitler saw it, the threat was biological; this racial enemy, he was desperately afraid, had poisoned his own blood and threatened that of his people. The "Final Solution" was inherent in the very statement of the problem: he and Germany could be safe only after all Jews had perished.

Mass Murder of the Jews

Another reason for the genocide grew out of the Führer's psychopathology. Since he never knew whether his own grandfather was Jewish, and no one could prove he was not, Hitler had to prove to himself beyond the shadow of a doubt that he could not possibly be "corrupted" by Jewish blood. In order to convince himself that such a direct threat to his personal identity and his life work was an utter impossibility, he became history's greatest scourge of the Jews. In effect he was saying: "See, I cannot possibly be Jewish. I'll prove it. I am the killer of Jews." And thus he screamed that he would "annihilate the Jews down to the third generation" that is, down to the degree of blood relationship he was trying so desperately to prove could not possibly be his own.

There were probably other reasons for the genocide. It seems, for example, to have been associated with Hitler's curious preoccupation with death (see Chapter 1, pp. 18-20). His thoughts of killing himself may have been displaced in the politics of genocide; perhaps he relieved personal anxieties about self-destruction by destroying others. Thus, when he spoke of spreading terror and said "The important thing is the sudden shock of an overwhelming fear of death," he was saying in effect: "People will recoil with fear of death (as I do); I can command them and I can command death by terrorizing or killing them." ⁵¹

Genocide may also have been a by-product of the deep feelings of guilt we have found in Hitler. Robert Jay Lifton has observed that paranoid despots seek to externalize guilt feelings in the form of an unending number of enemies whose death they exult in surviving. Thus, Hitler externalized guilt feelings by displacing them upon others and then killing them—by the millions—thereby demonstrating his special dispensation from death and his power over it. ⁵²

The number of times Hitler used the word "exterminate" is psychologically interesting. The word in German, *ausrotten*, is much more "externalizing" than it is in English. Because it is a verb with a separable prefix, emphasis is placed strongly on the preposition, *aus* (out): *Ich rotte den Juden aus!* or *Ich will den Juden ausrotten!* Hitler promised publicly as early as 1920 that he would take the evil of Jewry by the roots and exterminate it: *mit Stumpf und Stiel ausrotten!* ⁵³ And after he came to power he repeated the promise—and the same word—with

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* P.T. Ah, the Jew in him. He saw this alien Jewish spirit in himself as kept alive by the totality of Jews in the world. Hitler

From Private Neurosis to Public

a "monotonous insistence" was afraid that people might the Jews would be exterminated when he made this proposal, he warned that "and he told his audience that he had prophesied that the about my prophecies." Eign on his mind: "People always who laughed then, innumerable those who still laugh now from now." ⁵⁴ Hitler's conclusion suggestion that he felt internal fear and to external

He probably chose a practical and personal reason million people; but Hitler wanted to get revenge for the gas chambers blamed on the Jews. A parallel and makes the suggestion in the genocide:

If at the beginning of a thousand of these He gas as hundreds of the walks of life had to end at the front would not

Hitler's annihilation of a military defeat. Admittedly, it Hitler realized that he could the inevitability of victory Percy Schramm is probable by the end of 1941, after a tropic winter, that the kill longer obtainable. ⁵⁵ If so, it

⁵⁰ This characterization, in speeches and conversations in with his military advisers; October Year's message; the Berlin Sport February 1942, 30 September 19 February 1945.

⁵¹ It is curious—and to me for his prophecy. His Reichstag Jews. He must have been referring seems likely that this mistake about the contents and dates of

Old and sick that he would conquer the world the problem def

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THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

Reich! Ein Führer!"⁶⁹ The operative member of this trinity was the Führer.

Let us put the matter in a slightly different way. Hitler was a psychopath who reaped great political advantage from his self-delusion that ~~he was in fact the incarnation of a great historic myth~~. It was a delusion that had practical consequences. To the faithful he had become, in Dietrich Orlow's useful phrase, a "myth-person." He was both an individual and an abiding myth-principle, both changeable person and changeless absolute. In order to obey the myth-principle, members of the Nazi party, perforce, were obliged to obey the person. They could find no tenable ground in theory on which they could stand in opposition to the Führer; for the Führer, by definition, was the Party. Thus Hitler had it both ways: his authority was abstract, undefined, and changeless (the *Führerprinzip*), but at the same time it was arbitrary, specific, and unpredictable (the Führer's orders). He could apply his personal will and whim whenever he chose. He could judge subordinates, but they could never judge him without abandoning the basis of their faith, namely, "that he was the personification of the eternal myth."⁷⁰

One can get some feeling for the Nazi leadership principle by observing the images that were created of the Führer as he was hailed as leader, father, and savior in poetry, painting, prayer, and song. One poem is several cuts above the usual dreary encomium of the "follow the leader" genre and is perhaps worth repeating:

TO THE LEADER

Benign blue eyes and iron sword-hand
Husky voice, thou and the children's most loyal father
Behold across the continents banded together
Stand man and wife in the flames of the soul
Sacredly joined, an endless chain
Wave-encircled before the morn
Which your shoulders alone
Have raised across the mountain-ridges out of the
chasms of distress.⁷¹

Image-building was a reciprocal process: Hitler created his own image, but in an important sense his own propaganda machine also created him and required that the image become reality. As we have seen, Hitler saw himself as an infallible leader and as a Messiah sent from God with a special mission to save his Motherland. Special birthday editions of his own newspaper, the *Völkischer Beobachter*, substantiated and embellished that claim. On 20 April 1933 he was hailed as a person of absolutely unique greatness and of "unspeakable modesty." By 1937 he had become "the best imaginable expert in every specialized field." In 1938 he was a genius of "boundless passion . . . unshakable

The Intellectual World of Adolf

faith . . . concentrated str
tion."

In 1939 it was announ
of all times." But that wa
before it reached its apogee
race. . . . He embodies the
the dynamism of Hegel, the
II, the realism of Bismarck
Wagner, the perspicacity o
Tannenberg . . . and the das

All this raises question
cally complex: What was tl
quired such total approval?
Why did Hitler condemn his

Racial Theory and Volks

Hitler's idea of race wa
Struggle and conflict were i
all history was racial; the
sion of this leader was to es
himself to be the very emb
representative of the Germ
he himself proclaimed: "Ich

Hitler was so preposter
that he was never fully bel
meant precisely what he s
statements he promised the
a society based upon racial d

It is a simple matter to
to convey its importance t
where it took on the dimen
Hitler on this issue and tak
he said, "not only furnishes
culture as a whole." Mixture
the cause for the decline of
in Hitler's version of the Gar
purity of his blood and then
which he had created for h
mixture. . . . In this way cult
room for new formations. . .
the loss of that force of resi
blood. All that is not race in

Unlike other German
exalting the power of the S
earth," Hitler considered poli
State is a means to an end. It

The Intellectual World of Adolf Hitler

our country, Adolf Hitler. I am willing and ready to give up my life for him, so help me God. One Volk, one Reich, one Führer.

Confirmation of the oath was made upon entering the *Hitler jugend* at the age of 14. The ceremony was held on the anniversary of the Führer's birth:

I consecrate my life to Adolf Hitler; I am ready to sacrifice my life for Hitler; I am ready to die for Hitler, my savior, the Führer.⁶⁵

When the boy grew up, more oaths confirmed his boyhood experience. If he became an educator, he joined all other teachers in Nazi Germany in swearing to be "loyal and obedient to Adolf Hitler." Similarly, every member of the German armed forces was required to take an oath unique in the history of national armies in the modern era—an oath to one man:

I swear by God this sacred oath, that I will render unconditional obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Führer of the German Reich and people, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and will be ready as a brave soldier to risk my life at any time for this oath.⁶⁷

Hitler insisted that the only alternative to the *Führerprinzip* was the chaos of democracy. In a public speech he put the matter without undue modesty: "It is madness to think and criminal to proclaim that a majority can suddenly replace the accomplishment of a man of genius."⁶⁸

Hitler's concept of leadership placed his political theory on a different plane from that of any other authoritarian system, including Stalin's. Royal absolutism, for example, had been based not on the person of the ruler but on the institution of monarchy. "The King is dead, long live the King!" was a cry and a concept impossible among the Nazis. Hitler and only Hitler could be the Führer. Stalin, it is certainly true, exerted enormous personal power. But he was really not supposed to, and some Marxist theorists have decried his regime as the "cult of personality." That is a key difference: Nazism was nothing without the cult of Hitler's personality. Moreover, Stalin felt obliged to justify his dictatorship by claiming that it was consistent with an explicit, rationally accessible corpus of ideas: Marxism-Leninism. Hitler needed no such sanction. He was not the interpreter of an ideology; he was the Idea made incarnate. *He was Nazism*. He and he alone was the ultimate arbiter of all matters political, social, aesthetic, cultural, moral. His whim, quite literally, became the law of the land. The final sanction for his action lay in the myth and mystery of the rationally incomprehensible—and untranslatable—chant of the Nazis: "*Ein Volk! Ein*

HITLER GOD: ADOLF HITLER

with her first man is for a
the revelation that a soldier
time.¹⁵⁰

anxious about displeasing his
on occasion when he felt that
he was so fearful of a tongue-
children to run interference
daughter of the Meister—
and to persuade us children to
Meister's blows, but we were so
trembling before her that we

ordered total economic mobili-
afraid of how women would
flore and cosmetics. Dr. Goeb-
recorded his disappointment at
the factories or to cut down
diary of 10 May 1943—well
Stalingrad—Goebbels records
institute a tremendous power
beauty parlors they are your

Goddess of Fate, they were
Women have the quality," he
has a friend at the same time
with a stiletto." He convinced
showed his contempt by in-
the women closest to him.
full measure of loyalty and
presence that "a highly intelli-
bold woman." He recalled on
mistake of discussing politics
merity to disagree with him.
their mouths by saying, 'you
know women.' " He then con-
one to give women an
tions that do not suit them."
of women in danger of their
ing pretty women in a circus
1933, for instance, he sent
red marks to the girls who
for him during a command
names. He was not partic-
less pretty women were in-
rushed, and his breath came
worked violently.¹⁵³

The Image and the Man

He was intrigued by women's deaths. As we have noted, he ap-
proved when they committed suicide; he also approved of their murder.
He did not often show clemency in capital cases—for which he had
reinstated death by decapitation—but during the single year 1935
he pardoned six condemned murderers. Five of the six had been found
guilty of killing their wives. Subsequent statistics on his pardons are
are not available because as the German press announced in the fall
of 1935, henceforth "mercy acts" of the Führer would not be
publicized.¹⁵⁴

In a favorite metaphor, Hitler compared women to the masses,
both of whom were to be dominated by the audacious man of passion
and power. In lines notable for sadistic overtones and exaltation of
brutality, he said:

Like a woman whose psychic feeling is influenced less by abstract
reasoning than by undefinable sentimental longing for comple-
mentary strength, who will submit to the strong man rather than
dominate the weakling, thus the masses love the ruler rather than
the suppliant. . . . They neither realize the impudence with which
they are spiritually terrorized nor the outrageous curtailment of
their human liberties, for in no way does the delusion of this
doctrine dawn on them. Thus they see only the inconsiderate
force, the brutality and the aim of its manifestations to which
they finally always submit.¹⁵⁵

At another time, Hitler compared the masses to wild horses; he
was the stallion who could control them. He also thought of women
as a circus audience: juvenile, naive, and susceptible to thrills. He
concluded that "Someone who does not understand the intrinsically
feminine character of the masses will never be an effective
speaker."¹⁵⁶

He often said that he was never so happy or fulfilled as after
giving a successful speech. On these occasions he would leave the
stage soaked with perspiration, physically and emotionally spent. The
written text of his speeches cannot possibly convey the intimacy he felt
between himself and his audience. His speeches began as he stood
very erect, rocking back and forth slowly on his heels, his voice care-
fully modulated and deliberately low. After a period of gentle intro-
ductory foreplay, he would move with mounting excitement toward the
climax. The last five minutes have best been described as an "orgasm
of words." He once told an intimate of the very great importance he
attached to the delicate matter of sensing the precise climactic mo-
ment, which, he said, must be mutually shared between himself and his
audience. "By feeling the reaction of the audience, one must know
exactly when the moment has come to throw the last flaming javelin
which sets the crowd afire."¹⁵⁷

That the masses were for him a sexual substitute to be conquered

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1936

Books in this file

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rightly so—that the colonial fallout with England could be controlled, but that he himself—and to some extent justifiably—was irreplaceable.

Bismarck, after all, was neither a dictator nor a constitutional ruler, but a Prussian minister president and chancellor subject to dismissal. The fact that the early days of the German empire saw an almost twenty-year-long "Bismarck era" was a constitutional anomaly due entirely to the astonishing longevity of Emperor William I. As became obvious after William II's assumption of the throne, Bismarck's position depended on the good will of the emperor. In 1884 Emperor William I was already old, and it was to be assumed that he would soon be succeeded by Crown Prince Frederick, a Liberal linked to England by marriage. Frederick was influenced by his wife and made no secret of his preference for a more liberal domestic policy and a foreign policy tilting toward England. To counteract this and to make it difficult for a future emperor to replace him with a radically different chancellor, Bismarck decided to fan anti-English feelings in Germany and, so it seems to me, intentionally heated things up by his colonial policy.

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This interpretation is also borne out by the fact that in the late 1880s, when contrary to all expectations the old emperor lived to be almost ninety-two and the crown prince became mortally ill, Bismarck dropped the colonial policy like a hot potato. With the threat of a German Gladstonian

cabinet thus warded Bismarck's interest in as quickly as it had famous comment again in 1888, when he told a socialist who showed him to all the hidden riches is very nice, but my Here is Russia, and he middle. That is my m

Germany's "social place among the world dead; however, they Bismarck's departure whole, Bismarck himself 1884-85, was a man who repeatedly stressed that world power was not for could not afford it, then with preserving and saving Europe.

Nonetheless Bismarck's difficulties in Europe soon after the proclamation of 1877. The Ottoman empire, and the Christian, largely Slavians to break away, had been along Europe's southern

The Russians supported the separatist movements of the Balkans, the first ideological

(continued on back flap)

BG 1936-37

matic point at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the prevention of war through crisis management. In retrospect it is clear that this launched Germany on the road to World War I.

Even though Bismarck did not embark on his colonial venture until after the adjournment of the Berlin Congress, let us examine it first, since it was merely a side issue without significant after-effects.

In 1884 and 1885 Bismarck officially made four large African areas that already contained private German trading colonies—Togo, Cameroon, German East Africa, and German Southwest Africa—German protectorates. The facts are not disputed, but historians differ on Bismarck's reasons for doing so. Hans-Ulrich Wehler in his comprehensive study has called it an example of "social imperialism." In this he can cite the authority of Bismarck himself. In January 1885 Bismarck wrote to the German ambassador in London (who disapproved of this move because of the friction it caused between Germany and England) that the colonial question had become a vitally important matter "for reasons of domestic policy." But that actually only substitutes one riddle for another. What were these "reasons of domestic policy"? Wehler offers a wealth of possible domestic motives: the increasingly severe economic depression, the public's "intoxication" with the idea of colonies as a panacea, the fear that the pool of

available African territories of 1884, and, the colonial policy; insurance program—national unifying factor—enthusiasm over the creation of the Reich.

There is another convincing reason, which is passing. According to the sudden turn to colonial friction with England, personal reasons, namely "Gladstonian" cabinet. Bismarck's son Heinrich Bernhard von Bülow, in a memorandum in which he wrote: "When we embark on the Crown Prince was to be prepared for a long influence would be done by colonial policy, which led to conflict with England."

There exist still considerable remarks by Bismarck which are genuine, then the sudden turn is clear: Bismarck used his own position. Before we remember that he believed

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available African areas was shrinking, the elections of 1884, and, finally, the coincidence of the colonial policy and the equally new social-insurance program—all in all, the need for a new national unifying factor in view of the waning enthusiasm over the creation of the by now ten-year-old Reich.

There is another and, I believe, more convincing reason, which Wehler mentions only in passing. According to this theory, Bismarck by his sudden turn to colonialism deliberately invited friction with England for purely domestic, even personal, reasons, namely his fear of a liberal "Gladstonian" cabinet under Emperor Frederick III. Bismarck's son Herbert allegedly gave Prince Bernhard von Bülow, then the German chancellor, a memorandum in which Bismarck said:

"When we embarked on the colonial policy, the Crown Prince was not yet ill and we had to be prepared for a long reign in which the English influence would be dominant. To prevent this, the colonial policy, which at any moment could have led to conflict with England, had to be instituted."

There exist still clearer though even less provable remarks by Bismarck along these lines. If they are genuine, then the "domestic reason" for Bismarck's sudden turn to colonialism is crystal clear: Bismarck used it preventively to buttress his own position. Before criticizing him, we must remember that he believed—and as it turned out

ment also was under the aegis of a state within the state, not under Hitler's personal auspices. It was largely the domain of Hjalmar Schacht, a former Democratic party politician. At first he was head of the State Bank, and later he became the chief of Hitler's Economic Ministry. Schacht stimulated the economy through rigidly compartmentalized domestic economic measures—through credits without immediately felt inflationary consequences. The years from 1936 to 1939 were a time of unimagined well-being in which both sides, business and labor, were prospering—very different from the crisis days of Brüning. One must not underestimate the effects of the economy on the political climate. In those Hitler years the weather was benign.

The second big success Hitler scored in those years was his decision to rearm. It helped him overcome any misgivings the Reichswehr might still have harbored. Nor should one underestimate the professional and personal benefits rearmament brought to the officers' corps of the old Reichswehr. In the new big army promotions proliferated: lieutenants became colonels, colonels generals, generals field marshals. In short, everybody was doing well, not only materially but professionally. They were finally again allowed to show what they could do; they were part of an expanding military apparatus. Under these circumstances it would be foolish to go into opposition; it was easier to swallow all sorts of

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limit on the army—and his proclaimed intention to resurrect Germany's air arm. And in 1936 he made his boldest move, by which Germany scuttled not only the Versailles Treaty but also the voluntarily signed Locarno Pact of 1925: The Wehrmacht moved into the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. This led to the first crisis of Hitler's pre-1938 foreign policy. For a moment it seemed that France would confront him by mobilizing and sending its armies into the Rhineland. A number of Reichswehr generals, fearing such a French response, opposed Hitler's move, but he gambled that France would not act, and he proved to be right. The people began to feel that from now on Germany could do whatever it wanted, that nobody would dare bar its way. And with this defiance he probably scored the most significant of all his domestic psychological victories.

After this came the truly big, unanticipated successes of 1938: the unopposed peaceful march into Austria and the *Anschluss*, one of the goals of the earlier revisionists. In the fall of 1938—albeit after the first real threat of a crisis—came the Munich Pact in which France and England sold out Czechoslovakia, France's ally, and forced the Czechs to cede the Sudetenland, a predominantly ethnic German border region, to Germany.

The feeling throughout Germany was that Hitler had the Midas touch, that he was God's gift to them, that he had given them more than they had dared hope for. It no longer mattered that other

parts of his popularity.

What a beginning for groups: the fact that a mass party have though would not be what happened in 1933. The air

Even the ideas of the Communist resistance themselves were not Communists out by Hitler's fear of some. However, not the Reichstag not fled the arrested and party offices staffs arrested made illegal with a complete assistance worth. A great reporters, probably in the following

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fancies he articulated unconscious¹¹⁹ if he did articulate them. And it does not suffice to specify that he spoke to a national trauma if he personally came across more strongly than what he said. To be sure, his message also carried in transcription. "In 1928-1929 I read and heard about Adolf Hitler and his words went right to my marrow": this experience by a German farmer can be multiplied by millions.¹²⁰ As Hitler liturgically put it to "my columns of flag bearers" in Nuremberg on 11 September 1936 and, by extension, to all Germany lined up behind them: "You once hearkened to a man's voice, and it beat on your hearts, it awakened you, and you followed this voice. You followed it for years without ever having seen the bearer of this voice."¹²¹ Even so, his presence enhanced his message by that "terrific magnetism of his personality."¹²² The question is that enhancing.

A single answer remains—the right one. It is that Hitler's uncanny personal power over Germans came from his having coordinated his private traumatic fury with the national traumatic need.

This was a stupendous stunt. It took the devil's own psychological genius. ~~But even with that,~~ it was possible only because of three historic accidents. Hitler was born of a precedent for the German traumatic need, his breakdown coincided with Germany's in time, and his traumatic project complemented Germany's. Otherwise he would have come away from Pasewalk about like the next traumatic casualty before or after him: hell-bent on reliving his traumatic experience, but without that imperative engaging anyone else.

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An unconscious national regression to time out of mind sounds through the German rhetoric of enslavement and annihilation thrown up by the 1918 defeat. Defeat often carried just such penalties of old, which Hitler went far toward restoring. That does not prevent the apparent logic of traumatic reliving by individuals from fitting the German case. Well may a primitive people that somehow survived a sudden, startling defeat have relived it suicidally in striving to master the attendant fear.

* the act of reliving the trauma is to free the soul, ¹²⁷ the difference with Hitler is that the prodigious multiplication of the stakes was made possible only by the emotional invention provided by the 1918 defeat

1936, 1937, 1940, 1942, 1944

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of daily life, but then bolstered by foreign policy successes and later by military victories. Perhaps these responses were all too human, but still it seems to have been characteristic of this regime that it was more likely to win approval from the populace by diverting its attention from misery than by actually ameliorating conditions. Diversions of an intoxicating kind (presented in exactly that fashion) were abundantly available. Rarely has a generation been exposed to so many sensational new things in so few years.

The "Olympics, Spain, and the result of the London talks," states a report of August 1936, "are having a salutary effect on the morale of the populace and are helping us to smooth over all sorts of unpleasant things."¹⁴ In the following year, when relatively little happened, morale evidently reached a low point. "A sense of discontent among the people is stronger than ever," stated a report of May 1937. "The National Socialist government is being held responsible for the shortage of raw materials."¹⁵ The annexation of Austria then sparked "jubilation and joy." During the Sudeten crisis, "fear of war" reigned supreme, and after Munich there was once again "an elated mood."¹⁶

It is well known that the outbreak of war was greeted with little enthusiasm and with great apprehension. Nonetheless, a report on the events of June 1940 states that the victory in the west brought about "a degree of solidarity never hitherto achieved among the entire German people."¹⁷ After this high point, things went slowly downhill again. The uncertainty of the course of the war, the increasing food shortages, and the air raids on German cities prompted a pessimistic mood that set in during the summer of 1942 and, after the battle of Stalingrad, shaded into doubt and resignation and finally into a still hopeful fatalism. The daily struggle for existence and survival displaced politics and dominated all other considerations. It should be noted, however, that the assassination attempt of July 20, 1944, was not only, with few excep-

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tured by statistics. From time to time public referendums were held, but there was nothing to vote for between the registers of "yes" and "no." Even the officially announced election results, which very early recorded up to one-quarter "no" votes in some places, are unreliable, for falsification of election results is clearly documented in many cases.

But even when a nation is no longer polled, can no longer vote, and has lost the right to express opinions freely, public opinion still exists and can, within limits, be investigated. Even a dictator—especially a dictator—is in his own interest eager to know what his subjects and above all his enemies among those subjects think of him. Under Hitler, a kind of comprehensive polling of public opinion arose from the police surveillance and control of so-called ideological enemies and was incorporated into an extensive set of reports. These reports, which were collected and evaluated by several agencies but with especial zeal by the SD, the security department of the party, tell us more about public moods than about opinions. For the regime wanted above all to know whether morale was good or bad. It was not disposed to heeding the opinions of the populace; it intended to rule, and for that it needed popularity, as Hitler himself had stated.

It goes without saying that the utmost care must be used in drawing conclusions from reports on morale. Not that things were glossed over in the reports; that would have made them worthless. In the end they so dismayed the leadership that Bormann prohibited them in the summer of 1944.¹³ But there is a certain arbitrariness inherent in them. Statistical evidence of any precision is missing; reports often pertain only to certain parts of the Reich, and the spies did not, of course, find out what people were afraid to say. The result is an impression, not a definitive conclusion; a portrait of moods, not of opinions.

Generally speaking, one can say that morale fluctuated in a peculiar way. It was lowered principally by the economic cares

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and-file membership.⁴ Suster places even greater emphasis on it as a guiding force on Hitler. As well as the mysterious voices, he says, Hitler was up to his neck in occult practices. Suster argues that conventional historians who deny this close relationship do so because they have a rationalist's outlook that can make no sense whatever of what strikes them as being a collection of bizarre lunacies.

One almost feels in the background the existence of a mad syllogism: occultists never enjoy historical significance; Hitler enjoyed historical significance; therefore Hitler was not an occultist. . . .

If I see Hitler saying and doing all the things which occultists say and do, then I am justified in arguing [that] he was an occultist even though in some cases this is not immediately apparent.⁵

Reading this, one can feel another "mad" syllogism coming on: Initiates are under the control of occult forces and are therefore not responsible for their actions; Hitler was an initiate; therefore, Hitler was not responsible for his actions. Such flawed logic brings us to the central theme of this book: *Hitler was an evil human being and must be held responsible for his actions*. Unorthodox writers who seek to explain that magical forces were behind his actions are denying this basic premise, which must be faced if the full truth about Hitler and the Nazis is to be accepted without justification.

Hitler openly admitted to being guided strongly by two major forces that many would consider occult in origin: Providence and intuition, with the inner voice presumably serving as a joint conduit.

On 15 March 1936 he said in a speech: "I go with the assurance of a sleepwalker on the way Providence dictates." A few months later, he reiterated his belief in Providence and expanded on his version of the essence of his self-proclaimed guiding destiny at the Nuremberg rally when he told a Nazi women's conference: "I believe in Providence and I believe Providence to be just. Therefore, I believe that Providence always rewards the strong,

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it had developed an efficient decoding section with 240 cryptanalysts aided by a computer capable of decoding three thousand intercepted foreign messages a month. Irving writes: "In the years of his great diplomatic triumphs it was Hitler's furtive knowledge of foreign reports from Moscow, London, Paris, or Ankara that permitted his dazzling flashes of 'intuition.'"²²

One example given by Irving concerns the political maneuvering in 1939 over Poland. From the time of Munich until the outbreak of war with Britain, the agency fed wiretap information to Hitler on conversations between the British and French governments and their embassies in Berlin. As a result, he was able to follow on an hourly basis how his enemies were reacting to each Nazi ploy and he rightly deduced by 22 August 1939 that while the Western powers might well formally declare war, they would not actually fight—not at first, that is.²³ This suited Hitler, who had not wanted full-scale hostilities to begin until the following year when, incidentally, his astrological stars showed his destiny would be reaching its peak (see chapter 18).

The only problem with Irving's assertion is, as he himself says, "tragically, the entire. . . . Research Office archives were destroyed in 1945."²⁴

Hitler's most public displays of what are seen as his psychic abilities came with his speeches in which he conjured a picture of himself as a German Savior. "The people's need taught me to speak," said Hitler on 30 March 1936 in Cologne.

Some occultists came to explain Hitler's relationship with his audience by claiming he was in fact a "psychic vampire," that is, he seemed to draw more power and energy from an audience than he gave out. Ending what to most people would have been an exhausting speech, he appeared more refreshed and invigorated than when he had started. Somewhere he had learned, consciously or unconsciously, to recharge his batteries by drawing on the psychic life forces of others.²⁵

According to some nonorthodox historians, such as King and Suster, Hitler's occult powers began to fade from 1942 on as the fortunes of war turned against him and he stopped making public

speeches. Hitler knew that should he continue to appear before audiences, instead of having their energy to offer they would be focusing their unconscious resentments on him. They would not give him a positive charge on which to draw. As a result of his fear to face an audience, his psychic batteries began to run down.

To other observers his withdrawal from the public platform at this time adds to the picture of a tempestuous personality who more often than not made decisions on the run, snatching answers from the air and when it suited him ascribing them to intuition of a superhuman form. Such claims hid his erratic, undisciplined nature. His actions more often than not were based not on a known dogma or creed but on the guiding hand of his own personal providence who spoke to him in words no one else heard.

No better example of this is to be had than when it came to the big picture: Hitler's major prediction in a speech to the September 1936 Nuremberg party rally mentioned earlier was so very wrong: "And as a prophet I can say to you: this Reich has lived only the first days of its youth. It will grow on into the centuries, it will become strong and mighty. The banners shall be borne through the ages by ever new generations of our people."

Notes

1. Based on an article in *Sunday Telegraph*, 13 September 1987, p. 32, which is in turn based on Brian Inglis, *The Unknown Guest*. Also quoted as an unidentified report in the Reader's Digest book *Into the Unknown* (Sydney, Australia, 1982), p. 227; also quoted in Arthur C. Clarke, *World of Strange Powers* (London: Collins, 1984), p. 68.

2. George Ward Price, *I Know These Dictators* (1937), cited by Walter Langer, *The Mind of Adolf Hitler* (New York: Basic Books, 1972), p. 34.

3. For example, Francis King, *Satan and Swastika* (St. Albans, Herts, U.K.: Mayflower Books, 1976), p. 266.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

5. Gerald Suster, *Hitler: The Occult Messiah* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. xv.

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cause for satisfaction. Not only was Italy driven into a position of isolation, in which Mussolini was bound to look more favourably on German offers of support, but the League of Nations suffered a fatal blow to its authority.

As Mussolini later acknowledged, it was in the autumn of 1935 that the idea of the Rome-Berlin Axis was born. No less important was the encouragement which the feebleness of the opposition to aggression gave Hitler to pursue his policy without regard to the risks.

By March 1936 Hitler judged the moment opportune for another *coup* in foreign policy. The proposed treaty between France and Russia had become a subject of bitter controversy in French politics, and in London there was no enthusiasm for France's latest commitment. On 27 February 1936, the Franco-Soviet treaty was finally ratified.

Hitler's reply was to march German troops into the demilitarized Rhineland. It was a proposal which thoroughly alarmed Hitler's generals. German rearmament had barely begun, and the first conscripts had been taken into the Army only a few months before. If the French and their allies marched, the Germans would be heavily outnumbered. Furthermore, reoccupation of the Rhineland represented not only a breach of the Treaty of Versailles but a *casus foederis* under the Locarno Pact. Hitler did not dispute these facts; he based his decision on the belief that the French would not march—and he was right.

On the morning of 7 March, as the German soldiers were marching into the Rhineland, greeted with flowers flung by wildly enthusiastic crowds, Neurath, German Foreign Minister, summoned the British, French, and Italian Ambassadors to the Wilhelmstrasse and presented them with a document which contained, in addition to Germany's grounds for de-

nouncing the Locarno Pact peace proposals. As M. Fra Ambassadors, described it, 'H in the face, and as he did : proposals for peace!' In p carno Treaty, Hitler offered to France and Belgium, va and supplemented by the a attached so much importan

At noon Hitler addressed was another masterpiece of to the 'useless strife' betwe he asked: 'Why should it i general problem of conflict European states above the reason and consider it in t vision?'

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Hitler later admitted: 'I the march into the Rhinel racking in my life. If the into the Rhineland we wo with our tails between our sources at our disposal wo quate for even a moderate ever, followed exactly the before. There were anxio Paris and London, appeals much talk of the new oppo by Hitler's proposals. The the Council of the Leagu tional Court at The Hague

nouncing the Locarno Pact, new and far-reaching peace proposals. As M. François-Poncet, the French Ambassador, described it, 'Hitler struck his adversary in the face, and as he did so declared: "I bring you proposals for peace!"' In place of the discarded Locarno Treaty, Hitler offered a pact of non-aggression to France and Belgium, valid for twenty-five years and supplemented by the air pact to which Britain attached so much importance.

At noon Hitler addressed the Reichstag. His speech, was another masterpiece of reasonableness. Referring to the 'useless strife' between France and Germany, he asked: 'Why should it not be possible to lift the general problem of conflicting interests between the European states above the sphere of passion and unreason and consider it in the calm light of a higher vision?'

It was France, Hitler declared, who had betrayed Europe by her alliance with the Asiatic power of Bolshevism, pledged to destroy all the values of European civilization—just as it was France who, by the same action, had invalidated the Locarno Pact. Once again, reluctantly but without flinching, he must bow to the inevitable and take the necessary steps to defend Germany's national interests.

Hitler later admitted: 'The forty-eight hours after the march into the Rhineland were the most nerve-racking in my life. If the French had then marched into the Rhineland we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs, for the military resources at our disposal would have been wholly inadequate for even a moderate resistance.' Events, however, followed exactly the same pattern as the year before. There were anxious consultations between Paris and London, appeals for reason and calm, and much talk of the new opportunities for peace offered by Hitler's proposals. The Locarno Powers conferred; the Council of the League conferred; the International Court at The Hague was ready to confer. Ger-

many's action was again solemnly condemned and the censure again rejected by Hitler. But no one marched —except the Germans.

Meanwhile Hitler dissolved the Reichstag and invited the German people to pass judgement on his policy. The election results, a reported 98.8 per cent in favor, left little doubt that a substantial majority of the German people approved Hitler's action, or that it raised the Führer to a new peak of popularity in Germany.

While European governments began to accommodate themselves to the new balance of power, Austria became more and more uneasy. The premise upon which Austrian independence was based, the unity and military superiority of Italy, France, and Great Britain in face of Germany, was being destroyed. Sooner or later Mussolini's 1934 guarantee of Italian divisions on the Brenner frontier would be withdrawn.

In 1936 Papen, whose aim was to undermine Austrian independence from within and to bring about the *Anschluss* peacefully, gained his first successes. On 13 May, Prince Starhemberg, the Austrian Vice-Chancellor and an outspoken opponent of the Austrian Nazis, was forced to resign. Three weeks after Starhemberg had gone, the Austrian Chancellor, Schuschnigg, informed Mussolini that the Austrian Government was about to sign an agreement with Germany. The Duce, though repeating his assurances of support for Austrian independence, gave his approval.

The Austro-German Agreement of 11 July 1936 was designed on the surface to ease and improve relations between the two countries. It recognized Austria's full sovereignty and promised mutual non-intervention in internal affairs. The most important of its secret clauses specified that the Austrian Government agreed to give representatives of the so-called

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The Agreement also prospects of a *rapproc* he had extraordinary League Powers tacitly the sanctions they had than a fortnight later, in Spain and created was able to draw no Mussolini's Abyssinia

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France, for geogra deeply interested in any other of the Gr character of the Spa of uniting, French c prepared to support their own Left-wing The Spanish Civil W

National Opposition in Austria, 'respectable' crypto-Nazis like Glaise-Horstenau and later Seyss-Inquart, a share in political responsibility.

Ostensibly, Austro-German relations were now placed on a level satisfactory to both sides. But, in fact, for the next eighteen months the Germans used the Agreement as a lever with which to exert increasing pressure on the Austrian Government and to extort further concessions. The Agreement thus marked a big step forward in the policy of capturing Austria by peaceful methods.

The Agreement also materially improved Hitler's prospects of a *rapprochement* with Italy. Here again he had extraordinary luck. On 4 July 1936, the League Powers tacitly admitted defeat and withdrew the sanctions they had tried to impose on Italy. Less than a fortnight later, on 17 July, civil war broke out in Spain and created a situation from which Hitler was able to draw no fewer advantages than from Mussolini's Abyssinian adventure.

Hitler was at Bayreuth on 22 July when he received a personal letter from General Franco. That night he decided to give active help to Franco. In the course of the next three years German aid to Franco was never sufficient to win the war for him, but Hitler's policy was to prolong the war. In return for aid, Germany secured economic advantages (valuable sources of raw materials in Spanish mines); useful experience in training her airmen and testing equipment such as tanks in battle conditions; above all, strategic and political advantages.

France, for geographical reasons alone, was more deeply interested in what happened in Spain than any other of the Great Powers, yet the ideological character of the Spanish Civil War divided, instead of uniting, French opinion. Many Frenchmen were prepared to support Franco as a way of hitting at their own Left-wing Government, led by Léon Blum. The Spanish Civil War exacerbated all those factors

put off awkward decisions, they were wary of committing themselves to cooperate with Germany. Hitler was reluctant to take open action which would alienate them, in the hope that he might still win them over, yet he was tempted at times to regard Britain as 'finished' and her value either as an ally or an opponent as negligible. This alternation of moods never wholly disappeared from Hitler's ambivalent attitude towards Britain.

Hitler's best argument with the Conservative Government in Britain was the common interest of the European States in face of Communism. The Spanish Civil War sharpened the sense of ideological conflict in Western Europe, and many people in England as well as in France, who would have looked askance at a blatant German nationalism, were impressed by Hitler's anti-Communism.

Anti-Communism could also be used to provide the basis for a power-bloc which included Japan. In November Ribbentrop flew to Berlin from London for the signature of the Anti-Comintern Pact. The ideological objectives of the pact—the defeat of the Communist 'world-conspiracy'—gave it a universal character which a straightforward agreement aimed against Russia could not have had. It was expressly designed to secure the adherence of other States, and it was not long before Hitler began to collect new signatories. The public provisions of the pact dealt with no more than the exchange of information on Comintern activity, cooperation in preventive measures, and severity in dealing with Comintern agents. There was also a secret Protocol which dealt specifically with Russia and bound both parties to sign no political treaties with the U.S.S.R. In the event of an unprovoked attack or threat of attack by Russia on either Power, the Protocol added, each agreed to 'take no measures which would tend to ease the situation of the U.S.S.R.'

From every point of view, Hitler could feel satis-

The Counterfeit Peace,
faction with his fourth
tarization of the Rhineland: the contrast between his and the weakness of the increased his prestige. When the Olympic Games of August 1936, thousands of, and the opportunity to put the Third Reich. In September, the Party Rally on a scale which even Nuremberg equalled.

Hitler rounded off his long speech to the Reichstag in which he formally withdrew from those clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which had denied her equality of responsibility for the war. He must humbly thank Providence, he said, for having enabled me, once an unknown soldier, to bring to a successful issue our and rights as a nation.

It was an impressive performance, able to point, not only in foreign lands, but in economic recovery of national life. In January 1933 and December 1932, the unemployed fell to 3 million six hundred thousand. The recovery of economic life was none the less in Germany further than elsewhere, and Government expenditure of the country and on public works.

It is natural, therefore, that at some point up to which Germany was a force for good, but afterwards it became corrupted. All this began from the first Hitler :

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"Reich Intelligence Agency," Hitler had turned the project over to Göring, stipulating only that the agency was to make no use of agents, but to rely exclusively on what is today called signals intelligence (wiretapping and cryptanalysis). This was clear evidence of the trust that he reposed in Göring: It was like the absolute trust a blind man must have in his guide dog. Funded initially by Göring's Prussian state government, the harmless-sounding Forschungsamt began with four code-breakers, expanded to twenty by July 1933, and employed thirty-five hundred or more, operating throughout Germany and the occupied countries, over the next twelve years. Its senior officials were dedicated Nazis, and only one FA employee—Oberregierungsrat Hartmut Plaas, a close friend of Canaris and the former adjutant of Freikorps Commander Ehrhardt—was caught leaking FA secrets (he was shot).

Soon after it was set up, Göring handed over general supervision of the Forschungsamt to Paul Körner. Körner approved its budget and staff appointments. When the FA moved into its first cryptanalytical workshop, in an attic in Behren Strasse in the heart of the government district, the FA chief was Hans Schimpf, a quiet navy lieutenant commander who had until recently been attached to the army's code office.

All except Schimpf survived the coming war, but after the surrender they lay low, scared of being treated as Nazi agents. They volunteered little information, and the records of that era vanished. Scattered around the world, however, are a few items that clearly betray FA provenance, and they show beyond a doubt that it was one of the most efficient and accurate intelligence-gathering agencies of its time, its integrity guaranteed by the rigid civil-service standards imposed on its staff and by the extraordinary character of Hermann Göring as its ultimate master.

Hitler had granted to him the absolute Reich monopoly on wiretapping. Göring protected this monopoly fiercely. A big "G." scrawled at the foot of a warrant, forwarded to him by Pili Körner, would suffice for the tap to be applied. But that "G." was not easily attained, and he gave Himmler's Gestapo a particularly hard time. "If," recalled one FA official, "as was usually the case with the Gestapo's applications, the reason given for the wiretap was too vague, then the minister [Göring] simply disallowed it; and if he did permit it, he forbade any results to be forwarded [to the Gestapo] until he had given his express authority in each case."

Walter Seifert, head of the FA's evaluation section, who had joined straight out of Jüterbog Signals School in August 1936, would recall that Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the Gestapo under Himmler, hated having to submit every wiretap application to Göring—"But without that 'G.' on it I wasn't allowed to order the tap." Over the years he and Himmler would advance every possible argument for taking over the Forschungsamt. The Führer merely told them to take it up with Göring.

The first chief, Schimpf, lasted only two years. A cheerful womanizer, he became amorously entangled with a lady in Breslau; he solved the matter

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by shooting her and then (being Göring appointed Prince Christof intelligence job for the next eight

During Göring's regime, the FA premises in Berlin's Charlottenburg of former residential buildings served what Berliners call "the Knee," and language specialists sat at the guards and subject to the most strict paper, from the duplicate pads used paper of the "research results," was of the Brown Pages signed oath penalty in the event of violation. red double-thickness envelopes. canisters; handled only by special their authorized recipients. (Mile 27, 1936, promising "in the even pay all costs for the replacement

"The work of the FA," warned Ministerialdirektor in Göring's Pr profit only if its secrecy is safeguarded; security will result in the enemy regulations did not identify, "tall up." Thus the "results" were never nor discussed by phone except or stalled by the FA throughout the printer system. Recipients, regarded Brown Page intact to the FA. E. Gottfried Schapper wrote to Hitler peremptorily demanding the return to the Führer on the day that Gen

By 1937 the FA had grown so close of his Air Ministry, where secrecy now wore air-force uniforms. It around the clock in Berlin alone, journalists, and suspected enemies were divided into "regions" (Berlin, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, Polish moment. Dr. Gerhard Neuenhoff, O (and Belgian) "region" on September a thousand other specialists, strict

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by shooting her and then (being a gentleman) himself on April 10, 1935. Göring appointed Prince Christoph of Hesse,* and he retained this top Nazi intelligence job for the next eight years.

During Göring's regime, the Forschungsamt moved into magnificent new premises in Berlin's Charlottenburg district; housed in a sprawling complex of former residential buildings set discreetly back from Schiller Strasse, near what Berliners call "the Knee," the hundreds of specially sworn officials and language specialists sat at their equipment in halls patrolled by armed guards and subject to the most stringent security regulations. Every scrap of paper, from the duplicate pads used by the telephone monitors to the brown paper of the "research results," was number-stamped and logged. Recipients of the Brown Pages signed oaths of secrecy subjecting them to the death penalty in the event of violation. The Brown Pages were conveyed only in red double-thickness envelopes inside locked pouches or pneumatic-mail canisters; handled only by special FA couriers; signed for in triplicate by their authorized recipients. (Milch signed for his new pouch key on April 27, 1936, promising "in the event of loss to notify the FA immediately and pay all costs for the replacement of the pouch.")

"The work of the FA," warned Prince Christoph, who had the rank of Ministerialdirektor in Göring's Prussian Ministry, "will have both point and profit only if its secrecy is safeguarded by every possible means. Inadequate security will result in the enemy," whom these February 1938 security regulations did not identify, "taking precautions, and our sources drying up." Thus the "results" were never to be explicitly referred to in documents, nor discussed by phone except on the special secure-telephone network installed by the FA throughout the government district, or on the secure teleprinter system. Recipients, regardless of rank, had to return each and every Brown Page intact to the FA. Even Hitler had to toe this line. FA chief Gottfried Schapper wrote to Hitler's adjutant Paul Wernicke in May 1938 peremptorily demanding the return of seven numbered "results" delivered to the Führer on the day that German troops entered Austria.

By 1937 the FA had grown so costly that Göring switched it to the budget of his Air Ministry, where secrecy was easier. As camouflage, all FA officials now wore air-force uniforms. The FA maintained five hundred wiretaps around the clock in Berlin alone, primarily on foreign embassies, legations, journalists, and suspected enemies of the Reich. The Charlottenburg rooms were divided into "regions" (*Bereiche*)—one each for English, American, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, Polish, Czech, and the other languages of the moment. Dr. Gerhard Neuenhoff, one linguist who was assigned to the French (and Belgian) "region" on September 15, 1938, found himself just one of a thousand other specialists, strictly limited in their mobility in the FA

*Born in 1901, he had married Sophie Battenberg, one of the six German sisters of the present duke of Edinburgh (who fought against the Germans in WWII).

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complex: He was never allowed up to the top floor, where Section IV's code-breakers were at work with the Hollerith punched-card computers and the other tools of their trade. Neuenhoff was set in front of a standard hotel-type switchboard, monitoring forty lines including the Belgian legation, the French military attaché, and French correspondents in Berlin. He soon learned to recognize who was speaking—the French ambassador André François-Poncet, with his slow, pedantic enunciation, or the French journalist Madame Tabuis, with her shrill tones.

It is important to accept that these FA monitors were incorruptible civil servants, with neither the means nor the motive to falsify "results." They jotted down what they heard on paginated duplicate pads, in longhand, or recorded it on wire recorders; tossed the completed note, already headed "State Secret" (*Geheime Reichssache*) onto a conveyor belt; within minutes it was typed up, evaluated, cross-indexed, and issued—either by FA dispatch rider or vacuumed with the speed of a rifle bullet through Berlin's pneumatic-mail system into the very anteroom of the authorized minister or his Staatssekretär. Each canister had its own address code on it—three narrow rings in blue guided it, for example, to Milch's private office at the secret Air Ministry Building.

The Forschungsamt gave Göring an edge over every rival contender for power in Germany. Not one international cable crossed Reich territory or its adjacent waters without being tapped by the FA. There were FA field units in every amplifier station. Fifty synchronous teleprinters installed in the cavernous basement at Charlottenburg churned out "results" twenty-four hours a day. Göring's SigInt specialists "looped into" the great Indo-Cable that carried all London's telegraphic traffic with India. ("At first," recalled FA specialist Walter Seifert, "that was quite bountiful.") The cable from Paris, France, to Tallin, Estonia, navigated the Baltic Sea; Göring's frogmen tapped that, and of course the landlines between Vienna, Prague, Moscow, and London—all of which crisscrossed Reich territory.

The biggest customers for the Brown Pages were Hitler's new Propaganda Ministry and the Ministry of Economics. An intercept of any story being filed by a foreign correspondent in Germany enabled Goebbels to plant an immediate reply in rival foreign newspapers overnight. The FA could also supply inside economic information with a speed and reliability that assisted Göring and the Reich to make dramatic "kills." Seifert's evaluation section built up a card index of names and subjects; his subsection 12-C kept tabs on every spoken or enciphered reference to vital raw materials like rubber, nonferrous metals, wood, and newsprint. Göring's secret agency made him an expert in everything from international egg prices to the yield of low-grade iron ores.

He had laid down two rules: He was to be supplied automatically with copies of everything; and all FA intercepts of his conversations were to be drawn to his attention to enable him to check his own phone security. Sur-

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viving data shows that he used Reich's ponderous and inefficacious that came rattling through the pm N400,611 about German explosives rector Dr. Müller complaining "lin"; and N400,784 about aircraft Vienna, having serious problems.

There were those who considered how ungentelemanly. And often he paid his first state visit to Berlin the switchboard at Castle Bellevue Petacci. When the duke of Windsor duchess a month later, Hitler ordered

Such tidbits lightened the darkness. A monitor would cry out "Staats switch that poured the intimate room. Down the tube came transcribed one of the most eminent Catholics with him," Milch snickered, "Ca General von Schleicher's phone terminal's wife was heard teasing a friend it. Without an *in*, nobody!" "Give

Göring read it out to Gestapo and ordered the wiretap continued

His Forschungsamt gave to Him sureness of touch when they played mission arrived: An FA "flying" Hotel Bristol, monitored even the reporting the rock-bottom price they blow-piped across Berlin to the M termoon's vital conference. After 1936, Chief Evaluator Seifert took around N34,500 (now) reporting that said calmly, "They'll settle down; bered around N83,000) would tell aid of Austria in March, nor Czech

The sense of sovereign power that be underestimated. It put him a ci Noiseless taps were put on the ph widely disliked gauleiter of Franco Unity Mitford; on his talkative adjutant globe-trotting girl friend Princess Ste bedmate, the lovely Czech actress L

Still thwarted by Hitler and cheated of that rank, he decided to become Germany's greatest statesman since Bismarck anyway; and when his rivals' botched diplomacy finally resulted in war, Göring began reading for his most difficult role yet—the multiple role of Mightiest Warlord cum Most Honest Broker in All German History.

He was not lazy—this was a popular and hurtful misconception. He just could not be everywhere at once. Inevitably, as he discovered his hidden entrepreneurial skills, his devotion to the new air force declined. After the new Air Ministry Building opened in 1936, he rarely set foot in this imperious structure of concrete, glass, and marble. It was ruled by his stocky, rubicund, businesslike Staatssekretär, Erhard Milch. No lions roamed through Milch's purposefully furnished Berlin apartment, no jewels glittered on his fingers, but it was Milch who signed the orders and made the major decisions—which planes to build, where to erect the factories. Göring was content with the walk-on roles so long as they gave him adequate occasion to wear the full-dress uniform, buckle on the swords, and deliver great orations.

Occasionally Milch perambulated Göring around Rechlin Field to see the latest bomber or fighter prototypes, and it did not escape his watchful master's eye that Milch was the complete master of this domain. Göring began, that spring of 1936, to dismantle some of Milch's sub-empire. When General Wever was killed in a plane crash at Dresden on June 3, Göring overrode Milch's judgment to appoint Kesselring as the new chief of air staff, and he put his old Richthofen Squadron comrade Ernst Udet in charge of the all-important Technical Office as part of the same reshuffle. A balding, high-spirited stunt pilot, Udet was to become the Luftwaffe's nemesis; already heavily dependent on narcotics and alcohol, he was heading for the mental collapse that would kill him five years later. Milch soldiered on, although downright suspicious now of the morals of his master. It had not escaped him that a young nephew, Friedrich Karl Göring, born in 1908, had become a Luftwaffe officer despite examination failures; nor, as he had scrupulously noted in his diary in December 1935, that Göring was boasting that he had not paid the craftsmen who had built his Obersalzberg villa.

How Göring envied Benito Mussolini's marble-columned study at the Palazzo Venezia in Rome—the immense raised desk from behind which the Duce advanced with measured stride to meet him. On first seeing Schacht's poky office late in 1936, upon his resignation as minister of economics, Göring involuntarily cried out, "How can any man have great thoughts sitting in a cubbyhole like this?"

He had converted his Berlin villa into a Renaissance palazzo, knocking four already spacious rooms together to make an office even larger than Mussolini's, so that four sets of French windows opened onto the terrace and gardens outside. The ottomans were elephantine, the carpets were lavish, the hunting trophies that protruded from the walls were beyond compare. Each new visitor was bowled over in turn. The League of Nations high

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oring that pompous wedding, British ambassador had commented that Hermann Göring's glorious career. "I see for to London, 'no higher goal, afford."

s. When Hitler asked Emmy rtune could fulfill, she replied, just an actor."

eries of first nights, each more ain lifted, or so it seemed, it another costume. With Göring as one snag, the length of the one role than he was already text. He did not consider that cused by an American in June t, he would reply, "The jobs se to get things done. I didn't

old title of Reich chancellor.

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however, and there developed out of it a delightful Rococo farce which might well have served for one of Maupassant's best stories. Voltaire announced: "*Pater est, quem nuptiae declarant.* Let us include the child in Madame du Châtelet's miscellaneous works." Monsieur du Châtelet was then invited to Cirey. He came at once and spent some very agreeable days there. Madame was unusually kind to him, and shortly after his departure he was able to announce to his friends that he expected a child. The piquancy of the whole incident lies in the probability that everyone concerned was playing a part before the others. This kind of vaudeville in real life occurred almost daily. It would be difficult to find a more brilliantly comic "curtain" than the remark of the gentleman of France who, finding his wife in *flagrante delicto*, said: "But how careless of you, madame! Think if it had been anyone else but me!"

The Cicisbeo

Every woman had to have at least one lover, otherwise she was more or less compromised socially. In Italy many ladies stipulated for a particular *cicisbeo*, or even two, in the marriage contract. The bridegroom, having himself long since figured as a *cicisbeo* in some other similar contract, raised no objection. In her famous letters from Vienna, Lady Montagu reported that it was considered a serious insult there to invite a lady to dinner without her two men, the husband and the official lover. Her astonishment at this shows that the custom had not spread beyond the Continent; the hegemony of the middle-class element came so much earlier in England than elsewhere (as we shall presently see) that there is no question of an English Rococo in the proper sense of the word.

The declared lover — called in France *petit maître*, in Italy *cavaliere servente* — who was not infrequently an abbé, attended his mistress like a shadow: on her visits and her walks, to the theatre and to church, to balls and to gaming-tables; he sat beside her in the carriage and walked beside her litter, carried her sunshade and petted her lap-dog, which was his most dangerous rival in the lady's affections. In the morning he woke her, pulled up the blinds, and brought her chocolate; later on he made himself useful over her toilet and escorted the visitors to her bedside. For ladies preferred to receive even slight acquaintances at the hour of the toilet and even, at a later period, when in their morning bath. This custom is all the more curious in that bath-tubs were hardly used

in the Rococo. At bath anywhere; an sidered a crazy forr and girls bathing w contrary, since the erotic imagination. of the wash-basins we might almost as and intriguing cover

There is anothe often than the bath swing, which was s chalance. Coming in typical Rococo elem fantile innocence, th of man and the coq which it produced ac of course, other far l and "Spanish fly," v it is incomprehensib lead to the conclusi erotic. It was, on the no account to forgo the thoughts and enc problem of love and t technique makes it ci in others he had come when form and not c principal problem sig of decadence. It was o fullness of its feeling highest subtlety and k had hazarded its gar tematizers appeared. wrights — it was left fill that rôle. On the ot precisely in the period life develop the refin which are in fact their

Might use as the attempt of a charming actress to attract Adolf
She tells stories about the French

and the petit maître

provided by Goethe.

also p 146

to recover someone who had been
to be in the same room with you,
but in

whose instruction
to her is: "Entertain him."
To Hitler, he says "stein Eyeliner,
she is a very amusing creature with an
exceptional sense of the French, elegant &

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

The first resolution was made in 1919 when, after long internal struggles, I became a politician and took up the battle against my enemy.

Manifestly the date was important to Hitler. He was at that time 30 years old—the same age another Messiah is reported to have begun his mission to save mankind.

That he saw himself as the special agent of God and identified with Him was made manifest on many occasions:

I go the way that Providence dictates for me with all the assurance of a sleepwalker.

—Speech of 14 March 1936, Munich

God has created this people and it has grown according to His will. And according to our will [*nach unserem Willen*] it shall remain and never shall it pass away.

—Speech of 31 July 1937, Breslau

I believe that it was God's will that from here [Austria] a boy was sent into the Reich and that he grew up to become the leader of the nation.

—Speech of 9 April 1938, Vienna⁷²

Hitler did not like to be told that the ways of God were not always revealed to him. On one occasion an aide noted that "God does not let people look at the cards He holds" [*Der liebe Gott lässt sich nicht in seine Karten sehen*]. Hitler immediately broke forth into such a paroxysm of fury that he himself feared a heart attack. He gave orders that the aide never repeat the offensive phrase.⁷³

The feeling that he was being specially guided from on high grew more intense through the years. On 16 September 1935 he said, "What was denied to millions of men was given to us by Providence, and our work will be still remembered by the last members of posterity." In a speech in his hometown of Linz, 12 March 1938: "When I once departed from this city, I carried with me the very same confession of faith that fills me today. . . . If Providence once then called me from out of this city . . . then Providence must thereby have given me a mission. . . ."⁷⁴

His convictions were reinforced by miraculous escapes from assassination. After the failure of the bomb plot of 20 July 1944 he told a naval aide, "Now the Almighty has stayed their [assassins'] hands once more. Don't you agree that I should consider it as a nod of Fate that it intends to preserve me for my assigned task." His valet remembers that Hitler was very calm, saying, "That is new proof that I have been selected from among other men by Providence to lead greater Germany to victory." And again, "Because I have been saved while

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The Image and the Man

others had to die, it is clearer than in my hands."⁷⁵

His version of human history mythology. He believed that a pure early Garden of Eden. But this pure made incarnate in the form of the "the Jew is the personification of the reached his conclusion that in fight of Almighty God. In Hitler's theology the one committed in the biblical C races is the original sin [*Erbsünde*] sins against blood and race are the thought of World War II in eschatological commander of the forces of good at the forces of Satan. "Often it seems by the Devil and Satan, and we must we finally obtain ultimate victory."

He did not view the Party and zations. "I consider those who are greater than those who establish a Party," he had written in *Mein Kampf*, "We are not a movement, rat

The institutional pattern he was the Roman Catholic Church, which a boy he had dreamed of being at however, he raised his sights and gave an apostolic succession. He announced in the Brown House during 1930 my successors in the leadership of fallibility. I hope the world will grow has to the claim of the Holy Father."

He also fancied himself as a world he planned to conquer. "I'm I Soon I'll be the great chief of the Tar are mingling my name with their pra

Hitler saw striking parallels between Enlightenment and the Church's of the Faith (*Congregatio de Propaganda*) task was not to communicate knowledge conditional faith." He viewed the 25 of our faith" and the "rock" upon which proclamation of the "Thousand Year" was also fond of speaking of the "movement, and Volk. As the sign and chose a special type of cross, and this Hakenkreuz.

* D. R. I told him absolutely so that, together, combination of

or he would seem to admit an error and then immediately conclude that someone else was to blame. Thus, he called collaboration with Vichy France "our greatest political blunder . . . that too was the work of our great minds in the Wilhelmstrasse!" Or else a mistake was the result of some errant human virtue. He had been too kind or too tolerant: he had once been guilty of discussing politics with a woman; he had been "too soft" about Freemasonry; he had underestimated the "pernicious influence of the Jews on Churchill's Englishmen"; he had been too lenient in failing to throw a Danish statesman into jail; too tolerant of the Italians; much too kind to the Jews. . . .

Throughout his life he insisted that other people were to blame for his own failures. As a youth, when he was rejected by the Viennese Academy of Art, his roommate recalled how "he cursed the old-fashioned, fossilized bureaucracy of the Academy where there was no understanding of true artistry. He spoke of the trip-wires which were cunningly laid—I remember his very words!—for the sole purpose of ruining his career."¹²⁷

Years later, at the end of his career, he blamed his military failures on a number of different people. "He talks constantly of betrayal," an intimate reported on 23 April 1945, "in the Party leadership and in the Army. The SS also lies to him now." Soon he would add "the betrayal of my Allies" to the list of those responsible for his defeat.¹²⁸

He could not abide the thought of his own mistakes; nor could he tolerate others being superior to him in any way. Thus he ridiculed "so-called military experts" or "effeminate intellectuals," or suddenly quit playing a game of bowls or "Beavers" when anyone else was winning. His attitude about personal superiority expanded to include the nation. Germans, he insisted, were superior in all human endeavors from food preparation to music, architecture to dog training, poetry to weight lifting. Since he was absolutely sure that Germany would win the Olympic Games in 1936, he simply could not comprehend the success of the decadent and racially defiled Americans. When shown pictures of the Golden Gate Bridge he said that Germany must build a bigger bridge in Hamburg. Told that a span there would not be as long as the one in San Francisco, he sulked for a time and then said brightly, "Well, we'll build ours wider." Informed that the widest avenue in the world was in Buenos Aires, he said that his new capital, "Germania," would have a street wider than any other street in the world.¹²⁹

Hitler surrounded himself with people to whom he could feel superior. With the exception of Albert Speer, they were either men of intelligence inferior to his own or men with physical or emotional deficiencies he could ridicule. His personal adjutants, Brückner and Burgdorff, were notably deficient in mental endowment, as were the three SS aides who were also with him almost daily: Fegelein, Günzsch, and Rattenhuber. Among 30 candidates who applied for the position of personal chauffeur to the Führer, Hitler selected the shortest man in the group and kept him as his personal driver for the rest

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The Image and the Man

of his life, even though it was not the seat so that he could see over for many years the deputy Führer Goebbels, the brilliant minister of the club foot; Heinrich Hoffmann, the one with a deformed back; both his friends and Max Amann, his press business manager; Amann was dwarflike in stature; intellectual collaborator, was addicted to an assistant press chief was stoned had a bad limp; the leader of his 1st SS, Röhm, was replaced by the one-eyed Reichsführer of the SS, Walther Streicher, Gauleiter and editor of the *Der Stürmer*. Robert Ley, head of the Labor Front, a drunkard who had a speech defect, influential Party secretary, was an addict of the Luftwaffe, was a man of high morphine. During most of World War II, state of narcotic stupor." But to him in aviation history." Joachim von Ribbentrop, a vindictive man, remained hailed by him as "the greatest foreigner."

He constantly pleaded with him for his own ability. A minor official, for example, recalled that on the evening of 1936 he was summoned to the Reich Chancellery to discuss the military power structure. The inexperienced official was amazed for assurance that the invasion of Poland and that the French would not resist. A curious question whether I could give him the answer.

His valet recalled that before the war he was nervous and unsure of himself. He stood in front of a mirror and interrupted himself apprehensively, "Does that sound ready to go before the audience? I really look like the Führer?"

A servant of many years recalled that Hitler drew parallels between himself and Napoleon. He liked to "outdo" Napoleon in everything, for example, when he learned that Napoleon had more secretaries than he, he kept more secretaries busy than he. He dictated in a much louder voice. He excelled Napoleon in something else: he had more secretaries at the same time. To get one glance an entire page of a book.

* D. T. I could be at such times, I was so great, in the manner when he

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advisers. He requested and was assigned his own suite of offices opposite the Foreign Ministry at Wilhelmstrasse 74-76, one floor above street level in the old Bismarck Palace. The Büro was small and so dark that the conference room was called the Blue Grotto.

Erich Kordt described his new chief, the forty-year-old Plenipotentiary for Disarmament.

"Elegantly dressed, graying hair, watery eyes with one half-closed, a tic in the cheek muscles. Trying to look energetic. Nothing natural about him. He walks up and down, keys in pocket clinking. Then lunch at the Dahlem house: elegant, in the English style, much good art. Frau von Ribbentrop seemed ill. I hear she has many operations, constant headaches."

The first four associates to join the Büro ranged from a shipbuilder to a prince. Soon there were thirteen on the staff. The following year there were thirty-three, and at its peak, in 1936, the enlarged Büro, now called Dienststelle (Agency), had a staff of 150 and a budget of ten million marks, paid by the Nazi Party, not by the government.¹⁰ To assist the party, heavy industry was "induced" to produce some of the money. Roland Brauweiler, the head of the union of industrial companies, complained of the party's "endless shnorrng" (*ußerlose Schnorrerei*) using the Yiddish term for "begging."

In May, von Ribbentrop returned to London. Bypassing the German ambassador, von Ribbentrop and Kordt found rooms in the Savoy through one of von Ribbentrop's business friends. The evening papers headline was: MYSTERY EMISSARY FROM HITLER HAS ARRIVED. On May 10 he met with Sir John Simon, Lord Privy Seal Anthony Eden, Lord Stanhope, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and Sir Robert Vansittart, under secretary for foreign affairs. Once more he assured them of Hitler's warm feelings for Britain and asked them to postpone the German disarmament conference. They told him, courteously, that it was impossible. To Kordt's dismay, Ribbentrop's report to Berlin nevertheless implied that he had achieved the postponement, and on his return on May 15 he was greeted at the door of the chancellor's anteroom by a happy Adolf Hitler. Kordt was sure von Ribbentrop had ruined himself. He was wrong. Von Ribbentrop had a believing patron in Berlin.

On May 18, von Ribbentrop went to Rome, where he stayed with the German ambassador, Ulrich von Hassell. He called on Mussolini on the nineteenth, trying to get help for postponement of the disarmament conference.

Despite all his efforts, the conference began on May 20. What were

the feelings at the For being bypassed by the chancellor and his highly critical of the a few real Nazis had be careful of them. T tion," now began. the way people hid w

The first true Na und Prymont. He v gave him dangerous There was also an o nally the liaison betv ous it was manned b ministry's political a this unsavory missi mont and was arres was freed, he was "c

Von Ribbentrop, ment, made sure to Hitler. By 1934, a t Adolf Hitler. Kordt these impressions:

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Hitler loved to Some people waite tige in the eyes of tl

Von Ribbentrop listened to Hitler's the Führer, and th had said about thi

Nov 1936



ous, charming, and witty world of London society. Not since Edwardian days had there been such a coterie of cynics. The von Ribbentrops probably thought they could cope with the international world because, after all, they had learned to deal with Berlin's fierce snobberies. But they were wrong. Few outsiders could hope to survive the acid-tinged Oxbridge purgatory of London's salons of the mid and late thirties.

The London faced by the von Ribbentrops was witty, acerbic, and difficult. No one was safe. Jew, Nazi, pretender, king — everyone was skewered by London's society's tongues. This should not have been a matter of moment to world history, but in the case of the vulnerable, ambitious, insecure von Ribbentrops, it was. Once they realized they were frequent targets, they despised the London people who were their torturers. Probably because of their London trials, they came to feel bitter toward the British and all things British.

On November 7, 1936, when von Ribbentrop was already in residence as ambassador to the Court of St. James's, he and Annelies were defined in the diary of Sir Henry (Chips) Channon, MP: "My feeling is that they will not be a social success in London, though at first I prophesied great things for them; but for all their ambition, they have not the well-bred ease which Londoners demand, and Frau von Ribbentrop really dresses too dowdily. She will be the liability, though he has not started off well, either."⁵⁵

This was written after Channon and his wife had been the von Ribbentrops' delighted guests in Berlin during the 1936 Olympics, before von Ribbentrop had taken his post in London.

Adolf Hitler of course thought the von Ribbentrops were his perfect emissaries into the highest British circles, but the von Ribbentrops found a much more subtle world than they had ever faced, and were incapable of coping with it. Joachim, the impoverished young provincial who had married a rich and assertive wife and had then succumbed to a powerful national leader, was now to be overwhelmed once more, this time by a coterie of London society's insiders.

It was painful to the von Ribbentrops but only indirectly to Germany. Much more dangerous to Germany were Robert Vansittart and Duff Cooper, two influential men who were opposed in principle to any form of alliance between the British Empire and Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany.

The more powerful was Sir Robert Vansittart, who had been the permanent under secretary for foreign affairs since 1930. He was suspicious of Germany, shocked by Nazi brutality, disdainful of Hitler, and pessimistic about the future of European peace.⁵⁶ His brother-in-

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Von Ribbentro
Bayreuth Music Fe
Hitler, who was a
had decided to hel

shuttle troops from North Africa, and Hitler would provide them. In his memoirs, von Ribbentrop wrote that he suggested to the Führer that Germany stay out of Spain, there were "no laurels to be gained," and German intervention would have a negative effect in England. But Hitler insisted that he would not tolerate a Communist Spain. He had already ordered the planes for Franco, Von Ribbentrop wrote:

Hitler rejected my objections. He said Spain's Prime Minister Negrin was a Communist, that his weapons came from Moscow, and that there was a close connection between him and Léon Blum in France . . . I saw things differently. I tried to argue with Hitler but found it too difficult. He reacted nervously and cut off the conversation. He said he had made his decision, this was "a matter of deep principle, and not of my sort of mundane foreign diplomacy."

Again Hitler was the ideologue while von Ribbentrop attempted diplomacy. According to von Ribbentrop, the Spanish matter "disturbed his mission" later when he was ambassador to London.

Hitler's unfriendly rejection depressed him; he fell into a black mood whenever he ran afoul of Hitler. His subordinates called it his "Tango Nocturno," and he took to his bed. But he was soon cured.

Apparently, Hitler's anger did not last. The day after the disagreement over Spain, von Ribbentrop was ordered into his Führer's presence. As von Ribbentrop told it, Adolf Hitler named him state secretary of the Foreign Ministry to succeed Bernhard von Bülow, who had died in June. Hitler congratulated him.⁵⁷ According to von Ribbentrop, he told Hitler it would be wiser to send him to England as ambassador than to appoint him state secretary in Berlin. "Despite Hitler's skeptical view of the possibilities of a bond with Britain, it seemed important to keep the Führer fully informed about the London situation. Also, although British Kings had little political influence, Edward VIII was friendly to Germany." This was written after Hitler's death, when his recognition of Edward VIII's lack of influence may have been a matter of hindsight.

Others viewed von Ribbentrop's London appointment quite differently.

Typically, the former Foreign Ministry official Dr. Paul Schwarz said von Neurath wanted to get rid of von Ribbentrop, who was a thorn in his side as long as he was in Berlin.⁵⁸ Erich Kordt's vacation in Greece was interrupted by a frantic phone call. Von Ribbentrop sent D-AMY to fetch him at once to Bayreuth. As a member of the Foreign Ministry, Kordt knew that von Neurath was eager to get rid

of von Ribbentrop as state secretary. Von Ribbentrop "could not personally" go to London. Von Ribbentrop wanted von Ribbentrop, in addition, to be ambassador at large and was agreed hastily and proposed ambassador at unusual speed. For von Ribbentrop, professional whistler would guarantee

At first von Ribbentrop, which probably then refused to receive von Ribbentrop in Berlin for the Olynthian announce the appointment and that was exactment of his appointment for von Ribbentrop. How von Ribbentrop responded with "a secret." An apocryphal story cannot send von Ribbentrop was the people in England." they also know him! The Büro remain officials, who called in robes and big expenses for the London men, some of whom officials at the embassy to the level of the new the mysterious so-called Fund, and it was floored marks had a good mark. For the immediate commitments" away left without an ambassador. First the von Ribbentrop foreign visitors and le

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As a member of the
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of von Ribbentrop and probably had tried to prevent his appointment as state secretary. Von Neurath again threatened to resign, because he "could not personally work closely with von Ribbentrop." Now von Ribbentrop wanted Kordt to negotiate with von Neurath so that von Ribbentrop, in addition to keeping his London post, would be ambassador at large and would report directly to Hitler. The foreign minister agreed hastily and on July 27 he sent a request for acceptance of a proposed ambassadorship to London. It was granted on July 30, with unusual speed. Kordt claimed that many countries preferred Nazi ambassadors to Foreign Service professionals. Belgium turned down a top professional who had some Jewish blood, because a Nazi ambassador would guarantee the direct attention of Adolf Hitler.

At first von Ribbentrop refused to announce his London appointment, which probably confirms the Schwartz and Kordt views. Hitler then refused to receive von Ribbentrop's English guests, who were in Berlin for the Olympics. His adjutant told von Ribbentrop, "You announce the appointment, and the Führer will receive your guests," and that was exactly what happened. Von Ribbentrop's announcement of his appointment to London opened the doors to Hitler's levees for von Ribbentrop's guests.⁵⁹ Dr. Paul Schmidt, the interpreter, told how von Ribbentrop, on being congratulated after the announcement, responded with "a sour laugh."⁶⁰

An apocryphal story of the day was that Göring told Hitler, "You cannot send von Ribbentrop to London." Hitler insisted that von Ribbentrop was the right man because "Ribbentrop knows the top people in England." Göring laughed and replied, "The trouble is that they also know him!"

The Büro remained intact, despite the bitter dislike of the professionals, who called it "full of overpaid playboys with London wardrobes and big expense accounts." Von Ribbentrop's eventual entourage for the London embassy was 120, many of them lower-rank SS men, some of whom did the flunky work and guard duty. The regular officials at the embassy were paid extra cash to bring their salaries up to the level of the newly imported SS officers. This money came from the mysterious so-called *Sonderfond des Führers*, the Führer's Special Fund, and it was flown in weekly from Amsterdam, where German marks had a good market.⁶¹

For the immediate weeks ahead, von Ribbentrop had "previous commitments" away from England, and the embassy in London was left without an ambassador for a discourteously long period of time. First the von Ribbentrops planned a vast party in Dahlem to entertain foreign visitors and leading Germans during the Olympic Games. The

Nov '36



von Ribbentrop fête was one of three such stellar events. The other two were enormous entertainments given by Hermann Göring and Joseph Goebbels.

Another matter of priority was an anti-Comintern alliance with Japan, the "Aryans of the East," as Hitler called them. Comintern stood for the "Communist International," composed of the world's Marxist leaders, who met annually at the Comintern's headquarters in Moscow. Originally, there was some danger that such a pact would seem close to a declaration of war on Soviet Russia, but in November 1936, a clever legal expert at the Ribbentrop Büro, Dr. Hermann von Raumer, found a convenient technicality: Soviet Russia had denied responsibility for some controversial statements made by the Comintern's headquarters in Moscow. The Soviets had thereby removed themselves officially from certain directions they probably endorsed unofficially. This "loophole" allowed von Ribbentrop to formulate an anti-Comintern pact without officially involving Soviet Russia. The path was clear for von Ribbentrop's first attempt at Realpolitik with Japan. The whole subject of "race" and "congenial blood" soon came to haunt the conduct of Realpolitik. It caused problems for von Ribbentrop and his Büro, and it became an irritant for the supposedly principled and distinguished Foreign Ministry. Certainly with the approval of the opportunistic Konstantin von Neurath, the notorious department called Deutschland, its most Nazified wing, suggested on November 17, 1936, to the Nazi Party that it retain its racial policies in principle but avoid "damage in matter of foreign policy." The suggestion was turned down by the party on April 28, 1937.⁶² Therein lies one of the secrets of Nazi Germany. Its evil men were usually more determined than those who considered themselves principled and decent.

August 1, 1936, marked the opening of the Olympic Games and the appearance of the many guests von Ribbentrop had invited. The huge party Annelies and he were giving was at hand. Earlier in the year, on July 14, the Duke and Duchess of Brunswick, both convinced Nazis, came to England for an Anglo-German Fellowship dinner. Brunswick had given up the British dukedom of Cumberland to declare himself the complete Nazi German. To schedule the dinner for Bastille Day, 14 July, was probably a deliberate anti-French provocation. The Fellowship meeting was chaired by Lord Mount Temple, who had a Jewish wife (a daughter of banker Sir Ernest Cassel). There were the usual pro-German speakers, the Lords Revell and Lothian and General Sir Frederick Maurice of the British Legion.

Many of these Fellowship guests had been asked by von Ribben-



Hitler's diploma to King Edward did not wear for

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Martha Dodd had congratulated von Ribbentrop on his appointment to the London embassy and he "accepted with a sort of pained graciousness, disdain, and bored *savoir faire*." Obviously it was not his favorite subject. Then Miss Dodd heard of Hitler's unique attitude to sports, sportsmanship, and the human race. One of von Ribbentrop's young assistants told her that Adolf Hitler considered Jesse Owens and other black American athletes unfair competition because "blacks were animals, non-humans, and to enter them in competition against whites was like entering fleet-footed deer, gazelle, or other species of speedy animals, and totally unsportsmanlike and unfair."⁶⁸

After the Olympics, the von Ribbentrops had to plan all the details for their move to London. Joachim and Annelies separately went to see Pastor Niemöller, the decorated World War U-boat commander who now presided over the Dahlem congregation, one of the most fashionable Protestant parishes in Berlin. Niemöller was a German nationalist but a fierce opponent of National Socialism. He frequently preached sermons against the government's antireligious and anti-Semitic acts. Joachim wanted Niemöller, a world-renowned clergyman, to accept him back into the church he had left. He explained that the English "would expect that of him."

Niemöller told him that was not sufficient reason for confirmation, and turned him down.⁶⁹ Separately, Annelies had asked Niemöller to baptize her third child, Adolf, who was born on September 2, 1935, but Niemöller again refused unless von Ribbentrop returned to the church for God's sake and not for British society's.⁷⁰ Niemöller was denounced for his anti-Hitler attitude and was eventually sent to Dachau.*

Little Adolf von Ribbentrop was baptized elsewhere. Despite their misguided ambition, both von Ribbentrops were good parents.

In the meantime, the superb John Nash buildings that housed London's German Embassy were gutted, leaving only the façade. Annelies brought a Dahlem construction and furniture man named Martin Luther to London. He was hired to supervise the work of hundreds of imported German workmen. Luther, a tough Berliner and an old-time Nazi Party hand, remained a close associate of von Ribbentrop's and soon became his liaison to the "old fighters." Years later it was Martin Luther who represented the Foreign Ministry at the notorious Wannsee conference for the Final Solution of the Jewish

*Niemöller was arrested several times for his anti-Nazi sermons.

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question, and it was Martin Luther who eventually landed in a concentration camp for betraying von Ribbentrop.

A story went the rounds of London during the embassy reconstruction that any German workman whose wife, back in Germany, gave birth to a male child could collect a three hundred-mark bonus if the baby was named Joachim. Supposedly, there were seven Joachims born during those months.⁷¹

While the construction work was going on, the embassy was temporarily moved into 17 Carlton House Terrace, and a Chamberlain family house on Eaton Square was rented as the von Ribbentrops' private residence.

The same Dr. Hermann von Raumer who had found the loophole for the Anti-Comintern Pact said that this was the pre-London briefing of von Ribbentrop by Adolf Hitler.

Ribbentrop, bring me England into the Anti-Comintern Pact. That is my greatest wish! I'm sending you as the best horse in my stable. See what you can do . . . But if all efforts come to nothing, well, then, I'm prepared for war, though I'd regret it a lot, but if it has to be . . . But I believe it would be a short war and I'd offer generous terms to England, an honorable, mutually acceptable peace. Then I'd still want England to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. Ribbentrop, you hold all the trumps. Play them well. I'm prepared for an air agreement anytime. Do well! I shall follow you with interest.⁷²

Meanwhile, preparation of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan went forward through the Japanese ambassador, Viscount Mushakoji, and his military attaché, Baron Oshima. Several things still stood in the way. The Japanese government was reluctant to commit itself too deeply. To them the three-year-old Nazi government was still a "new" friend, while the governments of Britain and America were well-known and familiar quantities. Another problem was China. Germany was trading with China and there was still a German military mission in China training Chiang Kai-shek's army.

Von Ribbentrop's ally in the pursuit of a treaty with Japan was the famous geopolitical scientist Professor Karl Haushofer, a former Tokyo resident and the mentor of Hitler's deputy, Rudolf Hess. Haushofer's political views impressed Hitler, who now conveniently discovered the similarities between the mythical knightly Wagnerian spirit of National Socialism and *bushido*, the warrior's way of the Japanese samurai. While the von Ribbentrops were preparing themselves for London, the Büro carried out the other von Ribbentrop function as Ambassador Extraordinary at Large and Special Adviser

throp felt, right or wrong, that they respected him and the new Germany. And then, he always had Annelies by his side. Her taste and talent for entertaining would surely charm the most unbending Londoners. She had already worked wonders at the old embassy at Carlton House Terrace. Albert Speer, Hitler's favorite architect, was asked to help with the interiors of the rebuilt structure. The famous Professor Troost was designing special furniture. Martin Luther acted as contractor. Annelies even brought over some of her own valuable pieces of art from Dahlem. There were well-trained waiters, footmen, and guards, all SS men. Erich Kordt estimated that the total cost of the rebuilding was five million marks.¹

Germany would be proud of the embassy and the new ambassadorial family, including the four children, Rudolf, Bettina, Ursula, and little Adolf. Feelers were put out to Eton for Rudolf, who was fifteen, but his parents decided on London's Westminster, a day school. Bettina was enrolled in a boarding school in Cornwall. Ursula, who was a delicate child, stayed in London, and Adolf was only a year old.

Rudolf had joined the Jungvolk (the "Cub Scouts" of the Hitler Youth) at the age of ten in Berlin. At fourteen he became a member of the Hitler Youth. His *Fähnleinführer*, a sort of Hitler Youth scoutmaster, a young man named Thorner, came to London with the von Ribbentrops as a secretary-aide to the ambassador, paid by the Büro.²

It must have been wrenching for young Rudolf to trade the hard-edged, stiff Hitler Youth, with its brown uniform and shouted slogans, for the relaxed, top-hatted drawl of London's Westminster School. Thorner reported that Rudolf had several shouting matches at the Speakers' Corner near London's Marble Arch, where all one needs to this day is a soap box and a political cause. Rudolf howled "Bolshevism" at several speakers, who probably were.³ The Austrian Reinhard Spitzzy, also a secretary of von Ribbentrop's, said that Rudolf sometimes complained to him about his father, probably as the result of arguments with his schoolmates at Westminster, British schoolboys being unsympathetic to the Nazis.⁴

By the time the von Ribbentrops and their entire entourage, *Kind und Kegel*, as the Germans would say, arrived at Victoria Station on October 26, 1936, all seemed well in hand, organized and calm. Then the new ambassador decided, there and then, to apply the crude technique he had learned from Adolf Hitler and had used in the naval negotiations. On the station platform, dignitaries and embassy staff expected no more than the usual bland ambassadorial greetings. Instead, Joachim von Ribbentrop launched into an animated speech inviting Great Britain to join Germany in a crusade against "the

greatest danger of speech were handed. "Not Secret," Cabinet minister, dispatched Berlin dated 26 October 1936. Over business activities.

It was a surprise to "manage" his life. Austen Chamberlain's graph, complaining British affairs. He both strange to British. Also, "while von Ribbentrop and Goebbels stolen Germany's crown."

It was not an accident. As an opening in the new Germany's Embassy's ladies' waiting room, an invitation to the hostess at the embassy entrance on Berlin, von Ribbentrop's German style he was such as "manly, direct to mind. Instead, he laid and then dubbed it David Low, in. On hearing that on by the embassy staff looks exactly like. The teacher says, "year later, during the ushers were insulted who raised an arm."

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more entourage, Kind Victoria Station on sized and calm. Then to apply the crude had used in the naval and embassy staff orial greetings. In an animated speech crusade against "the

greatest danger of the century, the Bolshevik menace." Copies of the speech were handed out in mimeographed form to the press. Marked "Not Secret," Cable #237 to Führer and Reichskanzler and Reichsminister, dispatched at 17:34 hours London arrived 19:20 hours Berlin dated 26 October 1936, simply stated: "Arrived today. Took over business activities. Ribbentrop."

It was a supremely tactless way for a new ambassador to attempt to "manage" his host country's policy. Within the week, the influential Austen Chamberlain wrote an article in the conservative *Daily Telegraph*, complaining bitterly about this crude attempt to interfere in British affairs. He wrote "that neither the Nazi nor the Soviet faiths, both strange to Britons, are worth one British Grenadier's bones." Also, "while von Ribbentrop spoke of an anti-Communist alliance, Göring and Goebbels make speeches proclaiming that Britain has stolen Germany's colonies."

It was not an auspicious beginning.

As as opening gesture, perhaps to demonstrate his adherence to the new Germany's ways, von Ribbentrop decreed that the German Embassy's ladies would no longer curtsy to royalty and that all future embassy invitations would be worded in German instead of the language of the host country. An SS guard was posted in a sentry booth at the embassy entrance, also an unheard-of discourtesy. With one eye on Berlin, von Ribbentrop awaited the party's approval of the new German style he was introducing to stuffy old England. Nazi jargon such as "manly, direct, soldierly, forthright" was supposed to spring to mind. Instead, he had already been chastized by Austen Chamberlain and then dubbed "Brickendrop" by the widely respected cartoonist David Low, in the *Evening Standard* and *Manchester Guardian*. On hearing that only the raised-arm salute would henceforth be used by the embassy staff, Low drew a schoolroom, with one little boy who looks exactly like von Ribbentrop holding his arm in a Hitler salute. The teacher says, "Yes, von Ribbentrop, you may leave the room." A year later, during the coronation of George VI in Westminster Abbey, the ushers were instructed to guide straight to the cloakrooms anyone who raised an arm, "except His Excellency the German Ambassador."

The ambassador's urge to "Germanize" went far beyond the embassy. For many years a former German, Baron Bruno Schröder, a naturalized British subject and London resident, had financed London's German Hospital.⁶ The Hamburg-born Schröder (a non-Nazi cousin of the Cologne banker Kurt von Schröder, who had called the 1932 meeting with Hitler and von Papen) devoted himself and his money to this charity clinic, which employed some Jewish physicians

and had Jewish patients. Despite von Ribbentrop's personal urging, Baron Schröder refused to fire the Jewish doctors or discharge the Jewish patients. But to keep the appellation German Hospital, the administration had to fly the swastika flag, although there was still a small kosher kitchen for observant Jewish patients.

The new ambassador had the good fortune of having excellent staff members, since he needed frequent professional help. Erich Kordt was appointed first secretary, and Dr. Woermann became deputy to the ambassador, in charge during his frequent absences.

The ambassador refused to pay certain formal visits that were decreed by custom, such as the courtesy call to the financial secretary of the Admiralty, someone he deemed beneath his notice. The customary written self-introductions to other ambassadors were now in German, contrary to protocol. Said von Ribbentrop, "I don't care one whit about what used to be the custom." As a joke, the Turkish ambassador responded in Turkish.⁷

On October 30 von Ribbentrop, dressed in a morning coat, submitted his credentials to King Edward VIII.⁸ The King was deep in his romance with Mrs. Simpson, which was about to bring a crisis of major proportions. How could a British sovereign, head of the Church of England, marry a foreign divorcée? What would happen if the German-friendly British King were forced to abdicate his throne? The dilemma presented itself to Adolf Hitler in these simplistic terms: a young King, a war veteran and a liberal, is prevented from marrying the woman of his choice by a "clique of reactionaries and Jews." Hitler thought the King should "tell these plutocrats and Marxists" that nothing would keep him from marrying a "girl of the people."⁸ This was Hitler's lower-middle-class naïveté at its most conspicuous. In a misguided effort to show sympathy for the embattled King, he prevented the German press from reporting the entire matter. One wonders how Wallis Warfield Simpson of the International Best Dressed List would have reacted to the appellation "girl of the people."

The new ambassador's blunders were to be chided but not punished. Despite his careless and overbearing behavior, prominent Londoners, with few exceptions, were not willing to show anger. Only the press saw where von Ribbentrop was aiming and refused to follow. He stumbled on, overly eager to please Berlin and still impressed by his recent negotiating success. As a new senior diplomat, he was unsure of himself, so he used the weak man's way to bluff: press on

⁷Probably the presentation was informal, since the King was as yet uncrowned.

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until someone calls a halt. Several subordinates, including Kordt and Spitzky, reported that whenever von Ribbentrop lost his temper, they could make him stop in his tracks by being firm with him. He became reasonable only after being confronted.

Meanwhile, preparations went ahead to solidify the Anti-Comintern Pact, and on November 25, barely a month after he became ambassador, von Ribbentrop flew to Berlin, where he signed the pact with Japan. It was a stormy, bouncy flight and the big Junkers passenger plane was tossed around, but there was no stopping von Ribbentrop, and D-AMY's Captain Zivina was one of the best.⁹ Though this pact was duly signed by newly promoted Japanese Ambassador Oshima, the Foreign Ministry would have no part of it. So far as the professionals were concerned, the whole thing was a personal idea of Adolf Hitler's, negotiated outside normal diplomatic channels. From the point of view of the gentlemen of Berlin's Foreign Ministry, von Ribbentrop's signature gave Japan no valid treaty, nor was the pact taken as more than a gesture in Japan. Although the professionals in Berlin saw the pact as the "adventure of dilettantes," it created many fears of a future world conspiracy, particularly in Britain.

Adolf Hitler had personally visited Berlin's Japanese Embassy for the event, his first time in a foreign mission. Suddenly the Japanese had changed from the "culturally sterile race" of *Mein Kampf* to "a closely related race of heroes."¹⁰ The pact also caused great anger in China, Japan's victim and Germany's old ally.

The Anti-Comintern Pacts were von Ribbentrop's pride until the Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939. Each anti-Comintern signing, country by country, was widely publicized, repeatedly featuring von Ribbentrop, the architect of the metaphoric fortification against Moscow.

This was the first of many times that von Ribbentrop left his post and traveled to the continent, and soon the British government took affront. In Parliament he was called "part-time ambassador" to the Court of St. James's. *Punch*, the satirical magazine, was to describe him as "the Wandering Aryan." It upset Whitehall that the man who was accredited as the ambassador to Great Britain negotiated an agreement like the Anti-Comintern Pact, which could be deemed dangerous to Britain and certainly to the allies of France and Britain.

He returned to London in December for a meeting of the Nonintervention Committee with Spain, presided over by Lord Plymouth. The two main opponents, von Ribbentrop and Russian Ambassador Ivan Mikailovich Maisky, both knew that no amount of work by the

committee could stop intervention by Germany and Russia. Germany had already sent out "volunteers," the Condor Legion, who were all Luftwaffe pilots trying out their skills and equipment for things to come one day.

The ambassador instructed his staff to concentrate on the crisis of the King and his lady from Baltimore and on Mr. Stanley Baldwin, the prime minister who looked and talked like John Bull. The German Embassy expert in matters concerning royalty and its affairs of the heart was "Lu" Hessen, Prince Ludwig von Hessen, a great-grandson of Queen Victoria and a young official of the Ribbentrop Büro. The prince was told by the ambassador to stay as close as possible to Buckingham Palace and to report any rumors about the durability and future of the King.¹¹ While the British press desisted from any mention of King and country's dilemma, there were no holds barred when tackling the new German ambassador. The von Ribbentrops, in return for certain Nazi gestures meant to impress Berlin, became targets for London's gossip press. For instance, when Bettina was hurt in an accident at school, von Ribbentrop sought the advice of Professor Sauerbruch, Germany's foremost surgeon. Sauerbruch sent the family to an eminent specialist in Holland, a Jew, and Bettina was registered there under the name Henkell. The London papers found out and gloated.

Such Nazi manifestations as the Hitler salute, the use of German language in communications, the uniformed SS guard and waiters, the vast Mercedes limousine with its swastika flags (but London license plate CYF 3), the Jewish dentist who treated the von Ribbentrops in London,¹² the well-known D-AMY, which constantly ferried people between Berlin and London: all of these became the joy of gossip journalism reports. The von Ribbentrops were hurt by the sensationalized news coverage. Every time they left the embassy it was on a "mysterious mission." Every rumor was enlarged. Every visitor was a "mystery Nazi." What was surprising to von Ribbentrop, a man who had virtually grown up among English-speaking people, was the freedom of the press to publish rumor. His misjudgment was probably based on a false notion of his diplomatic immunity and the fancied respect due the senior official of a sovereign foreign nation. Several times he complained about the press to British government officials and even to the prime minister. It did not help him, because they could not help him. *Der Bo* (for *Botschafter*, or ambassador), as his staff nicknamed him, had to learn to live with it.¹³

Meanwhile, the imported SS staff was hard on Annelies. They thought of themselves as heroes, not as slaves. An example was the

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case of SS Rottenführer (Corporal) Scharchewski, who got drunk, fell asleep on duty, and then lectured Annelies on "betraying Hitler's principles of equality." Before he was arrested and flown under guard to Berlin for his punishment, he told her to "kiss his arse."¹⁴ The SS men were bored. Guard duty was one thing; scrubbing embassy floors was another.

On November 12, 1936, less than two weeks after von Ribbentrop had been driven to Buckingham Palace to present his credentials to Edward VIII, the King abdicated. It was a tremendous blow. Von Ribbentrop immediately informed Adolf Hitler and von Neurath of his view: the very pro-German King had been forced to abdicate his throne by reactionaries and Jewish plutocrats, using the Simpson romance as a pretext. It is hard to conceive that von Ribbentrop could have believed his own fairy tale. He was well acquainted with the Emerald Cunard set and other Windsor friends like Chips Channon. Surely he must have been told the constitutional facts long before the abdication. On his own staff, Ernst Woermann, his deputy, and Erich Kordt, the first secretary, were skilled diplomats, with connections in London. They certainly knew the truth, as did Chief of Protocol Count Dörnberg, the "red giant," who was a cousin of the Battenbergs (the name of the Mountbattens before the war).

Finally, Prince Ludwig of Hesse, who was related to the British royal family, must have told von Ribbentrop about the problems of a ruler who is also head his country's church: "No divorce and remarriage."

Perhaps von Ribbentrop fabricated the tale only to please his Austrian idol and then began to believe his own fabrication. He had done it before about the air treaty that never came about and about the unsuccessful attempt at postponing the Disarmament Conference.

On December 12, 1936, at a meeting of the Anglo-German Fellowship in London, von Ribbentrop made his first London speech since the much-noted arrival at Victoria Station in October.

Attempting a joke, he wielded a sledgehammer. He said that Lord Mount Temple was one temple that must not be destroyed because it was too useful, "despite the Lord's Jewish wife."¹⁵ He then spoke unimpressively about Germany's need for her former colonies, the discarding of the "shackles of Versailles," the danger of the Comintern, and the tragic mistake of fighting each other in the World War. But, he said, if ever Germany were to re-enter the arena, "she would not allow herself to be threatened or menaced."

On February 5, 1937, came the notorious gaffe that shocked Britain's tabloid readers and caused anguish to Hitler's staff members

in Berlin. It was a case of tactless, tasteless behavior, once again aimed straight at any doubting "old fighters" in Berlin.

The day had begun most decorously when the ambassador and some of his senior staff were driven to Buckingham Palace in the magnificent swastika-flagged Mercedes to attend His Majesty, King George VI, and to present the ambassador's credentials. The protocol was fairly strict. At the end of the formal handing-over of documents, the ambassador from Germany, dressed in knee breeches, hose, and buckled shoes, was to leave the audience chamber backward, stopping and bowing three times, according to custom. He did so, but each time he stopped to bow, he raised his right arm in a modified Hitler salute. Twentieth-century British court bows are not deep and never from the waist. They consist of no more than a dignified bending of the head. It was easy for the ambassador to raise his arm. Did he also shout "Heil Hitler"? No one can swear to it. Apparently the King smiled. The raised arm probably seemed "a bit rum" to him. But his entourage was less forgiving. They were mortified.

Reports reached the press, and they loved it. The Nazi salute to the new King! **RIBB HEILS KING!**

Low drew a cartoon of Soviet Ambassador Maisky in front of the King with the Russian's clenched fist under the King's nose, since Communists saluted with a raised fist. The caption read: **EVERYONE SALUTES IN HIS OWN WAY.**

The ambassador's staff members were as taken aback as the King's entourage. Reinhard Spitz, von Ribbentrop's secretary, described the immediate aftermath of the Great Saluting Crisis, when the ambassador and his aides had returned from the palace to the embassy.

Von Ribbentrop rushed into his office and turned on the **DO NOT DISTURB** light. Those who had escorted him stormed in, demanding cognac. Something awful had happened. [Erich] Kordt and [Prince] Lu Hessen fell onto couches, groaning. Then Hessen said, "Imagine, he greeted the King of England with the Hitler salute." Prince Lu smacked his forehead with his hand. Thorner gave a hollow laugh. Kordt's arm hung straight down. Woermann quietly cursed to himself.¹⁶

All German journalists in London were commanded to appear at the embassy to hear the "true story": the King had "smiled quite contentedly." Nevertheless, news of the gaffe quickly reached Berlin. Von Neurath was aghast. Even Hitler was critical.

During the War Crimes Trials in 1946, Göring said to the prison's

junior psychiatrist, Dr. Ribbentrop's act was "I with a raised fist and ye one was more sensitive man professional diplo about the thousands o hand-to-mouth in Lon take menial jobs in ord was much more harmf trop's gaffe. Architects sors were children's nan

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HITLER AMONG THE GERMANS

1936

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That is the miracle of our times: that you found me—that you found me among so many millions! And that I found you is Germany's fortune!

ADOLF HITLER, 13 September 1936,
at a Nuremberg Party Rally

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* How he was carried away w himself on that day. Like a good rider on a wild horse I decided to let him have his run. The measure of his success is that no one in the crowd was embarrassed by these remarks.

Summer '36

INSIDE THE THIRD REICH 88 L

the Siegesallee, a magnificent avenue lined with impressive buildings could be built, three miles long.

To be sure, all the architectural proportions of Berlin would be shattered by two buildings that Hitler envisaged on this new avenue. On the northern side, near the Reichstag, he wanted a huge meeting hall, a domed structure into which St. Peter's Cathedral in Rome would have fitted several times over. The diameter of the dome was to be eight hundred twenty-five feet. Beneath it, in an area of approximately four hundred and ten thousand square feet, there would be room for more than a hundred and fifty thousand persons to assemble standing.

During these first discussions, when our general views on the city plan were still fluid, Hitler thought it necessary to explain to me that the size of meeting halls should be governed by medieval conceptions. The cathedral of Ulm, for example, had thirty thousand square feet of area; but when the building was begun in the fourteenth century only fifteen thousand people lived in Ulm, including children and the aged. "Therefore they could never fill the space. Compared to that, a hall for a hundred fifty thousand persons could be called small for a city of millions like Berlin."

To balance this structure Hitler wanted an arch of triumph four hundred feet high. "At least that will be a worthy monument to our dead of the world war. The names of our dead, all 1,800,000 of them, will be chiseled in the granite. What a paltry affair the Berlin monument put up by the Republic is. How wretched and undignified for a great nation." He handed me two sketches drawn on small cards. "I made these drawings ten years ago. I've always saved them, because I never doubted that some day I would build these two edifices. And this is how we will carry it out now."

The proportions of the drawings showed, Hitler explained, that even then he had intended a diameter of more than six hundred and fifty feet for the dome and a height of more than three hundred thirty feet for the arch of triumph. What is startling is less the grandiosity of the project than the obsessiveness with which he had been planning triumphant monumental buildings when there was not a shred of hope that they could ever be built. And today it strikes me as rather sinister that in the midst of peacetime, while continually proclaiming his desire for international reconciliation, he was planning

buildings expressive war.

"Berlin is a big city, the most beautiful city in the world with grand style. Be of buildings. We must of the points he made. Most of the time we As a rule, he would riously.

At an earlier stage Vienna and Paris, and Vienna he admired great buildings, the Hofburg and the two in correct proportion public buildings, like from all sides. He ad coincide with his view is worthily represented. We will give Berlin about that."

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Initially, however administration around Hitler's plans when of clearing ground and the rapid transition think we're considering in Mecklenburg. Yet threat that the federal in fact a few hints

Stimmer 36

buildings expressive of an imperial glory which could be won only by war.

"Berlin is a big city, but not a real metropolis. Look at Paris, the most beautiful city in the world. Or even Vienna. Those are cities with grand style. Berlin is nothing but an unregulated accumulation of buildings. We must surpass Paris and Vienna." These were some of the points he made during the series of discussions that now began. Most of the time we conferred in his apartment in the Chancellery. As a rule, he would have all other guests leave, so we could talk seriously.

At an earlier stage in his life he had carefully studied the plans of Vienna and Paris, and he revealed an amazing memory for these. In Vienna he admired the architectural complex of Ringstrasse with its great buildings, the Rathaus, the Parliament, the Concert Hall, or the Hofburg and the twin museums. He could draw this part of the city in correct proportions and had absorbed the lesson that impressive public buildings, like monuments, must be planned to be freely visible from all sides. He admired these buildings even if they did not directly coincide with his views, like the neo-Gothic Rathaus. "Here Vienna is worthily represented. By contrast, consider the Berlin Rathaus. We will give Berlin a more beautiful one than Vienna's, no doubt about that."

He was even more impressed by the vast rebuilding project and the new boulevards that Georges E. Haussmann had built in Paris between 1853 and 1870 at an expenditure of 2.5 million gold francs. He regarded Haussmann as the greatest city planner in history, but hoped that I would surpass him. The struggles that Haussmann had waged for years led him to expect that the plans for Berlin would also encounter opposition. Only his authority, he believed, would successfully put the work across.

Initially, however, he found a cunning way to bring the municipal administration around; for the city was less than eager to accept Hitler's plans when it became evident that the considerable expense of clearing ground and building the avenues, the public gardens, and the rapid-transit railways would fall to the city. "We'll let them think we're considering building our new capital on the Müritensee in Mecklenburg. You'll see how the Berliners come to life at the threat that the federal government may move out," he remarked. And in fact a few hints of this sort sufficed; the city fathers soon proved

Morell assured him, "raised from the best stock of a Bulgarian peasant." The other injections and drugs he gave to Hitler were not generally known; they were only hinted at. We never felt entirely easy about these methods. Dr. Brandt asked around among his specialist friends, and they all pronounced Morell's methods risky and unproved and foresaw dangers of addiction. And in fact the injections had to be given more and more frequently, and biologicals obtained from the testicles and intestines of animals, as well as from chemical and plant sources, were poured into Hitler's bloodstream. One day Goering deeply offended Morell by addressing him as "Herr Reich Injection Master."

Soon after the beginning of the treatment, however, a foot rash vanished that had long caused Hitler much concern. After a few weeks Hitler's stomach also improved; he ate considerably more, and heavier dishes, felt better, and fervently declared: "What luck that I met Morell! He has saved my life. Wonderful, the way he has helped me!"

If Hitler had the faculty for placing others under his spell, in this case the reverse relationship developed: Hitler was completely convinced of his personal physician's genius and soon forbade any criticism of the man. From then on Morell belonged to the intimate circle and became—when Hitler was not present—the butt of humor, since he could talk of nothing but strepto- and other cocci, of bulls' testicles and the newest vitamins.

Hitler kept urging all his associates to consult Morell if they had the slightest ailments. In 1936, when my circulation and stomach rebelled against an irrational working rhythm and adjustment to Hitler's abnormal habits, I called at Morell's private office. The sign at the entrance read: "Dr. Theodor Morell. Skin and Venereal Diseases." Morell's office and home were situated in the smartest part of Kurfürstendamm, near the Gedächtniskirche. The walls were hung with inscribed photographs of well-known actors and film stars. The time I was there, I shared the waiting room with the Crown Prince. After a superficial examination Morell prescribed for me his intestinal bacteria, dextrose, vitamin, and hormone tablets. For safety's sake I afterward had a thorough examination by Professor von Bergmann, the specialist in internal medicine of Berlin University. I was not suffering from any organic trouble, he concluded, but only nervous symptoms caused by overwork. I slowed down my pace as best I

could, and the symptom tended that I was careful my health improved I be also had him examine I was disgustingly dirty and her again.

Hitler's health improve part with his personal pl house on Schwanenwerd Hitler's teatime visits mor outside the Chancellery t Goebbels's very rarely at once, to see the house I ha

From the end of 1937 Hitler resumed his old I discussed plans, he would I am going to live. Perhaps only after I am no longer of many of the major b 1950. Evidently Hitler wa Another example: "Once more time."⁶ In private shall not live much longer realize my plans. I must sors will have the force to hold up, for my health is g

On May 2, 1938, Hitler outlined his political testament of the Foreign Minister's speech, he referred to his testamentary bequest in case age, who might after night listen to endless tirades of temples, and police dogs dream of world dominion since attempted to establish They attribute the change Morell's treatment. It seems and aims never changed.

Goebbels

March 1. 1193f

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Germany's affairs. If Germany had had just two more army corps in Belgium in the war, he declared, in an extraordinary and again unreported passage, Germany would have won. 'That was a serious blunder,' he added. 'It won't happen the next time.'¹⁰⁸

Febr. 27

A month passed. On February 27, lunching with Goebbels and Göring, Hitler felt it was still premature to go into the Rhineland. But on the very next day the French confirmed their treaty with Moscow. As he would in each of the next three years' crises, Dr Goebbels initially counseled Hitler against over-hasty action. Still grappling with the decision the Führer phoned to invite him to join his private train that night; they argued for hours, and by Munich Goebbels was still urging caution.¹⁰⁹

March 1.

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Hitler however had made up his mind. On Sunday March 1, wrote Goebbels, his expression was calm but determined. Hitler explained his own credo: 'To the bold belongs the world!' Back in his chancellery in Berlin that Monday Hitler unveiled the plan to his commanders-in-chief. On Saturday (because, wrote Goebbels, Saturdays were best) he would proclaim that Germany was reoccupying the Rhineland, but simultaneously he would offer to return to the League of Nations and to sign a non-aggression pact with France. He was taking a calculated risk: France still had the biggest army in Europe. Britain, France, and Italy would all be justified in intervening.

'Nothing venture, nothing gain,' was Goebbels' attitude, all his former caution thrown to the winds.¹¹⁰ After lunching with Hitler that Thursday he mockingly referred to the throngs of 'knicker-wetters' in the foreign ministry.¹¹¹ In fact the Cabinet, belatedly briefed on Friday, the eve of the operation, loyally backed Hitler. Goebbels sent two paneloads of puzzled journalists into the Rhineland ahead of the marching troops. After Hitler announced his move to cheering Reichstag deputies that Saturday morning, Goebbels could hear the crowds 'exulting' below—a theme that would soon become a commonplace in his chronicle. 'Wire-taps show the world of diplomacy all at sea,' he recorded, adding, 'And the Rhineland a sea of joy.'¹¹²

It was perhaps the one moment in history when Hitler could have been stopped. His own generals had panicked, but Goebbels urged him to hang tough. 'If we keep our nerve now,' he wrote afterward, 'we've won.'¹¹³

Mar. 17, '36

* Dr. T. I was back in his good office again. Got into a bit of a quandary when humans become parabolic earth, so their power relations with angels and demons alter & become augmented. The A's and D's are obliged to move more carefully. Signs of rebellion appear.

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25: A Man of Property

HITLER had called an election to endorse his action in the Rhine-land. The climax was vintage Goebbels. He ordained that fifteen minutes before Hitler broadcast from Krupps' munitions works in Essen, a fitting stage, on March 27, every radio station would transmit the command to Hoist Flags on every building and homestead in Germany, to flutter until the election was over. As Hitler himself stepped to the microphone at four P.M., the Krupps' sirens were to hail 'the beginning of the Führer's great appeal for peace,' joined by the klaxons of every factory, locomotive, barge, and ship. While these sirens sang all traffic was to halt, demonstrating that the entire nation stood behind the Führer and his 'policy of peace.' The election's eve, Saturday March 28, was to see immense demonstrations throughout the country. Ten minutes before eight P.M. the great bells of Cologne's Gothic cathedral would toll, splendidly amplified by radios throughout the country, their clangor fading only as Hitler himself began to speak. After that, decreed Goebbels, the entire nation in unison, sixty-seven million voices, would sing the ancient Netherlands Prayer of Thanksgiving (to which he was particularly attached). Then would come the crucial Goebbels masterstroke—the deft touch which set him apart from all his imitators: Every radio station would fall *silent* for fifteen minutes, marking a reverent end to this, his 1936 campaign.¹

Thus it came to pass. Two weeks earlier he had written, 'This election just can't go wrong.'² (It would have been a miracle if it had, as the ballot papers bore only the names of Hitler and, in suitably smaller print, of Göring, Hess, Goebbels, and Frick; there was no provision whatever for voters to express dissent.)³ On Sunday March 29 98.6 percent of the voting population streamed into the polling booths, and 98.7 percent of those voted for Hitler—44,399,000 adult Germans.

March 29.

A CONCRETE gesture of Hitler's gratitude followed.

For some months Goebbels, now a best-selling author, had been wondering if he could afford to buy the summer cottage at Cladow.⁴ On one visit to Obersalzberg he had told Max Winkler, his business adviser, that he wanted to provide for his family and was thinking of buying a farm. Winkler advised against it—the minister would only lose money on the land. Besides, what funds had he in mind? Goebbels mentioned this idea to Hitler, who promised to have a word with Goebbels' publisher

1936

Max Amann;³ the minister now raised his sights and inspected a more luxurious redbrick property on Schwanenwerder, a millionaire's peninsula jutting into the Wannsee lake.⁴ The villa and its gate lodge in Insel Strasse stood on a gentle wooded incline verging on the bull-rush-fringed lakeshore. The property had, it seems, formerly belonged to one of the Barmat brothers, the Jewish embezzlers who had fled to Holland even before Hitler came to power.⁵ It was now in the name of the Jewish bank director Oskar Schlitter.⁶ Almost ten years earlier, Dr Goebbels and *Angriff* had repeatedly inveighed against 'Schweinenwerder' (Isle of Pigs) as a 'Jew-boys' paradise.⁷ Now he was going to 'out-Jew' them all.

At the climax of the Rhineland election campaign Karl Hanke brought the necessary papers over to Goebbels at Godesberg.⁸ Hitler wholeheartedly approved of the purchase. He believed in assisting his best lieutenants to become men of property.⁹ The final purchase price was 270,000 marks. The Führer personally phoned Goebbels from Munich guaranteeing that the money would be forthcoming—'Amann has turned up trumps again,' Goebbels wrote. He moved his family into the Schwanenwerder property just before Easter 1936, and invited his favorite younger sister Maria to stay with them.¹²

How did he eventually finance the deal? Goebbels asked Winkler to discuss the capital value of his private diaries with Amann. Amann accompanied him back to Berlin one day in October and they agreed terms. Goebbels had in mind an outright payment of three million marks for the diaries, but Amann came up with a different proposal: Goebbels should sell all rights to him, for publication twenty years after his death. '250,000 marks immediately and 100,000 marks per annum. That,' Goebbels recorded in a massive understatement, 'is most generous.'¹³ This was undoubtedly the origin of the cash he handed over in November to complete the Schwanenwerder deal: surviving among Goebbels' papers in 1945 a sheet of paper would be found listing his account with Amann's publishing house, showing that during 1936 they paid him advances totaling 290,000 marks against earnings of a much lower figure, 63,416.31 marks.¹⁴

MEANWHILE Magda has furnished the guest lodge for her idol, Adolf Hitler. In later years he will often show up unannounced, bringing perhaps Jakob Werlin, general manager of Daimler-Benz, to sample her crème caramel. His adjutant tips the Goebbels' servants and, later, will surrender to her the food-ration coupons for Hitler's share.¹⁵

For most of 1936 Magda Goebbels alternates between a sulky obstinacy and uxorial bliss. She grouches that she never has enough housekeeping money but the ministry's records show that two days before they move in to Schwanenwerder Goebbels has ordered his ministerial and parliamentary salaries paid directly into her bank account.¹⁶

Scene She resigns herself to his (perhaps imagined) infidelities.¹⁷ Vacationing with her in Switzerland, Mussolini's daughter Edda Ciano philosophizes that an unfaithful spouse is but a trivial annoyance in one's mortal span.

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Magda begins to go out more alone. One day Goebbels records moodily that the moment Magda returns home he leaves for Schwanenwerder—'I have no place I can call home when she's there.'¹⁸ Oppressed by the chains of marriage, he lies out late on the darkening meadow gazing at the stars.¹⁹ He indulges in a large motor launch, and spends many an afternoon lolling about the lake, chatting on its mobile phone to his friends; he buys another boat for Magda and the children.²⁰ Hanfstaengl describes one ghastly incident at a Goebbels party: As the last guests leave, the crippled minister trips and falls; Magda helps him to his feet. Purple with rage, he seizes her by the throat and forces her sideways to her knees. 'There,' he screams, 'now you see who is the stronger, who is the master!'²¹ After one tiff she resorts to tears. 'Sometimes she gets into a state,' he writes helplessly, 'like all women. Then you've just got to bare your teeth at her.'²²

His own circle expands. She becomes accustomed to all the other lovelies fluttering around her powerful husband.²³ There is a stream of delectable wannabee-actresses. 'I'll try,' notes Goebbels succinctly after Eva Vanya visits, seeking a role.²⁴ Anny Ondra, the blonde, cheerful, and naïve wife of boxer Max Schmeling, comes to Schwanenwerder; Goebbels finds Edda Ciano, who also comes, 'frightfully painted, like just about every other Italian woman.'²⁵ At the Italian embassy's reception for Edda, Bella Fromm notices that Goebbels ventures only the curtest nod in Leni Riefenstahl's direction.²⁶

It is the children who hold the Goebbels marriage together in the mid-Thirties. Helga, the apple of Hitler's eye too now, sits on her papa's lap singing lustily as they return from the seaside near Peenemünde that July.²⁷ 'Grandma is old,' she declares solemnly that summer. 'But Papa is—new!'²⁸ As the three children splash around in a new rubber dinghy, his heart aches with parental love.²⁹ He persuades the Cabinet to approve the death-penalty for child kidnappers. Hitler will say that if little Helga were twenty years older, and he twenty years younger, she would have made the ideal wife for him. An enchanting, precocious, graceful girl she will captivate everybody with remarks that are as genuine as Hitler's are contrived. 'My little heart is thumping,' she squawks in one moment of girlish panic, and her doting father remembers the words in his diary.³⁰

AMONG the cavalcades of English ladies passing through Berlin that summer of 1936 is Diana Mitford. Staying with her sister Unity at Schwanenwerder for the Olympic Games, she conveys to Goebbels a plea for secret funds from Sir Oswald Mosley, an upstanding and forceful former minister who has resigned from the British Labour party to set up his own radical movement along fascist lines. (When Mosley had visited Hitler on April 25, 1935, Goebbels noted in his unpublished diary: 'He makes a good impression. A bit brash, which he tries to conceal behind a forced pushiness. Otherwise acceptable however. Of course he's on his best behavior. The Führer has set to work on him. Wonder if he'll ever come to power?')³¹ By 1936 Mosley is already receiving substantial

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secret aid from Mussolini, and now he is boldly asking Hitler for an infusion of one hundred thousand pounds (around half a million dollars).³² Taking Diana and her sister Unity to see Hitler on June 19, 1936 Dr Goebbels procures (his diary claims) £10,000 for Mosley—less than the asking amount, but still a very substantial contribution given Germany's currency shortages.³³ Goebbels is dubious about Mosley, and nominates Franz Wrede, of the party's press office, to smuggle the cash over to London.³⁴ 'Mosley must work harder,' summarizes Goebbels after Wrede reports back to him, 'and be less mercenary.'³⁵ When Diana returns in August, asking for more, he fobs her off (with Hitler's approval). 'They must learn to help themselves,' he comments, recollecting his own penniless start in Berlin.³⁶

As her private sorrows increase, Magda drinks more heavily, and sometimes her eye wanders. It is Rosenberg, of all people, who tips off Goebbels about a certain Lüdecke in her life.³⁷ At first she cries a lot and denies it when he asks her, leaving him agonizing over whether she's lying. On the first night in August, the day the Berlin Olympiad opens, she admits that she has strayed. 'A great blow to my trust,' he writes, downcast. 'It'll take me a while to get over it.'³⁸ He spends sleepless nights brooding, and evidently mentions it to Hitler. 'He praises Magda a lot,' he writes after that. 'Finds her bewitching, "the best wife I could ever find."' 'When I speak alone with him,' records the young minister the next day, 'he talks to me like a father.'³⁹

Not for the last time, Magda leaves for the White Hart sanitarium in Dresden, playground of the wealthy, leaving her children at Schwanenwerder for the summer. Goebbels barely misses her. He has his hands full with planning the Nuremberg rally; Hitler has flatly rejected his half-hearted suggestion that they skip the rally this year because of the Olympics.⁴⁰

THE Olympic games of 1936 were a sporting and propaganda triumph for Germany. Tourists flooded in.⁴¹ Confounding foreign expectations Hitler ruled that all competitors be treated with equal respect regardless of race or religion. Goebbels ordered the party to keep a low profile.⁴² As Leni Riefenstahl's crews filmed the events, awash with a 1.2 million-mark loan from the ministry, Goebbels found her increasingly tiresome. 'I have had to knock some sense into La Riefenstahl,' he wrote. 'Her behavior is unspeakable! A hysterical woman! Anyway, no man.'⁴³ Their spat would continue until Hitler lost patience, banged their heads together, ordered Goebbels to accompany him to Riefenstahl's villa in Dahlem, and had a joint photograph printed in every newspaper the next day.⁴⁴

At the end of the games Goebbels staged the most sumptuous all-night party of his life. Benno von Arent's stage designers and craftsmen had labored for weeks to convert Peacock Island, an unspoilt wilderness near Potsdam, into a fairy grotto; thousands of butterfly-shaped lamps graced the trees, and there were three outdoor dance floors, brightly colored marquees, and tables for thousands of guests—among them Gustav

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Fröhlich and his eye-catching filmstar fiancée Lida Baarova, upon whom Goebbels heaped particular compliments this night; he had again noticed her talents in her latest film a few weeks earlier.⁴⁵ 'Everybody with legs was there,' recorded the little Doctor proudly afterwards, knowing he had outdone Goring at last. He sashayed around in an elegant white suit; Magda, never one to miss a party, had returned from Dresden, and glided at his side in a bright organdy outfit. 'Where the government gets the money from to entertain thus lavishly,' wrote Louis Lochner in a letter home, 'I don't know.'⁴⁶

The good times rolled for Dr Goebbels all that summer. He had the new launch, and a new Mercedes 5.4 liter two-seats sports car.⁴⁷ He had ordered yet another limousine, an open Horch tourer just like the Führer's.⁴⁸ He test-cruised an even classier motor boat.⁴⁹ And yet, in the more distant valleys of his mind, it was as if he could already hear a bell tolling—more persistent, more penetrating than the great peal of Cologne. He sat brooding at his desk, drafting his speech for the Nuremberg rally, reading up on the communist reign of terror in Republican Spain. The Reds there had slain priests and nuns, and butchered seven thousand of their enemies in Madrid alone. Might not the same one day come to pass in Berlin?

'Woe betide us in that event,' he wrote thoughtfully in his diary. 'We and our families would all be done for. The best thing then would be to finish yourself off first.'⁵⁰

Aug 18, 1936

26: Femme Fatale

LIVE wild, live fine! writes Goebbels in September 1936, opening a new diary.¹ He has just embarked upon the most destructive emotional entanglement of his life. He has seen Lida Baarova in her new film in June, and again at the Peacock Island fête in August, and it may be no coincidence that his new villa on Schwanenwerder is only a stone's throw from Gustav Fröhlich's twelve-roomed mansion, set amid tennis courts and boathouses by the lake. With Magda a fugitive from marriage in her Dresden sanitarium and again broodily pregnant—is 'Lüdecke' perhaps the father?²—the young minister soon tires of his latest private secretary Lucie Kammer. He often glances at his glamorous neighbors. When Lida returns one afternoon from the August Olympiad she finds him casually strolling down Insel Strasse with Helga and Hilde. He asks if he may have a look over the Fröhlich mansion. Her lover Gustl innocently obliges, while the little girls and Lida play with Fröhlich's lavish train set.³

On August 18, three days after Peacock Island, he invites the young couple out in his launch.⁴ Years later Lida will give her own shy account of this picnic cruise. The pretty actress sisters Höpfner, whom Goebbels is also cultivating, have joined them. It is a broiling-hot day, they swim, cruise, and sip tea until her Gustl apologizes that he has an all-night shoot at the studios and can one of the police escort-launches take them ashore?

'I always go everywhere with him,' explains Lida. The words strike a chord in Goebbels—Magda shares none of his interests. He insists jovially that Lida stay. Gustl, visibly annoyed, leaves without her. As the full moon rises, reflected in the still waters of the Wannsee, Goebbels limps over and stands behind Lida at the railing. 'How do you like it here in Germany?' he asks. His melodious, rich voice seems to caress her, she will later say. The bond is forged at this moment.

His rival, Gustav Fröhlich, meanwhile makes a classic mistake: After visiting his estranged spouse, a Jewess who has emigrated to London, he accidentally calls Lida by the wife's name at a tender moment. She flounces back to her own humble lodgings off Kurfürstendamm.

For a while that August Goebbels lets things drift. He takes Magda to Venice. But it is the actress Lilian Harvey with whom he punts along the canals while pregnant Magda stays in the hotel.⁵ The hunt is on—he cannot get Lida out of his mind. She is a head and shoulders taller than

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Sep 8, 1936

he is, but she has an arresting Slavonic beauty. Her fresh young face has both childish innocence and womanly guile. Early in September he ascertains that she is resting with her mother at Franzensbad, a spa near Nuremberg. Suddenly he begins looking forward to this year's Nuremberg rally after all. His diary records 'diverse phone calls' on the fifth about the première of *Traitors*, her latest film with Fröhlich—Goebbels is arranging to switch it to Nuremberg; phoning Magda from Nuremberg he pleads with her to stay away at Dresden or Schwanenwerder. Then phoning Lida he invites her over to Nuremberg, reassuring her that fellow actors Irene von Meyendorff and Willy Birgel will be coming too—'You can't miss out on this!' he says.

His rally speech on September 8 is one of his finest. Towering above the thousands on a lofty pulpit, he forcefully describes the murderous rampage of the bolsheviks in Spain, and the 'pathological and criminal madness' of their Jewish masters in Moscow.⁶

Lida arrives the next day, Saturday September 9. At the Grand Hotel banquet after the premiere he fusses over her, he flirts, and then commands her to accompany him over to Hitler's hotel. Here a female singer softly croons Nico Dostal's latest hit, 'I am so much in love...', and Lida is flustered to hear Dr Goebbels murmur in her ear, '... me too!'⁷ He has done this so often before, it is second nature to him now. As the party breaks up she plants a harmless kiss on his cheek; he removes the smudge with a pocket handkerchief, solemnly tucks it into his top pocket, and pleads with her to stay over and lunch with him the next day, Sunday. Here he inquires casually if she is still unmarried, and catching an aggrieved undertone in her reply about her lover's reluctance to remarry, he diffidently asks: 'Would you turn me down if I asked to see you again?'

That Sunday afternoon he asks her to stay on, to hear his second great speech. 'Please look at me closely as I speak,' he says, and pulls out that handkerchief. 'I shall dab at my lips with this, as a sign that I am thinking of you.'

What twenty-two-year-old female (Lida's birthday has fallen just three days before) is not bowled over by such artful devices? Bedazzled, Lida again puts off returning to her mother at Franzensbad. Goebbels makes no mention whatever of her in his diary of these days. 'A miracle has happened,' is all he writes.⁸ After the speech, in a circumlocution that will become familiar to its readers, he carefully records 'a little drive to recuperate'; the next afternoon, Monday, 'some sleep'; and then, without mentioning *whose*, 'departure to Franzensbad.'⁹ He sends his adjutant to the railroad station to see Lida off with roses and a photograph inscribed, 'Auf Wiedersehen!' A few days later he certainly sees her again in Nuremberg. 'A visitor from Franzensbad,' he notes, 'about which I am much pleased.'¹⁰ This is the first time that he has passed significant, if camouflaged, comments on a prospective lover in his diary.

Lida Baarova will affect him more profoundly than any other woman since Anka. They will bring to each other great happiness: But the ensuing romance, which is almost entirely platonic, will sweep him to

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the brink of divorce, self-exile, and even suicide. As for Lida, she will nobly abstain from the general calumny of him after his death. Legions of obscure starlets will claim, without a shred of supporting evidence, that he forced himself upon them. 'It would have left him no time at all for work,' Lida points out.

'Toward me,' she still insists, 'his behavior was impeccable.' It is his courtesy and patience as a suitor that impress her. But does she ever truly love him? Even years later she cannot be sure. 'I loved him in my own way,' she will recollect. 'I was very young and you are very susceptible at that age. . . . He loved me so deeply, that I fell in love with love itself.'¹¹

AT THIS Nuremberg rally Hitler announced a four-year plan for Germany. His grand ideas on foreign policy came as no surprise to Goebbels.¹² After sitting in on one conference aboard Hitler's yacht *Grille* at Kiel in May 1936 he had noted down the Führer's prophetic vision of a United States of Europe under a German leadership. 'Years, perhaps even decades of work toward that end,' he commented in his diary. 'But what an end!'¹³ Mussolini's victory in Abyssinia had seemingly confirmed one important lesson: that might was right. 'Anything else is nonsense,' concluded Goebbels.¹⁴ Clearly at Hitler's behest he was already gearing up for future hostilities. He established close relations with the Wehrmacht, and had quiet talks with Blomberg about beefing up transmitter powers and mobilizing war reporters.¹⁵ 'The Führer,' he added after another secret meeting with Hitler, Papen, and Ribbentrop, 'sees a conflict coming in the Far East. Japan will thrash Russia. And then our great hour will come. Then we shall have to carve off enough territory to last us a hundred years. Let's hope that we're ready, and that the Führer is still alive.'¹⁶ Anticipating that moment, late in November 1936 Hitler signed a deal with the Japanese. Over dinner with the signatories, Hitler prophetically remarked that it would not bear fruit for another five years. 'He really is taking the long view in foreign policy,' marveled his propaganda minister.¹⁷

While relations with Göring were strained but stable, a never-ending feud with Alfred Rosenberg had broken out, fueled by Goebbels' doctrinaire plans for a 105-member cultural senate and a seventh sub-chamber of the Reich chamber of culture. Suffice to say that Rosenberg still claimed culture as his own domain.¹⁸ Toward Hess as deputy Führer Goebbels preserved a bemused if antiseptic cordiality; in truth he found Hess bourgeois and probably unbalanced. Hess's businesslike chief of staff Martin Bormann suggested that he had neither imagination nor initiative—and would be proven wrong on both counts five years later.¹⁹ Goebbels had already spotted that it could be dangerous to have Bormann himself as an enemy.²⁰ Goebbels' early admiration for Ribbentrop had waned during 1935 and expired entirely after he was appointed ambassador in London in August 1936. He then took every opportunity he could to score off him. When agency photos arrived showing Ribbentrop's seventeen-year-old son leaving their Eaton Square house in his Westmin-

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ster school uniform of top hat and tails, Goebbels cruelly ensured that they were printed in every Berlin newspaper that Hitler read.²¹ Mercy was not a quality in which he excelled.

It is mid-September 1936 before Magda returns from Dresden to Berlin. She works off her rancor on her little husband. 'Magda's changing,' he notes self-righteously. 'It's sickening!'²² Seeking affection he turns to Lida Baarova, temporarily ensconced in the Hotel Eden with Fröhlich, to whom she has returned; their respective villas on Schwanenwerder are mothballed for the winter. He obtains an advance print of Fröhlich's latest movie, *City of Anatolia*, and offers to show it to them. The actor swallows the bait and his pride, and brings Lida along. Afterward Goebbels notes that Fröhlich's acting is not all that good; but it is with Fröhlich that Lida nonetheless leaves, bound for Franzensbad.²³

A grander campaign plan is called for. With some prodding the City of Berlin agrees to give Goebbels for his lifetime a domain in one of its forests on his forthcoming birthday. He has inspected it with Karl Hanke in mid-September; it is near the forest village of Lanke, about twenty miles north-east of the capital. Hanke has selected an idyllic location on a little swan lake, the Bogensee, enveloped by groves of fir, beech, and pine. 'All around, the deepest solitude,' describes Goebbels. 'Hanke has done his stuff well.' With manpower provided by the labour service, a two-story woodframed house is rapidly erected on an incline at the water's edge. A tall wire fence will be thrown up around the entire lake to preserve the minister's privacy.²⁴ (House and fence are still there. The author, visiting it nearly sixty years later, found one rusting hook in a nearby mildewed tree where once a children's swing had hung.)

Later that month he flies to Greece with Magda, taking in the Acropolis ('this noble temple of Nordic art') and Parthenon; he meets prime minister Johannis Metaxas, who professes to like the Germans as much as he loathes the Jews and bolsheviks. Then he returns to Berlin and continues furnishing his love-nest at Lanke, including among its accoutrements a special diary—kept just during his visits out here.²⁵

He fantasizes about being out here alone with Lida Baarova. He phones her in Prague, where she is visiting her mother, to ask when she will be back. 'Quite soon,' she replies guilelessly. 'Gustl's staying on at Karlsbad.'

He escorts her out frequently in the evenings. On October 5 his diary coyly records 'a little *Spazierfahrt*,' a motor outing before he returns late to bed.²⁶ Appeasing Magda he buys her a costly ring on Hellmut's first birthday. His diary sparkles with occasional flattery of Magda, but it has a dutiful quality.²⁷ Visiting the gracious spa resort of Baden-Baden (without Magda) in October he is evidently not alone, as witness the unexplained phrases that slip into its pages, like those on the twelfth, when the night ends with 'a big disappointment,' followed by the disembodied remark: 'Did not come down from room any more.' Followed by: 'I am so sad.'²⁸ At Berlin upon his return he finds Magda livid: 'About nothing—nothing at all.' Undaunted he goes out motoring again that afternoon,

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and stops at their (deserted) Schwanenwerder villa on the way back. It would be charitable to assume that he was alone, were it not self-evident that his diary has now become the vehicle for half-truths.

On the day before the new house at Lanke is formally handed over to him Magda takes the dour but handsome Hanke out to see it. Goebbels seizes the opportunity to visit Schwanenwerder again, where Lida Baarova is house-sitting the dust-sheeted Fröhlich villa three lots from his own.²⁹ He phones to invite himself round for tea. Lida points out how improper that would seem; covered with embarrassment, the minister suggests they motor out one day to see Lanke instead.³⁰ 'You know I have a little house out there now,' he says. 'We can have tea there. It's very pretty.' She helplessly falls in with his suggestion that one day she should motor out along the new autobahn in her little black and white BMW to the Lanke exit, where his chauffeur Alfred Rach will be waiting to meet her with his new open Horch tourer.³¹ 'All Berlin used to speak about his love affairs,' Rach will later reminisce, adding a revealing remark: 'He found that very flattering.'³²

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On his birthday at the end of October he drives out to Lanke. It is an idyll, romantic and tranquil. After that he takes Magda out there on the first day of November. Alone together in the middle of this autumn forest of yellowing leaves, fog, and rain, they spend a quiet day hanging pictures, playing the piano, and singing Schubert's lieder.³³ The next day his heavy Horch limousine returns, splashing through the fresh puddles—'all alone,' he writes, an untruth which his own diary exposes a few lines later. (He writes, 'We cook ourselves something.') This is the occasion that Lida will later describe, when his manservant Kaiser burns their only provisions, fried potatoes. Of such tiny episodes romantic memories are made. On November 5 the diary finds him out at Lanke once more, 'taking refuge' from 'unpleasantness' at home. 'She is so fickle,' he sighs on Magda's birthday. 'Sometimes good and sometimes horrid. But that's probably just how women are.'³⁴

He has less than nine years left of his allotted span, but he has assembled all the baggage that go with middle life: A beauteous young mistress; a dissatisfied, nagging wife; and three angelic infants who thump around the bare floor above him far into the night. 'It is music to my ears,' writes Dr Goebbels, still aged only thirty-nine.³⁵

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ONE evening in September 1936 Magda brought Diana Mitford to dinner at Schwanenwerder. Hearing that Sir Oswald Mosley, leader of the British Union of Fascists, was planning to marry Diana in secret, Magda suggested they do it in Berlin. Goebbels didn't like the idea and harumphed about it in his diary: Magda was getting too involved, he felt.³⁶ Hitler and Goebbels agreed that Mosley was not a great man; but Hitler coughed up funds for Diana, according to the diary, when she visited Berlin at the time of the Edward VIII crisis.³⁷

The secret wedding went ahead in Magda's drawing room at No. 20 Hermann-Göring Strasse; Magda invited the guests, who included Hitler,

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out to Schwanenwerder for lunch. The new Lady Mosley gave Goebbels an inside account of the royal scandal. The new king wanted to marry an American woman, already once divorced and still married to another, she said. Goebbels professed dismay at the depths a proud empire could sink to; but this was the king who, as Prince of Wales, had openly praised Hitler's social program and they all—Hitler, Goebbels, and Ribbentrop—agreed to do the decent thing now. As the American and Continental press broke into a raucous hue-and-cry Dr Goebbels, with Hitler's approval, forbade the German media to print one whisper on the scandal. After King Edward abdicated the Nazi wiretappers heard one British embassy official commenting that the new Duke of Windsor would not easily forget Hitler's restraint.³⁸

Their discretion was poorly rewarded. During 1937 and 1938 the anti-Nazi jibes from some elements of the British press multiplied. Ribbentrop told Goebbels that much of it was controlled by the Jews, as were Britain's cinema chains.³⁹ He suggested they purchase cinemas in London. Goebbels listened sympathetically. His ministry was awash with money, and he did use some secret funds to buy up foreign newspapers as well.⁴⁰ Like Hitler he regarded Britain as holding the key to Germany's future. But how to proceed? Mosley was 'spending a fortune and getting nowhere,' he concluded; he had won no seats at all in the municipal elections. 'I think he's a busted flush,' wrote Goebbels after a further panhandling visitation by Lady Mosley in August 1937.⁴¹

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His admiration of Hitler was now unconditional.⁴² The Führer confided in him regularly. In mid-July 1936 he and Magda had spent three days at the Berghof, Hitler's lavish new mountainside domain high above Berchtesgaden. 'We had a long parlay,' writes Goebbels. 'The three of us—the Führer, Göring, and I. That's always best.'⁴³ They had all shared the annual Wagner experience at Bayreuth that summer. In October 1936 Hitler had assigned to Goebbels an upstairs room at his own Berghof, a certain sign of his esteem for him.⁴⁴

Knowing Hitler's intentions, Goebbels took a closer interest in their growing armed forces. In early 1937 he spoke for two hours to selected Wehrmacht commanders about propaganda.⁴⁵ General von Blomberg attached significant weight to the wartime role of propaganda. In that autumn's maneuvers Goebbels' new propaganda units took part for the first time. There was one uncomfortable detail: Although Berlin went into full blackout, the 'enemy' planes still got through and Goebbels' ministry was adjudged a blazing ruin by the referees. 'Let's hope it's never for real,' he gasped in his diary.⁴⁶

THE Goebbels family spends a few days early in 1937 at Hitler's Berghof again. Before turning in one night, Goebbels speaks for some hours with Magda, now heavily pregnant, about love and marriage. He feels they are growing closer again, as always 'when nobody comes between us.'⁴⁷ After a couple of days he leaves his family there and returns to Berlin.