

1933

1933

Heiden

Walt

Hauptstadt

Lukas

Books in this File

The German Empire 1870-1918 Sturmer
The Rising Empire - Hoffner

Q.M.P. - Bues

The Life of the Bee

swarm of the previous year; and is naturally reluctant to venture far into space, having indeed almost forgotten the use of her wings.

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The bee-keeper waits till the mass be completely gathered together; then, having covered his head with a large straw hat (for the most inoffensive bee will conceive itself caught in a trap if entangled in hair, and will infallibly use its sting), but, if he be experienced, wearing neither mask nor veil; having taken the precaution only of plunging his arms in cold water up to the elbow, he proceeds to gather the swarm by vigorously shaking the bough from which the bees depend over an inverted hive. Into this hive the cluster will fall as heavily as an over-ripe fruit. Or, if the branch be too stout, he can plunge a spoon into the mass; and deposit where he will the living spoonfuls, as though he were ladling out corn. He

The Swarm

need have no fear of the bees that are buzzing around him, settling on his face and hands. The air resounds with their song of ecstasy, which is different far from their chant of anger. He need have no fear that the swarm will divide, or grow fierce, will scatter, or try to escape. This is a day, I repeat, when a spirit of holiday would seem to animate these mysterious workers, a spirit of confidence, that apparently nothing can trouble. They have detached themselves from the wealth they had to defend, and they no longer recognise their enemies. They become inoffensive because of their happiness, though why they are happy we know not, except it be because they are obeying their law. A moment of such blind happiness is accorded by nature at times to every living thing, when she seeks to accomplish her end. Nor need we feel any surprise that here the bees are

Swarm

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or do they refuse to transfer their affection and attentions? Such fidelity is admirable, but does cast doubt on the good sense of bees; the inflexible course taken almost inevitably ends in death. Why does instinct, if not intelligence, not serve them better here?

Beekkeepers have devised many methods of dealing with laying workers, but most don't work, at least not in my experience. The conventional technique is to take the hive a couple of hundred yards from its stand, dump the entire colony on the ground, and then return the empty hive to its original place. Theoretically, the laying worker, heavy with eggs and unused to being outside, can't fly back with the others, cut down by her own pretensions. This solution is tempting in its comforting implications and easy application. The flaw is that the laying worker, despite her bulk, usually hustles back to the hive with the others within minutes to resume her labors as a single parent, while other may die from the rough handling.

I have read many techniques guaranteed to introduce a queen to a colony with a laying worker, but do not personally know anyone who succeeded in reforming such deviant behavior. Occasionally a colony will accept a new queen and reject the laying worker, but this is rare. Many authorities believe that the only real solution is to kill off the entire colony, or unite it with a stronger one that is queenright; members of the latter we assume, are outraged by such corrupt behavior and kill the bogus queen to protect their own legitimate sovereign and conventional way of life. This represents a moral or political solution, the underlying theology supporting the quixotic notion that, given a chance, the erring bees will return to the path of virtue. Virtue, however, is helped along if the strong normal, or square, colony first kills the laying worker or reeducates her to her proper role.

The remaining workers must recognize that there is no salvation for them, and yet, in a final act of despairing self-deception they may build a queen cell around one of the drone eggs,

suggesting that their need for normalcy has deprived them of their reason and they are trying to deny or wish away their troubles with a final heroic illusion, one last grand fatal fantasy.

The whole problem of the laying worker puzzles me. Usually bees are clever enough in resolving their difficulties, but here they seem fatalistic, stupid, or deprived of reason. I can find no excuse for them. Would it not be simple and sensible enough for a colony with no queen and no eggs to produce a queen simply by stealing a newly laid egg from another hive? Surely their scruples are not above it. They will steal honey from neighboring colonies quickly enough; they are not adverse to slaughtering their own kind, in robbing, to advance their personal fortunes. Why, then, this reluctance to take bold and imaginative action? Why this surrender to adversity and terminal virtue?

FIFTY-SEVEN



Despair is a quality usually associated only with man, and yet I have seen despair, or what passes for despair, in other creatures. Despair is not to be confused with sorrow, which is a sadness, usually over a loss—despair is an overwhelming black melancholy that comes with the certain knowledge or belief that all is lost, there is no hope, despair feeding upon despair. Because humans are volatile in their emotions, despair may be a temporary condition following a severe setback of some kind, and recovery will probably follow eventually with the healing balm of time.

In animals despair usually comes with a severe illness that precedes death. We have no way of knowing, of course, whether

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Laying
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The
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cling about the hive or indecision. This is, for her, the supreme moment.

She flies swift and high, soon joined by hundreds or even thousands of drones. Their own built-in sensing system tells them the virgin queen is ready for mating. Now the drone's special tracking equipment serves him well, the powerful wings, the wide range of sight, the keen sense of smell, the mighty instinct to mate. Nature mobilizes all forces in this drama of reproduction.

The virgin queen is pursued not only by drones from her own hive, her brothers, but also by those from neighboring hives, all drawn by her scent and signals. Often the drones gather in a common congregating area, spending their days in idleness, like so many loafers in a neighborhood park or pool hall, perhaps boasting of their prowess, but certainly not of past conquests. They engage in daily reconnaissance flights, a kind of cruising, to sniff out receptive females.

The queen passes over this sexual staging area, alerting the lusting drones. The diversity of males helps prevent inbreeding, but the fastest and fittest will prevail. Today the drone is no longer a greedy buffoon. He is all grace, power, and determination, fired by his own ardor and life's mission.

The virgin queen usually goes on her mating flight alone, although she may be accompanied by a few bridesmaids from her hive. If she comes from a weak hive, and possibly is the only princess, the sole hope for a marginal community, the entire colony may accompany her.

Quickly the virgin queen and her suitors outdistance any escorts or bodyguards. She and the drones fly faster and higher than the workers. Nature has given the queen powerful wings and a streamlined body to outdistance all but the swiftest drones.

Before her mating flight, the virgin princess passed among the drones in the hive without causing the least excitement or arousing passion. Until the mating flight there can be no union of drone and queen. Copulation can take place only in the air.

The mating flight is brief, usually lasting less than twenty minutes and averaging about thirteen. No facet of a bee's life is private; her most intimate secrets have been documented and timed.

Queen and drones fly higher and faster. Soon only the most stalwart suitors are left; the feeble, sick, old, malnourished, and uninterested and those from inactive or impoverished hives have given up the pursuit. Finally one remains. Because of the intricacies of his anatomy, the drone can mate only when the rush of air forces open the lower part of his abdomen, freeing his genitals to enter the queen's open vulva.

His organ enters the queen, ejecting his sperm. There is a pop, resembling an explosion or cracking sound. The successful drone pays dearly for victory over his less fit rivals. In the instant of copulation his genitals are torn from him, his abdomen ruptured; he falls to earth paralyzed, to die, his male organ left behind dangling from the queen like a trophy. This seems a rather high price for success, even by nature's standards, a cruel and lethal jest. Is it altogether chance that the mating pair outraces the other drones, who do not see what befalls the victor?

We know the mechanics of this sex act but nothing of its emotional state. I like to think there is an instant of pleasure or rapture for these pawns of nature before the drone is struck down. Is the queen briefly a voluptuary, taking pleasure in her body and its fulfillment, or only mechanically obeying a biological drive with no sensual satisfaction?

In any case, there you have the sex life of the bees, a rather grim ending for the lecherous drone who gives his all for survival of the fittest, his fit progeny surviving as he perishes. How did bees ever become equated with sex? They do not live a riotous sex life themselves, and are mere agents in pollinating plants. A hive suggests the cloister more than the bordello. All but the queen and the condemned drones who mate are chaste from beginning to end.

* A.H.'s fears in 1928 with Celi.

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queens, or a negotiated truce or decree laid down by a weak colony to speed up brood production for the good of the hive. Even such an inbred tradition as queen rivalry must yield to the common welfare.

The arrangement, whatever is behind it, does not last long. One day the older queen simply disappears; I surmise that the bees, at a time of their own choosing, for reasons known only to them, have done away with their old mother, or she died of natural causes, which led the colony to build supersedure cells in the first place.

FORTY-ONE



After killing her rivals, or being prevented from doing so, the new princess spends the first few days of life preparing for her great moment: the mating flight. If successful, she will kill the reigning queen, her mother, and herself take over as mother to the hive. First, however, she wanders aimlessly over the combs; the colony pays little attention to her before she has proved herself. The virgin princess tends to race about the hive giddily and aimlessly. During this period she must feed herself from the stores of honey, but after the mating flight she will never have to do this again. She pauses occasionally to peer out the hive entrance, as if contemplating what lies ahead.

On a warm sunny day, she ventures outside on the landing board, at first hesitant, dazed by the brilliant sunshine after the darkness of the hive. She pauses briefly, getting used to the outdoor world which she will forsake immediately upon taking over her new role.

Suddenly she tucks her long, slender legs under her body

and gracefully takes to the air. This princess is a strong flier from the beginning, but at first she takes only short flights to develop her wings and learn to find her way back to the hive. Upon gaining strength and confidence, her flights become progressively longer and she ventures farther from the hive.

Even these prenuptial flights are not without risk. She may be eaten by birds, killed by other bees, fall victim to mishaps due to abrupt changes in weather, or encounter unforeseen foes. The longer she is away and the farther the flight, the greater the risk.

After the fourth day, the virgin princess is ready to mate, but this must occur before the twentieth day or she cannot become fertile, one of nature's built-in timetables that demand that certain events must happen at a given time or they can never take place in a normal manner.

The crucial mating flight of our virgin princess usually takes place four to ten days after she emerges from her cell; the average is about the ninth day. If bad weather or adverse happenstances delay the mating flight beyond the critical twenty-day limit, she has violated nature's inflexible timetable. The bees must send forth another queen or be provided with one. Time has passed this princess by. The rule is irrevocable.

FORTY-TWO



It is a perfect day in late spring or early summer; the weather is warm, sunny, and windless, probably early afternoon. The princess hesitates briefly on the landing board. Suddenly she springs into the air. Today there is new determination about her, a sense of mission. There is no cir-

The Hitler Era

*Dwayne - no need
to use B6 anymore,
All of 1933 can go
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THE LAST ERA OF THE GERMAN Reich must be called the Hitler era, although that designation does not hint at what differentiates it from two previous eras—the pre-World War I Imperial era or the Hindenburg era of the dying Weimar Republic.

Even though the emperor and Hindenburg were the representative figures of their respective eras, they could not single-handedly impose either domestic or foreign policies on the German Reich.

Jan - April 1933
Bismarck possibly might have, but even he could not dominate or shape his era as relentlessly and completely as did Hitler in the final twelve years of his rule.

When Hitler was made chancellor on January 30, 1933, he did not immediately arrogate all power to himself. On the contrary. At the time there were still many who thought that the curious Hitler-Papen government would collapse as quickly as its predecessors and be succeeded by something altogether different. That this did not happen may have come as a surprise to many, and perhaps even as a welcome surprise.

Within four months of becoming chancellor, Hitler had taken complete charge of Germany's political life, and by the end of July 1933 his tight grip on the reins of power was absolute. His takeover thus was a two-stage process.

The first half of 1933 was the first phase, which he used to clear the political arena. On January 30, 1933, the mixture of remnants of Weimar parliamentary democracy and the new authoritarian presidential rule that had evolved over the past three years still prevailed. By July 14, 1933, it had become a thing of the past. The political parties disappeared, as did presidential and parliamentary rule. The chancellor and his party now were the sole ruling forces. The way for this was cleared by an audacious move involving countless violations of law and unprecedented violence.

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tails are still somewhat murky, was the Reichstag fire on February 27, 1933. Hitler, with Papen's concurrence, used this act of arson as a pretext to induce the president to sign an emergency decree granting him unlimited powers. The constitution was more or less suspended, all basic rights were nullified, and arbitrary arrests became the order of the day. All this had been well prepared and took effect immediately, on February 28.

A new feature was introduced into German political life: legalized state terror. Initially the terror was used fairly selectively. The first victims were the Communists and other left-wing political figures, primarily leftist journalists and writers who had incurred the displeasure of the ruling clique. In the first weeks terror was not yet widespread, but it nevertheless had crucial consequences. The eighty-one Communist delegates elected the week after the fire were no longer in a position to take their seats in the newly elected Reichstag when it met three weeks later. They either had been sent to concentration camps or had gone underground or emigrated. That effectively nullified the election results.

The election had not pleased the government. The National Socialists and the German Nationalists won only a slim combined majority of 52 percent; the National Socialists by themselves received only 42.9 percent of the votes cast, instead of their hoped-for absolute majority. But once the Communist deputies were gone, the National So-

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cialists suddenly had an absolute majority, and together with the non-Socialist parties they even had the two-thirds majority they needed for the ultimate revision of the constitution—the dissolution of the Reichstag.

This two-thirds majority was forged on March 23, when the question of the abrogation of the parliamentary constitution was put to a vote. All parties except the Social Democrats voted for the so-called Enabling Act, which allowed the government to "legally" promulgate laws without the consent of the Reichstag, initially for a period of four years. That was the second coup after the arson of February 28. From there it was only a short step to the self-immolation of all non-Socialist parties and the banning of the Social Democratic and Communist parties in June and July.

One of the most striking aspects of this period is the ready acquiescence of the non-Socialist parties, their withdrawal from political life. This is connected to what at the time was called the "nationalist awakening" or the "National Socialist revolution"—that is, a complete change in popular mood between the Reichstag elections of March 5 and the summer of 1933. It is something that cannot be documented, but anyone who was there remembers it well. It is difficult to pinpoint moods; they are atmospheric, ephemeral, but they are significant. The popular mood played as great a role then as in August 1914, because this change

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in public feeling created the real power base for the future Führer state. It was—there is no other way of putting it—a widespread feeling of deliverance, of liberation from democracy. What should a democracy do when a majority of its people no longer values it? At the time most of the democratic politicians chose to resign and abandon politics, as though they were saying, "If that's what you want you can have it." In June and July 1933 the democratic parties behaved just as the crown prince had in November 1918.

The "national awakening"—and I remember it very clearly—had twin roots. The first was the dismay over the political uncertainty of the preceding years. People wanted to know where they stood; they wanted order, a firm hand, a strong will, a man to lead them. But, and that is the other root of that movement, they did not want a man like Papen or Schleicher, a representative of the effete old monarchist elite of 1918. They wanted someone entirely new, a popular leader (as Hitler appeared to be), and above all they wanted Germany once more to be unified, great, and strong—as in 1914, when the kaiser told them, "I don't know any parties anymore, I only know Germans." Now they really did not want parties anymore, only Germans. In doing away with the parties, Hitler won the support of a majority of the non-Socialist electorate, not only those who had voted for his National Socialists on March 5.

This national mood made an indelible impres-

1933

sion on the representatives of the old non-Socialist parties. A former minister of the Weimar Republic and now a delegate of the left-liberal Democratic party, who after some misgivings voted for the Enabling Act, said after 1945 that never before had he received so many letters of approbation from his constituents as after that particular vote. This may not seem all that significant, but it was symptomatic of a growing tendency between March and July 1933. Despite all the lawlessness of that period, despite the concentration camps and arbitrary arrests, despite the first unmistakable signs of official anti-Semitism, there was a growing sense that great times lay ahead. Once again the country would close ranks and find a savior, a man of the people, a leader who would restore discipline and order, who would unify the nation and lead the German Reich toward new and better days. It was this mood that enabled Hitler to clear the political stage with little resistance and to create an atmosphere in which no one outside his ranks would be able to stand up against him or thwart his plans.

It is a process that is still not fully understood, probably because people like to forget that in the spring and early summer of 1933 something like a national coming together was indeed taking place, not necessarily behind the National Socialist Party, but behind Hitler, behind the Führer, as he was beginning to be called. And simultaneously another extraordinary process was taking place,

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the so-called Gleichschaltung, the "leveling,"
 bringing all aspects of life into line. All political
 or even nonpolitical organizations (other than the
 parties then still in existence), from industrial as-
 sociations to trade unions down to the smallest
 local clubs, made every effort to fall in step, in
 other words to change their leadership, to become
 part of and go along with the movement that was
 sweeping through Germany.

In addition, vast numbers who had had no
 truck with the National Socialists rushed to join
 the party, the NSDAP, before it closed its doors
 to new applicants. There was one brief period in
 1937 when new members were admitted into the
 party, and once again many non-National Social-
 ist pragmatists eager to get ahead in their careers
 joined up—a not particularly admirable though
 all-too-human act. But regardless of their motives,
 the Germans in the thirties became a politically
 unified nation.

Now to the second phase of the takeover.
 What did things look like once the political stage
 had been cleared and Hitler and his party were the
 sole political power in Germany? The National
Socialist party may have been the only political
power, but it was not the only power. Hitler's es-
 tablishment encompassed a number of other in-
 struments, among them most importantly its
 defense corps, the SA.

Initially the SA was the real instrument of the
 official terror. The first concentration camps were

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set up and run by the SA, and at times it seemed as though it were an independent terror regime. It did not make arrests only when ordered by higher authorities, it also made arrests on its own, and not infrequently because of personal animus. To some extent Hitler had lost control over the terror and its physical violence and murders.

In addition to the SA there was another power center, not a political one but a much more real one: the Reichswehr. The army at first had supported Hitler's elevation to the chancellorship. A new group in the High Command, one committed not to General von Schleicher but to Generals Werner von Blomberg and Walther von Reichenau, was friendly toward the Nazis and thought it could use them for their own purposes, so they had supported Hindenburg when he made Hitler chancellor in January. However, the Reichswehr remained what it had always been—a state within the state. It was a friendly ally of the Nazis but not their subordinate.

A conflict with the potential of embarrassing Hitler broke out between the Reichswehr and the SA. The SA, a mass organization commanded by World War I noncoms, had visions of becoming the new Reichswehr, the great new revolutionary National Socialist army of the new Reich, in part by replacing the old Reichswehr leadership or by incorporating it into the SA, and in part by pensioning them off. One might think that this was in keeping with Hitler's ideas, considering that the

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SA was his organization and that he was its su-
 preme leader. Under this scenario, he would have
 a politically reliable army under his direct com-
 mand rather than one that merely supported him.
 Yet Hitler sided with the Reichswehr, for two rea-
 sons, it seems to me. The less important one was
 that from day one Hitler had planned to rearm and
 go to war. It was surely no accident that the first
 group he addressed in early February 1933, im-
mediately after becoming chancellor, was the
General Staff of the Reichswehr. For his rearmam-
ent and future war Hitler needed not only a will-
ing instrument, but, above all, a trained, first-rate
force. And the Reichswehr was just that. The SA,
 with its millions of enthusiastic lower-class mem-
 bers, lacked the military esprit and tradition of the
 Reichswehr. But Hitler had another, even more
 important reason for siding with the army in its
 contest with the SA.

Although Hindenburg was still alive, he no
 longer was as politically powerful as before. He
 was extremely old, and in 1934 he withdrew to
his estate at Neubeck. Who would succeed him?
Hitler was determined to be the one, to consum-
mate his takeover by assuming the combined of-
ices of chancellor and president. That however
could be done only if the army put no obstacle in
his way. Hitler thus was forced to try to obtain an
 agreement with the Reichswehr that would allow
 him to assume the presidency. In the final anal-
 ysis, such an agreement would put the Reichswehr

D.T.'s

preference.

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 wait too long about doing it.

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tution of his Reich, is another matter. At first glance it appears to represent utter discontinuity, for there was no precedent for one-man dictatorship or state terror, for the propaganda monopoly or the dismantling of all political parties. However, strange as this may seem, all these innovations were readily accepted in 1933, as though everyone had been waiting for them all along. These were indeed unprecedented measures, yet perhaps something in the background of the German Reich had paved the way for them. Bismarck was no dictator, yet in his early years he had molded the policy of "his" Reich as autocratically as Hitler shaped his in its final phase. The legacy he left, intentionally or not, was a conscious or subconscious yearning for a leader. And the same holds true for the people's distaste for political parties. In the second half of World War I as well as in the closing days of the Weimar Republic, both these sentiments rose to the surface, and both times Hindenburg was the central figure symbolizing these tendencies. But Hindenburg never translated these dreams into reality, neither between 1916 and 1918 nor between 1930 and 1932. Hitler, on the other hand, acted promptly in 1933, and for years afterward even outdid all the nationalist hopes for national community (and unity) and national grandeur—the ultimate and highest, almost religious aspiration. Hitler's "You are nothing, the Volk is everything" had always been the secret ingredient of the political ideology

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As he wrote in *Mein Kampf*: "It seems as though fate itself wanted to point the way. The vast Eastern empire is on the verge of collapse."

Hitler also recognized that England was largely responsible for Germany's defeat in the West and that the war against England might perhaps have been avoided. There were many similarities between the events leading up to World War I and those leading up to World War II. Bethmann Hollweg had been eager to keep England neutral in the event of a continental war against France and Russia, a war he believed was sure to come, and Hitler too made every effort to keep England neutral, or better still to have England on his side. He also thought he knew the reason for the earlier failure to keep England neutral: because Germany, although hemmed in on the continent by France and Russia, persisted in beefing up its fleet. This had needlessly challenged England to a contest over hegemony outside Europe. Hitler wisely decided not to make the same mistake: no fleet buildup, no world politics, but, rather, concentration on the war against Russia, possibly after a short war against France to protect the rear. It is remarkable, and probably no accident, that this logical plan, so carefully worked out between 1933 and 1938, failed.

In 1935 Hitler signed a naval pact with England in which he agreed to limit the German fleet to a third of Britain's, which was not all that painful a concession considering that Germany had

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a navy whose strategic failure
the British began building a
readnought battleships in 1900.
al strategy more broadly based
ed than the conversion of Ger-
was founded in the borderlands
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somehow reconciled to the naval
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s in life, but their estates were
ile they observed with disdain
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aristocracy. In this situation they
ectionism, recognized the bar-
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portrayed a well-armed Germa-
of commerce and industry, sit-
her gaze fixed on a long line of
n speed. At the turn of the cen-
om the well-to-do families used
Sunday best and there is not a
s where naval uniform is not to
g program gave employment to
s Krupp of Essen and displayed
its most modern, especially in
ances. A special tax was intro-

BG

and 1933
The German Empire · 87
Sturmer

duced on champagne to help pay for the navy—a tax that,
by the way, has survived to this day.

Germany was an industrial latecomer compared to
Britain. But in the last decades of the nineteenth century,
German industry was catching up rapidly, and after 1900 it
was beginning to overtake all of its earlier competitors
except the United States of America. German big business,
as a rule, harnessed the sciences to its wagon, with the
state-financed colleges of technology and *Technische*
Hochschulen supplying a steady stream of ambitious, hard-
working experts. German companies large and small, not
spoiled by captive markets in colonies and dominions, paid
more attention to marketing, invested in permanent edu-
cation for the workforce and understood the economies of
scale better than their British competitors. The fusion of
basic research and practical application became a specific
German strength, while the early shortage of capital had
been overcome long ago, not least through the formation of
giant, multifunctional banks operating worldwide.

Iron and steel output were an indicator for both eco-
nomic strength and military potential. Germany forged
ahead from 4.1 million tons in 1880 to 6.3 million in 1900
and 17.6 million in 1913, while Britain fell behind signifi-
cantly: 8.0 million in 1880, 5.0 million in 1900, 7.7 million
in 1913. The figures of iron and steel output for the United
States are no less instructive: 9.3 million in 1880, 10.3 mil-
lion in 1900, 31.8 million in 1913. France, Russia, Austria-
Hungary and Japan were, by comparison, insignificant, and
so was Italy. In energy consumption, another indicator of
industrial prowess, Germany started in 1880 at about half
the British level, but by 1913 the two countries were almost
on a par. In terms of aggregate industrial potential, mea-

* when Hitler arrives,
erster Schacht. 1933.

1933

Linz

card 51

2-23

7

1905

that

The name alone! Adolf Hitler, ^{it} was a name that consisted of ugly sounds, that

It could only deaden the onomatopoetic intensity, ~~the very liveliness and~~

~~seniority~~ of German itself. Adolf Hitlerplatz. Adolf Hitlerallee. Adolf

Poor
~~bad~~ sounds!

Hitlerstrasse. Mediocrity incarnate, ~~that~~ was our goal. Blunt the creation,

Discourage ~~and~~ the D.K. further?

Move to 1933

1933

37

But it observed its
ment. Von Papen, his
missions-committee
von Ribbentrop made
Jewish bankers who
theims, Goldschmidt-
Herzfelds. Among the
mann through business,
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er chamberlain to the
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ism in his pre-Hitler
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21 The Henkells, like
Jewish connections. A
to Henkell's sister was
Opfermann. Her hus-
Opfermann, a World
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also a Jew, as was von
ried. She remained his
e war, she worked for
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he arbiters of a certain
and Lali Horstmann.
-time member of the
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a his foreword to Lali
ote that during a time

when Prussia's pouting aristocrats and military people refrained from entertaining foreigners, the Horstmanns' Berlin home was an international haven of civilized dining and conversation.²² Their mansion on the Tiergartenstrasse was the scene of memorable parties. Horstmann, a former minister to Belgium and Portugal, headed the British desk at the ministry, and many foreign diplomats were devoted to him and to Lali. The Horstmanns also owned an exquisite country estate.

They entertained the most beautiful women, the most charming men, the greatest wits, the most creative writers and artists. Members of the younger set were invited after dinner to dance to the latest American tunes, and a white-gloved footman serviced the wind-up record player. Somehow, the young von Ribbentrops got invited to the Horstmanns' and finally met some of those elusive Berliners they had longed to know. The young Russian Princess "Missie" Vassiltchikov, who lived in Berlin during the Nazi time, wrote of evenings of "subtle defiance" of the "Brown Regime" after Freddy Horstmann resigned his ministry post in silent protest.²³

A former Berlin society debutante, *née* von Richthofen, who now lives in California, used to attend these soirées. She said that after the Horstmanns were bombed out of their large home in Berlin, they moved into a tiny apartment and remained the city's favorite hosts.

Freddy Horstmann's life ended in tragedy. Bombed out of Berlin and their country estate, Kerzendorf, the Horstmanns hid in the nearby woods while the Red Army approached. At Freddy's insistence, Lali escaped toward Berlin, but he refused to leave his treasures. He was captured by the Russians and starved to death in captivity. Lali escaped to England with the help of her many western friends.

Bubi von Schwabach, Lali's brother, once wrote to Ambassador Joachim von Ribbentrop in London, begging for help. He wanted to leave Germany. He received no reply. Von Ribbentrop told his secretary, Reinhard Spitz, "You know how the Führer feels about such things! I can't speak to him about Jews."²⁴ Von Schwabach was one of many old friends who were let down by von Ribbentrop.

At the very beginning of the Nazi period, von Ribbentrop often seemed to misjudge Hitler's purpose and aims. He told worried Jewish acquaintances and business friends, "Don't take Hitler's anti-Semitic talk too seriously. It's only a political gesture. It's aimed at the eastern Jews, not at German Jews. Everyone knows that German Jews lost a higher percentage of men during the war than Germany's aristocrats."²⁵ The day after the first anti-Jewish boycott, April 1, 1933, when Storm Troopers stood in front of Jewish stores bullying "Ar-

yans" not to buy from Jews, Ribbentrop, still essentially a businessman with tenuous Nazi connections, invited several Jewish social and business friends to a "reassurance" lunch at the Hotel Adlon. He was immediately denounced by Nazis who saw him there, and Hitler summoned him and reprimanded him for his "offense." Von Ribbentrop came out of that meeting in shock.

In 1930, three years before Hitler seized power, von Ribbentrop was still much involved with Jews both socially and professionally, so when Count Helldorf, his old regimental friend and now a Nazi bigshot, suggested he join the Nazi Party, he could not do so without business risk. He did not join then, but he had discovered the thrilling and dangerous world of radical politics. Here, in his own words, was his reasoning:

Since 1929 the German economy had been approaching a crisis. The screws of the Versailles reparations were too tight. Gold reserves shrank, and our balance of payments slid. There were millions of unemployed, and investment capital fled abroad. By 1930 it looked as if Germany would fall to the Communists. I was convinced that only National Socialism could save us. I watched the collapse of the moderate political parties. I suspected that you got nowhere without force. Only when catastrophe brewed did we get concessions. I did not wish to involve myself in politics but was forced to help in forming a coalition between my party, the DNVP [the right-wing National Party he had joined in the late twenties] and the NSDAP [the Nazi Party, which he joined on May 1, 1932].

It is difficult, though, to guess the truth about the von Ribbentrops' attraction to right-wing politics. No doubt in part it was a matter of conviction. After all, Joachim was a former officer, the son of an Imperial officer and the grandson of an Imperial officer, and he represented the lost war and Germany's vanished international prestige. But there was also opportunism and self-promotion. By touting anti-Communism, one could be guaranteed the attention of the "best" people. The von Ribbentrops began what one of their former neighbors described as a "political salon." Many prominent Berliners, some friendly with the von Ribbentrops, others only casual acquaintances, were invited to their villa on Lentzeallee in Dahlem, where they met and listened to various right-wing politicians of all shadings who offered their plans for a "cleansed and pure" Germany, a strong and rearmed Germany, a Germany with its "prewar honor" restored. Their simplistic theories promised an end to the years of submission, compromise, and empty debate, an end to the stringent penalties. The war would have been won but for a "stab in the back," or *Dolchstoß*, a

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page read: EUROPE I
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after a settlement in the
"Arabs attack Jews
Wailing Wall."

"Hitler appoints He
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German patience was

concentration camps and the newly coined term "protective arrest." On April 15, 1933, the *New York Evening Post* carried an article about the atrocities, as did the *Toledo Times* and *Augusta (Maine) Journal*. Other papers, like the *Columbus Journal* and the *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, were still unconvinced. The *Washington Post* was incredulous.²³ During the first months of 1933, American reporters in Berlin were often urged by U.S. diplomats to moderate their stories.²⁴

On March 27, 1933, Hitler issued a statement through his new foreign press aide, Ernst (Putzi) Hanfstaengl, that "all allegations of brutalities are base lies." Foreign Minister von Neurath and Hitler's banker, Hjalmar Schacht, issued similar denials.

The first tenuous moment of American anger at Nazi Germany had quickly come and would soon have gone, but American journalists like Louis Lochner, William Shirer, and H. R. Knickerbocker kept reporting the ugly facts from Berlin.

By now von Ribbentrop's old friend Count Wolf von Helldorf was the head of Berlin's SA, but von Ribbentrop was "safely" in the SS, like so many doctors, lawyers, and businessmen who shuddered at the proletarian SA. In 1933 the SS was a small, elite section of the SA. It had a distinctive uniform (black breeches, tunic, and cap), and most of its members were upper school or university-educated. At first, the SS functioned as a politicized "weekend soldier" organization, a vicious form of London's cheerful Honourable Artillery Company or New York's snobby National Guard Squadron A. Full of fancied mythical Teutonic lore and ideas, the SS was a haven for upper-class National Socialists and their way of distancing themselves from the rabble in the SA. (For unknown reasons, the SS had special appeal for physicians. "Aryan" medical doctors were seven times more likely to become SS members than other professionals.²⁵)

The SS had three "faces":

1. There was the "weekend" (*Allgemeine*) SS, which von Ribbentrop had joined.

2. There were the SS units under Reinhard Heydrich that included the Party Police (SD, or Sicherheitsdienst) and, eventually, the Einsatzkommandos (Action Squads) of the SD, which pillaged and murdered in the wake of the Army's Polish, Baltic, Balkan, and Russian campaigns. General Walter Schellenberg, who headed foreign espionage for the SS, was also under Heydrich. Equally frightening were the Death's Head (Totenkopf) units, which ran the concentration camps under the command of Oswald Pohl, who matched Heydrich in rank.

3. Finally, beginning with the war came the Waffen SS (SS at arms), virtually a combat-ready army spawned from Hitler's Guard Battal-

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arm "protective arrest." The *Post* carried an article and *Augusta* (Maine) *Journal* and the *St. Louis Washington Post* was among American reporters in moderate their stories.²⁴ Comment through his new that "all allegations of Neurath and Hitler's

anger at Nazi Germany, but American journalist R. Knickerbocker kept

Wolf von Helldorf was was "safely" in the SS, who shuddered at the elite section of the SA. It (sic, and cap), and most educated. At first, the "infer" organization, a vi- Artillery Company or Iron A. Full of fancied haven for upper-class ing themselves from the SS had special appeal for even times more likely to

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Heydrich that included eventually, the Einsatz- pillaged and murdered ulkan, and Russian cam- headed foreign espionage ly frightening were the the concentration camps ched Heydrich in rank. Waffen SS (SS at arms), Hitler's Guard Battal-

ion, the Leibstandarte. Waffen SS had its own infantry, artillery, armor, cavalry, signals. It also recruited from the police, the Death's Head concentration camp units, and from foreign countries. There were Waffen SS Divisions of Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian, Norwegian, Ukrainian, Danish, Dutch, Belgian, and even Indian troopers. Young Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Joachim's son, served in the division that grew from the Leibstandarte.

The sense of horror that all SS uniforms usually conveyed often sprang from the second category of police, Gestapo and Death's Head units and Einsatzkommandos. With the beginning of the war, the "weekend" SS lost importance, although for the Foreign Office there remained a certain opportunistic symbiosis. At the end, the ministry entered a time of self-protective and sycophantic cooperation with Heydrich's SD, although Heydrich despised von Ribbentrop.

In 1933 the first concentration camp was opened at Oranienburg, near Berlin, for "political re-education." It was run by the SA in the most brutal way. The original concentration camps were used for political revenge, not for racial "cleansing." The inmates were mostly the Nazis' old political enemies, Communists and Social Democrats. Gangs of Storm Troopers raided the Communist Party offices and also arrested Socialists, labor unionists, and anyone who had ever shown open opposition to the Nazis, written an article about them, or ridiculed them from a cabaret stage. A large number of innocent citizens were in constant danger of getting beaten up and locked up because Storm Troopers usually settled their personal scores and fancied insults without warning. Any SA man who was ever fired, dispossessed, or dunned now took his revenge. Any supposed insult was "righted" with rubber truncheons and steel knuckles. The streets of Berlin became dangerous for anyone who had dark hair and eyes and who would not give an immediate Hitler salute to a roving squad of shouting and singing SA, either on foot or in one of their open swastika-flagged trucks. Incident followed incident. A British Embassy member who did not salute was beaten up despite his diplomatic papers.²⁶ A few months later, the Portuguese consul general in Hamburg was set upon by an SA squad and had to be hospitalized, mainly because of his "Jewish appearance."

A black-humor Berlin story of the time tells of a famous anti-Nazi cabaret comic, a homosexual who was badly beaten up by Storm Troopers. The following night from the stage, limping and swathed in bandages, he blurted out his story. Two SA thugs had followed him on a dark street. They caught him, pulled down his trousers, and began beating him with their steel-buckled belts. The cabaret comic rolled

his two blackened eyes to heaven and, smiling through mangled teeth, lisped, "And it turned out to be a wonderful evening, after all!"

Those who were sympathetic to the new regime insisted that "these brutal things were done without the knowledge of Adolf Hitler." Later, when Nazi terror was more widespread and organized, many people in Germany still said, "*Wenn der Führer das nur wüsste!*" (If the Führer only knew!). Eventually everyone would learn that Adolf Hitler knew all. He approved of every horror, every debauch. He was the very force that powered the monstrosities.

There is no way that von Ribbentrop could have failed to see what was happening on the streets of Berlin. All Berliners were aware of the SA thugs and avoided confrontations. To pre-empt any negative reports abroad through Berlin's foreign embassies, State Secretary Bernhard von Bülow immediately instructed all German heads of missions in capitals all over the world to "exert a calming influence."

The Nazis had always accused Jews of "dominating" the scene. For instance, "everyone" had a Jewish doctor. The fact is that in 1933, when Hitler came to power, Jewish citizens were less than 1 percent of the total population, 550,000 out of sixty-two million. In Berlin, the Jews numbered 150,000 out of four million, or less than 4 percent. In all of Germany, there were nine thousand Jewish or part-Jewish doctors out of Germany's fifty-two thousand doctors, or about 17 percent.²⁷

While the SA rampaged through the city of Berlin, Adolf Hitler quickly demonstrated to von Papen and the other Conservatives in the cabinet that he would not be harnessed by them. On February 1, 1933, he dissolved the Reichstag. On February 4 he dissolved the provincial and municipal assemblies. With the aid of his fellow Nazi Wilhelm Frick, now the minister of the interior, and Göring, now the Prussian minister-president, he fired the top police officials and installed three Nazis: Rudolf Diels, Admiral Magnus von Levetzov, and Kurt Daluge. The SA had already been sworn in as auxiliary police.

On February 27, the Reichstag building burned. Of all the possible explanations throughout the years, the most likely is that the fire was set by a mentally retarded Dutch Communist named Marinus van der Lubbe and then was spread by a group of Storm Troopers, who used the old underground passageway between Göring's new official residence and the Reichstag building. Count von Helldorf was again at the center of trouble. Later, he claimed to have been involved. An SA officer named Kruse, an aide of Röhm's, said that he and twenty-three troopers were the actual arsonists.²⁸ In retrospect, one wonders how

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the most important responsibility and his Führer's total trust and attention. No doubt Joachim von Ribbentrop felt that he was Hitler's most trusted adviser.

In November von Ribbentrop, accompanied by Erich Kordt, set out to London for another meeting with Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden. This time the subject was an Anglo-German naval agreement. He launched an effort to establish "close and warm relationships" in Britain. Von Ribbentrop's informal arrival at Brown's Hotel signaled an unexpected display of British amity. All the evil of the bloody purge of June 30 and the murder of Dollfuss now seemed to have been forgotten in Britain as "not our business." Von Ribbentrop was entertained by Lord Londonderry, the Earl of Athlone, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and Arthur Henderson, the former foreign secretary.²⁷ In turn, he invited to breakfast the Lords Lloyd and Stonehaven, Mr. Norman Davis of the U.S. Embassy, Major Astor, and Mrs. Greville, a major Cunard shareholder. There were invitations to London's best clubs and to various hunts. The press was also eager to have his attention.

Von Ribbentrop was not quite so well received at a dinner party of Lord Cecil's, where Sir Austen Chamberlain expressed his anti-German feelings and George Bernard Shaw vented his spleen by telling von Ribbentrop to "stop talking peace! Talk attack, mayhem, and bloody battle, and these English will give you anything you want!"

Also somewhat reluctant was Lord Lothian, one of the architects of the Versailles Treaty.²⁸ Lothian, now regretting some of the harsh Versailles terms, said he had no objection to German rearmament if "they could convince the world of their peaceful intentions." Kordt thought that Lothian looked at von Ribbentrop as more of a courier than a diplomat.

E. W. Tennant, who had prepared von Ribbentrop's first unofficial meeting with Stanley Baldwin in 1933, claimed that Baldwin said he "liked von Ribbentrop's face" after their first breakfast conference, although Tennant's friend, J. C. C. Davidson, at whose home that meeting took place, denied this.²⁹ Von Ribbentrop also managed to intrigue the press lord Esmond Harmsworth, son of Lord Rothermere. He arranged for a dinner on December 19, 1934, with Hitler in Berlin for both Rothermere and Harmsworth, along with George Ward Price and Ernest Tennant.

British journalists were also invited to the party rallies at Nürnberg. These annual events were vast productions, which the Nazis organized beginning in September 1933. Hundreds of thousands of men and boys in uniforms from the Hitler Youth to Storm Troopers

and SS filled an immense dirigible. The party ground. From a platform, the Führer to his people and to craft floodlights upward the sky, a "described by its descent. On one end of revival structure a quarter of twenty yards high aided by its hovering opera, part pagan in the thunder of mass-throated synchronizing.

Reichs Propaganda assure good reports journalists were paid the alcoholic Clifford Hutchinson, and Jar English.³⁰ Murphy, Propaganda Ministry Dr. Robert Birley, heard that Dr. Goebbels had pupils.

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and SS filled an immense field that had once been the landing base for dirigibles. The party transformed it into the world's largest parade ground. From a platform high above the massed formations of ardent followers, the Führer preached his fierce sermons, sending his message to his people and to the whole world. At night, hundreds of anti-aircraft floodlights surrounding the field were beamed straight up toward the sky, a "temple surrounded by pillars of ice," as it was described by its designer, Albert Speer, Hitler's favorite young architect. On one end of the field, facing the participants, stood a Greek revival structure a quarter-mile long, fronted by a speaker's platform twenty yards high and backed by a ten-yard concrete swastika straddled by its hovering eagle. These party rallies were part Wagnerian opera, part pagan ritual. Uniformed Nazi legions swore allegiance to the thunder of massed kettledrums, shouting their oaths with deep-throated synchronized roars.

Reichs Propaganda Minister Goebbels made strenuous efforts to assure good reports in the foreign press. Certain British free-lance journalists were paid to write enthusiastic articles; among them were the alcoholic Clifford Sharp of the *New Statesman*, Graham Seton Hutchinson, and James Murphy, who translated *Mein Kampf* into English.³⁰ Murphy eventually became an employee of Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry in Berlin. Schoolmasters were also approached. Dr. Robert Birley, headmaster of Charterhouse, told Harold Nicolson that Dr. Goebbels had arranged a trip to the rally for some of the pupils.

At first von Ribbentrop could count on some sympathy. The historian Richard Griffiths has pointed out that ever since the 1929 economic crisis, leading British Conservatives had begun to express doubt about the moral value of representative capitalist democracy and to regret its materialism and greed. The idea of corporate government, in which a country was run by a board of capable appointees, as demonstrated by Mussolini's fascism, had great appeal in some surprising quarters. Fascism seemed to show true concern for the working man without brutalizing the bourgeoisie and upper classes as Communism did. Ramsay MacDonald, Austen Chamberlain, and even Winston Churchill had all expressed praise for Mussolini. Writing from Rome for the *Times* of London on January 21, 1927, Churchill said about Mussolini, "If I were an Italian, I'd follow you against Lenin. But we in England have not had to fight this danger and have other ways of doing things."³¹ In 1927, George Bernard Shaw wrote in a letter, "Mussolini is more Socialist than the British Labour Party." Many voices from unlikely quarters expressed doubt about democ-

1933

Jewry itself in Germany with full sharpness,⁽²⁵⁴⁾ and farther back 1933
 to his pre-Putsch scheme for holding the Jews hostage.²⁵⁵ The
 prophecy was also designed to spread the guilt across those
 closed borders for the annihilation to come. It was inherently
 contradictory. If the democracies' borders were closed to the
 Jews, then for the democracies the Jews were no hostages. Or if
 the Jews were strong enough in the democracies to plunge them
 into a war against Germany for the sake of their own "interests"
 and "Old Testament vengefulness,"²⁵⁶ then they would open up
 the democracies' borders first. Either way, the war that then
 came with those borders still closed was no "Jewish war." But
 the prophesy was cynical anyhow, as only eleven days later
 Hitler told a military group that "he must wage war . . . soon" for
 "a) mastery of Europe, b) world mastery for centuries."²⁵⁷ He
 nonetheless called that war a Jewish war to the last, as when in
 February 1945 he claimed that, before it, he had faced up to the
 "problem" of the Jews "by chasing them out on all sides in order
 to cleanse the German world of the Jewish poison. For us," he
 added, "this was an indispensable disinfection treatment under-
 taken at the last minute. . . . With this operation a success in
 Germany, we had a chance it would spread. It was even bound
 to, since health normally prevails over disease. The Jews were at
 once alert to this hazard, which is why they decided to go all-or-
 nothing and launch a fight to the death against us. They had to
 bring down National Socialism at whatever price, even should
 the planet be destroyed. No war was ever so typically or so
 exclusively a Jewish war as this one."⁽²⁵⁸⁾ This rationale of his
 prewar Jewish policy only compounded its illogic. For its
 avowed result was not that "health" prevailed over "disease" in
 the democracies (as it was "bound to"), but that the democracies
 were incited to a "fight to the death" against Germany—which
 was cleansed of the "Jewish poison" and yet succumbed in a
 purely "Jewish war." But psychologically the inconsequence
 was consequent. As in 1907, so, now again the "operation" left a
 residue of "infection" within Germany to be poisoned out in that
 losing "fight to the death."

1941

The transition to this poisoning-out was provided by the Eutha-
 nasia program, launched even as the expulsions practically

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Germany's claim to more "land and soil" as its rationale and with the goal of reversing Germany's defeat explicit. He soon came to treat of the "core problem" less and less, and then obliquely and (as in 1913-1918, when his anti-Semitism was latent) through cover terms, particularly "Marxism" and "Bolshevism." Thus the retribution called for in his speech of November 1928 to the Nazi old guard was against the "November criminals," identified with Jewry only deviously through one mention of "our Hebrew poisoners," one of enemy propaganda by "the German Jews," and one each of "the Jewess Rosa Luxemburg" and "the Jew Kurt Eisner" as arch culprits.²³⁸ "From him who cared to hear," Albert Speer affirmed long afterward, "Hitler had never concealed even his intention to exterminate the Jewish people."²³⁹ Even on those who did not care to hear, the message was not lost in being conveyed by hints after *Mein Kampf* of the mid-1920s. On the contrary, it found its own psychic level below that of clear consciousness, as it did formerly through his speeches that had muted it. Besides, his speeches that had not muted it were remembered and reprinted—uncensored in the latter case. And brutal *Mein Kampf* sold over 50,000 copies a year in Germany beginning in 1930 and close to a million a year beginning in 1933.²⁴⁰

The message retained its outward fuzziness for some years after Hitler established his dictatorship—even when he told Nazi district leaders in April 1937, by way of refusing to quicken his moves against the Jews: "The final aim of our whole policy is perfectly clear to all of us."²⁴¹ Joseph Goebbels mistook that final aim when he launched the *Reichskristallnacht*, a huge pogrom of late 9 November 1938 that proved "devastating" for all concerned.²⁴² Reichsbank chief Hjalmar Schacht mistook that aim his own way and a month later began negotiating in London for Jewish emigration from Germany to be financed by an international loan on Jewish properties in Germany. When Schacht came close to succeeding, Hitler fired him from the Reichsbank on 20 January 1939. The conflict between them had broken over Hitler's alternative of a currency issue to be based on those Jewish properties—one of his pre-Putsch schemes.²⁴³ "You don't

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Buch Schwarzschild did not reveal Forster's link with Hitler, but did connect him with another two "of today's potentates," affirming that in his Berlin days he had treated Hermann Göring for cocaine addiction and certified Bernhard Rust at a sex crime trial as legally irresponsible.⁶² Göring's morphine addiction—with documentation from after Forster's Berlin days—and Rust's mental derangement both came into the Comintern's otherwise fanciful *Braunbuch über Reichstagsbrand und Hitler-Terror*, completed in Paris in July and published in Basel early in August 1933.⁶³ Conceivably this, then, was what prompted Prussia's Prime Minister Göring or Minister of Education Rust to initiate the order telephoned from Rust's Ministry to the Curator (administrative head) of the University of Greifswald on 28 August 1933 to suspend Forster and investigate him as "politically unreliable" under the terms of a law of the previous 7 April "for the restoration of the Civil Service." To its follow-up letter urging expeditive action the Ministry appended extracts from a thickly Nazi denunciation of Forster, authorship undisclosed. The presumption against Forster was sustained by a sister superior, another sister, and an attendant from his clinic—the first questioned by the Ministry, the others in turn by the Curator as instructed. Forster was alleged to have tossed off remarks about the Reichstag fire as a put-up job, a speech by Hitler as low-level, and a war wound of Rust's as self-inflicted.⁶⁴ The allegation is credible, for a friend he had seen that summer in Basel recollected: "He had obviously got it into his head to make as many disparaging comments as he could about the regime, which he hated."⁶⁵ Irrelevant charges loomed larger, particularly of fast living in the clinic and of experimentation with patients standing on a wobbly table. The Curator consulted six professors who saw him on other business. They urged him to induce Forster to resign with a three-quarter pension as provided by the new law. All viewed Forster as "a psychopath easily excited at times and strongly inclined to depression at others."⁶⁶ But Forster's elder son, then thirteen-and-a-half, remembers him as poised and deliberate until this crisis.⁶⁷ And to his widow the Curator wrote afterward of "the grave difficulties that befell your husband and . . . the deep

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suppression of Marxism, parliamentarianism, and liberal democracy.¹¹⁰

Given its national character, Hitler's appeal is in no wise explained by its social variance in the course of his rise to power.¹¹¹ In particular, Hitler was not the recourse of the frightened middle classes against Bolshevism. The Bolshevik peril was patently, blatantly bogus in Germany after 1923 at the latest—and doubly so in Hitler's mouth, where it fronted for the bogus Jewish peril.¹¹² After the speaking bans on him were lifted in 1927–1928, Hitler built up a mass party by drawing former Nationalist voters in the first instance; converts from predominantly middle-class parties came later. He also gained disproportionately large worker support: a third of the Party's members were common laborers by the start of 1933¹¹³ (as against roughly eleven percent factory workers in the Communist Party at that same time¹¹⁴). His apocalyptic Nazi-Communist antithesis was a word game: the two parties exchanged members and voters wholesale down the years before his takeover¹¹⁵ and then Communist stalwarts joined the SA by the cell-load.¹¹⁶ Susceptibility and resistance to Nazism did vary fractionally this way and that with class, age, sex, religion, and much else from region to region and from election to election—here perhaps most closely with previous political commitment. In brief, Nazism spread helter-skelter on its way to engulfing Germany, so local zigzags tell nothing of why it spread. The Depression certainly eased its way,¹¹⁷ but by no means in the sense that people turned to Hitler for the sake of the economic recovery that was then accomplished under him. He had small use at most for economics. "World history teaches us that no people grew great or went under by economics," he proclaimed.¹¹⁸ On taking office he told an assemblage of generals that the crisis was one of human laziness: "So the masses must be trained to work again as fast as possible."¹¹⁹ His approach in office, insofar as he had one, was that of his predecessors, especially his immediate predecessor, Schleicher. His contribution to the recovery already under way was an unplanned side effect of his step-up of secret rearmament and related public works.¹²⁰ He never promised prosperity before

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ing, he had hasty recourse to intimidation and terror before they proved unnecessary. He had no preconception, and little sense, of how to proceed. Far from grasping opportunities with diabolical cunning, he just struck out as the spirit moved him, and all too recklessly to succeed except that the spirit moved his opponents correspondingly. Seeing the Reichstag in flames on 27 February 1933, he went wild at the seeming materialization of the Communist confrontation he had foretold. At two governmental meetings that night he could only issue heedless, unheeded orders for police violence against Marxism. The Reichstag Fire Decree for "defense against Communist acts of violence," drawn up at a cabinet meeting the next morning for President Hindenburg's ready signature, abrogated civil rights—an impulsive, impolitic gesture on the eve of elections for a new Reichstag intended to vote him an Enabling Act. To quote one historian of the event: "Hitler had no way of knowing that he would gain unlimited power without a struggle, at the very first try. In response to the supposed signal for total Communist resistance, he put down all his chips like a poor roulette player, and won."¹²⁹ The power he gained at that juncture was hardly unlimited, but no matter. In presenting his Enabling Act on 23 March 1933, he called on the new Reichstag "to grant us for the sake of law what we could have taken anyhow";¹³⁰ the Reichstag did even that. The fact that the Nazis polled less than a majority (43.9 percent) in the elections of 5 March 1933 even as the institutional Nazification of Germany went unresisted only bears out Hitler in his distinction between public opinion and national will.¹³¹ Whatever the head count against him, a despot's power was conceded to him on all sides. In the conscious forms it took, his opponents' compliance can be called variously timeserving and miscalculation and naïveté.¹³² But consciousness does not run very deep: remove the wearisome sound track and a spectacle of precipitous surrender emerges. That surrender was due to no German tradition of bowing to authority; authority had been flouted in Weimar Germany as nowhere else in Europe at the time. Compliance toward Hitler was continuous for twelve years. To explain it by his dictatorship is to confuse cause and effect. A fit symbol of the

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"seizure of power" is Communist chief Ernst Torgler delivering himself up to the police to prove his innocence of the Reichstag fire. Nine months later, in a miscarriage of Nazi injustice, Torgler was acquitted of the charge of complicity. Göring had him detained nonetheless to protect him from the Gestapo,¹³³ which Göring himself headed.

Torgler's "protective custody" was no sinister joke of Göring's, but a minute instance of the mess of overlapping and crossed competences through which Hitler ruled—of the "Führungschaos" within the "Führerstaat," as his press chief, Otto Dietrich, styled it in 1946.¹³⁴ For all its tangled lines of authority and policy, Hitler's regime could project such an image of concerted action in its heyday that it took historians long years to break through the illusion of a masterminded totalitarian machine. But this illusion harbored a reality now emerging from close studies of single offices or concerns of Hitler's state: that it cohered through its pursuit of the racial and expansionist objectives that Hitler had set for it.¹³⁵ This means through the expansionist objective, as expansionism was Hitler's justification for his domestic racial policy, whereas his racial aim abroad was "strictly secret."¹³⁶ That reality within the illusion held, beyond Hitler's state proper, for his Reich as a whole.

The fact that Germany followed Hitler to rerun the disaster course of 1914–1918 does not of itself prove that the 1918 defeat was traumatic: that fact alone could as well be put down to a national vocation for disaster. It does mesh with the indirect proof already provided, but this proof is difficult, special—and indirect. Direct proof is wanted. But so are comparable case studies, without which only guesswork is possible about the signs of that collective trauma or any other.

There is no reason to suppose that a collective trauma can be evidenced from the event itself any more than an individual trauma can. Similar experiences will traumatize one person and not another; one person just traumatized will appear frantic, another numbed, another nonchalant. The present collective case is complicated by the fact that the spontaneous, concerted reaction

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ing twice over, for it restricted the eradicating to Germany and presented the military-expansionist aim as the determinative one of the two. In a speech of January 1932 published as a pamphlet, Hitler set forth the three Aryan virtues as Nazi-held values confronting their opposites in a fight to the finish for control of Germany. For the Nazis' "inexorable resolve to exterminate Marxism in Germany down to the last root" he gave a single, insistent reason: "With today's body politic, no active foreign policy can be conducted any longer. . . . Forming the will of the nation as a whole is essential; it is the point of departure for political operations [abroad]." ³⁵ On 4 December 1932 he spelled out for a Reichswehr officer the first measures necessary to capacitate Germany for such political operations: "1. Repression of Marxism and its effects to complete extinction. Preparation of a new national unity of mind and will. 2. General spiritual and ethical rearmament of the nation on the basis of this new unity. 3. Technical rearmament. 4. Organization of national strength for national defense. 5. Attainment of formal recognition from the rest of the world for the new situation brought about." ³⁶ Four days after taking office he extended this short list in a talk to Germany's top brass (as noted by one of the generals present): "Overall political goal solely the recovery of political power. . . . Internally: complete reversal of present domestic situation in Germany. No tolerance for any manifestation of sentiments (pacifism!) opposed to the goal. He who won't bow must be bent. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Youth and entire nation must be attuned to the idea that only struggle can save us. Everything must yield to this idea (actualized in the Nazi movement's millions: it will grow). Toughening of youth and strengthening of will to defense by any and all means. Strictest authoritarian rule. Removal of the cancer of democracy! . . . Buildup of the armed forces most important requirement for reaching goal: winning back political power." Once this goal were reached, Hitler concluded, expansion would begin. ³⁷ The proposed exterminating, though displaced from the Jews to their institutional and intellectual mischief, was no less confined to Germany as a first step toward a new German power play. Hitler shortly pro-

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ceeded as he proposed, from reversing the German "domestic situation" to rearming for German expansion. And Jewry was not wiped out beforehand; it was separated out meanwhile. The military themselves were fooled on the whole, and increasingly, right down to the decisive juncture. "In the preparation of the attack against the Soviet Union and during its initial phase . . . cooperation between Hitler and the military leadership attained a maximum of unison. Working from a supposed consensus on goals between themselves and Hitler, most of the higher officers had not realized that . . . only an ancillary function fell to militarism by the terms of the radical universal anti-Semitic racial doctrine that determined policy as a whole and that was now, in 1941, to be translated into full-scale reality."³⁸ This was the harder to realize inside or outside the army since Hitler did not divulge his priorities before then. An exception that proves the rule was made for the Italian ambassador as an angry Hitler told him on 21 March 1933, in rejecting Mussolini's representations against an impending boycott of Jewish businesses: "I do not know whether my name will be held in high esteem in Germany two or three hundred years from now for all that I hope to be able to do for my people, but of one thing I am absolutely certain: in five or six hundred years the name of Hitler will be glorified everywhere as the name of him who will have extirpated the pestilence of Jewry from the world once and for all."³⁹

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In presenting the destruction of Jewry as a worldwide imperative concurrent with the fight for feeding ground, Hitler's secret rationale of 1928 had been more nearly forthright than his oratorical means-end conjunction of the two. But this conjunction did put the means first in time, and that was more than mere precedence in that the means was false. In no way could removing Jews be expected, for all Hitler's talk, to conduce to conquering land. That talk was like a tacit assurance beyond his expansionist program itself—and beyond his person, first known throughout Germany from his Putsch fiasco—that with him in charge of the means, the end would fail. Tacitly again, his naming Jewry's devices (democracy, Marxism) in place of Jewry itself as the national evil to be rooted out only signified to Germany that

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LEADER AND LED

For what is essential will always be the inner accord between leader and multitude.

ADOLF HITLER, 27 October 1928.¹

Hitler himself, he said, was nothing—nothing but a medium through which the movement operates. But then too he said that only Hitler has a grip on the movement.

HARRY KESSLER, Paris, 6 July 1933, quoting Hermann Keyserlingk.²

For Germany traumatized in 1918, Hitler legitimated himself as leader by succeeding, and exceeding, Ludendorff. Here the Putsch was pivotal. Earlier Hitler had bowed to Ludendorff, who towered over Germany's folkic movement.³ But at the Bürgerbräu beer hall Hitler called the moves; Ludendorff fell in behind him for the "national revolution" as prospective "regent of the Reich" (whatever that meant) and chief of a people's army.⁴ Then at their trial Hitler eclipsed Ludendorff by taking full responsibility for their deed; the court bore Hitler out by convicting him and acquitting Ludendorff. He disposed of Ludendorff politically in the spring of 1925 by running him against Hindenburg for president of the Republic: Ludendorff rolled up 1.1 percent of the national vote.⁵ Thereafter, the more Hitler superseded Ludendorff, the more hostile Ludendorff grew. With this hostility Ludendorff acquired clairvoyance about his successor's historic role, as can be seen from his private message of 30 January 1933 to Hindenburg, his wartime partner long since estranged from

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him: "In naming Hitler chancellor you have delivered our holy German fatherland into the hands of one of the greatest demagogues of all time. I solemnly predict to you that this wretched man will hurl our country into the abyss and bring unimaginable misery upon our people."⁶ To seal that unholy delivery, Hitler courted reconciliation with Ludendorff. He achieved it in March 1937,⁷ and to his telegram on that year's anniversary of their Putsch Ludendorff replied: "Today my thoughts too are more than ever for that joint effort of ours to raise up Germany. My best wishes accompany your effective action for our people's rise."⁸ Six weeks later Ludendorff was dead, and Hitler declared in epitaph: "With his name is linked for all time the greatest heroic struggle of the German people."⁹ Between telegram and epitaph Hitler had told Party officials in secret sessions that Germany had lacked the "force of leadership" needed to hold Europe in 1918.¹⁰ He completed this thought a year later for a South African interlocutor: "Had an Adolf Hitler stood at the head of Germany during the war, the war would not have been lost."¹¹

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Hitler's continuity with Ludendorff was clearest in the martial-predatory sphere. He enlarged upon Ludendorff's view of peace-making as imposing one's will on the enemy, Ludendorff's quest for more feeding and breeding ground for future wars, his hard-and-fast operational rule "not to surrender a foot of soil without a tough struggle,"¹² his modus operandi of all or nothing, conquer or perish, even his hope for deliverance from the final bind through a stroke of luck such as had befallen Frederick the Great in the Seven Years War.¹³ An overview of Ludendorff as warlord is a preview of Hitler as warlord. "For Ludendorff," runs a recent retrospect, "the First World War neither could nor ought to end with a compromise, but only with victory or defeat." And in his western offensive "Ludendorff staked so much on one card that the high command did not even order a rear line such as Antwerp-Namur-Sedan-Metz built in good time. . . . It is . . . a distinctive mark of Ludendorff's eastern conceptions that no unified plan at all underlay them. . . . Ludendorff's Ukrainian, Crimean, and Caucasian policies in particular were so immoderate that the

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When the need was greatest the Lord God gave the German people its savior—an unknown soldier of the World War, a man of the people, without rank or property or connections, a plain, simple man, but one with an overwhelming genius and greatness of character. From the primordial force of the people itself Adolf Hitler strode forward and took Germany's destiny into his clean, strong hands. Adolf Hitler arose and passed through all of Germany as the herald of German freedom and German justice, appealing, arousing, and inflaming the people like the incarnation of the German conscience itself. And then it seemed to all ardent, expectant Germans as if the beacon of the hidden Germany had illuminated the starless night of hopeless despair. The German heart was found again; with magic power it drew to itself and into itself the noblest German blood and poured it out again into the people [*Volks*] in countless streams of resolution and strength. . . .

Just as the Roman Catholic is convinced that the Pope is infallible in all matters of religion and morals, so we National Socialists believe with the same inner conviction that for us the Führer is infallible in all political and other matters that concern the national and social interests of the people. What is the secret of his mighty influence on his followers? Is it his goodness as a person, his strength of character, or his unique modesty? Is it perhaps his political talent for divining and foreseeing the course that events will take? Or is it his exceptional courage or his extraordinary loyalty to his followers? I believe that, whatever one singles out, one will in the end arrive at the conclusion that it is not only the sum of all these virtues but also something mystical, inexpressible, almost incomprehensible in this unique man, and he who does not feel it will not understand it. For we love Adolf Hitler, because we believe deeply and unalterably that he has been sent to us by God in order to save Germany.

And it is Germany's blessing that Hitler is that rare combination of penetratingly logical thinker, genuinely profound philosopher, and iron man of action, tenacious to the extreme. How seldom are the gifts of genius united with the will to action! In Hitler they find a perfect union.

ASSMANN: "HE MIGHT HAVE DONE MUCH GOOD
FOR GERMANY" (1944)²¹

Hitler may not have been "the greatest military leader of all time" portrayed in Nazi propaganda, but he was undeniably the

²¹ From Captain Heinz Assmann, former German Navy. "Some Recollections of Adolf Hitler," trans. Captain Roland E. Krause, U.S. Navy (retired), *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (December 1953), pp. 1289-91, 1293-95. Copyright © 1953 U.S. Naval Institute. Reprinted from *Proceedings* by permission.

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Sooner or later, as Schleicher knew, the responsible committee would summon the Reichstag again. After a second postponement the committee set the date of Tuesday, January 31, 1933. Schleicher had failed to rally a majority, and Hindenburg was again confronted with the same three options he had faced in November. Again he rejected a breach of the constitution, which Schleicher now suggested to him. In the end he even denied Schleicher the constitutional recourse of dissolving the Reichstag, whereupon the chancellor resigned on Saturday, January 28.

On Monday, January 30, Hindenburg appointed Hitler. We are now able to understand better the advantages that this move held for the president. As we have seen, Hitler also lacked a majority in parliament, but together with his Conservative partners he was short only forty-five votes. This was a much broader parliamentary basis for governing than either Papen or Schleicher had had. If the Reichstag were dissolved now (as it was soon after), it could be hoped that the new coalition government would win the necessary forty-five seats and so attain a majority in parliament. Thus it would be possible to restore the original sense of the constitution. *

This sounds altogether cynical and holds true in a purely formalistic sense only, since Hitler was a declared enemy of the constitution and had never hidden his intention of abolishing it. But Hitler promised to abolish the constitution without breaching it. He proposed to use constitutional means to gain a parliamentary majority in order to destroy the constitution by due process. This was in accordance with Hindenburg's wishes. Hindenburg was not a democrat but basically a royalist. He did not want to preserve the constitution at all costs. He only wanted to avoid breaching it and, formally speaking, he was successful. We may say, therefore, that Hindenburg appointed Hitler because Hitler offered an opportunity to render the country governable again without breaching the constitution.

* D.E. It was the road to power, for von Hindenburg the confidence that our party could form a coalition government with a majority, and the constitution could be saved

from himself, only two Nazis were to become members of the cabinet; in addition, two ministers belonged to the Conservative party, and the rest were independents. Hindenburg's adviser, Papen, became vice chancellor. Finally, before appointing Hitler, Hindenburg had been allowed to appoint a defense minister of his own choice. In other words, the risks involved in Hitler's appointment had been reduced for Hindenburg. Hitler had been "fenced in," as the famous formula ran, and with that, Hindenburg's doubts had been appeased.

The distribution of authority in the new coalition government was the result of unusual negotiations. Normally the president directed such negotiations himself (he did so for the last time in November 1932), since he was the one who finally had to appoint the chancellor. Hitler was the first and only chancellor whom Hindenburg appointed without having negotiated with him beforehand. Instead, the negotiations had been conducted by Papen, who managed to create the coalition that was formed on January 30. It was above all Papen who had allayed Hindenburg's doubts.

Papen's role is well known. He was not a member of parliament, not even a member of a political party, let alone the leader of one (he had once played a minor role in the Center party). Nor was he the delegated leader of any organized group. He was a private person, accountable to no one, free of all responsibilities, indeed irresponsible in every sense. His power rested solely on Hindenburg's trust, which he had gained when he was chancellor. The fact that as a former chancellor he was pressing for his own return to power is obvious and can be accepted without further elaboration. The additional consideration that Papen was shortsighted and frivolous is perhaps relevant but beyond the scope of our historical inquiry. The one point that does have to be recognized is that he was in a position to direct the vital negotiations in a national crisis. The responsibility for forming a

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To sum up, my conclusion that the final solution was ordered by Hitler is based on three arguments. First, nobody else had ever advocated systematic killing by the state as a way to solve the Jewish question. That Hitler had done so in the 1920s is not in itself proof that he acted accordingly in the 1940s. But it is a strong indication if taken together with his programmatic consistency in foreign policy and with the position of absolute authority he had acquired in Germany since 1933.

Second, all participants who expressed themselves on the subject testified both during and after the war that the killings were ordered by Hitler. Not one of them has ever suggested that somebody else proposed or initiated them. The widespread assertion that Himmler was the principal driving force is clearly refuted by contemporary evidence. Even if all the postwar testimonies are dismissed as apologetic, the wartime statements are convincing enough.

Third, given the nature of the Nazi state and its ruler, it is difficult to imagine that an act of such scope with such far-reaching consequences, one so compromising, moreover, to the conduct of the war and the chances for victory, should have been initiated by subordinate agencies. Since there is no other case of this kind, it can safely be ruled out.

If, then, we agree that the decision was made by Hitler, we must ask how it was reached and transmitted. I have already eliminated the possibility that a single order was given at a certain date. It is strange that this should ever have been imagined. It is in clear contradiction to most comparable practice and can perhaps be explained only by an arresting horror at crimes unprecedented in human history that has, for a long time, prevented or paralyzed conventional historical research and understanding. In other words, to suppose that Hitler had one day called a conference and given an order to exterminate the Jews, and that this order had been carried

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that they were being deceived but rather that he was being deceived.

In the beginning he had been open about his intentions. During the 1920s he repeatedly stated and wrote that a new war had to be waged in order to secure living space (*Lebensraum*) for Germany, and he had precisely articulated the domestic and foreign policy measures necessary to prepare the way. He had also repeatedly stated and written that the Jews had to be done away with, and he had noted that such a process was and would continue to be "a bloody one."¹¹ He had even mentioned poison gas in that context.¹² All this appeared in a book that had a distribution of hundreds of thousands of copies before 1933.

But it is also beyond doubt that the Germans did not grant him power in order to implement that program. Beginning with the memorable Reichstag elections of September 1930, when for the first time so many Germans voted for him that the chancellorship came within reach, Hitler deceived the Germans and the world. He had to remain silent about his war plans, if only to avoid alerting his adversaries. This, in turn, does not imply that the Germans themselves remained completely in the dark. That pluralistic party democracy was to be abolished and replaced by a rigid one-man rule was something the Germans well knew, and those who voted for Hitler favored that plan. That Hitler stood as an enemy to the Jews was something they also knew, put up with, or even condoned.

Hitler's rise to power may be controversial, but the numbers of Germans who voted for him is, by contrast, easy to determine. About every third German who went to the ballot box gave Hitler a vote at least once. One third—no more, no less. Even when he was in power, during the March elections of 1933 (which were no longer free yet still allowed alternatives), far more than half of all Germans did not vote for Hitler. How they viewed him after that can hardly be cap-

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My explanation begins with the assumption that the regime that came to power in Germany in 1933 differed strikingly from the preceeding one and from earlier forms of government because it was a monocracy. For now we will take that to mean that all vital political decisions were made by one person, in this case Hitler. Yet this definition of the term is not really adequate. Military dictatorships are, in my view, not true monocracies, for the military dictator rules in conjunction with the military, and his power remains circumscribed by the extent to which the military is willing to support him. By the same token, monarchies, despite the linguistic contradiction, are also not necessarily monocracies of the kind meant here, especially in cases where the monarch depends on the nobility, derives his power from it, and is thereby also held in check by it.

Our monocrat, if I may put it in this way, rules in a vacuum as little as anyone else does. He too needs support. He does not receive it from one group alone but from several, which—and this is the decisive face—have entirely differing and even opposing interests, and also have differing and even opposing expectations about his rule. His power rests on being able to play these groups against each other. Every ruler does this to a certain degree while still remaining dependent on the factions supporting him. But for an autocrat, the support of different and opposing groups constitutes the actual source of his power.

These types of monocracies, which were probably described for the first time by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, may be rare in history, but they do occur. Examples in modern history are the absolute monarchies that played the various estates against each other, and the reigns of Napoleon I and Napoleon III, who maneuvered their way between the upper and lower bourgeoisie, or between the bourgeoisie and the workers. The special conditions under which such autocracies emerged have been convincingly analyzed in some cases, and

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it can be useful to draw upon such analyses as analogies for explaining Hitler's rise to power, assuming, of course, that he was actually a monocrat. Description and analysis thus go hand in hand.

As we have seen, Hitler came to power as the head of a coalition government. If the Nazi party had had a majority in the Reichstag, he would to a certain extent have been dependent on it. The support he received from his own following and from the Conservative party (two groups with wholly different interests) provided the preliminary basis for his monocracy. The creation of the government had not been guided by parliamentary procedure, if only because the two coalition partners together did not constitute a majority in the Reichstag. Moreover, this had been preceded by an intrigue in which the industrialist Wilhelm Keppler, then Hitler's economic adviser, had persuaded the banker Kurt von Schröder to arrange a conference between Hitler and Franz von Papen in Schröder's house in Cologne. The meeting took place on January 4, 1933, and the result was that Papen induced President Hindenburg to name Hitler chancellor of a coalition cabinet. We saw in chapter 1 that this story in reality is much more complicated than our brief summary. It passes over the motives of those participating in the intrigue, leaves open the question of whether they acted under instruction from specific groups, and says nothing about negotiations with other parties. Moreover, the intrigue of January 4 was of special importance, but it was not the only one of importance in those agitated weeks.

Again, we can briefly summarize what we have learned. Hitler did not come to power as the authorized representative of a specific group, but because of the support of several differing groups and persons who expected different things from the new chancellor. In that respect, his accession resembled a transfer of power rather than a seizure of power. The

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seizure of power and the establishment of monocracy took place when Hitler played the different groups supporting him against each other, as well as the groups that opposed him or stood on the sidelines. It was then that he revealed the distinctive nature of his regime. Once again, some briefly sketched examples must suffice.

Hitler flattered the conservatives by opening the new Reichstag in Potsdam and even led them to hope that he would restore the monarchy. At the same time, he promised work and bread to his followers, spoke of a "national revolution," yet shied away from tampering with property arrangements, although he allowed his private army, the SA, a free hand for the first anti-Jewish pogrom. He promised armament contracts to big business, new tasks to the army, protection to civil servants—in short, everything to everybody. On May 1, 1933, he gave the working classes the Labor Day holiday they had demanded in vain for decades; the next day he abolished the trade unions. In July he concluded a concordat with the Vatican and thereby put an end to the political power of the Center party. In September he bestowed on the farmers the Hereditary Estate Act, which guaranteed the unencumbered intergenerational transfer of small farms. On June 30, 1934, he sacrificed his party army, the SA, and thereby bound the regular army to him, but not without simultaneously strengthening his own police force, which then persecuted his remaining opponents.

Clearly Hitler was not the representative of any single group or class but of many groups at the same time. He served or threatened them all, giving something here and taking something there, always steering a middle course, even between the mutually hostile dental surgeons and dentists. He had no other choice if he wanted to stay in power, for no group was so powerful that he could base his power on it alone. His only hope was that the various factions would cripple each other.

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Monocrats come to power through a stalemate, and this, as we have seen, is the fundamental fact, if not the decisive fact about the Weimar Republic.

The stalemate appears on a superficial level in the contrast between the republicans and the supporters of the old regime. In parliamentary terms, the Weimar coalition, that is, the Social Democrats, the Democrats, and the Centrists, stood against a massive opposition force consisting of Conservatives and many former National Liberals, who either flatly rejected the new constitution or accepted it only grudgingly as an unfortunate fact of life. But it is only through the social structure that the contrast can be fully understood. On the one hand, there were those groups or classes that had served as the backbone of the old authoritarian state—those in large landed property and in business, the more prosperous bourgeoisie, the army, and the civil service. On the other hand there were those who had been excluded from the state and who had repeatedly been attacked as enemies of the state, that is, the working class and petit-bourgeois classes, which were constantly growing in the wake of industrialization.

In the upheaval surrounding the defeat of 1918, the former ruling class moved temporarily into the political opposition without losing its social and economic power. For property relations, the general economic order and even the state apparatus changed very little, if at all. That led to the unequal, or to be more accurate the equal, battle that characterized the political controversies in the Weimar Republic and increasingly assumed the character of a stalemate. One element in German society was no longer strong enough to control the government and the other element was not yet strong enough, indeed the less so since a third faction comprising the Communists and later the National Socialists proved itself incapable of forming a coalition either among themselves or, until 1933, with one of the other two factions.

This situation did not result simply from the lost war or

1933

maintained and as many still hold today. Neither a parliamentary majority nor revolutionary force brought him to power. Power was transferred to him through a confusing play of forces. There was the formal designation by the Reich president, the coalition with the German Nationalists, and above all the negotiations between public and private individuals. These negotiations and the intrigue behind them could only succeed because the parliamentary system was no longer functioning, primarily because the constitutional parties had abdicated. The political decision-making process was thereby displaced to the realm of extraparliamentary affairs; the effect of that displacement was to bestow on a wide array of forces a freedom and influence that had not been foreseen in the constitution.

This was not a political development that saw the light of day only in the last phase of the Weimar Republic. Since neither of the two leading factions of German society dominated the government, a development took place that can be described as the growing autonomy of the state apparatus. Left without clear political directives, the army, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary for a long time had been acquiring power of their own that expressed itself in actions of unprecedented arbitrariness. In the resulting power vacuum, officials bound to accept direction freed themselves from control.

The fundamental state of the Republic bestowed, indeed imposed, growing influence on generals and high officials as well as on individual politicians and business leaders. Certainly they all had their own interests, as everyone does. But one can also assume that they worried about a state that no longer functioned properly. There was one fear that united all the propertied classes, regardless of their differences of opinion in other matters, and that was their fear of a social revolution, of communism. The Communist party grew nonetheless. In the Reichstag elections of May 1928 it received 10.6 percent of the vote; in September 1930 13.1 percent; in July

1933, 1932

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Hitler and the Germans

1932 14.3 percent; in November 1932 16.9 percent. Its electoral share, unlike that of the Nazi party, did not decrease, and it preached expropriation and promised sovietization.

Hitler, on the other hand, gave reassuring promises and openly courted the industrialists. Whatever else one might have thought of him, he was certainly a passionate anti-communist. Moreover, he had at his disposal millions of largely poverty-stricken (and therefore dangerous) followers and possessed such a charismatic appeal for them that he seemed in a position to make them serve the state. It was true that he spoke without much restraint and that he intended to abolish the constitution. But had not this very constitution, an exceedingly unpopular one at that, led to the present dilemma? And was it not possible to control the risk of transferring power to him by taking him in, binding him to a coalition, fencing him in, and taming him?

This was the train of thought of the political powers in the winter of 1932-1933. However briefly the process has been described here, it nevertheless offers an explanation for Hitler's rise to power. Unable to exercise power in their own right, the property holders of Germany, led by industrialists such as Keppler, bankers such as Schröder, and conservative politicians such as Papen, secured political power for a charismatic hero of the masses in the hope that he would at least protect their economic power and ward off a social revolution. To put it concisely, this constituted a pact with the devil: political power for economic stability. One was sacrificed to secure the other. And this plan did not, after all, fail completely, even though catastrophes of unimaginable extent followed and in the end buried the state.

Hitler could rule as he wanted so long as he did not seriously antagonize any of the differing and opposing factions that had helped him rise to power, neither his indigent followers nor his propertied stirrup holders, nor any of the other great social forces (such as the churches) whose institutions

* D. T. comments on the critics who say this is upon my word, they could not have been more accurate

1933

he was not in a position to destroy. This was the hallmark of his monocracy, its strength as well as its weakness, and Hitler fully understood his position. He was always haunted by the fear of being pushed off the throne.

There is much to be said for the view that Hitler, like the two Napoleons, turned to foreign adventures in order to preserve his political power. The way in which he ran state finances essentially allowed only a choice between bankruptcy or war. On the other hand, his foreign policy was not improvised, but followed a rigid plan that Hitler had designed long before coming to power and had incorporated into his world view. This plan, furthermore, was not wholly incongruent with general developments and its realization was therefore ensured. Late imperialistic territorial conquest was presaged in the development of Germany, just as it was in the development of Japan and Italy. All three states had entered world politics at the same time, around 1870, met disappointment in the result of World War I, and allied themselves subsequently. Thus Hitler, notwithstanding his own great personal responsibility in shaping events, was no more than the executor of a longstanding tendency.

With the accession of Hitler, however, German society had deprived itself of the opportunity to determine, according to its own interests, whether and how the path inherent in its development was to be taken. There were attempts, above all through military resistance, to prevent Hitler from taking the path to war or at least to complete defeat. Nevertheless, neither the military nor any other group that had made Hitler's accession possible was strong enough to win back its power of co-determination once it had abdicated it. Hitler led them all, up to the bitter end, to the destruction of their state.

The most horrifying thing is also the most difficult to explain: the murder of the Jews and of the often forgotten gypsies. Here too Hitler's personal responsibility was great.

1933

* Dr. T. All this is quality - only we
demons have their power. Whom our
work calls for it and the S.O. asserts.

Ravenscroft Meets Stein, and Goes to War 91 W

1933

R.T. *

came across a book written by Dr. Stein . . . a study of the historical background of the Grail romances. The plaintiff was much impressed by this book. He thought Dr. Stein had achieved these supernatural levels of consciousness which so much interested him. He sought the acquaintance of Dr. Stein and a close friendship developed between them. Stein indeed believed that he had the power to recapture lost moments of history by meditation, and he found a ready listener in the plaintiff. Their friendship began in the year 1948. Their discussion ranged over a wide field, including medieval and modern European history, contemporary politics, and medicine. Although each was working, the plaintiff as a journalist and Dr. Stein as a doctor. Their homes were close together in Kensington and they would meet in the evenings. . . .

Dr. Stein unfolded to the plaintiff the story of the spear, as he claimed to have traced it, partly by orthodox historical study and partly by meditation, beginning in pre-Christian times and continuing to the present day.

The plaintiff did not make anything approaching a full record of what was told him by Dr. Stein. He did not, at that time, have any notion of himself writing a book about the Hofburg Spear. He did, however, keep a diary from time to time and he also made separate notes for future reference. However, one evening in 1957, Dr. Stein telephoned the plaintiff and asked him to call. There is some evidence, though it is inconclusive, that Dr. Stein had a few days previously, made up his mind to compose his own book about the spear. However that may be, on that evening, Dr. Stein told the plaintiff that it was he who would have to write the story of the Hofburg Spear. They had a long session together, the plaintiff returning home in the early hours of the morning. It was the last time they met. Dr. Stein was taken ill next day and shortly afterwards died in hospital. The plaintiff believes that Dr. Stein had a premonition of his early death.

A disparity in the story of how Ravenscroft's *Spear* came to be written appears to have been revealed. Ravenscroft in his book does not specifically say that Stein told him at any stage it would be up to him to do the writing, only that the task fell to him

The SS

In 1896, English author M. P. Shiel wrote a story about a group of supermen roaming Europe. They murdered those people whose physical and mental flaws did not fit their concept of the evolution of humanity. Shiel gave his story a title which proved to be prophetic: *The S.S.*³⁶

Heinrich Himmler, one of Hitler's henchmen, was very much taken with the idea of leading a secret society, a desire that was to become the catalyst for an organization that grew out of the Nazi party as the party itself had grown from the Thule Society.

Himmler, a chicken farmer by occupation but more like a pedantic schoolteacher in appearance and manner,³⁷ was at first treated as a nonentity by fellow members of the party, which he joined in 1923. Because of his loyalty it was decided to give him a nominal role. Hitler placed him in charge of a small body of men, the *Schutzstaffel (SS)*,* whose task it was to protect Hitler and other party leaders. Under Himmler the SS grew to monstrous proportions to become an organization that was both a fanatical fighting force and the controller of a vast network of slavery and extermination camps.

The first thing Himmler did when he became its head was to persuade Hitler to allow him to increase its numbers. Soon it had grown to a corps of 30,000.³⁸ But Himmler had just started. His aim was to make the SS an independent body (eventually with its own mountaintop nation). The SS would become the Nazi Praetorian Guard—the biggest and preferably the only secret society in Germany.³⁹

By 1933 its membership had risen to 50,000. In April 1934, Himmler completed the takeover of the nation's political police, the Gestapo.⁴⁰ In the same year, members of the SS armed squads arrested and executed leaders of the rival group of thugs, the SA, whose brutal excesses had become embarrassing to the Nazis as they sought a veneer of respectability. However, the major reason

*Literally, "Elite Security Force"

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Febr. 1924

Astrology 181 W

inner strength, but external strength as well, so that it will give a mighty impetus to the pendulum of world history."²⁷

Some close friends had shown a copy of her annual to Hitler, who had responded: "What on earth have women and the stars got to do with me?" During the summer of 1923 she had tried to explain personally to a number of Hitler's followers "whom I know personally" that their Führer would have very critical aspects in November (1923).²⁸

Her subsequent prediction and much of the earlier one were accepted as being fulfilled when Hitler staged an aborted *putsch* on 9 November of that year, which began in a beer cellar and ended in a march to the center of Munich. Police fired shots to disperse the Nazi marchers and some were killed. Hitler fell over and broke a shoulder and quickly fled the scene.

In February 1924, he and a dozen of his followers were brought to trial. All were found guilty of conspiring to overthrow the German government. On 1 April 1924, they were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment: Hitler was given five years. However, he was released from the Landsberg prison less than nine months later. He had spent his time in prison writing *Mein Kampf*.

From 1924, Hitler's horoscope was rarely mentioned in German astrological periodicals. It had become dangerous, even life threatening to criticize Hitler in any way or to write disparagingly—even objectively—about him and that included his horoscope.

In 1933 probably the last public horoscope of Hitler appeared. It was based on a 5:45 A.M. birth arrived at on the basis of past events in Hitler's life. Published in *Astral Warte*,* it expressed a disbelief in Hitler's ability to form a government. A month later, with Hitler having been given the reins of power, the journal had to retract the dangerous remark.²⁹

By 1934 public references to Hitler's horoscope ceased altogether, probably as a result of a confidential directive to publishers from the Propaganda Ministry. The veto also applied to the

*"Astral Viewpoint"

horoscopes of all the leading Nazis and any kind of astrological speculation on the subject of the Third Reich.³⁰

Many Germans, as we have seen, were deeply influenced and impressed by astrologers, who were among the media stars of their day. Jealous Nazis regarded them as rivals in the battle for hearts and minds. One of the most outstanding "stars" was Ebertin, who survived the anti-occult purges. King believes she may have owed her freedom from Gestapo persecution to the protection of Hitler himself, an assumption based on the fact that records of his conversations show he frequently made joking but not unfavorable reference to Ebertin and her "astonishing prophecy."³¹

Her annual ceased publication in 1937, with the cryptic message that it was due to circumstances beyond her control. Shortly after the outbreak of war the London *Evening Standard* of 5 October 1939 noted: "The recent disappearance of Hitler's favorite astrologer Elsbeth Ebertin is reported from Breslau. . . . She has not been seen since the start of the war. She enjoys a big reputation among German astrologers and is said to be one of the few persons who knows the exact hour of Hitler's birth."³²

Ebertin lived quietly in Freiburg until November 1944 when she was killed in an air raid. Ebertin's son, Reinhold, told the astrology magazine *Kosmobiologie* in 1966 that she had foreseen what was to happen to her because she knew the horoscopes of many people living in the houses around her. But if she had moved she would have caused a panic—an offense that would have had her arrested by the Gestapo. People were saying that so long as she was there, nothing very much could happen to them.³³

A seemingly unequivocal opinion of Hitler's attitude toward astrology is offered by the woman who was one of his secretaries from 1933 until 1945, Fraulein Christa Schroder:

There were popular rumors that Hitler allowed himself to be guided by astrologers before reaching any important decision. I must confess that I never noticed anything of the kind and the subject was never mentioned in conversation. On the contrary, Hitler refuted this by his firmly held conviction that people born on the same day, at the same place, and at the same

so long as the wielders of it are not the standard bearers and apostles of a new spiritual doctrine . . . It is only in the struggle between *Weltanschauungen* [world views] that physical force, consistently and ruthlessly applied, will eventually turn the scale in its own favour.' This was the reason for the failure of every attempt to combat Marxism hitherto, including the failure of Bismarck's anti-socialist legislation — 'it lacked the basis of a new *Weltanschauung*.'

Out of this grew the idea of creating a new movement which would fight Social Democracy with its own weapons. For power lay with the masses, and if the hold of the Jew-ridden Marxist parties on their allegiance was to be broken, a substitute had to be found. The key, Hitler became convinced, lay in propaganda, and the lesson Hitler had already drawn from the Social Democrats and Lueger's Christian Socialists in Vienna was completed by his observation of the success of English propaganda during the war, by contrast with the failure of German attempts.

There were two themes on which Hitler constantly played in the years that followed the war: Man of the People, and Unknown Soldier of the First World War. When he spoke to the first Congress of German Workers in Berlin on 10 May 1933, he assured them: 'Fate, in a moment of caprice or perhaps fulfilling the designs of Providence, cast me into the great mass of the people, amongst common folk. I myself was a labouring man for years in the building trade and had to earn my own bread. And for a second time I took my place once again as an ordinary soldier amongst the masses.' These were the twin foundations of his demagoguery and, in however garbled a fashion, they correspond to the two formative experiences of his life, the years in Vienna and Munich, and the years at the Front.

Those years between the end of 1908 and the end of 1918 had hardened him, taught him to be self-

reliant, confirmed his belief in the power of his will. From a stock of fixed ideas and he altered little in the rest of his contempt for the ideals of liberalism, equality, and peace; for autocratic forms of government; for socialism; a rooted belief in the rights of individuals; and faith in the future. Most important of all, in the years he had already hit upon, political power was to be won, which, when fully developed, would be a career without parallel in the past. He had learned remained to be won on his own mind, and had still to make the decision to become a politician. The sudden shock to precipitate the end of the war, the defeat, and the overthrow of

of presidential government. Hitler did not at the time see this as the only means by which he could come to power legally. He continued to speculate on the possibility of a coalition with the Nationalists—even at one time with the Centre—or, better still, on the chances of winning an outright majority at the next elections. Each time the negotiations broke down he turned again to these alternatives, but always with an eye toward resuming negotiations.

Years ago, in Vienna, Hitler had admired the tactics of Karl Lueger and had summed them up in two sentences in *Mein Kampf*: 'In his political activity, Lueger attached the main importance to winning over those classes whose threatened existence tended to stimulate rather than paralyse their will to fight. ~~At the same time he took care to avail himself of all the instruments of authority at his disposal, and to bring powerful existing institutions over to his side, in order to gain from these well-tried sources of power the greatest possible advantage for his own movement.~~' Hitler was well on the way to 'winning over those classes whose existence was threatened'; now he faced the task of 'bringing the powerful existing institutions over to his side', above all the Army and the President. The years of waiting were at an end.

THE MONTHS

October 1931

The first contacts between disposed of power in picious. At the beginn Schleicher had a meetir Röhm's help, and subse cellor, Brüning, and F him.

Brüning asked for H rations question was elected as President. plished he was willing else more acceptable to take his place. Instead Hitler launched into a i which was that when he only get rid of German and, with England and I to her knees. He failed and the meeting ended in

In his interview with October, the first occasio met, Hitler was nervou Geli Raubal, with whom mitted suicide three wee to Göring, who was at t in Sweden, to return ar counts of the meeting Hitler obviously made much and trying to imj demagogic arts; instead is said to have grumble

had recently been serving as chief military adviser to the German delegation at the Disarmament Conference and had been hurriedly recalled without Schleicher's or Hammerstein's knowledge. Fortunately for Hitler, Blomberg accepted his new commission from the President, and the threat of a last-minute repudiation by the Army was thereby avoided.

It is possible that fear of what Schleicher might do helped Papen and Hugenberg to make up their minds and hastily compose their remaining differences with the Nazis. At any rate, on the morning of Monday the 30th, after a sleepless night during which he sat up with Göring and Goebbels to be ready for any eventuality, Hitler received the long-awaited summons to the President. The deal which Schleicher had made the object of his policy, and for which Strasser had worked, was accomplished at last, with Schleicher and Strasser left out.

During the morning a silent crowd filled the street between the Kaiserhof and the Chancellery. Shortly after noon a roar went up from the crowd: the Leader was coming. He ran down the steps to his car and in a couple of minutes was back in the Kaiserhof. As he entered the room his lieutenants crowded to greet him. The improbable had happened: Adolf Hitler, the petty official's son from Austria, the down-and-out of the Home for Men, the *Meldegänger*, of the List Regiment, had become Chancellor of the German Reich.

BOOK II

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REVOLUTI

30 Januar

Nazi propaganda later presented Hitler's coming to great national revival. Despite the mass suppression of his office in 1933 as the revolutionary or nationalist into power, nor even but as part of a 'shock gang' whom he had Hitler did not seize by a backstairs intrigue.

Far from being immune to much to luck and even his political opponents afterwards, the Party ebbed when the unexpected gave them a chance seen.

Before he came to in winning more than free election. Had the German people believed could never have hoped

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no strong middle-class Lib-
The middle-class parties
such a role—the People's

Party and the Democrats—had suffered a more severe
loss of votes to the Nazis than any other German par-
ties, and this is sufficient comment on the opposition
they were likely to offer.

But the heaviest responsibility of all rests on the
German Right, who not only failed to combine with
the other parties in defence of the Republic but made
Hitler their partner in a coalition government. The
old ruling class of Imperial Germany had never recon-
ciled itself to the loss of the war or to the overthrow
of the monarchy in 1918. They were remarkably well
treated by the Republican régime which followed.
Many of them were left in positions of power and in-
fluence; their wealth and estates remained untouched
by expropriation or nationalization; the Army lead-
ers were allowed to maintain their independent posi-
tion; the industrialists and business men made big
profits out of a weak and complaisant government,
while the help given to the Junkers' estates was one
of the financial scandals of the century. All this won
neither their gratitude nor their loyalty. Whatever
may be said of individuals, as a class they remained
irreconcilable, contemptuous of and hostile to the ré-
gime they continued to exploit. What the German
Right wanted was to regain its old position in Ger-
many as the ruling class; to destroy the hated Repub-
lic and restore the monarchy; to put the working
classes 'in their places'; to rebuild the military power
of Germany; to reverse the decision of 1918 and to
restore Germany—their Germany—to a dominant po-
sition in Europe. Blinded by interest and prejudice,
the Right forsook the role of a true conservatism,
abandoned its own traditions and made the gross
mistake of supposing that in Hitler they had found
a man who would enable them to achieve their ends.
A large section of the German middle class, power-
fully attracted by Hitler's nationalism, and many of
the German Officer Corps followed their lead.

The formation of a Nazi-Right coalition was based

on the belief that Hitler, once he had been brought into the government, could be held in check and tamed. At first sight the terms to which Hitler had agreed appeared to confirm this belief.

He was not even a presidential chancellor; Hindenburg had been persuaded to accept Hitler on the grounds that this time he would be able to provide a parliamentary majority. No sooner was the Cabinet formed than Hitler started negotiations to bring the Centre Party into the coalition. When these negotiations did not lead to agreement Hitler insisted that new elections must be held in order to provide a parliamentary basis for the coalition in the form of an electoral majority.

Papen saw nothing but cause for self-congratulation on his own astuteness. He had levelled scores with General von Schleicher, yet at the same time realized Schleicher's dream, the harnessing of the Nazis to the support of the State—and this, not on Hitler's, but on his own terms. For Hitler, Papen assured his friends, was tied hand and foot by the conditions he had accepted. True, Hitler had the Chancellorship, but the real power, in Papen's view, rested with the Vice-Chancellor, himself.

It was the Vice-Chancellor, not the Chancellor, who enjoyed the special confidence of the President; it was the Vice-Chancellor who held the key post of Minister-President of Prussia, with control of the Prussian administration and police; and the Vice-Chancellor who had the right, newly established, to be present on all occasions when the Chancellor made his report to the President. Furthermore, only three of the eleven Cabinet posts were held by Nazis, and apart from the Chancellorship both were second-rate positions.

With these arguments Papen overcame Hindenburg's reluctance to make Hitler Chancellor. In this way they would obtain that mass support which the 'Cabinet of Barons' had so notoriously lacked. Hitler

was to play his old in which he was no his name at the top decisions would be him in the Cabine tised by Papen, a r knew how to distin. shows of power.

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was to play his old role of barker for a circus-show in which he was now to have a place as partner and his name at the top of the bill, but in which the real decisions would be taken by those who outnumbered him in the Cabinet. This was *Realpolitik* as practised by Papen, a man who—as he prided himself—knew how to distinguish between the reality and the shows of power.

Rarely has disillusionment been so complete or so swift to follow. Those who, like Papen, believed they had seen through Hitler were to find they had badly underestimated both the leader and the movement. For Hitler's originality lay in his realization that effective revolutions, in modern conditions, are carried out with, and not against, the power of the State: the correct order of events was first to secure access to that power and then begin his revolution. Hitler never abandoned the cloak of legality; instead he turned the law inside out and made illegality legal.

In six months, Hitler and his supporters were to demonstrate a cynicism and lack of scruple—qualities on which his partners particularly prided themselves—which left Papen and Hugenberg gasping for breath. At the end of those six months they were to discover, like the young lady of Riga, the dangers of going for a ride on a tiger.

At five o'clock on the afternoon on Monday 30 January, Hitler presided over his first Cabinet meeting. The Cabinet was still committed to seeking a parliamentary majority by securing the support of the Centre Party, and Göring duly reported on the progress of his talks with the leader of the Centre, Monsignor Kaas. If these failed, then, Hitler suggested, it would be necessary to dissolve the Reichstag and hold new elections. Hugenberg saw the danger of letting Hitler conduct an election campaign with the power of the State at his command, but he reluctantly agreed to the plans after Hitler solemnly promised

him that the composition of the coalition government would not be altered, whatever the results of the elections.

The next day, when Hitler saw Monsignor Kaas, he took good care that the negotiations with the Centre should fail. On the advice of Papen, Hindenburg agreed once more to sign a decree dissolving the Reichstag 'since the formation of a working majority has proved impossible'. The Centre Party protested to the President that this was not true, but the decree had been signed, the date for the new elections fixed and the first and most difficult of the obstacles to Hitler's success removed. Papen and Hugenberg had allowed themselves to be gently guided into the trap. Goebbels wrote confidently in his diary, 'The struggle is a light one now, since we are able to employ all the means of the State. Radio and Press are at our disposal. We shall achieve a masterpiece of propaganda. Even money is not lacking this time.'

In order to leave no doubts of the expectations they had, Göring summoned about twenty-five of Germany's leading industrialists to his palace on the evening of 20 February. After Hitler spoke, Göring bluntly appealed to them: 'The sacrifice asked for is easier to bear if it is realized that the elections will certainly be the last for the next ten years, probably even for the next hundred years.' It was agreed to raise an election fund of three million Reichsmarks to be divided between the partners in the coalition, but there was little doubt that the Nazis would get the lion's share.

Throughout the election campaign Hitler refused to outline any programme for his Government. At Munich he said: 'Programmes are of no avail, it is the human purpose which is decisive.' The Nazi campaign was directed against the record of the fourteen years of party government in Germany, which had 'piled mistake upon mistake, illusion upon illusion.' What had the Nazis to put in its place? He was no

Revolution after Power

democratic politician, Hitler trick the people into voting for promises. 'I ask of you, Germany, you have given the others four, give us four.'

Hitler did not rely on the though the other parties were in the majority, their meetings were brutally assaulted and beaten, their papers continually suppressed. He admitted fifty-one people killed in the campaign and several hundred wounded. The Nazis did not mean to be scrupulous about fair play or fair

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The moment Göring enters the scene, he directs a massive political purge of the Prussian State Police, drawing particular attention to sweeping out the old officers, replacing them with new ones. In February, after urging the police to the activities of 'organization'—that is to say, the Communist Party—'Police officers who make use of force are to be removed from the ranks of the police.'

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in its place? He was no

democratic politician, Hitler virtuously replied, to
trick the people into voting for him by a few empty
promises. 'I ask of you, German people, that after
you have given the others fourteen years you should
give us four.'

Hitler did not rely on the spoken word alone. Al-
though the other parties were still allowed to func-
tion, their meetings were broken up, their speakers
assaulted and beaten, their posters torn down and
their papers continually suppressed. Official figures
admitted fifty-one people killed during the election
campaign and several hundreds injured. This time
the Nazis did not mean to be robbed of power by any
scruples about fair play or free speech.

Papen believed he had tied Hitler down by restrict-
ing the number of Cabinet posts held by the Nazis
to a bare minimum, but the real key to power in the
State—control of the Prussian police force and of
the Prussian State Administration—lay with Göring,
Prussian Minister of the Interior. By the curious sys-
tem of dual government which existed in Germany,
this office carried out the work of administering two-
thirds of Germany. In the critical period of 1933-4,
no man after Hitler played so important a role in
the Nazi revolution as Göring. His energy and ruth-
lessness, together with his control of Prussia, were
indispensable to Hitler's success. The belief that Gö-
ring would be restrained by Papen as Minister-Presi-
dent of Prussia proved ill-founded. Göring issued or-
ders and enforced his will, as if he were already in
possession of absolute power.

The moment Göring entered office he began a dras-
tic purge of the Prussian State service. He paid par-
ticular attention to sweeping out the senior police
officers, replacing them with S.A. or S.S. leaders. In
February, after urging the police to show no mercy
to the activities of 'organizations hostile to the State'
—that is to say, the Communists—Göring continued:
'Police officers who make use of fire-arms in the exe-

cution of their duties will, without regard to the consequences of such use, benefit by my protection; those who . . . fail in their duty will be punished in accordance with the regulations.' In other words, when in doubt shoot.

On 22 February Göring published an order establishing an auxiliary police force. Fifty thousand men were called up, among them twenty-five thousand from the S.A. and fifteen thousand from the S.S. All they had to do was to put a white arm-band over their brown shirts or black shirts: they then represented the authority of the State. It was the equivalent of handing over police powers to the razor and cosh gangs. This was 'legality' in practice.

The day after Hitler became Chancellor, Goebbels noted in his diary: 'In a conference with the Leader we arrange measures for combating the Red terror.' On 24 February the police raided Communist H.Q. in Berlin. An official communiqué reported the discovery of plans for a Communist revolution. The publication of the captured documents was promised in the immediate future. They never appeared, but on the night of 27 February the Reichstag building mysteriously went up in flames.

While the fire was still spreading, the police arrested a young Dutch Communist, Marianus van der Lubbe, who was found in the deserted building.

Göring at once declared that van der Lubbe was only a pawn in a major Communist plot to launch a campaign of terrorism. The arrest of Communist leaders, including the Bulgarian Georgi Dimitroff, followed at once, and the Reichstag Fire Trial was held in Leipzig with all the publicity the Nazis could contrive. The publicity, however, badly misfired. Not only did Dimitroff defend himself with skill, but the prosecution failed completely to prove any connexion between van der Lubbe and the other defendants. The trial ended in a fiasco with the acquittal and re-

Revolution after Power

lease of the Communist leader van der Lubbe to be hurried.

It is still a matter of controversy whether the burning of the Reichstag was, as claimed by the Nazis, a premeditated act, or whether van der Lubbe was a lone fanatic. At any rate, there is no doubt that the fire was a disaster. The next day Hitler proposed to the President 'for the preservation of the State.' The decree was a defensive measure against Communism. It suspended the guarantees of the Weimar Constitution for the Government if necessary to suppress any federal State, increase the punishment for crimes of high treason, postpone the right of appeal to one of death, and impose hard labour for life, in order to prevent the assassination of members of the Reichstag and breaches of the peace.

Armed with these all-embracing powers, Göring was in a position to suppress any opposition against their opposition. He postponed the formal proscription of the Communist Party until after the election. The class vote should continue to be divided among the rival parties of the Communist Party. But acts of terrorism by the Communist parties were now intensified.

In the last week of the election, the propaganda machine redoubled its efforts on the 'Marxists', producing a flood of Communist propaganda, counts of Communist preparations for a 'blood-bath', for which the arrest of van der Lubbe was the only substantiation. Hitler's storm-hurricane campaign, declared the end of Marxism and the

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It is still a matter of controversy whether the burn-
ing of the Reichstag was, in fact, planned and car-
ried out by the Nazis themselves, as has long been
believed, or whether van der Lubbe acted on his own.
At any rate, there is no doubt who profited by the
fire. The next day Hitler promulgated a decree signed
by the President 'for the protection of the People
and the State.' The decree was described 'as a de-
fensive measure against Communist acts of violence.'
It suspended the guarantees of individual liberty un-
der the Weimar Constitution, authorized the Reich
Government if necessary to take over full powers in
any federal State, increased the penalty for the
crimes of high treason, poisoning, arson, and sabo-
tage to one of death, and instituted the death penalty,
or hard labour for life, in the case of conspiracy to
assassinate members of the Government, or grave
breaches of the peace.

Armed with these all-embracing powers, Hitler and
Göring were in a position to take any action they
pleased against their opponents. They cleverly post-
poned the formal proscription of the Communist
Party until after the elections, so that the working-
class vote should continue to be divided between the
rival parties of the Communists and the Social Demo-
crats. But acts of terrorism against the Left-wing
parties were now intensified.

In the last week of the election campaign, the Nazi
propaganda machine redoubled the force of its attack
on the 'Marxists', producing the most hair-raising ac-
counts of Communist preparations for insurrection
and a 'blood-bath', for which the Reichstag Fire and
the arrest of van der Lubbe were used to provide
substantiation. Hitler stormed the country in a last
hurricane campaign, declaring his determination to
stamp out Marxism and the parties of the Left with-

out mercy. For the first time the radio carried his words into every corner of the country.

The campaign reached its climax on Saturday 4 March, the 'Day of the Awakening Nation', when Hitler spoke in Königsberg, the ancient coronation town and capital of the separated province of East Prussia. Hitler declared: 'One must be able to say once again: German People, hold your heads high and proudly once more! You are no longer enslaved and in bondage, but you are free again and can justly say: We are all proud that through God's powerful aid we have once more become true Germans.'

As Hitler finished speaking bonfires blazed out on the hill-tops, all along the 'threatened frontier' of the east. It was the culmination of a month in which the tramping columns of S.A. troops, the torchlight parades, the monster demonstrations, cheering crowds, blaring loudspeakers, and mob-oratory, the streets hung with swastika flags, the open display of brutality and violence, with the police standing by in silence—all had been used to build up the impression of an irresistible force which would sweep away every obstacle in its path.

In face of all this it is a remarkable fact that still the German people refused to give Hitler the majority he sought. With the help of his Nationalist allies, Hitler had a bare majority in the new Reichstag, but it did not escape the attention of the Nazi leaders that with the proscription of the Communist deputies they would have a clear parliamentary majority themselves, without the need of the Nationalist votes. The chances of Papen, Hugenberg, and the Nationalists acting as an effective brake on their partners in the coalition appeared slight.

Hitler's dictatorship rested on the constitutional foundation of a single law: the so-called Enabling Law, *Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich* (Law for Removing the Distress of People and

Reich). As it represented an institution, a majority of two-thirds was necessary to pass it, and after the elections was no longer so simple: the eighty-one members of the Reichstag could be left out of account, arrested so far would certainly not put in an appearance in the Reichstag with the Centre were to resume. Hitler showed himself in his true colours towards his Nationalist partners in the Cabinet and the Reichstag. The Centre revealed the same unwillingness to give up any of the powers the Government held. The Nazis held the whip-hand in February, and Hitler was prepared to do anything at this stage to get his desired appearances of legality preserved.

The Enabling Bill which was passed on 23 March 1933 gave the Government four years to enact laws without the consent of the Reichstag. It specifically should include the right to suspend the constitution and to conclude treaties. It also provided that laws to amend the constitution should be drafted by the Government and should come into effect on their own.

As the deputies arrived, there was a solid rank of black-shirted stormtroopers outside the building; inside, the corridors were lined with brown-shirted S.A. troops.

Hitler's opening speech was a declaration of the disciplined and bloodless revolution had been carried out to achieve national unity which had repudiated the divisions of the Republic. He declared, would make use of the Enabling Law only when they were 'extraordinarily and vitally necessary measures.'

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tion after the elections was to secure this. One step
was simple: the eighty-one Communist deputies
could be left out of account, those who had not been
arrested so far would certainly be arrested if they
put in an appearance in the Reichstag. Negotiations
with the Centre were resumed and, in the meantime,
Hitler showed himself in his most conciliatory mood
towards his Nationalist partners. Both the discus-
sions in the Cabinet and the negotiations with the
Centre revealed the same uneasiness at the prospect
of the powers the Government was claiming. But the
Nazis held the whip-hand with the decree of 28
February, and Hitler was prepared to promise any-
thing at this stage to get his bill through, with the
appearances of legality preserved intact.

The Enabling Bill which was laid before the House
on 23 March 1933 gave the Government the power for
four years to enact laws without the cooperation of
the Reichstag. It specifically stated that this power
should include the right to deviate from the Con-
stitution and to conclude treaties with foreign states.
It also provided that laws to be enacted by the Gov-
ernment should be drafted by the Chancellor, and
should come into effect on the day after publication.

As the deputies arrived, they had to pass through
a solid rank of black-shirted S.S. men encircling the
building; inside, the corridors and walls were lined
with brown-shirted S.A. troops.

Hitler's opening speech was restrained. He spoke
of the disciplined and bloodless fashion in which the
revolution had been carried out, and of the spirit of
national unity which had replaced the party and class
divisions of the Republic. The Government, he de-
clared, would make use of the powers of the Enabling
Bill only when they were 'essential for carrying out
vitaly necessary measures.' There was no threat to

the Reichstag, the President, the States or the Churches. 'The Government,' he concluded, 'offers to the parties of the Reichstag the opportunity for friendly cooperation. But it is equally prepared to go ahead in face of their refusal and of the hostilities which will result from that refusal. It is for you, gentlemen of the Reichstag, to decide between war and peace.'

The leader of the Social Democrats, Otto Wels; spoke next. There was silence as he walked to the tribune, but from outside came the baying of the Stormtroopers chanting: 'We want the Bill—or fire and murder.' It needed courage to stand up before this packed assembly—most of the Communists and about a dozen of the Social Democrat deputies had already been thrown into prison—and to tell Hitler and the Nazis to their faces that the Social Democratic Party would vote against the Bill. Wels spoke with moderation; to be defenceless, he added, was not to be without honour. But the very suggestion of opposition had been enough to rouse Hitler to a fury. Brushing aside Papen's attempt to restrain him, he mounted the tribune a second time and gave the Reichstag, the Cabinet, and the Diplomatic Corps a taste of his real temper, savage, mocking, and brutal. 'I do not want your votes,' he spat at the Social Democrats. 'Germany will be free, but not through you. Do not mistake us for bourgeois. The star of Germany is in the ascendant, yours is about to disappear, your death-knell has sounded.'

The rest of the speeches were an anti-climax. Monsignor Kaas, still clinging to his belief in Hitler's promises, rose to announce that the Centre Party would vote for the Bill, a fitting close to the shabby policy of compromise with the Nazis which the Centre had followed since the summer of 1932. Then came the vote, and excitement mounted. When Göring declared the figures—for the Bill, 441; against, 94—

the Nazis leaped to their feet and stretched in salute sang the

Outside in the square the proval. The Nazis had ever with the passage of the En his independence, not only also from the President. I aside the Constitution. The control of the resources o the gutter had come to pov

In March 1933, however, dictator of Germany. The p —'coordination'—by which life of the nation was to be control of the Nazi Party, l Hitler and Frick had not v the Enabling Act to take s ments of the States firmly the evening of 9 March vor from Berlin, carried out a c Held Government was tu pointed to all the principal

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the Nazis leaped to their feet and with arms out-
stretched in salute sang the Horst Wessel song.

Outside in the square the huge crowd roared its ap-
proval. The Nazis had every reason to be delighted:
with the passage of the Enabling Act, Hitler secured
his independence, not only from the Reichstag but
also from the President. He had full power to set
aside the Constitution. The street gangs had seized
control of the resources of a great modern State,
the gutter had come to power.

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In March 1933, however, Hitler was still not the
dictator of Germany. The process of *Gleichschaltung*
—'coordination'—by which the whole of the organized
life of the nation was to be brought under the single
control of the Nazi Party, had still to be carried out.
Hitler and Frick had not waited for the passage of
the Enabling Act to take steps to bring the govern-
ments of the States firmly under their control. On
the evening of 9 March von Epp, with full authority
from Berlin, carried out a *coup d'état* in Munich. The
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Similar action was taken in the other States. In
April, Hitler nominated Reich Governors (Reichs-
statthalter) in every State, and gave them the power
to appoint and remove State Governments, to dis-
solve the Diets, to prepare and publish State laws,
and to appoint and dismiss State officials. All eighteen
of the new Reich Governors were Nazis, usually the
local Gauleiters. In Prussia the new law afforded
an opportunity to turn out Papen. Hitler now ap-
pointed himself Reichsstatthalter for Prussia and
promptly delegated his powers to Göring as Prussian
Minister-President.

On the first anniversary of Hitler's accession to
power, 30 January 1934, a Law for the Reconstruc-
tion of the Reich rounded off this work of subordinat-

government officials, and heads of departments belonged to one of these classes. The six million unemployed in Germany, who had not disappeared overnight when Hitler came to power, represented a revolutionary pressure that was not easily to be damned.

It was by harnessing these forces of discontent and revolt that Hitler had created the Nazi movement, and as late as the middle of June 1933 he was still prepared to tell a gathering of Nazi leaders in Berlin: 'The German Revolution will not be complete until the whole German people has been fashioned anew, until it has been organized anew, and has been reconstructed.'

But there was a point beyond which this process could not go without seriously endangering the efficiency of the State and of the German economy. The two dangers to which Hitler had to pay particular attention were the disruption of the economic organization of the country, and attempts to interfere with the inviolability of the Army.

Men like Gottfried Feder believed that the time had come to put into practice the economic clauses of the Party's original programme, with its sweeping proposals for nationalization, profit-sharing, and the abolition of unearned incomes.

Although Hitler was indifferent to economic questions, he saw that radical economic experiments at such a time would throw the German economy into a state of confusion, and would prejudice, if not destroy, the chances of cooperation with industry and business to end the Depression and bring down the unemployment figures.

Hitler summoned the Gauleiters to Berlin on 13 July and told them: 'Political power we had to conquer rapidly and with one blow; in the economic sphere other principles of development must determine our action. Here progress must be made step by step without any radical breaking up of existing

Revolution after Power

conditions which would end our own life. . . .'

July 1933 marked a turning point of the revolution. The phase which he described as who do not yet in their heads

Hitler's own wish to bring end, for the time being at its gains, is plain enough. He convincing all his followers new policy. Röhm, the S.A. the name of the hundreds of Nazis who had been left out no end to the revolution provided for. At the beginning line with the change of dismissal of the S.A. and S.S. August, before a parade of the Röhm gave his answer: 'The tasks of the S.A. have been get used to the idea that we stay here, come what may.'

From the summer of 1933 this quarrel over the Second the dominant issue in German renewal and extend the Revolution more menacing. Röhm, Go S.A. leaders made open a comprehensive word which disliked, from capitalists a politicians and stiff-necked able bourgeois citizen with bureaucrats. The S.A. look spring of the previous year Promised Land had been finally appeared to be theirs to look pleased. Now, they grumble respectable, and many who

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July 1933 marked a turning point in the develop-
ment of the revolution. Hitler now spoke of a new
phase which he described as 'educating the millions
who do not yet in their hearts belong to us'.

Hitler's own wish to bring the revolution to an
end, for the time being at least, and to consolidate
its gains, is plain enough. However, he was far from
convincing all his followers of the necessity of his
new policy. Röhm, the S.A. Chief of Staff, spoke in
the name of the hundreds of thousands of embittered
Nazis who had been left out in the cold, and wanted
no end to the revolution until they too had been
provided for. At the beginning of August Göring, in
line with the change of policy, announced the dis-
missal of the S.A. and S.S. auxiliary police. On 6
August, before a parade of eighty thousand S.A. men,
Röhm gave his answer: 'Anyone who thinks that the
tasks of the S.A. have been accomplished will have to
get used to the idea that we are here and intend to
stay here, come what may.'

From the summer of 1933 to the summer of 1934
this quarrel over the Second Revolution was to form
the dominant issue in German politics. Demands to
renew and extend the Revolution grew louder and
more menacing. Röhm, Goebbels, and many of the
S.A. leaders made open attacks on *Reaktion*, that
comprehensive word which covered everyone the S.A.
disliked, from capitalists and Junkers, Conservative
politicians and stiff-necked generals, to the respect-
able bourgeois citizen with a job and the civil service
bureaucrats. The S.A. looked back nostalgically to the
spring of the previous year, when the gates to the
Promised Land had been flung open, and Germany had
appeared to be theirs to loot and lord it over as they
pleased. Now, they grumbled, the Nazis had gone
respectable, and many who had secured a Party card

only the day before were allowed to continue with their jobs, while deserving *Alte Kämpfer* were left out on the streets. In characteristically elegant language the S.A. began to talk of clearing out the pigsty, and driving a few of the greedy swine away from the troughs.

While the S.A., which was a genuine mass movement with strong radical and anti-capitalist leanings, became restive, Hitler was as strongly opposed as ever to Röhm's inveterate desire to turn the S.A. into soldiers and to remodel the Army. There were particularly strong reasons why he wished to avoid alienating the Army leaders at this time. The willingness of the Army to see Hitler become Chancellor and the benevolent neutrality of the Army while he arrogated more and more power to himself were decisive factors in the establishment of the Nazi régime. The key figure in guaranteeing the friendly attitude of the Army was General von Blomberg, but Hitler also made a powerful appeal to the Army by two promises: German military strength would be restored by rearmament, and the Army would not be called upon to intervene in a civil war.

Hitler's relations with Blomberg became closer as he began to take the first steps in rebuilding the military power of Germany. Looking ahead, he recognized the importance of having the Army again on his side, if he was to succeed Hindenburg, and he was anxious that nothing should disturb the confidence of the Army leaders in the new régime.

Röhm took a different view. By the end of 1933 the S.A. numbered between two and three million men, and Röhm stood at the head of a force more than ten or twenty times the size of the regular Reichswehr. The S.A. leaders, ambitious and hungry for power, saw in their organization the revolutionary army which should provide the military power of the New Germany. They were contemptuous of the rigid

military hierarchy of the Wehrmacht. They were avid for the prestige which would be acquired by supplying the state with motives were as crude and deniably a number of the S.A. were of the ability, and commanded by generals, however, were accepted the S.A. on an equal footing.

Hitler went out of his way to assure that he remained loyal to the Army, and the S.A. remained. If it was to go into the Army, as Röhm wished, it would be of it? The S.A. was the result of years of struggle. In the hands of the fighters' who had been brawling, but for whom it was not when it came to power a disillusioned radicals, re-mix with existing institutions had failed to get the job done successfully, who had no job to do.

Thus relations between the S.A. and the Army came a test case involving the so-called Second Revolution. The revolution was to be halfhearted, of all revolutionary leadership, the liquidation of the past.

Hitler first attempted conciliation and compromise. In December 1933 he made Röhm a member of the Cabinet. Röhm's appointment, which had long been a goal, began the New Year with Röhm of unusual friendship. More attentive to his 'imperishable service' and grievances of the 'old

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military hierarchy of the professional Army and were avid for the prestige, power, and pickings they would acquire by supplanting the generals. Their motives were as crude as their manners, but undeniably a number of them were tough, possessed ability, and commanded powerful forces. The Army generals, however, were adamant in their refusal to accept the S.A. on an equal footing.

Hitler went out of his way to reassure the generals that he remained loyal to them, but the problem of the S.A. remained. If it was not to be incorporated into the Army, as Röhm wanted, what was to become of it? The S.A. was the embarrassing legacy of the years of struggle. In it were collected the 'old fighters' who had been useful enough for street brawling, but for whom the Party had no further use when it came to power and took over the State: the disillusioned radicals, resentful at Hitler's compromise with existing institutions; the ambitious, who had failed to get the jobs they wanted, and the unsuccessful, who had no jobs at all.

Thus relations between the S.A. and the Army became a test case involving the whole question of the so-called Second Revolution—the point at which the revolution was to be halted—and the classic problem of all revolutionary leaders once they have come to power, the liquidation of the Party's disreputable past.

Hitler first attempted to solve this problem by conciliation and compromise. A law promulgated on 1 December made Röhm and Hess members of the Reich Cabinet. Röhm's appointment repaired an omission which had long been a grievance with the S.A. At the beginning of the New Year Hitler addressed a letter to Röhm of unusual friendliness, thanking him for his 'imperishable services' and assuring him of his friendship. More attention was now paid to the needs and grievances of the 'old fighters', and members of

the Party or S.A. who had suffered sickness or injury in the political struggle for the national movement were granted State pensions.

Röhm, however, was not to be silenced by such sops. In February he proposed in the Cabinet that the S.A. should be used as the basis for the expansion of the Army, and that a single Minister should be appointed to take charge of the Armed Forces of the State. The obvious candidate for such a post was Röhm himself. The Army High Command presented a unanimous opposition to such a proposal and appealed to the President, as the guardian of the Army's traditions, to put a stop to Röhm's attempted interference.

Hitler declined to take Röhm's side in the dispute, and the plan was allowed to drop for the moment. Although temporarily checked, Röhm kept up his pressure on the Army, and his relations with General von Blomberg, the Minister of Defence, grew strained.

At the end of March Hitler and von Blomberg were secretly informed that President Hindenburg could not be expected to live very much longer. Within a matter of months, perhaps of weeks, the question of the succession would have to be settled. It had long been the hope of conservative circles that Hindenburg's death would be followed by a restoration of the monarchy, and this was the President's own wish. Hitler, however, was now opposed both to a restoration and to the perpetuation of the existing situation. So long as the independent position of the President existed alongside his own, so long as the President was Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and so long as the oath of allegiance was taken to the President and not to himself, Hitler's power was something less than absolute. He was determined that, when Hindenburg died, he and no one else should succeed to the President's position. It was

to Adolf Hitler that the Army took the new oath of allegiance. The step was to make sure of claimed to represent the nation independently of the movements and parties.

In the second week of April presented itself. On 11 April the cruiser *Deutschland* to take He was accompanied by General General Freiherr von Fritsch, Chief of the German Army. Raeder, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. It is believed to have of this short voyage that the generals: the success for the suppression of Röhm's inviolability of the Army's force in the State. A conference of officers under Fritsch's chairmanship decided in favour of after—the terms of the League of Nations were communicated to them.

The news of Hitler's efforts to suppress the S.A., which leaked to Prague, sharpened the conflict between the Army and the Party as well as in the Reichstag. He made a general by Hindenburg's side, and it was itated naturally towards authority, and was on the staff of the S.A. as a full police force for special duties ready under his own hand at the School near Berlin. On 1 April, already head of the Sturmabteilung, he was appointed by Göring as he Göring found in Himmler

changes were those of Papen, Blomberg, and Schacht: the representatives of Conservatism acquiesced in their own defeat.

The same day the officers and men of the German Army took the oath of allegiance to their new Commander-in-Chief. The form of the oath was significant. The Army was called on to swear allegiance not to the Constitution, or to the Fatherland, but to Hitler personally.

Between March 1933 and August 1934 the balance of power in Germany had shifted decisively in Hitler's favour. In that year and a half he had mastered the machine of State, suppressed the opposition, dispensed with his allies, asserted his authority over the Party and S.A., and secured for himself the prerogatives of the Head of the State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Nazi revolution was complete: Hitler had become the dictator of Germany.

On 19 August the German people was invited to express by a plebiscite its approval of Hitler's assumption of Hindenburg's office as Führer and Reich Chancellor, the official title by which Hitler was now to be known. The Political Testament of President Hindenburg, much discussed but so far not discovered, was now conveniently produced. According to Papen, Hindenburg had decided to omit any reference to the restoration of the monarchy from his testament but to embody a strong recommendation of such a course in a separate letter to Hitler. Both documents were delivered to Hitler, but the letter was never seen again and no more was heard of a restoration. To remove any doubt, Colonel Oskar von Hindenburg was put up to broadcast on the eve of the plebiscite. 'My father,' he told the German people, 'had himself seen in Adolf Hitler his own direct successor as Head of the German State, and I am acting according to my father's intention when I call on all German men and women to vote for the handing over of my

Revolution after Powe

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1933

CHAPTER SIX

THE COUNTERFEIT PEACE

1933-7

Hitler hated the routine work of government, and, once he had stabilized his power, he showed comparatively little interest in what was done by his departmental Ministers except to lay down general lines of policy. In the Third Reich each of the Party bosses, Göring, Goebbels, Himmler, and Ley, created a private empire for himself, while the Gauleiters on a lower level enjoyed the control of their own local pashaliks. Hitler deliberately allowed this to happen; the rivalries which resulted only increased his power as supreme arbiter. Not until his own position, or special interests, were affected did he rouse himself to intervene actively.

Certain subjects, even in internal affairs, always interested Hitler—building plans, and anti-Semitic legislation, for instance—but he rapidly became absorbed in the two fields of foreign policy and preparation for war. He was not interested in administration, or carrying out a programme of reform—he was interested in power. The Party had been the instrument by which he acquired power in Germany; the State was now to be the instrument by which he meant to acquire power in Europe.

The aggressive—or, to use the favourite Nazi word, dynamic—foreign policy which Germany began to follow under Hitler's leadership gave expression to the long-smouldering rebellion of the German people against the defeat of 1918 and the humiliation of the Peace Settlement. Through the sense of national unity which it fostered, it served to strengthen

The Counterfeit Peace,

the political foundations support. Through the which it stimulated by it helped to overcome the Republic had founded pulse in Nazism was dis existing order outside G creation of a European N jobs and the privileges w Above all, such a foreign projection of that unappealing Hitler himself and in the eager to extend its master

In the 1920s Hitler wrote a use could be made of . . . How each one of them could be branded in the human man people until sixty million their souls aflame with a and a torrent of fire burst and a will of steel is forged cry: "*Wir wollen wieder arms again!*" There was first objective in foreign policy Treaty, and in January 1933 considerable justification: abolish the Treaty of Versailles the rest of the world to proclaim reveal this programme unveiled Instead of listening to these gentlemen would have I had written and rewritten human being has declared wanted more often than I.

In practice, now that recovery this could only mean German terms of full equality with recovery of at least part

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PEACE

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he favourite Nazi which Germany be- ership gave expres- llion of the German and the humiliation h the sense of na- erved to strengthen

the political foundations of the régime in popular support. Through the revived industrial activity which it stimulated by the rearmament programme, it helped to overcome the economic crisis in which the Republic had foundered. The revolutionary impulse in Nazism was diverted into challenging the existing order outside Germany's frontiers and the creation of a European New Order, in which the big jobs and the privileges would go to the *Herrenvolk*. Above all, such a foreign policy was the logical projection of that unappeased will to power, both in Hitler himself and in the Nazi Party, which was now eager to extend its mastery further.

In the 1920s Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf*: 'What a use could be made of the Treaty of Versailles! . . . How each one of the points of that Treaty could be branded in the minds and hearts of the German people until sixty million men and women find their souls aflame with a feeling of rage and shame; and a torrent of fire bursts forth as from a furnace, and a will of steel is forged from it, with the common cry: "*Wir wollen wieder Waffen!*"—We will have arms again!' There was little doubt that Hitler's first objective in foreign policy would be to annul the Treaty, and in January 1941 he himself said, with considerable justification: 'My programme was to abolish the Treaty of Versailles. It is nonsense for the rest of the world to pretend today that I did not reveal this programme until 1933, or 1935, or 1937. Instead of listening to the foolish chatter of émigrés, these gentlemen would have been wiser to read what I had written and rewritten thousands of times. No human being has declared or recorded what he wanted more often than I.'

In practice, now that reparations had been ended, this could only mean Germany's right to rearm on terms of full equality with other nations, and the recovery of at least part of the territories lost in

fantastic was on the reality.

accomplishing even less of overrunning many was politically only beginning to re-her history. Her army, and men permitted by ered by that of France n appeared certain to es with which France ty. So impressed were German generals with Germany's way that 1940, their advice was

ecame more and more iced that he had a far —or military—factors ie Foreign Office, and nt success of the bold k office as Chancellor ce of government. He ntry outside Germany ign language. His sole as a Party leader and l cared less for official suspicious of anyone In the short run, these be impressed by the schemes were likely to conventional methods ill in propaganda and n exploring the weak- rudeness in exploiting 1 which he had learned Germany and which he ations with even more

No man was more of an opportunist, than Hitler, and no man had more luck. But Hitler knew how to turn events to his advantage. He knew what he wanted and he held the initiative. His principal opponents, Great Britain and France, knew only what they did not want—war—and were always on the defensive. The fact that Hitler was ready to risk war, and started preparing for it from the day he came to power, gave him a still greater advantage.

The first and indispensable step was to rearm. Until he had the backing of military power for his diplomacy, Hitler's foreign policy was bound to be restricted in its scope. Until rearmament reached a certain stage Germany was highly vulnerable to any preventive action which France or the other Powers might take under the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. The overriding objective of German foreign policy, therefore, for the first years of Hitler's régime was to secure the time and freedom to rebuild military power.

Hitler's speeches from this period are masterpieces of careful propaganda. Well aware that there were many abroad—especially in Great Britain—who had long felt uneasy about the shortcomings of the Peace Settlement, he hinged all arguments upon the unequal treatment of Germany after the war. This invoked sympathy for Germany, allowed Hitler to appear as the representative of reason and justice, protesting against the unreasonableness and injustice of Germany's former opponents, and enabled him to turn round and use with great effect against the supporters of the League of Nations all the slogans of Wilsonian idealism, from self-determination to a peace founded upon justice.

In October 1933, when it became clear that the French—uneasily conscious of the inferiority of their manpower and industrial resources to those of Germany—were not prepared to disarm, Hitler pushed his argument a stage further. On 14 October he an-

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rope, including Vienna and Munich, where Hitler
picked them up.

Hitler's originality lay not in his ideas, but in the
terrifyingly literal way in which he set to work to
translate them into reality, and his unequalled grasp
of the means by which to do this. To read Hitler's
speeches and table talk is to be struck again and
again by the lack of magnanimity or of any trace of
moral greatness. His comments on everything except
politics display a cocksure ignorance and an in-
eradicable vulgarity. Yet this vulgarity of mind, like
the insignificance of his appearance, was perfectly
compatible with brilliant political gifts. Accustomed
to associate such gifts with the qualities of intellect
which Napoleon possessed, or with the strength of
character of a Cromwell or a Lincoln, we are as-
tonished and offended by this combination. Yet to
underestimate Hitler as a politician, to dismiss him
as an ignorant demagogue, is to make precisely the
mistake that so many Germans made in the early
1930s.

It was not a mistake which those who worked
closely with him made. Whatever they felt about the
man, however much they disagreed with the rightness
of this or that decision, they never underrated the
ascendancy which he was able to establish over all
who came into frequent contact with him. Generals
who arrived at his headquarters determined to insist
on the hopelessness of the situation not only failed to
make any protest when they stood face to face with
the Führer, but returned shaken in their judgement
and half convinced that he was right after all.

The final test of this ascendancy belongs to the later
stages of this history when, with the prestige of
success destroyed, the German cities reduced to ruins,
and the greater part of the country occupied, this
figure, whom his people no longer saw or heard, was
still able to prolong the war long past the stage of

er-Lord, 1939-45

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hancellery build- ost entirely in the s he paid was in o Berlin, when he took tea with his visit he had paid of Goebbels's re- f the war. Hitler f six S.S. officers, last carrying a the Führer's own . They spent the d discussing the Hitler left, Frau ion with the re- he Görings.'

ber 1942 and the ttered records of But there has re- ript of seventeen gues), which Bor- n February 1945. d Hitler's analysis

The Emperor without His Clothes

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of the mistakes which had brought Germany to the position in which she then found herself. It was one of the few times in his life when Hitler was prepared to admit that he had made any mistakes at all, and this alone would endow these talks with interest, quite apart from the fact that whenever Hitler discussed politics—as distinct from art or religion—he never failed to show the power of his twisted mind.

Had it been wrong to go to war? No, he had been jockeyed into war: 'It was in any case unavoidable; the enemies of German National Socialism forced it upon me as long ago as January 1933.' The same was true of the attack on Russia. 'I had always maintained that we ought at all costs to avoid waging war on two fronts, and you may rest assured that I pondered long and anxiously over Napoleon and his experiences in Russia. Why, then, you may ask, this war against Russia, and why at the time I selected?'

Hitler gave several answers to this question. It was necessary to deprive Britain of her one hope of continuing the war; Russia was withholding the raw materials essential to Germany; Stalin was trying to blackmail him into concessions in Eastern Europe. But the reason to which he always returned, 'and my own personal nightmare, was the fear that Stalin might take the initiative before me. . . . If I felt compelled to settle my accounts with Bolshevism by force of arms . . . I have every right to believe that Stalin had come to the same decision even before he signed the pact [of 1939].'

'The disastrous thing about this war is the fact that for Germany it began both too soon and too late.' He needed, Hitler declared, twenty years in which to bring his new élite to maturity. But the war also came too late. From a military point of view, it would have been better to fight in 1938, not 1939. Czechoslovakia was a better issue than Poland; Britain and France would never have intervened,

1937

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1945

War-Lord, 1939-45

and Germany could have consolidated her position in Eastern Europe before facing world war several years later. 'At Munich we lost a unique opportunity of easily and swiftly winning a war that was in any case inevitable.' It was all Chamberlain's fault: he had already made up his mind to attack Germany, but was playing for time and by giving way all along the line robbed Hitler of the initiative.

Once the war had begun, 'I must admit that my unshakable friendship for Italy and Duce may well be held to be an error on my part.' The Italian alliance had been a disaster. Not only had the Italians lost every campaign on which they had embarked, but by stirring up the Balkans they cost Germany six vital weeks' delay in the attack on Russia. Arab contempt for the Italians and the Duce's 'ridiculous pretensions' of an Italian empire robbed Germany of her opportunity. A similar opportunity had been lost in the French empire, where it should have been German policy to rouse the Arabs and other colonial peoples to throw off the French yoke.

But the greatest mistakes, Hitler concluded, had been made by Britain and the United States. Britain ought to have seen that it was in her interests to ally with Germany, the rising continental power, in order to defend the imperial possessions which she was now certain to lose. Churchill, a 'Jew-ridden, half-American drunkard', failed to see the need to bring about a unification of Europe, in which Britain would 'still retain the chance of being able to play the part of arbiter in world affairs.'

The United States ought to have realized that she had no quarrel with the Third Reich and preserved her isolation, Hitler continued. 'This war against America is a tragedy. It is illogical and devoid of any foundation of reality.' Once again it was due to the same sinister influence, the Jewish world conspiracy against Nazi Germany. 'Well, we have lanced

The Emperor without

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Such was Hitler's sibility of defeat. T thought for the millic ing, and the destructi and Europe. If he ad they sprang from insu too great tolerance; defeat rested not on h

To this Hitler add delivered the last of effect a political testa have been Europe's 1 February. If Germany it would be utter and Europe as well as th last burst of propheti the future:

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the Jewish abscess; and world of the future will be
eternally grateful to us.'

Such was Hitler's reasoning as he faced the pos-
sibility of defeat. There was not even a passing
thought for the millions of deaths, the untold suffer-
ing, and the destruction he had brought on Germany
and Europe. If he admitted to errors of judgement,
they sprang from insufficient hardness, from his own
too great tolerance; and the blame for war and for
defeat rested not on himself, but on others.

To this Hitler added a postscript. On 2 April, he
delivered the last of his table talk monologues, in
effect a political testament to the German nation. 'I
have been Europe's last hope,' he had declared in
February. If Germany was to suffer defeat after all,
it would be utter and complete, and a tragedy for
Europe as well as the German people. Then with a
last burst of prophetic power he drew his picture of
the future:

'With the defeat of the Reich and pending the
emergence of the Asiatic, the African, and perhaps
the South American nationalisms, there will remain
in the world only two Great Powers capable of con-
fronting each other—the United States and Soviet
Russia. The laws of both history and geography will
compel these two powers to a trial of strength, either
military or in the fields of economics and ideology.
These same laws make it inevitable that both Powers
should become enemies of Europe. And it is equally
certain that both these Powers will sooner or later
find it desirable to seek the support of the sole
surviving great nation in Europe, the German people.'

Those who dismiss Hitler's political gifts as negli-
gible may well be asked how many in the spring of
1945, with the war not yet over, saw the future so
clearly.

As the façade of power crumbled, Hitler reverted
to his origins; there is a far closer resemblance be-

933,

April 1945

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Jan 1933

I found the whole future Cabinet assembled there—Hitler (on whom I set eyes for the first time); Frick; Göring; Papen [vice-chancellor]; Seldte; Hugenberg; Blomberg; Neurath [likewise retained as foreign minister] . . . The Old Man welcomed us with a brief speech expressing his satisfaction that the nationalist right wing had at last united. Papen read out the list of ministers.

Hitler had already taken one determined step to consolidate the Nazi seizure of power. He had appointed, as was the chancellor's prerogative, the new minister of the interior in Prussia—Hermann Göring. In the first instance, this enabled Göring to ban the Communist protest demonstration threatened for that evening, but in the longer term it would provide the means to make the Nazi party's stranglehold on power impregnable. At the very first Cabinet meeting, held at 5:00 P.M. on that January 30, 1933, while crowds swayed and chanted in the street outside, roaring the national anthem up to the Cabinet Room windows, Göring predicted that the existing laws and police forces might prove inadequate; from the misgivings that he now voiced about the "present civil service structure" of his Prussian ministry, it is obvious that he was already planning a purge there too.

At this first Cabinet session Hitler and Göring adopted a more moderate line than the non-Nazi ministers when the possibility of banning the Communist party altogether was considered. Hitler felt, as Schwerin von Krosigk recorded later that day, that "a new Cabinet ought not to begin with immediate confrontations that would lead to bloody fighting, and probably a general strike and economic paralysis." The Cabinet minutes show that Göring backed Hitler and successfully suggested that they call a new general election immediately and hope for the two-thirds majority that would grant to the Nazi party the constitutional power to pass an enabling act making Hitler dictator.

That night Hitler and Göring stood at the Chancellery windows and took the salute as the SA and other Nazi formations staged a drum-beating, blaring, intimidating torchlight victory parade.

Göring had given Emmy a revolver to protect herself that night against any last-minute revenge attempts. He was worn out, but asked her before falling asleep next to her to do a favor for him the next morning. "Buy the Führer some flowers," he said. "He will like that."

The new elections were to be held on March 5, 1933. That did not leave much time. Working, living, eating, and sleeping in the Ministry of the Interior Building, Göring began a bare-knuckles purge, determined to cleanse the entire ramshackle structure of dissidents and replace them with men who were 150 percent dedicated to the new cause. On the very next day Schwerin von Krosigk remarked in his diary, "With his ruthless hiring and firing, Göring seems without question to be the Danger Man."

1933

But Hitler was a man in a hurry. He would still describe him later he would still describe him and add: "I've always said that steel—unscrupulous."

Neither of them had any in Hitler told his cronies, "will Vice-Chancellor Franz von the powers of chancellor of F Hitler and Göring. "As Pruss reassured in a confidential ci subordinated to Papen."

But Göring saw things differently. He boasted, "You will only get me

Throughout February, while planned, and purged. Foreign man," and told Britain's biographer Papen was quite unable to co regarded as the real Fascist in

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be the Danger Man."

But Hitler was a man in a hurry, and relied on Göring's nerve. Ten years
later he would still describe him admiringly as "ice cold in times of crisis,"
and add: "I've always said that when it comes to the crunch he's a man of
steel—unscrupulous."

Neither of them had any intention of losing office. "No living force,"
Hitler told his cronies, "will get me out alive."

Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen, formally vested by Hindenburg with
the powers of chancellor of Prussia, still hoped to exert some checks on
Hitler and Göring. "As Prussian police minister," the German press was
reassured in a confidential circular on February 2, "Herr Göring is also
subordinated to Papen."

But Göring saw things differently and crowed to Papen, echoing Hitler's
boast, "You will only get me out of this room flat on my back!"

Throughout February, while the election battle warmed up, Göring plotted,
planned, and purged. Foreign Minister von Neurath called him "a dreadful
man," and told Britain's bibulous ambassador Sir Horace Rumbold that
Papen was quite unable to control him. "Göring," advised Neurath, "is
regarded as the real Fascist in the Hitler party."

In broad outline Hitler's eventual plan, if he won the coming election,
was to restore Germany's economic health, rebuild her armed forces in
defiance of Versailles, and then start making history.

Göring would have a key part in this too. On February 2 Hindenburg had
appointed him Reich commissar for aviation. Göring appointed Luftansa's
bustling chief executive, Erhard Milch, as his deputy. On the sixth the two
men explained to a dubious Defense Minister von Blomberg that they intended
to build up a military air force under cover of expanding Germany's civil
aviation. Hitler hinted at this to his Cabinet on the eighth—this project would
provide work for the unemployed. "Everything for the armed forces!"—
that was the paramount principle that Hitler suggested to this Cabinet session,
and on the next day they voted an initial 40 million Reichsmarks for the
aviation budget. A week later they voted to increase that figure, and when
the finance minister stoutly objected, Hitler advised him that what they were
doing was to help the German people, "by camouflaged means," to acquire
the air force that Versailles had denied them.

That much is in the Cabinet minutes (which, like the Swedish hospital
dossiers, routinely spelled Göring's name wrong). The military records bear
it out. "Our air-force officer corps," Hitler told Blomberg, "is to be an
elite. The other services will have to lump it." By November 7, 1933, as
Milch's private diary shows, Göring would have secured a 1.1 billion-Reichs-
mark budget for the coming year. The aim was to create a "risk air force"
by late 1935, that is, a force strong enough to burn the fingers of any neighbor
who interfered with Hitler's intentions.

As uncrowned king of Prussia, Göring commanded the largest police force

March 1933

the ministry, he traded heavily on official and demanded that of thirty-two city police chiefs but ten. He fired hundreds of filled their desks with trusty Heinrich Himmler's SS. in State Parliament. (He would beked with political cronies and pacify President Hindenburg.) diary entry on the thirteenth, rms the cockles of your heart. radical things." He banned the s terrorized the other parties'

"My actions," he told police acted by legal considerations. I am not in office to dispense Shoot first and ask questions officers read. "Any mistakes policemen at Dortmund, "are illets." pasha!" Papen gasped to him. d that Dr. Erich Gritzbach, his g's pay as well as his. ti reported to Rome from Ber- net and is waging a merciless

have recognized her husband. al desk wearing a somber suit, l adventures, convinced of the With Emmy hovering in the ring with another man's legal aising functions in his Kaiser- residence. On February 20, he s to meet Hitler and make one tion. Banker Hjalmar Schacht ear-old Gustav Krupp, head of ie big names like Kauert, Win- ile top I.G. Farben executives ler were also definitely present. tance at the head of the table, the record in Krupp's files—

We've got [Hitler said] to seize the instruments of power first of all if we are to floor the enemy permanently. . . . You must never strike until you are at the summit of your might—until you are sure that you are at the peak of your power growth.

He described the coming election fight as stage 2 in his attack on the Communists. "There will be no turning back for us," he promised these men of money, "even if there's no clear election result. It's a case of either/or: Either the result is cut-and-dried, or we shall force a showdown some other way.

"I have only one wish for the economy," he continued, "that it enter upon a peaceful future, in parallel with our reconstruction at home. The question," Hitler added, "whether we raise a Wehrmacht [armed forces] or not will be decided, not at Geneva, but in Germany. But first we shall proceed through domestic peace to domestic strength—and there can be no peace at home until Marxism is finished."

Handsome and urbane, Göring spoke a few words, assuring them that the German economy would recover rapidly once political peace was restored. "There will be no experiments," Hitler's right-hand man promised.

"Göring," the Krupp transcript states, "led his argument adroitly on to the need for those circles not engaged in the political arena at least to make some financial sacrifice."

"Industry," he concluded, with a brazenness that suggests that he knew his remarks would be well received, "will I am sure be happy to make this sacrifice once they realize that the coming election of March 5 will be Germany's last for ten years—and perhaps for one hundred!"

Twenty-five pairs of heavily ringed, manicured hands applauded. Krupp thanked the forty-three-year-old Hitler for "having given us such a vivid insight into the way your mind is working." The Führer left Göring's apartment amid the rustle of checkbooks (Schacht had indicated that three million Reichsmarks was the kind of campaign fund they had in mind).

Stepping up the fight against their opponents, four days later Göring's police officials swooped on the Communist party headquarters in Berlin. He claimed that they had found incriminating documents in what he picturesquely called its "catacombs." "I was told," he later recalled, "that the Communists were winding up for a major coup. I had lists of all the Communists drawn up so that we could arrest them immediately when the balloon went up." For the moment these lists were kept on ice, since President Hindenburg had already proven unreceptive to the Nazis' radical measures, like a new law proclaiming their swastika to be Germany's national flag.

All such reservations were dramatically dispelled a few days later. At 9:30 P.M. on February 27, 1933, as Göring was toiling at his desk, reports reached him that his Reichstag Building was ablaze. He threw on a voluminous camel-hair coat and jumped into his car. He pulled up outside his official residence,

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across the street from the Reichstag. He could see flames already shooting up through the building's glass cupola, and the first fire engines were on the scene. His first thought was for the heirlooms that he had inherited from his father—some of them were hanging in the Speaker's Office. He was also heard to shout, "We must save the tapestries!" as he dashed into the tunnel that connected the speaker's residence with the blazing Reichstag Building. He came up inside the latter to find the big session-chamber already a furnace—sucking in air from outside so violently that, although not of negligible bulk, he found himself being dragged forward into the flames.

It is now generally accepted by reputable historians that the Nazis were not the instigators of this blaze—fortuitous though it proved for their campaign and cause. Göring, toppling helplessly toward the flames, would certainly have cursed his own misfortune if they had been. "As I opened the door," he told George Shuster years later:

I was all but drawn into the flames by the hot draught. Fortunately my belt snagged in the door [of a phone booth] and that stopped me from toppling forward. Just at that moment the huge cupola came crashing down . . . I saw self-igniting firefighters on the benches and chairs in the chamber that had eaten through the leather upholstery and set them on fire.

His office was still intact. He met Hitler and Goebbels there, joined shortly by Rudolf Diels, chief of his political police, and Vice-Chancellor von Papen, who had been dining over in the cliquish Herrenklub with President Hindenburg when the shocking news of the fire came. One of the security men told Hitler that the last person he had seen leaving the chamber was Ernst Torgler, the senior Communist deputy. In fact, Torgler had left over an hour previously, which did not prevent Göring from claiming mischievously in his conversation with George Shuster, "I saw Torgler there, carrying a briefcase."

Shortly, a more convincing suspect was apprehended, trying to get away through the south door. Naked to the waist and streaming with sweat, this young man of twenty-four made no attempt to conceal that he had started the blaze, using his own clothes and four packets of firefighters for the purpose. A burly, stooping bricklayer with tousled hair and vacant eyes, he was identified as Marinus van der Lubbe, a member of a Dutch Communist splinter organization. In a crazy one-man protest against the new government for "oppressing the workers," this Dutch youth had already tried unsuccessfully to burn down three other buildings, including Berlin's City Hall, castle, and a welfare office.

For Göring, who had hoped for proof of an immense Communist conspiracy, Van der Lubbe, "a halfwitted Communist pyromaniac," was a poor exhibit. Discussing it at the Chancellery later, however, that same evening,

1933

Hitler and Goebbels saw it of publicity from this "godse away with the March 5 elect

"Now we'll show them," body who stands in our way

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A draft presidential decree of its file, ready for Hindenbu

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Hitler and Goebbels saw it very differently. If they extracted every ounce
of publicity from this "godsent beacon," as Hitler called it, they could walk
away with the March 5 election.

"Now we'll show them," cried Hitler, purpling with excitement. "Any-
body who stands in our way now will get mown down!"

In a further meeting at Göring's own ministry, Hitler instructed him to
make immediate use of the arrest lists that they had so fortuitously drawn
up during the past few days.

A draft presidential decree suspending civil liberties was also taken out
of its file, ready for Hindenburg to sign.

Small wonder that when his ministry's press chief now diffidently laid
before Göring his draft communiqué, announcing Van der Lubbe's arrest
and police beliefs that "a hundredweight" of incendiary materials had been
used, he exploded with frustration, swept his desk clear of the accumulating
telegrams and police reports, grabbed a blue pencil, and shouted, "Rubbish!
One hundredweight? Ten—no, one hundred!"

The official stammered that Van der Lubbe could hardly have carried in
all that alone.

"Nothing is impossible!" cried Göring. "There were ten—no, twenty
men!"

He dictated a new communiqué to his secretary, Fräulein Grundtmann,
scrawling his own outsized "G" at its foot.

He adhered to the same standards of accuracy in reporting to the quailing
Cabinet ministers the next morning:

Admittedly the man arrested [Van der Lubbe] was maintaining
that he had perpetrated the outrage on his own, [said Göring
according to the Cabinet minutes], but this statement was not to
be credited. He, Reich Minister Göring, was assuming that there
had been at least six or seven attackers. The arsonist was definitely
observed some time before the fire consorting with the Communist
Reichstag deputy Torgler; both are reported to have walked around
inside the building.

All of this was quite untrue, as was the rest of Göring's report to the Cabinet,
about the seizure of Communist plans to set up terror squads, burn down
public buildings, poison communal soup kitchens, and kidnap the wives and
children of leading ministers.

Playing the role to the full, Göring announced that he had closed every
museum and castle, had banned every Communist and Social Democrat
newspaper in Germany, and had arrested the Communist officials. The world
press was already indignantly proclaiming that the Nazis themselves had
torched the Reichstag. Göring was privately facetious about the allegation.
"The next thing we know," he sniffed, "they'll be claiming I stood and

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watched the blaze wearing a blue toga and playing the violin!" Not least among the administrative problems that the fire had caused him was that he now had to relinquish Prussia's best theater, the Kroll Opera House, to provide a home for future Reichstag sessions.

Perhaps some Cabinet ministers still voiced misgivings about the evidence, because on March 2, Göring would assure them that further documents had been seized during the night, proving this time that Moscow had given the Communists in Berlin a mid-March deadline to take action or forfeit their Soviet cash subsidies in consequence. Suffice it to say that never in later years, and least of all to subsequent interrogators, did Göring repeat these claims; nor did he ever produce the documents—"captured maps" locating the electric-power installations, subway, and transformer stations that were to be blitzed. ("One map," he had convincingly claimed, "was found at [Communist] party headquarters, the other had been cut up and distributed to the individual hit squads.")

The Reichstag fire was the first occasion on which he resorted to such truly monumental falsehoods. But the lies served their purpose, because they enabled him to lock up three thousand political opponents before election day. Among the Communists to be apprehended were three Bulgarians—Vassil Tanev, Blagoi Popov, and Georgi Dimitrov. Together with Torgler and the luckless Van der Lubbe, they were accused of responsibility for the Reichstag fire and committed for trial. Göring reserved his venom particularly for Dimitrov, who was a leading member of the Comintern (the Soviet directorate of international subversion). "Dimitrov," he snorted years later, "was a murky figure. Wherever he turned up, you could be sure there was dirty work afoot."

When the Reichstag fire trial began at Leipzig late in September 1933, Göring attempted to turn it into a crusade against the Communists and was humiliated. He appeared in person as a prosecution witness, clad in brown tunic, riding breeches, and polished jackboots. He would never forget the resulting confrontation with Dimitrov on November 4.

"My opinion is different," retorted the Bulgarian at one stage.

"Logical," conceded Göring. "But mine's the one that counts!"

"I continue," said Dimitrov. "Is it known to Mr. Göring that the party with what he calls this 'criminal ideology' is a party that rules one-sixth of the earth's surface? Namely, the Soviet Union?"

"What they do in Russia," Göring broke in after a further lecture by the defendant, "is a matter of indifference to me. I am concerned only with the Communist party in Germany and with the alien Communist scoundrels who come here and set our Reichstag on fire."

There were shouts of "bravo" from the public benches.

"This bravo-bravo," mimicked Dimitrov. "Of course. Say bravo. To wage war on Communist party in Germany is your good right. Like right of

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Communist party in Germany fighting!"

"Dimitrov," snapped the judge to make Communist propagandist

"He is making Nazi propaganda."

Once Göring snapped, "Listen, people are aware of it. It's aware—that it's aware that you're acting over here to set our Reichstag on fire, arrant nonsense to the German level charges at me! In my eye strung up on the gallows long ago!"

The judge murmured a rebuke quite content," he said, "with

Cool and sovereign in the kn turned to Hermann Göring. "A

Beet red, Göring screamed: across you outside this courtroom."

All four hard-line Communists found guilty and submitted to the flicker of remorse. Remorse, if stiff a sentence for Van der Lubbe did not deserve so much notoriety.

Two days after the Reichstag fire, Göring's advertisement for a general election, the blue folder of testimonials. Kroppe and a sailor for eight. Göring fire Handle a launch?" (Göring had do most of the driving myself," "But you can take over the wheel."

Kroppe asked for 140 marks a of more. "Four weeks' notice, you, then you're out on your ear Get it?"

"Yes," stammered Kroppe. "Göring softened. "You start a hand at his own cramped quarters."

"We'll be moving into the prison."

on Research Institute's secret

a small, well-camouflaged air civil aviation, and then, from 1938, rapidly build a full-scale but Göring could have raised his trust, and the Führer gave any other politician. Through came "Money is no object!" ring approach. When General "It's not your money, is it!" March 11, 1933, in the offices se. Göring rarely visited the the Prussian prime minister's y. Milch, whom Göring was into visiting the experimental on March 29, but when they left it to Milch to confer with e himself concentrated on the at he had explained to Balbo on building bombers at first,

"Do as you think best." 1935, Blomberg agreed to their and not a branch of either the May 6, Milch issued contracts —the purpose of businessman zer enviously called him, was istry, regardless of the quality ircraft workers above all else. ty-five hundred workers, and ure only eighteen Junkers 52

to be the happiest year of his forty-two, commissioner for our flying clubs (sport flying): is of the Luftwaffe's uniform. ointments could scarcely have he selected one of the army's dly agreed to the transfer, laould have been the next com-l another army colonel, Albert stone grin, to run the admin- of these men had ever flown,

nor had the officer Göring appointed on July 1, 1933, as chief of air-force personnel, Colonel Hans-Jürgen Stumpff.

Stumpff, never one of Göring's critics, found him "packing a colossal punch" in those days. "He was bursting with ideas," the colonel later recalled. On Hitler's orders, the other services had to release their best material to Göring's new air force. During the first year Stumpff recruited 182 officers from the army and 42 from naval aviation. A rapid-training program began. When Stumpff proudly reported the training of the thousandth pilot, Göring congratulated him: "Now on to the next thousand!" he bel-lowed.

"You left every conference with him," said Stumpff afterward, "boosted to an extra thousand rpm."

The real architect of the secret air force was Milch. A year senior to his minister, he was ambitious, loud-mouthed, and every bit as ruthless. Milch had trampled many of his business rivals in his climb to power, and he never enjoyed Göring's perennial, inexplicable popularity. Göring could hardly overlook Milch's naked ambition. Several times in May and June 1933 it was Milch and his minister who had attended the Cabinet meetings, and Göring heard that his Staatssekretär was saying, "The real minister is me!" Milch suspected that Göring had succumbed to morphine again, and tackled him about it. It was a strained, rambunctious relationship, not made easier for Göring by the knowledge that Milch was indispensable to him. Once he telephoned Milch, sitting in that first secret ministry building in Behren Strasse: Milch listened only briefly to Göring's ill-tempered outburst before hanging up on him.

Göring phoned again. "We were cut off," he said.

"No," snapped Milch. "I put the phone down on you. I don't want our switchboard to get the impression that our minister has no manners."

What Göring never took into account, Milch explained to this author, was time: "That was beyond him." Milch methodically pulled together all the strands that, entwined, go to make an air force—civil aviation, meteorological services, aeronautical laboratories, flying schools, ground organization. In mid-August he signed the orders setting up *Fliegerwaffen* schools for specialist training in navigation, air-to-air combat, gunnery, flight engineering, and naval aviation. When he took the dates and deadlines in to his minister, Göring just roared with laughter. "You're planning to do all this over the next five years?" he bellowed. "You've got six months."

Among the very highest air-force officers, there were powerful and often unusual forces of cohesion. Each had something on the other.

But deadliest of all was the file being built up on Milch by rivals like SA Brigadier (*Oberführer*) Theo Croneiss in Bavaria. Milch had bankrupted his little airline in the twenties, and now Croneiss put it about that the Staatssekretär's father, Anton Milch, was really a Jew. The words flew around the Nazi hierarchy. Gauleiter Joseph Terboven told his friend Göring, who tackled

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Milch that August as they were driving back from the Obersalzberg, where they had just inspected the site for Göring's new luxury villa. Milch was shocked and investigated his own blood ancestry. By October 4, when they met again to inspect the secret uniform being designed for the new air force, he had established the truth—which Milch saw as a vindication. Milch handed to Göring a letter written by his mother, establishing beyond doubt that his biological father was not Anton Milch, but in fact her own uncle. That he was the product of incest was not a pleasant discovery, but for a Staatssekretär in Nazi Germany, it was preferable to being a half-Jew. On October 14, Göring reprimanded Croneiss for the slander. Two weeks later he discussed the letter with Hitler, Blomberg, and Hess. "It's all okay," Milch noted in his diary on November 1.

Versions of the story percolated around the air force for the next twelve years. Lieutenant Colonel Erich Killinger told fellow officers that Milch's brother was still a Jew. "Milch," added Killinger, "proved—or claimed—and his mother, who's still alive has confirmed it, that she had had an affair with a Christian and that Erhard [Milch] was the product. So Milch," guffawed Killinger, unaware of the awful truth, "branded his own mother a whore so as to become a Christian."

Göring shielded Milch against the slander and never revealed what he knew, even years afterward under interrogation in the shadow of the gallows.

Sovereign, unimpeachable, arrogant: Some idea of the breathtaking scope of Göring's ambitions in 1933 is given by a letter to the minister of culture, Bernard Rust, expressing indignation at the appointment of a "Reich bishop" without consulting him.

I was astonished [Göring wrote] to find that the appointment is a fait accompli.

In my view, so long as we have only regional [Protestant] churches and not one Reich Church, no Reich bishop can be appointed. Until the [1918] revolution, the King of Prussia was the summus episcopus of the Church of Prussia. In my opinion these prerogatives now devolve upon the Prussian State Ministry, i.e., upon the Prussian prime minister . . .

The Prussian prime minister was, of course, Hermann Göring himself. This open letter, in which he neatly claimed to be legal successor to the king of Prussia and head of the Protestant (Evangelische) Church as well, was published in the first edition of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* on June 27 but expunged from all later editions.

The dispute over the Reich bishop had a Forschungsamt sequel that illustrates how Göring did not hesitate to use the Brown Pages to manipulate his Führer.

The background was this. I Protestantism, Hitler had tried subversion, setting up a new c Horse operation. At an April called for a united Reich Church a Reich bishop as their leader. Ludwig Müller of Königsberg

Thousands of disaffected Protestant candidate to Müller, the leader of this opposition: clergyman, Martin Niemöller, zealous Nazi until this Müller

After initially sharing their di more useful to back him, he the spiritual conniving of the assembling a police dossier on Emergency Pastors' League (Pf) uary 19, Göring found him still c President Hindenburg on this is dozen of the clergymen in person and Göring ordered wiretaps placed

At 1:00 P.M. on the appointed in two lines facing the desk in Hitler to argue their case ("with mealy n many quotations from the Scrip banishing a red file, from which "Mein Führer," he cried, " province, I request permission to ducted by"—and here he pointed Emergency League."

Niemöller, crew cut and lean-faced as his name was mentioned.

"Read it out," invited Hitler.

"We've done our 'mine-laying' Niemöller's words. "We've subordinated. We've fixed him good and p affairs, the chancellor's going to l comeuppance—the last rites!"

Hitler glared at Niemöller. "Do you can drive a wedge between the the very foundations of the Reich?"

Niemöller attempted to reply—"his "cares for the Church, for Jesus your German people."

for Carinhall on a bluff overlooking one of the lakes, Dolln See, and sent an architect to Sweden to make drawings of a timber-hunting lodge that he had admired on the von Rosen estate. In her memory, he intended to make the new building the center of a wildlife sanctuary for endangered species—species like the elk and buffalo, the deer and wild horse and, indeed, himself.

He wanted Carinhall to have the best of everything. He called in two Prussian court architects, Hetzelt and Tuch, and gave them ten months to have the main lodge complete. Eventually Carinhall would cost the taxpayer 15 million Reichsmarks, borne equally by the Air Ministry and Prussian government budgets. It would become over the next twelve years an extraordinary, baroque palace—oversized, vulgar, and faintly ludicrous, in the image of its builder. He approved every detail of its design down to the lavish door handles. He selected the furniture, designed the green-and-gold livery for the foresters and footmen, brought back gaudy bric-à-brac from his later forays into occupied Europe. The buildings spread and multiplied around the center courtyard, with steep thatched roofs, fountains, statues, and avenues of trees. The rooms were embellished with the costliest crystal chandeliers, Flemish tapestries, and priceless Old Masters. "Magnificent," he would later exclaim to Heinz Guderian, by then a Panzer general, showing him the works of art at Carinhall. "I really am a Renaissance man. How I love opulence!" Whereupon he took the visitor by the arm and led him to the drawing room, flanked by two anterooms called the Gold and Silver rooms, where the gifts made to General Göring by the judicious, the wise, and the ambitious were on permanent display.

Throughout those early years the rumors, abetted by Communist propaganda, that Göring was back on narcotics would not go away. Prussian lawyer Count Rüdiger von der Goltz observed him as though in a trance during one speech at Stettin. Morphine intake might explain the speed with which Göring abandoned the norms of honesty and solicited both gifts and bribes. Making amends for his property confiscated in 1923, the state of Bavaria had allowed him to buy a prime site on the Obersalzberg mountain, right next to Hitler's famous chalet. Among his papers in 1945 was the deed of another plot of land at Hochkreuth, near Bayrischzell, given him by Consul Sachs on Bavaria's behalf on March 3, 1935. The speed of his transformation from Goebbels's "upright, childlike soldier" of January 1933 to the murderous, grasping Göring of 1934 took even his friends' breaths away. Whatever the occasion, paintings, sculptures, vases, embroidery, and furniture poured in for him—bronze lions, trinkets of gold and ivory, silver, and amber.

His staff rapidly perfected and systematized the bribery. Fräulein Grundtmann meticulously listed all gifts—donors, dates, and occasion. Some were innocuous, like the gifts from his childhood friends Erna and Fanny Graf; others were heavy with unspoken intent—presents from future allies and enemies, from ambassadors and agents (the British colonel Malcolm Christie gave him *Sporting Anecdotes*), from aristocrats and Reich ministers (for

Christmas 1937 Rudolf Hess thou collected speeches). The Grundtm directors, publishing moguls, inc like C. & A. Brenninkmeyer, * I.G. Farben, and minor ones like Ufa and Fox movie companies. sea voyages. The Phillip Reemtsma painting of "The Sunday Hunts Führer"). Into the early Grundtm Swedish businessman Birger F. I giving him a dishwasher as early a prominently in Göring's life and i donated a flower basket, followe

Every municipality in Germany Düren, and Düsseldorf through th him. There were presents from fri Carin's and Emmy's families—ar properly in his family at all—in 1' and his wife gave him two small small bronze vase. The German Cd doorplate inscribed with his fath godfather's widow) gave him a do

Invited to Göring's birthday on brought along a modest painting o to Göring, however, he found a shooting brake with four horses.

Soon the first stage of Carinhall Out here among the dark Satanic felt like a Teutonic knight of old. Robert to dress him in red top bo in floor-length coats like a French e

Emmy or no Emmy, his waking morbid memory of Carin. Her ght the workmen were constructing Ca shore, he ordered them to excavat thick walls of Brandenburg granite. to receive the pewter sarcophagus

One day he expected to lie in it l eternity with her beneath these mo

Their gift paid off. Göring's office files i Leipzig department store despite the local gaul small traders.

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new bison reservation and attempted to persuade one bison to mate with another, but the bull took one glance at the cow, had reservations of his own, and fled the forty pairs of invited eyes.

Göring met them all again at Carinhall itself, dressed now casually in white with a green leather jerkin. When curious eyes alighted on the shapely blonde, Emmy Sonnemann, he introduced her to them as "my private secretary"—one of his less harmful inexactitudes.

Maneuvering for greater status, Göring had begun acting as Hitler's alternate foreign minister. His three missions to Rome in 1933 had not been wholly successful. Talking to the British ambassador on October 11, 1933, Mussolini had unkindly apostrophized the German general as "a former inmate of an asylum." On November 6 and 7, Göring conducted what proved to be his last talks with the Italian dictator for three years. He had brought a private letter from Hitler and again assured Mussolini that the Reich was willing to declare in writing that Germany did not desire to annex Austria. Mussolini, however, went one stage further, and in March 1934 he signed the Roman Protocols with Austria and her neighbor Hungary, effectively guaranteeing Austria's independence. This was not what Hitler had wanted at all, and he thereafter put Rudolf Hess in sole charge of developing the Austrian affair.

Outflanked here, Göring swiveled his attention to Poland and, later, southeastern Europe (the Balkans), and in both regions he scored personal successes.

The new Polish ambassador in Berlin, Józef Lipski, was a passionate huntsman like himself, and through him Göring cadged an invitation to the Polish State Hunting Ground at Białowieża in March 1934. Enlarging the contacts he made there, he used his dictatorial powers in Prussia to do the Poles little favors, as when a Ukrainian nationalist killed the Polish minister of the interior and fled to Germany in mid-June. Göring arbitrarily loaded the wretched assailant onto the next plane back to Warsaw, an act of dubious legality that won him immediate acclaim from the Poles (and an annual spring visit to Białowieża thereafter until 1938).

He extended this unorthodox diplomatic style to the mineral-rich Balkans, hitherto neglected by both Hitler and the foreign ministry, undertaking in the spring of 1934 the first of a series of spectacular swings through the southeast. He often noised it around that he was conveying special handwritten messages from Hitler, or that he was traveling on Hitler's personal instructions—which flattered these smaller, half-forgotten nations but only dismayed Italy the more, since she regarded the Balkans as an Italian preserve.

Regardless of Italian feelings, on May 15, 1934, General Göring set out with Milch, Korner, Kerl, and Prince Philipp of Hesse on a ten-day "vacation" tour of the southeast. Rather tactlessly, he took along his (still-married) lady friend Emmy Sonnemann, causing scandalized comment that

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Goebbels was not slow to call to had announced that the tour was just before takeoff that they were affront that left the Italian well Mussolini spluttering with anger.

To the delight of the Hungarians instead, allegedly for technical reasons" caused him to dally; like to see the king (who was Göring succeeded in convincing and the Aegean Sea that Nazi (mann Göring) would not abandon

It was altogether an odd episode state visit to Rome in three weeks on Germany, and he confidential that Herr Göring would not be on the trip. It was a calculated affront Duce's personal emissary to the hardest since 1924 at German—certainly not easy, and attracting

Göring, anxious to demonstrate number-two man in the Reich, a macabre ceremony at Carinhall

It was June 20, 1934, the day of Carin's remains in the lakeside pharaohs' wives can have been buried on train bore the pewter sarcophagus ferry to the railroad station where awaited her arrival. At Göring's command whole route were cast into deep mud at attention on their local railroad the bridges, saluting and showering slowly passed, and thousands of homage to their prime minister's

The scene at Carinhall itself was the thin summer mists steaming sl ranks of soldiers standing in motion funeral music throbbed and droned

Göring had invited Carin's relatives and politicians, to witness this homage was to her memory. To the blare answering bellows of Hermann's dozen strong men groaned and strided into the granite mausoleum. After

indulge Göring's passion. Göring's hunting diaries—which are preserved—portray a cavalcade of foreign diplomats and martial gentlemen accepting his invitations to Prussia's hunting grounds. There he could meet as equals Czar Boris of Bulgaria, or the regent of Hungary, the kings of Greece and Romania, and the prince regent of Yugoslavia.

This was all to the good, but it went beyond that. With Göring, the huntsmen had the inside track. Senior air-force officers who were not good shots found the going difficult. Hunting was as indispensable an asset to promotion in the Luftwaffe as polo was in the British Army. And woe betide those who did not praise Göring's hunting hospitality or criticized his game. Invited to a shoot during the Olympics, the Swedish prince Gustaf Adolf shot a magnificent twenty-point stag but remarked loftily that he hoped to do better on his father-in-law's estate (he had married the German-born Sibylla). "Things didn't go so well between him and Hermann . . ." wrote Thomas von Kantzow in his diary. "Hermann won't be inviting him back to Carinhall in a hurry."

It had all begun rather unpromisingly. When he had become speaker of the Reichstag in 1932, Göring had declined the rather unprepossessing hunting ground assigned to him by the then-reigning establishment. He prophesied confidently that within a year he would be prime minister, with the pick of all Prussia's state forests at his disposal. In 1933 he found the hunting scene to be a microcosm of Germany itself—plagued by petty rivalries and self-interest. Each humble parish or great estate seemed to have its own hunting laws and taxes. Wildlife could be hunted down at will. Conservation and breeding of the dwindling species were impossible. In Germany the eagle, bear, bison, and wild horse were almost extinct.

Göring had directed Scherping to set up a uniform nationwide hunting association (*Deutsche Jägerschaft*) to regulate the sport, restock the lakes, tend the forests, and protect the dying species. The association would levy taxes on huntsmen to pay for the upkeep of the forests and game parks. "I want a new hunting law for Prussia," he had briefed Scherping on that day, May 9, 1933, "one that can later serve for the entire Reich."

With one stroke of the pen he made it a criminal offense to kill an eagle, or hunt with poisons, artificial light, or the steel trap ("that medieval instrument of torture"). When the professional bodies bleated protests, Göring waved them augustly aside. His Prussian Game Law, passed on January 18, 1934, was envied far beyond Germany's frontiers. He insisted that the new game officials must be animal lovers, dedicated National Socialists, and unafraid of speaking their minds. In practice these desiderata proved unworkable. The best foresters were not always Nazis, and when it came to the test he did not encourage independent minds. In May 1937 Professor Burckhardt, sitting in that cavernous office in Berlin, witnessed him take a phone call from a forester asking for permission for local farmers to take their own action against a plague of wild boars. "One more word," bellowed

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ly those who saw General Göring with his lions could sense the fondness that each felt for the Scherping, in 1937. "And," he is kind that society ladies might at Zoo. They were great hulking entity in trifling with being slashed

een this man, Hermann Göring, o phoniness about it. An animal he true animal lover. Scherping, and father had served three kings f a wild animal's perception and ontrolled man and beast alike. period known as the Third Reich htened Game Laws that he intro- wn private kingdom. He was an that has always deemed itself a : clannish hunting fraternity "that n, but even he found it useful to

1933

a considerable part in the economic rise of the new power. In the open country and among the proletariat of the towns — which was nowhere more numerous and more demoralized than in Spain — there was famine, and even the lower middle-classes fell into a very depressed condition. It became increasingly difficult to collect taxes, and thus the nobility and the court also were involved in the general bankruptcy. It was no unusual sight to see the royal body-guard begging for the soup distributed to the poor at the monastery gates. Bread, onions, dried grapes, a little sheep's-milk cheese, and an egg or two formed the Spaniard's diet; he could but rarely afford the famous national dish, the *ola podrida* soup, concocted of cabbage, turnips, garlic, mutton, and bacon. There were neither state schools nor compulsory education of any sort. Only the members of the nobility and the higher bourgeoisie were able to read, and even they were only allowed such books as a strict and fanatical censorship permitted. The Court of the Inquisition was as active as ever, and by its ruling that an accused man should not see his witnesses and accusers face to face, the door was opened wide to cowardly revenge and treacherous denunciation. A widespread criminal association, the so-called *germania*, which was in league with the police, troubled the whole country-side. In spite of the general poverty, gambling was universal among high and low, and the State, as holder of a monopoly for the manufacture of playing-cards, was the beneficiary of this vice. Drunkenness alone was not among Spain's national evils. The word of abuse "*borrachito*" (drunkard) was an insult which could only be avenged by blood. In all ranks, indeed, the outward conception of honour was developed to an unwholesome point. This side of the Spanish national character, that in which its hardness, passionateness, and bizarrerie most strikingly express themselves, is familiar to all through the country's literature and has been most movingly described in Calderon's *El Médico de su honra*. Lope de Vega says: "Honour is something which depends upon others; no one is honoured through himself, for it is from the other that he receives honour." (This curiously coincides with Schopenhauer's definition: "Honour is, objectively, the opinion of others as to our value and, subjectively, our dread of that opinion.") It is very typical of the almost pathological loyalty of the Spaniards that — despite their extreme susceptibility, which made death itself preferable to

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an unavenged insult — is illustrated in a number of Zurilla's *Del Rey abate* work its title, which king may insult another and restore anyone's injury.

Not only the villas and houses — palaces and pavements, and for camps under the Macan in Russia, the decoaches were unknown as simply to be a safety or suchlike the poetry, and gaiety. With them their mag court displayed the sp national festivals, to matic performances world. And even the perpetual love-intrigues, the intoxicating perf cost nothing.

The crown and su a race of glossy, mela lived in great poverty and ever-ready *espa* maintained proverbial to fore the king, in whc quez has preserved f anæmically pure blo class-consciousness, t with the same incomj lineating that very dif acterized Renaissance of this Christian-orie Every facial emotion egg and sugar, and t

1933?

can make them objects of faith. The *Pure Reason* deals with the laws of our knowing, the *Practical Reason* with the laws of our action. Now, just as the laws of theoretical reason only possess rigid necessity and universality because they are not drawn from experience, but existed before all experience, so the laws of the practical reason can only claim unconditional validity if they are not abstracted from our empirical life, if (since the *content* of our action always comes from experience) they have a purely *formal* character.

As the theoretical reason dictates laws to the phenomenal world, so the practical gives to itself the moral law, which runs: "Always act so that the maxims of your will can be valid as principles of universal application." Either practical principles contain precepts which are only valid upon certain conditions, as, for instance: "If you want to be a master, you must train yourself," in which case we have a Hypothetical Imperative; or else they have an unconditional validity independent of all assumptions, as, for instance: "Thou shalt not lie," in which we have a Categorical Imperative. The moral law is such a Categorical Imperative, it is absolute and unconditioned, independent of all assumption, valid everywhere and always, before all experience, without any empirical confirmation, it is valid even if it is never or nowhere put into practice. "Morality is not the means to make us happy, but the means to make us worthy of happiness." We must observe the moral law from a feeling of duty, and not as an inclination, for if it were followed through inclination, it would be done for its own sake. Here we are at the summit of Kantian moral philosophy, on the raw pure glacial heights of absolute ethics.

The moral law within us says: "thou shalt," and from this "shalt" the "canst" must follow, else the demand would be absurd. As a sense-being man is subject to the necessities of nature, as a moral being he is free. In this form metaphysical ideas gain a new reality. We must will absolute moral perfection; and since this is unattainable at any period of our earthly life, our moral consciousness demands immortality. For similar reasons our practical reason demands the existence of God, freedom, and the soul. These ideas are not axioms of the pure reason, but postulates of the practical reason.

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(*) D.T. It makes sense only if the maxims of the will also contain all that is conventionally forbidden. It is not universal application that is in question but a true measure of volition

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at home everything that till now has been imported." In the same spirit he forbade his officials to visit foreign watering-places for cures, and limited his subjects, when they went abroad, to a certain sum for travelling. Every household was bound under official supervision to use a fixed minimum quantity of salt, and permis- sions to marry were only obtainable in return for the purchase of goods from the royal porcelain-factories. Nevertheless, this tyranny had its good points: enormous mulberry plantations were laid out for the home production of silk, and hop- and potato- growing made excellent progress under state fosterage.

Napoleon once said: "Genius is diligence." And this definition of it, like others, will fit Frederick the Great remarkably. It sounds incredible, but is nevertheless true, that in this country literally everything, from the greatest and roughest tasks to the smallest and most subtle, was done by the brain and working-power of one man. It must have been instructive, paradoxical, intriguing, and alarming for the contemporaries to see this thousand-eyed man- ager running the whole state-system down to the last thread. Here the King showed not only the diligence, but the all-roundness of genius. It is not too much to compare him with Julius Cæsar in this respect. The man of genius can do everything, knows every- thing, understands everything. He is never a specialist. He is there, ready, and able to do exactly what circumstances may require. Frederick refused to let himself down at any particular standpoint, he was a polyhistor of life. Whatever he took in hand became trans- fused with his vigour, which, ever the same, one and indivisible, needed only to be given a sphere, any sphere, of action to expand instantly and triumphantly.

For this reason Frederick the Great's strategic achievements, recognized as extraordinary by even his bitterest enemies, cannot be considered apart from his personality as a whole. We have grown used to thinking of generalship as the expression of a specific professional knowledge and a definable professional talent for which it is sufficient to graduate in a few military courses. But just as it is not enough for a great doctor merely to have studied medicine, or for a great artist to know how to use his colours, so is a great commander unthinkable without some deeper knowl- edge of the human soul, the way of the world, and in general all things worth knowing. He must be a sort of artist and, above all,

philosopher.

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THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

mind with decapitation. He saw in Cromwell the foe of parliamentarianism, Communism, and Catholicism, but he particularly admired him because he had the courage to have a king beheaded. "Ah, Cromwell," he said, "that's my man. He and Henry VIII are the only two positive figures in English history." He was also greatly impressed with Frederick William I and the decapitations he ordered. He saw a film in 1923 entitled *The Life of Frederick the Great* and talked repeatedly about the scene that pictured young Prince Frederick as he was forced to watch the executioner chop off the head of his closest friend. Hitler commented "That is the way German justice should be handled: either acquittal or beheading." ⁵⁷

As soon as he became chancellor, he restored the use of the headman's ax, but his preferred method of execution seems to have been the rope. A special decree of 29 March 1933 saw to it that hanging by the neck was introduced for an exceptionally large number of cases. His own fear of strangulation was further projected onto others in the grisly orders he gave for the execution of generals who had conspired against him in the plot of 20 July 1944. He ordered that each man be "hung on a meathook and slowly strangled to death with piano wire, the pressure being periodically released to intensify his death agonies." Hitler had a color film made of the scene. He "loved the film and had it shown over and over again; it became one of his favorite entertainments." ⁵⁸

Hitler was infatuated with the Medusa. He once expressed great enthusiasm for the mosaic Medusa head in the rotunda of the University of Munich, and one of his favorite paintings was by Franz von Stuck, a sinister, flashing-eyed Medusa which he had first seen in a book in Hanfstaengl's house. When he designed his gigantic desk for the Chancellery, three heads adorned the front panels. One was of the Medusa, with writhing snakes emerging from her hair. ⁵⁹

Freud believed that men who are fascinated with decapitation and the legend of the Medusa's head are expressing castration anxiety in a disguised form. As we shall see, Hitler showed his own concern about loss of testicles in many other indirect ways. But he also talked explicitly about it. He told the French ambassador, for example, that the Poles were castrating German citizens. And he tried to persuade the League of Nations' representative in Danzig that the Nazi press was attempting to tone down stories of Polish atrocities: "No one believes me about this, but I have ordered that the sensational cases, such as castration, should not be mentioned in the press. They excite public opinion too much." ⁶⁰

Blood

Just as primitive tribes attribute magical significance to blood, so did Hitler. He was sure, for example, that all of human history was explicable in its terms and, in one of his messier metaphors, observed

The Image and the Man

that "blood is the cement of civilization the historical problem of explaining the earth. Everything depended upon one if it of blood.

He used the word often in describing that his opponents would "drown" the sacred "Blood Flag" of 9 November "Blood Order" for those who had introduced the idea of *Blutkitt* (blood cement) the SS. He seems to have come across about Genghis Khan while a prisoner he may have heard that it was also practice murder societies. (Similar technique Mau Mau and the Manson cultists.) To enforce absolute loyalty and obedience force a prospective member, as part of an act which directly and flagrantly violated taboos. Such an atrocity, by cutting it from his previous value system, ties his civilization because it is the only group with outrage he has perpetrated. In psychology he has been obliged to commit reinforcement his value system, his new conscience.

In Hitler's Germany, medical doc performance, or to watch, "medical experiments abdominal surgery on the unconscious patients." Other initiates of the SS were before the eyes of their mothers. Hitler of his SS had participated in such together by the bonds of a common effort to have worked rather well.*

* The process of acquiescing to atrocities illustrated in the experience of Professor Doe, a distinguished medical career and was chairman of the University of Münster before joining the SS. A doctor at Auschwitz was to observe what was (a "Special Action"), a method of mass extermination and their babies, were customarily thrown alive on piles of wood soaked in gasoline. The piles experienced his first *Sonderaktion* he found it Dante's Inferno. . . . I cannot stand it." But in performances he was able to take them in with equanimity. "September 6, 1942: Today, half a hen with potatoes and red cabbage . . . In the evening at 8 o'clock outside for a 50 Sixth and seventh *Sonderaktion*. . . . In the banquet. We had pike . . . good coffee, except Human Behavior in the Concentration Camp

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

Frederick William as set forth in army regulations of 1726 was a preview:

When one takes the oath to the flag one renounces oneself and surrenders entirely even one's life and everything to the monarch. . . . Through this blind obedience one receives the grace and confirmation of the title of soldier.

The king's bureaucracy, less well remembered in popular history, had at least as much historical importance as the army. Indeed, the two institutions were related in spirit and form. The civil service was operated like the army, with the same bristling discipline, absolute subordination, and complete centralization. Both institutions were calculated to eliminate all personal opinion and initiative and to make officials subordinate to the king alone.¹⁴

The king's control over the private lives of his subjects often seemed to fulfill the royal boast that "salvation is God's affair; everything else belongs to me." His chief means for enforcing that claim was his formidable and ubiquitous army of state officials who "wore the king's coat." They spread his autocratic system into every hamlet of the realm. Along with army veterans and elementary school teachers (who were usually army veterans), they inculcated the "correct attitudes" associated with what have become known as the "Prussian virtues" of obedience, discipline, industry, and thrift.*

Frederick William's influence was felt by generations of his countrymen. Writing in 1914, a leading historian said that Germany "still carries the . . . ineradicable stamp of his personality." In 1933, Oswald

* The monarch practiced the virtues he preached. His marginalia on requests for money, for example, bear witness to the royal frugality—as well as his penchant for writing doggerel and thinking about excrement. On one occasion, he noted that he could not fulfill a petitioner's request because he had to feed 100,000 men, and not even the king of Prussia was able to shit gold:

Eure Bitte kann ich nicht gewähren
Ich habe hunderttausend Mann zu ernähren
Gold kann ich nicht scheissen.
Friedrich Wilhelm, König in Preussen.

The royal concern about feces and flatulence was shared by other famous Germans. Hitler's anal fixation has been noted (see Chapter 3, p. 148), and Martin Luther believed that the products of the anus provided the best defense against the Devil. He could render the Devil helpless, he firmly believed, if he could but "fart into his nostrils." He wrote a message personally addressed to the Devil saying, "Note this down: I have shit in my pants, and you can hang them around your neck and wipe your mouth with it" (Erik Erikson, *Young Man Luther*, 61, 245). One of Frederick William's descendants, Emperor William II, wrote in a marginal note on a state paper that the best thing to do with the suggestions of the Hague Conference of 1899 with regard to restrictions on the conduct of war was to "shit on their resolutions"; see *Die grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette* (Berlin, 1924), 4: 306.

The Past As Prologue: Hitler

Spengler called the king of him and his son as their conscience" of National So Frederick II, called the greater impact than his father. Certainly no one in Austrian—was hailed with (Frederick the Unique), many but the greatest place in the German valha and Bismarck." Neubauer through many editions be to honor him as the ideal solitary height above his philosopher and historian, and complete devotion to the

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This "rape of Silesia" war that would give Frederick commander. His brilliant v would be studied in the p examples of superb genera "masterpiece . . . which w immortal." Popular history as the intrepid national he surrounded by "those dan Russia, and Madame de Por though half the world oppos

This is the memory t perate days in the Berlin a of 1945, as he sat before t frantically reading the Germ raphy hoping to find inspir:

they responded to him with enthusiasm. It was also comforting to damaged egos to hear that the German people were not merely equal to other nations but were the master race. *Die Herren Rasse*

Hitler's movement and its "dynamism of rancor" also promised something else: that deep-seated feelings of anxiety and fear could find an outlet in primitive hatred and aggression. As Fritz Stern has noted, "It is naive . . . to suppose that aggression must spring from lust of conquest. Fear too impels aggressive action."

The German middle class in 1930-1933 was gripped by what one writer has called *die grosse Angst*—an all-pervasive "great fear" of many things, including economic catastrophe, personal failure, social upheaval, moral decline, the Communist menace, the Jewish peril. Everywhere there was apprehension and alienation. Hitler understood. He personally felt their fears, for he too was a "little man" riven by alienation, self-doubt, and *Angst*. He played brilliantly upon the fears of others and convinced them that salvation lay through hatred and aggression.¹⁹⁷

Albert Speer, looking back from his prison cell in Spandau and attempting to fathom the strange personality of the man who had captivated him for so long, finally reached the conclusion that at the core of Hitler lay nothing but "pathological hatred." As a person who was himself consumed by hatred, Hitler knew its power to move others. One reason for his political success in 1933 was the stunningly effective way he applied the axiom he had laid down a decade earlier in *Mein Kampf*, when he wrote that hatred is more powerful than love and noted scornfully that the leaders of the Republic had done nothing whatever to cultivate the most valuable of all political qualities: "wrathful hatred." He promised that under his leadership "hate would become a single fiery sea of flames." He kept that promise. His confidant Joseph Goebbels recorded in his early diaries what he considered to be one of his master's best epigrams: "For our struggle, God gave us His abundant blessing. His most beautiful gift was the hate of our enemies, whom we too hate with all our heart." Years later, a Swiss diplomat noted that "the main energy of Hitler is the energy of hatred" and showed how he used this energy to his political advantage. Thousands of Germans were drawn to him, the Swiss said, because they too needed to hate and this man supplied that need. "Never," he said, had he "met any human capable of generating so terrific a condensation of envy, vituperation, and malice."¹⁹⁷

Hitler's general appeal to the lower middle class was well summarized by a thoughtful German observer:

Nazism contained an incomparable and unsurpassable combination of all those psychological elements which the masses needed . . . [Hitler] could not immediately give bread to the starving and wages to the unemployed but he absolved the weary, the desperate and the downtrodden from the heaviest burdens of their souls. He allowed them . . . to gather hope and to feel superior. He released

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them from the loads of reason, responsibility, and morality. He
led them back into the regressive paradise of irresponsibility and
implicit faith. He let them relax into a precivilized, presocial, in-
fantile stage. He allowed them to hate and believe, to strike and
bely, to march and feel as the masters of the world.

Hitler also offered concrete programs well calculated to catch the
interests of the lower middle class. He was careful to stress in hundreds
of electrifying speeches that he stood, point by point, for the exact oppo-
site of everything that troubled the "little men" of Germany. Democracy
was at fault, so he offered authoritarian government; class privilege and
exploitation were resented, so he promised *Gemeinschaft*; in place of
international cooperation and the League of Nations, associated with the
Versailles-Diktat, he promised militant nationalism. Above all, he sensed
the longing for a heroic leader, a longing as old as the Barbarossa
legend, and as current as this memoir of 1934 written by a high school
teacher:

I reached the conclusion that no party, but a single man alone
could save Germany. This opinion was shared by others, for when
the cornerstone of a monument was laid in my home town, the
following lines were inscribed on it: "Descendants who read these
words, know ye that we eagerly await the coming of the Man whose
strong hand may restore order."¹⁰⁸

Hitler also knew the attraction that a particular kind of socialism
could have in thousands of households where the inflation and the De-
pression had wiped out bourgeois aspirations. Hitler's socialism had
great appeal, for it allowed the lower middle class to escape a desperate
dilemma: economic disaster had prevented a rise to bourgeois status,
but social traditions prevented them from sinking into the *Lump-
enproletariat*. Hitler's socialism permitted the Hans Schmidts to become
socialists in a national system without becoming proletarianized or in-
ternationalized. His system was one in which all racial Germans could
be members of one *Volksgemeinschaft*, a racial community in which
social distinctions were blurred and rendered unimportant.

With remarkable adroitness, Hitler adjusted socialist slogans to
make them fit the needs of the lower middle class. He changed Marxist
hatred for the bourgeois to hatred for the Republic and the Jews. He
agreed that Germans were victims of exploitation—but by the Jews.
Like the socialists he provided a vision of future utopia—not of a
classless society but of a racially equal *Volksgemeinschaft*. The world
would yet be conquered—not by the proletariat but by "Brown battalions
marching." The revolution would be completed—not by the dictator-
ship of the proletariat but by the dictatorship of the Führer. Hitler
also confiscated and modified socialist symbols: the red flag was pre-
served in his swastika; "comrade" became a Nazi salutation; his Party's

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THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

name preserved the words "Socialist" and "Workers;" he organized mass demonstrations, approved marching songs, and encouraged the raised-arm salute; May Day was converted into a National Socialist holiday.¹⁰⁰

One suspects that a key reason why Hitler was so successful with the lower middle class was that they recognized him as one of themselves. In the phrase of a German essayist, Hitler appealed because he was a "mirror of bourgeois boobery" (*Spiegerspiegel*). He was *Kleinbürger* incarnate, whose manners were banal and whose speeches were larded with hackneyed nationalist clichés, but whose very stylistic mediocrity had its appeal. He was "a man of the masses" who did not so much conquer the common man as identify with him.²⁰⁰

He looked the part. And his very nullity was a source of his strength. The anxious and ineffective "little man" of Germany who longed for power and greatness could identify with Hitler, for he was a kindred soul; he was one of them. They could "see greatness emerging from a creature who was smaller than you or I—that is what made Hitler an experience for millions."²⁰¹

Dorothy Thompson, one of the very few foreign correspondents who was permitted a personal interview with Hitler, was surprised and disappointed by the "startling insignificance" of this man who has set the world agog. . . . He is the very prototype of the 'Little Man,'" she wrote in the spring of 1932. And when she thought of him sitting in a seat of power, "involuntarily I smiled: Oh, Adolf! Adolf! You will be out of luck!"²⁰² Miss Thompson was mistaken. Like so many others, she underestimated this nondescript politician and failed to recognize the paradox that part of his power lay in his "startling insignificance."

But only part of his power. For while he was one of the masses, he was set apart from them by the touch of political genius. It is only a half-truth that he was a product of his time and place. True, he profited enormously from the economic, psychological and political chaos of 1930-1933—but he had prepared for his moment and knew how to use it. The tide of history had lifted him up, but he could succeed only because he was "a superbly prepared swimmer."²⁰³

Consider how he cast his own speeches and the meticulous care with which he organized the demagogic assaults of other Party orators. He set up special Party Speakers' Schools to train hundreds of orators who toured the entire country. Their style and forensic ability may not have been sophisticated, but throughout Germany they convinced thousands that they had answers to all pressing problems, that this Party cared for and understood the needs of the masses and would act to fulfill them. Hitler's own speeches reflected with studied spontaneity the longings of the people. None of his competitors showed a remotely comparable ability to combine ideology and propaganda or anything like his capacity to sense the psychic needs of his audiences. Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler's adroit finance minister, was right in saying that he played on the *Kleinbürgertum* like a skilled harpsichordist plucking

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Adolf Hitler
Hitler

The Past As Prologue: Hitler

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HITLER AND THE "GERM

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The Past As Prologue: Hitler and History

1933

the chords of middle-class sentiments. Two examples of hundreds of speeches must suffice to show how closely he identified with the masses. He too had been a common laborer, a soldier at the front; he too had known hunger and privation. He was proud to be one of his people:

When I speak to you today and thus to millions of other German workers, I have more right to do this than anyone else. I have grown out of you yourselves; once I myself stood among you, I was among you in the war for four and a half years and now I speak to you to whom I belong, with whom I feel myself to be bound still today and for whom in the final analysis I carry on the struggle. . . .

In my youth I was a worker like you, and then I worked my way up by industry, by study, and, I can say, by starving.

And again, his words flew like an arrow to their hearts:

We are so happy to be able to live among this people and I am proud to be permitted to be your Leader! So proud that I cannot imagine anything in this world that I would rather be. I should a thousand times rather be the last *Volksgenosse* [fellow countryman] among you than to be a king anywhere else. . . . When I drove through the streets just now and saw those hundreds, thousands, and millions of *Volksgenossen* to the right and to the left of me, from all enterprises and workshops, from all factories and offices, my heart beat faster and I thought to myself; that is our Germany! That is our people, our glorious German people, our beloved German Reich.²⁰⁴

HITLER AND THE "GERMAN CHARACTER"

Hitler's appeal went far beyond the lower middle class to embrace millions of Germans in all walks of life. An explanation for this enormous popularity must consider both the personality of Hitler and the character of the German people. For what has been said of Martin Luther was at least as true of Adolf Hitler: "It is inconceivable that he should have evoked so great a popular response unless he had succeeded in expressing the underlying, unconscious sentiments of large numbers of people and providing them with an acceptable solution to their . . . problem."²⁰⁵

Social psychologists, psychoanalysts, and cultural anthropologists have said that by 1933 the German people as a group were suffering from psychological problems which made them particularly responsive to some sort of authoritarian leader. Erik Erikson has called them "charisma hungry"; Eric Fromm found them to be sadomasochistic; Else Frenkel-Brunswick characterized them as "authoritarian personalities"; Kecskemeti and Lienes have spoken of the Germans' "compulsive

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The Past As Prologue: Hitler and History

Hitler. "We were driven by the force of circumstance," one leader said pathetically in August 1933. "We were really only the passive object of developments." 234 The moderate socialists later protested that it was not their fault that Hitler came to power—their theoretical Marxist allies, the Communists, had cooperated with Hitler and attacked them instead of helping them. There is truth to the charge, but it overlooks the crucial fact that the Social Democrats themselves had done little to fulfill social promises and had done nothing when, in July 1932, Chancellor von Papen and his "Cabinet of the Barons" illegally seized the government of Prussia—two-thirds of Germany. At this time, as later, the moderates lacked the will to take effective action. Totally misjudging the nature of Hitler and his threat, they kept thinking that "the ultimate victory of the working class movement" was indeed inevitable, and that Hitler was merely a passing phenomenon. In accordance with that tradition, they put their faith in the "potential energy of a mass party" and kept reassuring themselves with that empty and amorphous slogan. A corollary of this belief was that Hitler, as the head of "reactionary forces," would of his own accord disintegrate along with his supporters, whereas the power of the working class was "indestructible." 235

The conservative parties of the right, which had spent so much of their energies vilifying the Republic, showed that they had no political program of their own except to devise ways to make accommodations with Hitler. By 1932, German conservatism was intellectually sterile and politically bankrupt.

The chancellor of the republic during the critical years of 1930–1932 was Dr. Heinrich Brüning of the Catholic Center Party. He has often been portrayed as an able political leader who struggled manfully against the Nazi tide. His record does not support that reputation. He made the critical political mistake of dissolving the Reichstag in 1930 and attempting to rule by emergency presidential decree, thus making his government dependent upon the whim of old President Hindenburg, who was increasingly influenced by a clique of military reactionaries. Brüning's myopic and stubborn policy of deflation exacerbated the Depression, idling factories and throwing millions of workers out on the street. The "Hunger Chancellor" did little to help democracy. The position he had maneuvered himself into between left and right produced this devastating political joke: "Why is Brüning like a guitar? Answer: Because he's held by the left hand and played by the right."

But Brüning may not have been merely inept. Recent studies have raised very serious questions about his purported commitment to democracy and opposition to Hitler. It is now clear that his chief hope as chancellor was to win Hitler's secret support for a restoration of the monarchy; that Cardinal Pacelli, later Pope Pius XII, urged Brüning, a devout Catholic, to make special accommodations with Hitler; and that Brüning himself assisted Hitler in writing one of the Führer's key speeches. The Weimar chancellor's attitude toward Hitler at this time

the Church will now join the National Socialist formations in great numbers, just as in Italy. But will their influence there become strong enough to check new animosities against the Catholic Church, especially attacks on our Catholic denominational schools and the schools of our orders etc.? There is to be a concordat with the Vatican. If the Pope concludes it, he will take the vital interests of the Church into account. But will such a Concordat remain permanently valid if there is no political power to support its validity? It is different in Italy. The whole country is Catholic and even the Liberals think of Catholicism as part of the national greatness. In Germany, on the other hand, denominational divisions go deep, and anything that has seemed to favour the Catholic Church has always been offensive to the Protestant section of the people. At the moment there is no evidence of any particularly hostile Protestant agitation against Catholicism. The Protestant Association has obviously lost much of its impetus. But will that remain so? Who knows?...

In fact, the position of the Centre had been further undermined by the negotiations between the Government, the Catholic hierarchy in Germany, and the Vatican over a Concordat. The Catholic authorities proved willing to abandon their political party in return for a Concordat guaranteeing their religious activities. Hitler, however, had no doubt that in the Concordat signed on 8 July 1933 he had a bargain as he told the Cabinet on 14 July 1933:

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...The Reich Chancellor saw three great advantages in the conclusion of the Reich Concordat:

1. that the Vatican had negotiated at all, considering that they operated, especially in Austria, on the assumption that National Socialism was un-Christian and inimical to the Church;
2. that the Vatican should have been persuaded to bring about good relations with this purely national German State. He, the Reich Chancellor, would even a short time ago have thought it impossible that the Church would be willing to commit the bishops to the support of this State. The fact that this had now been done was certainly an unreserved recognition of the present regime;
3. that, with the Concordat, the Church should have withdrawn from activity in associations and parties, and, for instance, have abandoned even the Christian labour unions. This also he, the Reich Chancellor, would, even a few months ago, have thought impossible. Even the dissolution of the Centre could be termed final only with the conclusion of the Concordat, now that the Vatican had ordered the permanent exclusion of the clergy from party politics.

That the objective which he, the Reich Chancellor, had always been striving for, namely an agreement with the Curia, had been attained so much faster than he had imagined even on 30 January—this was such an indescribable success that, in the face of it, all critical misgivings should be withdrawn.

June 1933

After all the parties had dissolved themselves, the one-Party State was formally proclaimed by the Law against the Establishment of Parties, 14 July 1933.

114

Art I. The National Socialist German Workers' Party constitutes the only political party in Germany.

Art II. Whoever undertakes to maintain the organisation of another political party or to form a new political party shall be punished with penal servitude of up to three years or with imprisonment of between six months and three years, unless the act is subject to a heavier penalty under other regulations.

(iv) The Revolution Stabilised: Conflict with the SA

Meanwhile, the SA was becoming dissatisfied with the compromises the regime had made with established institutions. It contained a large number of impoverished members of the lower middle class and a number of unemployed. Some were hostile to the Establishment, taking seriously the anti-capitalist aspects of the Party programme. The majority simply felt disgruntled at their failure to turn the Nazi take-over into the kind of concrete material benefits for themselves which they had anticipated. In fact, the Government went some way towards conciliating the Party rank and file by insisting that old Party fighters have priority in employment, a measure which led to some SA men acquiring jobs.

Nevertheless, the leader of the SA, Ernst Röhm, at least was not conciliated and in a newspaper article in June 1933 he expressed disillusionment at the inadequate fruits of the seizure of power and determination to continue the revolution:

115

...A tremendous victory has been won. But not *absolute* victory!

The new State did not have to disown the bearers of the will to revolution as the November men⁵⁸ had to with the red hordes who were the followers of their revolution, born of cowardice and high treason. In the new Germany the disciplined brown storm battalions of the German revolution stand side by side with the armed forces.

⁵⁸i.e. the Social Democrats.

June 1933

Not as part of them.

The Reichswehr has its own undisputed task: it is committed to defend the borders of the Reich, so far as its small numbers and completely inadequate armament enables it to do so.

The police have to keep down the law-breakers.

Beside these stand the SA and the SS as the third power factor of the new State with special tasks.

The Leader and Chancellor of the German people needs them for the tremendous work of German revival which still lies before him.

For the SA and the SS are the foundation pillars of the coming National Socialist State—*Their* State for which they have fought and which they will defend. The SA and SS are militant-spiritual [*kämpferisch-geistig*] bearers of the will of the German revolution.

Already here and there philistines and grumblers are daring to ask in astonishment what the SA and SS are still there for, since Hitler is now in power. We are after all, they point out, nationalist again. Swastika flags fly over the streets. There is law and order everywhere. And if it is disturbed, the police will take care that it is restored as quickly as possible. So why the SA and SS?

The philistines and grumblers, whether they stand in the ranks of our eternal and irreconcilable adversaries, or are 'coordinated', or even wear the swastika, have not understood the meaning of the German revolution and never will understand it.

The course of events between 30 January and 21 March 1933 does not represent the sense and meaning of the German National Socialist revolution.

Anyone who wanted to be a fellow-traveller only during shining torchlight processions and impressive parades with rumbling drums and booming kettledrums, with blaring trumpets and under waving flags, and now believes he has 'taken part' in the German revolution—can go home! He has confused the 'national uprising' with the German revolution! He has intoxicated himself with outward appearances; perhaps he has got carried away by the unheard-of mood of 'Potsdam Day', perhaps he was delighted to see millions and millions of workers march for Germany at the Festival of German Labour,⁵⁹ and for a few hours felt a breath of our spirit—but he is not one of us! For the coming years of struggle he can creep back to the hearth or the desk or the pub from whence he came. The fighters in the simple brown service shirt of the SA and SS will not miss him on their path forwards to the German revolution, just as they did not meet him when, in long years marked by sacrifices and blood, they fought their passionate fight for a new Germany.

... The SA and SS will not tolerate the German revolution going to sleep or being betrayed at the half-way stage by non-combatants. Not for their own sake, but for Germany's sake. For the brown army is the last levy of the nation, the last bastion against Communism.

If the German revolution is wrecked by reactionary opposition, incompetence, or indolence, the German people will fall into despair and will be an easy prey for the bloodstained frenzy coming from the depths of Asia.

For this reason the fantasy in the minds of some 'coordinated' people and even some low-level dignitaries calling themselves National Socialists, that to keep calm,

⁵⁹On 1 May 1933, see below, pp. 423-4.

June 1933

is the first duty of a citizen, is a betrayal of the German revolution.

The people who are now everywhere 'involved' and murmur—still softly as yet—their upright-bourgeois little maxim of 'law and order' were nowhere to be seen during our long pilgrimage in search of the new Germany for which we longed. At the most they stood aside and looked on as we fought and bled for Germany. We were too undistinguished for them, too loud, too radical. We still are, as far as they are concerned. It is enough for them that the black-white-and-red colours of the Bismarck empire are flying over Germany and, as a concession to the revolution, the swastika flag. For them the degree of outward power so far acquired, in which they are allowed a share, is enough. They would have even been contented with considerably less, because they did not have to struggle; they were only the beneficiaries of our victory.

... If those bourgeois simpletons think it is enough that the State apparatus has received a new sign, that the 'national' revolution has already lasted too long, for once we agree with them. It is in fact high time the national revolution stopped and became the National Socialist one. Whether they like it or not, we will continue our struggle—if they understand at last what it is about—with them; if they are unwilling—without them; and if necessary—against them!

The SA were not alone at fault. All sections of the Party were guilty of arbitrary interference both in the State administration and in the business community, as the following account by an unusually responsible SA leader indicates:

116

The authority of the State is in danger through constant unjustified interference by political officials in the machinery of normal administration.

Every NSBO⁶⁰ functionary. NSBO local branch leader, NSBO district leader... every political cell leader, political local branch leader, political district leader is giving orders which interfere with the exercise of the authority of the ministries at the lower levels, that is to say, the authority of the regional governments, the district offices, down to the smallest police station.

Everyone is arresting everyone else, avoiding the prescribed official channels, everyone is threatening everyone else with protective custody, everyone is threatening everyone else with Dachau.⁶¹

Businesses are being forced to dismiss any number of employees, and businesses are being compelled to take on employees without checking on their qualifications...

Right down to the smallest police station, the best and most reliable officials have become uncertain about the hierarchy of authority; this clearly must have a devastating and destructive effect on the State.

⁶⁰Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellenorganisation: the National Socialist Factory Cell Organisation.

⁶¹The notorious concentration camp near Munich.

July 1933

I really cannot be counted among the pussyfooters, and for that very reason I must see that if the revolution is to be turned into an ordered relationship between State and people, the State apparatus must be made completely safe from all revolutionary interference from the street.

It must be left to the responsibility of the State ministries alone, both in the spheres of policy and of personnel, to embody revolutionary ideas in a form which is suitable to the community....

Every little street cleaner today feels he is responsible for matters which he has never understood....

No one can dispute that fact that, at the moment, two-thirds of the daily work in my area, and in all other areas I know, has to be wasted on trifles arising from Party officials' lack of discipline....

The leadership principle is in grave danger from these conditions.... I do not mind if my giving this warning makes me appear a grumbler. I can only state that these present circumstances must inevitably lead to chaos.

Hitler had little sympathy for the disillusionment of the SA. He was concerned lest constant interference by the Party and the SA at the lower levels might alienate important groups such as the Army, industry, and the Civil Service. It could jeopardise economic recovery and so prevent the regime from gaining the popular support it needed. It could delay his main objective of mobilising the economic resources and will of the nation for diplomatic and strategic purposes. For this a period of stability was essential. On 6 July 1933, therefore, in a speech to the Reich Governors (*Reichsstatthalter*), he formally ended the revolution which, he insisted, must from now on take the form of evolution. This did not mean that there were to be no more fundamental changes but that such changes must in future be initiated from above and not from below, and that tactical compromises would be necessary to ensure the stability of the regime:

117

The political parties have now been finally abolished. This is an historic event, the meaning and significance of which many people have not yet understood. We must now abolish the last remnants of democracy, especially the methods of election and the majority decisions still employed today in local government, in economic organisations and works committees, and the responsibility of the individual must be stressed.

The achievement of outward power must be followed by the inward education of man. We must beware of making doctrinaire decisions from one day to the next and of expecting a final solution from them. People are easily capable of bending outward form to suit their own intellectual stamp. The switch-over must not be made until suitable people have been found to carry out the switching. More revolutions have succeeded in their first assault than, once successful, have been brought to a standstill and held there. Revolution is not a permanent state, it must

July 1933

not develop into a lasting state. The full spate of revolution must be guided into the secure bed of evolution. In this the most important part is played by the education of the people. The present state of affairs must be improved and the people embodying it must be educated in the National Socialist conception of the State. A businessman must not therefore be dismissed if he is a good businessman even if he is not yet a good National Socialist; especially not if the National Socialist put in his place knows nothing about business. In business, ability alone must be decisive! The task of National Socialism is the safeguarding of the development of our people. But we must not keep looking round to see what next to revolutionise; rather we have the task of securing one position after another in order to hold them, and occupy them gradually in model fashion. In this we must gear our actions to a period of many years, and plan in terms of long periods of time. We do not provide bread for any worker by theoretically coordinating people. History will not judge us by the number of businessmen we dismissed or locked up, but by whether we knew how to provide work. Today we have the absolute power to succeed. But we must be able to replace those we dismiss by their betters. The businessman must be judged first on his business abilities; we must keep the economic apparatus in order. We shall not abolish unemployment with economic commissions, or with theories and blueprints of organisations. The main thing now is not programmes and ideas but the daily bread of five million people. The economy is a living organism which cannot be changed at a blow; it is constructed according to primitive laws bound up with human nature. The carriers of intellectual poison now seeking to penetrate the economy are a menace to both State and people. Practical experience must not be rejected simply because it is opposed to a particular idea.

In confronting the nation with reforms, we must show that we understand things and can cope with them. Our task is work, work, and again work! Our success in providing work will be our most powerful source of authority. Our programme is not a matter of fine gestures, but of maintaining the life of the German people.

The ideas of the programme do not demand that we act like fools and overturn everything, but that we realise our concepts wisely and carefully. In the long run, the more successful the economic underpinning of our programme, the more secure will be our political power. Reich Governors must ensure, and are responsible for seeing, that no organisations or party authorities shall claim governmental rights, dismiss people, or fill offices for which only the Reich Government and, in the field of economics, only the Reich Minister of Economics is responsible.

The Party has now become the State. All power comes under the authority of the Reich. The emphasis of German life must be prevented from shifting back into particular areas or even organisations. No longer does authority stem from any part of the Reich but only from the concept of the Germans as a nation.

This statement, however, had only a limited effect on the Party activists, and above all, on the SA men, who felt disgruntled at the fact that the Nazi take-over had made so little difference to their lives, apart from giving them the satisfaction of revenge on their political opponents. This is clear from the fact that only three months later on 6 October 1934 Frick felt obliged to send out the following circular:

1933

Despite repeated announcements by the Reich Chancellor and despite my numerous circulars new infringements by subordinate leaders and members of the SA have been reported again and again during the past weeks. Above all, SA leaders and SA men have independently carried out police actions either for which they had no authority whatever or which they carried out in a way that cannot be reconciled with the existing laws and regulations of the National Socialist Government. In this way even the extra-territorial status of the ambassador of a foreign power has recently been seriously violated by unauthorised SA men, thereby involving the foreign policy of the Government.

These infringements and excesses must now cease once and for all. I make it the duty of Reich Governors, State Governments and all subordinate institutions to intervene sharply against such infringements or any attempt at unauthorised interference. Unless members of the SA are employed as auxiliary police officers or as auxiliary officials in the frontier service by the proper authorities, they have no police jurisdiction whatsoever. In future, therefore, all police activities of the SA in all circumstances must cease. Where it becomes necessary in exceptional circumstances to employ members of the SA to assist the police in particular actions, they must never act independently but only in the presence and under the supervision of the police and only in accordance with the orders of the police officer. The leader of the police force carries full responsibility for the employment and the conduct of such auxiliary SA men. Furthermore, auxiliary police officers and auxiliary border customs officers are not to carry out their work except in the company of an official. Only if these orders are minutely observed can *agents provocateurs* be effectively prevented from damaging the SA and the National Socialist State...

During the autumn and winter of 1933, the SA was becoming more and more a law unto itself. In addition to the interference of the SA commissars in the Government offices at various levels, the SA was also intervening in the judicial process, forcing the prosecuting authorities to drop charges against SA men and successfully asserting its right to discipline SA men who broke the law. It had even established its own police force, the *Feldjäger*, who claimed sole jurisdiction in matters involving the SA. The monthly reports prepared by the Gestapo on the political and economic situation referred to the discontent of the population at the undisciplined behaviour of the SA and their concern at the obvious inability of the authorities to do anything about it.

This resentment was not restricted to the State authorities, including the Gestapo, or the population at large; it was even shared to some extent by the Party authorities. The SA did not disguise its contempt for the political leadership at local and district level. According to the Gestapo, the SA men mocked the local Party officials as 'Christmas tree men' and 'Lametta stallions' because of their uniforms which the SA felt were undeserved by these Party bureaucrats. 'Political earthworms' was another current epithet.

1933-34

But much more serious from Hitler's point of view were the military ambitions of the SA. Apart from its rather vague social revolutionary aims, the SA under Röhm had a more concrete objective: it aspired to become the armed force of the State into which the Regular Army would be integrated. To this plan the Army leadership was totally opposed. Under the new Minister of Defence, General von Blomberg, who was a pro-Nazi, the Army had adopted a benevolent attitude towards the new regime. This was also partly dictated by the belief in the need to win Hitler's support in resisting the ambitions of the SA—a good instance of the way in which Hitler could use the Nazi organisations to put pressure on other bodies so that in effect they 'coordinated' themselves.

But by the beginning of 1934, the Army authorities were becoming increasingly concerned about the military ambitions of the SA, which by absorbing other paramilitary organisations had grown to over 2,500,000 men compared with the 100,000 or slightly more of the Army. Hitler could not afford to antagonise the Army, the one organisation which had the power to remove him from office. An efficient and contented Army was also essential if he was to achieve the aims of his foreign policy. The riff-raff of the SA would be no substitute.

At a conference on 28 February 1934, attended by the Army, SA and SS leaders, Hitler rejected Röhm's idea of a militia. He made Blomberg and Röhm sign an agreement by which the SA would be responsible for pre- and post-military training under the direction of the Army. Two days later, Blomberg drew Hitler's attention to an instance of the growing military activity of the SA, particularly serious as it involved the region demilitarised by the Versailles Treaty. This could cause diplomatic complications which would in turn complicate the process of rearmament:

I feel obliged to refer again to the significance of the armed staff guards of the SA. According to an order of the Chief of Staff [of the SA] every *Obergruppe* and group is to set up its own armed staff guards with a heavy machine gun company. This has already begun in certain areas. According to a report by the Commander of Military District VI, leaders of SA brigades are planning the formation of such a staff guard as well and are swearing in SA people for 1-1½ years for that purpose. Selection and training are being carried out with the aim of appearing in public. In terms of numbers this would amount to 6000-8000 men permanently armed with guns and machine guns in that military district alone. It is particularly unfortunate that the formation of these staff guards is taking place in connexion with so-called SA auxiliary labour camps which are mostly situated in the big cities. Today I received a report that a staff guard armed like this is being formed in Höchst am Main, that is to say, in the neutral zone...

Goebbels

1933

152 II: THE GAULEITER OF BERLIN

Unlike Stennes, the man still enjoyed wide support in the party's ranks. Even Hitler was not as hostile to him as Goebbels would have liked. Indeed, the Führer sent the gauleiter of Saxony to hint to Strasser that he could let bygones be bygones even now.¹⁵ At Göring's apartment on the tenth, the talk was again only of Strasser. Hindenburg's office told the press that he was thinking of appointing 'a National Socialist' as vice-chancellor, and on the twelfth his Staatssekretär Otto Meissner revealed that Strasser had secretly met the president. The next day Göring told Goebbels that Strasser was about to do the dirty on them; the press too hinted that Strasser was to become vice-chancellor.¹⁶

Jan 15

The voting in Lippe on January 15, 1933 brought the personal triumph that Hitler therefore badly needed. The party's vote surged forward by twenty percent. Strasser was done for. On the sixteenth Hitler addressed the gauleiters assembled at Weimar for three hours. 'Hitler's victory,' wrote Goebbels, 'is total. We have sweated out the Strasser affair.'¹⁷

THE REICHSTAG was due to meet again at the end of January 1933, but in effect the Nazis were already in control, as Goebbels proved, staging an outrageous provocation a few days before then: The memorial to Horst Wessel was to be dedicated on the twenty-second. He arranged for twenty thousand S.A. men to parade on Bülow Platz right outside the communist party's national HQ. General von Schleicher pleaded with Hitler not to risk attending. 'He who dares,' advised Goebbels, 'wins!'¹⁸ The Berlin police had to protect the parade with machine-guns, armored cars, and sharpshooters. The Nazi pageantry was blemished only by Mrs Wessel; she repaid Hitler's earlier indifference to her son's death by arriving late and making him wait half an hour.

Jan 27

Hindenburg's slow-witted son Oskar and his secretary Otto Meissner encouraged Hitler to fight on. All were agreed that Schleicher's time was up. For two days rumors flew as Göring and Frick negotiated with the other aspirants to power. On January 27 Schleicher had been reconciled to resigning on Saturday, but he was still campaigning stubbornly against Hitler's taking over.¹⁹ Hitler bargained with Hugenberg about a coalition that evening. But the D.N.V.P. stated unacceptable demands. Schleicher resigned on Saturday the twenty-eighth. The Reichstag was to resume on the following Tuesday. Goebbels sat at home, nervously playing with the infant Helga, while Göring carried on the bargaining process. On Sunday Goebbels drafted a belligerent leading article, then went over for coffee at the Kaiserhof. As he was nervously chatting with Hitler, Göring burst in and roared: 'It's all fixed!' Papen had agreed to recommend Hitler's appointment as chancellor. Those present solemnly rose and shook hands all round. Göring added that Frick was to be minister of the interior in the Reich, with himself as his counterpart in Prussia.²⁰ Hitler announced that he would dissolve the Reichstag at once. To establish an absolute majority he needed to fight one more election campaign—the very last one,' noted Goebbels cynically, 'but we'll pull it off.'

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'IT'S ALL FIXED!' 153

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There was one serious snag for Goebbels. Hitler's canny opponents had not allowed his Nazis even now more than three ministerial portfolios. Goebbels had taken a propaganda ministry for granted. Hitler cleverly weaned him off his disappointment, arguing that a government minister of propaganda could hardly direct a necessarily partisan election campaign. He promised Goebbels he would get his ministry—later; they would appoint a straw man to keep the seat warm meanwhile.

At the eleventh hour, that Sunday January 29, 1933, Alvensleben, Schleicher's man, brought rumors of an army putsch being planned by his generals with General von Hammerstein, the army chief of staff. Not for the last time, however, the German army proved incapable of decisive political action.²¹

AT eleven A.M.—it was now January 30, 1933—President von Hindenburg sent for Hitler and swore him in as chancellor. Goebbels waited at the Kaiserhof. 'The Old Man was quite emotional,' Hitler told him afterwards. 'He's delighted that the nationalist right wing has united at last.' Goebbels phoned Magda with the news.²²

'Herr Doctor,' Ello Quandt admonished him afterward, 'now the going gets tougher. You've got to show what you and your friends can do.'

His joy evaporated. 'Whatever!' he snapped. 'Now we're in power. And nobody's going to cheat us of that. We know all the tricks!'²³ He ordered Berlin's biggest-ever torchlight parade for that night, changed into uniform, and drove off to the Reich chancellery for the first time in his life.

Jan 29

Jan 30

1933

20: The Big Lie

FOR Joseph Goebbels the years of poverty and struggle seemed to be over, though he still had no formal government office.

He was now thirty-five, his life already three-quarters spent. 'G.' wrote one official English visitor at this time, 'has charm and a captivating smile and manner'—surprising, he felt, in one described as the cruelest man in the whole movement. The Englishman detected in Goebbels something of an intensely enthusiastic undergraduate, but also a dangerous fanatic.¹ Franz von Papen was struck by the wide mouth and intelligent eyes. General Werner von Blomberg, Hitler's new defense minister, felt that Goebbels was convinced of his own superiority.² Goebbels' staff would find him a disagreeable employer. He rarely showed gratitude, and preferred cruel sarcasm to measured criticism. 'A man with many enemies,' concluded Blomberg, 'Goebbels had no friends at all.'

Wisely, most of his enemies had fled. Albert Grzesinski had escaped to Paris where he was even now composing memoirs in which Dr Goebbels would not fare well at all.³ Dr Bernhard Weiss had fled to Czechoslovakia. With their departure, Goebbels was at a rather loose end. 'G.' Alfred Rosenberg would write, 'was a discharger of purulence. Until 1933 he squirted it at Isidor Weiss. With him gone, he began to discharge it over us instead.'⁴ The publication in 1934 of his opinionated diaries *Kaiserhof* would infuriate the other top Nazis. 'They used to say that the falsification of history begins after fifty years,' Ribbentrop would snort to his family. 'Wrong—it starts at once!' (Goebbels had not mentioned him.)⁵

Falsch - es starte plötzlich!
Not that the diaries are devoid of inherent usefulness. While the later volumes utilized repeatedly the same stereotype phrases, this very ossification enables us to deduce where perhaps other unwritten events need to be suspected between the lines. They lauded Magda Goebbels so cloyingly that one suspects that Goebbels' occasional nocturnal *Spazierfahrt* (motor outing) through Berlin was designed to grab more than just the 'breath of fresh air' to which he referred. The diaries portray him at other times as flogging himself to the limits of endurance for the cause. ('Twelve hours non-stop sitting at my desk today,' he writes in July 1933.) But as the years passed the pages filled with unbecoming references to villas, boats, and motor cars—the latter evidently donated by the party's benefactors in the Daimler-Benz company.

(sofort)

Febr. 1937

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Kaiserhof made him briefly a wealthy man. Tax returns among his papers indicate that his literary royalties total 34,376 marks in fiscal 1933, 134,423 in 1934 (the year of *Kaiserhof*), 62,190 in 1935, 63,654 in 1936, and 66,905 the year after that.⁶

He had firmly hitched his star to his Führer (still often referred to as 'Hitler' in the 1933 diary). Over the following years he consolidated their personal relationship, becoming a regular lunch guest at the chancellery, where he delighted the others with his repartee. Far into the night he and Hitler yarned about cars and kings and criminals. 'And how we laughed,' he recorded after one session that summer. 'Until my jawbone ached.'

Sept

In September 1933 Hitler turned the first sod to begin work on Germany's autobahn network; Goebbels saw the crowds cheering and weeping. Often the Führer revealed to him his secret plans—to unite and expand the Reich under one central government, but also eventually to create a senate to provide the checks and balances that even a dictatorship would need. After President von Hindenburg's demise, they agreed, Hitler himself should become head of state, with a popular vote to confirm it when that time came.⁸

ON that historic day when Adolf Hitler came to power Goebbels had stood next to him in the chancellery window looking down on his six-hour torchlight parade. One million Berliners surged past them, holding up their children to their new leader, to the thump and blare of brass bands. A radio truck arrived and Goebbels spoke a running commentary; he found that speaking into a radio microphone took some getting used to. 'It is a moving experience,' he ended, 'for me to see how in this city, where we began six years ago with just a handful of people, the entire public has arisen and is marching past below—workers and citizens and farmers and students and soldiers... Truly one can say, Germany is awakening.' Only Munich and Stuttgart refused to carry the broadcast.⁹

Chilling news awaited him on his return home at three A.M. that night. Assassins had gunned down his twenty-four year old S.A. officer Hans-Eberhard Maikowski and a police constable.¹⁰ Maikowski, another veteran of the Pharus Rooms battle, had marched at the head of his No. 33 Sturm in that evening's parade. Hitler told Goebbels that he wanted no reprisals. He wanted the Red Terror to 'burn out first'—a phrase which Goebbels subtly changed in *Kaiserhof*, the published text, to 'flare up.' He had six hundred thousand Berliners line the rain-sodden streets of Berlin for the funeral of Maikowski and the policeman. The Berlin S.A.'s scoundrelly commander Count von Helldorff strutted at the head of the parade; he had put all bars off limits to his S.A. as a mark of respect that day, but he himself was sighted that evening in full uniform in a particularly sleazy Kurfürstendamm bar.¹¹

Febr. 1

Still feeble from her illness, Magda came home on February 1. Goebbels broke it to her that he was not included in Hitler's Cabinet. 'I am being frozen out,' he wrote in his diary. Although Hitler had mentioned a propaganda ministry several times in recent months, he had now given

to the tedious responsibility whispers that 'They've sto Hitler is.'

Hitler did want to lull got worse. Walther Funk throughout added to the his predecessors' cheers. A first newspaper wrote, 'that I

The disappearance. Never in robust fantasies. 'I have no aim was in power he observed not to expect Goebbels' (He prudent in bed he was Master's gut the coming 'Amen!'—a

In the run Day of the A a depth and radio station. With the Pr was much as Paris, and Lo possible fore still in Germany exaggerating would write, covered with hardly any Je party.¹²

This year, evening February the whole era. Goebbels was Ernst 'Putzi'

* a scene - the criminal fascists Hitler

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1933

to the tedious and narrow-minded ex-schoolteacher Bernhard Rust the responsibility for culture and higher education in Prussia. Goebbels heard whispers that he was to be fobbed off with the job of radio commissioner. 'They've stood me in the corner,' he recorded privately. 'Fat lot of good Hitler is.'

Hitler did not even plan to take any steps as yet against the press. 'We want to lull them into a sense of security,' mimicked Goebbels. Things got worse. On February 5 Hitler appointed the financial journalist Walther Funk his Staatssekretär for 'press and propaganda.' Meanwhile throughout Prussia Göring appointed reliable new police chiefs, and added to the provisional arrest-lists of communists already prepared by his predecessors; Göring also banned the police force's rubber truncheons. A flurry of bans descended on their enemies—the Social Democrat newspapers like *Vorwärts* and 'all those Jewish organs,' as Goebbels wrote, 'that have been such a pain in our necks.'

The disappointment at being excluded from office gnawed at Goebbels. Never in robust health, he fell ill, his days and nights troubled by feverish fantasies. 'I am tired and disheartened,' he wrote in mid-February 1933. 'I have no aim and no longer take any pleasure in my work.' The party was in power, and he was an outcast! 'The likes of Göring reigns supreme,' he observed ironically. When Karl Hanke, his chief aide, now told him not to expect any government funds for the coming election battle, Goebbels scoffed, 'Then let Fatso Göring do without his caviar for once!' (He prudently cut this suggestion out of the published text.) After a week in bed he went to the Sport Palace with Hitler and listened to His Master's guttural Voice intoning against marxism, setting the tenor of the coming final election battle. Hitler actually ended with the word 'Amen!'—a brilliant touch in Goebbels' view.

In the run-up to election eve, which Goebbels proclaimed to be the Day of the Awakening Nation, he developed a propaganda campaign of a depth and breadth surpassing anything before. Partial control of the radio stations ensured that every night his or Hitler's voice was heard. With the Prussian police now in Göring's hands, of course, the going was much easier. But the Jews and communists who had fled to Prague, Paris, and London poured vitriol over the new Hitler government. Irresponsible foreign journalists did the rest. Even ex-chancellor Brüning, still in Germany, watched in fury as they filed blatantly untrue stories exaggerating the plight of the Jews. 'In the spring of 1933,' Brüning would write, 'foreign correspondents reported that the river Spree was covered with the corpses of murdered Jews.' At that time, he pointed out, hardly any Jews had suffered except for the leaders of the communist party.¹²

This year, 1933, was however the year of the Big Lie. On Monday evening February 27 occurred one of the most controversial episodes of the whole era. Hitler had come to dine with the Goebbels family. Shortly, Goebbels was called away to take a phone call from Hitler's friend Ernst 'Putzi' Hanfstaengl, a well-known prankster. Hanfstaengl shouted

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excitedly that the Reichstag building was on fire. Since Goebbels had twitted him with a phone call only days before, he ignored the message. Hanfstaengl phoned again, this time to report that he could see flames leaping out of the Reichstag's cupola.¹³ Hitler and Goebbels tried to phone the Reichstag; nobody answered—small wonder, because a phone call to the Brandenburg Gate police station confirmed that the Reichstag was on fire. They drove off at top speed down the Charlottenburg Chaussee.

Afterward the world's press clamored that the Nazis themselves had started the blaze. With this author's discovery of the missing Goebbels Diary entries in Moscow, that version is finally laid to rest. He, Hitler, and Göring were equally stunned by the news.

Hitler summons me to the Kaiserhof [this day's unpublished entry begins]. He's enthusiastic about my [radio] commentaries. Says Munich and Nuremberg were really great... Hitler fabulous as always...

Back home to work. Much to do. At nine P.M. Hitler and Auwi come over. Music and gossip. Then Hanfstaengl phones: Says the Reichstag's on fire. What a wit! But turns out to be true. Race straight down there with Hitler. The entire building a mass of flames. [We] go in. Göring follows. Papen, whose acquaintance I thus make, is also there. Thirty arson sites. Fires set by the communists. Göring rampant, Hitler raging, Papen clear-headed. The main assembly chamber a picture of devastation. So take action now!... To work! Hitler consults with Papen. We meet back at the Kaiserhof. Everybody beaming. This was the last straw. Now we're well away. Culprit caught, a twenty-four-year-old Dutch communist.¹⁴

'He's being interrogated now,' Göring told them. 'We decided straight away,' Goebbels related at the subsequent trial, 'to ban the communist press and later the Social Democrat press too, and to take the top communist officials into custody.'¹⁵ Göring ordered the S.A. to stand by in case of an all-out communist uprising.

At midnight Hitler and Goebbels hurried over to the *Völkischer Beobachter's* Berlin office. It took half an hour even to get into the sleeping building, and more time was wasted while printworkers, compositors, and a surly sub-editor were found. There was no sign of Rosenberg himself, the editor. Scouring the proofs of the next day's edition, Hitler finally found the sensational news tucked away in the Berlin in Brief column ('Fire damage to the Reichstag'). 'Man, are you mad?' he shouted at the sub-editor. 'This is an event on a colossal scale!'¹⁶

We drove over to the VB [Goebbels' diary continues]. It is really badly laid out. Hitler sets to work there straight away. I dictate a new gau poster and a fabulous article...¹⁷ During the night all communist party officials are arrested. Entire communist and Social Democrat press banned. Good work done.... Over to Hitler at Kaiserhof. He's

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THE BIG LIE 161

delighted with my article. It is half-past five in the morning... Two S.A. men shot in Berlin. To sleep at seven. Three hours. Then straight back to work!

The fire was a godsend to the Nazi radicals. Goebbels was already disquieted by the speed with which Hitler and even Göring were succumbing to Hindenburg's bourgeois spell. This lone communist fire-raiser had rescued the revolution. During the night he sent for the journalist Alfred-Ingemar Berndt to take down a fiery press release.¹⁸ This announced the sweeping arrests, and described the Reichstag fire as a communist beacon, a signal for a marxist insurrection. This was as much a lie as the claim by Jewish and communist agencies worldwide that the Nazis had staged the fire. Even the authoritative *Manchester Guardian* published a dispatch from an anonymous special correspondent alleging that Hitler, Göring, and Goebbels had foregathered in Berlin that evening 'awaiting their fire.'¹⁹ The world's press readily copied this Big Lie, and historians in time adopted it from them.

Neither Hitler nor Goebbels wanted to believe that the mad Dutch communist Marinus van der Lubbe had acted alone in torching the Reichstag building. Eight years later Hitler still suspected that the hand of Ernst Torgler, the communist leader, had been behind it.²⁰

THE last four days of the election battle saw the scheming, marching, speaking, singing, bell-ringing, flagwaving climax of Goebbels' career so far. On election day itself, March 5, 1933 he and Magda escorted Hitler to a Wagner opera, then sat up late waiting for the returns. Goebbels found them disappointing. True, the Nazis had won 43.9 percent, but Hitler was still well short of the absolute majority he craved; in his own Berlin constituency the Nazis had achieved with 31.3 percent the second lowest vote after Cologne-Aachen. Goebbels however was now free to come into the government. Hitler announced at his next Cabinet that the new Reichstag would be solemnly inaugurated at a session in the famous Garrison Church at Potsdam, with President von Hindenburg in attendance. 'Now,' he added, 'there must come about a bold operation of propaganda and enlightenment, designed to forestall any political lethargy. This public enlightenment must emanate from a newly created central authority.'²¹

Thus Goebbels got his job as Reich minister of propaganda and public enlightenment—a cumbersome title pressed on him by Hitler. He hated that word 'propaganda' and went to elaborate lengths over coming years to cleanse it of its negative hubris.²² As for the ministry, he already had the necessary structure in mind—initially seven divisions, controlling the radio, press, films, propaganda, and the theater as well as a legal department and a defense department (to defend, that is, against lies). Nobody would ever deny that Goebbels proved a capable minister, and in this he was aided by his first Staatssekretär Walther Funk. They made an odd couple—the one now notoriously heterosexual and seemingly ascetic, the

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✱ Dr. Goebbels will take credit for van der Lubbe + the Reichstag fire

March 1933

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other a homosexual and bon viveur. Funk later called his minister brilliant, but devoid of any scruple and cruelly, coldly calculating. His personal conceit led to angry complaints over the years from composer Richard Strauss, conductor Wilhelm Furtwängler, film star Emil Jannings, and scores of others. 'Goebbels' treatment of female artistes,' reminisced Funk irritably, 'was a great deal friendlier.'²⁴

Berlin's Jewish community was stricken by forebodings. Hans Schäffer, still Staatssekretär in the finance ministry and a board-member of the powerful Ullstein newspaper group, wrote in his well-informed diary: 'It's apparently not definite whether Goebbels will also get the press under him. Hitler and Funk are opposed, as he'd become too powerful.'²⁵ Bella Fromm, forty-three-year-old society columnist on an Ullstein newspaper, noted the club foot and recalled her grandmother's advice: 'Beware of those who are marked.'²⁶ At a diplomatic reception later that month Goebbels found her at his table and expatiated rudely against all Jews and communists. The Romanian envoy soothingly told him that Jewish though the lovely Bella might be, she was right-wing. 'Even worse,' snapped the new minister.²⁷

Initially Schäffer's minister, the conservative Count Schwerin von Krosigk, refused even to provide any funds for what he called 'this [propaganda ministry] nonsense.'²⁸ On the eleventh the Cabinet debated the new ministry; Hitler justified it as being necessary to prepare public opinion for important government actions—he cited a harmless-sounding agricultural example involving foodstuff policies, then added: 'The importance of all this in time of war must also be stressed. The government would act only after the public-enlightenment phase had run for some time and taken hold.' He would however reserve ultimate control of the press to himself. Only Hugenberg, a major newspaper owner, expressed qualms.²⁹ Two days later President von Hindenburg signed the decree establishing the propaganda ministry.³⁰

Goebbels, Germany's youngest-ever minister, addressed his first ministerial press conference on March 15. 'The Reich government,' he told the world's newspapermen, 'needs more than fifty-two percent of the whole electorate'—he had included the voters of the D.N.V.P., which was in coalition with Hitler—it needs the whole nation.³¹ Nobody ignored him now. The American ambassador warned his new president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, that Goebbels was a master orator—far superior to Hitler and far cleverer.³²

To house his new ministry Goebbels had been allocated the rambling old Prince-Leopold Palace on Wilhelms Platz, right across from Hitler's chancellery. It was the kind of listed architecture before which civil servants instinctively genuflected. Its great salons had been kept permanently locked, the priceless furniture shrouded in dustsheets. The paneling was dark and musty, the windows narrow and obscured by heavy drapes. A refit was out of the question. The building's custodian, Hofrat (privy counselor) Schwebel, nervously lectured the young new-

comer that not even ignored him. Had decorators from the plaster and stucco Schwebel.³³

Goebbels move

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The upshot of t from Hitler—or s counter-boycott o 29 that this threat agency in Berlin, smear campaign w a one-day boycot casting from a ma a Jewish store.' T impact of the boy put it, 'German J midnight on April he could easily rei shall crush Germa

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Wm. F. Dodd

March 22, 1933

comer that not even the minister's own office could be changed. Goebbels ignored him. Had there not been a revolution? He recruited builders and decorators from the ranks of his S.A. and they stripped out the offending plaster and stucco overnight. 'You might go to prison for that,' gasped Schwebel.³³

Goebbels moved in on Wednesday March 22, 1933.

The international Big Lie campaign (as the Nazis saw it) against Hitler's Germany had redoubled in intensity since the election. Disgruntled opponents committed outrages in stolen Nazi uniforms. The Cabinet approved harsh penalties for such impersonations—Goebbels even urged the death penalty.³⁴ Emigré journalists published lurid reports from Berlin. One said that Hitler had ordered Torgler's ears cut off; another that the body of Hirsch, the editor of *Red Flag*, had been found floating in a canal; a third that Ernst Thälmann had been tortured to death. Enraged by the newspaper dispatches, the international Jewish community started a boycott of German goods.³⁵ In London, Jewish restaurants refused to serve Germans. Goebbels retaliated by inviting Sefton Delmer, a British newspaperman who had covered the Reichstag blaze, to visit Torgler, Hirsch, and Thälmann in custody. Offered the front page of the London *Daily Express*, Goebbels challenged the émigrés to name even one Jew who had yet died. 'The Jews living in Germany,' he wrote in his article, 'have held such an enormously large number of powerful posts in the life of the nation that the German element seemed almost completely excluded from the leading positions.' He blamed the Jews for spreading similar atrocity stories during the world war. 'The German nation today has other business to do than to stage blood baths and indulge in Jew baiting.'³⁶ Berlin wiretaps confirmed that the Hearst press's Berlin correspondent was the arch culprit.³⁷

The upshot of the Jewish campaign overseas was that Goebbels secured from Hitler—or so he claimed—approval to threaten a short, sharp counter-boycott of the Jews. He told his Cabinet colleagues on March 29 that this threat had been extremely effective and that the main Jewish agency in Berlin, the Central-Verein, had promised that the foreign smear campaign would cease. Nevertheless on March 31 he announced a one-day boycott of all Jewish stores. 'Tomorrow,' he said, broadcasting from a mass rally, 'not one German man or woman is to enter a Jewish store.' There would follow a three-day period to assess the impact of the boycott, and it would be repeated if necessary until, as he put it, 'German Jewry has been annihilated.'³⁸ Raising the boycott at midnight on April 1, he told a cheering throng in the Lustgarten that he could easily reimpose it. 'If it must be resumed,' he threatened, 'we shall crush German Jewry.'³⁹

The world's press greeted Goebbels' crude but effective boycott with uproar (while overlooking the Jewish boycott which had triggered it). Speaking to an official British visitor Goebbels quoted in justification the familiar figures on the preponderance of Jews among Germany's lawyers, doctors, and other wealthy professions. As for isolated anti-Jewish out-

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rages reported during the boycott, he claimed that communists disguised in Nazi uniforms had perpetrated them.⁴⁰

He enjoyed the thrill of unbridled power; he fancied that the world's Jews were whimpering with fear.⁴¹ Yet his antisemitism was still broadly tactical, rather than innate. He needed the stimulus of a visible enemy. He could still split his sides laughing at the Jewish comedian Otto Wallburg, who would later die in Auschwitz.⁴² When Furtwängler, conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic, bravely protested at the discrimination against Otto Klemperer, Bruno Walter, and Max Reinhardt, he replied: 'We can see no objection to having Leo Blech [another Jew] direct some German masterpiece at the state opera, because no one gets the feeling of any violence done to the national spirit. But it is not necessary that the majority of opera conductors should be Jews. . . . Those of Jewish blood who have real ability should be free to exercise their art: But they must not call the shots.'⁴³

HE attended virtually every Cabinet that year. Intellectually far above the rest, he easily worsted them in debate. Between them the dialectician Goebbels and the brutal Göring made opposition impossible. 'They attacked every problem,' Vice-Chancellor von Papen recalled, 'with the furious élan of the rabble-rouser.'⁴⁴ Goebbels' secret diary now bristled with barbed references to Göring's pathological ambition, his pompous megalomania, and his ever gaudier uniforms.⁴⁵ He had to fight hard to wrest control of the radio from the aviator's porcine clutches.⁴⁶ He found Göring cavorting with his lady friend Emmy (still married to another) at the Berghof in August. Hitler delivered an outspoken speech to his gauleiters about uniforms—'no names,' wrote Goebbels, stifling a chuckle, 'but everybody knew whom he meant.'⁴⁷ Learning that 'Fatso' was demanding the rank of general, Goebbels wrote, 'Why not field marshal and be done with it!'⁴⁸

ON April 25 he returned home to receive the civic dignities that the worthies of his native Rheydt now hastened to bestow upon him. The townsfolk had hung out a sea of flags; the catholic church bells pealed, no doubt equally willingly. He had let it be known that he desired a torchlight parade past his home. His mother stood beside him at an upstairs window. 'For eight years she has been vilified on my account,' he lectured the mayor. 'And she was the only one who understood me.'⁴⁹ At his old school he spoke once more from the stage where he had delivered the valediction sixteen years before. Local boy makes good: But his career in infamy was only just beginning.

April, 1933

21: Bonfire of the Books

IN April 1933 the Reich Cabinet tackled May Day: Should this traditional workers' festival now be proscribed?

'Leave May Day to me,' said Goebbels, and declared it a Nazi national holiday instead—bigger and brasher than anything that had gone before. He rallied a million and a half Berliners on the Tempelhof fields and basked beside the Führer in his open limousine as it majestically rolled through the cheering masses.

'Mein Führer,' he boasted at the microphone, 'I stand before you as the spokesman of the greatest multi-million movement that German soil has ever borne!'

An acrid stench filled the Berlin air as Hitler was dining with Auwi on May 10. He heard that an enormous bonfire of books was blazing beneath newsreel floodlights in the opera square, and made a wry comment about Goebbels' revolutionary activism.²

In fact Goebbels was not the instigator.³ The party's student organization had first approached his ministry a month earlier for financial support for this symbolic burning of decadent and anti-German literature. Although they had listed him as principal speaker in a draft program as early as April 10, for several weeks he had kept his distance: He had after all studied under famous Jewish teachers like Waldberg and Gundolf. It was not until a week before the event that his adjutant finally conveyed to the students his agreement to deliver the main speech.⁴ Between the opera and the university they had erected a crisscross log pyre, some twelve feet square and five feet high, on a thick bed of sand. Some streets away, five thousand students assembled in their full regalia and solemnly marched to the square carrying flaming torches, with an S.A. marching band at their head. Forty thousand Berliners packed the square. As the students hove into sight, followed by motorized tumbrels charged with the condemned books and pamphlets, the Berliners' cheering turned into mass hysteria.

'I thought they'd all gone stark raving mad,' wrote Bella Fromm privately, 'particularly the womenfolk.'⁵

The students marched around the bonfire tossing books onto it. Indictments were read over the loudspeakers. As each hated author was named, the cheers rang louder—and not just in Berlin: In every German university city the bonfires blazed that night, on the Königsplatz in Munich, the Römerberg in Frankfurt, and the Castle Square in Breslau.

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against the starched collar
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BONFIRE OF THE BOOKS 167

At midnight the little Doctor himself drove up and mounted the swastika-decked rostrum. Golo Mann, a student witness of the scene, noticed that Goebbels seemed distinctly ill at ease.⁶ His brief radio commentary was heard all over Germany. 'The Age of Jewish Intellectualism is over,' he remarked, in a tone that was more reasoned than inflammatory. 'This symbolic fire is blazing now outside many a German university, to show the world that here the intellectual basis of the November Republic is sinking into the ground.' 'If the old men cannot understand what is going on,' he intoned, 'then let them grasp that we young men have gone and done it!'

The ugly bonfires seized the world's headlines. The *New York Times* devoted a whole page to them, and published the Nazis' list of 160 proscribed authors in full.⁷

Speaking in the Sport Palace the next day Goebbels warned the Jews against continuing their international boycott against Germany. 'We have spared the Jews,' he said, 'but if they think ... that they can again stroll down the Kurfürstendamm as if nothing at all has happened, let them heed my words as a last warning.' The Jews were guests in Germany, he said, and must behave accordingly.⁸

THAT month, May 1933, Goebbels announced extensive overseas trips to explain the new Germany. He mentioned Danzig, Vienna, Rome, and Chicago (he hoped to be Germany's delegate to Chicago's World's Fair). Reaction was swift. The Danzig Senate banned him from speaking, and the Jews orchestrated massive protests in Chicago.⁹

Italy posed none of these problems. Goebbels traveled there at the end of May taking not only the Italian-speaking Magda, as Otto Wagener remarked jealously to Bella Fromm, but 'a few of his mistresses who are disguised as his secretaries.'¹⁰ The incumbent ambassador in Rome, Ulrich von Hassell, struck Goebbels as singularly incompetent.¹¹ Officially the propaganda minister's purpose was to study the Italian film industry, but he also engaged in secret talks with the king and Mussolini. He had long admired the Duce as an inspiring orator. 'Mussolini,' he once observed, 'does not like to be photographed smiling. Why should he? To be a statesman takes instinct, circumspection, and a gift for both organization and oratory.'¹²

On parting, Mussolini bade Goebbels assure Hitler that he would go through thick and thin with him.¹³

A MEN's fashion magazine publishes a photograph taken in Rome—of Goebbels in gala uniform, with the tongue-in-cheek caption: 'The Society Dress for Storm Troopers.'¹⁴ Magda has similar public relations problems. Commanded by Ullstein's now Nazi-groveling *Berliner Zeitung* to include her in a series on prominent society hostesses, Bella Fromm gags and persuades Bertolt Brecht to write the piece for her. Magda's secretary politely returns the draft with the directive that 'Frau Reichsminister Goebbels ... does not desire the public to be told of her interest in

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Buddhism.' A reference to her playing chess is also to be deleted.¹⁵

With the Frau Reichsminister, as the Goebbels Diary hints that spring, the first problems are arising. The honeymoon is over, and his lifestyle is to blame. After one frigid drive to Koblenz, he writes that he has sorted things out with her—'We were beginning to fall out. . . . She really is a sweet and lovely woman.'¹⁶ While omitting this private passage from *Kaiserhof*, he does leave in their subsequent visit to Freiburg with 'its Castle Hill, and old chestnut trees'—surely a little subtle flagwaving to Anka, whom he fondly imagines among the book's millions of readers.

In his view there is no room for women in politics.¹⁷ To his irritation however Magda becomes a patron of the new National Socialist Welfare organization (N.S.V.), and a few days later she broadcasts on Mother's Day.¹⁸ Goebbels angrily attends her inaugural reception for the N.S.V. at the Kaiserhof. His diary takes note only of the other gorgeous women there.¹⁹ When her millionaire ex-husband is arrested for tax evasion, Goebbels, jealous of their continued clandestine meetings, refuses to intercede; bail is set at four million marks (a million dollars).²⁰ On May 10 he records tersely, 'Row with Magda.' He has told her while in Italy that they should now add to their little family, and try this time for something more useful, perhaps, than a girl.²¹ With the necessary act still unperformed, Magda betakes herself and their infant Helga to the fashionable Baltic resort of Heiligendamm for the summer, leaving the little Doctor to cool his heels and ardor in Berlin for a while. When Goebbels briefly joins her he again brings several females with him: Among them, Bella Fromm learns, is the lovely Hela Strehl, a fashion editor at Scherl Verlag. 'Relations between Hela and Magda Goebbels,' records the journalist, 'are inevitably strained.'²²

The Goebbelses' apartment on Reichskanzler Platz is now overcrowded, what with the chauffeur and burly S.S. bodyguards. At the end of June 1933 Hitler assigns Hugenberg's former official residence to them. It is a secluded little villa built in 1835 in an overgrown park and shielded from the street—soon to be renamed Hermann-Göring Strasse—by centuries-old trees. The villa stands next to the American embassy. Goebbels hands the villa's keys to Magda on July 1. She swiftly turns it into a fairy-tale castle, furnishing it with expensive antiques from a store in Nettelbeck Strasse. Two weeks later they can move in. A week after that Director Jakob Werlin of Daimler-Benz brings them a new Mercedes motor car.²³ What more can the modern German minister's heart desire?

HIS propaganda ministry has a lavish budget from the first day. He had boasted that it was going to cost the taxpayer nothing, and kept his word. It would have an income in fiscal 1933 of 10,737,500 marks (around \$2.7m at that time), largely from radio license fees. Its projected expenditure was 13,528,500 marks; the shortfall would be more than matched by the money, put at 4,247,000 marks, consequently saved by the ministry of the interior, the Reich chancellor, and the foreign ministry. For

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Goebbels himself the ministry's budget provided an annual expense allowance of 4,800 marks plus a net ministerial income of 59,500 marks (around \$15,000). The 1933 budget also allowed 25,000 marks for the purchase of two automobiles for Dr Goebbels and Funk, as well as 190,000 marks for setting up provincial propaganda agencies, *Landespropagandaämter* (from 1937, Reich propaganda agencies); of these there would eventually be forty-one. A quarter of a million marks were set aside for enlarging the ministry building by fifty rooms, and eighty thousand marks for expanding its telephone network from seventy-four to 150 extensions.²⁴ His own instrument had over fifty pushbuttons coded in a kaleidoscope of colors: his ministry would eventually sprawl over fifty-four buildings in Berlin alone.

His corruption aside, he was a model minister. By enforcing economies on the Berlin radio network alone he would save one million marks and use this money for other cultural activities.²⁵ He regrouped the regional networks under one national radio authority. In his first months of office he replaced the top echelons in broadcasting with trusty Nazis and appointed the self-important and humorless Eugen Hadamowsky as national director.²⁶ Broadcasting prospered in Nazi Germany as in no other European country at that time. From four million listeners in 1933 the figure would soar to twenty-nine million in 1934 and ninety-seven million in 1939, with a corresponding leap in his license income. He was thrilled by the technological advances. At the annual radio fair he found himself telephoning with Siam, and with the captain of the liner *Bremen* on the high seas. People told him that television would follow within months.²⁷

A biography is not the place for a full analysis of the ministerial structure which Dr Goebbels created and ran. He changed its organizational chart frequently—an amorphous structure of vertical departments (*Abteilungen*) which split, subdivided, spawned, and coalesced again over the ministry's twelve-year existence. His office was large but not lavishly furnished, hoasting only a desk, some bookcases, and a globe. He had selected tough young Nazis as his lieutenants and their verve, coupled with the bureaucratic skills of the senior civil servants, initially assigned by other ministries, ensured his success. Eighty-two percent of his initial staff came from outside the civil service; they were *Angestellte* (temporary salaried staff), not *Beamte* (permanent civil servants)—an important distinction.²⁸ Ninety percent were veteran party members. One hundred of his initial 350 staff members had the party's badge in gold.²⁹ He preferred revolutionary fervor to bureaucratic ability.³⁰ He promoted on performance, not age or seniority—Dr Werner Naumann, quick-witted, lean, and ambitious, would become his last Staatssekretär in 1944 at the age of only thirty-four.

At first there was a shambles as his erstwhile desperadoes and bare-knuckle streetfighters learned the ropes of government service. But they soon had the new ministry up and running. Most outstanding among his minions was Karl Hanke, not yet thirty: Bullet-headed, dour, and

1933

handsome, he was put in charge of Goebbels' private office (Ministerbüro). Goebbels persuaded the Cabinet to allow Hanke the civil service rank of Ministerialrat.³¹

Now Goebbels not only chose the game, he laid down the rules. 'Why the complaints?' he boasted to cheering Nazis at the Sport Palace, explaining his new press laws. 'The foxes outsmarted the sheep, and it's only right that the foxes now forbid the sheep to attack them.'³² That the professions in Germany were regulated was nothing new: There was already a Literary Academy, of which Heinrich Mann was chairman. The Press Association had also existed before Hitler.³³ But within six months Goebbels would force everybody working in the field of German cultural endeavor to toe the party line—from journalism, writing, and publishing right across the spectrum to the opera, theater, and film.

On August 14 his diary first mentioned a chamber of culture.³⁴ Concerned by Robert Ley's attempts to force all cultural workers into his monolithic Labour Front, a month earlier Goebbels had written hastily to the Reich chancellor stating that he intended to establish such a chamber himself.³⁵ He had set out his ideas to harness Germany's creative artists to the new National Socialist state in a memorandum to Hitler three days later.³⁶ Hitler gave him the go-ahead on the Obersalzberg on August 24.³⁷ This awesome governing body would become the umbrella authority for seven sub-chambers, controlling the press (presided over by Nazi press baron Max Amann),³⁸ literature (Hans Friedrich Blunck), theater (Otto Laubinger), music (Richard Strauss),³⁹ the graphic arts (Professor Eugen Hönig),⁴⁰ film, and radio (Hadamowsky).⁴¹ The chamber of culture dispensed considerable funds and subsidies, setting up specialist schools, meeting welfare needs, providing legal aid, and conducting professional examinations. Goebbels was its president and Funk vice-president; but the chamber's day-to-day management was in the hands of the ruthless, ambitious and antisemitic Nazi Hans Hinkel, with the equally rabid Nazi lawyer Hans Ernst Schmidt-Leonhardt as his legal adviser. Full Jews could not belong; nor could anybody stripped of German citizenship.⁴² Among the chamber's records was later found a blacklist enumerating all those anti-Nazi writers and émigrés whose membership was banned, including Dr Bernhard Weiss, Albert Grzesinski, and 'Nahum Goldmann, eastern Jew, businessman, and agitator.'⁴³

The chamber of culture began operations on September 22. Each of its sub-chambers was further divided into *Fachschaften* and *Fachgruppen*—specialist chapels: The stage had forty thousand members, dance six thousand, and light entertainment thirteen thousand. Each sub-chamber was empowered to impose fines of up to one hundred thousand marks. Each such penalty was reviewed by its corresponding ministerial section and by Dr Goebbels himself.

Henceforth, German art was to be pure. The chamber of music prohibited the playing of atonal, 'Jewish,' and Negro music; surrealist art, cubism, and dadaism were among the prohibited genres. At the formal dedication of the chamber of culture in mid-November in the

Berlin Philharmonie eaten liberalism fit Germany, America nominating Goebb Göring. 'While Hitler Dodd, 'Goebbels is radio, publications, ganda machine.'⁴⁵

The Press Law (1933) established the principle that editors must possess proper qualification literally as a composition in journalism.⁴⁷ Those replacing Redakteure Jews were excluded "Poulette", wrote E von Huhn, 'has been an overdose of Vero

GOEBBELS had always moved swiftly both members. In May 1933 general manager of setting up a film organization no Jews were industry's chamber films on which non-

Under his patronage perhaps because of, on them—the inflation fell on hard times—on Goebbels after 1933 related bawdy tales (as the victims, and catinness would distort Only one actress, though (and still does);⁵¹ or example that actress by going to bed with unfavorably about that she would confide to me. I almost hated her

Five years younger, snow-capped mount freshly arrived as gau of her film *The Sacred*

Aug 14

Aug 24

1933

BONFIRE OF THE BOOKS 171

Berlin Philharmonic Hall Goebbels declared the old decadent, worm-eaten liberalism finished.⁴⁴ In an analysis of the 'ruling trio' in Nazi Germany, American ambassador William E. Dodd had no hesitation in nominating Goebbels as Hitler's 'first lieutenant,' ranking even above Göring. 'While Hitler is a fair orator as German oratory goes,' stated Dodd, 'Goebbels is a past master. He . . . has combined all the newspaper, radio, publications, and art activities of Germany into one vast propaganda machine.'⁴⁵

The Press Law (Schriftleitergesetz) enacted on October 4, 1933 abolished the principle of anonymous journalism.⁴⁶ It made journalists and their editors personally responsible for their writings. Henceforth the proper qualifications had to be earned either on the shop floor, starting literally as a compositor's apprentice, or on an approved university course in journalism.⁴⁷ The editor became a Schriftleiter, a true German word replacing Redakteur, which to Goebbels' sensitive ear had a Jewish ring. Jews were excluded here too, often with mortal consequences. 'My dear "Poulette",' wrote Bella Fromm in her diary, referring to journalist Vera von Huhn, 'has been so upset, as she's not wholly Aryan, that she's taken an overdose of Veronal. I am at my wit's end.'⁴⁸

GOEBBELS had always taken a close interest in the film industry. He moved swiftly both to expand it and to impose Nazi constraints on its members. In May 1933 he reached agreement with Dr Ludwig Klitzsch, general manager of the largest studio, Universum Film AG (Ufa), about setting up a film credit bank initially financed by the ministry.⁴⁹ Once again no Jews were allowed in the industry, and on October 19 the industry's chamber announced that it would not pass for exhibition any films on which non-members had worked.⁵⁰

Under his patronage the German film industry bloomed. Despite, or perhaps because of, the treasures that he and his ministry had lavished on them—the inflated salaries, the pensions, and the handouts when they fell on hard times—its members almost unanimously heaped calumnies on Goebbels after 1945. Secure in the knowledge that he was dead, they related bawdy tales of blackmail and rape in the hope of being regarded as the victims, and not the beneficiaries, of the Nazi reign. Cant and cattiness would distort the image of a man who was, admittedly, no saint. Only one actress, the beautiful Lida Baarova, would speak well of him (and still does);⁵¹ others would spread malicious gossip, charging for example that actress and director Leni Riefenstahl 'only made the grade by going to bed with Goebbels.' In self-defense Riefenstahl too talked unfavorably about the minister. 'I always was in bad standing with him,' she would confide to her captors. 'He was cold and forbidding toward me. I almost hated him.'⁵²

Five years younger than Goebbels, Leni Riefenstahl starred mostly in snow-capped mountain dramas. By her published account Goebbels, freshly arrived as gauleiter in Berlin, had hung around the 1926 première of her film *The Sacred Mountain* hoping for a glimpse of her; by his own

Oct 4

May

Oct 19

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May 16, 1933

diary's testimony, he saw her in 1929 starring in the mountaineering film *Piz Palü*, and found her a 'delightful child.'⁵³ He probably met her at Magda's society gatherings at Reichskanzler Platz in the autumn of 1932. In her memoirs she relates sharing a train journey to Munich with him in November 1932; he talked for hours of power struggles and homosexuality, before taking her along to see Hitler speak the next day. In his diary, Goebbels wrote of this train journey: 'Long talk with Mr Schnee.... He traveled to Munich with me and wants to speak with Hitler here. Arrived dead tired.' It is probably not too fanciful to suspect that his 'Mr Snow' was none other than Leni Riefenstahl.⁵⁴

Whatever ardor may have been concealed by the use of the pseudonym faded rapidly thereafter. In her 1987 memoirs she provided a lurid description of Dr Goebbels visiting her late in 1932 and forcing his attentions on her—of him kneeling before her weeping, of her crying out, 'Go, Herr Doctor, go!'⁵⁵ On Christmas Eve, so her narrative continues, Goebbels arrived unannounced with two gifts for her—a red leather-bound first edition of *Mein Kampf* and a bronze Goebbels medallion. 'I am so lonely,' he moaned, explaining that Magda had just been rushed to the clinic: 'I fear for her life.'⁵⁶

Human memory of course plays harmless tricks. It suppresses, elides, compresses, and inflates. But there was more. In May 1933, her memoirs relate, Goebbels persuaded her to drive him deep into the Grunewald woods, where he showed her his pistol ('I don't leave home without it') and then made a pass at her as she drove her car in a slippery slalom around the rain-lashed trees; as he put his arm around her waist, the car hit a hummock and slithered to a halt, its wheels spinning. What had he intended? What indeed had she? The vehicle now immobilized, he limped off distraught in one direction, suggesting she head in the other.⁵⁷

The Goebbels Diaries, not always a monument to truthfulness, made no reference to any such undignified episodes. They did however report continued interviews and discussions with 'L. Riefenstahl' of a frequency now difficult to reconcile with the bodice-ripping tenor of her memoirs. She told him on May 16 of her production plans; he suggested a film on Hitler himself; Leni, 'inspired,' accompanied the Goebbelses to *Madame Butterfly* that evening. A few days later she picnicked with him and Hitler at Heiligendamm.⁵⁸ Magda told her privately that she had married Dr Goebbels only so as to be near to Hitler.⁵⁹ What of Leni's politics? 'She is the only one of all the stars,' wrote Goebbels that summer, 'who understands us.'⁶⁰ Her name often cropped up in the diary, and in mid-August she spent the night at Heiligendamm with the Goebbelses again.⁶¹ Given all of this it is hard to visualize the further scene which her memoirs now describe—Goebbels invited her over that summer to suggest a film on the power of the press: He lunged at her breast, she dragged herself free, ran to the door and found a bell: By which she was saved.⁶² That September she made her first great film of the party's annual Nuremberg rally, a masterpiece which would be surpassed only by her second such film, 'Triumph of the Will.'

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ALL of this is not to say that Dr Goebbels does not stray from the path of marital fidelity at all. He certainly dallied with Ello Quandt, Magda's unhappily married sister-in-law.⁶³ Signing autographs at the Berlin S.A.'s sports festival that summer, Goebbels points his pencil at a particular blonde. 'Find out her name,' he whispers to his adjutant. Police HQ provide the data he needs, and a few days later she is glimpsed traipsing down the red-carpeted marble staircase from the minister's private quarters.⁶⁴

Relations with Magda are strained. She has accepted the post of honorary patron to the Reich Fashion Bureau. It brings her into contact with the Jews of Germany's rag trade. When he orders Magda to resign, she sulks, and refuses to go down to the annual Bayreuth festival with him. 'If Magda doesn't mend her ways,' he grimly records, 'I'll have to draw some conclusions.' Hitler sends his private plane to fetch her. She makes her grand appearance after Act One, and the Führer negotiates a truce between them. A true pal, reflects Goebbels: 'He agrees with me,' he adds, 'women have no place in public life.'⁶⁵ After Wagner's *Valkyries* on July 25 the minister is summoned by phone to visit a Baltic baroness waiting at the festival restaurant. 'A fabulous woman,' sighs Hitler, and explains: 'The bolsheviks nailed her husband to the door of his house.' She has donated her fortune to the party. Now she wants to introduce Dr Goebbels to a friendly princess; the latter alas turns out to be a corpulent and elderly dowager. Since he makes no secret of his lack of interest, the princess declaims to Hitler loud enough for all the room to hear, 'Excuse me, mein Führer, but tell me: What do you think about adultery?' Cringing, Goebbels comments in his diary on how unpleasant Bayreuth has become.⁶⁶

On August 1 he exchanges his well-tailored party uniform for a white summer suit and begins a seaside vacation with Magda at Heiligendamm. He likes to nurse his Latin tan—even in winter he uses a sun lamp—but frowns on women who use such artificial aids. Once, sitting in his beach basket, he lectures the scantily clad beauties who swarm around him: 'The German woman does not bleach her hair.' The girls suppress astonished chuckles. He has not detected that his own wife is not a natural blonde. 'Since when have you worn lipstick, my sweetest,' he once asks her. 'Always,' she replies. (He does not believe her.)⁶⁷

Leni Riefenstahl describes one scene which rings very true. At the chancellery one day Hitler commands her to report on progress with her film on the 1933 rally. She has filmed a few thousand meters of wooden, unconvincing footage of the event, but protests to Hitler that Goebbels and the party, who have their own agenda, have placed every possible obstacle in her way. Humiliated, Goebbels bawls at her afterward: 'If you were a man, I would throw you down the stairs.'⁶⁸ Working now at the party's command she completes the editing of this film, *Victory of Faith*, and is paid a director's fee of twenty thousand marks from ministry funds. The hour-long movie has its première at the Ufa Palace on the first day of December 1933, then vanishes for the next sixty years.

Sept 22, 1933

174 III: THE REICH MINISTER

THAT summer Dr Goebbels organized an outing of thousands of automobiles along the land corridor through Poland to East Prussia. It was a clever propaganda exercise; the summer drive through Poland to this amputated German province with its rolling farmland where the famous Trakehnen thoroughbred horses were raised and its gaily decorated German towns like Rastenburg and Gumbinnen—names that still had to find their shivering niche in history—was not without effect on the foreign journalists.⁶⁹

Tightening his grip on the press that September he brought all advertising under the control of one advertising council, the Werberat. 'All advertising must be true,' his guidelines laid down. More importantly in a country swamped with six thousand different newspaper titles, he enforced the first elements of standardization to enable even the smallest businesses to profit from advertising, using standard-size matrices.⁷⁰ Newspapers were also ordered to publish honest circulation figures. These and other commonsense regulations would long outlive him in modern Germany.

He also limped briefly onto the stage of international diplomacy. The League of Nations disarmament conference was to resume in Geneva, Switzerland, on September 22. Konstantin von Neurath, Hitler's foreign minister, suggested that Goebbels accompany the German delegation to explain and justify his anti-Jewish measures.⁷¹ On the eve of departure Goebbels told reporters: 'Germany does not want war. Indeed, we are in no condition for one.'⁷² Leaving by air from Rüdelsheim the next day he pointed out, 'It is the "pacifist" nations which always prepare for the next war.' On the phone, Hitler advised him to deliver a cautious speech, and Goebbels did as he was told. He dressed impeccably in a suit and striped tie just like the others; interpreter Paul Schmidt marveled at the speed with which the Nazi agitator adopted the local argot—within hours of his arrival he was speaking with all the oleaginous ease of a practiced Geneva diplomat.⁷³

At the suggestion of Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker, Hitler's envoy to Switzerland and one of the oiliest of them all, Goebbels was invited to meet lawyers and academic dignitaries. A professor of economics questioned the Führer Principle. 'You are probably a reservist,' Goebbels argued. 'If an enemy barrage is beginning, the *Führerprinzip* is your only salvation. We Germans are under that barrage.'⁷⁴ The mood toward him was initially frosty. For various reasons Goebbels decided to address only a press conference and not the general assembly. Although the French urged a boycott, three hundred journalists turned up to hear him in the mirrored salon of the Carlton Palace hotel. Nobody applauded when he rose, and very few when he finished speaking. This was not Nazi Germany. In his two-hour speech, pronounced in a serious, baritone voice, he reviewed the Nazi 'revolution' and claimed that eighty percent would vote for Hitler in an election now. Justifying the concentration camps which the Nazis had set up, he invited any foreigner to inspect them

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Turning to the Jewish problem, he trotted out the familiar figures about how the Jews dominated the medical and legal professions in Berlin, with similar figures for the press, literature, theater, cinema, stock exchange, and Reichstag. 'By settling the Jewish problem legally,' he argued, 'the German government has opted for the most humane method.' Nobody, he waspishly pointed out, had offered to absorb Germany's Jewish refugees.⁷⁵

A Polish woman journalist challenged him on Nazi Germany's lack of freedom of expression. 'You can't write what you want either,' retorted Goebbels, baring his teeth into a smile. 'But only what your publisher allows.'⁷⁶

The French foreign minister Joseph Paul-Boncour was impressed by the contrast between Goebbels' gleaming eyes and elegant gestures, and his misshapen physique.⁷⁷ Baron Kurt von Stutterheim, the *Berliner Tageblatt's* former London correspondent, told Anthony Eden that Goebbels reminded him of the Irish rebel leaders during the Troubles. 'There is a strong fanatical strain in him.'⁷⁸ All in all Baron von Weizsäcker felt that Goebbels had done a good job.⁷⁹

Sept 1933

22: Twilight of the Gods and Tally-ho

ON ONE DAY that September of 1933 twenty thousand well-drilled schoolchildren formed up in a Berlin stadium into a map of Germany, while clusters of smiling children standing outside represented the lost German provinces of Memel, Danzig, and the Saar. At a given signal Germany's frontiers opened to engulf these communities abroad, and the whole mass melted into a giant swastika. Germany, Goebbels told the youthful audience, wanted peace.¹ At a ceremony marking the 250th anniversary of the first German settlement in America he spoke of a new era of understanding between nations.² 'I am calling over the Rhine,' he said at Bad Honnef a few days later, gesturing toward France. 'We want peace. We are ready to expunge the past.'³ That October, Hitler took Germany out of the League of Nations. On November 12 after a typical Goebbels propaganda drive ninety-three percent of the German electorate voted their approval.

Nov 12

A campaign of anti-Nazi Big Lies began—many of them uncomfortably close to the truth. In London, the *Saturday Review* published a forged article, attributed to Goebbels, demanding the revision of the east German border at Poland's expense.⁴ In France, the *Petit Parisien* reproduced instructions which Goebbels had allegedly issued to his propaganda offices overseas, backing up these territorial claims; these too were a forgery.⁵ Fighting back, Goebbels took up an idea which the party's propaganda office had already mooted as a fund-raising gimmick in 1932, an *anti*-Comintern, as the counterpart of the Comintern, the Soviet Union's international subversion agency. 'The Moscow Jews,' wrote Dr Eberhard Taubert, head of his anti-communist section, in a later overview explaining Goebbels' tactics, 'had to be defeated with their own weapons.'⁶ Taubert's anti-Comintern plugged the seductive line that bolshevism was a Jewish swindle aiming for world domination, and that Hitler was the only remaining obstacle. With the trial of the alleged Reichstag arsonists approaching, Goebbels told Taubert to publish documentation alleging that the communists had been plotting a *coup d'état*; the book, *Armed Uprising*, appeared a week before the Leipzig trial.

The Reichstag fire trial confronted Goebbels with a difficult conundrum. At the beginning of September a left-wing propaganda cell in Paris had published a convincing *Brown Book of the Hitler Terror* accusing him and Göring of burning down the Reichstag, and listing 250 people allegedly murdered by the Nazis since then. One such alleged victim was

Dr Ernst Oberföhrer, who had led his own life in Munich, and was now a murderer to silence that Moscow lay. Leipzig to Berlin. Dr Goebbels for to her beautiful a black chapeau vigorously as he noted, in an extenuation the word *absurd* that no other version. 'I cannot conceive the preparation often the common Rooms battle, the Wessel as a pimple.

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Operating through Goebbels began, beginning

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Dr Ernst Oberföhrer, a D.N.V.P. politician (who had actually taken his own life in May).⁷ The book claimed that Goebbels had ordered his murder to silence him. He set his propaganda the task of establishing that Moscow lay behind the blaze. On October 10 the court came from Leipzig to Berlin to hear testimony. Göring testified on November 4, and Dr Goebbels four days later. Magda, with eye-shadow discreetly applied to her beautiful eyes and her blonde Aryan tresses gathered up beneath a black chapeau, as a court observer wrote in his notes that day, applauded vigorously as her husband testified: He did so, the same expert observer noted, in an extraordinarily suggestive manner—thus, when he appended the word *absurd* to a train of thought he did so in such a persuasive manner that no other verdict seemed conceivable.⁸ 'As a layman,' Goebbels stated, 'I cannot conceive how just one individual could carry out and execute the preparations for such an arson attack.' He reminded the court how often the communists had lied during the years of struggle—the Pharus Rooms battle, the drowning of Hans Küttemeyer, the defaming of Horst Wessel as a pimp, the Goebbels-Ulbricht debate.

The ultra-civilized word-duel that ensued between Ernst Torgler and Goebbels showed how similar their intellects were, as they banded rival quotations about the nature of revolutions. His clash with Torgler's fellow defendant the Bulgarian agitator Georgii Dimitroff was less urbane. After one stinging rebuff, Goebbels replied with a quotation from Schopenhauer: 'Every man deserves to be looked at. But he does not deserve to be spoken to!' (The quotation had been recommended to him in a letter tossed into his open Mercedes by an anonymous well-wisher the day before.)⁹

'I shall expect a loyal hearing from the foreign press,' Goebbels said, concluding his personal defense in terms of injured innocence, 'and I hope they will find space in their columns for this detailed rebuttal; because it is not right that the government of a decent, diligent, and honorable people should be smeared before the whole world like this.'¹⁰

WITH the domestic German press he had fewer qualms. His new press law kept the journalists tightly muzzled, although it was not without its positive elements as well. It imposed on journalists a duty to report truthfully and to refrain from writing anything that might 'injure illegally anybody's honor or well-being, or damage his reputation or hold him up to ridicule or contempt.'

Like all such attempts to regiment the liberal professions, ludicrous situations developed. The chamber of literature addressed warning letters to the Brothers Grimm for not having filled in membership forms (they had been dead for eighty years).¹¹ One Nazi censor banned an advertisement because it showed a girl clutching a bar of soap to a part of her anatomy 'which could not be identified for reasons of decency.'¹²

Operating through Max Winkler, who had a shrewd business brain, Goebbels began to buy up or close down printing and newspaper concerns, beginning with Hugenberg's Verlagsanstalt ('Vera') and Ullstein,

Oct 10

the big Jewish-controlled newspaper publisher in Berlin.¹³ The Reich paid 8.5 million marks for Ullstein's stock, including two millions to liquidate Ullstein's debts. Goebbels renamed it Deutscher Verlag, and purged its recalcitrant editors.¹⁴ When Ehm Welk, editor of the Ullstein magazine *Grüne Post*, took too literally Goebbels' invitation to criticize, the minister shut the publication down for three months and removed Welk to one of Göring's new concentration camps.¹⁵ Through Winkler, Goebbels also squared accounts with the Jewish Mosse publishing empire, whose *Berliner Tageblatt* had been one of his most dedicated enemies. Real-estate speculation had landed the owner Lachmann Mosse in financial difficulties and he had already fled to Paris before Hitler seized power; the sequestrators were more than pleased to sell off the *Tageblatt* to Goebbels after they found that Mosse had plundered his employees' pension funds. Winkler also acquired for him by more or less forceful methods the share capital of the non-Jewish *Börsenzeitung*, the Frankfurt *Generalanzeiger*, and Hugo Stinnes' *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.¹⁶

GOEBBELS' marriage is still faltering. On New Year's Day 1934 he decides that it's all over between them; but he relents because she is pregnant again.¹⁷

He has all but forgotten Anka Stalherm. At the 1933 Nuremberg rally he spotted her insufferable husband Mumme, now a middle-rank party dignitary.¹⁸ But now they are divorced and Goebbels hears she is going to the dogs—'Lost!' he records, 'What a comedown!' On his birthday, greetings come from her; in a typed reply, he mechanically suggests she drop in some time.¹⁹ The magic has gone. Besides, as overlord of Germany's burgeoning film industry he has legions of willing, supple starlets like Marianne Hoppe²⁰ and Käthe Dorsch²¹ at his beck and call. He will follow the rest of Anka's story with only half an eye. 'Frau Mumme tells me her woes,' he writes years later. 'She is to be pitied. But what can one do?'²² She remarries; her husband dies in action. Taking pity on her Goebbels has her appointed editor of the fashion magazine *Dame*. In an editorial she will fondly mention the book of ballads that the minister lovingly inscribed for her as a fellow student at Heidelberg, by Heinrich Heine, the Jew. Goebbels has her reduced to the ranks as a mere staff writer.²³

During 1933 he has earned 4,317 marks (about a thousand dollars) from his seven books in print.²⁴ He is almost pathologically proper in personal money matters. He draws his salaries as minister and gauleiter but claims only his proper expense entitlements, not charging Magda's car or their household overheads against the ministry. His tailoring is equally punctilious. Gone is his clothes' slept-in look. He polishes his shoes himself. He takes delivery of a motor yacht, and belatedly learns how to drive a car as well.²⁵ 'I'll get the hang of it soon,' he writes confidently in his unpublished diary on April 6. 'It's just the details that still elude me.' At Easter 1934, as the time for Magda's confinement

approaches, Wannsee lak now, and the Goebbels me Fiedler on b them back to 12 after a far birth of their open the nex Hilde. At firs Once more t task of break Schaumburg the minister, coming!' He happy surrou

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released from the S.S. . . . The selection standards required a certificate of good conduct from the police. It was required that people be able to prove that they led a decent life and performed their duty in their profession. No unemployed persons or people who were unwilling to work were accepted.

For Heydrich, the S.S. already represented the nucleus of a secret police once the Party came to power. As Reitlinger has pointed out, an official political police already existed in both Berlin and Munich, and when the great police purge came after 30 January many men in this secret service remained to serve the Nazis; among them for example was Heinrich Mueller, who later became head of the Gestapo before he had in fact become a Party member. Affidavits read at the Nuremberg Trial make it clear that the S.D. was well prepared with its screenings of the members of the Political Police in Munich, which was known as Department VI of the Police Organization. Most of them were immediately absorbed into the service of Himmler when he was appointed President of Police in Munich by Hitler, a very minor office compared with that given to Göring who, in addition to his Cabinet rank and Presidency of the Reichstag, became also Minister of the Interior for the state of Prussia. This appointment gave Göring charge of the police in what was by far the largest and most influential state administration in Germany. Göring immediately used his authority to place the Berlin S.S. leader, Kurt Daluge, at the head of the Prussian police, and appointed Rudolf Diels, a police official married to his cousin, Ilse Göring, as head of the section of political police that he created, the Berlin Police Bureau 1A, which was later to be renamed the Gestapo. Daluge at this stage was wholly under the influence of Göring and refused even to receive Heydrich, who went to Berlin to see him on Himmler's behalf on 15 March. Daluge, young, bland and opportunist without either intelligence or conscience, had reached the rank of an S.S. general by the age of twenty-nine. Before joining the S.S., he had been in charge of refuse disposal for the City Engineer. Now he had to use his wits to steer his way through the conflicting currents of his superiors' struggle for power.¹³

In the months immediately following Hitler's Chancellorship, it was Göring, not Himmler, who was the principal activator of police control. He poured his prodigious energy into the defeat of the remnants of democracy in Germany and into the rout of the Com-

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munists, the Party's chosen enemy in the Reichstag and in the streets. Speed was ~~what mattered~~, and the use of violence and terror to break up the forces of resistance ~~before they could realize what was happening and oppose this sudden, savage onslaught by rallying themselves to out-vote Hitler in the elections due on 5 March.~~ Within a week the Prussian Parliament was dissolved; within a month unreliable police chiefs and civil servants alike were dismissed and replaced, and the police, both new and old, were armed; 'a bullet fired from the barrel of a police pistol is my bullet', cried Göring. To stop disorders, either real or imagined, Göring commandeered 25,000 men from the S.A. and 10,000 from the S.S. and armed them to supplement the activities of the police; the Communist leaders were arrested and their party virtually put out of action before the elections could be fought. In February, the night of the Reichstag fire, both Hitler and Göring declared that a Communist putsch had been imminent and that the fire was a beacon from heaven with which to blaze the trail of the Communist traitors. On 28 February the clauses of the constitution guaranteeing civil liberties were suspended, and anyone could be placed without trial under 'protective custody'. At the polls the Nazis secured only a bare majority along with their allies the Nationalists, but with the Reichstag stripped of its Communist deputies Hitler was able to put through an Enabling Bill on 23 March which gave him power to govern by means of emergency decrees.

Action of this order was scarcely in Himmler's nature. When it was decided that the Catholic Conservative government in Munich should be removed, it was the S.A. under the Ritter von Epp, the friend of Roehm, who dismissed them on 8 March. Himmler, the Bavarian President of Police, was by-passed. In the same month, Göring set up his first concentration camps in Prussia under the supervision of Diels, and in April segregated his political police in their own headquarters in the Prinz Albrechtstrasse in Berlin. In January they became known officially as the Geheime Staatspolizei, the Secret State Police, or Gestapo for short. This was a first significant move towards centralization in the police control of the state, and it was a warning to Himmler, whose autonomy still lay only in Bavaria.

Between April 1933 and April of the following year, Himmler took his own devious but independent line of action. Heydrich had become head of the Bavarian secret police and of the S.S. Security

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Office. Himmler established his own model concentration camp at Dachau, parallel with those created by Göring and others which were set up elsewhere, both semi-officially and unofficially by the S.S., the S.A. and the Nazi Gauleiters, who had been hurried into office in the various *Gaue*, or regions, into which Germany was divided for Nazi administration. At Nuremberg Göring claimed that he closed those unauthorized camps that came to his notice and where, he gathered, brutalities were practised. A camp founded by the S.S. near Osnabrück led to active friction between Himmler and Göring, whose investigators, led by Diels, claimed they were fired upon by the S.S. guards when they were sent to find out what was happening. Himmler was forced to close the camp on direct orders from Hitler. Göring's intervention was largely dictated by his desire at this time to become the co-ordinator of police activities throughout Germany. That he failed was due to the persistent ambition of Himmler to improve his personal position and the desire of Roehm to merge the large forces of the S.A. into those of the regular army with himself as Supreme Commander, a situation which neither Göring nor Hitler would tolerate.

To control his camp at Dachau, Himmler established a volunteer formation of S.S. men willing to undertake long-term service as camp guards. This central formation was called the Death's Head (*Totenkopf*) unit and granted the special insignia of the skull and crossbones; the officer put in command of this and other Death's Head units was Theodor Eicke, a former Army officer and veteran of the First World War, who was one of Himmler's most trusted adherents on racial matters. One of Eicke's guards at Dachau was an Austrian, Adolf Eichmann; another in 1934 was Rudolf Hoess, later to take charge of extermination of the Jews at Auschwitz.

Hoess - another man, like Goebbels and Heydrich, at one time intended for the Catholic priesthood - had been a soldier during the 1914-18 war, and later joined the Free Corps.¹⁴ He had been involved in a brutal political murder and imprisoned for six years before becoming a Nazi after his release and joining the S.S. This extraordinary man, so dutiful and even intelligently moralizing in his attitude, wrote his memoirs in confinement after the Hitler war and explained in great detail his relations with Himmler. He had belonged to the idealistic agricultural organization called the *Artamanen*, a nationalist youth movement which was dedicated to the cultivation of the soil and the avoidance of city life. It was through

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this that he claims he first came to know Himmler, who, in June 1934 at an S.S. review in Stettin, invited him to join the staff in Dachau, where in December he held the rank of corporal in the Death's Head Guards.

Dachau, Himmler's experimental concentration camp, was established by an order signed by him as Police President of Munich on 21 March, and authorized by the Catholic supporter of the Nazis, Heinrich Held, the Prime Minister of Bavaria, a few days before his forcible expulsion by the S.A. The order, which appeared in the Munich *Neueste Nachrichten* on the day it was signed, read:

'On Wednesday 22 March, the first concentration camp will be opened near Dachau. It will accommodate 5,000 prisoners. Planning on such a scale, we refused to be influenced by any petty objection, since we are convinced this will reassure all those who have regard for the nation and serve their interests.

Heinrich Himmler

Acting Police President of the City of Munich'

Dachau, which was situated about twelve miles north-west of Munich, became a permanent centre of sanction by the Nazis against the German people and all those whom Hitler was later to subject. In the first unbridled period of power, the seizure of men and women for interrogation, often under torture, by the S.S. and the S.A. grew out of hand, and by Christmas 1933 Hitler found it necessary to announce an amnesty for 27,000 prisoners. No one now knows how many were in fact freed, and Himmler was later to boast that he succeeded in persuading Hitler to omit any prisoners in Dachau from the amnesty.

The order for protective custody was as brief as the order establishing Dachau; it read: 'Based on Article I of the Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State of February 28 1933, you are taken into protective custody in the interest of public security and order. Reason: suspicion of activities inimical to the State.'

Göring was quite open about the reason for establishing the camps: 'We had to deal ruthlessly with these enemies of the State . . . Thus the Concentration Camps were created to which we had to send first thousands of functionaries of the Communist and Social Democratic parties.' Frick was later to define protective custody as 'a coercive measure of the Secret State Police . . . in order to

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counter all aspirations of enemies of the people and the State.¹⁵

Göring's barbarous vigour was one aspect of Nazi cruelty; Himmler's attention to the details of brutality was another. Almost twenty years separate us from the full exposure of what happened in the concentration camps, and no documentation could be more complete, ranging from the testimony given by thousands of persecuted men and women who managed to survive, to the detailed witness of such men as Hoess and Eichmann, Himmler's agents in the most fearful record of torture, destruction and despair that human history has ever compiled in such thorough and horrifying detail. While Göring as a man was no more brutal than many other oppressors in the evolutionary struggle of modern Europe, the coldly punitive administration of sadism by Himmler challenges comprehension. Yet it is necessary to understand him, not least because there will always exist human beings who, once they are given a similar power over others and have similar convictions of superiority, may be tempted to act as he did.

Himmler had learned to live and work by regulations, and on 1 November 1933, the rules governing life and death in Dachau were completed by Eicke under Himmler's exacting direction. The legalistic phrasing, the comfortable work of men sitting at desks as Himmler so often sat, covers with a bureaucratic gloss the acts of terrorism which the careful rules incite. For example:

'The term commitment to a concentration camp is to be openly announced as "until further notice" . . . In certain cases the Reichsführer S.S. and Chief of the German Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a concentration camp . . . In this case, too, there is no objection to spreading the rumour of this increased punishment . . . to add to the deterrent effect. Naturally, particularly suitable and reliable people are to be chosen for spreading of such news.

'The following offenders, considered as agitators will be hanged: anyone who . . . makes inciting speeches and holds meetings, forms cliques, loiters around with others; who for the purpose of supplying the propaganda of the opposition with atrocity stories, collects true or false information about the concentration camp . . .'¹⁶

Himmler's secret pursuit of power began outside Prussia, where he realized Göring was omnipotent. Roehm, watchful of the situa-

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tion, realized that Himmler and Heydrich formed a powerful team and would not be content with the minor place in the Nazi state which had been allotted to them; he decided it might be wise not to alienate the leaders of the S.S. By the summer Göring's initial energy was spent, and his pleasure-loving nature, combined with the desire to accumulate other positions of importance under Hitler, led him to slacken his control over his subordinates, who were more directly involved in the struggle for supremacy developing between the S.A., the S.S. and the Gestapo. Daluge, Göring's Chief of Police, had by now decided to keep in touch with Munich.

Artur Nebe was the principal S.S. man among the many working in the Gestapo; Diels claims Nebe was spying on him for Heydrich, and that Karl Ernst, Roehm's Chief of Staff of the Berlin S.A., was actually threatening his life until Roehm ordered him to desist and suggested to Diels he had better join the S.S. for his own self protection. The opportunity to do so came after an S.S. raid on Diels's flat had led to an open breach between Göring and Himmler, which they had the good sense to heal at a meeting in Berlin. Diels was placated with an honorary commission in the S.S. But this did not save him from having to escape in October from threatened arrest by the S.S. on an order, he claimed, issued by Göring himself. This happened after Göring had been shown evidence prepared by Heydrich of Diels's anti-Nazi activities before his adoption by Göring.

Whether Diels was telling the truth or not, his story is important because it reveals the gradual growth in stature of Heydrich and Himmler in the eyes of the men in Berlin. Germany consisted of many semi-autonomous states both large and small, of which Bavaria, where Hitler's Nazi faction had originated, was now second only to Prussia in importance. Himmler knew as well as Göring that Hitler wanted to unify the control of Germany, and as a reward for his supreme efficiency in Bavaria he asked the Führer to extend his powers in the remaining states of Germany. In the race to build single police-states, Göring had made a powerful initial spurt, but he lacked the staying-power to win. From October, Himmler began to gather for himself the offices of Chief of the Political Police in the remaining states of Germany, completing the process by March in the following year.¹⁷

This assimilation of special powers in the German states through acquiring the office of Commander of Political Police was illegal

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because Frick, the Nazi Minister of the Interior, was never consulted, in spite of the fact that the provincial governments were responsible to the Ministry of the Interior for their police administration. To cover his activities, Himmler always declared himself the servant of the provincial governments when, after parading the local S.S. formations in order to intimidate the officials, he assumed his new command on their behalf. Frick, in the face of Hitler's policy of the gradual centralization of power, was all but helpless to defend his own rights as Minister against these obvious encroachments by Himmler into his area of responsibility. According to the anti-Nazi Gisevius, he roused himself to forbid the states to create further offices without his direct consent, but Himmler circumvented this by forcing the finance ministers of the provincial governments to subsidize his S.S. formations and the concentration camps in their area. In one way or another, Himmler built up the network of his powers until the web spread over the whole of Germany with the exception of Göring's Prussia.

At the same time, during the autumn of 1933, Heydrich had established in Berlin, in open defiance of Göring, a section of the S.D. at premises in Eichen-Allee, and in November Gregor Strasser, who had once been Himmler's employer, made his celebrated pun in a note sent to Hans Frank: 'Hitler seems to be entirely in the hands of his Himmlers and *Anhimmlers* (adorers).' Nevertheless, it was Roehm who received official promotion to Hitler's Cabinet in December 1933, a step which so alarmed Göring that it made him carefully reconsider his future relationship with Himmler.

Gisevius, at that time still an official in the Gestapo, has described how he became involved in the intrigues between Daluge, Diels and Heydrich. In February 1934 he was invited, to use a polite term, to attend a conference at the barracks of the S.S. *Leibstandarte* in Lichtenfelde along with Nebe. They went, thinking their last hour had come; to their surprise, they were greeted by Dietrich, Commandant of the *Leibstandarte*, with flattering messages from Himmler and Heydrich. Their stand against corruption in the Gestapo was specially commended, and they were invited to sit down there and then and write a report of their 'grievances', as Dietrich put it. They did so, recording many instances of 'extortion, torture and killing'. As Gisevius puts it: 'It was always a favourite S.S. tactic to appear in the guise of respectable citizens and to condemn vigorously all excesses, lies or infringements of the law. Himmler,

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when talking to a small group, sounded like the stoutest crusader for decency, cleanliness, and justice. Undoubtedly Himmler believed in his mission, like a strict schoolmaster, while Heydrich went on filling his files for the final assault on the citadel of Prussia.

To emphasize the need for the co-ordination of the political police under a single authority, Heydrich made use of a report from one of his agents that a Communist plot was forming, quite unknown to Göring's Gestapo, to murder Göring. Arrests were made before either Göring or Hitler was informed, and Himmler used the plot to press the Führer to place the whole police force of Germany under the control of the S.S. After some hesitation, Hitler agreed, and with Göring's consent the Prussian Ministry of the Interior was merged with the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and its political police, including the Gestapo, placed under Himmler as the new head of the national secret police force. To soften the transfer of power, Göring as Prime Minister of Prussia remained nominally responsible, but on 10 April he addressed the assembled Gestapo in the presence of Himmler and Heydrich, explaining to them that Himmler would in future take charge of their work as his deputy. He ordered them to support Himmler in the struggle against the enemies of the State, while Himmler in his turn protested his loyalty and gratitude in an excess of delighted subservience. 'I shall forever remain loyal to you. Never will you have anything to fear from me', he declared. On 20 April 1934 Himmler formally took over the Gestapo, with Heydrich as his deputy. The links in the chain of office were now complete.

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INTRODUCTION

more convenient to regard them now as outside the pale of humanity. The thousands of men and women who worked with them were for the most part their admirers or their willing colleagues, while the influential Europeans and Americans who either actively favoured them or else tolerated them as a rather grim necessity in European politics who should not be opposed by any show of force, are not so far removed from those who actively cheered them in the streets.

The Nazi Party, as Alan Bullock has pointed out in his admirable biography of Hitler, had no political philosophy; their attitude to power was solely that it was something to be won by any means that could be improvised, irrespective of the moral issues involved. It was Hitler's utter unscrupulousness in handling the political leaders of other countries that preyed on their weakness and took a contemptuous advantage of their traditional sense of values in diplomacy. This lack of scruple is by no means uncommon in many human activities. Indeed, his unscrupulous brilliance was the very aspect of Hitler's character that excited widespread popular admiration and sympathy between 1933 and 1938, both inside and outside Germany.

The nature of the régime and of the public reaction to it sprang directly from the characters of the men who created it. Though this is in a sense true of all régimes, none in recent history has been so hastily and casually constructed as Hitler's Third Reich. Both policy and administration were largely concocted as a result of the individual whims of the various leaders, and of intuitive decisions taken at random in response to the mood of the moment or an urgent need to out-smart some opponent. The sufferings of the German people and those they were led to inflict on others twenty years ago were largely the result of the personal psychology of Hitler and of the three men whose lives we have attempted to reconstruct and interpret.

In each case we have tried to approach the task of writing these biographies with as little prejudice as possible. We have described in turn the development of Goebbels, Göring and Himmler through their childhood and adolescence; we have shown how they came to join the Nazi Party and discussed the particular contribution they made to it during its early formative period. There could scarcely have been three more different men than these in temperament and social background, nor could the particular parts they played in supporting Hitler during the years of his power have been more divergent. It has been a profound and at times a shattering experience to retread the familiar path of German history from 1923

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was the friend and employer of Hitler's other economic adviser, Walther Funk, disciple of Schacht. The *Börsenzeitung*, founded to serve German stock-exchange interests, had become a mouth-piece of the Reichswehr; it had conducted the press campaign which had overthrown first Groener and then Brüning. If Stuepnagel became Reichswehr Minister, Hitler would not demand the chancellorship for the present; he would create no difficulties for a Papen government.

Probably Hitler's most important move in Cologne was to come out for a hands-off industry policy. For in those weeks the struggle between state leadership and private initiative was one of the great subjects of German politics. Hitler sat across the table from Papen and repeated what he had said in hundreds of speeches: that of course the creative personality must have free play in the economic sphere as elsewhere; that of course it had to serve the common welfare. A pathetic utterance — its substance, stated in simple terms, was approximately: Let them make plenty of money, then they'll do what we say.

If Hitler got no definite promises at this meeting, he did obtain an important piece of information. Papen told him that Schleicher possessed no signed order for dissolution of the Reichstag, such as he had possessed. For the Schleicher government had been appointed for the express purpose of bringing about a reconciliation with the Reichstag where Papen had failed. If it could save itself only by dissolving the parliament, it had failed in its aim. Hitler had not been quite clear about the parliamentary nature of the Schleicher government; now he was informed.

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The Cologne conversation probably saved Hitler from bankruptcy. A consortium of heavy industrialists was formed for the purpose of putting National Socialist finances in order. The most important member of this group was Otto Wolff, an industrial leader who up till then had been close to the moderate parties and whose shift made a strong impression on the business world; Fritz Thyssen was also a member. The sum raised to cover the most pressing obligations cannot have been small; 'finances have also improved very suddenly,' noted Goebbels with satisfaction on January 17.

All the same, the Cologne meeting did not in the decline of the National Socialist Party; it did not compromise that was so sorely needed. Schleicher came to the meeting and accused Papen of acting behind his back. Papen replied that, on the contrary, he had been trying to help Hitler, that Hitler was now ready for an understudy. When Papen came out with the suggestion of making Schleicher Reichswehr Minister, Schleicher flatly refused.

And so, from the purely political point of view, Hitler gained the meager knowledge that he could, if he chose, throw Schleicher with the help of the Communists. The result apparently would be a new Papen government. The undisciplined party was continuing to crumble under its own feet. In the Bavarian province of Franconia, the S.A. mutinied, with its group leader Stegmann as leader. Mutineers accused *Gauleiter* Streicher of embezzling the S.A. leadership, and revealed interesting particulars of Streicher's private life, from his 'nude culture' to his dealings with ex-convicts. Röhm was obliged to return in January where he was spending platonic vacation days with his mistress, Wolf Helldorf. With the help of the new funds, the S.A. breaches were hastily mended, a number of officers were bribed and bought back, and the party began to fall after the middle of January soon after the election. Whether the party did not soon come to power was uncertain; whether Schleicher remained a question of life and death.

It still looked as if the National Socialists would receive the blow of Strasser's entrance into the cabinet. Strasser and the National Socialist deputy Kerl were arrested in the state of Lippe; on January 13, Göring announced the terrifying news that Strasser was soon to enter the great success in the Lippe campaign can save us from the present situation,' wrote Goebbels in his diary.

Suddenly another, almost equally dangerous enemy appeared in the rear: Hugenberg. The leader of the Nationalist Party, owner of the largest German newspaper,

ployer of Hitler's other economic adviser, of Schacht. The *Börsenzeitung*, founded exchange interests, had become a mouthpiece. It had conducted the press campaign which opened and then Brüning. If Stuepnagel Minister, Hitler would not demand the chance he would create no difficulties for a Papen

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the promises at this meeting, he did obtain information. Papen told him that Schleicher was for dissolution of the Reichstag, such as the Schleicher government had been apparently of bringing about a reconciliation with Papen had failed. If it could save itself from parliament, it had failed in its aim. Hitler was about the parliamentary nature of the situation when he was informed.

It probably saved Hitler from bankruptcy. A group of heavy industrialists was formed for the National Socialist finances in order. The most important group was Otto Wolff, an industrialist who had been close to the moderate parties and had made a great impression on the business world; Fritz Haber. The sum raised to cover the most important part had not been small; 'finances have also been noted Goebbels with satisfaction on Janu-

All the same, the Cologne meeting did not immediately halt the decline of the National Socialist Party; it did not bring the political compromise that was so sorely needed. Schleicher had got wind of the meeting and accused Papen of acting behind his back. Papen replied that, on the contrary, he had been trying to do him a service, that Hitler was now ready for an understanding. But when Papen came out with the suggestion of making Stuepnagel Reichswehr Minister, Schleicher flatly refused.

And so, from the purely political point of view, Hitler had merely gained the meager knowledge that he could, if he pleased, overthrow Schleicher with the help of the Communists, though the result apparently would be a new Papen government. Meanwhile, the undisciplined party was continuing to crumble away beneath his feet. In the Bavarian province of Franconia, nearly the whole S.A. mutinied, with its group leader Stegmann at its head. The mutineers accused *Gauleiter* Streicher of embezzling funds due to the S.A. leadership, and revealed interesting particulars of Streicher's private life, from his 'nude culture' to his friendships with ex-convicts. Röhm was obliged to return in haste from Capri, where he was spending platonic vacation days with his friend Count Wolf Helldorf. With the help of the new funds, the most dangerous breaches were hastily mended, a number of Stegmann's subordinates were bribed and bought back, and the golden rain that began to fall after the middle of January soon soothed rebellious spirits throughout the country. Whether the calm would last if the party did not soon come to power was uncertain. The speedy fall of Schleicher remained a question of life and death for Hitler.

It still looked as if the National Socialists would scarcely survive the blow of Strasser's entrance into the cabinet. Hitler, Goebbels, and the National Socialist deputy Kerrl were gathered in their castle in the state of Lippe; on January 13, Göring arrived with the terrifying news that Strasser was soon to enter the cabinet; 'only a great success in the Lippe campaign can save us from this dangerous situation,' wrote Goebbels in his diary.

Suddenly another, almost equally dangerous enemy, attacked them in the rear: Hugenberg. The leader of the German Nationalist Party, owner of the largest German newspaper and film trust,

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I wanted to save himself by reaching Schleicher and entering his government. Schleicher immeasurably. Hugener of Economics and Agriculture; he was of which were the cessation of pay-debts, reduction of interest on agriculture, food imports, increased farm income received by Schleicher, on the fourth. He informed both men that he was in the cabinet, but that he must be guaranteed his plans; Schleicher must persuade them at least six months; otherwise he must set setting immediate elections.

He received a visitor from Austria, Kurt Schuschnigg, Minister of Justice. As Schuschnigg later said, Schleicher was amazingly optimistic about the German situation, said Schleicher to his guest. 'I refused in this connection,' wrote Schuschnigg, 'in building up a cross-connection between the two governments and hoped in this way to find a political platform which would provide a common element; Hitler was no longer a problem; his movement presented no political problem. He added—I cannot vouch for it is the sense—that an attempt at a Hitler) had come under discussion, but he had demanded the Reichswehr Minister could not let them have it.' Schuschnigg thought political conditions in Germany. Afternoon he spoke with Doctor Schreier of the Center Party. 'Here, too, I found political optimism, which made the strong

In 1933, the elections were held in Lippe, the bird's nest seized. Indeed, the Nationalists had their high-water mark of July, 1932, but had fallen from the November low, with a rise

of approximately 17 per cent (38,000 as against 33,000). True, other parties without much effort had obtained even comparatively greater gains. Stresemann's former party gained 20 per cent and the small democratic party 60 per cent. The Social Democrats, 15 per cent (29,700 as against 25,000). Moreover, this sample of 90,000 voters could not really be called a barometer for the rest of Germany. Yet for Hitler's state of mind it was vital. He had shown that he still knew how to win, and he was able to reckon that Strasser's departure had made no further inroads on the party's strength. 'There can no longer be any question of compromise,' Goebbels suddenly blared forth, hinting at the extent of the concessions Hitler had still been prepared to make in his Cologne conversation with Papen. Strasser 'is sinking back into the nothingness from which he came,' and 'there can be no more mercy. The Leader above all!' Hitler, looking back at the past, began to admit that perhaps he had not done everything correctly; and even so, things had turned out all right. 'I, too,' he said with modesty at a meeting of his functionaries in the Berlin Sportpalast after the elections in Lippe, 'can go wrong and make mistakes. But what counts is, who makes the most mistakes?' The opposing side, he declared, had made the greatest mistake by trying to smash the National Socialist Party.

When Hitler said this, he already knew that Schleicher's plans had been frustrated. The two days, from January 15 to January 17, had changed much. He had not been able to give his government a broad base. 'Never with Hugenberg!' his most loyal followers—the Center—had cried. This was the answer when Schleicher inquired of Prelate Kaas whether Adam Stegerwald, the Catholic labor leader, would not enter his cabinet. Schleicher had expected too many miracles of his diplomacy. His eternal hesitations and conferences, his evasion of any definite decision, finally brought even Strasser to despair. He asked Hitler for a meeting, wanting to find his way back. Göring informed him that Hitler no longer wished to see him.

Slowly, almost invisibly, the weight shifted. Hitler had threatened that with the help of the Communists he would make it impossible for the government to maintain parliamentary rule. Now

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he put his threat into effect. Schleicher had publicly and truthfully declared that Germany was freed from reparations. Thereupon Alfred Rosenberg drew up a statement, which was submitted on January 20 to the Reichstag's committee on foreign affairs, where it was passed by the united majority of National Socialists and Communists: The committee on foreign affairs declared that Germany was not free; that she was subjected to excessive interest payments; that the Lausanne accord had not been ratified by the foreign powers; and 'for all these reasons the committee on foreign affairs [that is, the National Socialist-Communist majority] is of the opinion that the Chancellor's above-mentioned remarks may give rise to false ideas at home and abroad, and have therefore not benefited German interests.'

The game which the National Socialists played with the Communists in the last months of their fight for power will always be remembered as a masterpiece of political strategy. They systematically shattered the political order of Germany by fighting in the streets with the Communists and collaborating with them in parliament. In the Reichstag they destroyed the basis of all government, on the streets they destroyed the peace. After their electoral victory in Lippe, they did everything in their power to arouse and provoke the Communist menace. They sent the S.A. more systematically than before into the workers' neighborhoods, the centers of Communist power; they provoked street brawls, ending the lull that had followed the murder of Potempa, and publicly mourned their dead as victims of 'Communist murder agitation.' And they did all this with a party machine which constantly was on the point of falling apart. Certainly they lacked neither courage nor resourcefulness.

Goebbels tried to prove that the decline of the National Socialist Party would be the greatest misfortune for middle-class Germany. 'We came,' he said at the beginning of January, 'with twelve million people. If we lost these people, they would be lost to the nation; they would go over to Bolshevism.' Even Schleicher voiced these sentiments; through Hans Zehrer, one of his press spokesmen, he declared that the National Socialist Party must not be allowed to disintegrate, for if it did, Germany would have ten million Communists the next day.

In order to convince these worried souls that Communist menace, which only National Social Berlin S.A. was assembled in the heart of a Cohood. A gathering of some ten thousand stood Bülowplatz, facing the broad façade of the Karl Communist Party headquarters, was announced May 22. Near-by lay the Luisenstadt Cemetery, was buried. The Communists ordered a countenour; the most violent street battle since 1923. A responsible government could have done out both demonstrations. Schleicher, as usual too good, reckoned that an impartial measure, equally, would put both into a common rage ment. Perhaps in the hope of maneuvering, he bidden only the Communist demonstration, at tect the National Socialists with all possible poli Schleicher's last important act. Escorted and police, the S.A. 'conquered' 'Red Berlin' as the called it. Goebbels, who organized this dre 'revolution with the Herr President's permission:

... Everywhere armored cars and machine : occupied the windows and roofs across the to see what will happen. Outside, in front o House, stands the S.A., and in the side str fuming in impotent rage. The S.A. is marchi conquered this Red domain. The Bülowpla munist Party has suffered a terrible defeat. . heroic victory for the S.A.

Surrounded by a heavily armed police c armored cars and machine guns—that was But when they became a government party, really begin; armed with the state power, the 'Commune' back into its dark streets and win workers. With this almost effortless victory of must have made an impression on the Reich whoever this leadership was.

* D.T. to A.64 Nobody can follow what goes on in the Presidency, but in the streets, you are still the only one fighting the Communists

Among Hitler's fanatical adherents was Ludwig Müller, the Protestant chaplain of the East Prussian Reichswehr, assigned to the First Military Command in Königsberg. In 1930, Müller persuaded his commander to attend a mass meeting at which Hitler was to speak. It was the time of hysterical frontier tension with the Poles, when Hitler was hailed as a 'German margrave' and prayers were addressed to him. This faith seems to have touched General Werner von Blomberg. He was a gifted, cultivated officer, very soldierly in appearance, though nicknamed the 'rubber lion' because of his gentle manner. Blomberg was bowled over by Hitler at their first meeting, and frankly admitted it; he soon virtually became an instrument of the thundering voice. Shortly after this fateful meeting, he was sent abroad to study military progress in the United States. The public seems to have taken little notice of his visit; some day perhaps it will be known how much of his American observation Blomberg worked into the German military machine. In 1932, at any rate, he was one of the directors of German army policy, the third after Schleicher and Hammerstein; and he was Germany's military expert at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. German bourgeois ministers were surprised when this Reichswehr leader advised them to read *Mein Kampf*, and even quoted passages. A colder nature was Blomberg's chief of staff, Colonel Walter von Reichenau; perhaps less of an admirer of Hitler, but in his thinking and manner of life a true National Socialist officer, who broke with the Prussian tradition by making personal friends of the men under him. Blomberg and Reichenau were among those supporters of National Socialism who, like Ribbentrop, assured their Jewish friends that things would not be so bad; when they did get so bad, Reichenau said that Hitler had brought Germany so much good that a patriotic German Jew must regard himself as 'fallen on the field of honor.'

This type of officer considered it the duty and right of National Socialism to bring the army 'spiritual domination over the people.' It became the creed of Blomberg, Reichenau, and many others that the Reichswehr must withdraw again from politics. Schleicher, they believed, had led it on a false path. Schleicher 'had ceased to be a soldier,' Reichenau later declared; he was 'a born conspirator and

a sad proof of the fact that in politics officers can't equal the qualities of their profession.'

History now played one of its bitterest jokes. It was the Prussian general, Kurt von Schleicher, to decide whether to decide democratically—that is, with the National Socialists—violence and mass murder—or whether to smash or at least paralyze parliament. It was perhaps the man who was most determined to bar the National Socialists from power; for he wanted to exclude the people itself from power. On January 21, Hugenberg accused Schleicher, the 'socialist' letting Germany slip into Bolshevist mass rule; about the same time, the Chancellor was 'permitting conflicts between the National Socialists to arise.' The color of this rural Bolshevism which the Junkers were so fond of invoking was Brown, and not National Socialism. The decisive accusation was that he wanted to govern with parliament; but Germany, they said, could 'be saved only by a strong state leadership.' In his own dictatorship; but he would have been satisfied perhaps under the chancellorship of Papen, could he have saved the economic life, including agriculture; for economic life, they believed, was the national destiny.

The Bolshevist uprising of the small against the large, which Hugenberg feared, was actually in progress; its mover, National Socialism. The budget committee of the Reichstag was investigating the use and misuse of the state funds; it aimed to discover which of the Junkers were themselves on the taxpayers' money. With National Socialism the budget committee resolved, on January 25, that the accounts should conduct a thorough investigation of the Aid scandal and issue a detailed report on its findings. On the National Socialist votes it was decided that the government should render a complete report showing which estates owned land and fifty acres in size had received state support. On the Socialist votes the committee demanded an investigation of the gentlemen, for the most part nobles, had really fallen into 'debtedness'; and whether they could not

ical adherents was Ludwig Müller, the Prot-East Prussian Reichswehr, assigned to the end in Königsberg. In 1930, Müller permitted to attend a mass meeting at which Hitler spoke of hysterical frontier tension with the East, hailed as a 'German margrave' and prayers for this faith seems to have touched General Hugenberg. He was a gifted, cultivated officer, very popular, though nicknamed the 'rubber lion' because Hugenberg was bowled over by Hitler at their first meeting; he soon virtually became an inspiring voice. Shortly after this fateful meeting he went to study military progress in the United States to have taken little notice of his visit; some know how much of his American observations went into the German military machine. In 1932, one of the directors of German army policy, Hugenberg and Hammerstein; and he was German at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Hugenbersters were surprised when this Reichswehr head said *Mein Kampf*, and even quoted passages. Hugenberg's chief of staff, Colonel Walter von Hugenberg, of an admirer of Hitler, but in his thinking a true National Socialist officer, who broke Hugenberg's ion by making personal friends of the men and Reichenau were among those supporters who, like Ribbentrop, assured their Jewish friends not be so bad; when they did get so bad, Hugenberler had brought Germany so much good that Jewish must regard himself as 'fallen on the

considered it the duty and right of National Army's 'spiritual domination over the people.' Hugenberg, Reichenau, and many others that withdrew again from politics. Schleicher, they said, was on a false path. Schleicher 'had ceased to be a soldier'; he was 'a born conspirator and

a sad proof of the fact that in politics officers can so easily lose the qualities of their profession.'

History now played one of its bitterest jokes. It forced the Prussian general, Kurt von Schleicher, to decide whether to govern democratically—that is, with the National Socialists, the party of violence and mass murder—or whether to smash the party of violence and mass murder; but to do that, he would first have to smash or at least paralyze parliament. It was perhaps Hugenberg who was most determined to bar the National Socialists from real power; for he wanted to exclude the people itself from power. On January 21, Hugenberg accused Schleicher, the 'social General' of letting Germany slip into Bolshevik mass rule; above all in agriculture, the Chancellor was 'permitting conflicts between big and small to arise.' The color of this rural Bolshevism which the big landowners were so fond of invoking was Brown, and its true name was National Socialism. The decisive accusation was that Schleicher wanted to govern with parliament; but Germany, said Hugenberg, could 'be saved only by a strong state leadership.' He meant by his own dictatorship; but he would have been satisfied if he himself, perhaps under the chancellorship of Papen, could be dictator over the economic life, including agriculture; for economic life, he believed, was the national destiny.

The Bolshevik uprising of the small against the great, which Hugenberg feared, was actually in progress; its scene was parliament; its mover, National Socialism. The budget committee of the Reichstag was investigating the use and misuse of the Eastern Aid funds; it aimed to discover which of the junkers had enriched themselves on the taxpayers' money. With National Socialist votes the budget committee resolved, on January 25, that the Reich court of accounts should conduct a thorough investigation of the Eastern Aid scandal and issue a detailed report on its findings; with National Socialist votes it was decided that the government should also render a complete report showing which estates over two hundred and fifty acres in size had received state support. With National Socialist votes the committee demanded an investigation of whether the gentlemen, for the most part nobles, had really used their 'loans to relieve indebtedness'; and whether they could not have paid their

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D.T.

s by no means ended. This was the population where National firmly entrenched: the students. nmittees of various universities, votes and mandates; as late as ty a tenth of their votes at the gen. Hindenburg remained unly willing to do anything, profall. 'The Leader maintains an s on January 27. 'There is still a pointed.' He hastily added that n affair'; but essentially, he says portant: the Reichstag must not socialists had won power because ew defeat.

istag's council of elders—a kind parliament should convene on ty was very eager for this meetdecision. Only Schleicher could ut he suddenly decided that this od into parliament; to let them that they were dissolved if they

the point where Papen had left parliament had failed. True, he nt, he maintained, even if it did ty in the Reichstag, enjoyed the e people, for he confused party people. And he would have reallly with Hugenberg in his cab: even than a Hitler government, masses, while Papen and Hugenthe people behind them.' Kaas legality from below.' Schleicher d to send out the Reichswehr to against the people. On the twenis associates in the Reichswehr

Ministry and discussed the dangers of a new Papen government. They appear to have speculated on means of breaking Papen's influence on Hindenburg. It has been claimed that a suggestion was put forward of taking Papen and Hugenberg into protective custody in order to separate them from Hindenburg. According to another rumor, they thought of sending troops into Berlin from Potsdam. If this suggestion was ever made, it can scarcely have been more than idle day-dreaming, but it is said that a young officer attending the conference was horrified and reported the remark to Oskar von Hindenburg.

On the next day, January 28, Schleicher called on Hindenburg as Brüning had done eight months before. The overthrower of chancellors was himself falling. He told the President that the Reichstag was to meet in three days and demanded the power of dissolution. According to the official report, Schleicher said 'that the present Reich government, in accordance with its character of presidial government, would be in a position to defend its program and its opinions in the Reichstag only if the Herr Reichs President put an order of dissolution at its disposal.' Schleicher called his government a presidial government in order to make it clear to Hindenburg that this was his own government. But this was untrue; from the beginning, Schleicher's government was oriented toward parliament, and Hindenburg logically answered that 'in the situation prevailing at the present time, he could not accede to this proposal.'

The conversation could not be friendly. Schleicher told Hindenburg that if he could not dissolve the Reichstag he could not prevent a discussion of the Eastern Aid and the attendant scandals. Hindenburg is said to have replied: It is sad that you are not in a position, without such an order, to prevent a debate in which Prussia's oldest historical families would be covered with mud. This was the origin of the legend that Schleicher threatened Hindenburg with disclosure of the Eastern Aid scandal, and that Hindenburg hastily dropped his general and called Hitler to power, in order that Hitler should hush up the scandal (after his deputies had just voted for its exposure!). The truth is almost the exact opposite. Schleicher demanded dictatorial powers in order to re-

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* I had my spheres of influence at that meeting

If all of this 1931-33 is to be used, much work must be done. These notes are too fragmentary.

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press the debate on the Eastern Aid, and Hindenburg demanded that he do this without dictatorship. The old man did not act in fear but in anger. Hitler did not force his hand; Hindenburg broke Schleicher's attempt to do just this. The true interpretation of the episode is simply that the fickle old man felt the weight of Schleicher's domination and shook it off when it became just a fraction of an ounce too much.

The old President seems to have referred in harsh terms to the conversation in the Reichswehr Ministry and the plans for arresting Papen and Hugenberg. According to Schleicher's own version, he answered fearlessly that most of the rumors were nonsense, but that he did indeed regard it as his duty to do his utmost to prevent a return of Papen to the government. For such a government meant civil war, and neither the Reichswehr nor the police was morally equal to a civil war. In a statement which he himself gave to the press, he declared that 'not a single word is true' of all the assertions about a march of the Reichswehr on Berlin and the arrest of Hugenberg and Papen; these were 'absolutely senseless and malicious inventions and slanders.' However, 'Herr von Schleicher considered it his urgent duty as Chancellor still in office and as leader of the German armed forces, to describe to the President the dangers which, in his opinion, were inherent in the plan, still much discussed in public, of reappointing former Chancellor von Papen. Herr von Schleicher regarded such a cabinet, based on a tenth of the German people, as a challenge to the other nine tenths of the German people; in view of the complications and political struggles which, in his opinion, were inevitable, such a challenge would have led to demoralization in the Reichswehr and the police. In this situation, he declared it was the right and duty of the Chancellor and Reichswehr Minister in office to prevent such a development to the best of his ability.'

With a stubbornness bordering on mutiny, these Reichswehr officers were determined to prevent a new Papen cabinet. Through misunderstandings, this, too, gave rise to a legend that Schleicher wanted, by a *coup d'état*, to prevent Hitler from taking power. According to his own account, which, perhaps with slight shifts of emphasis, is not unworthy of credence, he desired the exact oppo-

site. The above-quoted statement continues: 'Herr von Schleicher gave his opinion that the National Socialist Party on the basis of a pap would be the best solution.'

Parliament . . . majority . . . and therefore H own plan, and for years it had also been Schl was nothing improbable or surprising about it. meant dictatorship by way of parliament, al Napoleon III and the counsels of the Wise Schleicher, the curbing of the National Sociali ment, as, so often in the history of parliam parties had been curbed by the necessity of : When Hindenburg brusquely dismissed Schlei that Hitler was now curbed; he had some re this time Hitler would not refuse Chancellor port, at least for the moment. It was Schleiche himself as the spokesman of the Reichswehr, project and forced the old man reluctantly to were three possibilities, he said, of solving th The third and last was a presidial cabinet wit solve the Reichstag, and thereby bend the Rei this Hindenburg had just refused him. But a experience of the past, the Papen experiment : be repeated. Therefore, Schleicher, according to sidered these two possibilities: '1. A governr mentary majority which probably could be est the leadership of Adolf Hitler. 2. The form: government based on a strong popular tendency be achieved only under the leadership of Adolf support of the Right groups. This would have only if the President were to abandon his resi Adolf Hitler with the chancellorship.'

Hindenburg was still resisting the appointme cher now urged him to consent. Schleicher political acts always had an *arrière-pensée*; if C lieved, he had sent Hitler a warning, two days e an appointment. Up to the last moment, pe

lowingly or not, when he recom-
majority government under Hitler's
ing exactly what he had been pre-
sents unconsciously, for two years.

re advice from the most responsible
of his advisers, State Secretary Otto
was to free the old man from the
terrifying political position, to relieve
tator governing against the Reichs-
to give a Hitler government its vote,
ed to rule by strictly parliamentary
lists, it is true, demanded that the
ng period. Would it not be possible
mitted time in strict accordance with
ay satisfy both sides?

l Hitler. In his person, in his move-
acy and the principle of leadership
nan to satisfy both sides, to adjourn
ith the constitution.

fall, Hitler might have accepted a
adversary had fallen, he was un-
n is now out of the question,' writes
discussing the situation with Hitler;
ical and are not cheering too soon.'
days. The German Nationalists put
Hitler's chancellorship; they fought
would be tougher than Papen him-
property and heavy industry doubt-
presented desired. It fought against
la of a majority government under
ainst a participation of the Center in
fight against the Center, they also
while, not only Meissner demanded
Hitler also desired it, to avoid being
erman Nationalists. The Stahlhelm,
lte and Theodor Duesterberg, also
uations; the two asserted that they

were present by the will of Hindenburg, for Hindenburg was
honorary president of the Stahlhelm, and actually did want the
Stahlhelm to have a share in the government. But the Stahlhelm
itself was not clear about its own desires, its leadership was not
united; Duesterberg supported Hugenberg, Seldte supported Hitler;
and it became apparent that these half-dozen dictators could no
more find a common aim than the six hundred deputies in the
Reichstag.

No power can be won without a sacrifice of principles; and Hitler, 1933
who looked to power as his salvation, abjured many things that had
seemed to him absolutely indispensable a few months before. After
he had reluctantly renounced massacres and rolling heads, and only
too readily renounced inflation and socialization, he became Chan-
cellor by declaring his readiness not only to be a strictly parlia-
mentary chancellor, but also to tolerate continuous interference on
the part of Hindenburg and to submit to every conceivable restric-
tion. Of ten ministers only three were to be National Socialists.

These three were himself as Chancellor, his friend Frick as Minister
of the Interior, and Göring as head of a newly established Ministry
of Aviation. There was no mention of Goebbels, much less of
Röhm. At the same time the Prussian government posts, which
gave more practical state power than those of the Reich, were dis-
tributed. This was the 'commissar' method of distributing posts that
had prevailed in the largest state of the Reich since Papen's *coup*
d'état. Göring became Prussian Minister of the Interior, and that
could mean power, for the police is power. But Göring's superior,
also appointed by the Reich, was Papen. In this government, Papen
turned up wherever there was a key position to fill. He also became
Vice-Chancellor in the Reich cabinet, and Hindenburg exacted the
condition that Hitler should never appear before him alone, but
always accompanied by Papen; for the old man wished to speak
only with him.

Konstantin von Neurath, Hindenburg's personal adviser, re-
mained in charge of foreign policy. A general regarded by Hinden-
burg as trustworthy obtained the Reichswehr Ministry. This was a
general who for some time had come forward as an opponent of
Schleicher, having attacked him for forcing the Reichswehr into pol-

itics. Was no one aware of the relations between Werner von Blomberg, the new minister, and Hitler? Was no one aware that Colonel von Reichenau, whom Blomberg brought with him as the new chief of ministry, was widely known to be a National Socialist? The German press in those days took scarcely any interest in the person of the new Reichswehr Minister, but used up much space and time in pointing out that Hugenberg was the real new dictator of Germany. For by stubborn negotiation the German Nationalist leader had attained his goal: he had become Minister for Economics and Agriculture. The cabinet, he felt sure, would force the Reichstag to grant it one year in which to work undisturbed. He, Hugenberg, would remold the economy and save the country. Not even Labor was accorded to the National Socialists; Franz Seldte, the Stahlhelm leader, became Minister of Labor. Hitler was no dictator; he had sworn that he would not 'use his power one-sidedly'; and even if he wanted to break his oath, he was apparently in no position to do so.

Meissner and Papen probably thought they had accomplished a master stroke. As Chancellor, Hitler now bore the responsibility for German policy, and since he would achieve no greater miracles than anyone else, his supporters would be disillusioned in time and turn back to the reliable old parties; the heavy burden of responsibility would reduce Hitler as a public figure to normal proportions. For the present he brought the government strong support in parliament; and yet this cabinet was so cleverly constructed that Hitler could do no real damage and could no longer become a dangerous power; he would be a powerless chancellor and hence a broken party leader.

1/30/33 This was the cabinet that had been recommended to Hindenburg by Papen and Meissner. Up to the last minute, the old man seems to have resisted. At noon of January 30, when Hitler drove over to Hindenburg's palace with his new ministers, his friends remained behind in the Kaiserhof, anxious and uncertain. 'Our hearts are torn back and forth between doubt, hope, joy, and discouragement,' writes Goebbels. 'We have been disappointed too often for us to believe wholeheartedly in the great miracle.'

To a large part of the public, Hitler's appointment did indeed

seem a miracle, and many believed that only a very unsavory one, could account for it. Or had promised Hindenburg to restore the moral such a promise, he needed only seven weeks official statement. It was further maintained Oskar von Hindenburg had been blackmailing pose some shady stock speculations with a job they had made improper use of their inside. It seems to be true that Oskar and Meissner, they had suffered in such a speculation, a banker for about a million marks; it is said the account of this business, called 'sub-account' but in a safe in his house. The safe one night unknown burglars, and 'sub-account B' did later, the banker got the 'friendly advice' to let as possible. So far the story seems true, but Schleicher well would rather believe that he had burglary in order to get a hold on his unreliable Meissner; then, too, he was probably much more their shady deals than a National Socialist or

But even if Hitler got 'sub-account B,' Oskar hardly be in danger, for they knew at least as much about Hitler, Göring, Goebbels, Röhm. It was Hitler that when Neudeck was given to Hindenburg been cheated out of the inheritance tax; it was the chief of state had received another for thousand marks through private collections in require no Eastern Aid. Unpleasant as these things not be used for blackmail, for they were known National Socialists, but to the public as well; and Göring, for years a bitter enemy of Hindenburg story, including the tax swindle, in a widely when Hitler was in power, he did not hesitate of these scandals to intimidate Oskar von Hindenburg understanding of the National Socialist seizure advanced by these mystery stories. Hitler came seemed the only man who could restore to Ger-

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seem a miracle, and many believed that only another miracle, and
 a very unsavory one, could account for it. One story was that Hitler
 had promised Hindenburg to restore the monarchy; if ever he made
 such a promise, he needed only seven weeks to retract it in an
 official statement. It was further maintained that Meissner and
 Oskar von Hindenburg had been blackmailed with threats to ex-
 pose some shady stock speculations with a Jewish banker in which
 they had made improper use of their inside political information.
 It seems to be true that Oskar and Meissner, as the result of losses
 they had suffered in such a speculation, were indebted to the
 banker for about a million marks; it is said that the banker kept
 the account of this business, called 'sub-account B,' not in his office,
 but in a safe in his house. The safe one night was broken into by
 unknown burglars, and 'sub-account B' disappeared; some days
 later, the banker got the 'friendly advice' to leave Germany as soon
 as possible. So far the story seems true, but people who knew
 Schleicher well would rather believe that he himself engineered the
 burglary in order to get a hold on his unreliable friends, Oskar and
 Meissner; then, too, he was probably much better informed about
 their shady deals than a National Socialist outsider.

But even if Hitler got 'sub-account B,' Oskar and Meissner could
 hardly be in danger, for they knew at least as many unsavory stories
 about Hitler, Göring, Goebbels, Röhm. It was also known to Hit-
 ler that when Neudeck was given to Hindenburg, the state had
 been cheated out of the inheritance tax; it was known to him that
 the chief of state had received another four hundred and fifty
 thousand marks through private collections in order that he would
 require no Eastern Aid. Unpleasant as these facts were, they could
 not be used for blackmail, for they were known, not only to the
 National Socialists, but to the public as well; General Erich Luden-
 dorff, for years a bitter enemy of Hindenburg, had told the whole
 story, including the tax swindle, in a widely read weekly. Later,
 when Hitler was in power, he did not hesitate to use one or another
 of these scandals to intimidate Oskar von Hindenburg; but an
 understanding of the National Socialist seizure of power is not ad-
 vanced by these mystery stories. Hitler came to power because he
 seemed the only man who could restore to Germany a parliamentary

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government, such as Hindenburg had demanded in August and even more in November.

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Röhm stood at a window in the Kaiserhof and looked across at the Chancellery through binoculars; for when Hitler came out, his face would show how things had gone. Suddenly Hitler was in the room. 'He says nothing, and all of us say nothing. But his eyes are full of tears.' It was a day full of ceremonies and pageantry; at noon, Hindenburg administered the oath of office; at night twenty-five thousand S.A. men marched past the Chancellery with torches, and the National Socialists of Berlin marched with them.

Hindenburg stood at the window, beating time with his crooked stick to the old military marches that resounded from below. A few yards away, Hitler stood at an open window, laughing, dancing, gesticulating with childish joy, now and then bowing to someone.

Hugenberg and Papen could not have organized any such torch-light parade in six hours. Here for the first time in many months the 'ruling powers' again saw a part of the 'people' before them, and perhaps they thought that 'public opinion' was marching down there in the glow of the torches. The torch-bearers in turn believed that their Leader had now become a ruling power and they with him; the Leader himself knew better. 'We shall still have to carry on a very intensive struggle,' writes Goebbels on February 1. 'The situation in the country is not yet clear enough for us to speak of an absolute consolidation of our position.' We have been called because we are the people—are we? The will of the people is still expressed in ballots and in parliament; the task set us by Hindenburg is still to relieve the tension between the executive and parliament; to win over the block of votes we need for a majority. Practically speaking, this meant an understanding with the Center, which, in secret, was exceedingly willing for an understanding.

For a moment Hitler was probably serious about this understanding. The Center was even to be offered a cabinet post; one ministry had been left free for the purpose, and, strangely enough, it was Franz Gürtner, Hitler's old protector, whose portfolio was intended for a man of the Center. Public and private assurances were meanwhile given that the National Socialists would commit no act of violence, no breach of the constitution; to the question

whether the S.A. would not assume the force, Minister of the Interior Frick replied of January 30: '... The integration of played no part in the formation of the existing plans to integrate the S.A. with the announced in his press that the Reichstag v 7, when he would issue the government's ta necessary powers.

In order to assure himself of these power two hours on the morning of January 31. I wanted was the Center's consent to a law to work for one year 'without the vicissitudes of construction,' for this was the 'last and only of meeting the danger of ruin to our people wanted a clear promise from Hitler that he the constitution, and, though Hitler spoke no clear answer. It was agreed that the Center its questions in writing. This was done on asked the new government for 'Guaranties would remain within the limits of the constances that no unconstitutional measures w basis of a so-called state of emergency.' Al also demanded that the rights of the work paired; this meant that Hugenberg would not smash the trade unions. Every question n you, but say something satisfactory and you s answer. It was Hugenberg who, up till th power to prevent new elections; now it was with his great plan for the salvation of Germa own economic dictatorship, whom the Cente Kaas's demands—renunciation of emergenc peasants in the East, increase of exports—Hugenberg's known plans, not against Hitler ally unformulated and uncertain aims. Now minister of economics that there was only one yoke of the Center: dissolution of the Reichst

For months Hitler had lost election after

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 Lippe. But if he dissolved the Reichstag now, he had everything in his favor that he had lacked since August: the magic of triumph, the irresistibility of power. 'Now it is easy to carry on the fight,' writes Goebbels. 'For we can call on all the state's means. The radio and the press are at our disposal. We shall furnish a masterpiece of agitation. And this time of course [of course!] there is no lack of money.'

Hugenberg resisted stubbornly, for he had experience enough to suspect that Hitler alone would be the victor in this election, and that everyone else would be defeated. What he needed, he insisted, was a strong government, no parliament! Send the Reichstag home — yes. Elect a new one — no! Hitler replied that this was in sharp contradiction to the injunction of strict constitutionalism which the field marshal and President had given the new government. If the National Socialists should gain an absolute majority — Hitler was asked — would they not form a cabinet to suit themselves and throw out all the other ministers? In reply, Hitler gave his word of honor 'that, regardless of the results of the coming elections, all the ministers active in the present cabinet would remain.' A tactician of uncanny adroitness, he forced his will on his startled cabinet with arguments and words of honor. Hugenberg gave in. The following morning Hitler and Papen called on Hindenburg and bade him dissolve the Reichstag. The situation had changed since Schleicher; Schleicher had been unable to hope and promise that he would have a majority in a new Reichstag. Hitler could make such a promise, and hence the dissolution of the Reichstag was no longer an act of violence against parliament, but a hand outstretched to the people, a questioning of public opinion. Once again Hindenburg signed a paper in which he declared the Reichstag dissolved, 'since the formation of a working majority has proved impossible.' In an unctuous letter, Hitler explained to Kaas why he had preferred not to answer his questions: Such an answer, he wrote, would have served a purpose only if it had been clear on principle that the Center was prepared to give the government a year in which to work. A discussion of the questions put by Kaas would only 'lead to bitterness as sterile as it is to me undesirable.' And Hitler did not abandon hope of still reaching an understanding

with the Center: 'I venture to hope even to then in a future that is perhaps not too far d to broaden our front for the elimination of dangers within our nation.' Kaas replied true that the formation of a majority in th impossible; if he had received a satisfactory questions, . . . the Center Party, in accor principles, . . . in awareness of the gravity objectivity, would have been prepared to be its work.'

Now Gürtner became Minister of Justice: set for March 5, 1933. The final struggle b

On February 22, Göring, as Prussian Minister of the Interior, shamelessly forgetting what Frick as Reich Minister of the Interior had promised two weeks before, issued the following decree, a model for the *coup d'état* cloaking itself in legality:

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* The demands made on the existing police force, which cannot be adequately increased at the present juncture, are often beyond its power; by the present necessity of utilizing them outside of their places of service, police officers are often removed from their proper field of activity at inopportune times. In consequence, the voluntary support of suitable helpers to be used as auxiliary police officers in case of emergency can no longer be dispensed with.

Some fifty thousand men were mobilized in this way in Prussia. A fifth of them belonged to the Stahlhelm; some twenty-five thousand came from the S.A., the remaining fifteen thousand from Himmler's black-shirted S.S. They served in their own uniforms and wore white arm-bands inscribed with 'auxiliary police.' This auxiliary police went around with rubber truncheons and pistols in their belts, traveled free of charge on the street-cars and buses; with pistols in their belts, they marched into restaurants and cafés. Fingering their weapons, they sold the frightened guests photographs of Hitler, Göring, or Goebbels at exorbitant prices. At side tables terrified waiters served the auxiliary police their meals. From the police treasury each auxiliary policeman drew three marks daily. Thus, the first fifty thousand of the Uprooted and Disinherited were scantily provided for.

The army of the *coup d'état* stood ready, at least in Prussia. But in the South, distrust and resistance grew. In Bavaria, plans were forged to proclaim Prince Rupprecht regent, or even king. At the same time a similar group was active in Prussia; it is not clear whether Hitler, by ambiguous talk or significant silence, encouraged these people to hope that he was really their friend. He could point to Prince August Wilhelm, who called him 'my Leader.' But his profound, heartfelt hostility toward princes could escape only the most superficial observers. To the Bavarian king-makers he cried out that their plan 'would be broken and smashed by the Bavarians themselves,' for the Bavarian people wanted nothing to

do with these things of the past. Blom made a speech to the Munich Reichswehr watch in the south of the Reich. He said: 'He forces are stretched over the Reich like matter 'which tribe the individual soldier entered the armed forces, 'he has obligation, by oath and by will, to the entire of the National Socialists and their S.A., false caution 'that we [the Reichswehr] armed might of Germany.' When he S.A. was armed; he also knew that Röhm months to make his private army the 'Br hands of the state. But Blomberg trusts perhaps it sufficed him that the Brown forbidden by law to take their pistols case, he called on the Reichswehr to regard 'Behind us and beside us stand many men disarmed, to be sure, but as determined fight for the fatherland. Let us seal our cry: Our beloved fatherland, the Hurrah!'

With these words the Reichswehr put the acts of the S.A. — present and future that the Hitler régime was more than power was considerably greater than the of voting power in the cabiner'; for the measured in percentages, and no will Hitler's, either for determination or break movement, it was the Communists who ambition; but the Communists clung to their mysterious conception of history. On February 22, Social Democratic mayor of Altona, met of the Communist Reichstag fraction, in. 'it is five minutes to twelve,' he asked the Communists would not at least give up their Democrats and conclude a united front all 'It doesn't enter our heads. The Nazis must

~~To be able to say that taken him across and on its class~~

* Dr. Dietrich was one of the steps was in place.

ring, as Prussian Minister of the Interior, what Frick as Reich Minister of the Interior has before, issued the following decree, a cloak of legality:

On the existing police force, which cannot stand at the present juncture, are often beyond the necessity of utilizing them outside of their proper officers are often removed from their proper posts at opportune times. In consequence, the voluntary helpers to be used as auxiliary police officers can no longer be dispensed with.

Men were mobilized in this way in Prussia. In the Stahlhelm; some twenty-five thousand, the remaining fifteen thousand from the S.S. They served in their own uniforms and were inscribed with 'auxiliary police.' This was done with rubber truncheons and pistols in their hands, on the street-cars and buses; with them they marched into restaurants and cafés. Finckel sold the frightened guests photographs of the police at exorbitant prices. At side tables the auxiliary police ate their meals. From the auxiliary policeman drew three marks daily. And of the Uprooted and Disinherited were

d'état stood ready, at least in Prussia. But no resistance grew. In Bavaria, plans were made for Rupprecht regent, or even king. At the time he was active in Prussia; it is not clear whether he was really their friend. He could not escape the hostility toward princes could escape observers. To the Bavarian king-makers an 'would be broken and smashed by the' the Bavarian people wanted nothing to

do with these things of the past. Blomberg went to Munich and made a speech to the Munich Reichswehr garrison, 'which stands watch in the south of the Reich.' He assured them that the 'armed forces are stretched over the Reich like a steel claw,' and it did not matter 'which tribe the individual soldier belongs to'; for when he entered the armed forces, 'he has obligated himself without reservation, by oath and by will, to the entire German fatherland.' As for the National Socialists and their S.A., Blomberg stated without false caution 'that we [the Reichswehr] are and shall remain the armed might of Germany.' When he said this, he knew that the S.A. was armed; he also knew that Röhm had been working for months to make his private army the 'Brown People's Army' in the hands of the state. But Blomberg trusted in Hitler's word, and perhaps it sufficed him that the Brown auxiliary policemen were forbidden by law to take their pistols home with them. In any case, he called on the Reichswehr to regard the S.A. as their friends: 'Behind us and beside us stand many millions of determined men, disarmed, to be sure, but as determined as we are to live and to fight for the fatherland. Let us seal our alliance with them with the cry: Our beloved fatherland, the proud German Reich—Hurrah!'

With these words the Reichswehr put its stamp of approval on the acts of the S.A.—present and future. It was becoming clear that the Hitler régime was more than an experiment, that its power was considerably greater than the 'less than thirty per cent of voting power in the cabinet'; for the will to power cannot be measured in percentages, and no will in Germany approached Hitler's, either for determination or breadth of aim. Next to his movement, it was the Communists who had the greatest historical ambition; but the Communists clung stubbornly to their strange, mysterious conception of history. On February 23, Max Brauer, Social Democratic mayor of Altona, met Ernst Torgler, chairman of the Communist Reichstag fraction, in Berlin. Pointing out that 'it is five minutes to twelve,' he asked Torgler whether the Communists would not at least give up their fight against the Social Democrats and conclude a united front alliance. Torgler answered: 'It doesn't enter our heads. The Nazis must take power. Then in

**To be able to say that meant I had taken him across one very high ridge on the climb to action.*

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four weeks the whole working class will be united under the leadership of the Communist Party.' Brauer thought Torgler must be suffering from the strain. But a few days later, he met Soviet Ambassador Chinchook in Hamburg. Brauer asked the same question and received the same answer: 'No, they [the National Socialists] must come to power now, and then at last the old fight will come to an end. In four weeks the Communists will have the leadership of the whole working class.' No disappointment could destroy this faith. A German Communist leader by the name of Heckert, who fled to Russia a few weeks later, publicly declared before the executive committee of the Communist International that the German events had confirmed Comrade Stalin's predictions, and that Social Democracy and Fascism were twin brothers. In a resolution of April 1, 1933, the International stated that the open Fascist dictatorship in Germany had freed the masses from the influence of Social Democracy and thus 'accelerated the tempo of the evolution of Germany toward proletarian revolution.'

The Communists were prepared for illegal struggle; they had maintained an illegal machine for years under the parliamentary governments. They were convinced that they would come through the brief period of Hitler's dictatorship relatively unharmed, while the Social Democrats, softened by democracy, would succumb to the unaccustomed climate. The calculations of the conservatives and the Bolsheviks were startlingly similar. Generals, junkers, big capital, and Communists were convinced alike that it was the generals, the junkers, and big capital who really had state power; all were agreed that Hitler as Chancellor would inevitably disappoint the masses and lose his supporters. The National Socialists were full of contempt for this unrealistic view; Hitler declared publicly that he had set elections because a government cannot rule in the long run unless it has the people behind it; because 'there can be no resurrection of the nation without the might of the workers'; true, for these reasons, he wished the German people to decide for him—but 'not because I lack the determination to settle with the spoilers of the nation without an election. . . . On the contrary, their lordships'—he meant the generals, junkers, and capitalists—'can be convinced: on the fifth of March, so help me

God, Germany will no longer be in the hands of the Junkers and the bourgeoisie. The meaning: regardless of how the elections turn out, another speech: 'It is now for the German people to decide. If the German people abandon us in this decision, we shall go the way that is necessary to perish.'

The terror became more and more blatant, itself; yet it did not lure the counter-terror from the Social Democrats, demonstrably, intended on a large scale; nor can any such plan be deduced from the Communists during this period. Hitler was also claiming the right to make a *coup d'état*; he alone claimed by a section of public opinion; and amid the fury of this last impassioned struggle for power in Germany, he believed himself able to give society a new shape. In his first government program he promised to solve the economic crisis 'with two goals: Within four years,' he promised, 'the German people shall be saved from pauperization; within four years the Reichstag shall be ended once and for all.' Four years was the time he gave for the Reichstag, and by now he was determining the Reichstag four years of dictatorial powers instead of four years, give us four years' time, then pass judgment.

The vastness of his plans, now that he was in power to carry them out, made a profound impression on voters, though he did not reveal details and formulated any. Germany, he said, had 'become a land where our people have nearly forgotten happiness. Soviet Russia; and where people have laughter of despair.' Here he spoke the plain truth. Official statistics that he summed up in the speech: 'three million potential wage-earners, eight to ten million unemployed, condemned to unemployment.' He would promise that in a few days, weeks, or months, it would mean hard work for the people to live that freedom, happiness, and life will be given from Heaven, for nothing whatever comes

* D.T. It had worked with

Lenin. The Mensheviks came to power and then the Bolsheviks. Now, the actors were different, but the text of the play was essentially the same. After the Bolsheviks took power, it would be the same for the Communists. ~~Now they were~~ Now restricted were their brains. They were hardly aware of the terrible, infectious and gloom; since a philosopher, twice a week.

working class will be united under the leadership of the Party.' Brauer thought Torgler must be the same. But a few days later, he met Soviet Ambassador in Hamburg. Brauer asked the same question and received the same answer: 'No, they [the National Socialists] will not, and then at last the old fight will come to its end. The Communists will have the leadership of the German people.' No disappointment could destroy this belief. The Communist leader by the name of Heckert, who was then, publicly declared before the executive committee of the Communist International that the German people and Comrade Stalin's predictions, and that Socialism and Communism were twin brothers. In a resolution of the National Council stated that the open Fascist dictatorship had freed the masses from the influence of Socialism and accelerated the tempo of the evolution of Germany at revolution.'

The masses were prepared for illegal struggle; they had been trained for years under the parliamentary system. They were convinced that they would come through Hitler's dictatorship relatively unharmed, while the system softened by democracy, would succumb to the dictatorship. The calculations of the conservatives and the Socialists were startlingly similar. Generals, junkers, big capitalists and big capital who really had state power; Hitler as Chancellor would inevitably disappear and lose his supporters. The National Socialists were not for this unrealistic view; Hitler declared that elections because a government cannot rule without the support of the people behind it; because 'there is no power of the nation without the might of the people'. For these reasons, he wished the German people to elect a government 'not because I lack the determination to settle the nation without an election. . . . On the other hand, the people'—he meant the generals, junkers, and capitalists—were convinced: on the fifth of March, so help me

God, Germany will no longer be in the hands of her spoilers.' Meaning: regardless of how the elections turn out. For, as he said in another speech: 'It is now for the German people themselves to decide. If the German people abandon us in this hour, that must not deter us. We shall go the way that is necessary if Germany is not to perish.'

The terror became more and more blatant, scorning to conceal itself; yet it did not lure the counter-terror from its hiding-places. The Social Democrats, demonstrably, intended no illegal action on a large scale; nor can any such plan be deduced from the acts of the Communists during this period. Hitler was alone in publicly claiming the right to make a *coup d'état*; he alone was supported in this claim by a section of public opinion; and this because he alone, amid the fury of this last impassioned struggle for freedom and power in Germany, believed himself able and willing to give society a new shape. In his first government proclamation he promised to solve the economic crisis 'with two great four-year plans.' 'Within four years,' he promised, 'the German peasant must be saved from pauperization; within four years unemployment must be ended once and for all.' Four years was the legal term of the new Reichstag, and by now he was determined to demand of the Reichstag four years of dictatorial powers instead of one: 'German people, give us four years' time, then pass judgment on us!'

The vastness of his plans, now that he was in possession of state power to carry them out, made a profound impression on the voters, though he did not reveal details and doubtless had not formulated any. Germany, he said, had 'become dismal and sad; our people have nearly forgotten happiness and laughter, as in Soviet Russia; and where people have laughed, it has been the laughter of despair.' Here he spoke the plain truth; and it was the official statistics that he summed up in the sentence: 'Of twenty-three million potential wage-earners, eight to nine millions are condemned to unemployment.' He would promise no one that things could be better in a few days, weeks, or months; no, he would need four years; it would mean hard work for all—'let no one believe that freedom, happiness, and life will suddenly come as a gift from Heaven,' for nothing whatever comes as a gift: 'We never

D. T. I do not know if it was the result of all my counselling, but he had arrived at that intensity of will, was himself as well as by me, and was, finally, to some large degree, his own man.

believe in outside help, never in help that lies outside of our own strength, outside of our own people.' Therefore, he would make no cheap promises, and the first point on his program was: 'We shall not lie and deceive.' He saw no reason to explain the details of his plans to the disrupters; by their very questions about his program, they had shown that they understood nothing: 'For all programs are vain; the decisive thing is the human will, sound vision, manly courage, sincerity of faith, the inner will — these are the decisive things [uproarious applause].'

A great will indubitably flowed through these speeches, a powerful magnetism gripped many who heard him. They promised no paradise — though some simple souls may have understood 'paradise'; what Hitler really promised was that he would attack great problems with the big methods of a man who respects history. 'I have resolved to undertake the greatest task in German history; I am willing and determined to solve this task.' To this end he was prepared to shake the nation to its foundations, to break and remix souls; for this great task demanded great men, and 'therefore we shall break with all the products of a rotten democracy, for great things can come only from the power of the individual personality, and everything that is worth preserving must be entrusted once more to the power of the individual personality.'

1933 What Hitler promised was not that the hard times would end, but that they would acquire a meaning; the German nation should learn to look on itself as a task that could be solved; it should learn once more that action can help, and that 'it is better to make a mistake than to do nothing.' This accounts for the attraction of his propaganda; even in the horrors and injustice, a dulled and demoralized public could sense the will to action. It is in the times of the greatest disappointments and fears that injustice is approved because it is a force, and (as the Wise Men of Zion said) the vilest deeds of statesmen are most admired.

0.7 Many a newspaper reader and radio listener was moved to tears when the Leader renounced his salary as Chancellor; a thing that meant little to the author of *Mein Kampf*, for since 1930 the sales of his book had mounted sharply. When he was informed that he could not legally give up his salary, he had it transferred to a fund

for war invalids. But this was not yet 1 that bathed his figure in the aura of ir should not be stepped up too much, wrote February 25, 'for up to the last day it mus it.'

The great act, which would give content been considered for over a decade. The 'fig Swastika and Soviet Star' must appear to light of an 'attempted Bolshevik revolution. the Lord hath sent me to do these works refused to flare up, Göring's police and in search of the flame. On February 24 Liebknecht House. The building had been before by the Communist Party leadership piles of pamphlets; and the mere existence to speak of 'catacombs.'

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Absolutely my advice

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for war invalids. But this was not yet the great symbolic deed that bathed his figure in the aura of irresistibility. The tempo should not be stepped up too much, wrote Goebbels in his diary on February 25, 'for up to the last day it must be possible to intensify it.'

The great act, which would give content to Hitler's speeches, had been considered for over a decade. The 'fight to the finish between Swastika and Soviet Star' must appear to the people in the garish light of an 'attempted Bolshevik revolution.' 'Then you will see that the Lord hath sent me to do these works.' When the revolution refused to flare up, Göring's police and auxiliary police set out in search of the flame. On February 24 they invaded the Karl Liebknecht House. The building had been quietly evacuated long before by the Communist Party leadership. But in the cellar lay piles of pamphlets; and the mere existence of a cellar led the S.A. to speak of 'catacombs.'

The German press was full of stories about catacombs and underground passages. Otherwise there were no exciting revelations in the official reports. True, in the night of February 25, a trifling fire was discovered beneath the roof of the rambling 'Castle' in the center of Berlin, the former residence of the Hohenzollerns, now used for government offices. The blaze was extinguished at once; there were indications of incendiarism, but nothing was made public. Regardless who had set it, there was not enough fire to talk about.

Meanwhile, the material from the Karl Liebknecht House was carefully studied—though it seems to have consisted only of pamphlets. But three days later, Göring made breath-taking disclosures, though he remained vague about the evidence. The Communists, it seemed, were planning to fire government buildings, castles, museums, and vital factories all over Germany. A sensational fire was to be the 'signal for bloody revolution and civil war.' At four in the afternoon, on the day after the fire, general looting was to begin in Berlin. (Report of the official Prussian Press Service, February 28, 1933.) According to one of Göring's reports, hostages were to be arrested and food poisoned in restaurants. All this was discovered by Göring and Daluge in the

* Göring: a cellar? A large cellar? Perfect - we shall speak of catacombs.
Goebbels: You have become very good at that.
Göring: Perhaps, you have shown the way.
Goebbels: No. Genius is genius. At that moment, they almost liked each other.

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papers they had found in the Karl Liebknecht House on February 24—or so they said later.

In the first three days after February 24, the German public learned nothing of these terrors. But the Reich government and the National Socialist leaders must have been waiting with feverish anxiety for the bloody revolution, the fire and the looting. It therefore seems strange that Goebbels's diary says nothing about all the tension. On the evening of February 24, when the horrible discoveries were made in the Karl Liebknecht House, he notes: 'Glorious weather, snow and sun. Leave the night train after a good sleep and return refreshed to work. In the evening I deliver my attack on the Social Democrats in the Sportpalast. . . .' Not a word about the Communists!

February 25: 'Everyone is concentrating on the election campaign—not on defense against the Communist threats. 'If we win it, everything else will take care of itself.' That night there had been the fire in the Berlin Castle. Goebbels passes over this event as though no attempted Bolshevik revolution had been imminent.

February 26: 'Sunday. Vacation from my Ego. Reading, writing, and music at home. At night we hear *Götterdämmerung* in the Municipal Opera and are overcome by the eternal genius of Wagner. Now we have strength again for a whole week's work.' All this when he must have known from the evidence found in the Karl Liebknecht House that the Communists were about to launch their orgy of arson and murder.

Count Helldorf, leader of the Berlin-Brandenburg group of the S.A., was similarly unconcerned. Helldorf wielded the greatest National Socialist power in Berlin. He must have been thoroughly familiar with the disclosures about the imminent Communist revolution. That did not prevent him from making the rounds of the Berlin taverns on the night of February 27 with his friend and associate, Sixt von Arnim. In a winerom near the Nollendorfplatz, they heard that the Reichstag was burning. Now this must be the expected 'signal' for a Bolshevik revolution.

Strange to say, Helldorf did not rush post-haste to the Reichstag. On the contrary, he, who was responsible for the safety of the Leader and the Nazi Movement in Berlin, told his deputy, Sixt von

Arnim, that he was tired and was going to be related all this later as a witness in court. He left the Reichstag and see what was going on, there was anything serious.

At the same time, Hitler was eating dinner. Were they anxiously conferring about the fire hung over their heads? Oh, no—'we play it safe. . . . Suddenly a phone call from Doctor Hanfstaengl is burning. I think he is making wild jokes, Leader anything about it.'

It was no wild joke. The flames were rising, cupola; the inside was completely gutted and the police arrested a single suspect at the scene. Lubbe, twenty-four-year-old mason and vagabond who had previously belonged to the Communist Party in Holland, an asocial type of Left radical temperament. At once the official bureau flow announcements that later had to be retracted carried a Communist Party book on his person to relations with the Social Democrats. Hidden to the scene of the fire with a large escort; to a correspondent Hitler said that this was the end of Communism, and that the fist of National Socialism descend heavily upon it.

The next day Göring, through the official Press reported the plans for a Communist uprising; in cabinet he made a speech in which he claimed that a Communist deputy, had conversed with van der Lubbe for hours in the Reichstag building.' Of this, said Göring, was an 'unexceptionable proof.' The 'unexceptionable proof' of the conversation of three National Socialists, later retracted. Göring also spoke of men with torches. In an official report, he said that these men had taken an underground passage which led from the Reichstag to the Reichstag president—that is, Göring from top to bottom with S.A. men.

On the morning after the fire, Ernst Torgler

in the Karl Liebknecht House on February 27. After February 24, the German public knew of the fire and the looting. It is clear that Goebbels's diary says nothing about anything on February 24, when the horrible disaster struck the Karl Liebknecht House, he notes: 'and sun. Leave the night train after a good rest to work. In the evening I deliver my speech to the members of the Reichstag in the Sportpalast. . . . ' Not a word

one is concentrating on the election campaign against the Communist threats. 'If we win, we will take care of itself.' That night there had been a fire in the Reichstag. Goebbels passes over this event as a Bolshevik revolution had been imminent.

Vacation from my Ego. Reading, writing, thinking. At night we hear *Götterdämmerung* in the Reichstag. We are overcome by the eternal genius of Wagner. We are again for a whole week's work.' All this is known from the evidence found in the Reichstag: that the Communists were about to launch a coup d'état.

On the morning after the fire, Ernst Torgler, chairman of the Berlin-Brandenburg group of the Reichstag, reported the plans for a Communist uprising. To the assembled cabinet he made a speech in which he claimed 'that Torgler, the Communist deputy, had conversed with van der Lubbe for several hours in the Reichstag building.' Of this, said Göring, 'we have unexceptionable proof.' The 'unexceptionable proof' was the observation of three National Socialists, later rejected as false by the court. Göring also spoke of men with torches, and, according to an official report, he said that these men had escaped through an underground passage which led from the Reichstag to the palace of the Reichstag president—that is, Göring's own palace, filled from top to bottom with S.A. men.

On the morning after the fire, Ernst Torgler, chairman of the

Arnim, that he was tired and was going to bed—Helldorf himself related all this later as a witness in court. He instructed Sixt to go to the Reichstag and see what was going on, and report to him if there was anything serious.

At the same time, Hitler was eating dinner in Goebbels's house. Were they anxiously conferring about the Communist blow that hung over their heads? Oh, no—'we play music and tell stories. . . . Suddenly a phone call from Doctor Hanfstaengl: the Reichstag is burning. I think he is making wild jokes, and refuse to tell the Leader anything about it.'

It was no wild joke. The flames were rising over the Reichstag's cupola; the inside was completely gutted and the building a ruin. The police arrested a single suspect at the scene: Marinus van der Lubbe, twenty-four-year-old mason and vagabond, a Dutch subject who had previously belonged to the Communist organization in Holland, an asocial type of Left radical tendencies and definitely unbalanced. At once the official bureaus flooded the public with announcements that later had to be retracted: van der Lubbe had carried a Communist Party book on his person; he had confessed to relations with the Social Democrats. Hitler and Goebbels drove to the scene of the fire with a large escort; to an English newspaper correspondent Hitler said that this was the incendiary torch of Communism, and that the fist of National Socialism would now descend heavily upon it.

The next day Göring, through the official Prussian Press Service, reported the plans for a Communist uprising. To the assembled cabinet he made a speech in which he claimed 'that Torgler, the Communist deputy, had conversed with van der Lubbe for several hours in the Reichstag building.' Of this, said Göring, 'we have unexceptionable proof.' The 'unexceptionable proof' was the observation of three National Socialists, later rejected as false by the court. Göring also spoke of men with torches, and, according to an official report, he said that these men had escaped through an underground passage which led from the Reichstag to the palace of the Reichstag president—that is, Göring's own palace, filled from top to bottom with S.A. men.

On the morning after the fire, Ernst Torgler, chairman of the

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Communist Reichstag fraction, went to the police; he declared that the accusations against the Communists, and especially against him personally, were ridiculous and that he would refute them. He stated that he did not know van der Lubbe, had never seen him, and consequently had not made incendiary arrangements with him. Torgler was immediately arrested. The police also arrested Georgi Dimitroff, a Bulgarian, of whom they knew only that he was a prominent Bulgarian Communist. Not until more than a year later did it come out that this Dimitroff was the leader of the Central European section of the Communist International. Two other Bulgarian Communists, Popoff and Taneff, were also arrested.

As days went on, Göring's stories about the terrible Communist plans became wilder and wilder. He said that he would publish the material 'in the very near future.' Former Chancellor Brüning replied in a speech that this was good, and he only hoped that the material would soon be published. To which Hitler replied in a public speech of March 3: 'Herr Brüning may set his mind at rest. We shall publish the material.'

It was never published. If the public had then known anything about Helldorf's strange behavior on the night of the fire, further questions might have been asked. The leader of the armed might of the National Socialists in Berlin knew — if the statements about the documents from the Karl Liebknecht House are to be believed — that a Communist uprising was imminent. He knew that a fire was to be the 'signal.' He knew that two days previous an attempt at incendiarism had been discovered in the Berlin Castle. But when he heard that the Reichstag was burning, he did not go and look; he did not summon his S.A. to battle; he went to bed. His was the kind of implausible behavior that occurs only when a man is building up an alibi. And scarcely less remarkable was it that Hitler and Goebbels should have been playing music with Communist incendiary murder staring them in the face.

Months later the world was still waiting for the documents that Göring had promised to 'submit to the public in the very near future.' His police had many months' time in which to search for proofs of the attempted Communist revolution, and there were no earthly limits set to its investigation. For many months the Reich

Court investigated the fire and studied the documents were no part of it; they were court. In its verdict, to be sure, the Reich believed the Reichstag to have been set on fire the court admitted that it had no proofs of this: 'have been an act only of Left radical elements *probably!* — 'promised themselves an opportunity the government and the constitution, and seized court did a strange thing: it acquitted the two Torgler and Dimitroff, and their Communist Taneff. Only the apathetic, evidently insane admitted that he knew none of the four others; he insisted on his guilt, was condemned to death, he cremated.

Today it is as good as proved that the Reich Communist crime which the National Socialist quite so clear who really did set the fire and of a single individual, the preparations were to be assumed that the incendiaries were close toists, but their identity and methods have remained world was duped with all sorts of 'documents' presumably manufactured by the National Socialist to create confusion. Supposed confessions of it offered for sale, and the forgeries were not all. The irrefutable document in the case, however, not produced: Göring's material from the Karl

Whether a troop of S.A. men passed into the underground passage from Göring's palace of National Socialist deputies went about cushions, and carpets with inflammable liquids. At all events, the fire would be the signal for a for that 'night of the long knife' which Hitler obliged to renounce. Now the cabinet, the Reichstag, would allow him to break his promise. Göring later publicly admitted — to hang van der Lubbe the Reichstag immediately and without trial, in should see how sub-humans are exterminated;

fraction, went to the police; he declared that the Communists, and especially against him jealous and that he would refute them. He now van der Lubbe, had never seen him, and made incendiary arrangements with him. ely arrested. The police also arrested Georgi t, of whom they knew only that he was a Communist. Not until more than a year later his Dimitroff was the leader of the Central the Communist International. Two other s, Popoff and Taneff, were also arrested. öring's stories about the terrible Communist and wilder. He said that he would publish ry near future.' Former Chancellor Brüning t this was good, and he only hoped that the e published. To which Hitler replied in a 13: 'Herr Brüning may set his mind at rest. material.'

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Court investigated the fire and studied the evidence. Göring's documents were no part of it; they were not mentioned in court. In its verdict, to be sure, the Reich Court said that it believed the Reichstag to have been set on fire by Communists, but the court admitted that it had no proofs of this: 'This can't — can! — 'have been an act only of Left radical elements, who probably' — *probably!* — 'promised themselves an opportunity for overthrowing the government and the constitution, and seizing power.' Then the court did a strange thing: it acquitted the two Communist leaders, Torgler and Dimitroff, and their Communist comrades, Popoff and Taneff. Only the apathetic, evidently insane van der Lubbe, who admitted that he knew none of the four others, but stubbornly insisted on his guilt, was condemned to death, hastily executed, hastily cremated.

Today it is as good as proved that the Reichstag fire was not the Communist crime which the National Socialists made of it. It is not quite so clear who really did set the fire and how. For the work of a single individual, the preparations were too extensive. It may be assumed that the incendiaries were close to the National Socialists, but their identity and methods have remained unknown. The world was duped with all sorts of 'documents,' a number of them presumably manufactured by the National Socialists themselves, to create confusion. Supposed confessions of the incendiaries were offered for sale, and the forgeries were not always very competent. The irrefutable document in the case, however, is that which was not produced: Göring's material from the Karl Liebknecht House.

Whether a troop of S.A. men passed into the Reichstag through the underground passage from Göring's palace; or whether a band of National Socialist deputies went about sprinkling benches, cushions, and carpets with inflammable liquids, is still uncertain. At all events, the fire would be the signal for a Saint Bartholomew, for that 'night of the long knife' which Hitler had at first been obliged to renounce. Now the cabinet, the Reichswehr, the President, would allow him to break his promise. He wanted—as Göring later publicly admitted—to hang van der Lubbe in front of the Reichstag immediately and without trial, in order that the people should see how sub-humans are exterminated; he wanted the same

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fat to strike five thousand bearers of the 'Asiatic plague' throughout the country in a single night. At the scene of the fire, Hitler issued the command, and auxiliary police (S.A. and Stahlhelm) swarmed out, occupied public buildings, railroad stations, district halls, gas works. For a whole day the Reich cabinet wrangled over Hitler's projected blood-bath, and the National Socialists did not entirely have their own way. Hugenberg, and for a time Papen, wanted an immediate Reichswehr dictatorship: a state of military emergency, a régime of the commanding generals, mass arrests, suppression of political propaganda on all sides; and above all, indefinite postponement of the Reichstag elections. None of these proposals was approved by Reichswehr Minister von Blomberg. Was it not the purpose of Hitler's cabinet to spare the Reichswehr the need for military dictatorship? Hadn't the Reichswehr formed its alliance with the 'millions of determined men' in order to extricate itself from politics? The aims of the conservatives and the generals were tragically at variance, and the ultimate result of this conflict was the Third Reich as we know it today.

The power was thrust at the Reichswehr, which thrust it back, and the armed bohemians seized it. Hitler and his people did have to accept certain restrictions: van der Lubbe would not be hanged outside the Reichstag; Germany's highest court was to investigate the mysterious fire; Göring must offer better proof for his allegations against the Communists; no mass blood-bath would be sanctioned. These were the obstacles which this cabinet could place in the path of what the furious Chancellor called the salvation of Germany. Still thinking that they were the true masters of the government and well pleased that they had checked the National Socialists to some extent, the ministers decided to assume a dictatorship of their own until after the elections. Hindenburg signed an emergency decree, 'For the Protection of People and State.' It suspended the most important property rights and personal guarantees in the Reich constitution, and proclaimed: 'Therefore restrictions on personal freedom, on the right of free speech, including freedom of the press, freedom of association and meeting; infringements on the secrecy of the mails, telegraphs, and telephones; orders of house search and confiscation; as well as restrictions on the rights of

private property, even beyond the legal limits, there follow threats of heavy penalties, with relatively light offenses.

From now on the police was almost unconquerable German people. In Prussia, by far the largest of the auxiliary police, the National Socialist Party, the Minister of Police, could issue any command and be sure that the S.A. would carry ever carried out far more than its minister could the storm troopers thundered through cities and houses, arrested their enemies at dawn; drag into S.A. barracks where hideous scenes were carried out weeks and months. If the victims were not concealed in the woods or thrown into ponds usually found in a condition which an official report, described in a report to the police city of Bochum on April 6: 'A Communist was brought to the police. Since he was in no taken into custody, he was transported to a hospital shows a number of wounds resulting from blows to be intermittently unconscious and without there is danger of death. The circumstances of the injuries occurred have thus far been impossible to still in no condition to be questioned.'

At first one was lucky to be arrested on the big blacklist. These men were sent to ordinary prisons as a rule were not beaten. But terrible was the fate of the S.A. arrested for their own 'pleasure.' Given power to destroy the leadership and propagandists' parties. He imprisoned all the Communist hands on and a few Social Democratic deputy Communist press was suppressed indefinitely; and Social Democratic papers suspended for two weeks before the elections. From then on the Social Democratic meetings, while Communist meetings, were specially suppressed.

To destroy Communism, the Nazis had to

* Papen's attempt to get rid of the army agent back from Hitler's prison. Blomberg comes through, the army is sent to von Papen, and then the police is Göring.

the police.

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 night. At the scene of the fire, Hitler
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From now on the police was almost uncontested master over the
 German people. In Prussia, by far the largest state, this included
 the auxiliary police, the National Socialist private army. Göring,
 the Minister of Police, could issue any command he pleased, and
 could be sure that the S.A. would carry everything out; actually it
 carried out far more than its minister could order. By truckloads
 the storm troopers thundered through cities and villages, broke into
 houses, arrested their enemies at dawn; dragged them out of bed
 into S.A. barracks where hideous scenes were enacted in the ensuing
 weeks and months. If the victims were not beaten to death and
 concealed in the woods or thrown into ponds and rivers, they were
 usually found in a condition which an official, who has remained
 unknown, described in a report to the police press bureau of the
 city of Bochum on April 6: 'A Communist who had fled was found
 and brought to the police. Since he was in no condition for being
 taken into custody, he was transported to a hospital. His body
 shows a number of wounds resulting from blows. He was found
 to be intermittently unconscious and without pulse. At present
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At first one was lucky to be arrested on the strength of Göring's
 big blacklist. These men were sent to ordinary police prisons and
 as a rule were not beaten. But terrible was the fate of those which
 the S.A. arrested for their own 'pleasure.' Göring made use of his
 power to destroy the leadership and propaganda of the two work-
 ers' parties. He imprisoned all the Communist deputies he could lay
 hands on and a few Social Democratic deputies. The whole Com-
munist press was suppressed indefinitely; and the several hundred
Social Democratic papers suspended for two weeks. This was a
 week before the elections. From then on there were virtually no
 Social Democratic meetings, while Communist meetings were offi-
 cially suppressed.

To destroy Communism, the Nazis had to smash democracy.

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Nevertheless, elections were to be held. A people which had been deprived of all liberties should voluntarily say yes to all this. Sefton Delmer, correspondent of the London *Daily Express*, asked Hitler whether the present suspension of personal freedom in Germany would become permanent. Hitler replied: 'No! When the Communist danger is eliminated, the normal order of things will return. Our laws were too liberal to enable me to dispose of this underworld suitably and quickly enough. But I myself desire only too urgently that the normal situation shall be restored as soon as possible. But first we must put an end to Communism.'

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Account

There remained only one party of any size that was neither the declared enemy of the government nor explicitly associated with it. This was the Center. On the day after the Reichstag fire, it met to consider a course of action. Crime was openly ruling Germany; none of these men believed that the Communists had set the fire. Kaas, however, put through a resolution that for the present the Center should 'hold its peace,' and not openly accuse the government of incendiarism and falsehood. A few words of veiled though unmistakable doubt, publicly uttered by Brüning, were all that the Center Party said about the Reichstag fire.

Before the ashes of the Reichstag building were cold, the air waves were alive with National Socialist voices blaring forth details about the murderous, incendiary plans of the Communists, that had been frustrated just in time; S.A. men rushed about in trucks, drunken with victory and roaring threats at the people; in the cellars of the S.A. barracks, woolen blankets stifled the cries of victims. In a public speech Göring cried: 'My measures will not be weakened by juridical scruples or bureaucracy. My work is not to administer justice, but only to destroy and exterminate.' This was the mood governing the elections. Outside the polls, giant posters screamed: 'Your vote for Adolf Hitler!' or, 'Stamp out Communism! Crush Social Democracy!' Other placards, here and there, advocated a so-called 'Black, White, and Red Fighting Front.' This, for practical purposes, was the old German Nationalist Party, led by Hugenberg, Papen, and Franz Seldte of the Stahlhelm. Of other parties the voter saw and heard next to nothing; the Social Democrats made no speeches and issued no literature. In many smaller localities, the

polls were manned only by National Socialist secret ballot was discarded and voting took place after the secrecy of the mails and of telephone calls had been suspended, many people ceased to believe in where it was still observed.

This was the political condition which the voter was to judge. Confused by an overpowering prospect of the crumbling ruins of a disintegrating system, full of his own ability to shape a democratic system, he will to greatness apparent in the speeches of the men; face to face with tangible injustice, yet held back by his government on the necessity for hardening the Communist blood-bath; and, on top of all these threats — the German voter gave his verdict on 14 March 1933. 56.1 per cent of all the votes cast, he rejected the Nazis and its methods.

Under the normal conditions prevailing in Germany, this would have been a great victory for Hitler. He had been on a steep down grade since November 6, 1932, having recovered, obtaining 17,200,000 votes, four million below the previous peak; this was 43.9 per cent of all votes cast. National Socialism showed itself by far the strongest opposition in Germany. But greater, nevertheless, remained the mass which, with all its contradictions, was also the mass which, in its opposition to National Socialism. It was against Hitler's 17,200,000.

Of this opposing mass, 7,100,000 belonged to the Social Democrats, 4,800,000 to the Communists, a fifth of whose votes had been frightened away in these elections; 4,400,000 to the Center, a million to the related Bavarian People's Party; collectively, 3,100,000 to the Red, White, and Black Front. Of the people who voted for this last group wanted a revolutionary government, perhaps a dictatorship; they wanted Hitler and Göring, and some, without doubt, voted for Hugenberg and Papen in the belief that only men who might still be able to do something would be able to do so, and Göring.

ere to be held. A people which had been would voluntarily say yes to all this. Sefton of the London *Daily Express*, asked Hitler pension of personal freedom in Germany at. Hitler replied: 'No! When the Comed, the normal order of things will return. al to enable me to dispose of this underkly enough. But I myself desire only too situation shall be restored as soon as possut an end to Communism.'

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polls were manned only by National Socialists; occasionally the secret ballot was discarded and voting took place publicly; and after the secrecy of the mails and of telephone conversations had been suspended, many people ceased to believe in the secret ballot even where it was still observed.

This was the political condition which the voter was called upon to judge. Confused by an overpowering propaganda; stifling beneath the crumbling ruins of a disintegrating state; grown distrustful of his own ability to shape a democratic world; moved by the will to greatness apparent in the speeches and acts of the new men; face to face with tangible injustice, yet hour after hour lectured by his government on the necessity for hard measures to avert the Communist blood-bath; and, on top of all this, intimidated by threats — the German voter gave his verdict on March 5, 1933. With 56.1 per cent of all the votes cast, he rejected National Socialism and its methods.

Under the normal conditions prevailing in earlier elections, this would have been a great victory for Hitler. His party, which had been on a steep down grade since November 6, 1932, had mightily recovered, obtaining 17,200,000 votes, four million more than at its previous peak; this was 43.9 per cent of all votes cast, and National Socialism showed itself by far the strongest united mass-power in Germany. But greater, nevertheless, remained the multi-colored mass which, with all its contradictions, was absolutely united in one point, its opposition to National Socialism. It cast 20,400,000 votes against Hitler's 17,200,000.

Of this opposing mass, 7,100,000 belonged to the Social Democrats; 4,800,000 to the Communists, a fifth of whose former voters had been frightened away in these elections; 4,400,000 fell to the Catholic Center, a million to the related Bavarian People's Party; and, decisively, 3,100,000 to the Red, White, and Black Fighting Front. The people who voted for this last group wanted a conservative counter-revolutionary government, perhaps a dictatorship; in no event did they want Hitler and Göring, and some, without inner enthusiasm voted for Hugenberg and Papen in the belief that these were the only men who might still be able to do something against Hitler and Göring.

ack, White, and Red Fighting Front, the bare majority of a little over fifty-one. In itself it was a feeble majority, lacking undertake profound changes in the form. Hugenberg and Papen, Hitler could just to bring him a democratic majority in as no majority sufficient to sanction change of the constitution.

re taken into account, Hugenberg and Hitler of his success; but if the political d, they could not. On the day after the the thanks and admiration of the cabinet was already ample ground to distrust the when the government had been formed; have been lost if they had separated. As he election campaign, 'Against National egative majorities in Germany'; this state rman politics had suffered for two years, jority did not want Hitler, but it wanted o united will to confront the united will

met slight resistance when on March 6 it treets, to invade public buildings, even to less houses. Göring, Papen's 'subordinate,' tes in the provinces not to resist the en- above all, they must do nothing to pre- ing the swastika flag on public buildings. ld obtain from his 'subordinate' was that ng of the old reactionary black, white, and panting along wearily in the wake of the , looking for empty flagpoles on which to d red rags—'the typical battle-followers,' : always to be found when the danger is tion by permission of the Herr President es of Prussia. The 'best of the nation' lost e into private homes, dragged political , beat them to death or unconsciousness;

occasionally looted Jewish shops; 'borrowed' private cars, expropriated Jewish firms, to which they appointed so-called 'commissar managers'; for the most part this was done according to individual whim and no comprehensive plan. The regularity and uniformity of procedure arose from the lust for loot and pillage which for years had been nourished in these masses. Since the regular authorities had no legal basis for action against the arrested leaders of the Left parties, the S.A. established its own prisons, which it called 'concentration camps'; at first these were unoccupied factories or warehouses. The S.A. had learned the simplest rule of police repression: that the will of an imprisoned mass must first be broken by the most loathsome cruelty. Every arrest consequently began with a severe beating, and life in a concentration camp, particularly in times of overcrowding, was for most prisoners a monotonous series of kicks and blows; a coat improperly buttoned, a spot on one's clothing, a wrinkled bedcovering, inevitably meant a blow from the inspecting officer. Years of incitement from above had taught the S.A. a bestial lust for torture and murder; many who may have been good-natured human beings when they began their service in the concentration camps were gradually turned into torturers and murderers by the routine.

Trade-union leaders went to Papen and reported the excesses, submitting proofs and statements by witnesses. Papen threw up his arms and cried that he simply could not believe such things. But he need only have read the newspapers with a little care. Many of the murders could not be kept secret; the official reports of the Brown auxiliary police then stated with cynical regularity that the victim had been 'shot while trying to escape.' It became a favorite practice to hurl the victims from high windows, because this could easily be represented as suicide. An English newspaper wrote: 'The habit of jumping out of the window in an unguarded moment has cost many political prisoners in Germany their lives in the past weeks.'

Franz von Papen must have known these things. But after March 5 those forces gathered around the person and the legend of Hindenburg could no longer part company with Hitler. For after the defeat of Communism, another danger, which had hovered over Germany for some time, assumed serious forms: South German

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Minister Schaeffer out of their beds and beat them to a pulp. Prince Rupprecht, who had nearly been proclaimed regent, rapidly set out for Greece. On March 10, Hitler in Berlin issued a joyous proclamation to his party comrades: 'A gigantic upheaval has taken place in Germany,' he said. This was the 'national revolution.' From this day on, the National Socialists, throughout the country, called their enterprise a revolution.

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R.T.

The looting of Jewish shops, the theft of automobiles, the violent expropriation of businesses and houses; the torture and murder of political enemies had swollen to an orgy of mass terror; once again the melancholy lesson of history was confirmed, that nothing turns people so rapidly into beasts as a great cause. And yet, humanity rebelled against this hideous form of greatness; people who had voted National Socialist, even on March 5, grumbled; the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, a newspaper close to industry, had courage to protest. In his proclamation, Hitler wrung his hands and asked for an end of the atrocities; delicately, he referred to the misdeeds of his men as 'molestation of individual persons, obstruction of autos, and interference with business life'; this, he said, must stop. On March 12, he flew victoriously to Munich, alighted from the plane and made a little speech: 'Years ago I here took up the struggle, the first part of which may now be considered as ended. A co-ordination (*Gleichschaltung*) of political life, such as we have never before experienced, has been completed.'

One people, one state, one machine, one stream — that is what Hitler meant by his engineer's term; society can be guided; we have discovered this, and that is why we have our hand on the controls. Only seven days before, the German people had examined its conscience in the solitude of the election booth, and its majority had rejected Hitler; but this solitude was at an end when the S.A. filled the streets and shouted up at the windows: 'Flags out!' The people were now drawn into the 'streets and squares,' by the ruse of pageantry, but also by the violence of fists knocking on doors and voices speaking through the keyhole: 'Everyone out to hear the Leader's speech.'

The omnipresence of society, which embraces the individual in every state form, began to grow noisy. Hitler liked to maintain

that his state was the best democracy; 'democracy,' as Goebbels some months later did at the meeting of the League of Nations; 'scure the will of the people streaming up by parliamentary intercalations.' There was than the speakers themselves believed. F armies, police, judges, but the so-called 'w most imperceptibly, but most effectively, t individual; caught in the popular will or individual is carried upward by the mounti by the receding wave — this is human n tirely prevented by the most excellent state of the liberal state that it did make room science amid the maelstrom of the mass; t a freedom of choice, which he himself was

The new democracy, ennobled by flags, c camps, now quickly put an end to this lil vates its citizens by education. Set in mot their own, that section of the people which began to forget its remnant of personal obeyed its own judgment, but the great s march columns and thought for all. The s broken apart by the disintegration of the p Socialist propaganda skillfully exploited the desires. Even those who were most violer Socialism could not deny its reality; and t attraction. The bitterest hatred against H grandeur of the mass drama that was bre no political conviction could banish from march rhythm of the Horst Wessel song. plished facts called forth reluctant admirat ness, even when it is hostile, degenerated, i into an ugly fanaticism and servility. N nightmare of foreign grandeur, had appear now he belonged to them, as though create longing; Fate, which had denied them vi lately gave them, if not victory, a victory

very good!
D. ti. Later, a ^{very good!} ~~quarter~~ by the named Heiden declared "the melancholy ~~lesson~~ ^{lesson} of history was confirmed — nothing turns people so rapidly into beasts as a great cause."
Let no one say that we devils are the only ones who understand human nature.

of their beds and beat them to a pulp. Prince arly been proclaimed regent, rapidly set out 0, Hider in Berlin issued a joyous proclamations: 'A gigantic upheaval has taken place in is was the 'national revolution.' From this icialists, throughout the country, called their

shops, the theft of automobiles, the violent sses and houses; the torture and murder of vollen to an orgy of mass terror; once again if history was confirmed, that nothing turns beasts as a great cause. And yet, humanity ideous form of greatness; people who had ; even on March 5, grumbled; the *Deutsche* newspaper close to industry, had courage to nation, Hitler wrung his hands and asked ies; delicately, he referred to the misdeeds of of individual persons, obstruction of autos, business life'; this, he said, must stop. On riously to Munich, alighted from the plane h: 'Years ago I here took up the struggle, may now be considered as ended. A *col- tung*) of political life, such as we have d, has been completed.'

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: society, which embraces the individual in a to grow noisy. Hitler liked to maintain

that his state was the best democracy; 'an ennobled form of democracy,' as Goebbels some months later declared to newspapermen at the meeting of the League of Nations; only that we do not 'ob- 1933 secure the will of the people streaming upward or render it infertile by parliamentary intercalations.' There was more truth in this lie than the speakers themselves believed. For it is not the force of armies, police, judges, but the so-called 'will of the people,' that almost imperceptibly, but most effectively, tyrannizes the will of the individual; caught in the popular will or the social mood, the individual is carried upward by the mounting flood or drawn down by the receding wave—this is human nature and cannot be entirely prevented by the most excellent state. But it was to the credit of the liberal state that it did make room for the individual conscience amid the maelstrom of the mass; that it did force upon him a freedom of choice, which he himself was far from always desiring.

The new democracy, ennobled by flags, drums, and concentration camps, now quickly put an end to this liberal freedom which elevates its citizens by education. Set in motion through no effort of their own, that section of the people which had hitherto resisted now began to forget its remnant of personal conscience; it no longer obeyed its own judgment, but the great super-mind which led the march columns and thought for all. The soul of the individual was broken apart by the disintegration of the popular will, and National Socialist propaganda skillfully exploited the lack of logic in human desires. Even those who were most violently opposed to National Socialism could not deny its reality; and this reality was a mighty attraction. The bitterest hatred against Hitler could not deny the grandeur of the mass drama that was breaking over the nation— no political conviction could banish from the world the eternal march rhythm of the Horst Wessel song. The power of accomplished facts called forth reluctant admiration; the worship of big- ness, even when it is hostile, degenerated, in the Germany of 1933, into an ugly fanaticism and servility. Napoleon, the century-old nightmare of foreign grandeur, had appeared among the Germans; now he belonged to them, as though created and achieved by their longing; Fate, which had denied them victory in 1918, now belatedly gave them, if not victory, a victory celebration.

Goebbels chooses the action 573

THE REICHSTAG FIRE

573

R FUEHRER

r and that resistance would serve no
ated men by fear and hope; which did
ls of power, but permeated the whole
d itself by laws, but commanded and
ding to circumstance—had its models
s that Lycurgus, the Spartan lawgiver,
a laws; 'for he believed that the most
rees, aimed at the happiness and virtue
nd immutable only if they have been
character of the citizens by education,
ey have a bond which is stronger than
e other hand, he held it advisable not to
nulae and immutable customs, all the
ate to trade and commerce and which
is way and that, but to leave them to the
ent men. . . . ' It was into such an 'educa-
ned gradually to remold the old 'legisla-
: measure in this direction on March 14,
his cabinet, a 'Ministry for Popular En-
da,' and entrusted it to the most willing
who until then had implemented his
n the party: Doctor Joseph Goebbels.
unsuccessful novelist, an unsuccessful
ssful film writer—all this side by side
remely successful political speaker. He
that all success in these fields is merely
was convinced, far more seriously than
standards, could be forced on a nation
al theaters of Germany suddenly began
novel *Michael* suddenly found a mass
ae was the minister. This was the be-
tellectual tornado, in which the driest
rs whom no one had wanted to read
in their buttonholes, up to terrified pub-
print large editions; incompetence loudly
repressed only because of its patriotic

opinions; at his crowded banquets, Hitler suddenly found himself
sitting beside actresses, no longer exactly in their prime, who whis-
pered to him how they had been kept down by the old Jewish
theater clique; players of second- or third-rate rôles suddenly turned
up at rehearsals and announced that in the name of the Leader
they were assuming the direction of this theater, which from now
on should serve the true German intellectual effort; and the drama
critic of the National Socialist newspaper was on the spot with a
play from the days of Frederick the Great, or, if he was a little more
modern, with a so-called front-line drama from the World War; if
he was a real genius, the product might be entitled *S.A. Man
Kruse, a Life of Struggle for Nation and Leader*; Jewish publishers
of big democratic newspapers began to ask a local reporter for his
political advice, because he was reputed to be a member of an S.A.
group in his free time.

If ever the bankrupts and intellectually underprivileged have had
a period of greatness, it was in the spring of 1933, in the realms of
literature, theater, press, and film in Germany; the wild determina-
tion of thousands of shipwrecked, untalented careerists to make
something of themselves on this great occasion, merely by pro-
claiming their political faith, gave the so-called National Socialist
Revolution a powerful impetus, absolutely genuine in the human
sense, an impetus arising from the most primitive instincts of greed.
With the skill of a true general, Goebbels hurled this army of in-
competent opportunists and job-hunters against the large and small
key positions of German intellectual life, and took them by storm.
The radio, which in principle had always been an instrument of the
government in Germany, but for reasons of objectivity had scarcely
been used for political struggle by former governments, was imme-
diately taken in hand by Goebbels, and men of doubtful reputa-
tion even by National Socialist standards were appointed heads of
the big stations; for these shady characters, owing to their lack of
other accomplishments, were at least reliable.

These new lords and masters, suddenly raised to the light
from obscurity and personal nonentity, looked important in their
silver-braided uniforms and helped to spread a mood of sudden
bliss. The unexpected had suddenly come to pass, nothing had be-

come something; wonders were still possible. That the man whom his own party comrade Rosenberg had kicked through the doorway when he came begging for ten marks had suddenly become Minister of the Interior and omnipotent master in Bavaria seemed like the confirmation of some Messianic prophecy. For years millions had thought that everything must be changed; for thousands the change had now come to pass.

Under Goebbels's direction, the parvenus now staged a great victory celebration; the outward occasion was the convening of the newly elected Reichstag. As the scene, Goebbels had chosen the grave of Frederick the Great, that Prussian King whom the National Socialists rather unaccountably proclaimed as the first German socialist. The Garnisonkirche (garrison church) in Potsdam near Berlin, where the Prussian Kings lie buried, is looked upon by a limited number of people in Germany as a national shrine, somewhat comparable to Independence Hall in Philadelphia, or, even more, to the Invalides in Paris. For the Prussian officers' corps, above all, this place is endowed with a sentimental aura; to the German public the city of Weimar, with its memories of the great German poets, is far dearer; it is with good reason that the German Republic was founded in Weimar. And now, as a calculated gesture, Weimar was to be replaced by Potsdam.

On March 21, the members of the Reichstag met in the Garnisonkirche, but the Left parties were not invited. Prior to the act of state, the members of the government and the Reichstag had attended services at various churches. Hitler and Goebbels were conspicuous by their absence. 'In the morning I go to the Luisenstadt Cemetery with the Leader,' writes Goebbels. 'We do not attend the services, but stand at the graves of our fallen comrades.'

Then a glittering procession poured into the Garnisonkirche. Hindenburg read a short speech, in which he maintained that the people had 'with a clear majority shown its support of this government appointed by my confidence' — meaning that everything is in the best democratic order, but this applies only to the present government, mind you, not to a purely National Socialist régime. 'Thereby,' Hindenburg continued, 'the people have given the government a constitutional basis for its work.' Hitler, in one of his

most bombastic speeches, promised that the new 'restore the primacy of politics,' which may mean that politics was more important than the Hindenburg, for whose benefit the whole show, arose with difficulty from his place and crypt; those assembled could peer through the ceiling as he stood deep in thought at the tomb of the Great. The ceremony was accompanied by the shouting of the S.A. and the Stahlhelm. At the tomb, the assemblage drove back to Berlin; in the House, near the Reichstag, the new parliamentary business session, again chose Göring as president to hear Hitler's government statement two days later. It was already a rump parliament. Of the 100 members whom were imprisoned, none, of course, had any voice; twenty Social Democrats were absent, most of them in flight.

From this Reichstag the government demanded that the President should retire for four years, and that legislation to the government. The sole restriction on the Reichsrat — the semi-parliamentary body of individual German states. The President, now with a legislative majority in the Reichstag, automatically the background; this was expressly confirmed and he was deprived of his right — a mere formality — to sign laws. The government itself in this dictatorship law; in the cabinet session of March 23 it was unanimously accepted. Later, this enabling law extended, but historically the first draft has remained of the National Socialist Reich. Its most important provisions were:

Article 1. Laws can be passed, not only by the Reichstag, but also by the Reich President.

Article 2. The laws decreed by the Reich government from the Reich constitution in so far as they conflict with the laws of the Reich are null and void.

D.T. This is interesting, Frederick the Great had, after all, no great respect for Goethe — considered him overrated and without a real grasp of the what one may call the more real of the realities. Perfect. From Weimar to Potsdam.

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cannot lead us to tolerate those who despise the law as a matter of principle; we cannot surrender the nation to these people'—if here, as so often, he cloaked a grim announcement in a phrase of artificial banality, in the next sentence he became quite frank: 'Equality before the law will be granted to all those who stand behind the nation and do not deny the government their support.' But those who deny the government their support have, as Hitler had stated earlier, 'no rights whatever.' Then came the conclusion, for the sake of which the whole speech was made: 'The government offers the parties an opportunity for a peaceful German development and for the future conciliation that can grow out of it. But it is equally determined and ready to take up any challenge of rejection and resistance. Now, gentlemen, you yourselves may make your decision: will it be peace or war?'

War was Hitler's last word, his eternal war against the other half of the people. In the galleries, in the corridors between the deputies' benches, stood S.S. and S.A. men with pistols at their belts. Göring, in his president's chair, looked out over the hall through binoculars as though prepared at any moment to command: 'Fire!' Otto Wels, leader of the Social Democrats, explained why his party would vote against the dictatorship law; it was a clear speech of rejection, but between Göring's binoculars and the pistols of the S.A., Wels no longer dared to say what was happening in the country and how the masses really felt. The S.A. had ceased to limit its acts of violence to Communists and Socialists; already they were invading courthouses, dragging out Jewish lawyers and thrashing them through the streets. Protests had been raised abroad; refugees had reported some of the atrocities; Hitler roared at Wels that the Social Democratic International was helping to spread these lies—he actually called them lies. Kaas explained why the Center, despite all its misgivings, would vote for the government's dictatorial powers. He recalled Hitler's promises, and all the National Socialists applauded. A few small splinter parties made dejected speeches for the affirmative. And then the mutilated Reichstag submitted, avoiding war. The attitude of the Center was decisive; with 441 against 94 Social Democrats the law was passed. The National Socialist fraction jumped up and sang the Horst Wessel song.

pp 525-577 may make
his above paragraph more
comprehensible.

Chapter XX

COUP D'ÉTAT INSTALLMENT

FROM THE AFTERNOON OF MAY
was dictator, created by democracy and although he was still bound to his cabin being independent of Hindenburg now, minute to pass before showing it. As the two detectives went up to the governor Günther Gereke, who was still Reich President. Hitler arranged to have Hindenburg in connection with the vanished funds of the committee, most probably with the intention these funds had remained in the hands of the government. The case was tried before two courts; for years, but refused to say what had been intimating that he was shielding high-society people would be grateful to be treated to the very midst of the cabinet. Ministry: If we are radical toward the masses toward ourselves.

The movement was bursting bulwark 30 seemed built for all eternity; the *coup d'état* Zion was assuming the traits of a real intellectual no longer followed only the crowd

those who despise the law as a matter of order the nation to these people' — if here, grim announcement in a phrase of art-sentence he became quite frank: 'Equal-granted to all those who stand behind the government their support.' But those their support have, as Hitler had stated er.' Then came the conclusion, for the speech was made: 'The government offers for a peaceful German development and that can grow out of it. But it is equally take up any challenge of rejection and re- you yourselves may make your decision:

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1933

Chapter XXIII

COUP D'ÉTAT BY INSTALLMENTS

FROM THE AFTERNOON OF MARCH 23, 1933, HITLER

was dictator, created by democracy and appointed by parliament, although he was still bound to his cabinet. But he could boast of being independent of Hindenburg now, and he allowed scarcely a minute to pass before showing it. As the deputies were leaving, two detectives went up to the government bench and arrested Günther Gereke, who was still Reich Commissar for Re-Employment. Hitler arranged to have Hindenburg's favorite prosecuted in connection with the vanished funds of the Hindenburg Committee, most probably with the intention of showing publicly that these funds had remained in the hands of Oskar von Hindenburg. The case was tried before two courts; Gereke was sent to prison for years, but refused to say what had become of the money, darkly intimating that he was shielding high-placed persons; and that some day people would be grateful to him. So the terror penetrated to the very midst of the cabinet. Hitler declared, with dignity: If we are radical toward the masses, we must be radical toward ourselves. *

The movement was bursting bulwarks which even on January 30 seemed built for all eternity; the *coup d'état* of the Wise Men of Zion was assuming the traits of a real revolution. The armed intellectual no longer followed only the commands of his leaders, now

* D. T. I felt like a coach who had worked for years with an athlete of considerable promise but dubious character, intermittently hard and timid. Now, he had developed. I was a proud coach. He understood the basic premise and from now on would count on it — no man is free entirely of his past, but if he should be then I would be found guilty of his associates.

him and forcibly seized the posts studied. The intellectual proletariat here was a class which could give streamed out of the overcrowded created new ones for themselves. For ring from a surplus of men with man universities there were some students. It had been reliably calculated three hundred and thirty thousand ons of academic training, and since ned active for an average of thirty-thousand such positions became free duration of study at five years, this forty thousand students only fifty ployment, while nearly twice that vere without hope. At the end of ose graduated from the universities ork. The great moment had now

At the head of S.A. squads, young shed their Jewish colleagues out of brown-shirted student groups, young drove Jewish professors out of the sed those hopeless masses of the soht that the great hour of vengeance They, too, were led by intellectuals.

Adrian von Renteln, leader of the l also been appointed leader of the movement. This National Socialist rm the department stores, occasion-orce, while National Socialist intel-of the big Jewish newspapers, and sibility that they were now taking mmissars of the national revolution. times able to bribe these revolution-carry on under their protection. But ul; louder and louder grew the com-jective justice' Jews had been mis-to death.

This was something stronger than system. Hardly anything could have been worse for the young National Socialist régime than a premature anti-Semitic economic revolution. But no more than Lenin in 1917 was able to forbid the Russian peasants to seize the land was Hitler able to curb a human type that demanded economic security and had learned that this was his right at the expense of an inferior and hostile race.

Was this a pogrom, an anti-Semitic blood-bath? In a conversation with a foreign journalist, Hitler maintained that less than twenty persons had lost their lives in the 'national awakening.' This was doubtless a conscious falsehood. A careful compilation from official reports in German newspapers shows that in the time from January 31 to August 23, 1933, at least a hundred and sixty opponents of the National Socialists were killed, either in street clashes, 'shot while trying to escape,' 'jumping out of the window in an unguarded moment,' or 'hanging themselves in prison.' The figure one hundred and sixty represents those admitted by the National Socialists; the true figure must be considerably higher, for it has been proved that many murders were not reported in the press. These atrocities caused widespread indignation abroad. The foreign newspaper reader may well have imagined at times that Germany was swimming in a sea of blood. Spontaneous protests arose; most effectively in the United States, where in some sections an effective boycott against German goods was organized.

There was an attempt at a world protest against something which, it was felt, might become an attempted world pogrom; for the S.A. man who killed a Jew in Germany felt, vaguely at least, that he was killing a fragment of world Jewry. But the mass of National Socialist atrocities in the spring of 1933 was directed, not against Jews, but against political foes; most of the Jews murdered or tortured were Communists or Socialists. Social Democrats and Communists, it is true, had a worse time of it if they were Jews; in the concentration camps they were segregated and treated with special harshness. But primarily the blow was directed against 'Marxism,' the socialist and democratic Left; in the National Socialist formulation, the political weapon of Jewry must be broken, not yet Jewry itself. But though it was primarily the political foe and

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not the Jewish race which fell a victim to the bestial cruelty of the S.A., it was the persecution of the Jews that produced the strongest reaction abroad.

The National Socialists declared that here again the influence of Jewish world power was at work. The true reason lay deeper. Up till this time, foreign countries, as well as the German public, had been lulled by the National Socialists in the comfortable faith that 'things would not be so bad'; that the anti-Jewish agitation was not meant so seriously; that the breaking of interest slavery was not meant seriously; that the war speeches were not meant seriously. Now it turned out that this was a lie. The anti-Semitic agitation was meant seriously — perhaps the war speeches as well. The persecution of political enemies — bestial as it was — was still part of the political struggle; but the attack on the Jews was an assault on a peaceful group. The ambassadors of foreign powers uttered polite warnings; Hugenberg and Papen apparently tried to restrain Hitler; Hjalmar Schacht spoke with his habitual bluntness; it was fortunate for Hitler that he had so devoted a personal admirer in Reichswehr Minister von Blomberg. Hitler had to find a way out, and what a way he found!

On March 26, Goebbels wrote in his diary:

In the night I go to Berchtesgaden, whither the Leader has summoned me. Up there in the mountain solitude he has pondered the whole matter fully and has come to a decision. We shall make headway against the foreign lie only if we get our hands on its originators or at least beneficiaries, those Jews living in Germany who have thus far remained unmolested. We must, therefore, proceed to a large-scale boycott of all Jewish business in Germany. Perhaps the foreign Jews will think better of the matter when their racial comrades in Germany begin to get it in the neck.

This was a sudden, unexpected attack on the Jewish world power, at first not foreseen by Hitler himself; at the same time a test of the existence of such a Jewish world power. Presumably Goebbels believed in it no more in 1933 than in 1925; this is implied by his carefully chosen words about 'originators or at least beneficiaries.' But Hitler, in the depth of his feeling, if not of his intelligence, was

surely convinced of the Jewish world conspiracy. If he had not hated the Jews in Germany, he would, in harming innocent persons. By a mass mobilization, the party was in a position to stop the shops, in this way destroying their owners by the use of extreme violence. It was a senseless plan. Schacht that Hitler had to learn that the economic Jews would create an economic vacuum into which they would suck in large numbers of Germans; Schacht to resign. If Goebbels is to be believed, the fear in the cabinet that the Jewish question might frighten Hitler, in his mountain solitude, had been a practicable scheme; for the first time since he had gone out of his way to invite difficulties, to make unnecessary enemies.

What Hitler might have been if he had not hated the Jews. This was more than the half-humorous sigh of a man who would have liked to join him. M. Goring, who had come for a visit, that the might cost Germany the friendship of Italy, for pose herself to a struggle either with the spook with the reality of Jewish influence in international politics. And, subsequently, Goring, more than any other leader, soft-pedaled the Jewish question. The man who was Julius Streicher of Nuremberg, Gaulle, whose pornographic lunacy had strengthened the conviction that the anti-Semitism of the Nazis could not be a mere consternation even of many National Socialists. He announced that Streicher would direct the boycott, who still remembered Hitler's early speeches, in which he had shown the Jew, consciously and for political motives, as a danger to the Aryan peoples sexually, degraded their sense of honor, life, and subjugated them morally by desecrating their graves. But it was known that for Streicher the 'racial question' was other than a struggle between Aryan and Jewish blood; it was a struggle for the domination of the feminine sex; that he seldom spoke of his agitation; that his illustrated newspaper, Der

* This was a matter of immense seriousness. H.H.

* Get Rabel!

To do a war against world Jewry was a dangerous step. I might have consulted the O.C. I did not know his dispositions in the rest of the world nor how many serious and important people, clients he led who would be injured in such a thorough-going engagement. Despite the nature of the response which he gave, and not too revealing — "On balance, allow him to proceed." I recognized that something larger than any compromise was at stake. And so I decided to follow up — "Encourage him on this course."

H.H. a large-scale boycott of Jewish business in Germany would develop into an all-out world economic and ideological war. — back to *

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tion of the Jews that produced the strongest

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shops, in this way destroying their owners economically without
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Schacht that Hitler had to learn that the economic destruction of
the Jews would create an economic vacuum which would inevi-
tably suck in large numbers of Germans; Schacht even threatened
to resign. If Goebbels is to be believed, the fear was even expressed
in the cabinet that the Jewish question might bring war. Unques-
tionably Hitler, in his mountain solitude, had thought out an im-
practicable scheme; for the first time since he had been Chancellor,
he had gone out of his way to invite difficulties, to lose sympathies,
to make unnecessary enemies.

What Hitler might have been if he had not alienated the Jews!
This was more than the half-humorous sigh of lukewarm reaction-
aries, who would have liked to join him. Mussolini threatened
Göring, who had come for a visit, that the anti-Jewish agitation
might cost Germany the friendship of Italy, for Italy could not ex-
pose herself to a struggle either with the spook of world Jewry or
with the reality of Jewish influence in international economic life.
And, subsequently, Göring, more than any other National Socialist
leader, soft-pedaled the Jewish question. The most vociferous anti-
Semite was Julius Streicher of Nuremberg, *gauleiter* of Franconia,
whose pornographic lunacy had strengthened many in the belief
that the anti-Semitism of the Nazis could not be serious. To the
consternation even of many National Socialists, it was now an-
nounced that Streicher would direct the boycott. There were few
who still remembered Hitler's early speeches, in which he set forth
how the Jew, consciously and for political motives, poisoned the
Aryan peoples sexually, degraded their sense of honor and emotional
life, and subjugated them morally by desecrating their women.
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his agitation; that his illustrated newspaper, *Der Stürmer*, was the

* Geli Raubel!

* Streicher on perversion: "Cheap
but winning gifts offered to
the private parts of German
women by these Jewish lovers."

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soul of indecency; that he himself ecstatically wallowed in filth and made libertinism his religion. Now that he had come to power in Nuremberg, he went so far as to clip the hair of girls who had been friendly with Jews and publicly exhibit the couples in amusement parks; in his domain, Jewish prisoners were forced to eat grass which had previously been befouled; in a public speech, he boasted of having personally thrashed a defenseless prisoner. With all this, Streicher spoke and acted aloud what Hitler secretly thought and desired; his *Stürmer*, Streicher claimed, was the only newspaper which the Leader read from cover to cover, including the rather detailed drawings of Christian girls being raped by Hebrew voluptuaries; with his concentration on the pornographic aspects of racism, Streicher was the embodiment of Hitler's subconscious. This grimacing faun was now raised from his semi-obscurity and shown to the world as the face of National Socialism.

It was the true face, and herein lay the strength of this policy, for in general no strong policy can be carried out secretly in the long run. This was the appearance of a world type which meant to carry on a world struggle, to unite the 'Aryans of all countries.' It was the premature beginning of a long-term propaganda: the Jews have attacked us, we are only defending ourselves; the Jews incite the world against Germany—Germany doesn't want to harm the world in any way; it is they who desire the struggle, not we; peaceful peoples are the tools and the victims—against our will. The various excuses were lies, but as to the great aim, there could be no deception: it was spiritual world conquest. Here and there an inept thrust might fail; but a powerful policy does not conquer by individual thrusts, but by persistent pursuit of its aim and constant—though not always successful—adaptation to circumstances. In fourteen years of political struggle, Hitler had made many mistakes and false steps, but through errors and failures he had nevertheless become a force attracting greater and greater successes. Prematurely driven by circumstance, he now initiated a new and powerful policy with a small failure.

To destroy the German Jews economically at one stroke soon proved impossible. The most benevolent supporters, the best foreign friends, gave warning. The United German Societies in New York

cabled to Hitler, 'in conjunction with local German and American citizenship,' declaring that they strongly against the anti-German agitation in a view to warding off attacks, requested a 'strictly legal, political, and economic situation of the Reich.' At Hitler's behest an official in the Chancellery Hitler thanks you for your co-operation in Jewish agitation. German Jews, like all others, are treated according to their attitude toward the Defensive action of the National Socialist Party. The challenging behavior of German Jews at home sent numerous messages abroad, requesting boycott; Cyrus Adler, president of the Jewish American Jewish Committee, cabled to Berlin that the Jewish body in America had inspired the boys his friends were doing everything in their agitation.

This might already be called a result, even begun. The Jewish world power did not show if Hitler was not yet strong enough to carry out strong enough to intimidate and divide the enemy. Hastily this straw was seized. Hitler was able. 'world Jew' had already capitulated; for the could temporarily abandon a plan that was inexecutable, and postpone the economic annihilation. He was sure, a demonstration boycott was organized kind of party holiday. S.A. men stood outside, barred admission, though occasionally a relapse through. Hitler and his followers forcibly that they had won a victory and silenced world. atrocity propaganda has abated perceptibly, in the diary. The events soon contradicted him; but that National Socialism was fighting for the for Germany; and that this struggle would last are faced,' he wrote on April 2, clearly upon a spiritual campaign of conquest, which must last the whole world exactly as we have carried it

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cabled to Hitler, 'in conjunction with local German Jews of German
and American citizenship,' declaring that they themselves 'protested
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a view to warding off attacks, requested a 'statement on the future
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At Hitler's behest an official in the Chancellery wired back: 'Chan-
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Defensive action of the National Socialist Party is necessitated by
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at home sent numerous messages abroad, requesting cessation of the
boycott. Cyrus Adler, president of the Jewish Agency and the
American Jewish Committee, cabled to Berlin that no responsible
Jewish body in America had inspired the boycott, and that he and
his friends were doing everything in their power to oppose the
agitation.

This might already be called a result, even before the struggle had
begun. The Jewish world power did not show itself very powerful;
if Hitler was not yet strong enough to carry out his boycott, he was
strong enough to intimidate and divide the enemy by a mere threat.
Hastily this straw was seized. Hitler was able to maintain that the
'world Jew' had already capitulated; for the present, therefore, he
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ticable, and postpone the economic annihilation of the Jews. To
be sure, a demonstration boycott was organized for April 1, as a
kind of party holiday. S.A. men stood outside Jewish shops and
barred admission, though occasionally a rebellious public broke
through. Hitler and his followers forcibly persuaded themselves
that they had won a victory and silenced world Jewry; 'the foreign
atrocious propaganda has abated perceptibly,' wrote Goebbels in his
diary. The events soon contradicted him; but he was fully aware
that National Socialism was fighting for the world and not only
for Germany; and that this struggle would last a long time. 'We
are faced,' he wrote on April 2, clearly quoting Hitler, 'with a
spiritual campaign of conquest, which must be carried through in
the whole world exactly as we have carried it through in Germany.

* Goering: I am the nearest thing
you have to a friend in this
new era, and I advise you,
man to man, write to your
influential fellow Jews in
America. Get them to understand
how much that German boycott in
German goods is hurting dear
Jews here in Germany.

1933

In the end, the world will learn to understand us.' The Jews, he said, would do well to keep silent about their persecution in Germany. 'For the more they speak of it, the more acute becomes the Jewish question, and once the world begins to concern itself with this question, it will always be solved to the detriment of the Jews.'

Through these words shines the truth that National Socialism does not find the question of Jewish world domination ready-made, but creates it. National Socialist Germany suddenly cast this question upon the world, probably sooner than originally intended; but from then on systematically, not only by means of speeches, but by a conspicuous act: stringent anti-Semitic legislation. It was legally established that the Jews were not citizens with equal rights; in unofficial speeches it was stated that they were not human. Or, as Goebbels had said in a pamphlet, *The Nazi-Sozi*, in 1932, 'Certainly, the Jew is also a man, but the flea is also an animal,' and the other animals do not harbor and cultivate the flea, but exterminate it; as Walter Buch, chairman of Hitler's highest party court, expressed it some years later: 'The Jew is not a human being, he is a manifestation of decay.' In most of the countries of central and western Europe, the Jews were profoundly fused with the rest of the population; in some places they were scarcely distinguishable. The Jews in the German city of Worms on the Rhine boasted that they had been living there longer than the Germanic population; their cemetery showed tombstones from the fourth century A.D. In the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the Jews of Regensburg on the Danube were threatened with annihilation because their ancestors had crucified Christ, they replied: it could not have been the ancestors of the Regensburg Jews, for they had been living in Regensburg even before the crucifixion. Not even the anti-Semites denied that the Jews played a large part in the economic rise of Germany in the nineteenth century; Richard Wagner regarded the creation of the economic age as the sin of the modern Jews. It was a Jew, Walter Rathenau, who at the beginning of the First World War, created the essentials of German economic mobilization; it was the same Jew who, toward the end of the war, made a profound impression on the German youth with his prophecy that the economic age was drawing to an end.

The attack of the National Socialists w Jews in economic life. Here it became really had dawned. The economic was nc Jew in economic life no longer seemed which subjected economic life, was able. German Jews in its economy and to drav new the times were was to be learned w man middle class, which critics, still t economic age, have declared to be the for ism. This middle class might have had t Semitic feeling; for years the small inc carrying on a hard fight against depart shops which in Germany belonged predor Point 16 of the party program even decla stores would be broken up and their spac men; representatives of small business w the department stores, looking over the pl ing. Seldom has a party so bitterly disapp as National Socialism these small-busines Hess stated that the party leadership r with the aim of abolishing department sto bling department stores as not indicated therefore forbade 'any actions against dep prises resembling department stores.' The continued to thrive for years.

It was not the Jewish businessman, bu who was excluded from German society b ment administration and the practice of intellectual professions. Frick submitted cabinet showing that the great majority c some courts even the majority of the jud Jewish utterances to the effect that the Jew favor so high a proportion. There had b struction of the Jewish masses by the boy Jewish share in the state proved a plan of which good will and sense of justice avai cials had entered some branches predomir

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1933

The attack of the National Socialists was not directed against the Jews in economic life. Here it became apparent that a new day really had dawned. The economic was no longer dominant, and the Jew in economic life no longer seemed dangerous; the new state, which subjected economic life, was able for many years to use the German Jews in its economy and to draw profit from them. How new the times were was to be learned with bitterness by the German middle class, which critics, still thinking in terms of the economic age, have declared to be the force behind National Socialism. This middle class might have had the most grounds for anti-Semitic feeling; for years the small independent shop had been carrying on a hard fight against department stores and one-price shops which in Germany belonged predominantly to Jewish capital. Point 16 of the party program even declared that these department stores would be broken up and their space rented to small-business men; representatives of small business were already going around the department stores, looking over the places they thought of renting. Seldom has a party so bitterly disappointed its own supporters as National Socialism these small-business men; on July 7, Rudolf Hess stated that the party leadership regarded 'active measures with the aim of abolishing department stores and enterprises resembling department stores as not indicated for the present,' and he therefore forbade 'any actions against department stores and enterprises resembling department stores.' The Jewish department stores continued to thrive for years.

It was not the Jewish businessman, but the Jewish intellectual, who was excluded from German society in 1933, first from government administration and the practice of the law, later from other intellectual professions. Frick submitted statistics to the Reich cabinet showing that the great majority of Berlin lawyers, and in some courts even the majority of the judges, were Jews; he cited Jewish utterances to the effect that the Jews themselves ought not to favor so high a proportion. There had been resistance to the destruction of the Jewish masses by the boycott, but reduction of the Jewish share in the state proved a plan of great popularity, against which good will and sense of justice availed nothing. Jewish officials had entered some branches predominantly through the influ-

* D.T. the O.O. had also indicated that the pressure against the Jews was to be intermittent and contradictory - no need to lay on hat tactics.

1933

ence of the Left parties; and in order to show that these Jews were party favorites of Marxism, bacilli of Jewish world revolution, and hence the born enemies of the ruling intellectual, the first anti-Semitic law issued by the Hitler government, through Frick on April 7, 1933, was called the 'Law for the restoration of the professional civil service.' Its key sentence was: 'Officials of non-Aryan origin are to be retired.'

Similar laws followed in quick succession. Jews were no longer allowed to teach at universities; were not admitted to the judiciary; were not allowed to practice law or serve as physicians for insurance companies; their attendance at schools of all types was limited to 1.5 per cent. At Hindenburg's insistence, those who had served as soldiers during the war or had fought in the Free Corps of the counter-revolution — for there were some — were exempted from these harsh measures. In later years even these Jews had no Hindenburg to protect them.

Some time later, other special laws drove the Jews out of journalism, literature, and theater; they were forbidden to write for newspapers, books written by them might not be published; Jewish painters were forbidden to paint. In short, the Jews were rapidly excluded from all spheres of intellectual and artistic life; for these, after all, were the key positions of the 'educational state.' Wilhelm Furtwängler, the non-Jewish conductor, opposed Goebbels in an open letter, demanding 'that men like Bruno Walter, Otto Klemperer, Max Reinhardt, etc., must continue in the future to express themselves in Germany'; for 'in the last analysis I recognize but one dividing line: that between good and bad art.' Goebbels replied that Furtwängler was very much mistaken, 'Art in the absolute sense, as known under liberal democracy, must not be; art and intellect — and this is his meaning — are only instruments of domination; he, Goebbels, for example, was also an artist, whose task it was 'to mold the firm and well-shapen image of the nation from the raw material of the mass.'

This molding proceeded with great thoroughness, and the slightest and subtlest traces of the combated influences were burned out of the masses. For the first time the German public was made aware that one could be a Jew without wanting to be or perhaps

even knowing it. For the first time the I ceased in teaching the whole world what the of race. Hitherto, the couplet, 'What you The swinishness is in the race,' had been a r stood by few. Now it became bitter earnest handed down a definition in which 'non-A than Jewish: 'Anyone is considered non-Ar from non-Aryan, and in particular Jewish pr It suffices for one parent or one grandparent

One 'Jewish grandmother' made the s treated exactly like a Jew, at least with reg the civil service. The grandmother did not e she became a curse to her grandchildren even but non-Aryan; that is, descended from Jew the Duesterberg type, particularly widespre upper crust. And, indeed, the whole anti-Se weapon in the struggle between different lead

Hitler himself stated that the main thing out of the intellectual professions and to creat class free of Jews. On April 6, in an add physicians, he declared: 'Germany's claim t ership of her own race must be satisfied by the majority of Jewish intellectuals from the c life of Germany. The admission of too larg eigners in proportion to the whole of the n preted as recognition of the intellectual supe and this must absolutely be rejected.' As an intellectual got rid of competition; as a clas system of domination; competition was repl

Up till now the object of this command h millions who had voluntarily subordinated th giving him their vote. But the true goal wa who were still opposed to him; for they inclu To gain control of this group, trained to apparatus, seemed at this point more impoi Socialist leadership than to occupy additiona for if you had the workers you had the state

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ceeded in teaching the whole world what they meant by the concept
of race. Hitherto, the couplet, 'What you believe is no disgrace,
The swinishness is in the race,' had been a mere Nazi joke, under-
stood by few. Now it became bitter earnest. On April 12, Frick
handed down a definition in which 'non-Aryan' meant far more
than Jewish: 'Anyone is considered non-Aryan who is descended
from non-Aryan, and in particular Jewish parents or grandparents.
It suffices for one parent or one grandparent to be non-Aryan.'

One 'Jewish grandmother' made the subject a 'non-Aryan,'
treated exactly like a Jew, at least with regard to employment in
the civil service. The grandmother did not even have to be Jewish;
she became a curse to her grandchildren even if she was a Christian,
but non-Aryan; that is, descended from Jews. This was a blow to
the Duestenberg type, particularly widespread among Germany's
upper crust. And, indeed, the whole anti-Semitic legislation was a
weapon in the struggle between different leader groups.

Hitler himself stated that the main thing was to drive the Jews
out of the intellectual professions and to create an intellectual upper
class free of Jews. On April 6, in an address to a delegation of
physicians, he declared: 'Germany's claim to an intellectual lead-
ership of her own race must be satisfied by a swift eradication of
the majority of Jewish intellectuals from the cultural and intellectual
life of Germany. The admission of too large a percentage of fore-
igners in proportion to the whole of the nation might be inter-
preted as recognition of the intellectual superiority of other races,
and this must absolutely be rejected.' As an individual, the armed
intellectual got rid of competition; as a class, he founded a new
system of domination; competition was replaced by command.

Up till now the object of this command had been the seventeen
millions who had voluntarily subordinated themselves to Hitler by
giving him their vote. But the true goal was the twenty millions
who were still opposed to him; for they included the working class.
To gain control of this group, trained to handle the technical
apparatus, seemed at this point more important to the National
Socialist leadership than to occupy additional posts of command;
for if you had the workers you had the state—provided only that

*P.T. & So many of our clients
fit this special non-Aryan
category. We were always badly
looked for people who changed
their religion—particularly when it
was a question of obtaining more
power in the social world. These
people obviously they were more
open to an approach than to
anything. Now however, the
way of dealing with the
multiplication of problems that
attacks even now appears promising.*

1833

you were a little more conscious of your aims than the weary and unenterprising trade-union leaders. In many localities the S.A. had already forced their way into trade-union headquarters; beatings had occurred. No trade-union leader called for determined resistance, and there is every reason to suppose that the leaders knew what could and what could not be expected of their followers. The education of the working masses in the ideals of the economic age was now making itself felt. The worker, taught for decades that the only thing he had to fight for was his material interests, was bound to ask himself whether these interests would be better served by resistance to the new order or by participation in it.

Just as the German generals discovered in 1918 that under certain circumstances democracy was the stronger state form for military purposes and hence could be a means of future victories, the German proletariat, trained to regard democracy as a means of achieving material aims, did not regard it as an ideal in itself; it was now willing to exchange the worn-out implement for a new one, as Ferdinand Lassalle had predicted. The founder of the National Socialist Shop Cell Organization (N.S.B.O.), a certain Reithold Muchow, proclaimed that the workers would be the leading estate in the new Reich. Johannes Engel, another leader of the N.S.B.O., speaking in April at the Berlin Sportpalast, cried out to the employers: 'You are only servants. We do not recognize the employer as an employer. Without the people, you are a heap of dung [up- roarious applause].' Göring was present at the meeting; he stepped forward and added: '... not only has German National Socialism been victorious, but German socialism as well.' Of course, it was well known that the National Socialists held words cheap, and Hitler's remarks about the low cultural level of the working masses could not be entirely forgotten. But this state needed the workers anyhow and would be prepared to pay for them. The cold-blooded realism of the masses contributed at least as much as any surge of enthusiasm to the success of co-ordination (*Gleichschaltung*) in the spring of 1933. Even the Communists, who had originally conceived things differently, began to give out the watchword: Go into the National Socialist organizations and bore from within; turn them into revolutionary cells. A national law of April 5 gave em-

ployers the power to discharge an employee to the state'—in other words, to Communists; the real decision rested with the 'shop cell.' The workers began to join.

Under the Weimar Republic the Gewerkschaften were political battlefields, and the politics reflected more strongly in them than in the politics of the public elections. In the revolution of 1918-19 councils had arisen, which later became known by the name of 'workshop councils.' Intended originally as a democratic instrument for the removal of the 'talists,' for the removal or subjection of the practice these councils often became an instrument of control over the masses; shrewd and up-to-date employers used them as an instrument of control over the workers, complained that they were no longer 'house'; on the other hand, the trade unions used the councils obstructed their own influence in the big industries, the elections to these councils were important political decisions. On April 7, 1933, the National Socialists, that no Social Democrat elected to the Reichstag was permitted to hold office; the workers under the National Socialist shop cells, with 30.8 per cent of the vote, overshadowed the Social Democratic Party.

The mass flight of the workers threw the crisis. The workers still belonged to the trade unions. The workers still stopped paying their dues, creating financial difficulties. The embarrassed leaders insisted on nothing to do with politics; as early as March 1933, the colleagues published a statement that Social Democratic trade unions had different and separate interests; the unions would not reject state control; and that capitalism had conquered with National Socialism. The statement added: 'The trade unions declare the working organization with the employers' organizations. Engel, two weeks later, was to call a heap

* I would tell him that he had not only material interests to offer the trade-union workers, but mystical excitement—a sense that the country was off on a deep mystical profound voyage—'Just because he's a worker who drinks too much and makes jokes about party does not mean that he has no sense of mystery and that that, too, must be satisfied.'

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1933
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employers the power to discharge an employee 'on suspicion of hostility to the state'—in other words, to fire Social Democrats and Communists; the real decision rested with the National Socialist 'shop cell.' The workers began to join the shop cells by droves.

Under the Weimar Republic the German factories and mines were political battlefields, and the political life of the masses was reflected more strongly in them than in the unpopular apparatus of the public elections. In the revolution of 1918-19, factory councils had arisen, which later became permanent and official under the name of 'workshop councils.' Intended by their Socialist founders as a democratic instrument for the expropriation of the 'capitalists,' for the removal or subjection of owners or managers, in practice these councils often became an instrument for leading the masses; shrewd and up-to-date employers were often able to use them as an instrument of control over their workers. Others, to be sure, complained that they were no longer 'master in their own house'; on the other hand, the trade unions sometimes found that the councils obstructed their own influence on the workers. In the big industries, the elections to these councils often represented important political decisions. On April 7, such a decision occurred in the mines of the Ruhr. The National Socialists had proclaimed that no Social Democrat elected to the industrial council would be permitted to hold office; the workers understood, and the National Socialist shop cells, with 30.8 per cent of the votes cast, for the first time overshadowed the Social Democratic unions.

The mass flight of the workers threw the trade unions into a crisis. The workers still belonged to them formally, but many stopped paying their dues, creating financial difficulties for the unions. The embarrassed leaders insisted that they really had nothing to do with politics; as early as March 21, Leipart and his colleagues published a statement that Social Democracy and the trade unions had different and separate functions; that the trade unions would not reject state control; and, apparently in the belief that capitalism had conquered with National Socialism, the statement added: 'The trade unions declare themselves ready to form a working organization with the employers'—the employers whom Engel, two weeks later, was to call a heap of dung.

1933

For years no Social Democratic trade-unionist had said, 'We no longer recognize the employers as employers'; on the contrary, the recognition of the classes as classes, each in its place and struggling for this place, had become the philosophy of the trade-union movement. No such sharp words had been spoken at the May Day celebration which Hitler, exactly ten years before, had wanted to break up by force. It was a startling example of propaganda as an art of adaptation, when Goebbels, immediately after the acceptance of the enabling law by the Reichstag, put forward a motion in the cabinet that May First should be declared a national holiday. In the Weimar Republic, which they themselves had established, the German workers had not been able to put through such a measure; now Hitler gave them their holiday, at which ten years before he had wanted to shoot them down 'like mad dogs.'

In these ten years the National Socialists had grown and learned. The 'anti-capitalist' intellectuals, appointed by Gregor Strasser, still led the shop cells. A group of them, with a certain Brucker at their head, met with Leipart and Grassman at the beginning of April, and summoned them to resign immediately from their posts of leadership of the trade unions and thus avert the collapse of the unions; for—according to the minutes of the conference—'we as National Socialists have no interest in that. On the contrary, we want to create a unified trade union.' Leipart insisted that he was speaking to them as a German, and as a German he must demand an end to the maltreatment of labor leaders and withdrawal of the S.A. from the trade-union headquarters: 'For you have the intention of smashing the trade unions!' All National Socialists in one voice: 'No, we do not. It is Hugenberg who wants that!' Leipart went on to say that if the National Socialists, especially Göring, had not committed so many acts of violence, 'the attitude of the trade unions toward this government would be the same as toward any previous government.' But he could not, said he, be a traitor.

Brucker repeated that the National Socialists had no desire to harm the trade unions themselves: 'Adolf Hitler himself has demanded that the trade unions must not be destroyed. . . Every worker must be organized.' When Leipart asked Brucker if he had been commissioned by Hitler to negotiate, the National Socialist

gave an answer characteristic of Hitler's: he had no direct commission, but the League of Nations, in the sense of the new state negotiations could lead to no practical result. It was historically significant in that they confronted intellectual fighting to win the workers with labor leaders. Brucker said: 'We do not require labor leaders must come from the unions and from workers. The chairman of a trade union is a doctor. Wage negotiations with employers: Wage contracts: no! Wage schedules: yes, to regulate wages and prices.' Whereupon Leipart understood: 'Do you know how long ago? Do you know that the workers slave all day; that they had no vacation and hardly know that their wages were bad; that they lived in huts; and were totally excluded from culture? We came and raised the workers up to their level. A man spoke up: 'The working-class leader is not a social class as the worker if he wants to be the same upbringing and feel the same pressure. We beat their beef at their leader off and on, they man. . . . ' The National Socialist Fikentscher said: all active persons have equal rights and duties. The editor, the engineer, and the doctor, side by side with the worker. . . . ' Eggert, a trade-unionist: 'In our trade union language which permits us to think in terms of the worker. If you try to approach the worker from the outside, you are not able to get inside him. The stock of skill is not behind us!'

This was a desperate self-deception. That where his interests called him; for decades he had been training him to do just that; but he had instructed him better than his leaders. When he really be a 'heap of dung' may not yet have been decided that the National Socialist would not resist from his place of work. Mean-

ocratic trade-unionist had said, 'We no
ers as employers'; on the contrary, the
classes, each in its place and struggling
the philosophy of the trade-union move-
ds had been spoken at the May Day
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s a startling example of propaganda as
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by the Reichstag, put forward a motion
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gave an answer characteristic of Hitler's reptile-like leadership: 'We
have no direct commission, but the Leader expects us to handle
everything in the sense of the new state idea.' Consequently, the
negotiations could lead to no practical result, but they were his-
torically significant in that they confronted the new type of in-
tellectual fighting to win the workers with the old class-conscious
labor leaders. Brucker said: 'We do not recognize that trade-union
leaders must come from the unions and from the same trade as the
workers. The chairman of a trade union can, for example, be a
doctor. Wage negotiations with employers will not exist in future.
Wage contracts: no! Wage schedules: yes! In future the state will
regulate wages and prices.' Whereupon Leipart, struggling to make
himself understood: 'Do you know how things looked fifty years
ago? Do you know that the workers slaved for fourteen hours a
day; that they had no vacation and hardly a Sunday off? Do you
know that their wages were bad; that they lodged in miserable
huts; and were totally excluded from cultural benefits? Then we
came and raised the workers up to their present position.' Grass-
man spoke up: 'The working-class leader must come of the same
social class as the worker if he wants to be understood. We have
the same upbringing and feel the same pressure. Even if the work-
ers beef at their leader off and on, they know that he is their
man. . . . ' The National Socialist Fikenscher: 'In our shop cells
all active persons have equal rights and equal obligations: the
editor, the engineer, and the doctor, side by side with the worker.
. . . ' Eggert, a trade-unionist: 'In our trade unions we speak our
own language which permits us to think and feel with the worker.
If you try to approach the worker from outside, you'll never be
able to get inside him. The stock of skilled workers will always
stand behind us!

This was a desperate self-deception. The skilled worker stood
where his interests called him; for decades the trade-union leaders
had been training him to do just that; but now his interests in-
structed him better than his leaders. Whether the employers would
really be a 'heap of dung' may not yet have been decided; but it
had been decided that the National Socialist shop cell could drive
any resister from his place of work. Meanwhile, Hitler received re-

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ports that the trade unions were on the brink of financial collapse because so many members had ceased to pay their dues. The demoralized organization was scarcely in a position to withstand an act of violence, but perhaps only an act of violence could save the unions and force the members to go on paying their dues.

What Hitler decided was an act of violence against a section of his own party; he decided to crush the remnants of Strasser's once powerful apparatus. Not the leaders of the N.S.B.O., the Bruckers and Muchows, should infiltrate and buy their way into the unions; representatives of the new party leadership created in 1932 should seize the trade unions and at the same time sweep aside the N.S.B.O. The leader of the undertaking was to be Robert Ley, who had always hated Strasser and idolized Hitler. One of Hitler's most faithful satraps, he was leader of the party's 'political organization,' meaning its whole non-political apparatus. On April 17, Goebbels, too, received his directives from the Leader on the Obersalzberg: 'We shall mold May First into a grandiose demonstration of the German popular will. On May 2, the trade-union headquarters will be occupied. Co-ordination also in this field. There may be a fuss for a few days, but then they will belong to us. . . . Once the trade unions are in our hands, the other parties and organizations will be unable to survive. . . . It is too late to turn back. Now things must take their course. In a year all Germany will be in our hands.'

* Hitler's optimism and self-confidence rose by leaps and bounds; in the cabinet he demanded an end to voting: he as chairman would simply make all decisions; and how often decisions had been made before they were even presented to the cabinet! The conservatives were still at their posts of command, but the ground was receding from under their feet; throughout the country the S.A. was in power, but when Papen crossed the Wilhelmstrasse from the Chancellery to the Prussian Ministry of State, he was still ostensibly Vice-Chancellor, Premier of Prussia, the President's confidential adviser, the man without whom the Chancellor could not say a word to the old Chief of State. On these few square yards of asphalt, in these few offices, Papen still seemed a powerful man; Hitler was his ward and Göring his 'subordinate.' On April 7, a law was

passed putting an end to this lie; by this law S.A. over Germany was given legal force. *halers* (governors) were appointed over the promise to preserve the states intact, but he pointed the ministers and high officials and *d* over, all eighteen of them were National *g* *gauleiters*, wherever *gau* and provincial bound incided. In Prussia the governor was the C Hindenburg could not complain, for by *t* Prussia were 'indissolubly bound together,' mandated. Papen, Göring's 'superior,' had sud 'subordinate,' and even this questionable *g* days. On April 11, Hitler appointed Göring in Papen's place, and also made over to hi governor of Prussia. Papen was now only V Reich, actually a figure without competency power; the only thing he could do — which : was to complain to Hindenburg.

What a metamorphosis in seventy days, April 11! Aside from the sudden exclusion o had occurred in the personnel of the Reich ca no longer even true that the cabinet contained of National Socialists. The authors of this realized that the magic of Hitler's propagand fore the members of his cabinet. Increasing fabulous successes of his Chancellor, Franz Sel and Reich Minister of Labor, became a Natio and the same process occurred in thousands ar all over the country. The National Socialists we therefore, it seemed to many, they were alw: dubious success of the Jewish boycott, May 1 g: an uncontested triumph; on April 19, even l tion and evasions, called on all his trade-union pate everywhere in the celebration inspired by Events had gone beyond Hitler's own prop before. The great masses were 'joining in with at this moment, Hitler had predicted, National

H.T. At last he could see, he
could believe. My *Stolz*

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lf-confidence rose by leaps and bounds; an end to voting: he as chairman would and how often decisions had been made sented to the cabinet! The conservatives command, but the ground was receding roughout the country the S.A. was in ssed the Wilhelmstrasse from the Chan-istry of State, he was still ostensibly Vice-ssia, the President's confidential adviser, he Chancellor could not say a word to n these few square yards of asphalt, in ill seemed a powerful man; Hitler was 'subordinate.' On April 7, a law was

passed putting an end to this lie; by this law the *de facto* rule of the S.A. over Germany was given legal force. So-called Reich *statthalters* (governors) were appointed over the states. Hitler kept his promise to preserve the states intact, but his *statthalters* now appointed the ministers and high officials and decreed the laws; moreover, all eighteen of them were National Socialists, mostly party *gauleiters*, wherever *gau* and provincial boundaries more or less coincided. In Prussia the governor was the Chancellor himself, and Hindenburg could not complain, for by this act the Reich and Prussia were 'indissolubly bound together,' as he had always demanded. Papen, Göring's 'superior,' had suddenly become Hitler's 'subordinate,' and even this questionable glory lasted only four days. On April 11, Hitler appointed Göring Premier of Prussia in Papen's place, and also made over to him his prerogatives as governor of Prussia. Papen was now only Vice-Chancellor of the Reich, actually a figure without competency and hence without power; the only thing he could do — which seldom helped him — was to complain to Hindenburg.

What a metamorphosis in seventy days, from January 30 to April 11! Aside from the sudden exclusion of Gereke, no changes had occurred in the personnel of the Reich cabinet; and yet it was no longer even true that the cabinet contained only thirty per cent of National Socialists. The authors of this calculation had not realized that the magic of Hitler's propaganda would not halt before the members of his cabinet. Increasingly impressed by the fabulous successes of his Chancellor, Franz Seldte, Stahlhelm leader and Reich Minister of Labor, became a National Socialist at heart; and the same process occurred in thousands and millions of people all over the country. The National Socialists were always victorious; therefore, it seemed to many, they were always right. After the dubious success of the Jewish boycott, May 1 gave promise of being an uncontested triumph; on April 19, even Leipart, after hesitation and evasions, called on all his trade-union members to 'participate everywhere in the celebration inspired by the government.'

Events had gone beyond Hitler's own prophecies of three years before. The great masses were 'joining in with shouts of Hurrah'; at this moment, Hitler had predicted, National Socialism would be

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see the masses themselves had lost their howed a suicidal frenzy in breaking with connections, parties, leaders. They looked litical world fell into ruins, and tacitly uncertain, but bold edifice was growing up. aeral flocking to National Socialism, but a :—'they have won out, that makes them : would not have participated voluntarily May Day celebration at the Tempelhofer orkers in the large factories let themselves position. The directors and managers had was called 'German Socialism.' In every asses marched out to some meadow; in speaking to the million at the Tempel- m loudspeakers.

er spoke directly to the mass of the work- ad only recently compared with a people Now he said that for him there could be say at the end of my days: I have won the German Reich.' If he had wished to tell : had to admit that what he wanted was reason he would take away their trade een a forceful, impressive lie if he had t Germany, as the Engels and their com- hout the country. But Hitler avoided the ight lie. In the Reichstag he had already ed German economic revival through a f employers; his government, he had de- : 'an economic bureaucracy organized by t encouragement of private initiative with erty.' Even to the workers at the Tem- l that creative initiative must be liberated cts of majority decisions, not only in par- mic life as well.'

ve cried out that Hitler was no Socialist! is anti-capitalist and shop cell leaders, his ay have looked on very sourly when he

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praised, as the embodiment of 'creative initiative,' what they themselves had called a 'heap of dung.' But Hitler knew the masses and their state of mind better than his critics. The masses wanted work, no state of the future; the crisis was a problem capable of solution; energy could solve it, and here was energy. Hitler's political gift did not express itself in drawing practical economic plans, which would have been hard for him, but in proclaiming that he would stand all concepts of social rank on their heads—by brute force if necessary. The old society, he said, had looked down on the manual worker; now that would cease; and in order to teach rich people respect for manual labor, it was 'our unbreakable determination to put every single German, whoever he may be, whether rich and well-born, or poor, into contact with manual labor once in his life, to make him acquainted with it.' This was the meaning of May First, the new festival, to be observed 'down the centuries': to bring the Germans back together, 'and if they demur, to force them together.'

In the long run, only those can be coerced who really want to be, and this was the secret of Hitler's whole policy of successful coercion. Hitler's task was to find work for masses who wanted work; desperately difficult as this had seemed at some moments, it would have been a thousand times more difficult to force masses to work who did not want to. If the people's determination to work were combined with an equal determination on the part of the government, the question of program, the method, was almost secondary. Actually, the government had as yet no National Socialist plan for shaping economic life; its economic policy was not directed by National Socialists; as under Schleicher, the most pressing task was to relieve the crisis, 'in opposition to the laws of economic reason.' In Hitler's speech of May 1, he did not promise any key project to revive the whole economic machine; but he did have a private plan intended to put some scores of thousands to work for meager pay: the construction of giant motor highways through the length and breadth of Germany. The country actually was deficient in highways, because it had comparatively few automobiles; it was Hitler's dream that a great increase of automobile construction would bring Germany the same blessings it had showered on the

* See D. T. note at near. 1788

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United States ten years before. Behind this was the idea which National Socialism now cast with force upon the modern world: that the mysterious primal force of political economy, demand, or need could be created and guided from above, here discouraged and there driven forward. But the prerequisite for this was absolute authority, which seemed obtainable only from absolute power. And, therefore, on the morning after the great labor festival, the trucks filled with storm troopers were again rolling through the streets of Germany. This time they stopped in front of the trade-union headquarters; the Brown bands stormed in, arrested the leading functionaries, in Berlin as well as in the states. Leipart and Grassman were beaten, forced to run long distances and do knee-bends; the same occurred all over the Reich with such oppressive uniformity that for the first time the German public learned the full meaning of 'co-ordination.' In paralyzed wonder, the over-powered workers looked on at their own ruin. There was no fight. Robert Ley addressed a pathetic proclamation to the workers: 'Worker,' he assured them, 'your institutions are sacred and unsalable to us National Socialists. I myself am a poor son of peasants and have known poverty. Worker, I swear to you that we shall not only preserve everything you have; we shall extend the protective laws and the rights of the worker, in order that he may enter into the new National Socialist state as an equal and respected member of the nation.'

From these National Socialist acts of violence, a sense of power, well-nigh unaccountable to outsiders, spread to the German workers. Injustice, repression, and destruction were the order of the day; but the victims acquiesced and were contented. They approved the power, even when it made mistakes and did injustice; for it was through lack of power that conditions had grown so bad. In the spring of 1933, the ideal of the age, a functioning social machine, was reflected in the barbaric joy of the German masses at the violence and energy with which the state and economic life had been set running again. With a stroke of his pen, Ley put an end to the historic state of affairs in which trade unions, with different political views and different aims, had existed side by side; all were now fused into a single body, and the armed intellectual

gave this body the military name of 'German Worker' was no longer asked if he wanted Front; he simply belonged; and within a million German workers were enrolled in the National Socialist machine. How it would clear; but in its founding congress of May no doubt that it would be merely one pillar only pillar, of National Socialist power: 'I leadership representing a real authority, and one social group.'

With the creation of the German Labor Front came an elemental force, drawing all German sudden changes of name, the organizations turned life co-ordinated themselves, and a country been rich in clubs and societies, was suddenly Those milk producers, who in Schleicher's the domination of Danish butter, formed a and proclaimed an 'offensive of German but Front called for an offensive of its own, not Front' and the 'Bowling Front.'

Some of these fronts thought they could names and yet remain exactly as they were. them was assumed by a National Socialist had been something else the day before; but demands on the state, the 'selfish aims,' were far 'common aims.' To renounce freedom was not egotism. All were ready to grant the state, were powerful enough to destroy all, the right to thereby help all. By adaptation and co-ordination preserve their place and failed to notice that was their downfall. If their 'Heil Hitler' was selves above all that they were deceiving; the the storm because, themselves carried away to feel the wind. There were the overly wise downward path, persuaded themselves that the flood tide toward their great aims. Former King his luxurious Dutch exile, said to an English

§ A large number of them detect their trade union leaders. Many of the remainder are indifferent.

** D.T. I had to teach him that one lesson: The theories of economics work or do not work to the degree that the ~~release~~ sum of human energy in a project increases. This can be accomplished at times by the theory itself which can function well in certain periods for reasons which have nothing to do with the theory. But any social ~~development~~ that increases the sum of human energy will always work well economically. I equate the best such a ~~united theory~~ (benefits for the hard worker and satisfying emotion for his soul)*

re. Behind this was the idea which with force upon the modern world: force of political economy, demand, or guided from above, here discouraged at the prerequisite for this was also obtainable only from absolute power. ing after the great labor festival, the pers were again rolling through the re they stopped in front of the trade-own bands stormed in, arrested the n as well as in the states. Leipart and d to run long distances and do knee-over the Reich with such oppressive time the German public learned the m.' In paralyzed wonder, the over-t their own ruin. There was no fight, thetic proclamation to the workers: our institutions are sacred and unasts. I myself am a poor son of peasants. I swear to you that we shall not have; we shall extend the protective rker, in order that he may enter into te as an equal and respected member

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gave this body the military name of 'German Labor Front.' A worker was no longer asked if he wanted to belong to the Labor Front; he simply belonged; and within a short time twenty-three million German workers were enrolled in this section of the National Socialist machine. How it would function was still not clear; but in its founding congress of May 10, at Berlin, Hitler left no doubt that it would be merely one pillar, and by no means the only pillar, of National Socialist power: 'There must arise a state leadership representing a real authority, and not dependent on any one social group.'

With the creation of the German Labor Front, co-ordination became an elemental force, drawing all Germany in its wake. With sudden changes of name, the organizations of economic and cultural life co-ordinated themselves, and a country, which had always been rich in clubs and societies, was suddenly bristling with 'fronts.' Those milk producers, who in Schleicher's time had risen against the domination of Danish butter, formed a 'German Milk Front' and proclaimed an 'offensive of German butter'; a German Honey Front called for an offensive of its own, not to mention the 'Shoe Front' and the 'Bowling Front.'

Some of these fronts thought they could merely change their names and yet remain exactly as they were. Leadership in all of them was assumed by a National Socialist who, as often as not, had been something else the day before; but the goals, the demands on the state, the 'selfish aims,' were far from giving way to 'common aims.' To renounce freedom was not to renounce private egotism. All were ready to grant the state, which had shown itself powerful enough to destroy all, the right to command all and thereby help all. By adaptation and co-ordination many hoped to preserve their place and failed to notice that this very adaptation was their downfall. If their 'Heil Hitler' was a lie, it was themselves above all that they were deceiving; they did not believe in the storm because, themselves carried away by it, they could not feel the wind. There were the overly wise who, already on the downward path, persuaded themselves that they were riding the flood tide toward their great aims. Former Kaiser Wilhelm II, in his luxurious Dutch exile, said to an English journalist in the

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spring of 1933: 'Herr Hitler has done what no one else was in a position to do; he has inspired the whole German nation with a common spirit; he has sent a wave of national sentiment through Germany such as she has never experienced in all her history.' Taken literally, this was a resigned admission that the younger pupil of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the man of the people, had accomplished what had been denied to the philosopher's contemporary, friend, and sovereign. But the dethroned monarch intended no modesty and resignation; to Hindenburg he wrote, some months later, that the time would soon be at hand to restore happiness in Germany by bringing back the monarchy. Wilhelm praised the elemental event because he had no fear that it would last; these men of the past had no feeling for the forces of a present that to them was far beyond future.

But the old historic forms had ceased to be Germany; they were at most channels corroded by the flood of the new spirit. Heine had predicted that Thor would rise from his millennial sleep and smash the cross and the Gothic cathedrals with his hammer. There was no need to disturb Thor. Matthias Groeber, the Catholic archbishop appointed by Rome, who had concluded his shrewd compromise with National Socialism the year before, now carried his shrewdness one step farther. He ordered his clergymen, who gave religious instruction in the schools, to use the Hitler salute — the gesture invented by Gabriele d'Annunzio, heathen and enemy of the Church. In reply the pupils were to raise their hand in the Hitler salute and say: 'Praised be Jesus Christ!' And the priest, with his hand still raised: 'Forever and ever, amen!'

Chapter XX

CONQUEST BY

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWO
Houston Stewart Chamberlain had summed future German foreign policy in a letter II: 'A race-conscious Germany, knowing its organization from its center to its extreme character of its different tribes, would — even population than the Anglo-Saxon and Russia power and by inner spiritual superiority, dominate Europe.'

Shortly after Hitler came to power, Alfred Rosenberg, the German 'seer of the Third Reich,' procured the 'spiritual teacher of the new Germany,' Professor Goebbels, speaking to the press in Hamburg, 'What Germany has experienced with the revolution in Germany will not be limited to Europe. Hitler's declaration of war on the old Europe is the prelude. The end of the development will be the domination of Europe by 'inner superiority' along the National Socialist lines.' This would dominate Europe by 'inner superiority' in Chamberlain's terms.

Inner superiority would, by a stronger inner

* It is not certain that
Heine predicted

→ I did not think of this,
nor was Matthias Groeber
a friend of any of my associates.
I had to wonder whether
this had not come from
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Chapter XXIV

CONQUEST BY PEACE

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, Houston Stewart Chamberlain had summed up his idea of a future German foreign policy in a letter to his friend, Wilhelm II: 'A race-conscious Germany, knowing its aims and unified in organization from its center to its extremities, despite the special character of its different tribes, would—even though less rich in population than the Anglo-Saxon and Russian worlds—by outward power and by inner spiritual superiority, dominate the world.'

Shortly after Hitler came to power, Alfred Rosenberg, the ambassador of the Wise Men of Zion and now the officially appointed 'spiritual teacher of the new Germany,' proclaimed the late Anglo-German the 'seer of the Third Reich.' He prophesied in a speech, 'What Germany has experienced will befall other peoples.' And Goebbels, speaking to the press in Hamburg, said: 'I am convinced that Germany has a world mission to fulfill. The present revolution in Germany will not be limited to two countries of Europe. Hitler's declaration of war on the democratic state is only the prelude. The end of the development will be a Europe organized along the National Socialist lines.' This meant that Germany would dominate Europe by 'inner superiority,' to speak in Chamberlain's terms.

Inner superiority would, by a stronger magnetism than sheer

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force, raise Germany to the commanding position of the great land blocks, the United States and Russia, or of the rising Asiatic continental power to be dominated perhaps by China, perhaps by Japan. The new Fascist science of political organization would rise to its greatest heights if the old world 'culture territories,' hitherto split up into nations, were welded into such a unit by superior leadership, and their old abilities, trained and stored for centuries, were opposed to the still incompletely organized force of the half-empty American and Asiatic continents. The position of Germany, a land of industrial surplus, surrounded in a large arc by the Balkans and Russia, lands of agrarian surplus, seemed like the summons of history to organize this space politically as a 'productive unit' with a calculable demand and production potential—to use the terms of the economic age.

The economic part of the Versailles system had been buried by Hoover's moratorium of 1931, by the American and English protective tariffs. On December 15, 1932, the French Chamber decided that France, since she was receiving no further German reparations, would cease payments on her war debts to the United States. In vain did Premier Edouard Herriot argue with the Chamber, pleading that the most powerful friend France had in the world should not be offended; he resigned; his successor was Edouard Daladier. For the first time France was led by a man who had not been a politician at the time of the World War, but merely an officer at the front.

The system of Versailles was broken in body and spirit. After 1929, the great world question was no longer: defense of all against a German war of revenge, but the struggle of all, even of the defeated nations, against the common enemy, the crisis; though, to be sure, in the consciousness of certain groups, the common enemy was identified with the Communist menace.

For world economy to enjoy conditions of peace, armaments would have to be eliminated or at least reduced; for they were devouring the prosperity of nations and their menacing presence deprived the business world of all confidence in a peaceable future. If, therefore, England granted Germany equality of armaments in principle, it was not intended that Germany should have more arma-

ments, but that Italy and particularly France thing was certain: only a Germany left at economic recovery could be a bulwark against the French Maginot Line could be no such bulwark.

Now, however, an equalization of the military and Germany, to which France herself had Geneva, would inevitably deprive the ring of surrounding Germany of much, if not all, of France's small allies—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania—could place absolute reliance in barely as strong as Germany. What made the more menacing was that these 'successors' of the Habsburg monarchy inherited its main evils: they were the oppressed nations of Austria-Hungary themselves contained foreign minorities, hosts of the new states (Germans, Slovaks, and Hungarians in Yugoslavia, Croats in Yugoslavia, Hungarians in Rumania).

The Czechoslovaks were led by men of democratic character (Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, Premier and Foreign Minister); the country was proud of its form of government. Under these leaders, Czechoslovakia, in the disquieting turn of events, held fast in the French alliance. Poland, however, had been a different story. Under the leadership of her armed leader in Joseph Pilsudski, she began from 1932 to turn away from the French alliance inwardly, though not formally for purposes to emasculate it.

Pilsudski was one of the most remarkable figures to emerge after 1918; first a Socialist, then founder of a dictatorship—a combination which, from Napoleon and Joseph Stalin, has influenced Europe again. A strange, somber figure, somewhat grotesque with his immense mustache and deep-set eyes, his life, troubled in spirit, living in mysterious isolation, nevertheless dominating a power with uncontested authority. He violently cor-

manding position of the great land
Russia, or of the rising Asiatic con-
perhaps by China, perhaps by Japan.
tical organization would rise to its
d 'culture territories,' hitherto split
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ersailles system had been buried by
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ments, but that Italy and particularly France should have less. One
thing was certain: only a Germany left at peace to work out her
economic recovery could be a bulwark against Bolshevism—the
French Maginot Line could be no such bulwark.

Now, however, an equalization of the military strength of France
and Germany, to which France herself had formally consented in
Geneva, would inevitably deprive the ring of French alliances sur-
rounding Germany of much, if not all, of its force; for none of
France's small allies—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and
Rumania—could place absolute reliance in a France which was
barely as strong as Germany. What made the danger to them all
the more menacing was that these 'succession states' of the old
Habsburg monarchy inherited its main evils. They had formerly
been the oppressed nations of Austria-Hungary, and now they
themselves contained foreign minorities, hostile or indifferent to
the new states (Germans, Slovaks, and Hungarians in Czecho-
slovakia, Croats in Yugoslavia, Hungarians and Germans in Ru-
mania).

The Czechoslovaks were led by men of democratic, liberal, 'west-
ern' character (Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, President, Eduard Beneš,
Foreign Minister); the country was proud of its parliamentary
form of government. Under these leaders, Czechoslovakia, despite
the disquieting turn of events, held fast in letter and spirit to the
French alliance. Poland, however, had been distrustful since Lo-
carno. Under the leadership of her armed intellectuals embodied
in Joseph Pilsudski, she began from 1932 on to renounce the
French alliance inwardly, though not formally, and for practical
purposes to emasculate it.

Pilsudski was one of the most remarkable historical figures to
emerge after 1918; first a Socialist, then founder of a military dicta-
torship—a combination which, from Napoleon III to Leon Trotzky
and Joseph Stalin, has influenced European history again and
again. A strange, somber figure, somewhat recalling Nietzsche
with his immense mustache and deep-set eyes; in the last years of
his life, troubled in spirit, living in mysterious solitude, almost un-
approachable, nevertheless dominating a powerful political machine
with uncontested authority. He violently combated the parliament

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'Marxist,' 'Bolshevist,' or otherwise 'disruptive' authors, and publicly burned them; they spared neither the living nor the dead, neither classics nor unknown moderns, and the finest writing was mingled with real filth. In Berlin works of Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Walter Rathenau, Erich Maria Remarque, and Heinrich Heine were burned in front of the State Opera House. Goebbels made a short speech and it could be noted that he was not entirely at his ease; if students, he said, took upon themselves the right to burn trash, they must also be conscious of the duty to create something better. But then he added, with a glance at the burning books: 'Never as today have young men had the right to cry out, Studies are thriving, spirits awakening, oh, century, it is a joy to live!'

While incomprehensible and hideous things kept happening in Germany, which foreboded nothing good for the future of the rest of the world, Hitler's policy toward foreign countries was of a suppleness, indeed a compliancy, which should have aroused amazement, except for the fact that most people see only what they expect and perceive the new only after it has become customary. On all sides, Hitler stretched forth friendly hands, as he had predicted in his letters to Hervé and explained in his correspondence with Papen. Sometimes he met hands that were stretched out with the same doubtful sincerity. This was the case with Pilsudski's Poland.

The most resolute and ruthless among his enemies — whom he never met personally — exerted a secret spell over Hitler which the latter always felt in the face of genuine authority. In the spring of 1933, Hitler liked to quote Machiavelli's phrase that one must either destroy or conciliate an enemy; and this same clear, cold wisdom — perhaps even consciously — determined the steps of the Polish dictator. When France entered on negotiations about Mussolini's Four Power Pact, Pilsudski believed that the time had come for Poland to force a decision. For this pact was tacitly but indubitably directed against Soviet Russia, but Poland, which would be the chief sufferer in a conflict of all Europe against Bolshevism, had not been included. France, her alleged friend and protector, had nevertheless declared herself ready to confer on a plan which barred Poland from the council of European powers.

Pilsudski answered with a series of memos to the German border; with reinforcement of land was allowed to maintain in Danzig; ambassador, Wysocki, to ask Hitler blue peace or war; finally, by posing to France 'question of Locarno.' When the S.A. appeared as 'auxiliary police' with revolution interpreted as 'concentration of armed forces in Poland' Pilsudski informed the French government that Poland would join her. To start war in 1933 was in strict opposition to French public opinion against the whole psychology of the French government made to prevent war, not to hasten it. The reshaping of Edouard Daladier, refused to meet.

After the attack on Germany had failed abruptly for peace. Feelers had been sent out; armed intellectual on one side could easily be met by intellectual on the other side would be willing.

The ring around Germany began to break. At that moment France would not close it. Hitler's ambassador Wysocki, while German Ambassador Beck; the result was a communiqué of certain solemnity by both sides. German public the desire 'to examine and treat the common countries dispassionately; in this, the existence of a firm basis.' Definitely peace! A week later National Socialists stormed the headquarters of the trade unions in Danzig. The Polish government circumstances would have raised a lot of conspicuously indifferent.

True, this *rapprochement* was extremely tentative. Nationalists in both Germany and Poland regarded a final reckoning with the other as a matter of policy. Poland was the only one among the great powers that had taken German territories and people that Alsace-Lorraine, taken by France, did not. All those nationalists in Germany, who set t

therwise 'disruptive' authors, and compared neither the living nor the dead, v moderns, and the finest writing was Berlin works of Karl Marx, Sigmund Erich Maria Remarque, and Heinrich at of the State Opera House. Goebbels could be noted that he was not entirely said, took upon, themselves the right to be conscious of the duty to create some: added, with a glance at the burning ve young men had the right to cry out, s awakening, oh, century, it is a joy to

and hideous things kept happening in l nothing good for the future of the rest y toward foreign countries was of a sup- ncy, which should have aroused amaze- at most people see only what they expect y after it has become customary. On all h friendly hands, as he had predicted in explained in his correspondence with t hands that were stretched out with the This was the case with Pilsudski's Poland. ruthless among his enemies—whom he erted a secret spell over Hitler which the ice of genuine authority. In the spring of : Machiavelli's phrase that one must either emy; and this same clear, cold wisdom —determined the steps of the Polish dic- ed on negotiations about Mussolini's Four lieved that the time had come for Poland is pact was tacitly but indubitably directed t Poland, which would be the chief suf- Europe against Bolshevism, had not been leged friend and protector, had neverthe- y to confer on a plan which barred Poland, pean powers.

Pilsudski answered with a series of military demonstrations on the German border; with reinforcement of the little garrison Poland was allowed to maintain in Danzig; by commissioning his ambassador, Wysocki, to ask Hitler bluntly whether he desired peace or war; finally, by posing to France what might be called the 'question of Locarno.' When the S.A. and S.S. in the Rhineland appeared as 'auxiliary police' with revolvers, this could be interpreted as 'concentration of armed forces in the demilitarized zone'; Pilsudski informed the French government that if France marched Poland would join her. To start war in order to save peace? This was in strict opposition to French public opinion; indeed, it was against the whole psychology of the French alliance system, which was made to prevent war, not to hasten it. France, under the leadership of Edouard Daladier, refused to march.

After the attack on Germany had failed, Pilsudski decided abruptly for peace. Feelers had been sent out long before, and the armed intellectual on one side could easily guess what the armed intellectual on the other side would be willing to do.

The ring around Germany began to break, because at the decisive moment France would not close it. Hitler received Polish Ambassador Wysocki, while German Ambassador von Moltke called on Beck; the result was a communiqué of May 4, published with a certain solemnity by both sides. Germany and Poland expressed the desire 'to examine and treat the common interest of the two countries dispassionately; in this, the existing treaties should serve as a firm basis.' Definitely peace! A week later, on May 12, the National Socialists stormed the headquarters of the Social Democratic trade unions in Danzig. The Polish press, which under former circumstances would have raised a loud outcry, remained conspicuously indifferent.

Truc, this *rapprochement* was extremely unpopular in both countries. Nationalists in both Germany and Poland had for years regarded a final reckoning with the other as the great aim in foreign policy. Poland was the only one among the victors of Versailles that had taken German territories and people—for it was admitted that Alsace-Lorraine, taken by France, did not want to be German. All those nationalists in Germany, who set their hopes for the future

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change of friendly assurances with Poland and Russia. Although the existence and the internal methods of the Hitler government had aroused world resentment, it was the old-style German career diplomacy with its boastful speeches which really threatened an explosion. To fill the measure of folly, Papen, who at home and abroad was considered Hindenburg's spokesman, made a speech full of childish bloodthirstiness to his electorate in Munster, May 13. (To the German man, the battlefield is what motherhood is to the woman.) The career diplomats apparently believed that this was the new tone which the new master expected of them. Hitler convoked the Reichstag for May 17 and intimated that he would inform the whole world in detail of his aims in foreign policy.

On the day before Hitler's speech, a message from President Roosevelt suddenly reached the chiefs of state of forty-four nations; in it the President set down his position on the question of peace and disarmament. Such a declaration on the part of America had been expected since Herriot's conversations in Washington. President Roosevelt had made his opinions known before this: that equal rights for Germany must not mean German rearmament, but the disarmament of the others; he had implied that France must not be expected to sacrifice any part of her security. What optimists in England and France now hoped for was a further, more significant step. If a formula for disarmament should be accepted by a majority in Geneva, it must also be enforced; but this seemed possible only if the world banded together in a security pact to apply sanctions against any possible infringement. The spirit of 'collective security,' which had been thought dead, now reappeared; America, under the leadership of Roosevelt, was expected to find a formula for participation in a security pact. But of this there was not a word in the President's note.

This note declared a solution of the world economic crisis to be the indispensable basis for political pacification; the World Economic Conference must, therefore, convene in all haste; currencies, which had all been endangered by the fall of the British pound, must be stabilized; international action to restore prices was demanded. The President's disarmament proposals moved in two directions: no country must rearm beyond the limits established by

treaty—this applied to Germany—and armaments must be observed by all; but in the MacDonald plan, the President indiged the principle of equal rights for Germany. Almost velvet demanded the abolition of 'offensive,' that is, abolition of bombing planes, tanks, lery. His explanation of this demand seen

'Modern weapons of offense,' he said, 'modern weapons of defense. Frontier forts, ments, coast defenses—in a word, fixed longer impregnable to the attack of war plery, land battleships called tanks, and poi agree wholly to eliminate from their posse which make possible successful attack, defe become impregnable and the frontiers and nation will be secure.'

With this impressive description of the Roosevelt gave the French to understand th or less dependent on pure defense, would elimination of all heavy offensive weapons, offensive weapons existed, Germany could having them some day—and then, God b This proud achievement of the French d three and a half years, virtually on the poi the stronger the Maginot Line grew, the we meaning of the French alliance system, for t definitely the French army entrenched itse Pyrenees,' the less able and willing it inevit allies in the east by a thrust into Germany. French army to offer a military guaranty o would have become final and irrevocable by velt's proposal, and eastern Europe would hav German orbit, and become one more object strengthened Germany and a strengthened S if France withdrew her protection from he what protection the allies had to offer her, Ro her no better protection in exchange; for in t

* a paragraph on von Papen.
D. T. He had been raised to please.
He had known from boyhood that
one had to act tough when with
the toughs. But he had also
learned as a boy that most of one's
life was spent with adults, and to
get along well with them, impeccable
manners were the only way. Now
however, he was with the tough boys
and so he made remarks about
the battlefield and the German man.

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the chiefs of state of forty-four nations;
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treaty—this applied to Germany—and the obligation to limit
armaments must be observed by all; but in expressing his approval
of the MacDonald plan, the President indirectly approved the prin-
ciple of equal rights for Germany. Almost more important, Roose-
velt demanded the abolition of 'offensive weapons' by all nations;
that is, abolition of bombing planes, tanks, and mobile heavy artil-
lery. His explanation of this demand seems prophetic:

'Modern weapons of offense,' he said, 'are vastly stronger than
modern weapons of defense. Frontier forts, trenches, wire entangle-
ments, coast defenses—in a word, fixed fortifications—are no
longer impregnable to the attack of war planes, heavy mobile artil-
lery, land battleships called tanks, and poison gas. If all nations
agree wholly to eliminate from their possession and use weapons
which make possible successful attack, defenses automatically will
become impregnable and the frontiers and independence of every
nation will be secure.'

With this impressive description of the battle of the future,
Roosevelt gave the French to understand that they, a people more
or less dependent on pure defense, would do well to agree to the
elimination of all heavy offensive weapons. As long as these heavy
offensive weapons existed, Germany could not be prevented from
having them some day—and then, God help the Maginot Line!
This proud achievement of the French defensive art was, after
three and a half years, virtually on the point of completion; and
the stronger the Maginot Line grew, the weaker became the inner
meaning of the French alliance system, for the more obviously and
definitely the French army entrenched itself behind its 'concrete
Pyrenees,' the less able and willing it inevitably became to help its
allies in the east by a thrust into Germany. This incapacity of the
French army to offer a military guaranty of the French alliances
would have become final and irrevocable by acceptance of Roose-
velt's proposal, and eastern Europe would have been drawn into the
German orbit, and become one more object of conflict between a
strengthened Germany and a strengthened Soviet Russia. But even
if France withdrew her protection from her allies, and thus lost
what protection the allies had to offer her, Roosevelt's plan accorded
her no better protection in exchange; for in the President's message

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background

the hoped-for statement that after disarmament the United States would join in guaranteeing of peace.

London and Paris! The *Daily Telegraph* informed from Hitler, all the statesmen who had received his message would view it with disappointment. He declared that if Roosevelt was not present, he could not secure peace. In France, which only a short time before had been so friendly to the United States, Roosevelt bluntly stated that America understood nothing. But the reaction of Rome to the American President's proposal 'uncon-

said almost the same thing to an astonished world. The world, and the United States, had expected a speech full of violent threats. Which Hitler would outdo Papen's battlefield is, Hitler said:

The American President, of which I learned much, it had to be admitted, granted Germany the right to demand that the German government to warm up to agree without further discussion to this the international crisis. . . . Heavy offensive that Germany does not possess. . . . The only justifiable suffer from fear of an invasion is Germany is prepared at any time to renounce offense of the world renounces them. . . . Germany's part in any solemn non-aggression pact, for the sake of an attack, but of her security.' Complete reversal of the German foreign policy. But it was not, as most of his audience expected, a reversal of the foreign policy formulated by Hitler years before. It was the continuation of his policy. In his correspondence with Hervé and Papen, Hitler had warned his Sudeten German supporters not to carry Bolshevism into Europe, and now the consequence of a war, however it turned out,

would 'be a Europe sinking into Communist chaos.' In his speech Hitler again stressed that Germany must protect the rest of the world from Communism. Regardless of how this might infuriate the Strasser clique in his own party, one of his government's chief aims, he said, 'was prevention of the threatening Communist revolution and construction of a people's state, uniting the different interests of the classes and estates, based on the concept of property as the foundation of our culture.'

How much of this peace speech had been discussed by the Reich cabinet is not known; but probably there was very little discussion or argument. Hitler's speech, in tone and attitude, was entirely his own, the continuation of a line he had been following for a long time; almost in every point it overruled his professional diplomatic advisers, just as he had formerly overruled his 'revolutionaries,' his Otto Strassers and Walter Stenneses. It was Adolphe Légalité, reassuring an anxious world, swearing to uphold peace. Perhaps in his more intimate circle, when he explained this policy, he varied his old formula about democracy and prophesied, 'Peace must be overcome with the weapons of peace.' If he discussed this policy with anyone, it was with Mussolini, for it was the wish of Mussolini as well as Hitler that Germany should under no circumstances arouse the world's distrust by premature demands for rearmament.

Hitler's reaction to MacDonald's proposal, that equal rights for Germany should be realized slowly, was quite different from that of Noddy and Neurath. He called the English plan 'a possible basis for future agreement.' He himself proposed a transitional period of five years; only at the end of five years should the disarmament of the great military states be completed, and then — not until then — would Germany achieve her full equality. Meanwhile, he declared, no one need fear that Germany would secretly build up an army contrary to the treaties; for the S.A. — whatever might be thought of it abroad — was not such an army and never could be. Here Hitler was speaking the truth; the Reichswehr did not allow the S.A. to be an army. Hitler even offered to place the S.A. under foreign supervision if other countries (perhaps he meant Poland) would do the same with their own semi-military formations.

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Still arguing almost explicitly against the German Nationalists — 'do not confuse us with the bourgeois world!' — he explained why National Socialism wanted to, had to, and would, dispense with war. War, he implied, was a method of purely political state formations, belonging to an outlived dynastic era, while National Socialism was the philosophy of the great European national revolution, and therefore extended far beyond state limitations; a philosophy of democracy among nations which must make it possible to create a system of international justice and renounce force. His clumsy and uncertain choice of big words indicated that the speaker himself only half-believed what he was saying, but at the moment wanted to believe it: 'Through many centuries,' he said, 'the European states and their boundaries arose from conceptions which were restricted to exclusively state lines. But with the victorious emergence of the national idea and the principle of nationalities in the course of the past century, and in consequence of the failure of states arisen from other presuppositions to consider these new ideas and ideals, the seeds of numerous conflicts were planted.' The Treaty of Versailles might have changed this unhealthy state of affairs; but it neglected to do so, 'partly from ignorance, partly from passion and hatred.' The speaker enumerated all the sins which rightly or wrongly he had for fourteen years been holding up to the Peace of Versailles. The peace, he declared, had brought Germany such misery that since the day of its signing, 224,900 persons had committed suicide, and 'Germany, contrary to the sacred conviction of the German people and their government was branded with the World War guilt.' Did Germany wish to wipe out the curse of this 'world peace' by a new war? Never! 'No new European war would be able to replace the unsatisfactory conditions of today by any better ones. On the contrary. Neither politically nor economically could the use of force produce a more favorable situation in Europe than that which exists today. Even if a new European solution by violence brought a decisive success, the end result would be only to increase the disturbance of the European balance, thus planting the seeds of new future conflicts and entanglements. New wars, new victims, new insecurity, and new economic distress would be the consequence [lively applause]. . . . It is the deep and earnest

wish of the national government of the German people for such an unpeaceful development by its own operation.'

What a change, what a reversal, since then when Hitler had scoffed at General von Seebock's pacifism, his faith in the limitation of armaments, the generals who did not want to believe in armaments; now it was Hitler who corrected the form of the Reichstag! And if one of them had the unlimited insistence on national claims by little nations in Europe was bound to cause a reply with an expression of almost Utopian peace-promoting power of the right of nations to a territorial reshaping of Europe in Versailles, of the real national frontiers, would historically solution.' And even in the German East, he brought out revealing the secret of his ideal solution, the settlement of European problems would at that time without difficulty to find a way which we understandable claims of Poland as well as of Germany.' The assignment of the Corridor was only intimated — was not such a way, for he did not reveal — as predominantly German government will, on its own responsibility, carry an agreement, which cannot be eliminated with a better one.' For, according to his new action, the peace-promoting power of absolute nationalism inwardly rebelled against the rape of any free state can have greater understanding for the needs of the national states and their vital needs than the national revolution which arose from similar urging for herself which she is not willing to give.

A classic formulation of a truly exalted principle. Hitler kept giving mere assurances that Germany's peace, doubt could still counter with the one. Then he explained his longing for peace with seemed to have gathered from the depths of his

D.T. The trick, as always, was to use simple language that had no meaning.

→ From it, one could see any new interpretation.

pp 672 + 673

If an exemplar needed of A.H.'s ability in foreign policy to

See the D.T. note

ly against the German Nationalists — bourgeois world!' — he explained why, had to; and would, dispense with method of purely political state formed dynastic era, while National Social great European national revolution, and state limitations; a philosophy of which must make it possible to create a and renounce force. His clumsy and is indicated that the speaker himself as saying, but at the moment wanted by centuries,' he said, 'the European rose from conceptions which were re- es. But with the victorious emergence principle of nationalities in the course sequence of the failure of states arisen consider these new ideas and ideals, its were planted.' The Treaty of Ver- this unhealthy state of affairs; but it in ignorance, partly from passion and erated all the sins which rightly or years been holding up to the Peace declared, had brought Germany such its signing, 224,900 persons had com- y, contrary to the sacred conviction of ir government was branded with the many wish to wipe out the curse of war? Never! 'No new European war unsatisfactory conditions of today by trary. Neither politically nor econom- produce a more favorable situation in s today. Even if a new European solu- cisive success, the end result would be ance of the European balance, thus ture conflicts and entanglements. New ury, and new economic distress would p[ro]p[er]ly. . . . It is the deep and earnest

wish of the national government of the German Reich to prevent such an unpeaceful development by its sincere and active co- operation.'

What a change, what a reversal, since the days, not so far past, when Hitler had scoffed at General von Seeckt for his moderate pacifism, his faith in the limitation of armaments! Now it was the generals who did not want to believe in the limitation of armaments; now it was Hitler who corrected them from the platform of the Reichstag! And if one of them had argued back that the unlimited insistence on national claims by three dozen big and little nations in Europe was bound to cause war, he would have replied with an expression of almost Utopian confidence in the peace-promoting power of the right of national self-determination; a 'territorial reshaping of Europe in Versailles, taking consideration of the real national frontiers, would historically have been an ideal solution.' And even in the German East, he believed, though without revealing the secret of his ideal solution, 'a considered treatment of European problems would at that time have been able without difficulty to find a way which would have met the understandable claims of Poland as well as the natural claims of Germany.' The assignment of the Corridor to Poland — this he only intimated — was not such a way, for he regarded the Corridor — unrightly — as predominantly German. But 'no German government will, on its own responsibility, carry out the breach of an agreement, which cannot be eliminated without being replaced by a better one.' For, according to his new and startling conception, the peace-promoting power of absolute nationalism was that it inwardly rebelled against the rape of any foreign people: 'No state can have greater understanding for the newly arisen young national states and their vital needs than the Germany of the national revolution which arose from similar urges. She wants nothing for herself which she is not willing to give others.'

A classic formulation of a truly exalted principle. As long as Hitler kept giving mere assurances that Germany needed and desired peace, doubt could still counter with the one word: 'Now!' But then he explained his longing for peace with an idea which he seemed to have gathered from the depths of his political being;

From it, one could later claim any new interpretation that now proved necessary.

as a last step, was to age that had no mean

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with an argument combined of passionate faith and brilliant falsehood. And an extraordinary number of people were immediately convinced:

'National Socialism is a principle which as a philosophy gives a general and fundamental obligation. Because of the boundless love and loyalty we feel for our own nationality, we respect the national rights of other peoples, and from the bottom of our hearts we desire to live with them in peace and friendship. Therefore, we do not have the idea of "Germanization." The mentality of the past century, which led people to think that they could make Germans out of Poles and Frenchmen, is alien to us, and we passionately oppose any attempt at the reverse. We see the European nations around us as a given fact. Frenchmen, Poles, and so on are our neighbors, and we know that no event that is historically conceivable can change this reality.'

Hitler's unexpected message of peace, shedding sweetness and light on a world trembling in fear of war, the ingenuity with which he cloaked the incredible in a film of credibility, show Hitler as a master of expedient propaganda; as a political pathfinder, discovering ways out of apparently inextricable situations; as the true armed intellectual, who unscrupulously masters the means for the solution of the task in hand. Yet, in this case, he can scarcely be accused of lying to the world. What he said was objectively the pure truth: that the world, and with it Germany, needed peace. This was all the more incontestable as in the moment when he said it he probably believed it himself; and for this reason millions inside and outside of Germany believed him. With disarming forthrightness he admitted that Germany would leave the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations if she were again denied equal rights; he also admitted that obviously Germany could not defend herself against an occupation of the Rhineland; only it was 'inconceivable and out of the question that such an act should obtain legal validity through our own signature.' Hitler stepped forward in the figure of an eccentric saint who apparently was slow to give his signature, but once he had given it, never broke his word. German refugees might attempt to prove the contrary with facts out of Hitler's past — facts were powerless against the tone of truth in Hitler's speeches.

For the first time since he had been making seemed to express the sentiment of the whole German without distinction of parties; for the first time without the slightest jarring note of opposition — the fact that one sixth of the Reichstag, the Communists, was forcibly excluded. However, it was the first time then had come out for peace with the greatest of the German people. The National Socialist German Workers' Party could honorably have given its support to a government of concentration camps and but for the fact that the government was bound to support it. But Frick, shortly before the session opened, declared that they had better think carefully before voting for the fatherland's need, the life of the individual, the importance. This was intended to mean: anyone who supported the government will be beaten to death, and he will be in concentration camps with him. A part of the leaders had already fled abroad, and between the leaders who had remained at home a bitter struggle, an irritation, was going on about the line to be taken. The leadership headed by the party chairman Wels, claimed total leadership and wished to organize an unlimited struggle against the régime; those who had remained in Germany, like Paul Loebe, former president of the Reichstag, were for carrying on 'within the framework of the law' of course with great tactical caution. In line with this Hitler decided after Hitler's speech to join in the Reichstag the approval; they comforted themselves with the thought that if this were not exactly the bravest kind of resistance, it at least served the cause of peace. The unanimous support of Hitler's peace.

With his peace speech Hitler had immediately become the most powerful and most widely heard speaker in the world. A mold and disseminator of world views, to which the earth listened, whether in agreement or hostility. The influence on public opinion such as history had seldom known. And so began the campaign of spiritual conquest.

1933

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For the first time since he had been making speeches, Hitler
seemed to express the sentiment of the whole German people with-
out distinction of parties; for the first time he found agreement
without the slightest jarring note of opposition — if one overlooked
the fact that one sixth of the Reichstag, the Communist fraction,
was forcibly excluded. However, it was the party which up till
then had come out for peace with the greatest conviction, which
now found it hardest to support this peace speech. No Social Demo-
cratic Party could honorably have given its support on any point
to a government of concentration camps and breach of the consti-
tution, for any kind of support was bound to strengthen the tyranny.
But Frick, shortly before the session opened, dryly said to the parties
that they had better think carefully before voting, for in this hour
of the fatherland's need, the life of the individual would be of no
importance. This was intended to mean: anyone who votes against
the government will be beaten to death, and his comrades in the
concentration camps with him. A part of the Social Democratic
leaders had already fled abroad, and between the émigrés and those
who had remained at home a bitter struggle, not free of personal
irritation, was going on about the line to be taken. While the exiles,
headed by the party chairman Wels, claimed to represent the party
leadership and wished to organize an unlimited underground strug-
gle against the régime, those who had remained behind, led by
Paul Loebe, former president of the Reichstag, and Carl Severing,
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And so began the campaign of spiritual conquest that Houston

* D.T. end all this in ^{one} year!

Chamberlain had demanded and Goebbels had announced; it was the first trumpet blast of the 'great world mission.' National Socialism, said Hitler, had arisen from the same roots as the nationalism of the Poles and Czechs. If you listened attentively, a faint cry of 'Aryans of all nations, unite,' could be heard behind his words. Hitler might boast today that he was destroying democracy and tomorrow claim that he was bringing the 'true' or 'ennobled' democracy, as Goebbels put it; it was neither the first nor presumably the last time that despotism has called itself democracy. Since the dramas of Friedrich Schiller, the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, and the operas of Richard Wagner, there had been no such effective attempt at the spiritual conquest, or 'Germanization,' of the world as in Hitler's peace speeches which were now to follow one another over a period of years. It is easy to see that the herald of peace literally followed the counsel of the Wise Men of Zion, 'always to appear outwardly honorable and conciliatory'; 'to accustom the peoples to take our IOU's for cash' and in this way lead them 'some day to regard us as the benefactors and saviors of the human race.' But the effect cannot be explained by mere oratorical sleight of hand. Hitler's speeches expressed a feeling shared by the post-war generation of all nations — and perhaps by the speaker himself at the moment — that the relations between nations must have a meaning which war could not have. For the world — H. S. Chamberlain had seen and expressed this — is a task capable of solution, and the great final solution is peace — for Chamberlain a 'German peace.' The last war, at its outbreak welcomed as a gift from Heaven and cheered with astonishing uniformity by nearly all nations, had turned out to be the greatest of all deceptions, a world horror that benefited the people of no country. No less had been the disillusionment of the peace, which did not bring with it the world order for which men had hoped.

Hitler with all his political powers was not the prophetic figure that could promise and make credible this world future which had hitherto failed to materialize, though he occasionally had something of the sort in mind — as he occasionally had everything in mind. Nevertheless in his speech — which in places, to use Hans Grimm's words, 'was more than himself' — there was the distant

*is the secret of absolute control (was)
to have "everything in mind"*

sound of a more peaceful future, even though it at best as a future in the style of H. S. tific world order of German organizational National Socialist violence. Though Napoleon, he was subject to the curse of 'All these wielders of power,' said Wagner peace except under the protection of a god when he stood before the Reichstag and the for a moment at least, put it in his power felt. What makes his speech significant is the fact that he had to say it, and despite orable underlying purpose, it is a document of our epoch. Like Aristide Briere he turned his back on cannon.

Actually Hitler, with his assurances of peace of so many millions in the world, that at mood permeated all relations. Most hesitantly France, where the *Echo de Paris* sarcastically must be applauding Hitler from his belief Hitler no more than we should have. The liberal press of England was also re. *Herald*, organ of the Labour Party, up till the criticism of Germany's internal condition abruptly and demanded that Hitler be taken servative weekly *Spectator* wrote with enthusiasm Roosevelt had held out a hand to German world, and that Hitler had taken it. An immediate *Spectator* continued, lay on the shoulders smaller responsibility on those of England; Hitler were drawing at the same rope. Almost concluded that in the unity of these two haunted world.

As for President Roosevelt, he had listened radio. The German press reported that Hitler received with great applause in the White Wolff Bureau quoted Roosevelt's secretary as a dent was enthusiastic at Hitler's acceptance of

ended and Goebbels had announced; it was of the 'great world mission.' National Socialism from the same roots as the nationalism of the 19th century. If you listened attentively, a faint cry of 'unite,' could be heard behind his words. It lay that he was destroying democracy and he was bringing the 'true' or 'ennobled' Germany back to its roots. It was neither the first nor presumptuous. Despotism has called itself democracy. Since Schiller, the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner, there had been no such thing as spiritual conquest, or 'Germanization,' of the world. Peace speeches which were now to follow would be of years. It is easy to see that the herald of the new era, the counsel of the Wise Men of Zion, was hardly honorable and conciliatory; 'to accuse our IOU's for cash' and in this way lead us back to the old relations. The effect cannot be explained by mere oratorical skill. His speeches expressed a feeling shared by all nations — and perhaps by the speaker — that the relations between nations must be changed. A war could not have been seen and expressed this — is a task capable of final solution is peace — for Chamberlain's last war, at its outbreak welcomed as a gift, ended with astonishing uniformity by nearly all nations to be the greatest of all deceptions, a lie told to the people of no country. No less had it been of the peace, which did not bring with it the things which men had hoped.

Political powers were not the prophetic figure who could make credible this world future which had been realized, though he occasionally had something to say — as he occasionally had everything in his speech — which in places, to use Hans' words, 'more than himself' — there was the distant

absolute control over
the mind.

sound of a more peaceful future, even though he himself envisaged it at best as a future in the style of H. S. Chamberlain, a scientific world order of German organizational skill, brought about by National Socialist violence. Though broader of horizon than Napoleon, he was subject to the curse of all Napoleonic figures. 'All these wielders of power,' said Wagner, 'could not conceive of peace except under the protection of a good many cannon.' But when he stood before the Reichstag and the world on May 17, Fate, for a moment at least, put it in his power to say what the world felt. What makes his speech significant is not how he said it, but the fact that he had to say it, and despite its treacherous, dishonorable underlying purpose, it is a document of the political world sentiment of our epoch. Like Aristide Briand seven years before, he turned his back on cannon.

Actually Hitler, with his assurances of peace, spoke to the hearts of so many millions in the world, that at once a more peaceful mood permeated all relations. Most hesitant was the reaction of France, where the *Echo de Paris* sarcastically remarked that Stresemann must be applauding Hitler from his grave, meaning: Let us believe Hitler no more than we should have believed Stresemann. The liberal press of England was also reserved; but the *Daily Herald*, organ of the Labour Party, up till then full of the sharpest criticism of Germany's internal conditions, shifted its position abruptly and demanded that Hitler be taken at his word. The conservative weekly *Spectator* wrote with enthusiasm that President Roosevelt had held out a hand to Germany in the name of the world, and that Hitler had taken it. An immense responsibility, *The Spectator* continued, lay on the shoulders of France, a scarcely smaller responsibility on those of England; but Roosevelt and Hitler were drawing at the same rope. Almost ecstatically, the writer concluded that in the unity of these two lay a new hope for the haunted world.

As for President Roosevelt, he had listened to the speech over the radio. The German press reported that Hitler's words 'had been received with great applause in the White House.' The official Wolff Bureau quoted Roosevelt's secretary as saying: 'The President was enthusiastic at Hitler's acceptance of his proposals.'

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Chapter XXV

HITLER VERSUS NATIONAL SOCIALISM

IN THE FIRST BOOK OF HIS *DISCORSI*, MACHIAVELLI writes that a tyrant who wishes to establish absolute rule in a country not previously ruled by tyranny must change everything: officials, institutions, titles, even the location of the cities; yes, he must even move inhabitants from one province to another, 'as shepherds drive their flocks from place to place.' He, on the other hand, who wished to reform a state to the satisfaction of all, would do well to leave as many things as possible outwardly as they are, so that the changes are not even noticed. Measured by this rule, the National Socialists conducted themselves more like reformers than like tyrants in the first months, even years, of their régime; for although they thoroughly revamped the methods of government, they retained most of the traditional institutions from parliament, whose decisions they never failed to invoke, down to the subdivision into states.

Here Hitler appeared at the height of his fickle political technique. Power suddenly offered problems he had not expected and was by no means prepared to solve—a situation very different from H. S. Chamberlain's utopian scientific dreams. Yes, there were many problems to be left unsolved—for the moment, at least; issues to be left untouched, resistance unbroken.

The reason for this was no inclination or gentleness on Hitler's

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part; it was his appreciation of the inevitable fighting for power, his task, in his own existing institutions to his purposes; now, he had to make them serve him. As for power or utility in them, they must not be eternal law of political wisdom, the trampled one of their political ideals, and party program. They abandoned the ideal of unity. Hitler, who otherwise appreciated institutions, struggled against this necessity and it was stronger than ever. For the administrative apparatus were not in the states; here were the central switches, here public life of the nation. And for this reason or altered; the apparatuses were taken over, as Premier of Prussia, attempted stronger. In place of the provincial diet, he gave his state a chamber of leaders; the good National Socialist fashion, to a council consisting of higher officials: Staatsrat, had carried on a rather incongruous Prussian state administration; Ley had ordinated' this body, of making himself this vantage-point governing Prussia as it occurred at the end of April. Göring took for two months, then he threw Ley out—the laws in Prussia—and transformed officials into an areopagus of powerful aristocrats. From now on party functionaries formed the top leaders of the S.A. and the S.S. chief group leaders; and the Prussian gaus till then the party gaus in Prussia had many the provinces, the comparatively large a which the Prussian state was composed. O employed by the National Socialists in the now to appoint many of the *gauleiters* precisely where this could not be done, the *gaulei*

* D.T. Here is where my counsel was needed as never before. To see him grow, to see him comprehend the nature of the politically flexible, of the principle unshaken, and the principle ^{staple} ~~beat~~ into an S or a U, the patience not to touch certain matters, and ~~then~~ a development of an acute sense when to move—all this was taking place in him. Three weeks ago I no longer looked upon him as my cheat but my younger brother.

Chapter XXV

TLER VERSUS ONAL SOCIALISM

BOOK OF HIS *DISCORSI*, MACHIAVELLI who wishes to establish absolute rule in a coun-
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resistance unbroken.

his was no inclination or gentleness on Hitler's

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part; it was his appreciation of the inevitable. As long as he was
fighting for power, his task, in his own words, was to incline the
existing institutions to his purposes; now, after his seizure of power,
he had to make them serve him. As long as they had a spark of
power or utility in them, they must not be destroyed. Obeying this
eternal law of political wisdom, the National Socialists again
trampled one of their political ideals, embodied in point 25 of their
party program. They abandoned the idea of giving Germany polit-
ical unity. Hitler, who otherwise appreciated the power of existing
institutions, struggled against this necessity; but it was a necessity,
and it was stronger than ever. For the wheels and levers of the ad-
ministrative apparatus were not in the Reich, but in the separate
states; here were the central switches, here was the power over the
public life of the nation. And for this reason nothing was smashed
or altered; the apparatuses were taken over as they were; and Gö-
ring, as Premier of Prussia, attempted to make Prussia even
stronger. In place of the provincial diet, which had lost all power,
he gave his state a chamber of leaders; in the process he had, in
the good National Socialist fashion, to crush a rival. Up till then
a council consisting of higher officials and mayors, the so-called
Staatsrat, had carried on a rather inconspicuous existence in the
Prussian state administration; Ley had hit on the idea of 'co-
ordinating' this body, of making himself its president, and from
this vantage-point governing Prussia as Hitler's 'chief of staff.' This
occurred at the end of April. Göring tolerated this state of affairs
for two months, then he threw Ley out — it was Göring who made
the laws in Prussia — and transformed the shadowy council of
officials into an areopagus of powerful and celebrated names.

From now on party functionaries formed the core of the *Staats-
rat*: the top leaders of the S.A. and the S.S., their group leaders and
chief group leaders; and the Prussian *gauleiters* of the party. Up
till then the party *gaus* in Prussia had more or less coincided with
the provinces, the comparatively large administrative districts of
which the Prussian state was composed. One of the shrewdest tricks
employed by the National Socialists in their seizure of power was
now to appoint many of the *gauleiters* presidents of these provinces;
where this could not be done, the *gauleiters* became at least state

the provincial presidents were required to make decisions, to obtain the consent of the Reich in filling offices. In the smaller states, they became Reich *statthalters*; so that the Reich was not entirely unified, a net of National Socialism covered the whole Reich.

It was intended to be something else; an apparatus calculated to enhance Göring's fame. It included leading men of science and art; among them Kurt Schwitters, the conductor, and Fritz Hartmann. In addition, Göring used his *Staatsrat* of members of hungry ravens in his political apparatus and a monthly fee of a thousand marks

made its way into every corner and into every apparatus. Pleased with his new situation that Prussia would continue, as it had been the fundament of the German Empire, he surrendered so much as the smallest strip of land; that anyone who made any such a concentration camp. Hitler replied that National Socialism was 'not to preserve the old but to create the new.' Although Göring loyally followed him all and primarily as the true paladin of the Reich, he had learned for over a decade, it was not to be learned the lesson of obedience. He followed his *Staatsrat* in the Berlin Castle, but the faithful paladin had taken an independent defiance of his Leader's will. But in his favor, for the task was the conquest of power.

In conquest and destruction was often seemed impossible to snatch a valuable thing without damaging it. If it was not the Leader to make the proper distinction, the egotistic and disunited followers, with their egotism was an indispensable

force in the party, but it could not be left unchecked. A decision and reckoning were due some day. It was more than ten years since Hess, in his portrait of Hitler, had foreseen this decision and had calmly prophesied that to attain his goal the Leader would 'trample his closest friends.' For years Hitler had seen this type of crisis approaching; he had several times fought his way through similar crises. He had surrounded himself more and more with the type of supporter he would need in trampling his friends; in exactly such a crisis, he had drawn Hess out of almost total obscurity and raised him to the party leadership. Now, in the spring of 1933, he put Hess in charge of the whole party apparatus—once again demonstrating by his choice that the party was his property. After Hess had tacitly held this position for some time, Hitler appointed him, on April 27, 'my deputy, with the power to take decisions in my name in all questions relating to the conduct of the party.' In so far as ruling meant work, Hitler transferred his power and his worries to his industrious helper, a man conscious of his own limitations, almost enjoying them.

Thus there arose a new apparatus of leadership with the task of curbing, and if necessary breaking, National Socialism as a mass movement in conflict with the Hitlerian system of authority and obedience; both ostensibly one and the same thing, in reality two opposed principles. For while Hitler's policy was directed toward conquering and dominating the existing political conditions, within the National Socialist movement, forces were still working which were out to destroy and break them; for some time they had their way because Hitler as yet did not see his own way clearly enough.

These were concerned with more than power; many were out for more than advantages. They wanted their life to have a new meaning, their existence in society a purpose; their value for their own people was the one thing that gave their careers on earth any value. To many, and not always the worst among them, only faith in their fatherland had retained any meaning, their own nation had become God; if they hesitated openly to declare themselves religious unbelievers, Hitler had provided them with a suitable formula: 'We know two Gods: one in heaven and another on

D. T. inspired

* at my advice.

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earth; the second is Germany.' But 'we' are Germany, Hitler had said on another occasion, and 'we' meant 'I.' And so there were people who prayed to Hitler, perhaps without realizing that this was prayer.

But now there arose voices among the National Socialists, openly declaring that the new movement must renew the German belief in God — making it clear that God was embodied in the German people. Many insisted that German religion must free itself from the Jewish Biblical tradition — from 'Satan's Bible,' as Hitler eleven years before, in a conversation with Dietrich Eckart, had called the Old Testament. The New Testament was no better, said others, perhaps fewer in number. General Ludendorff, head of a politico-religious sect numbering several tens of thousands, which he called the 'Tannenberg League,' after his most famous military victory, rejected both the teachings and the person of Jesus, whom even Gobineau and Wagner had declared to be 'white,' that is non-Semitic. Hitler himself in his youth, as he told his friend Hanisch, had been convinced that the historical Jesus had been no Jew, but the son of one Pantherus, a Greek soldier in the Roman army. In Ludendorff's eyes, however, the Saviour was the embodiment of Asiatic magic, a force destructive to the Germanic peoples. And, it must be added, to him one of the most dangerous agents of the Roman priesthood was Hitler himself.

For it could not be denied that Hitler still belonged to the Catholic Church. In March, 1933, it is true, he had demonstratively remained absent from the services of his Church; there was the story that in his youth he had spat out the Host. But he was on terms of intimate friendship with several Catholic clergymen, such as Abbot Alban Schachleitner, former head of the Emmaus Cloister in Prague, who after 1918 had been driven out by the Czechoslovakian revolution. In his whole being Schachleitner was a fragment of that German national dynamite scattered through the whole of Central and Eastern Europe. It is possible that his faith in his people overshadowed his faith in his Saviour. Hitler, who in 1918 certainly still went to confession and communion, is even said later to have received the sacrament from the hands of this National Socialist abbot. At all events, on July 1, he let it be officially pro-

but

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claimed: 'Reich Chancellor Hitler still by Church and has no intention of leaving it.'

Certainly, he had stated that '... the priest eliminate . . . we shall give him back to the And to satisfy him the party of the Catholic to eliminate the priest from politics; Kaas, retired from the leadership of the Center Party found a position in the Vatican. But Brüning, on, and had conferences with Hitler, who bid his bid for collaboration. Actually, the party a few months, share the government with in Bavaria Count Quadt-Isny, the new leader's Party, served as Minister of Economy. Step by step, the Catholic Church abandoned to National Socialism. The same German before had warned against the un-Christian, a conference at Fulda, March 28, 1933, that a speech of March 23, with its conciliatory they felt justified in 'hoping that the above-n prohibitions and warnings need no longer be and recommended obedience to the legal abitions and warnings had been issued while were merely marching through the streets and were withdrawn when thousands were murdered in concentration camps.

By retreating on the political field the Church spiritual power intact. But was this possible?

For centuries it had been true that the clear approximately equal strength — if Austria helped to tear Germany apart. But now: 'A on the brown shirt,' said Rosenberg, 'he cease a Protestant; he is only a National Socialist' — this mean except that the National Socialist Christian? At all events, this is exactly what by his words. In a society where the individual the nation was everything, God could be nothing; this was no philosophical hair-splitting.

* The American

Germany.' But 'we' are Germany, Hitler had said, and 'we' meant 'I.' And so there were Hitler, perhaps without realizing that this

voices among the National Socialists, openly movement must renew the German belief that God was embodied in the German that German religion must free itself from religion — from 'Satan's Bible,' as Hitler eleven years with Dietrich Eckart, had called the New Testament was no better, said others, General Ludendorff, head of a politico-military movement, several tens of thousands, which he called 'Hitler's' after his most famous military victory, and the person of Jesus, whom even Hitler had declared to be 'white,' that is non-Jewish in his youth, as he told his friend Hanisch, that the historical Jesus had been no Jew, but a Greek soldier in the Roman army. In fact, the Saviour was the embodiment of destructive to the Germanic peoples. And, it was one of the most dangerous agents of the Hitler himself.

denied that Hitler still belonged to the Church, 1933, it is true, he had demonstratively renounced the services of his Church; there was the story that he spat out the Host. But he was on terms with several Catholic clergymen, such as Engelbert, former head of the Emmaus Cloister in Munich, who had been driven out by the Czechoslovakian whole being Schachleitner was a fragment of dynamite scattered through the whole of Europe. It is possible that his faith in his Saviour. Hitler, who in 1918 had renounced his profession and communion, is even said later to have taken the sacrament from the hands of this National Socialist, on July 1, he let it be officially pronounced.

1933
claimed: 'Reich Chancellor Hitler still belongs to the Catholic Church and has no intention of leaving it.'

Certainly, he had stated that '... the priest in politics we shall eliminate ... we shall give him back to the pulpit and the altar.' And to satisfy him the party of the Catholic Church itself took care to eliminate the priest from politics; Kaas, the prelate, on May 6, retired from the leadership of the Center Party, went to Rome, and found a position in the Vatican. But Brüning, his successor, carried on, and had conferences with Hitler, who had not as yet revoked his bid for collaboration. Actually, the party of the Church did, for a few months, share the government with the National Socialists; in Bavaria Count Quadl-Isny, the new leader of the Bavarian People's Party, served as Minister of Economics.

Step by step, the Catholic Church abandoned political resistance to National Socialism. The same German bishops, who three years before had warned against the un-Christian movement, declared in a conference at Fulda, March 28, 1933, that after Hitler's Reichstag speech of March 23, with its conciliatory words for the Church, they felt justified in 'hoping that the above-mentioned general prohibitions and warnings need no longer be regarded as necessary,' and recommended obedience to the legal authorities. The prohibitions and warnings had been issued while the National Socialists were merely marching through the streets and issuing threats; they were withdrawn when thousands were murdered or beaten to a pulp in concentration camps.

By retreating on the political field the Church hoped to keep its spiritual power intact. But was this possible?

For centuries it had been true that the cleavage into two sects of approximately equal strength — if Austria was included — had helped to tear Germany apart. But now: 'As soon as a man puts on the brown shirt,' said Rosenberg, 'he ceases to be a Catholic or a Protestant; he is only a National Socialist' — and what else could this mean except that the National Socialist had ceased to be a Christian? At all events, this is exactly what Rosenberg had meant by his words. In a society where the individual was nothing and the nation was everything, God could be nothing unless he was the nation; this was no philosophical hair-splitting, but a state of mind

✱ The American right wing.

masses. The church-weariness and faithlessness of the Protestant church memberships, was clear from the emptiness of the halls and sport stadiums could no longer thronged to political meetings.

3, the Catholic Church was able to demonstrate in Germany. In the city of Trier, many decades, a remarkable relic, contested was put on exhibition: the so-called 'holy cross' which wore on the cross; for days throngs from the moderate-sized city and followed the relic, where they passed six or eight abreast. The National Socialists could not have staged such a spectacle; perhaps this demonstration of the 'holy cross' made Hitler more receptive to a conciliatory attitude, negotiations for which had been in progress.

an in these 'concordats' was to lend the German Reich an international treaty. Up till then the German Reich had concluded its treaties with the German states, without regard to the political division of Germany; obviously, the German Reich was in favorable conditions from predominantly Protestant Prussia. Now, under Hitler, the German Reich was again begun. One thing that was definitely excluded between the Third Reich and the Pope was that is, a foreign power — from concluding a treaty with the German state; even if the existing concordat could not immediately be eliminated. Kaas in violation of the Reich Concordat, with the idea that the Pope could be forced to give one of his promises in an unsent letter, as in the case of his dealings with the Center Party. Papen, the Catholic Reich Minister, as chief negotiator.

The Reich Concordat would mean the definition of the Catholic Church from German political life. The German Reich had to adjust itself to a non-parliamentary system, as had been antemptuously predicted: 'I see the time

coming when the Pope will be glad if the Church is taken under the protection of National Socialism against the parties of the Center.' Perhaps in reality it was not too hard a blow for the Pope, or at least for his Secretary of State, Cardinal Pacelli, that by the Concordat they would have to forbid the German clergy to engage in political activity; the Reich government promised in a codicil that it would also prevent the Protestant clergy from engaging in political activity. The treaty obligated the Holy See, before appointment of any archbishop or bishop, to inquire if the provincial *statthalter* had any objection to the candidate; also, the bishop had to swear loyalty to the German Reich and promise to respect the government.

In return, the government agreed that many of the Church's religious and social organizations, including the Catholic workers' clubs, would be tolerated. While this was being discussed, the Munich S.A. assaulted members of these clubs who had gathered for a national congress (June 11-12, 1933), and beat them severely, not far from the place where, fourteen years before, twenty-one Catholic workers had fallen beneath the bullets and rifle butts of the murderers' army. But the conferences on the Concordat went on.

In renewing the Berlin treaty of friendship, the 'godless Jews of the Kremlin' had been the first world power to hold out a hand to Hitler; the Vicar of Christ on earth became the second. Many German Catholics felt more humiliated than protected by this treaty. The majority of the bishops and the Holy See saw things differently. Not a few sons of the Catholic Church vacillated when confronted by the choice between obedience to their clergy and obedience to their secular leaders; the Church now was compromising to save spiritual values in the modern man, values which lay outside of all social relations. On the other hand, such profoundly earthly considerations as concern for church property — cloisters, schools, hospitals — and for the livelihood of the clergy must also have influenced the Holy See in its dealings with the Antichrist.

At the same time, the National Socialists tried to sever the Catholic Church from the active life of the nation, they made a serious and promising attempt to take possession of the Protestant Church which was a German Church to begin with. Here the task

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was entirely different: not to tear or lure believers away from their Church, but to lead unbelievers back. In June, 1932, some National Socialist clergymen had founded an organization calling itself the 'Faith Movement of German Christians'; at its head stood a minister named Hossenfelder. It was a minority group in the Protestant clergy; and the 'German Christians' could not even claim to represent the 'living church'—i.e., the mass of believing men and women—against 'alien' priests. For those leaders of the Protestant Church who resisted National Socialism were supported by the majority of the churchgoers. The National Socialist ministers replied that they alone could bring back the non-churchgoers, and that these lost sheep were what mattered.

These were the masses of 'involuntary' church members; those numerous laymen who, according to the State Church laws prevailing in Germany, were counted as belonging to the official Church and had to pay church taxes, although they had not seen the inside of a church for years. Only this 'State Church' system makes all the German church struggles comprehensible. Up to the fall of the German Empire in 1918, practically everyone had to belong to a religious community, either the Catholic Church or the Protestant State Church. In Prussia, the King was supreme head of the Protestant Church. After the founding of the German Republic, this state of affairs had ceased in principle, but only in principle. In practice the state continued to collect church taxes, and anyone who did not expressly leave the Church had to go on paying them; but as a rule, even those who had lost their faith did not expressly resign. It was principally these faithless church members who had now suddenly flocked to the 'German Christians.'

With the authority of National Socialism, the German Christian ministers were able to enlist considerable masses of the unbelieving or half-believing church membership. Among their leaders was Ludwig Müller, the army chaplain who had brought Hitler and General von Blomberg together; Hitler believed that he was performing a masterly stroke when he summarily dismissed Hossenfelder and made the friend of his Reichswehr Minister head of the German Christians. Müller did not fulfill expectations; in the middle of May, the leaders of the Protestant Church drew from

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him an admission that the Church must be ship.' But he did make it clear that the Pro run in accordance with the 'leader principle, new leadership had for German Protestant Papism: there would be a 'Reich Bishop' with bishops under him. Taking Müller by surprise Church body elected as their bishop a man Friedrich von Bodelschwingh, a widely respected by no means a National Socialist. His election to Hitler, because Bodelschwingh was the home for the feeble-minded, caring for the leader's opinion, should have been exterminated race.

At this point, open warfare broke out between the party. Almost anything might have provoked two faiths which could not live at peace. The most obvious cause for conflict was the racial man Christians demanded that only Aryan Church, and especially to the clergy. The number of Aryans who had ceased to be Jews was latest statistics at one million; over this relatively German churches of both denominations were The Church as such could not renounce that had said: 'Ye shall teach all the nations.' went even farther, and refused to admit that to be Germans; in a pastoral letter of June 1933, the kind for many years to come—the Catholic national unity can be achieved, not only by like mentality, and that exclusive consideration of judging state membership leads to injustice. The Church the German Christians, with their introduction of the 'Aryan clause' into the articles of the thousand years of church history on its behalf the Christian Church had begun with the pagans must be circumcised Jews, and only when discarded did Christianity begin to grow and now, in 1933, it was no longer permissible for

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him an admission that the Church must be 'free of state guardian-
ship.' But he did make it clear that the Protestant Church must be
run in accordance with the 'leader principle.' The very titles of the
new leadership had for German Protestant ears an ugly ring of
Papism: there would be a 'Reich Bishop' with a number of other
bishops under him. Taking Müller by surprise, the majority of the
Church body elected as their bishop a man of their ranks, Pastor
Friedrich von Bodelschwingh, a widely respected Churchman and
by no means a National Socialist. His election was an open insult
to Hitler, because Bodelschwingh was the director of a famous
home for the feeble-minded, caring for those people who, in Hit-
ler's opinion, should have been exterminated for the good of the
race.

At this point, open warfare broke out between the Church and
the party. Almost anything might have provoked it, for these were
two faiths which could not live at peace with one another. The
most obvious cause for conflict was the racial question, for the Ger-
man Christians demanded that only Aryans be admitted to the
Church, and especially to the clergy. The number of German non-
Aryans who had ceased to be Jews was later set by National Social-
ist statistics at one million; over this relatively small number the
German churches of both denominations waged an intense struggle.
The Church as such could not renounce these people, for Christ
had said: 'Ye shall teach all the nations.' The Catholic Church
went even farther, and refused to admit that non-Aryans had ceased
to be Germans; in a pastoral letter of June 10, 1933 — the last of its
kind for many years to come — the Catholic bishops declared that
national unity can be achieved, not only by like blood, but also by
like mentality, and that exclusive consideration of race and blood in
judging state membership leads to injustice. In the Protestant
Church the German Christians, with their insistence on the intro-
duction of the 'Aryan clause' into the articles of faith, stood two
thousand years of church history on its head. For the history of
the Christian Church had begun with the principle that all Chris-
tians must be circumcised Jews, and only when this principle was
discarded did Christianity begin to grow and to 'teach all nations';
now, in 1933, it was no longer permissible for a Christian to have

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July 33

been a circumcised Jew. When Bodelschwing and his clergymen resisted this idea, Göring ordered his subordinate, Bernhard Rust, the Prussian Minister of Education, to use force; hesitantly and reluctantly, Rust set a taskmaster over the Protestant Church, a civil servant by the name of Jaeger. High and low clergymen were thrown out. Müller was made head of the Protestant churches, and Bodelschwing was forced to resign. On July 2, 1933, the swastika flags were raised over the Evangelical churches of Germany.

It was the flood tide of the Nazi revolution. In this moment it still seemed uncertain how far National Socialism would go in the breaking of resistance; whether it would submit to the limitations which Machiavelli advises the reformer to accept. Hitler himself was not clear how far he could go and how far he wanted to go. At first he had counted on a slow but persistent overcoming of resistance; but then there had been great and unexpected successes, and his confidence rose above all difficulties. On June 15, he assembled the National Socialist leaders in Berlin and commanded them to intensify their struggle against those adversaries who were still present. The last months, he said, had strengthened him in the conviction that the National Socialist government would master foreign and economic difficulties with the same success that it mastered domestic difficulties. It was his conviction, firm as a rock, that the mighty movement of National Socialism would outlive the centuries and that nothing could end it. But the watchword for the present was: 'The law of the National Socialist Revolution has not yet expired. Its dynamics still dominate the development of Germany.' He had learned much from Leon Trotzky, whose slogan of the permanent revolution he now adopted: 'The German Revolution will not be concluded until the whole German nation is given a new form, a new organization, and a new structure.'

He never called this new Germany by the name which had been made popular by Goebbels: the 'third Reich' — meaning that it came after the (first) Holy Roman Empire (962-1806) and the (second) Bismarckian Empire (1871-1918 A.D.). This perhaps was due to his desire to make a clean break with the past. It was a time when he thought of himself as leading a revolution against everything reactionary, whether it was the Church, the economic age, or the

bourgeois parties. It was a wave which would motley remnants of the past, and he knew that even when he struck at the Comen Hugenberg and his crowd at the same time, to that past; to the Weimar Republic, the 'in

The German Nationalists, who really had every outward sign of democracy, still gave the few votes in parliament which it needed this very fact, they prevented it from becoming dictatorship. However, there were signs that port would soon become superfluous. In the elections to the *Volksstag* (parliament) were the National Socialists achieved what had put them in the Reich: an absolute, though scant, exactly 50.03 per cent; but a safe majority of in Bavaria and in some of the Prussian provinces the head of the Danzig government a national party only a short time. Hermann Rauschning, so-called 'latelings,' a type mostly hated by absolutely needed to cover that unsavory crime with a respectable name.

What had remained in the end of Hitler was essentially a group of inadequately armed men with Germany's large economic holdings managers and administrators than as owners. Ministries of economics and food supply, this held its hand on the most powerful lever: chosen the weakest of all positions of power, the economic field that the most perilous corner was not the National Socialist workers who lution in the economic sphere; it was those defenders and beneficiaries of the existing middle class, threatened with ruin by over was enraged at big capital; the peasant pro National Socialists, demanded no less than German credit system.

In the first months of the régime, the 'ar

D.T.
* Here could come a quick explanation
on circumcision & St. Paul.
D.T. How I wanted to know whether
Paul had become one of our clients?

June '33

National Socialism had not been very vociferous; it had been drowned out by the fight against Communism. The stock exchange had received Hitler's first successes with good cheer; after the elections of March 5, stocks had risen sharply. Then, by his Jewish boycott, Hitler had suddenly scotched this hope and confidence and stocks had crashed; they remained low when one staggering law on racial purity and co-ordination followed another. The conquest of the trade unions did not relieve the fear of the capital. For after the radicalism of the workers seemed to be crushed for the moment, capital was faced with the possibly more dangerous radicalism of the armed bohemians.

This radical spirit took possession of the party when increasing political success failed to benefit the mass of the membership. It was impossible to satisfy immediately the avid masses who had harnessed their future to this party; and at the head of these disappointed masses stood some of the first men. Röhm, whom Hindenburg had refused once and for all to tolerate in the government, had been put off with the beggarly post of a minister without portfolio in Bavaria. Gottfried Feder, as though there were no National Socialist government, had to go on fighting bitterly and hopelessly for the main point in the party program he had helped to frame, the breaking of interest slavery; he had received no post at all. He had indeed a strong support in R. W. Darré, Hitler's prophet among the peasantry; but Darré himself had no position in the government. True, thousands were already provided for, but this aroused the envy of tens of thousands who had been left out in the cold, who felt that in view of their great services to the movement they had been kept waiting too long.

The chief dispenser of lucrative posts in the government was Göring, the Prussian Premier, who also headed the still mysterious Ministry of Aviation. In both capacities he provided for a swarm of personal friends, who for the most part were quite unknown to the party. There was Göring's friend Körner, who became Secretary of State in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, hence the most powerful dispenser of patronage in the Reich. There was Erhard Milch, director of the *Lufthansa*, whom Göring appointed Secretary of State in his new aviation ministry, partly because

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Milch had supported Göring in the old d short of funds. No one had ever heard that Socialist, while it could not be doubted that and when Erhard Milch, pursuing a custom to gain wide popularity, claimed to be a mother's infidelity, his detractors found out of this supposedly Aryan mother allegedly.

The thousand-headed swarm of job-hu reservoir from which the current of radicalis But it claimed to speak in the name of the keepers.

Large sections of the rural population, s tain of mortgages, were passionately awaiti terest slavery. Darré wanted to reduce all agr per cent. Hugenberg, as Minister of Food S infringing sufficiently on the sanctity of cont agricultural interest from its really insane le per cent, and even canceled some farm del 1933). Schacht, as president of the Reichsb this reduction of interest, which seemed to Hugenberg clung to his plan; in addition, he which had done so much political damage ir country by means of high customs duties, th and butter prices. Then Hitler justified th peasantry was so important that for their sal measures, such as the raising of prices, must

Thus began the short-lived era of 'German t

The different sections of the German econ broad and varied network of organizations. *menverbände* (associations for the maintenanc ards); there were organizations for common rials, for distributing orders, for advising prod organization of production, and for maintain complementary plants. This highly develop organization culminated in the powerful c taining high prices. These associations not or but they seemed to the National Socialist p

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June 1933
Milch had supported Göring in the old days when he had been short of funds. No one had ever heard that Milch was a National Socialist, while it could not be doubted that he bore a Jewish name; and when Erhard Milch, pursuing a custom which was beginning to gain wide popularity, claimed to be the fruit of his 'Aryan' mother's infidelity, his detractors found out that the maiden name of this supposedly Aryan mother allegedly had been Rosenau.

The thousand-headed swarm of job-hunters was the human reservoir from which the current of radicalism in the party was fed. But it claimed to speak in the name of the farmers and the shopkeepers.

Large sections of the rural population, stifling under a mountain of mortgages, were passionately awaiting the breaking of interest slavery. Darré wanted to reduce all agricultural credits to two per cent. Hugenberg, as Minister of Food Supply, thought he was infringing sufficiently on the sanctity of contracts when he reduced agricultural interest from its really insane level to four and a half per cent, and even canceled some farm debts by decree (June 1, 1933). Schacht, as president of the Reichsbank, violently opposed this reduction of interest, which seemed to Darré absurdly slight. Hugenberg clung to his plan; in addition, he threw Danish butter, which had done so much political damage in Germany, out of the country by means of high customs duties, thereby driving up milk and butter prices. Then Hider justified this by saying that the peasantry was so important that for their salvation even unpopular measures, such as the raising of prices, must be taken.

Thus began the short-lived era of 'German Socialism.'

The different sections of the German economy were linked by a broad and varied network of organizations. There were the *Nor- menverbände* (associations for the maintenance of industrial stand- ards); there were organizations for common purchase of raw materials, for distributing orders, for advising producers, for the rational organization of production, and for maintaining relations between complementary plants. This highly developed and efficient system of organizations culminated in the powerful cartels aimed at main- taining high prices. These associations not only did not disappear, but they seemed to the National Socialist planners like a ready-

4 D.T. If your information to reinforce
Goering's enemies, particularly Ett.

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made framework for a future National Socialist economic order. Among younger men, it was almost a matter of course to call this future economic order 'socialism.' The twenty-six-year-old Baldur von Schirach, leader of the Hitler youth, who could boast of standing close to Hitler, declared bluntly in those revolutionary June weeks: 'A socialist and anti-capitalist attitude is the most salient characteristic of the Young National Socialist Germany.'

Despite the rhetoric, these words did express the sound sentiment that socialism, like every great political idea, demanded above all a mental attitude on the part of the people, and that objective conditions were only secondary. But if this socialism were to be described in economic terms, it was clear that it could not mean an egalitarian elimination of private property. On the contrary, private property was not to be eliminated, but restored; for in this view, capitalism was the real enemy of private property, while socialism meant that one man's property would be equal—in importance and dignity—to another's.

For private property—in Hitler's view—belonged, along with superior strength, superior intelligence, and higher discipline, to the characteristics by which the higher race is distinguished. The uneven distribution of wealth came from the same causes as the organization of nations; from the interaction between races of different 'value'; from the superiority of the stronger race over the weaker. As soon as these two racial types came together, or, in Hitler's words, 'as soon as this process of nation and state formation was initiated, the Communist age of society was past. The primitive faculty of one race creates different values from the more highly developed or divergent faculty of another. And consequently, the fruits of labor will be distributed with a view to achievement'—and with this ponderous and tiresome racial argument Hitler comes to the same result as the most common old-fashioned Liberals: 'The idea of private property is, therefore, inseparably bound up with the conviction that the production of men varies in essence and in value.'

This means: the 'better race,' because the more creative one, deserves more property. But only because it is the more creative one; property is justified by nothing else. For 'common good' always dominates private interest; this is 'socialism,' and property could not continue to exist without this socialism.

The intellectuals who led the National Soc of the Middle-Class Tradespeople' now wan ism into serious practice. Out of the existin tions they wanted to create an apparatus wh capital the same advantages as big capital: easier access to raw materials, wider informat situation, etc.; but would not destroy the i business. At the same time, the monopolies w and where they could not prove their neces good,' they were gradually to be dissolved. I ism, property would be retained and even pr far as it could be shown that it served the 'cor

These economic control organizations, strei ness for competition with big business and tion of monopolies, have been termed 'estates, tions': the 'corporate state,' a favorite project c ticians of the 'Quadragesimo anno' school, seen economic form for the Third Reich.

The man who pressed these projects was had been a major in the German Army, tl Corps, which after the German collapse had against the Red Army in the Baltic; he now section in the Brown House, which Hitler h: at the time of Gregor Strasser's fall. It still ex tress of Wilhelm Keppler, who, in Hider's Papen and Baron von Schroeder his word th would engage in no foolish economic experir

Hitler personally had little understanding What attention he did give economic matters great state projects such as motor highways which would put masses of men back to wor sonally hardly wasted a thought on the corp goal for the future was the creation of a new

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Hitler's view — belonged, along with telligence, and higher discipline, to the higher race is distinguished. The un- me from the same causes as the organ- interaction between races of different of the stronger race over the weaker. types came together, or, in Hitler's ss of nation and state formation was e of society was past. The primitive ifferent values from the more highly ty of another. And consequently, the uted with a view to achievement'— tiresome racial argument Hitler comes common old-fashioned Liberals: 'The refore, inseparably bound up with the of men varies in essence and in value.' e,' because the more creative one, de- ly because it is the more creative one; ng else. For 'common good' always s 'socialism,' and property could not s socialism.

The intellectuals who led the National Socialist 'Combat League of the Middle-Class Tradespeople' now wanted to put this social-ism into serious practice. Out of the existing economic organiza- tions they wanted to create an apparatus which would give small capital the same advantages as big capital: lower operating costs, easier access to raw materials, wider information on the marketing situation, etc.; but would not destroy the independence of small business. At the same time, the monopolies were to be investigated, and where they could not prove their necessity for the 'common good,' they were gradually to be dissolved. In this brand of social-ism, property would be retained and even protected, but only in so far as it could be shown that it served the 'common good.'

These economic control organizations, strengthening small busi-ness for competition with big business and controlling the opera- tion of monopolies, have been termed 'estates,' or in Italy, 'corpora- tions': the 'corporate state,' a favorite project of Catholic social poli- ticians of the 'Quadragesimo anno' school, seemed to many the ideal economic form for the Third Reich.

The man who pressed these projects was Otto Wagener. He had been a major in the German Army, then leader of a Free Corps, which after the German collapse had fought independently against the Red Army in the Baltic; he now headed the economic section in the Brown House, which Hitler had wanted to dissolve at the time of Gregor Strasser's fall. It still existed to the great dis- tress of Wilhelm Keppler, who, in Hitler's presence, had given Papen and Baron von Schroeder his word that National Socialism would engage in no foolish economic experiments.

Hitler personally had little understanding of the controversy. What attention he did give economic matters was directed toward great state projects such as motor highways; mass undertakings which would put masses of men back to work overnight. He per- sonally hardly wasted a thought on the corporate state. His great goal for the future was the creation of a new man.

The idea that material conditions could mold the spirit of a gen- eration was profoundly alien to him; on the contrary, he saw in material circumstances the product of a spiritual condition, of a 'weltanschauung' as he called it. This urge to create a new weltan-

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schaung gave the movement its religious streak, and in Hitler was a true religious passion. In his eyes, political activity was tantamount to educating people in a new faith; he did not seek to change the institutions of society, but its state of mind, following Machiavelli's counsel to leave outward conditions essentially in their old form, but to work on people from within. Although he claimed that he would protect and restore the institution of the family that had been damaged by the general social disintegration, he aimed really to uproot the youth and tear them away from their families; '... and so we shall take the children away from you and educate them to be what is necessary for the German people,' he cried on June 17, to the 'isolated persons who think that they can no longer adapt themselves to circumstances.' Yes, perhaps they could no longer adapt themselves, but 'you will pass away, and after you will come the youth which knows nothing else.'

This attempt to dissolve the family found and molded the suitable human implements. On June 18, Hitler conferred on the leader of his 'Hitler Youth,' his friend, Baldur von Schirach, the title 'Youth Leader of the German Reich.' Schirach, like many others in the movement, was a renegade from Germany's former ruling class, in this respect comparable to Prince August Wilhelm. He was the son of a theater director in Weimar; his mother, the American-born Emma Middleton Lynah Tillon, claimed two signers of the Declaration of Independence among her ancestry. As a student, he had been obliged to resign, under unpleasant circumstances, from an exclusive fraternity, and from that time on he had hated the upper crust of his own generation. Although strikingly handsome, his face had the banal and inexpressive quality that characterized his verses; for he wrote verses in which he called Hitler 'Germany's greatest son,' and expressed amazement that this 'genius grazing the stars' had remained a man like you and me. He was violently opposed to the old Christian God and carried his devotion to Hitler so far as to marry his Leader's extremely youthful protégée, Henny Hoffmann, the daughter of the truncated and jocose photographer.

Schirach, like most of the National Socialist 'co-ordinators,' had the good fortune to find a people which had already been thor-

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oughly organized into clubs and great centers. It has been estimated that toward the end of 1933, 11 million young Germans out of a population of 60 million were organized into youth associations, for groups; these associations, in turn, were bound up in the Committee of German Youth Associations, with its 100,000 members, merable desks and card indexes. The committee began, true to form, with the occupation of the Reichstag, formed young men (April 5, 1933). 'A year later *Der Beobachter* lamented ironically, 'the Reichstag is now two rooms, and not very large ones, in the Reichstag building. Today it is a whole four-story building, and for the apparatus, which is growing and growing, the growth of this apparatus, Hitler now in the Reichstag in which he promised that National Socialism would last centuries, because it was more than a political revolution, speech of March, 1934, he described what the great revolution of the preceding spring was not, not the creation of new political and economic measures had been the decisive factor in the last analysis, is that in this year we created the new Germany, which will perhaps be realized in a year or three hundred years.

It is such certainty of a blessed future that the young men, strength for shameless deeds in the present, overran their 'friends' to whom, five months later, they swore themselves by oaths and words of honor; on the other hand, stormed the meeting places and the National Combat Ring throughout Germany and casualties; Göring had the leaders arrested; Hugenberg sent a courier to Hindenburg for help, but Hindenburg did nothing to save the Left or Right.

Next day, Frick, the Minister of the Interior, dissolved the Democratic Party. From their exile in the Reichstag, the committee built an underground organization which attained considerable size, but lacked experi-

* Is there a copy of this speech in his collection of speeches?

Make the parallel to Christ's separation from the family.

ment its religious streak, and in Hitler
1. In his eyes, political activity was tanta-
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under unpleasant circumstances, from
from that time on he had hated the
ration. Although strikingly handsome,
inexpressive quality that characterized
s in which he called Hitler 'Germany's
mazement that this 'genius grazing the
like you and me. He was violently op-
posed and carried his devotion to Hitler
's extremely youthful protégée, Henny
f the truncated and jocose photog-

National Socialist 'co-ordinators,' had
people which had already been thor-

oughly organized into clubs and great centralized organizations. It
has been estimated that toward the end of 1932 no less than twelve
million young Germans out of a population of sixty-six millions
were organized into youth associations, for the most part sport
groups; these associations, in turn, were bound together in a 'Reich
Committee of German Youth Associations,' a bureau with innu-
merable desks and card indexes. The co-ordination of the youth
began, true to form, with the occupation of this office by some uni-
formed young men (April 5, 1933). 'A year ago,' even the *Völkis-
cher Beobachter* lamented ironically, 'the Reich leadership had only
two rooms, and not very large ones, in the Brown House in Munich.
Today it is a whole four-story building, and even now it is too small
for the apparatus, which is growing and growing . . .' Cheered by
the growth of this apparatus, Hitler now began to make speeches
in which he promised that National Socialism would endure for
centuries, because it was more than a political movement. In a
speech of March, 1934, he described what had really happened in
the great revolution of the preceding spring. Not the conquest of
power, not the creation of new political conditions, not the eco-
nomic measures had been the decisive factor — no, 'decisive, in the
last analysis, is that in this year we created the basis for a German
rebirth, which will perhaps be realized in a hundred, two hundred,
or three hundred years.'

It is such certainty of a blessed future that can give a man the
strength for shameless deeds in the present. The National Socialists
overran their 'friends' to whom, five months earlier, they had bound
themselves by oaths and words of honor; on June 21, the S.A., pistol
in hand, stormed the meeting places and offices of the German
National Combat Ring throughout Germany; there were shooting
and casualties; Göring had the leaders arrested by his police chiefs.
Hugenberg sent a courier to Hindenburg in distant Neudeck for
help, but Hindenburg did nothing to save any of the old parties,
Left or Right.

Next day, Frick, the Minister of the Interior, suppressed the Social
Democratic Party. From their exile in Czechoslovakia the party's
committee built an underground organization, which at times at-
tained considerable size, but lacked experience and suffered grave

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setbacks; yet, in spite of all weaknesses, the organization (at least up to 1938) was able to furnish the world with the most extensive and reliable information on occurrences in the factories and occasionally even in high government circles. The greater experience of the Communists in illegal work now made itself felt, but also led to actions of excessive rashness. It is likely that there was considerable treachery in the ranks, and even now, Social Democracy was regarded as the main enemy. Ernst Thaelmann, the Communist Party chairman, arrested on the day after the Reichstag fire, had been buried alive ever since, sharing this fate with many of his party comrades. The Social Democratic leader, Paul Loebe, disappeared into prison for a long term; others were sent to concentration camps for an unlimited period. Johannes Stelling, a member of the Social Democratic Party Committee, was murdered; several of the party leaders committed suicide.

On June 21, the S.A. had fired on Hugenberg's youth organization; the day after, it struck in Munich against the Bavarian People's Party, with whom the National Socialists shared the government. The Bavarian People's Party in Munich maintained connections with the Clerical Party leaders in Austria; the National Socialists spoke of treason, occupied the party offices of the Bavarian People's Party, arrested members and confiscated property. This was a token of what Brüning's Center Party might expect. It had been stipulated in Rome that Catholic priests might no longer belong to a political party; the National Socialists saw to it that there was no party to which they could belong.

The parties now quickly collapsed. Forsaken by Hindenburg, Hugenberg resigned from his two economic ministries on June 27; next day the German Nationalist Party declared itself dissolved. The Center under Brüning tried to carry on negotiations for another week; then Brüning resigned from the leadership, and on July 5 what was left of the party committee announced that the party had voluntarily dissolved itself. Hitler promised that several of its deputies might enter the National Socialist Reichstag fraction as guests. But then he immediately had prominent members of the Center arrested and tried for alleged embezzlements. They were dragged through the streets, forced to draw carts, and wear humili-

ating signs around their necks. Some of the concentration camps, as though they had been Jews. Those arrested included priests.

The great event, the 'second revolution' for followers had been clamoring for months Churches, economics, political parties—noth been able to resist. The 'reaction' seemed beaten. Again the goal appeared to be reached at last. Hitler had missed it first, stopped by Hindenburg; Hindenburg could no with the big stick.

But he did. On June 29, the President, Neudeck, and made serious representations to initiated destruction of the Protestant Church. some previous occasions, for example before it put his verbal reproaches in writing and published of 'anxiety for the freedom of the Church.' If continued, let alone intensified, they 'cannot fail to to the nation and the fatherland, and national suffer'; Göring's dictatorship over the Church the first public remonstrance Hitler had received since he had become Chancellor.

Now would have been the moment for Hitler to his policy and his plans—if he had had. But he had only a tactical method. He had how far he could go without resistance. Now and this resistance did not lie only in Hindenburg or stubborn will. The old man was fundamentalism had reached the point where it could be leader himself.

Therefore Hitler obeyed Hindenburg at times were taken out of Göring's hands and transferred to moderate Frick. Hossenfelder vanished completely. The German Christians gave up their insistence could be Christians; they also abandoned the two main branches of German Protestantism, Lutherans, into a uniform German Protestantism.

weaknesses, the organization (at least in the world with the most extensive occurrences in the factories and occupation circles. The greater experience of work now made itself felt, but also led to less. It is likely that there was considerable, and even now, Social Democracy was not. Ernst Thaelmann, the Communist leader, had shared this fate with many of his party members; Paul Loebe, disappeared; others were sent to concentration camps. Johannes Stelling, a member of the Reichstag, was murdered; several of the others died.

After the fall of Hugenberg's youth organization in Munich against the Bavarian People's Party, the National Socialists shared the government. The party in Munich maintained connections with the National Socialists in Austria; the National Socialists had confiscated property. This was a token of the party might expect. It had been stipulated that the party might no longer belong to a political party. It saw to it that there was no party to

collapse. Forsaken by Hindenburg, the party had two economic ministries on June 27; the National Socialist Party declared itself dissolved. The party tried to carry on negotiations for another year from the leadership, and on July 5 the Reichstag announced that the party had dissolved. Hitler promised that several of its members had prominent members of the party who had allegedly embezzled. They were forced to draw carts, and wear humili-

ating signs around their necks. Some of them were sent to concentration camps, as though they had been Social Democrats or Jews. Those arrested included priests.

The great event, the 'second revolution' for which Röhm and his followers had been clamoring for months, seemed imminent. Churches, economics, political parties—nothing and nobody had been able to resist. The 'reaction' seemed beaten on the whole front. Again the goal appeared to be reached at last; eleven months after Hitler had missed it first, stopped by Hindenburg. These times were definitely gone; Hindenburg could no longer threaten him with the big stick.

But he did. On June 29, the President summoned Hitler to Neudeck, and made serious representations to him regarding the initiated destruction of the Protestant Church. As he had done on some previous occasions, for example before the fall of Groener, he put his verbal reproaches in writing and published them. He spoke of 'anxiety for the freedom of the Church.' If the attacks were continued, let alone intensified, they 'cannot fail to cause grave damage to the nation and the fatherland, and national unity will inevitably suffer'; Göring's dictatorship over the Church must cease. This was the first public remonstrance Hitler had received from Hindenburg since he had become Chancellor.

Now would have been the moment for Hitler to stick desperately to his policy and his plans—if he had had a policy and a plan. But he had only a tactical method. He had only tried to find out how far he could go without resistance. Now, here was resistance, and this resistance did not lie only in Hindenburg's limited insight or stubborn will. The old man was fundamentally right. The revolution had reached the point where it could become a danger to its leader himself.

Therefore Hitler obeyed Hindenburg at once. Church questions were taken out of Göring's hands and transferred to the more moderate Frick. Hossenfelder vanished completely from the scene. The German Christians gave up their insistence that only Aryans could be Christians; they also abandoned their plan to fuse the two main branches of German Protestantism, Calvinists and Lutherans, into a uniform German Protestantism. It was, however, con-

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ceded to the Lutherans that one of their number would become 'Reich Bishop.' To the pious Christians it seemed a victory that the Holy Scriptures and the writings of the reformers would remain the foundation of the Protestant faith. But it was conceded to the German Christians that new elections be held for the democratic 'Church parliament,' the highest legislative body of the Church—the old method of conquering democracy through democracy. The 'German Christians' were successful and elected Müller 'Reich Bishop.'

On July 13, Hitler announced to his Reichs President that the 'German Christians' had reached an agreement with the Church and that peace had been restored. As a born politician, he had recognized the decisive instant between stubborn persistence and inevitable retreat more clearly than had his co-workers. Having withdrawn a step in the church question, he now realized that in economic matters National Socialism had at various points passed the limits of the possible. He adopted Keppler's policy and hastily commanded the waves to stand still.

True to an old custom, he assembled his S.A. leaders for this purpose in Bad Reichenhall, a spa near his mountain home (July 2, 1933). Here he declared, as though he had never so much as mentioned a continuation of the revolution: 'I shall proceed ruthlessly against a so-called second revolution, for such a revolution could have chaotic consequences. . . .' And hinting that he feared opposition in his own ranks, he added: 'Anyone who rebels against the National Socialist state power will be seized with an iron fist, regardless what camp he is in.'

Here Hitler was speaking to the egotistic and faint-hearted band which in constant panic had urged him to retreat all through the year 1932, in order that the party should obtain a few comfortable jobs. Now it was he who demanded retreat; but again his meaning was: no jobs. For 'no second revolution' meant exactly this.

The mass of the armed bohemians had grounds for bitterness. With giant steps the Leader was passing over his most loyal followers, those Uprooted and Disinherited, whose sole remaining hope in life had been the party. True, R. W. Darré became Minister of Food Supply in place of Hugenberg; though not exactly an 'old

fighter' (and for this reason blindly devoted he was a man with National Socialist ideas) forget all about his two per cent interest. He promised that rapacious capital would be lucky to get the post of undersecretary in Economics—a humiliating position, for he was subordinate of another of National Socialist superior was almost a stranger to the party exchange and the financial sections of the party. He was Doctor Karl Schmitt, general director of a man insurance company. A more prominent rapacious capital would have been hard to find in his life lending money and collecting interest. He bought his way into the National Socialist party generous aid in hard times. In his place he substituted for a man whose name was a byword of socialism and who even now refused to be Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichsbank.

The new policy of July, 1933, was a compromise reaching as the erstwhile revolution supposed. Bohemians had been rebuffed; now the military was betrayed; both, because only in this way did the proletarian masses. As Hindenburg his task was to solve the unemployment problem. He had desperately attempted 'in opposition to its own ideals and programs. The shortage as the Social Democratic unions had realized capitalism, or rather the capitalists, in motion had to be persuaded to provide work; mass provided and available jobs broadly distributed. National Socialism depended on making the And so, as it developed, the uprooted proletariat obstacle in the path of a middle-class corporate

With all the strength of his changeable campaign for the protection of the economy. Four days after his condemnation of the se-

* The rule of bad and faith.

It confused his opponents, it confused his followers, but it worked in the way that a river moves forward despite all rocks, pools, and circular eddies. If he had been travelling upstream these same moves would have produced disaster. But it was obvious to me that the ORG had unleashed a mighty flood down the old German river.

one of their number would become Christians it seemed a victory that the writings of the reformers would remain tant faith. But it was conceded to the elections be held for the democratic best legislative body of the Church — a democracy through democracy. The successful and elected Müller 'Reich

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fighter' (and for this reason blindly devoted to Hitler personally), he was a man with National Socialist ideas; but he was forced to forget all about his two per cent interest. Gottfried Feder, who had promised that rapacious capital would be brought to its knees, was lucky to get the post of undersecretary in the Reich Ministry of Economics — a humiliating position, for here Feder became the subordinate of another of National Socialism's unknowns. His new superior was almost a stranger to the party, but familiar to the stock exchange and the financial sections of the 'Jewish business press': he was Doctor Karl Schmitt, general director of the largest German insurance company. A more pronounced representative of rapacious capital would have been hard to find; Schmitt had spent his life lending money and collecting interest; he had literally bought his way into the National Socialist Movement by giving the party generous aid in hard times. In his new post he was really a substitute for a man whose name was a battle-cry against any kind of socialism and who even now refused to join the party: Doctor Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichsbank.

The new policy of July, 1933, was a counter-revolution, as far-reaching as the erstwhile revolution supposedly had been. The armed bohemians had been rebuffed; now the middle class was openly betrayed; both, because only in this way did it seem possible to satisfy the proletarian masses. As Hindenburg had said, the 'most urgent task was to solve the unemployment problem.' What Schleicher had desperately attempted 'in opposition to the laws of economic reason,' National Socialism had to deliver, if necessary in opposition to its own ideals and programs. The shortest road to this solution — as the Social Democratic unions had realized for years — was to set capitalism, or rather the capitalists, in motion again. The employers had to be persuaded to provide work; masses of jobs had to be improvised and available jobs broadly distributed. Life or death of National Socialism depended on making the workers workers again. And so, as it developed, the uprooted proletariat was the greatest obstacle in the path of a middle-class corporate state.

With all the strength of his changeable nature, Hitler led the campaign for the protection of the economic age he had so despised. Four days after his condemnation of the second revolution, he gath-

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ered his *statthalters* in the Chancellery. He roared at them that in future he desired no so-called economic revolutions; that the eternal 'co-ordinating' must cease; that there would be no corporate development, although he himself had promised it; and above all, that the job-hunters who had not yet obtained their piece of pie should not get the idea of taking it by force—if for no other reason, because many of them were know-nothings. It was a startling turn, comparable to the 'New Economic Policy' of the Bolsheviks in 1921. 'A businessman,' cried Hitler, 'must not be deposed if he is a good businessman but not yet a National Socialist; and especially not if the National Socialist who is put in his place understands nothing of economic affairs. By theoretical co-ordinations we don't get bread for one worker. We shall not eliminate unemployment by economic commissions, organizations, constructions, and theories. . . . One would not have believed him to be the same Hitler who had cried out that economic affairs were 'something secondary' and must 'serve the nation.' 'We must not reject practical experience,' he cried, 'because it is opposed to some preconceived idea'—and it would have been hard to find any more annihilating criticism of the National Socialist idea. If we come before the nation with reforms, we must also prove that we understand things and can master them'—a reflection which would not have been irrelevant even before January 30, 1933. The prophet who had promised fourteen years before to die for his immutable program now abjured it with the banal justification: 'The important thing is not programs and ideas, but daily bread for seventy million people.' Two weeks earlier he had proclaimed the permanent revolution; now he said: 'The revolution is no permanent condition'; and the art was to halt a revolution 'at the proper moment.' 'People should not look around to see if there is something left to revolutionize'; they should conquer and secure the positions and 'gradually occupy them with the best talents.' This was an admission that his elite was anything but the best: in reality, the whole National Socialist method of forming an elite consisted, not in seeking out the best, but in the training of average—and often less than average—men to a certain political usefulness.

Up till then the National Socialists had 'behaved like fools, over-

HITLER VERSUS NATIONAL S

throwing everything'—and stolen and black he might have added. This must stop; and s longer needed because the party had alrea power: 'The party has now become the sta enforce our will everywhere.' But not—this in the asinine way we have been doing. For us by whether we have arrested as large a leaders as possible, but by whether we have cr was gained by destroying intellects and talents portant thing was to make them stop resistn revolution, said Hitler, must be brought into evolution, and 'the main point in this respect i individual'; 'the people who embody the pr must be educated in the National Socialist st characteristic that this brand of education, see but actually so supple and ready to comprom treat.

This halt in the revolution was exactly v manded of the state reformer who did not war interruption of 'co-ordination' was soon expri issued an order to cease molesting the departr up the idea of forcing the employer's associ Front. Wagener and his whole following we from the party leadership, and Wilhelm Keppl responsible for the halt in co-ordination, official House as well as the Chancellery as Hitler's economic questions' (July 13). Robert Ley, a powers as organizational leader of the party, the Combat League of Middle-Class Tradespe Schmitt, the Minister of Economics, made it l that the corporate development must be aban an end to all talk of corporations, which he bra This was bitter earnest. Wagener and several, sent to concentration camps. This was not o been too idealistic; it was also a case of the su ing up those who had been less successful.

After stormy weeks that shook its very fo

* D. to He was, I had long come to recognize, nothing without an hypothesis. So he would believe in an idea, give instructions to implement it, and if the hypothesis failed to produce what he wanted, he would pick up the opposite, and believe in it as fully while he did.

--- this was an hypothesis.

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Chancellery. He roared at them that in economic revolutions; that the eternal that there would be no corporate development had promised it; and above all, that or yet obtained their piece of pie should it by force—if for no other reason, be-know-nothings. It was a startling turn, onomic Policy' of the Bolsheviki in 1921. er, 'must not be deposed if he is a good National Socialist; and especially not who is put in his place understands is. By theoretical co-ordinations we don't

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throwing everything'—and stolen and blackmailed in the process, he might have added. This must stop; and such methods were no longer needed because the party had already won uncontested power: 'The party has now become the state.' And so 'we can enforce our will everywhere.' But not—this was what he meant—in the asinine way we have been doing. For 'history will not judge us by whether we have arrested as large a number of business leaders as possible, but by whether we have created work.' Nothing was gained by destroying intellects and talents that resisted; the important thing was to make them stop resisting. The stream of the revolution, said Hitler, must be brought into the safe channel of evolution, and 'the main point in this respect is the education of the individual'; 'the people who embody the present state of affairs must be educated in the National Socialist state conception.' It is characteristic that this brand of education, seemingly so self-reliant but actually so supple and ready to compromise, began with a retreat.

This halt in the revolution was exactly what Machiavelli demanded of the state reformer who did not want to be a tyrant. The interruption of 'co-ordination' was soon expressed in action. Hess issued an order to cease molesting the department stores; Ley gave up the idea of forcing the employer's associations into the Labor Front. Wagener and his whole following were removed overnight from the party leadership, and Wilhelm Keppler, who was primarily responsible for the halt in co-ordination, officially entered the Brown House as well as the Chancellery as Hitler's personal 'deputy for economic questions' (July 13). Robert Ley, availing himself of his powers as organizational leader of the party, summarily dissolved the Combat League of Middle-Class Tradespeople early in August. Schmitt, the Minister of Economics, made it known on August 13 that the corporate development must be abandoned; Hess ordered an end to all talk of corporations, which he branded as high treason. This was bitter earnest. Wagener and several of his following were sent to concentration camps. This was not only because they had been too idealistic; it was also a case of the successful bandits locking up those who had been less successful.

After stormy weeks that shook its very foundations, the Third

order. Intentionally, though not al-
 evolution had been steered to a certain
 any case, Hitler dominated the storm
 he called revolution would not be an

day 17, critics abroad admitted for the
 like a statesman. Now, after a halt
 ution, voices arose in Europe saying
 an. The first important treaty of the
 government matured in this mood. On
 concordat was signed in Rome; twelve
 changed letters of ratification. On the
 too, hitherto critical toward the Third
 benevolent than the Rothermere press,
 friendly discussion to Hitler's speech
 dination. The article did, it is true,
 n it went on to say:

not devoid of ideals. . . . He undoubt-
 the old German virtues of loyalty, self-
 the state. Some of the grosser forms of
 ave been checked under the new régime;
 support which may be very valuable to
 devote himself to the moral and economic

to the régime of concentration camps;
 sorts — obviously economic and diplo-
 macy adhered to his policy of pacification
 revolutionizing and co-ordination. He
 would be no objection to the secret Ger-
 everyone was aware. 'Even the passion
 is bringing striplings and learned pro-
 on the rifle range, will not altogether
 be really confined to the art of de-
 n although no other country is at least

these remarks, Hitler on the following

day made it clear to a gathering of S.A. men in the city of Dort-
 mund that he meant to devote himself above all to the moral resur-
 rection of Germany; the thing, he said, was to educate people, not
 to stand institutions on their heads. And education, he declared,
 faithful to his old theory of propaganda, meant a spiritual driving
 of the masses, until they knew no will other than that of the lead-
 ership: 'The German people must put itself a hundred per cent in
 the service of our idea. . . . We must educate millions of men to fit
 into our state. . . .'

On July 14, the cabinet, which since March 23 had been making
 all the laws without bothering the parliament or the President,
 issued a decree 'against the formation of new parties.' The first
 paragraph ran: 'In Germany the National Socialist German Work-
 ers' Party is the sole existing political party.'

The one-party system, which had been in power for years in
 Russia, Italy, China, and Turkey, had come to Germany. This sys-
 tem has been called dictatorship, meaning despotism, but this does
 not express its essential character. A despotism ignores the will of
 the people; but these new states of the armed intellectuals take the
 will of the people so seriously that they create it and shape it them-
 selves — or so they think; Hitler called this 'education.' For this
 they use the methods which they have preserved from the demo-
 cratic surroundings of their origins. Although all other parties have
 been destroyed, the concept of the party has remained; elections,
 parliaments, messages to the people, consent of the legislative body,
 plebiscites — continue to be the salient features of public life, and
 have even acquired a higher solemnity. The outward forms seem
 scarcely changed, and Machiavelli might well be pleased; for his
 disciples, by using the methods of democracy more adroitly and
 cynically than the democrats themselves, have fathomed the banal
 secret: that one can do what one wants with men, as soon as one
 brings them to want it themselves.

But the course of history reveals a higher secret. At the height
 of his victory, the victor retreated in many places, seemingly of his
 own free will, changed his plans, disappointed his own followers,
 adapted himself to necessity. And the true secret of political victory
 is contained in this Hegelian necessity: to know what one wants,
 and to want what the people want, but do not yet know.

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 between the D. N. and the
 C. O., since the material
 for an exceptional
 effort by either side
 was that if one of
 us could win, and
 then, of course, was
 about a reasoning
 as pure and simple
 as mountain water.
 since I had never
 won a C. O. would
 do so his victory.

D. T. the dirtier the political
 deeds, the more one must put
 one's emphasis upon the moral
 intensity of one's ^{grand} ultimate aims.
 I was not only impressed with
 how little he needed me now
 but even more with human potential
 itself. For he was taking now
 entirely out of his own ideas and his
 own creative sense of manipulation.
 And so I began to understand all
 again how ultimate was the conflict
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OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY

IN THE SUMMER OF 1933, VERNON BARTLETT, THE British journalist, took a trip through National Socialist Germany, and on his return he published a book of impressions. 'I do not believe—and most emphatically do not believe—' he wrote, 'that Germany wants war. Not yet! And it will not be her fault alone if she ever does.'

Hitler—this was Bartlett's conviction—was far too concerned with the internal, and especially economic, reconstruction of his country to think of war. The Englishman had astonishing ideas regarding the shape of this reconstruction: 'Hitler, like Gandhi, wants a return to the spinning wheel, not only because he is an economic nationalist, but because he believes in simplicity. The most important feature of the German Revolution is that it is, in essence, a reaction against excessive materialism.'

This was Bartlett's way of saying what many Germans, notably Schacht, had been preaching for years: that Germany must base herself on the home soil, save, live frugally, and work twelve hours a day, and this should continue for a generation, as Frederick the Great had demanded in his time. Schacht continued his sermon under the Third Reich: 'Economic self-abnegation and readiness to content ourselves with reduced luxury expenditures'—this, he declared on July 31 in a radio speech addressed to the United States, was the essence of the new Germany; today many were working voluntarily for the community at reduced wages. Writers like Oswald Spengler held up frugality and hard labor to the German people as the supreme blessing. In his campaign speeches of Febru-

ary and March, Hitler had appealed to the pr
promising them the greatness of a hard life.
he said some months later, was Germany's
was in the offing; Germany needed no other

Through want to greatness, through hunge
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Socialists by several foreign observers; this w
they could see between German economic
Socialist power politics. At the end of Augu
commercial attaché at the British Embassy in
government with scarcely concealed admiratio
the supporters of the new German governn
the sake of their principles, to renounce econ
vantage. The standards of a democratic, in
italist state like Great Britain, he said, did
surely seemed most startling of all to a fore
party ideals and economic necessities came i
ways the ideals that won out.

The persecution of the Jews seemed an o
Nazi indifference to economic expediency; a
Thelwall had this particularly in mind. In r
the Jews exemplified the extreme concern of
economic matters after the first revolutiona
Jews were expelled from some intellectual
start, and beyond a doubt German econom
lost valuable workers without any pressing
ample in the field of chemical research wher
prominent. But these Jews were not drive
political idealism; it was merely that unemp
ist intellectuals wanted jobs. In the main, th
for a long time between useful and non-use
yers and civil servants were mercilessly remov
received much better treatment; despite all
'Jewish mind,' indispensable Jewish econom
tained their positions on the business press; J
their places in industry for an astonishingly le
boycott mood had cleared, Jewish businessm

PEOPLE'S MONEY

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lessing. In his campaign speeches of Febru-

ary and March, Hitler had appealed to the pride of his audience by promising them the greatness of a hard life. The fight for work, he said some months later, was Germany's war, and here victory was in the offing; Germany needed no other wars and victories.

Through want to greatness, through hunger to power—this was the interpretation put on the first economic measures of the National Socialists by several foreign observers; this was the only connection they could see between German economic policy and National Socialist power politics. At the end of August, John F. Thelwall, commercial attaché at the British Embassy in Berlin, reported to his government with scarcely concealed admiration that in many spheres the supporters of the new German government were willing, for the sake of their principles, to renounce economic and political advantage. The standards of a democratic, individualistic, and capitalist state like Great Britain, he said, did not apply; and what surely seemed most startling of all to a foreigner was that, where party ideals and economic necessities came into conflict, it was always the ideals that won out.

The persecution of the Jews seemed an outstanding example of Nazi indifference to economic expediency, and it is probable that Thelwall had this particularly in mind. In reality, the treatment of the Jews exemplified the extreme concern of the Third Reich with economic matters after the first revolutionary holiday. True, the Jews were expelled from some intellectual professions at the very start, and beyond a doubt German economic life and technology lost valuable workers without any pressing necessity, as for example in the field of chemical research where Jews were especially prominent. But these Jews were not driven out for reasons of political idealism; it was merely that unemployed National Socialist intellectuals wanted jobs. In the main, the régime distinguished for a long time between useful and non-useful Jews. Jewish lawyers and civil servants were mercilessly removed, but Jewish doctors received much better treatment; despite all the fury against the 'Jewish mind,' indispensable Jewish economic journalists long retained their positions on the business press; Jewish technicians kept their places in industry for an astonishingly long time; after the first boycott mood had cleared, Jewish businessmen were graciously as-

* Klaus Hitler's doctor.

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sured that they had nothing further to fear, and some were prevented by the authorities from emigrating or liquidating their businesses — for suddenly they had ceased to be Jews and become employers, and employment was what mattered most to the régime. Consequently there was a tendency to persecute and dismiss Jewish employees and white-collar workers.

In the middle of 1933, the first Jewish refugees appeared in foreign capitals with exposés of conditions in Germany. But from within Germany, from the Jewish masses who had remained behind, the reports became more and more reassuring: things were not really so bad. In some cities, it was true, as in Julius Streicher's Nuremberg, the restaurants and cafés were closed to Jews and in general it was made hard for them to leave their houses; these cities achieved world fame by their brutalities. But in most towns the treatment of the Jews became more moderate; and their businesses, like all businesses in Germany, were flourishing again in the economic revival.

This was the end of the talk about hunger and frugality, saving and simplicity, not to mention spinning wheels. The people should have grounds for economic satisfaction with the new régime. Addressing German captains of industry in August, Hitler sharply attacked 'primitivism and frugality' as the expression of an 'envious attitude.' In November, he boasted to Ferdinand de Brinon, the French newspaperman: 'I have restored to the German people the concept of their honor' — by means of National Socialist victory celebrations. 'I will also give back to them the joy of living.'

He knew the sources of this joy of living. He had once promised the unmarried women that under the Third Reich they would get husbands; and he kept this promise. The story that National Socialism favored free love and illegitimate births is a childish fantasy. Since 1933, the Reich has given young couples applying for it a loan of a thousand marks on marriage, all or a part of which did not have to be returned if a number of children were produced within a specified time; during the first five years of the régime, approximately 880,000 marriages were promoted by this financial aid, at times as much as thirty per cent of all marriages, and actually the greater part of this money was not repaid. Families were

founded, the birth rate increased; and these the life of the nation gave whole branches building trades to furniture manufacture to ployment, not to mention the jobs which the or never required.

Much has been said about National Socialist female labor. In reality, women did not have jobs in industry to any appreciable degree; and that were being made and distributed, they did the men. Between 1933 and 1936, women's employment sank from 29.3 to 24.7 per cent. But trial workers rose in the same period from 4.1 other words, the percentage of women among but their absolute number rose by one quarter when there was as yet no question of a total German people for war production, rather an of production for the unemployed.

Adolf Hitler, the architect and builder, erected for his party in Munich, and everywhere in Germany began to beautify their cities, to tear down old splendid new façades. A few years later, in Napoleon III, the régime leveled whole sections room for mighty temples of the new deified greatness put bread into the mouths of the workers. This battle of labor was not yet the battle of believed. In 1933, there was no sign of stripping, of renouncing superfluous comforts for necessities, of saving materials and labor power war supplies — despite the scarcity of raw materials a public demand for luxuries was almost in theaters, museums, monuments were erected, ployment for jobless hands.

Almost half of the potential of Germany's when Hitler came to power. The Reich Bureau 1928 as a norm, estimated that in 1932 average 1 to 58.7 (and for a time lower). And even in 1935 tive power had not been exploited to capacity, 1

* P.T. a scene - an analysis by Hitler of which Jews were to be kept, which removed. Complaints by Hitler and about Streicher's remark by Hitler - "He is invaluable, ^{that} the ~~moment~~ secretly in them" "The moment that Jews see a predictable pattern in what we do to them as a class, they will find a way with capitalism. The trick is to divide them. Get it to the point where Jews are hating Jews."

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founded, the birth rate increased; and these new families entering the life of the nation gave whole branches of industry, from the building trades to furniture manufacture to textiles, increased employment, not to mention the jobs which the young wives vacated or never required.

Much has been said about National Socialist hostility toward female labor. In reality, women did not have to relinquish their jobs in industry to any appreciable degree; although of the new jobs that were being made and distributed, they did receive fewer than the men. Between 1933 and 1936, women's share in industrial employment sank from 29.3 to 24.7 per cent. But the number of industrial workers rose in the same period from 4,100,000 to 6,100,000; in other words, the percentage of women among the employed fell, but their absolute number rose by one quarter — all this at a time when there was as yet no question of a total mobilization of the German people for war production, rather an artificial mobilization of production for the unemployed.

Adolf Hitler, the architect and builder, erected palatial buildings for his party in Munich, and everywhere in Germany his lieutenants began to beautify their cities, to tear down old buildings and erect splendid new façades. A few years later, in faithful imitation of Napoleon III, the régime leveled whole sections of Berlin to make room for mighty temples of the new deified state; the religion of greatness put bread into the mouths of the wrecking crews.

This battle of labor was not yet the battle of rearmament as many believed. In 1933, there was no sign of stripping off peacetime luxury, of renouncing superfluous comforts for the sake of military necessities, of saving materials and labor power for weapons and war supplies — despite the scarcity of raw materials. Instead of this, a public demand for luxuries was almost forcibly encouraged; theaters, museums, monuments were erected, merely to find employment for jobless hands.

Almost half of the potential of Germany's industry lay unused when Hitler came to power. The Reich Bureau of Statistics, using 1928 as a norm, estimated that in 1932 average production had fallen to 58.7 (and for a time lower). And even in 1928, German productive power had not been exploited to capacity, for in this year there

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had been an average of 1,400,000 unemployed. In the same period, from 1928 to 1932, while the index of German industrial production fell from 100 to 58.7, that of the 'world' — that is, those industrial countries of which statistics were available (exclusive of Soviet Russia) — fell only to 65.1, or, if the United States, especially hard hit by the crisis, were disregarded, only 73.4. Of all the large countries, Germany and the United States had, at the depth of the crisis, suffered the greatest loss in production; that is, they disposed of the greatest reserves in unused economic power. Both countries put a part of this unused power to work by great government projects.

In these efforts, National Socialist Germany possessed one resource of government orders which the United States lacked: she planned to build a new army. But to revive 41 per cent of Germany's productive power, to re-employ 6,000,000 people, the planned army of 300,000 with all its needs was far from enough. In Seeckt's view, the army should in peacetime not make full use of industry's power of armament production; for a premature mass armament was in danger of soon becoming obsolete; and by keeping industry too busy, it discouraged experiments with newer and better weapons. It may be assumed that Seeckt's view, despite possible modifications, had remained that of the High Command. Consequently, no 'war economy' was built up in Germany in 1933, as has been maintained abroad; what happened was merely that an economy capable of war was better utilized and to some extent speeded up; for the economy of the modern industrial state is in itself the strongest war machine, as soon as it comes into warlike hands, the hands of the armed intellectual.

In Germany this was the case, and the German army that was now being built with the help of German industry was the army of Seeckt, not of Röhm; no monster army with which the world could be conquered, but a weapon easy to handle, mobile and sharp enough to protect Germany effectively against all possible military threats. Germany's situation in the heart of the continent, in itself a weakness for the defensive on all fronts, became, through the presence of a relatively small army, an incomparable strength for the offensive on one front. Of the four great armies which had

surrounded Germany in 1914 — the French, Russian — only the French still existed as a th had in 1928 reduced her term of military se paper she disposed of 428,000 soldiers at th these only 256,000 were in Europe; some 40 real soldiers, but only police — *garde mobile* rest, some 172,000, were in the Asiatic and more than half of these, or 87,000, were c Against this divided French army, a co equipped German force of 300,000 would h adequate counterweight, particularly as they ordinated to a resolute and ruthless comm political restrictions at home.

Aside from Germany and France, the sole continent was Italy. But Italy, in the long equal of neither France nor Germany, and ir more of a threat to France than to German other countries, even of Poland, did not c and Hitler's task, which he had already be make sure that they always remained by then quantity was the Soviet Union. But in 1933, an economic crisis in which hundreds of thou and the ruling group, under the leadership of with serious resistance, if not worse, in the 1931, Hitler had publicly expressed his doubt his contempt for the inefficiency of Bolshevis the whole régime was crumbling; it seems th not consider Russia seriously as a military ad

It was for an explicitly limited task — to m to an isolated foe — that the German army v created; then, with changing political situat times changed its form, size, and aims. To i forms, and lodging for this army in its first great economic task, but none which could h industry in motion. Although expansion and German armed forces had been under way i since Papen's régime, the German troops still

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ational Socialist Germany possessed one resource which the United States lacked: she had an army. But to revive 41 per cent of Germany, to re-employ 6,000,000 people, the planned economy was far from enough. In Seeckt's view, in peacetime not make full use of industry's production; for a premature mass armament becoming obsolete; and by keeping industry from experiments with newer and better weapons. At Seeckt's view, despite possible modifications, the High Command. Consequently, no 'war' in Germany in 1933, as has been maintained, was merely that an economy capable of being speeded up and to some extent speeded up; for the industrial state is in itself the strongest war machine; it comes into warlike hands, the hands of the

as the case, and the German army that was the help of German industry was the army of the future; no monster army with which the world could not do without; a weapon easy to handle, mobile and sharp, Germany effectively against all possible military opposition in the heart of the continent, in itself defensive on all fronts, became, through the small army, an incomparable strength for the front. Of the four great armies which had

surrounded Germany in 1914—the French, Italian, Austrian, and Russian—only the French still existed as a threat. But even France had in 1928 reduced her term of military service to one year; on paper she disposed of 428,000 soldiers at the end of 1933, but of these only 256,000 were in Europe; some 40,000 of these were no real soldiers, but only police—*garde mobile* and *gendarmes*; the rest, some 172,000, were in the Asiatic and African colonies, and more than half of these, or 87,000, were colored, native troops. Against this divided French army, a concentrated and fully equipped German force of 300,000 would have been a more than adequate counterweight, particularly as they would have been subordinated to a resolute and ruthless command, hampered by no political restrictions at home.

Aside from Germany and France, the sole military power on the continent was Italy. But Italy, in the long run, was the military equal of neither France nor Germany, and in any case represented more of a threat to France than to Germany. The armies of the other countries, even of Poland, did not count by themselves—and Hitler's task, which he had already begun to solve, was to make sure that they always remained by themselves. An unknown quantity was the Soviet Union. But in 1933, Russia was shaken by an economic crisis in which hundreds of thousands died of hunger, and the ruling group, under the leadership of Stalin, had to contend with serious resistance, if not worse, in their own party. Up to 1931, Hitler had publicly expressed his doubts of Russian strength, his contempt for the inefficiency of Bolshevism, his conviction that the whole régime was crumbling; it seems that up till 1933 he did not consider Russia seriously as a military adversary.

It was for an explicitly limited task—to make Germany superior to an isolated foe—that the German army was first planned and created; then, with changing political situations, this army several times changed its form, size, and aims. To provide weapons, uniforms, and lodging for this army in its first moderate form was a great economic task, but none which could have set all German industry in motion. Although expansion and rearmament of the German armed forces had been under way for more than a year, since Papen's régime, the German troops still used wooden cannon

umn maneuvers of 1933. Göring and his energy in building an air fleet, but for the present to the building or re-

as long a menacing legend before it became on feverish German plane construction presumably inspired by the German id fear at a time when reality was none the least the strongest element in German material, a young generation filled with which had learned a primitive flying technique. 'Already, before 1933, these ways resembling the combat leagues, a human political picture. Even the Social trade unions had had their flying numbering tens of thousands. In the there no comparable organizations; they Union, and it seems that Göring, they as a military power long before Hitler, and among the younger German fliers, made use of the rising columns of air dynamics had discovered in the vicinity of balloons, and even cities, with their steep climb to column, these fliers could drift easily. The art of gliding was perfected by the inventions of Versailles made it impossible to fly in motored planes—one more example of great accomplishments; in this way largely achieved a knowledge of winds, clouds, and the use of immense benefit to motorized

fleet for these young men was an under-
standing of the industry, though highly efficient in
the motor production; plane construction
witnessed a great improvement in quality as
the ambitious effort of German aviation up
to 1929-30 of a plane capable of cross-

gliding

ing the ocean by the firm of Dornier (the so-called DoX), had failed as a result of weakness in motor construction; and in the end Dornier had recourse to American motors.

Production of internal combustion engines, primarily in fulfillment of state orders, was from the start a central point in Hitler's economic program. There are no statistics covering airplane construction, but the related field of automobiles shows an increase far above that of general production: in 1932 approximately 43,000 private automobiles were built; in 1933 more than twice as many, approximately 93,000, or nearly as many as in 1929; in 1934 the figure had risen to 147,000—still none too impressive compared to the 4,500,000 in the United States in 1929, the 2,100,000 in 1934, or even the modest 256,000 in England in 1934.

The acceleration of machine construction points to an early and systematic motorization of the army. It could not be denied that German industry was working for this army; but it was only a fraction of its work, and the main problem remained unemployment. Konstantin Hierl, the National Socialist proponent of the mass army, was consoled with the leadership of the 'Labor Service'—seemingly a mass army for putting men back to work. Under Papen and Schleicher it had still been voluntary in form, but now—at the beginning of 1934—it became formally compulsory, though in practice compulsory only for a section of the gradually diminishing unemployed. Formally, every young German of nineteen was to enter the Labor Service for half a year; since every year 540,000 young men became eligible, the service should have embraced 270,000 men. They led a military life, lived in camps, were commanded by officers, learned to stand, march, run, jump, climb, crawl, like soldiers. Their chief implement was the shovel, and in addition to its normal functions, they learned to handle it like a rifle; above all, they learned obedience and the fear of their superiors.

But the High Command kept insisting that all this was useless from a military standpoint: when the time came for the army itself to take over the young people, they would have to be taught everything from the beginning. For what few weapons were produced went almost entirely to the Reichswehr. With his stern belief in specialization, Hitler insisted that professional officers under-

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stood nothing of politics, but that the purely technical handling of arms could be put into no better hands. Therefore, the Labor Service was to labor; it performed those gigantic works which no one else performed because they held out no promise of profit. Woods were cleared and leveled for farm land, dikes built, marshes drained, dry land irrigated. When, with the passing years, normal economic life demanded more and more labor, the Labor Service lost its importance as a haven for the unemployed; and in time it was overshadowed by the troop organized by Doctor Karl Todt, which first built the new motor highways and later the 'West Wall.' The construction of highways began in September, 1933, with some thirty thousand workers, increasing in the next years to an average of seventy thousand; of a projected network of approximately seventy-three hundred miles of four-lane highway, about one quarter was opened to traffic by the end of 1933.

On May 31 (while Hugenberg was still Minister of Economics), the Reich government had decided to issue a billion in so-called 'work drafts' (*Arbeits-Schatzanweisungen*); these were negotiable certificates paid out to employers who undertook projects of 're-employment,' or 'maintenance projects.' Anyone who equipped a factory with new machines or who merely had his house repainted could finance his operations with these work drafts, and his taxes were even remitted; Fritz Thyssen declared his intention of opening two new shafts in his coal mines — while the coal still lay unsalable on the sidings. All in all, the public treasury poured out approximately three billion marks from various sources (railways, postal service, unemployment insurance) for projects which, according to the view hitherto prevailing in those times of crisis, were senseless or at least unnecessary — at any rate, gave promise of no yield; the expenditures of the Reichswehr are not included in this sum. The ideal of rational operation, through which the German economic machine had been raised to such high efficiency between 1924 and 1929, was abandoned; in many industries — though this was never made official — the government limited the working week to forty hours; in order to distribute the available work among more hands; in some industries, as in cigar or bottle manufacture, a law prohibited the use of machines in order to provide work for more

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manual workers. The employers' associations in West Prussia declared that their members would, petty misgivings, 'undertake new installations but economically necessary at the time.'

There is no doubt that greater emphasis was laid on goods than on consumers' goods; greater emphasis on farm tools, industrial semi-manufactures, than on directly into consumption, such as clothing, furniture, etc. The index of employment for the production goods in 1932-34 — on the basis of the level of 1936 as evaluate 48.8 to 78.2, or approximately 60 per cent; that for goods industry only from 78.5 to 94.2, or exactly 21 per cent. This more rapid tempo in production goods continued for years. Before Hitler came to power, relatively little had been produced for direct consumption, while now great emphasis is laid on increased production of capital plant, machinery, and farm tools.

Nevertheless, in Germany the greatest, most concentrated effort at re-employment, that embracing the largest single industry, was made by an industry chiefly satisfying private consumption in the first years of National Socialism, no industry showing employment figures as construction and the related building material industry. Between 1932 and 1935, the index of employment in the construction industry rose from 19.2 to 70; in the building material industry, from 41 to 83.1; in the former an increase of 350 per cent, in the latter of more than 200 per cent. In 1935, 2,600,000 workers were involved (building trades, 1,900,000; building material industry, 615,000). The construction industry, with its employment of 30,000 to 70,000 workers, has had a major effect on these figures. The main factor in this increase was the building of new dwellings. In 1932, 141,265 new dwellings were built, and in 1935 more than twice as many. Larger dwelling complexes were constructed, big buildings with more individual apartments. The statistical expression of this is that the number of new dwellings rises more slowly than the number of dwellings. At the same time, the number of the new 'non-dwelling' constructions decreased from 54,200 in 1932 to 52,600 in 1934.

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(while Hugenberg was still Minister of Economics), the government had decided to issue a billion in so-called (*Arbeits-Schatzanweisungen*); these were negotiable bonds issued out to employers who undertook projects of 'reconstruction or maintenance projects.' Anyone who equipped a factory with new machines or who merely had his house repainted was given a bonus in his operations with these work drafts, and his taxes were reduced; Fritz Thyssen declared his intention of opening new pits in his coal mines — while the coal still lay unsalable on the market. All in all, the public treasury poured out approximately 10 billion marks from various sources (railways, postal savings, employment insurance) for projects which, according to the conditions prevailing in those times of crisis, were senseless or unnecessary — at any rate, gave promise of no yield; the government's operations of the Reichswehr are not included in this sum. The national operation, through which the German economic situation had been raised to such high efficiency between 1924 and 1933, was abandoned; in many industries — though this was never fully true — the government limited the working week to forty hours in order to distribute the available work among more hands; in industries, as in cigar or bottle manufacture, a law prohibited the use of machines in order to provide work for more

manual workers. The employers' associations in the province of West Prussia declared that their members would, in disregard of their petty misgivings, 'undertake new installations beyond what was economically necessary at the time.'

There is no doubt that greater emphasis was laid on production of goods than on consumers' goods; greater emphasis on machines, farm tools, industrial semi-manufactures, than on articles going directly into consumption, such as clothing, furniture, etc. The index of employment for the production goods industries rose in 1932-34 — on the basis of the level of 1936 as evaluated at 100 — from 48.8 to 78.2, or approximately 60 per cent; that for the consumers' goods industry only from 78.5 to 94.2, or exactly 20 per cent; and this more rapid tempo in production goods continued in the succeeding years. Before Hitler came to power, relatively more had been produced for direct consumption, while now greater stress was laid on increased production of capital plant, machines, factories, and farm tools.

Nevertheless, in Germany the greatest, most concentrated effort was made at re-employment, that embracing the largest single group of workers, was made by an industry chiefly satisfying private needs. In the first years of National Socialism, no industry so increased its employment figures as construction and the related building material industry. Between 1932 and 1935, the index of employment in the construction industry rose from 19.2 to 70; in the building material industry, from 41 to 83.1; in the former an increase of over 350 per cent, in the latter of more than 200 per cent. Roughly 2,600,000 workers were involved (building trades, 1933 — 2,020,000, building material industry, 615,000). The construction of motor highways, with its employment of 30,000 to 70,000 workers, did not have a major effect on these figures. The main factor was that in 1932, 141,265 new dwellings were built, and in 1934, 283,995, or more than twice as many. Larger dwelling complexes than before were constructed, big buildings with more individual apartments; the statistical expression of this is that the number of buildings rises more slowly than the number of dwellings. At the same time the number of the new 'non-dwelling' constructions decreased, from 54,200 in 1932 to 52,600 in 1934.

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Not by building of air fleets, but by building new housing, did National Socialism begin to revive German economic life and obtain a solid and lasting popularity. Foreign observers, it can well be understood, were more impressed by the millions of S.A. men in new uniforms. Scarcely anyone was willing to believe that the S.A. was not the coming German army, though it happened to be true. When Röhm, in an interview at the beginning of October, gave assurance that the S.A. was not an army but a new religion — 'as the early Christians were bearers and warriors of their new view of life, Christianity' — to most people it sounded absurd, though actually the thought behind his words was more ominous than any war-like threat. Hitler was grieved at foreign suspicions; with righteous indignation he asked visitors what in the world led foreigners to think he wanted war. 'I have a long domestic task before me,' he said to Ferdinand de Brinon, his French visitor, in the beginning of November. 'I shall need years to reach my goal. Do you think that I want to destroy my work by a new war?' Brinon published this and similar utterances in the Paris *Matin*, which Hitler had formerly called a hotbed of Jewish lies and which actually was in a sense the organ of the Jewish bourgeoisie of France. Hitler had also said that if he wanted peace, all Germany wanted peace, for 'I alone decide on German policy, and if I give my word, I am accustomed to keep it.' De Brinon remarked that Ward Price, Lord Rothermere's correspondent in Germany and his unofficial ambassador to Hitler, had called Hitler sincere, and, he added, Ward Price was right.

Strange how these foreign observers, themselves half-Fascist at heart, loved to speculate about Hitler's 'sincerity.' As though he could have been lying when he maintained that he needed many years more time for his internal reconstruction! The German people needed time to adapt themselves to a far-reaching social upheaval.

The National Socialist economic policy meant a return to work for millions; for even more millions it meant the final liberation from the fear of losing tomorrow the little employment they still retained. The state now seemed able to protect its people from starvation; mankind seemed to have risen one step — that is the feeling which the National Socialist revolution gave to many people.

This progress had been bought with the loss: renunciation of free speech, with a press do- concentration camps for a minority and atroci concealed.

Did this price have to be paid? In 1933, un- decrease all over the world. In the United S estimate of the American Federation of Labo from thirteen millions to ten millions. The off for Business Research (*Konjunkturforschung*), that in Latvia unemployment had decreased by second quarter of 1932 to the second quarter by 23 per cent; in Germany, only by 9 per ce two millions, apparently a third, or 33 per ce employed, was misleading, since it could be ascrib summer rise in employment. In Great Britain, registered an improvement of 6 per cent in t According to the index of the International Lal the level of employment for nineteen large, from 100 in 1929 to 75 in 1932; in 1933, it rose in 1935 to 88, or an increase of 17.3 per cent in the same period the German level of employ German figures, rose from 12,500,000 to 15,900,0 per cent. In a word: the 'National Socialist. r entirely National Socialist nor entirely a miracl of a world recovery; though in Germany, it mi recovery was experienced with a passion equ The German Institute for Business Research al: two millions who had returned to work in Ge August, some 1,400,000 would have done so w tion of the state, in consequence of the usual st roughly 300,000 to 700,000 in Germany owed ti to the general world prosperity. The measures ernment, properly spoken — still according to Institute for Business Research — would only back to work.

But what was world prosperity? No longer a p but of political, forces; in most countries it ha

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Did this price have to be paid? In 1933, unemployment began to
 decrease all over the world. In the United States, according to an
 estimate of the American Federation of Labor, unemployment fell
 from thirteen millions to ten millions. The official German Institute
 for Business Research (*Konjunkturforschung*) noted in July, 1933,
 that in Latvia unemployment had decreased by 31 per cent from the
 second quarter of 1932 to the second quarter of 1933; in Rumania,
 by 23 per cent; in Germany, only by 9 per cent — for the figure of
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 registered an improvement of 6 per cent in the course of a year.
 According to the index of the International Labor Office in Geneva,
 the level of employment for nineteen large countries had fallen
 from 100 in 1929 to 75 in 1932; in 1933, it rose to 78; in 1934 to 84;
 in 1935 to 88, or an increase of 17.3 per cent in three years; during
 the same period the German level of employment, according to
 German figures, rose from 12,500,000 to 15,900,000, an increase of 27
 per cent. In a word: the 'National Socialist miracle' was neither
 entirely National Socialist nor entirely a miracle, but largely a part
 of a world recovery; though in Germany, it must be admitted, this
recovery was experienced with a passion equaled nowhere else.
 The German Institute for Business Research also found that of the
 two millions who had returned to work in Germany by the end of
 August, some 1,400,000 would have done so without the interven-
 tion of the state, in consequence of the usual summer revival; and
 roughly 300,000 to 700,000 in Germany owed their re-employment
 to the general world prosperity. The measures of the Hitler gov-
 ernment, properly spoken — still according to the estimate of the
 Institute for Business Research — would only have sent 300,000
 back to work.

But what was world prosperity? No longer a product of economic,
 but of political, forces; in most countries it had been accelerated,

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if not induced, by state intervention. The great world revival from which Hitler profited did indeed result from a general political exertion, from state intervention in economic life. And that conservative country in which the state hesitated to intervene suffered the consequences. In France, employment had fallen more slowly during the great crisis than in Germany, from 100 in 1930 to 80.9 in 1932; but while in Germany, England, America, and the world in general employment then began to rise, the French index continued to fall to 73.5 in 1935.

All over the world attempts to create separate national spheres of prosperity were in progress. The German developments were merely a part of this picture, though indeed the Germans were more methodical than anyone else in their international efforts. No other country was so adept at co-ordinating economic policy, diplomacy, and propaganda. The outside world, doubting more and more the wisdom of its past policy, was more receptive than before to German complaints. Already Schleicher had blamed—not entirely without justification—the decisions of Ottawa for the special distress of German agriculture; now Hjalmar Schacht began to complain of the foreign tariffs which forced Germany—so he said—to defend herself with the harshest and indeed most unscrupulous means.

From time to time in former years, the condition of German foreign trade had been disquieting; often imports had been billions in excess of exports; or, to speak in the language of private business, more had been bought than could actually be paid for. But in those days the whole world had been glad to lend Germany money and had not pressed for repayment. In 1928, German imports had amounted to 14,000,000,000 marks, while exports had been only 12,300,000,000; but the difference had been almost made good by foreign long-term loans to the amount of 1,460,000,000 marks, not to mention short and medium-term loans and stock flotations. But after 1930, no further long-term loans were offered, and where possible the short-term loans were called in; the mass of international trade decreased throughout the world, and prices kept falling. In 1932, Germany exported goods valued at only 5,700,000,000 marks, but imported only 4,700,000,000—a complete upset of the trade

balance; borrowed imports had ceased to of imported goods was honestly covered small source of error in these figures; up-cluded the so-called 'payments in kind' which frayed a part of her reparations; but the figures the general picture with fair accuracy. In every, German exports continued falling to imports sank to 4,200,000,000.

Germany's exports and imports had fallen thirds; the patient seemed to be scarcely better figures are misleading; for the seemingly reveals a remarkable gain which became evident in 1932; a gain which was most helpful to Nazi decisively influenced the economic structure. The diminishing trade figures of Germany and other countries did in one way present an exaggerated picture: the bulk of goods exchanged on the world market prices crashed at an even faster rate; consequently exports were valued at 12,000,000,000 marks at 4,000,000,000, this does not mean that they had fallen to one third. Possibly it had not. The greater part of the decline in value must be due to prices. In 1927, German imports had a value of 14,000,000,000 marks and a weight of 82,200,000 tons; when in 1932 they were valued at 4,200,000,000 marks, or considerably less than in 1927, their weight was still 45,800,000 tons, or more than half.

This discrepancy between value and weight is the best outline of the process. Using a suitable method, the official German statistics reveal that Germany derived from the difference between value and weight. This method measured the value of exports by their actual prices, but by the prices prevailing in Germany obtained in this way do not tell how much to pay for her imports in a given year or how much for her exports, but how much she would have received if the prices of 1928 had still prevailed in the world. Figures alone give a true picture of the quantity.

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It was the first great accomplishment of Hjalmar Schacht to save this billion—or two billions—for Germany's raw material program and to take advantage of the low raw material prices while they lasted. He pointed to the continued decline in German export figures, and declared that if foreign countries would not buy German manufactures, they could not expect Germany to pay her debts. At first the continued difficulties of the German export trade greatly embarrassed National Socialist propagandists; they did not know whether to attack the 'Jewish boycott' abroad or to conceal its successes from the home population. Actually the boycott had little to do with the decline in German exports; at the end of June, 1933, the Congress of German Commerce and Industry noted a sharp falling-off of anti-German propaganda abroad, and thirteen months later, in July, 1934, the German Ministry of Economics published a statement to the effect that an investigation by the competent authorities had shown that the political boycott was not the decisive factor in the decline of German exports.

Shortly after Hitler came to power, Germany's foreign creditors had been forced to accept a reduction of interest on capital lent to Germany from an average of 7 to 8 per cent to an average of 5 to 6 per cent. At the end of May, 1933, Hjalmar Schacht invited representatives of the foreign creditor banks to Berlin and asked them virtually to renounce interest payments on their long-term credits. This the foreign bankers refused to do, but pointed out that in a few days the great World Economic Conference was to open in London and would solve the problem of German foreign indebtedness, like so many other problems.

The London Economic Conference of June and July, 1933, solved no problems. Conceived and summoned by Ramsay MacDonald, originally welcomed and approved by Franklin D. Roosevelt, it concentrated its efforts, after beginnings in various directions, on the question of stabilizing international currencies, on attempts to restore the lost sanctity of money. After the majesty of money had been shattered in Russia and in Germany, and had suffered grave damage in France as well, the most respected of all international currencies had begun to totter; England had taken the pound off the gold standard and reduced its value. Just as the Economic

Conference was beginning its work, the United States new leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt, followed England; the Gold Repeal Joint Resolution of June 1933 took the American currency off the gold standard. The pound to slip and was later officially devaluated. It was (so much wealth had been destroyed, which now clung to her currency, stabilized only a few years before. the currency, if for no other reason, said Schacht, no longer pay her debts to foreign countries who chased her goods.

Schacht insisted that the cessation of payments was to him, and this may be believed; he knew the impact on national credit, and he would surely have been overjoyed if finance had voluntarily declared a moratorium. But the rule of finance capital was crumbling, and anyone who tried to crash with it had to help in its fall. For this he had his methods. First, all interest on foreign loans was reduced from 8 per cent to a maximum of 4 per cent; even of this amount only half could be paid to foreign creditors; the other half of the interest, as well as all sums destined for amortization, had to be paid in Germany; not in possession of the debtor himself, but in the form of 'bank' to which the individual debtor made payments. The clearing bank then tendered the foreign creditor a paper scrip, which for practical purposes he could spend only in Germany; moreover, the scrip was subject to an immediate discount. These measures were put in the form of a law on June 3, 1933; on July 1, they became valid. The foreign creditors had to submit.

It was a masterpiece of official bankruptcy; a system of foreign finance; a brilliant victory of the new state over the old. The limited utility of the scrip, the constant danger that one day devalue it to the vanishing point, made it a doubtful asset on the international stock exchanges. In the sorts of paper appeared, all based on the conception that the state, possessing wealth—claims, shares in businesses, banks—should be prevented from disposing of it freely; special regulations were the German Jews, who were

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vented from freely disposing of their funds within Germany; especially the liquidation of their bank deposits was made virtually impossible. In time there came to be a varied assortment of foreign claims on the different kinds of half or wholly 'blocked' deposits in Germany; these claims were traded abroad, bought and sold; they had their prices and rates, which were almost always considerably below their nominal value. For it was almost always doubtful whether such a claim could ever be collected; at best, the money could only be used in Germany; and expense, loss of time, and irritation were certain. For all these claims against blocked German accounts, the expression 'blocked mark' came into use, and the different kinds of blocked mark became a currency devaluated by the state, side by side with the pound, the dollar, later—for the second time within ten years—the French franc, etc. The blocked mark repeated, though in a much attenuated form, the downward course of the German mark after 1919.

But only the blocked mark. The German domestic mark was in no way affected by this devaluation; the domestic mark was not devaluated, wages and prices were subjected to an iron control, and even in the following years of prosperity, they rose only slightly. And equally successful was the state control over the real German mark in its foreign relations. For not only were foreign assets in Germany blocked and controlled, property or claims held by Germans abroad were likewise blocked. Restrictions on such property had been imposed by Brüning's law governing the flight of capital; at one time or another such restrictions had—even in peace—been imposed by almost all countries; but Schacht's legislation and its mode of operation held a place by themselves. Germans receiving payments from abroad had to deliver their foreign notes to the Reichsbank which gave them marks in exchange; if they wished to make a purchase abroad, they had to obtain the necessary sum in foreign credits from the Reichsbank, or rather its *Devisenstelle* (foreign draft office); and only if the foreign draft office regarded the transaction as useful to the German economy did it provide the precious foreign checks. It gave them more readily if the foreign goods were to be purchased in a country with which Germany had a favorable trade balance—that is, which bought large quantities of

goods in Germany. A German importer might buy silk in Italy rather than in France, or, to put it another way, Argentina instead of in Australia; vacation travel abroad—unless they had good reasons—was what amounted to the same thing, high recreation definitely restricted to Italy, or, possibly, Spain. In any case, the way the funds flowing back and forth between Germany and foreign countries were closely regulated, and care should remain in exact proportion to the state of the market. Hideous penalties were proclaimed for the export of German goods. Not a mark was to go abroad for anything not covered by German sales to the country in question. It had not been approved in advance by the foreign office. The German mark vanished from foreign markets for speculation, but remained active in the internal market of bona-fide goods and services. Like the currencies of other countries, it dispensed without bad consequences what that had formerly been regarded as indispensable. Currency of most countries, it had ceased to be a measure of value honored for its intrinsic value, but was, is, a measure of value honored for its intrinsic value, a token of credit, strictly limited in its use, and confined to its assigned sphere. This process went so far that the mark, except in connection with transactions approved by the government, to have any real value outside of Germany. After 1933, it ceased to be an independent measure of value, and was reduced to two other functions usually ascribed to money—transferring and of storing value.

It remained questionable whether Germany had destroyed her currency. In any case, she removed the mark from the national stock exchange and, far more drastically, she devaluated it to the state. By this step Germany destroyed the system of international free trade which had been in force in London was trying to restore. But the conference was not needed to paralyze this conference. For the conference was stunned to receive a message from America, which called things by their proper names. America's withdrawal from the plans for international

posing of their funds within Germany; especially of their bank deposits was made virtually free came to be a varied assortment of foreign kinds of half or wholly 'blocked' deposits in which were traded abroad, bought and sold; their rates, which were almost always considerably lower. For it was almost always doubtful whether they could be collected; at best, the money could only be obtained at a heavy expense, loss of time, and irritation were certain against blocked German accounts, the 'exchange' came into use, and the different kinds of currency devaluated by the state, side by side with the dollar, later—for the second time within a few years of the franc, etc. The blocked mark repeated, in attenuated form, the downward course of the dollar in 1919.

The German domestic mark was thus devaluated; the domestic mark was not only in prices but was subjected to an iron control, and in years of prosperity, they rose only slightly. It was the state control over the real German economy. For not only were foreign assets in Germany controlled, property or claims held by Germany were blocked. Restrictions on such property were Brüning's law governing the flight of capital; or such restrictions had—even in peace—been in all countries; but Schacht's legislation and the Reichsbank held a place by themselves. Germans received foreign notes to deliver their foreign notes to the Reichsbank in exchange; if they wished to obtain the necessary sum in the Reichsbank, or rather its *Devisenstelle* (foreign exchange office) only if the foreign draft office regarded the German economy did it provide the sum. It gave them more readily if the foreign country was one with which Germany had trade—that is, which bought large quantities of

goods in Germany. A German importer might be advised to buy silk in Italy rather than in France, or to purchase wool in the Argentine instead of in Australia; vacationers who wanted to travel abroad—unless they had good reasons to the contrary, or, what amounted to the same thing, high recommendations—were definitely restricted to Italy, or, possibly, Switzerland. In this way the funds flowing back and forth between Germany and foreign countries were closely regulated, and care was taken that they should remain in exact proportion to the stream of goods actually traded. Hideous penalties were proclaimed for taking cash out of Germany. Not a mark was to go abroad for any purpose that was not covered by German sales to the country in question, and which had not been approved in advance by the foreign draft office. The German mark vanished from foreign markets as an object of trade and speculation, but remained active in the international exchange of *bona-fide* goods and services. Like the currency of most countries, it dispensed without bad consequences with the gold coverage that had formerly been regarded as indispensable, and, like the currency of most countries, it had ceased to be real money—that is, a measure of value honored for its intrinsic value. It was merely a token of credit, strictly limited in its use, and worthless outside of its assigned sphere. This process went so far that German bills, except in connection with transactions approved by the Reich, ceased to have any real value outside of Germany. And so the mark, having ceased to be an independent measure of value, lost in part the two other functions usually ascribed to money: the functions of transferring and of storing value.

It remained questionable whether Germany had saved or destroyed her currency. In any case, she removed it from the international stock exchange and, far more drastically than England, subjected it to the state. By this step Germany definitely broke with the system of international free trade which the Economic Conference in London was trying to restore. But the German delegation was not needed to paralyze this conference. For on July 3, the conference was stunned to receive a message from President Roosevelt, which called things by their proper name and announced America's withdrawal from the plans for international stabilization

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of currencies. Three days after Germany had stopped payments in order to rebuild her industry by her own strength, though not without stolen money, the President of the United States told the assembled financial experts of the world that a nation's internal economy was more vital to that nation's prosperity than the state of its currency; moreover, stabilization of currencies would not solve the problem of world trade; and it was more important to break down trade barriers; America—the message implied—would help herself and recommended the same to all countries. This was the end of the World Economic Conference, and after a few days it 'adjourned.' Hjalmar Schacht, always at great pains to discover a similarity between the American New Deal and the economic policy of the Third Reich, gave an interview in London, on July 12, in which he said that the failure of the conference had been a good thing; that all these conferences were going the same downward path as parliamentarianism; that in world economy as elsewhere the general watchword was: no more prattling. And the world should be grateful to President Roosevelt for his withdrawal: 'For Roosevelt has in principle the same idea that Hitler and Mussolini have put into action: take your economic fate into your own hands and you will be helping not only yourselves but the whole world!'

Schacht.

Chapter XXVI

'FRANCE IS TO B

WHEN SCHACHT LAMENTED HIS OWN which compelled him to destroy Germany's cred which compelled him to destroy Germany's cred of saving Germany, it was no mere hypocrisy. Schacht designate the point at which Germany fo the choice between two ways to win the place was due her: the hard and slow way of using b for peace and agreement, or the more showy w force; which inevitably must lead to taking more chose the second way. This way, no doubt, had lined in the plans of the new rulers; but it will question whether a happier destiny in the prec have preserved her from these rulers and thei methods.

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Chapter XXVII

1933

'FRANCE IS TO BLAME'

WHEN SCHACHT LAMENTED HIS OWN BITTER FATE, which compelled him to destroy Germany's credit as the only way of saving Germany, it was no mere hypocrisy. These pleas of Schacht designate the point at which Germany for the last time had the choice between two ways to win the place in the world that was due her: the hard and slow way of using her growing power for peace and agreement, or the more showy way of taking it by force; which inevitably must lead to taking more than her due. She chose the second way. This way, no doubt, had long ago been outlined in the plans of the new rulers; but it will always be a grave question whether a happier destiny in the preceding years would have preserved her from these rulers and their dismally skillful methods.

True, in the beginning, as in all politics, a thousand principles had to be sacrificed in order that one opportunity might be seized. In the conflict between Hitler's Germany and her neighbors, of which Schacht's trade policy formed a part, Germany tried again and again to keep the peace and transform hostilities into friendships, because only in this way could her position in the heart of Europe cease to be a weakness and become a strength. For instance, National Socialist diplomacy exerted great self-discipline in abstaining from setting off the 'national dynamite' scattered through eastern Europe. Germany might, by invoking the right of national self-determination (the justice of which was incontestable), have raised claims on nearly all her frontiers. There were the German inhabitants of Danzig and those in Poland; there were the three and a

quarter million Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, forming a ring around the rest of that country; a few Germans living under a mild Danish rule in the border district of Slesvig; the Germans in the small area of Eupen and Malmédy, given to Belgium in 1919; the Germans in the Italian South Tyrol. But nowhere did National Socialism, in its first years, make any attempt to bring these Germans 'home to the Reich.' Two years before, Hitler had pre-claimed that the Czechoslovakian state would have to be smashed with the help of the Sudeten Germans. Now not a word of this. The relatively small National Socialist Party of the Sudeten Germans was dissolved by the Czechoslovakian government in October, 1933, its leaders fled to Germany, and thus perished the oldest of all National Socialist parties, the mother movement, twenty years older than the N.S.D.A.P. Many Sudeten German National Socialists were tried and imprisoned—but Germany took no notice and kept silent. From Poland came complaints about the persecution of German minorities—official Germany, in public at least, was silent. No loud word or unfriendly act toward any of the countries in the French ring of alliances; with iron self-control the Third Reich waited for its day, which had not yet come.

For in these countries the German minorities lived on the soil of proud and jealous national states. But Austria, in her mutilated post-war form, was solely and purely a product of that Versailles world which it was the main business of German policy to rend thread by thread. Sudeten Germany, the Vistula Corridor, and German-speaking South Tyrol were territories which Czechs, Poles, and Italians could regard as their own—no one except the Austrians themselves could regard Austria as his own. No diplomacy in the world could overlook the fact that large parts, even the majority, of these Austrians, wanted, or had at one time wanted, to be united with Germany. In the disputes between the German minorities and the national governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia, people were struggling against people; in Austria the people struggled mainly against bureaucracy and diplomacy. And so it was the internal condition of Austria which influenced German foreign policy—and not the other way around. Even those opposed to *Anschluss* admitted, in spite of themselves, how hard, indeed how

impossible, it was for the little country to break in many. Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, for exact aim of his government to be the establishment of a man state.'

In March, 1933, Hans Frank, Hitler's friend minister, took a trip around Austria making speeches and the government as though he had been many, attacking Brüning or Severing; the Austrians, led by Theo Habicht, a German, and an Frauenfeld, began to hurl bombs, mostly hard at government officials and public buildings, answered with arrests and established a mild sor camp. Hitler countered with a serious blow: as Germany exacted a payment of a thousand marks desiring to visit Austria. This virtually closed Austria's Alpine provinces had largely lived on the trade. In answer, Dollfuss suppressed the National civil war, and the National Socialists and arrested its leaders; Habicht, Frauenfeld, their supporters fled to Germany.

These National Socialists were organized in Legion'; equipped with arms, even cannon, the ready to march at any moment; planes regularly trian frontier and threw down proclamations. International civil war, and the National Socialists confidence that might have been the envy of the national. But the German Foreign Office insisted internal affair of Austria; the Austrian National chosen Hitler as their Leader; this was their right affair.

Dollfuss turned to the great powers for help. In past when Germany could be frightened by from Paris. As long as the world could come to no decision, it would not go out of its way for Austria; a protest in words was not to be expected. On July of Commons, Sir Austen Chamberlain described menace of National Socialism with epigrammatic

spirit shown within Germany to Germans is a menace to every nation beyond her borders. . . . But Sir John Simon, the Foreign Minister, had nothing to offer Austria but 'the whole sympathy of this country'; and the Four-Power Pact, just concluded between England, France, Italy, and Germany, 'which I hope will be used to assist that country. . . . England did not promise embattled Austria her own aid, but only that of all Europe — little more than an empty word.

It was the English Left which in those weeks made a real attempt to injure National Socialist Germany. On July 25, the Congress of British Trades Unions and the Labour Party issued a call to their members to boycott German goods. But on the conservative side, the most influential makers of public opinion opposed the boycott. In the first days of July, Lord Rothermere published another of his enthusiastic articles on the new Germany in the *Daily Mail*; in Germany, wrote the founder of the 'Empire Party,' youth had seized the power of command, there had been a national awakening, an example to all the world. With the same methods Mussolini had made his country the best governed on earth, and he, Rothermere, confidently expected Hitler, who had come to power at the age of forty-three, to achieve equal successes in Germany. The simple, unadorned patriotism of Hitler and his followers was, according to Rothermere, a source of great agitation among British parlor Bolsheviks and 'culture Communists.' The most hateful detractors of Nazis, he went on, were to be found in those very sections of the British public and press which were most enthusiastic about Soviet rule in Russia. These people had undertaken a loud campaign of slander against what they called 'Nazi atrocities,' which, as everyone who visited Germany quickly discovered, consisted only of a few isolated acts, which propagandists had generalized, multiplied, and exaggerated in order to give the impression that Nazi rule was a bloodthirsty tyranny. Rothermere did not refrain from remarking that under the Weimar Republic there had been twenty times as many Jewish officials as before the war; and, as though to prove that he really knew nothing about conditions in Germany, he concluded with the remark that Hindenburg and the Crown Prince, along with Herr Hitler, constituted the center of the edifice. These three men

would go down in history as the founders of Hitler was a leader who had gathered together elements of his country for the public welfare. . .

The growth and consolidation of National S Germany, the broad, confused, and vain efforts at the part of public opinion in the western country historical content of this period. But through it kept up their dwarfish activities: notes, memoranda the meaninglessness of which was suspected even pants. This became evident when finally an attempt do something for menaced Austria. The Daladier France, though none too hopefully, attempted to Simon at his word with his invocation of the Pact and to frighten Berlin with an impressive protest. Pact broke down at once; Italy declared that she in no common measures, since this would constitute friendliness to Germany. On August 5, the Italians rushed to the German Foreign Office and 'in a friendly the attention of the Reich government to . . . ' an equally friendly way, Neurath replied that the Reich was willing to suppress Habicht's radio speeches; that more planes throwing down leaflets; he hoped that no explosions of paper bombs, but for this Germany no responsibility. Rome, highly pleased, transmitted promises to Paris and London, and requested that they take no steps of their own.

But France insisted in London that at least France should take steps in common. England, indifferent to Central Europe in general, was, after the desertion of France, prepared for joint action. On the morning of August 1, the German ambassador appeared alone in the German Foreign Office to note of protest; not until the afternoon did the French ambassador put in an appearance. Both received a sharp rebuff as a disunited Europe could not but expect. An official communiqué on the incident approached the limit of discourtesy:

The French ambassador stated this morning,

any to Germans is a menace to every . . . But Sir John Simon, the Foreign Minister Austria but 'the whole sympathy of the Four-Power Pact, just concluded between Germany, 'which I hope will be used . . . England did not promise embattled only that of all Europe — little more than

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Lord Rothermere published another of the new Germany in the *Daily Mail*; in the 'Empire Party,' youth had seized here had been a national awakening, and

With the same methods Mussolini had governed on earth, and he, Rothermere, who had come to power at the age of great successes in Germany. The simple, Hitler and his followers was, according to great agitation among British parlor Bolsheviks. The most hateful detractors of to be found in those very sections of the which were most enthusiastic about Soviet people had undertaken a loud campaign of, called 'Nazi atrocities,' which, as every quickly discovered, consisted only of a propagandists had generalized, multiplied, to give the impression that Nazi rule was Rothermere did not refrain from remarking Republic there had been twenty times as before the war; and, as though to prove that about conditions in Germany, he concluded denburg and the Crown Prince, along with the center of the edifice. These three men

would go down in history as the founders of a new Germany; Hitler was a leader who had gathered together all the valuable elements of his country for the public welfare. . . .

The growth and consolidation of National Socialist power in Germany, the broad, confused, and vain efforts at understanding on the part of public opinion in the western countries, were the real historical content of this period. But through it all the diplomats kept up their dwarfish activities: notes, memoranda, official visits, the meaninglessness of which was suspected even by the participants. This became evident when finally an attempt was made to do something for menaced Austria. The Daladier government in France, though none too hopefully, attempted to take Sir John Simon at his word with his invocation of the Four-Power Pact and to frighten Berlin with an impressive protest. The Four-Power Pact broke down at once; Italy declared that she could participate in no common measures, since this would constitute an act of unfriendliness to Germany. On August 5, the Italian ambassador rushed to the German Foreign Office and 'in a friendly way called the attention of the Reich government to . . . ' and so on. In an equally friendly way, Neurath replied that the Reich government was willing to suppress Habicht's radio speeches; there would be no more planes throwing down leaflets; he hoped that there would be no explosions of paper bombs, but for this Germany could assume no responsibility. Rome, highly pleased, transmitted the German promises to Paris and London, and requested these governments to take no steps of their own.

But France insisted in London that at least France and England should take steps in common. England, indifferent to Austria and Central Europe in general, was, after the desertion of Italy, unprepared for joint action. On the morning of August 7, the French ambassador appeared alone in the German Foreign Office with his note of protest; not until the afternoon did the British chargé d'affaires put in an appearance. Both received a sharp answer such as a disunited Europe could not but expect. An official German communiqué on the incident approached the limits of diplomatic discourtesy:

The French ambassador stated this morning, with reference to

that, in the opinion of the French government, with regard to Austria was not compatible with existing contractual obligations. It was informed that the Reich government was not prepared to appropriate the application of the Four-Power Conference at no contractual infringements of any kind in the part of Germany; Germany, therefore, did not interfere in German-Austrian affairs as per chargé d'affaires, who appeared in the same manner, received the same answer.

most unfriendly diplomatic communiqué submitted herself since 1919 in her dealings. The western powers accepted the diplomatic step; they consoled themselves that, after all, Hitler had promised the independence of Austria. Thereupon a new (August 19), semi-official and even rudeness was promised to France and England; certified on friendly conversations with Italy, there was no concern of France and England; and remained rejected.

The German ambassador had so amiably discussed the Free City of Danzig and the Republic of Poland regarding their future relations. Negotiations with the Polish Foreign Minister, and Hermann Goering, the Danzig Senator, it was the first formal meeting and National Socialism. Up till then the instance of Polish military power, had been the League of Nations against any possible Polish use of a High Commissioner of the League. Now the Danzig National Socialists refused Geneva; Danzig and Poland agreed to themselves and to cease presenting them

on a line. Peace with individual neighbors in the world, as represented by the League—

Actually this great peace of all with all was an impossible figment of the brain, unrealizable in the world of reality. To be true and possible, it should have penetrated far deeper than the outer edges where the peoples touched one another; it presupposed a certain intimacy in the social relations between the nations; the London Economic Conference had tried to achieve such an intimacy, but with inadequate means. What was needed was a new form of life among the nations; what was offered was at best diplomatic agreements in which no two diplomats meant the same thing. To most of its English proponents, for example, collective security meant a system in which England would not have to give much help, since her responsibility was shared with so many others. But for France collective security was a condition in which everyone would have to help her with all his forces.

In French internal politics, rearmament and collective security became opposed, hostile concepts. Collective security meant: no necessity to rearm; no necessity for a larger army, hence no necessity for going back to the system of two years' service.

Without doubt, the military spirit had an even harder time in France than in the Germany of the twenties, combating the opposition of the masses; the struggle of the armed intellectuals for the working class seemed utterly hopeless. In *Au fil de l'épée*, a book dedicated to Marshal Pétain, Lieutenant Colonel Charles de Gaulle had written in 1932: 'Could we, indeed, conceive of life without force? . . . It is the medium of thought, the instrument of action, the prerequisite for movement, the midwife of progress. . . . Cradle of cities, scepter of empires, gravedigger of decadence, force gives law to peoples and controls their destiny. . . .' It was a summons to the national élite to understand, not the inevitability, but the creative necessity, of violence and war; 'this abnegation of individuals for the benefit of the whole, this glorified suffering—of which troops are made—correspond most perfectly to our aesthetic and moral concepts: the highest philosophical and religious doctrines have chosen no other ideal. . . . It is time for the military élite to regain consciousness of its pre-eminent rôle, for it to concentrate on its objective which is, quite simply, war. . . .'

Collective security or rearmament—this seemed to be the choice

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* One of the German officers could quote De Gaulle with some feeling approaching reverence.

. Actually, there was not even a choice. The British cabinet decided to cease pressing seemed like a gesture of friendship and that France would be left to her fate and must not count on England's help.

in strong. She submitted a plan which was equally impossible for eight years: first, Germany in which to transform her professional period of service into a short-term militia; in which to manifest her good intentions, increase her armaments somewhat, while have to decrease their armaments accordingly. A moratorium was to be substituted proposed by MacDonald and accepted by her. He said of this plan, it could in any case save rearmament and save the world from for this reason it met with the approval of France. It made such an impression on Italy that she was shamefully forsaken by the 'great' September 24, the French plan, bearing the England, and Italy, was presented to Ger-

many of Hitler's great policy which was to the world formed a front against Germany. Italy did not change her position, not yet, in this apparently united front there was at best an agreement on a plan, no compromise, to stick together. Even if the British will — which it decidedly had not — large would not have followed it.

trial of the alleged Reichstag incendiaries. Englishmen of the political Left, working German refugees, staged a 'counter-trial' in London, some with and some without authority and testified why in their opinion, not the Socialists, and particularly Göring, had The Communists had staged the affair

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behind a screen of supposed non-Communists; Willy Muenzenberg, a German Communist leader, had organized the whole undertaking. The results were what was to be expected. Even Sir Austen Chamberlain called the 'counter-trial' a shameful abuse of hospitality. Lloyd George, England's leader in the World War, co-author of Versailles, who had long deeply regretted his own work, said, on September 22, in a meeting at Bournemouth, that if the powers succeeded in overthrowing National Socialism in Germany, Communism would succeed it; and that the Communists in the whole world, from Russia to America, were praying that the western nations would drive Germany into a Communist revolution.

Against this world mood, shifting between rancor and hope, tormented by the fear of irrevocable decisions, National Socialist propaganda now undertook a great offensive. When the plenary assembly of the League of Nations met at the end of September, Goebbels was the German delegate. Neurath refused to let the propaganda minister appear as the spokesman of Germany in the assembly; but outside Goebbels found a wide audience. It was wrong, he told fellow journalists at a press conference, to believe 'that the peoples wanted to govern themselves. They cannot and they have no desire to, they only want to be well governed.' This was what National Socialism did, said he; consequently, the Third Reich was 'an ennobled form of democracy.' It seemed as though Goebbels had been sent to Geneva to abjure all National Socialist principles, for he firmly denied that National Socialism had a 'world mission' to fulfill and that it planned the fascistization of Europe; no, National Socialism was 'a typically German phenomenon which can be explained only on the basis of German environment, German character, and German distress'; in a conversation he said that National Socialism was something so good that Germany wanted to keep it entirely for herself.

A few days later, simpler, more forceful words were addressed — not to the world, but to France alone — by Göring; as one of the military leaders of National Socialism, he invited the military leaders of France to a conference. In an interview with Jules Sauerwein, the French journalist, he made a peace proposal couched in very general terms; it was published by *Paris Soir* on

eat sensation. The gist of the conversation / to bring about peace if France were not and parliament. It was impossible, said Germany should want to annihilate one who had ever been able to do so and never taken offense at the line, 'Victoriously in a song sung by the German combat id: I have given orders to stop singing it. to send him a soldier, and with him he eement on certain needs of a German , said Göring in conclusion, the Leader : Leader desired peace, the whole nation have you such a man in France, despite your parliamentary compromises?' speech delivered at Vichy. He asked, not Germany wanted armaments when she why she 'trained her youth for war?' But ontests Germany's right to existence as a tends to humiliate Germany.' Despite all of these words, they were more than a er publicly conceded Germany since Ver-ladler asked: 'What does Germany want? rching and drilling . . . ?' it sounded like eply in a personal conference, a discussion ate and another — which was just what

licy was still dominated by the party of tember 24, the great powers had agreed on r quarantine, and when the Disarmament er, it would have this plan to deal with. nt Hans Luther, his ambassador to Wash-y of State Cordell Hull, and, according to bureau, Luther learned that the American ed that no pressure should be put on Ger-ons should be made contrary to justified the American State Department 'expressly n German armament were at hand.' Per-

haps the sanguine German ambassador had heard too much. On the fourteenth, the bureau of the conference met in Geneva and Sir John Simon, as spokesman of the British delegation, declared that he still adhered to the plan for an eight-year transitional period. Germany's protests were rejected.

In his great peace speech of May 17, Hitler had declared that if the other powers meant to 'do violence' to Germany by outvoting her, their sole purpose could be 'to remove us from the conferences.' But: 'The German nation has character enough not to force its collaboration on other nations in such a case; though with a heavy heart, it will draw the necessary consequences. As a people constantly defamed, it would be hard for us to continue membership in the League of Nations.'

Now Germany had been 'outvoted.' Here was a splendid opportunity to teach the world once and for all that the Leader's words must be taken seriously and to carry the fight over European foreign policy to the peoples themselves with an issue which, in England and in France as well, might stir up one political party against another; and with which he hoped to unleash within his own people a surge of popular enthusiasm even greater than in the spring. And it was a unique opportunity to show that the apparent unity of the world against Germany would not withstand a test.

On the night of October 14, Germany announced her withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations.

It was one of those political blows in which Hitler has always been a master; a combination *blitz* which he hurled in three or four directions at once, almost always choosing the right moment, as a rule uncannily sure of success. In the same hour he dissolved the Reichstag; new elections were to be held November 12; only one list of deputies, the National Socialist list, with a few 'Hospitants,' as for example Hugenberg, was to be put before the voters; they only could say 'Yes' or 'No' — and the most were convinced that practically they could not say No. At the same time they had, by way of plebiscite, to state whether or not they approved Hitler's foreign policy — which on the bulletin of vote was explained as a policy to save peace. The great plebiscite, the irresistible instrument of Napoleonic propaganda technique, the use of which Hitler had

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been announcing for ten years, but for which in the spring of 1933 his hands had not been sufficiently free, now descended on the German people like a natural cataclysm. A question of overpowering simplicity was put to the voters: Do you want peace? And the rest of the world was asked, more emphatically than before: Do you want Bolshevism?

Once again it was the events and circumstances that had shaped this propaganda and forged its cutting edge. For some weeks the Reichstag fire trial, which in the spring Hitler had been unable to prevent, had been in progress in Leipzig. The secret preparations for this trial are not yet known, but their results are a matter of record. In the presence of National Socialist power, German justice did not have the courage to look for the officially unknown incendiaries; it took refuge in a procedure of formal correctness, merely seeking to ascertain whether the accused Van Der Lubbe, Dimitrov, Torgler, Popov, and Tanev had set the fire; the preliminary investigation left little doubt of the result. Unexpectedly, Georgi Dimitrov proved one of the most courageous and adroit agitators of the Communist International—though his captors remained unaware of his identity. In endless disputes with Buenger, the chairman of the court, with National Socialist witnesses such as Goebels, Heines, and particularly Goering, Dimitrov effectively destroyed the National Socialist propaganda fable of the Reichstag fire. He asked Goering if he were afraid of his questions; and Goering roared back in uncontrolled rage, 'You'll be afraid of me when you get out of here, you scoundrell'—thus admitting that he did not regard Dimitrov as guilty, but meant to have him killed regardless. Large parts of the German public were carried away by the speeches of the Bulgarian despite his poor command of the language; he made the trial one of the most effective performances of Communist world propaganda.

But Communist propaganda it was; and it was Communist propaganda that had staged the so-called counter-trial in London; it was Communist propaganda, said Hitler, that cast world suspicion upon Germany and ascribed warlike intentions to his country; German refugees, in particular, had been highly active in this: 'These ruinous and inferior characters have succeeded in arousing a world

psychosis,' he said in a radio speech on the night after his withdrawal from the League of Nations to witness, by the example of the Lor what National Socialism had saved the world from this menacing catastrophe'—the Rec—the National Socialist Movement has not only man people, it has also rendered an historic service to Europe.'

And now incendiary Communism was busy stirring mood in Europe; but Adolf Hitler—or so he imposed it and offered Europe peace. He had, accordingly left the League of Nations and the Disarmament order that Germany might seek understanding with adversaries, between nation and nation, in what had been possible beside the Swiss lakes. Daladier's cautious, reassuring words. 'I take it as a sign of justice,' said Hitler, 'that the French Premier in his found words in the spirit of conciliatory understanding this innumerable millions of Germans are grateful made more of Daladier's words than the speaker intended; he spoke to the French with a mixture of irony of which Stresemann had not been capable:'

With hopeful emotion we take notice of the French government, under its new leader, does not trample and humiliate the German people. We refer to the unfortunate sad truth that these have so often in history sacrificed the blood of the battlefields. I speak in the name of the whole when I assure you that we are all filled with the desire to do away with a hostility the victims of which have lost their portion to its possible gain. The German people's military honor has remained untarnished through its battles and contests of arms, just as in the French only our old but glorious adversary. . . .

Only a few years earlier, Hitler had publicly said that Germany must forcibly retake Alsace-Lorraine from France, a statement solemnly contradicted. There was only one relation

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 world from this menacing catastrophe' — the Red incendiary torch
 — 'the National Socialist Movement has not only saved the Ger-
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 must forcibly retake Alsace-Lorraine from France. This he now
 solemnly contradicted. There was only one relatively unimportant

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 they could call their guards, that is, they didn't doubt
 the loyalty of their guards.*

*# D.T. latter it up — petition
 with a towel. Only you will
 be able to believe what you say
 as you say it.*

*# With a controlled press, there was no problem at in
 contradicting oneself. The utility of the moment could
 hardly be withheld by the imperfect memory of
 people over what the speaker had or had not said. A few
 years ago. And if they argued all the better. With ordinary
 people, argument was confusion. And if they were to be
 taken as an old newspaper fella (assuming they were old)
 all there) what could they do with the information. 120*

way to print it

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to Russia, Hitler even used the word 'friendship': 'Only thus was it understandable and possible for Germany to continue cultivating friendly relations with Russia despite the great difference between their ruling ideologies.' He admitted that the results were meager; that 'Mr. Stalin in his last great speech had expressed fear that forces hostile to the Soviets might be active in Germany'—but he, Hitler, would correct that impression: after all, Russia did not tolerate German National Socialism within her borders—and so Germany tolerated no 'Communist tendencies, let alone propaganda. The more clearly and unequivocally both sides respect this state of affairs, the more naturally can the interests common to both countries be cultivated.' He went so far as to welcome the stabilization of conditions in Eastern Europe 'by a system of alliances' if these alliances were truly intended to strengthen peace.

At any rate, Hitler declared, he himself had brought true peace to a region where for years a war had secretly been smouldering, threatening the peace of all Europe: the Polish-German border. Before he came to power an unsatisfactory state of affairs had prevailed between Germany and Poland, a constant irritation, and even something like hereditary enmity. In fact, Hitler might have added, he himself had fanned this enmity to its most intense heat when in many speeches he loudly demanded the return of the Polish Corridor. With great candor, as though he himself had never said anything about Germany's need for 'living space' in the East, the Führer proceeded to explain that there was no reason for such an hereditary enmity in either nation and that there never would be any reason for it: 'Germans and Poles will have to face the fact of each other's existence and make the best of it. Therefore, it is expedient to accept a circumstance which could not be removed during the past thousand years and which will not be removed after us, and to give it such a form that both nations will derive as much profit from it as possible.' Hitler did not deny 'the differences that doubtless exist' and indicated his regret that Pilsudski had so far avoided an interview with him; yet he was 'happy to find that the leader of the present Polish state, Marshal Pilsudski, had the same broadminded approach that he [Hitler] had himself.' If anything remained to be desired, it was the settlement of commercial

and customs questions, of the competition between man coal and the importation of Polish agricultural products by German farmers. But Hitler did not say a fate of the German minorities in Poland.

However, he did say a great deal about the fate from whom he himself had sprung, the Austrians. That the German Reich intends to take over the Austrian 'force,' he said, 'is absurd and cannot be proved.' Then on the words 'Reich' and 'state.' Hitler frankly acknowledged that National Socialism involved an international revolution. Austria was a most logical place to start it. 'Of course, Austria has taken hold of the entire German nation and depths is not going to halt at the frontier posts of a German by race.' Whether National Socialism was international, it reached across borders: 'But even apart from that, it is not an isolated one if we consider that practically all revolutionary movements in Europe have sprung from the borders of their countries of origin. Thus, the idea of the Revolution filled the imagination of people all over the world regardless of frontiers. It was, therefore, quite natural for Austrian Germans to take up the National Socialist idea of unity of spirit with the whole German people.' Germany, he said, would gladly offer the Austrian government an agreement; but being an Austrian himself he spoke for his countrymen, and in his opinion the best thing the government could do was to take a vote among its people in order to prove to the whole world how well it was doing in their wishes. In other words, Dollfuss should call a referendum; he would get the surprise of his life. 'I believe that much: no government that is kept in power by force can last forever.' In his excitement Hitler went so far as to suggest that Austria should suppress this movement [National Socialism] by measures and applying force, that is, of course, its own. But then it must assume *personal* responsibility for the fate of its own policy and take what comes.

he thought that neither Germany nor the other upon themselves the incredible burden which would bring in its train amidst the present crisis, the laws of economic reason a world armament; and even Germany seemed to admit this. On German government quite candidly published that Germany's armaments expenditures by 352,000,000 marks, or about fifty per cent; relieved in the authority of the Versailles Treaty armaments were horrified. In fact, what these as rearmament in a moderate degree approved d's and Italy's diplomatic notes; and Germany that of all the great powers she was still the spending less on defense than before 1914. French government asked its Parliament for credits to the amount of three billion (the current expenses); the United States and to bring their navies up to the strength alongton Agreement; the British air fleet was in Russian armaments, never denied by Russia ved in by many at that time, were a miraculous efficacy was later confirmed by events. Thus, le Brocqueville feared was under way, although ing. The immediate cause of this race was, in e, the indisputable armaments of the National in Germany, which, for its part, complained aments of the rest of the world forced it to arm ile publishing its own armaments budget with suggested that these figures expressed a thrifty th the laws of economic reason; the figures somewhat when the three-hundred-thousand-y and began to train; but the whole German nt seemed to be remaining within tolerable

small comfort to the leaders of British foreign d, through their bilateral conversations, to find on the European Continent. Captain Anthony

Eden, in his official capacity of British Minister at the League of Nations, in fact even then a second Foreign Minister slowly built up at the side of Sir John Simon, undertook such a tour of investigation in February, 1934, a strikingly young envoy of the conservative British ruling class. In a marked gesture of courtesy toward National Socialist Germany, the British Minister first visited Hitler in Berlin (February 21), and the courtesy was well received. Once again Hitler was on the whole satisfied with the British proposals; he was satisfied with the three hundred thousand soldiers which were to be allowed him. He insisted on planes, which the British had not foreseen, but he did not want bombers, only fighters for the purpose of repelling attacks; and even this German air force, intended purely for defense, would be only half as strong as the French air force. To be sure, if Germany agreed to such marked military inferiority, it was not for all time to come, but only for five years, and full equality must be achieved within ten years.

It seemed that Hitler's meeting with Eden was just such a success as the Führer desired. Perhaps for the first time he managed to convince a foreign statesman that the much-discussed and feared S.A. were not an army and that he did not want them to be an army. He seems to have promised Eden that he would do away with certain aspects of National Socialist Germany which were considered particularly offensive abroad, such as the terrorist rule of the S.A. At any rate, Eden left with favorable impressions, and these were perhaps strengthened when a few days later Mussolini joyfully told him that if Hitler made such acceptable proposals, the best thing to do was to take him quickly at his word. Three hundred thousand soldiers for Germany seemed to Mussolini a reasonable figure; and if Hitler renounced bombing planes for ten years, the Italian dictator — as he told Eden — hoped that by the end of that period bombing planes would have disappeared from the world completely.

Thus, negotiations and exchanges of notes went on between the powers. That there was still a high council of nations in Geneva was half-forgotten; no one any longer took the Disarmament Conference seriously; collective security was almost a fantasy, a chimera, something like perpetual peace or the elimination of poverty.

wer to choose our own path in accordance
solves of the nation in any emergency that
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eign pressure. These are not the times when
le the safety of our country to the passions or
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We must be independent and free; we must
de and choice. We have never lived at any-
ave never entrusted the home defense of this
power, never asked for any help from any-
t to be dependent upon the French air force
land home. The fact that we cannot defend
friends across the Channel have additional
lication and a whole series of implications
roach the establishment of the condition of
overseas protection.'

urchill, who was certainly a friend of France,
hing that a less good friend, Lord Lothian,
yd George and co-author of the Treaty of
a letter to the *Times* written at the begin-
posal that we should try to stabilize Europe
coalition against Germany, as in 1904, in-
war whenever a European power is forced

Instead, Lord Lothian warned Europe—
France: 'Europe itself should gradually find
rnal equilibrium and a limitation of arma-
asement. . . .' One of the most portentous
vas coined here. But England, Lothian in-
re in this appeasement: 'We shall not assist
ement] by taking sides. Indeed, by doing
o delay it. . . .'

umph for Hitler? Were England and France
rmany and Italy slowly came close together?
ad partially lost her Polish ally, one day be
as well?

net had given up Daladier's plan to attempt
ig with Germany. Germany's rearmament

had progressed too rapidly; and who could seriously hope to stop
this process by conversations? A conversation, let alone an agreement,
would have meant that France was openly abandoning the treaties,
whatever these were worth. But this was the very thing which
England now urged her 'friend across the Channel' to do.

The direction of France's foreign policy was in the hands of
Louis Barthou, who may be considered the last classic statesman
of the Third Republic. A white-bearded old man of seventy-two, an
adroit opportunist in the domestic field, not exactly a creative mind
in the field of foreign politics, he was a remarkable mixture of
talent and energy and was inspired by a great guiding principle.
This principle was his lifelong fear of the German danger. He also
had a strong will to break this danger. He spoke German and was
a highly educated man who had achieved the rare distinction of
being elected to France's literary society, the French Academy of
the 'Forty Immortals.' He had written a book about Richard Wagne-
ner, and liked to quote Heine's gloomy prophecy that Germany
would become a great danger to the world once Thor awoke from
his thousand-year-long sleep and began to break the churches and
the Cross. Barthou thought that this historic day had come; he said
that only two or three years were left in which the danger could be
eliminated.

England, however, demanded that France negotiate with Ger-
many; this meant that Hitler was to have a three-hundred-thousand-
man army if he renounced bombing planes and accepted a transi-
tional period of five to ten years. It might be possible to accept this
plan; but who would vouch that Hitler would abide by it? Barthou
asked England for *garanties d'exécution* (guaranties that the plan
would be carried out)—which was only a different form of France's
eternal demand that England support her if Germany violated the
treaties. Embarrassed, England countered by asking what such
garanties d'exécution meant concretely; and it was again France's
turn to reply.

What England's idea amounted to was: We will grant Hitler his
army, and the four of us—England, France, Germany, and Italy
—will sit down around a table. We will determine the future
armaments of Europe; and neither Poland nor Czechoslovakia,

Russia, her possible future ally, will be

deliberately come forward as a possible friendship with Germany had grown cold. of Nations, which Soviet diplomacy had instrument of the bourgeoisie in its class list fatherland, Russia indicated her desire system of collective security. The decision against the continuation of this security policy in the domestic political constellation in

Right, wanted to accept England's proposal Hitler if England promised adequate security, at the risk not only of alienating Russia, but French ties with Poland. But Edouard had favored a Russian alliance and wished system of general security, once more open Germany. He was still the leader of kind of incarnation of French democracy, yielded to his demands. Thereupon Bar-Doumergue replied with the same threat, r. The British plan for negotiations with

ceived R. H. Campbell, the British charge rsay and handed him a note complaining. The German military budget was cited; was openly showing that she now no y the Treaty of Versailles. Henceforward own security on which depended that of negotiations were futile until Germany Nations. Therefore, 'France regrets that y [Germany] should abruptly have ren- undertaken by the two countries [France qual good faith and good will.' e importance: it put an end to the dream ment. No doubt German armaments had a very difficult task; but France under-

took to say in hard and unfriendly words that it was impossible — while Hitler still was speaking of peace and reconciliation. The decision to negotiate or not to negotiate with Germany involved for France the choice between England and Russia as her ally. Now she had chosen, and rejected England; yet in the end she was unable to retain her allies in the East.

A year and a half before, Hitler had demanded that if the disarmament negotiations collapsed again, France should be considered guilty of their failure in the eyes of the world — that is to say, of England and America. This was the case now. Germany was re-arming, but France was considered responsible for it. The estrangement between France and England had begun before that seventeenth day of April, 1934; but now it was to be final for years to come.

At the beginning of June, 1934, Doctor Cosmo Lang, Archbishop of Canterbury, in an address to the Convocation of Canterbury, made a number of political remarks. Among other things he said that 'he could not but deplore the attitude taken by M. Barthou,' and rebuked France for having 'almost contemptuously rejected the most reasonable proposals put forward by Germany.' As for Germany herself, Doctor Lang, while expressing his concern over the growth of 'paganism' under the influence of the National Socialist Movement, said that nevertheless 'he had the very greatest sympathy with the immense, undoubted, and, on the whole, beneficent awakening which had come to Germany and German life in every aspect, in the remarkable revolution associated with the name of Herr Hitler.'

About the same time Schacht began to set up so-called 'control posts' for raw materials throughout Germany. Questionnaires were sent out to businessmen, who were invited to state before the middle of May, 1934, the amount of aluminum, lead, chromium, copper, magnesium, manganese, quicksilver, wolfram, zinc, and tin they had in stock. Also the stocks of wool, cotton, skins, and hides were to be listed. Germany began to take a census of her raw materials, to test her economic strength, and everyone knew that henceforward aluminum, quicksilver, cotton, and skins were no longer merchandise, but weapons. This was the first step toward rearmament 'beyond the limits of economic reason.'

the legend of his monastic frugality, giving it a quality of the pitiful, saintly, and awe-inspiring.

Restless, insatiable, and longing for greatness as a public figure, in private life he found his well-being in a mild uneventfulness, and the inevitable apparatus of luxury that grew up about him was calculated only to protect him from noise, disturbance, and compulsion. Even his crowded banquets were a kind of menagerie which he attended as a spectator. Rudolf Hess, Heinrich Himmler, Wilhelm Frick, resembled him in this; they were silent, fishlike natures, with a taste for quiet and littleness. But the party leadership was also full of beasts of prey, the type which rends more than it can consume, and which likes to take its pleasures beneath the public eye. Göring and Goebbels were typical; Hitler was obliged to attack them publicly, but could not improve them. They were at all times ready, was their reply, to die for their Leader; but you could not expect a man, who gave his life without stint, to stint himself in the pleasures of life. It seemed to afford these men a perverse pleasure to insult public opinion by a shameless exhibition of their magnificence. There was a kind of sporting rivalry between them in their experiments on the public patience: how long would people continue to find mockery wonderful?

The band of armed intellectuals had at last come into money. They flung themselves into lives of wild, indecent sybaritism, forever pursued by the secret anxiety that they might be dead tomorrow or sooner. Hitler tried to teach them that it was better to 'find bliss in commanding' rather than in stolen motor-cars, expropriated castles and villas, wild eating and drinking bouts, and obscene distractions which sometimes occurred before the eyes of an indignant public.

This conflict between the Leader and his lieutenants involved more than dignified behavior. It was an attempt to remold the character of the leaders, to cleanse them of the incalculability and wildness of the years of struggle and give them the hardness and sobriety which are needed in a ruling class. Ruthlessness in battle and pleasure had given the armed bohemians force for the attack; but to preserve and to mold, they would need the self-discipline which makes the bohemian into an armed intellectual. The 'chosen

order of leadership'—and that is what Hitler wanted—must learn to discipline itself if it wanted to rule the people; for 'what the people demand of the state, this leadership will demand of itself and realize through its own ordination to its own laws.' The National Socialist movement, was far more than a political movement, and it was believed that its aim was mere domination of the state; it had learned anything from the past nor understood its future.

The task of the future consisted in creating, by a process of selection, the nation of which Houston Stewart Chamberlain dreamed, and 'scientifically drilling' it. The highest task was to create a nation in its essence clearly defined, to create and lead this nation; for this very reason, to protect the German nation from the curse of so-called democracy. Chamberlain had called racial purity a scientific matter; Hitler thought that racial purity—though luckily it was not a political misfortune. He first expressed these thoughts in all their breadth at a Party Day in Nuremberg, September, 1933. 'A glance at nature,' he declared, 'shows that creatures of a pure race are more or less equal, not only in their nature and abilities. This equality is a great obstacle in the formation of higher communities... a nation of individuals must sacrifice their individual freedom and submit themselves to the will of an individual. But much to be said for this, it would in reality be very difficult to find a man who were entirely equal why, nevertheless, one must not raise his will above that of the others.' Struggle is hard to make noble equals understand why the Leader is the Leader. Yes, up till then he had publicly preached obedience, but in the circle of his intimates he had said the opposite. 'after victory,' he admitted that the movement possessed the doctrine of which he had never spoken in public. He did so for the first time; and so the masses of the movement knew that the opposite was true of what they had been told by their Leader up till then. It is the better man who commands the inferior who obeys. 'The two concepts of command

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and longing for greatness as a public figure, and his well-being in a mild uneventfulness, a paratus of luxury that grew up about him was protect him from noise, disturbance, and crowded banquets were a kind of menagerie to a spectator. Rudolf Hess, Heinrich Himmler, enabled him in this; they were silent, fishlike for quiet and littleness. But the party leader—beasts of prey, the type which rends more than which likes to take its pleasures beneath the hand Goebbels were typical; Hitler was obliged to, but could not improve them. They were his their reply, to die for their Leader; but you know, who gave his life without stint, to stint himself of life. It seemed to afford these men a perverted public opinion by a shameless exhibition of there was a kind of sporting rivalry between them on the public patience: how long would it mockery wonderful?

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on the Leader and his lieutenants involved behavior. It was an attempt to remold the men, to cleanse them of the incalculability and of struggle and give them the hardness and added in a ruling class. Ruthlessness in battle on the armed bohemians force for the attack; to mold, they would need the self-discipline of a man into an armed intellectual. The 'chosen

order of leadership'—and that is what Hitler wanted his party to be—must learn to discipline itself if it wanted to discipline the people; for 'what the people demand of the state, this order of sworn leadership will demand of itself and realize through absolute subordination to its own laws.' The National Socialist Party, said Hitler, was far more than a political movement, and anyone who believed that its aim was mere domination of the state 'has neither learned anything from the past nor understood the task of the future.'

The task of the future consisted in creating, by artificial cultivation, the nation of which Houston Stewart Chamberlain had dreamed, and 'scientifically drilling' it. The higher race, indeterminate in origin but in its essence clearly definable as 'Aryan,' should create and lead this nation; for this very reason, Heaven protect the German nation from the curse of so-called racial purity! Chamberlain had called racial purity a scientific monstrosity; Hitler thought that racial purity—though luckily it was an impossibility—would be a political misfortune. He first expressed these thoughts in all their breadth at a Party Day in Nuremberg in September, 1933. 'A glance at nature,' he declared, 'shows us that the creatures of a pure race are more or less equal, not only physically, but also in their nature and abilities. This equality is the greatest obstacle in the formation of higher communities... a multiplicity of individuals must sacrifice their individual freedom and subordinate themselves to the will of an individual. But much as reason would counsel this, it would in reality be very difficult to explain to men who were entirely equal why, nevertheless, one man must ultimately raise his will above that of the others.' Strange! It would be hard to make noble equals understand why they must obey? Yes, up till then he had publicly preached obedience as a virtue; but in the circle of his intimates he had said the opposite; and now, 'after victory,' he admitted that the movement possessed a secret doctrine of which he had never spoken in public. Now he would do so for the first time; and so the masses of the movement learned that the opposite was true of what they had been hearing from their Leader up till then. It is the better man who commands, the inferior who obeys. 'The two concepts of commanding and obey-

1934

ing,' Hitler declared in 1933, 'assume an entirely different and compelling meaning as soon as men of different value clash or mingle and a common purposive bond is created by the stronger part. The higher race—higher primarily in the sense of organizing ability—subjects a lower race, and thus enters into a relation which henceforth comprehends unequal races. From this results the subordination of a multiplicity of men to the will of a few, deriving simply from the right of the stronger, a right which is seen in nature and which can be regarded as the sole conceivable, because solely rational, right.'

This is the rational, expedient, organized nation: the domination of a minority of good race over a majority of inferior race. According to this doctrine, the Germans are not a master race, but a people to be led by a master race; as foreseen by Houston Stewart Chamberlain: 'Only the few,' said the creator of the National Socialist racial theory, 'can conceive great politics and execute them with iron logic; it is absurd to think that a whole nation can carry on "politics" and particularly that politics of which only Germany is capable and which alone befits it. Today there is much talk of "people" and in the last analysis it is always by certain circles who want to seize power and use it in their selfish interests. Germany must not become an industrial, financial, or agrarian state; she must be ruled by circles standing outside all parties and special interests; only under this condition is a truly scientific policy possible.'

The independence of the new leader class from special economic interests is what Hitler calls 'socialism'; and it is this economic independence which safeguards for the 'state-forming master race' its domination over the 'born slaves.' In a speech which Hitler delivered in February, 1934, at Berlin he made no bones about his social concepts:

The primitive man will have no understanding for the needs of the spirit, but he begrudges them to no one. All the millions of small and hard-working citizens of a nation do not demand that the wise man should adapt himself to their knowledge or that the man blessed with artistic gifts should prefer their culture. They always grant him what is his, but they also demand, and rightly so, that in return for their co-operation in the community they be

given that which is compatible with their nature. A truly superior leadership of a political nation must be of high social understanding . . . [Social understanding the lowly his pleasures, but not to desire them for political leadership of a nation must seek their essence from the rest of the people, not in any low pleasurable self-discipline. They must understand that it moves them from the primitive man, raises them above they must know that only those whom a man right above him will in the long run be recognized as above those who are slaves of the most primitive physical the long run, be no masters over the born slaves.

On August 6, 1933, Hitler gathered together the civil servants of the party at his residence in Obersalzberg. He led his guests in goosestep along a narrow mountain path to a roundabout summit and there addressed them in a short speech of which the gist was more or less as follows: they saw Germany, and Germany was now theirs; but they must not imagine that they could do with it what they pleased. Their orders implied a terrible responsibility. Once more he said that no second revolution was necessary.

Röhm was not among the guests. On that same day was a Sunday—he had ordered 82,000 S.A. men to march on Tempelhof Field near Berlin and made an address to them on the occasion. He had made a speech against the 'reactionaries' who had suggested that they had come for the S.A. to disappear. He could have named some of these reactionaries by name, and the best known would have been Göring. Not that Göring wanted to dissolve the S.A. Troops. S.A. leaders, however, had become police officers such that they were under the orders of the Prime Minister. But Röhm insisted that they were and must remain first and foremost, and that his orders had precedence over theirs. For a man like Edmund Heines, an *Obergruppenführer* of the S.A. who had become chief of police of the city of Silesia and established a reign of terror there, Göring's orders meant nothing at all. The war between these National Socialist leaders had now almost come out into the open.

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given that which is compatible with their nature. And therefore a truly superior leadership of a political nation must be filled with a high social understanding . . . [Social understanding means to give the lowly his pleasures, but not to desire them for oneself:] the political leadership of a nation must seek their essential distinction from the rest of the people, not in any low pleasures, but in a harder self-discipline. They must understand that only what removes them from the primitive man, raises them above him. And they must know that only those whom a man rightly feels to be above him will in the long run be recognized as above him. And those who are slaves of the most primitive physical needs can, in the long run, be no masters over the born slaves.

On August 6, 1933, Hitler gathered together the civilian functionaries of the party at his residence in Obersalzberg. He led his guests in goosestep along a narrow mountain path to one of the surrounding summits and there addressed them in a short but violent speech of which the gist was more or less as follows: Below them they saw Germany, and Germany was now theirs; but they must not imagine that they could do with it what they pleased; giving orders implied a terrible responsibility. Once more he tried to prove that no second revolution was necessary.

Röhm was not among the guests. On that same August 6 — it was a Sunday — he had ordered 82,000 S.A. men to march before him on Tempelhof Field near Berlin and made an inflammatory speech against the 'reactionaries' who had suggested that the time had come for the S.A. to disappear. He could have quoted many of these reactionaries by name, and the best known of all would have been Göring. Not that Göring wanted to dissolve the Storm Troops. S.A. leaders, however, had become police chiefs and as such they were under the orders of the Prime Minister of Prussia. But Röhm insisted that they were and must remain S.A. leaders first and foremost, and that his orders had precedence over any others. For a man like Edmund Heines, an *Obergruppenführer* of the S.A. who had become chief of police of the city of Breslau in Silesia and established a reign of terror there, Göring's orders meant nothing at all. The war between these National Socialist government leaders had now almost come out into the open. As early as

* Comita Göring and Goebbels

• D. T. I used to wonder
whether their devils were and
why the O.C. did not discipline
them, ~~both~~ devils and clients,
both!

1933

May, 1933, Göring had flatly forbidden his police officials to belong to the S.A. or the S.S. (or even the Steel Helmets); in the beginning of August he took an unusual step and sent the whole S.A. and S.S. auxiliary police home. This was the treatment accorded the 'old fighters' who had conquered power for Hitler and Göring. In helpless rage Röhm exclaimed on Tempelhof Field: 'Those who think that the task of the S.A. has been accomplished will have to accept the fact that we are here and intend to stay here.' They were here 'to suppress the defeated enemy and, if need be, exterminate him.' And he would not let anyone gainsay him in this matter.

This — among other things — was a conflict between the state and the party over the right to practice terrorism. The Third Reich could not endure without using force against a part of its citizens, without at least frightening the others and threatening all of them. This state was always hovering on a wave of inflamed emotion, whether of enthusiasm or of fear. The S.A. considered terrorism its monopoly; but on May 3, Göring had created a government agency for the purpose of exerting terrorism, and given it the name of Secret State Police (Geheime Staats-Polizei, abbreviated Gestapo). This police was explicitly charged with those tasks which only a few months before had been considered unlawful arbitrary acts strictly forbidden by the constitution, and which, for that reason, seemed reserved to the S.A. Henceforward the Gestapo, without any individual orders from above, had the right to exercise the exceptional powers against people's lives, freedom, and property which the Third Reich had granted itself on the night of the Reichstag fire. Moreover, it was not a National Socialist to whom Göring had given these extraordinary powers, at least not an 'old fighter' known to the party — it was the same Councillor Werner Diels who had once betrayed his State Secretary Abegg to von Papen. At first the Gestapo had authority only in Prussia. It must be said that throughout Germany there had always been a 'political police' — an institution as old as history itself; in the French Republic it was more powerful than Parliament; in Tsarist Russia it had forged *The Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion*, in Bolshevik Russia it was one of the pillars of the state. In the Weimar Republic, it had not been

→ follow-up on p 225

quite as powerful. Had not a saboteur like Frid the head of the political police in Bavaria? Had the support of this Bavarian police, been able to support party? That is why in Bavaria the party and the state rapidly and more intimately than in Göring's day Röhm's subordinates assumed the direction of the police apparatus — this was Heinrich Himmler, who of Reichsführer of the S.S. was subject to the order staff of the S.A.

Here was an extraordinary confusion. The Nation 'conquered power,' but the struggle between the state continued. Hitler's way of describing this was to let it grow organically; the stronger, he implied, this was how it should be. Nevertheless, some thought had clearly said that the party commanded the state contradicted them publicly; the Führer had not said 'we'; and 'we' were something different — only the whom the Führer had appointed to commanding many were they? And who were they? Almost all Hitler's tools or the tools of his tools; but people like Rosenberg, and Streicher held no important government posts. Among the most bitterly disappointed of the National Socialists was Hitler's personal favorite, the lawyer, Hans Frank, who hoped to become Minister of Justice over the whole country. It was a stain on the escutcheon of this Frank, whose ambition was written in his face all his life. His father had been a lawyer, had been sentenced to prison for several years before; he had been disbarred, but still taking care of his son's juridical business while his bookkeeper. No sooner had Hitler come to power than Frank Senior was readmitted to the Munich bar with full powers. He was a National Socialist dignitary with worse blots on his record than most, but they did not demand to be made Ministers of Justice. It is true that in Bavaria, where the party flaunted themselves more impudently than in the Reich, Frank and his friends disregarded all delicate considerations. The young man became Minister of Justice of that

as limited authority, and Hitler's personal book on bitterly while in great Prussia a com- without any academic background, one Hans he head of the Ministry of Justice because he friend; while a lawyer from Kassel, a certain ally managed the Ministry's affairs as Kerrl's ile later Freisler succeeded Kerrl, when Kerrl ous a failure. But he, Frank, could not achieve the leader of the National Socialist jurists was ly one worth desiring: the Reich Ministry of here the laws were really made.

on experience these men slowly learned that the ve not necessarily one and the same thing. They up on the idea that all political executive power in the state. Since the creation of the Spanish sixteenth century, this view had become dom- d Europe. Since Napoleon I, it had no longer en financiers and industrialists exercised their by influencing the government authorities; only s own sphere of influence in society. This state cal power was not shaken until after the First en in the very countries where one would have re so-called dictatorships. In these countries e accurately, the numerous organizations between ate—competed with or surpassed the power of ministration; and in a thousand concrete cases o predict which of the two would be stronger us. It was an excess of power that burst all com- nited time spilled over into a chaos of cross-

ice, Frank, who had not become Minister of s appointed 'Reich Commissioner for the Co- e in the German States and for the Renovation on of Law.' This opaque title meant that he was tials entrusted with the administration of justice, ges, into the National Socialist organizations; e rebaptized the 'League of National Socialist

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Jurists,' which he had founded and of which he had been the head for several years, as the 'German Juridical Front.' Respectable old legal societies, such as the Prussian Judges' Union and the German Lawyers' Union, had to join this 'Juridical Front' in a body. It can be said for the German judges that, at least for a time, they tried to oppose the rape of the law by the National Socialists; the largest of their organizations, the 'German Judges' Union,' declared on March 19 that the German judge 'has always ordained justice in accordance with the law and his conscience. This must continue to be so!' Later these same judges declared that their mission was 'to protect the weak.' This was not at all the National Socialist idea, and Frank replied contemptuously: yes, previous justice did 'protect the weak and created a morality for slaves.' Now equal rights no longer existed for all, but only for those who, in Hitler's words, 'did not refuse their support to the government.' According to Kerrl the idea that 'objectivity must be the idol of jurisprudence' was a superstition; no, justice must not 'practice dead objectivity worship'; and Frank said: 'Law should not protect the weakling, but make the strong even stronger.'

The German judges' backbone was broken when the government broke down the security of their existence. As in England, the judges in Germany had held tenure for life and could not be removed from office. This privilege, designed to insure the independence of the courts, was eliminated by the National Socialists.

For many months the German judges tried to preserve the principle of equality at least in the wording of the laws, and the old officials of the Reich Ministry of Justice insisted that murder must remain murder, and homicide, homicide, no matter who was the criminal and who the victim. The S.A. leaders were particularly bitter about this. As it was, the police and public prosecutors often did not dare to bring National Socialist murderers to justice; but the S.A. men demanded that their impunity be confirmed by law.

For this reason, as early as March 21, the government of the Reich decreed an 'amnesty' covering crimes under the previous régime 'which were committed out of the best will for the good of the Reich.' At once the five murderers of Potempa were released from prison.

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meant war from the very beginning for its Führer had proclaimed that war was the final goal of politics, the law of life, absolutely essential to man. (Chapter II.)

In a real sense, World War II began not in 1939 with Hitler's invasion of Poland but with his accession to power in 1933. Psychologically, however, it had begun long before that: perhaps in the conflicts and aggressive rages repressed in early childhood, but certainly in his plans of the 1920s. That war was essential to Hitler was brought home suddenly to Albert Speer while talking with his Führer in Paris in 1940, as they looked at the Arc de Triomphe. Hitler was totally unimpressed because he had created a design for a triumphal arch, to be erected in his new capital of "Germania," which would dwarf the one in Paris. But what astonished Speer was that Hitler's sketch was dated 1925. He comments: "Now I think you will see what I mean by the connection between his blueprints and his aggressions. For the historians must ask themselves, 'Where was Adolf Hitler, the unknown, in 1925?'" 106

The answer is that Hitler, released from Landsberg prison, was somewhere in Bavaria, but with very little Party and very little support. That he drafted a plan for an enormous triumphal arch in that year indicates both belief in his destiny and the depth of his feeling that the resolve to strike was indeed "always within him."

Again in the 1920s, in a noteworthy passage in his second book, Hitler showed the inner aggression that drove him insatiably onward: "We shall attack and it is immaterial whether we go 10 or 1,000 kilometers beyond the present lines. For whatever we gain, it will always be only a starting point for new battles." 107 To live in peace with another country was simply not possible for him, for as he told his foreign minister, "You know, Ribbentrop, if I am an ally of Russia today, I could attack her tomorrow. I just can't help myself. [Ich kann halt nicht anders]." Indeed, Hitler talked so often of battle and attack and enemy that an intimate spoke of his master's "pathological need for battle." 108

There was another psychological reason why Hitler required war: he saw it as a way to cleanse the body of the Motherland from impure and tainted blood. And total war, with its conditions of maximum state security and the movement of thousands of people, would provide the optimum circumstances in which he could launch a vast program of mass murder of the "unfit and unworthy." Furthermore, conquest of foreign land would permit him to set up extermination camps where polluted blood would not defile the sacred soil of his Reich. Both the wording and the dating of Hitler's decree for mass killings are important. He called it the "Order for the Destruction of Lives Which are Unworthy of Being Lived" (*Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens*), and he set the date of the order for 1 September 1939. That is, he would begin the war for his New Order on the same day that he would start the process of "internal cleansing" (*innere Reinigung*). As the German historian who noticed the connection between Hitler's idea of "cleans-

ing" and genocide has co-undertaken from a psychohygiene and cleanliness v departure." 109

Thus were private feeling
Führer felt unclean and unw

Nazi foreign policy also unconscious desires affected upon crisis—from the Rhine to Poland—was related to H fantasies about the imminent was convinced that, like his cancer. He must do his conq

His decision to seize A 1938 provides a particularly between private feelings and there were other reasons for forth in many books, they ne

We have seen that in) with Germany. He loved he: associated with borderline p pure Motherland, so he hate which he associated with his Just as he spoke well of his i so he could also refer to Au: But basically he despised tl Austrian dynasty—exactly li Germany again and again 111

Even as a boy, he said, distant father—"did not an mans." Austria, in ways ren had also tried "to oppress i Hitler's hatred for his father said, "fanned into flaming inc

Both his father and Aus nation by the Jews. The Aust before him) was a cesspool garians, Ruthenians, Serbs, C fission-fungus [Spaltwitz] of l city was the personification of

The emotional young G ther's rejection of Germany. William, testified that "He [I be classed [as a German] Austrian, and that was somet

388 * D. T. An a determining
him to go further, to reach the
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THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

lems which Erikson finds characteristic of later stages of development: autonomy, identity and integrity.

Hitler's childhood, we have found, was plagued by feelings of suspicion, resentment, and mistrust. These attitudes—so typical of borderline personalities—remained throughout his life. They helped shape political decisions, and they contributed to the atmosphere of distrust that permeated his Reich.

The Führer could never open himself to another person. He had no friends. His closest associates, men who had been with him for years, never really knew him. He lied to them all, he said, and the closer they seemed to come to him, the more he lied.

Distrust of others entered into the routines of his life. "Always at his desk were three pencils," his valet recalled, "one red, one green, one blue." The colors were used to make notes or to mark documents or letters, not in accordance with their intrinsic importance but to remind himself whether he trusted or distrusted the person involved. He explained the system: "I use the red one when I write about or to an enemy; the green one when I make notes about friends; the blue when I have a feeling that I should be cautious [about someone]." ⁹³

Mistrust became the hallmark of his government and set the tone for the society. "The Third Reich," an anonymous official observed, "is a system wherein no one trusts anyone else." One of the consequences was governmental confusion. Western observers, impressed with gigantic displays of Nazi pomp and propaganda such as the Olympic Games of 1936, the great Party rallies at Nuremberg, and the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe maneuvers, concluded that Hitler's Reich was operated with machine-like efficiency. They were mistaken. His government was shot through with corruption and inefficiency. It was a chaos of competing and overlapping jurisdictions jealously guarded by leaders who did not trust their colleagues.

When, after four years of war, Albert Speer became Reichsminister for munitions in 1942, there existed four separate "Supreme Reich Authorities," each with independent power over German war production: the Four-Year Plan, the Armed Forces Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Labor, and Speer's own Munitions Ministry. "Only slightly lower in rank and essentially as independent were at least eight more: the Ordnances Offices of the Army, Navy and Air Force and five plenipotentiaries under the Four-Year Plan. (Iron and Steel, Construction, Chemical Industry, Machinery and Water Power.)" In addition, "Himmler had been building an economic empire of his own through the SS main office of Economics and Administration, which ran all its own business enterprises free of all outside control."

Hitler refused to adjudicate serious disputes over war production and allocation of resources which developed between Göring and Speer, or between the *Gauleiter* and Goebbels, or between Himmler and Bormann. He could not choose among them, for he could trust no man with too much power. True, Speer's influence over the economy became

From Private Neurosis to

extensive, but it always "a process of attrition Hitler." ⁹⁴

The same problem, where Hitler also was the military *Abw. dienst* of the SS; Rile espionage system; Him the enemy but also to Ministry of Propaganda; Himmler; Rosenberg organization to spy on the archy. The Führer's mission.

Nor was there an Greater Reich. In Czech either the first "Protect Frank—and they could humane; Frank was brought. In the end he tried to live with both parts of

Literally dozens of important disputes cry judgment. The result was with some exaggeration anarchy." ⁹⁶ The obvious fusion and refusal to m—the ancient method. But Hitler had already subordinates long after established the principal authority in the Reich.

A monographic study notes his refusal to choose among them. It concludes that "This would help to explain him." ⁹⁷

A political leader of irreconcilable policies, person who is external psychological makeup.

These personal could had far-reaching consequences cause Hitler distrusted avaricious, incapable of revolt. The masses, he trustworthy. That was

GOD: ADOLF HITLER

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From Private Neurosis to Public Policy

considered to be the depravity of cinema, stage, cabaret life, and literature. It was comforting to be told that such depravity was due entirely to "Jewish influences." In dozens of effective speeches, Hitler appeared as a "pious deacon" articulating the outrage and conscience of the petty bourgeoisie.¹⁰

During the postwar period, cherished beliefs, long accepted as eternal verities, were being challenged by three of history's most influential thinkers, all of whom were Jews. To many Germans, Marx, Freud, and Einstein were dangerous radicals bent on overthrowing whole systems of social, economic, ethical, and scientific order. All three found popularizers who spread their ideas with disturbing effectiveness. Emotional reaction against "subversive Jewish thinkers" increased the appeal of Hitler's demagoguery, which thundered against "Jewish Ideas" and exalted a simple "Germanic faith."

Anti-Semitism Institutionalized

After Hitler attained power, his personal rancor against the Jews was indeed "projected and rationalized as public policy." His anti-Semitism became the law of the land. 1933

Hitler's first measures against the "Jewish peril" were designed to stop Jews from participating in the civic and cultural world to which they had contributed for many generations. An "Aryan paragraph" in the Law for the Restoration of the Civil Service of 7 April 1933 dismissed all Jewish civil servants. This paragraph was soon expanded to include lawyers and doctors, then writers, artists, and university and high school teachers and students. Subsequent legislation required that all Jews designate as their first name either "Sara" or "Israel." When war came in the summer of 1939, Jews were not permitted to drive motor vehicles or take part in German cultural events.

Two laws in particular document Hitler's personal obsession with racial purity, his fear of "bad blood" and tainted ancestry. The Law for the Prevention of Progeny Suffering from Hereditary Disease (*Gesetz zur Verhütung erkrankten Nachwuchses*) provided death or sterilization for "hereditary diseases" ranging from schizophrenia to congenital blindness and deafness. Women could also be sterilized for color blindness, since, as an SS official pointed out, "We must not have soldiers who are color-blind. It is transmitted only by women." Jews, by definition, were carriers of "hereditary disease."¹¹

Hitler's concern about "Jewish blood" also produced the Nuremberg Racial Laws of September 1935, whose wording he personally supervised. Officially entitled *Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre* (Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor), this legislation made it a criminal offense for a German to have sexual intercourse with a Jew, and specifically forbade German women from working as domestics in Jewish households. But no

and its new child - technology 369

THE GOD: ADOLF HITLER

It was also comforting to damage were not merely equal to Heinrich Himmler Case sm of rancor" also promised of anxiety and fear could find in. As Fritz Stern has noted, "It must spring from lust of con-

1933 was gripped by what one pervasive "great fear" of many personal failure, social up-
 lace, the Jewish peril. Every-
 nation. Hitler understood. He
 a "little man" riven by aliena-
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 to feel superior. He released

The Past As Prologue: Hitler and History

them from the loads of reason, responsibility, and morality. He led them back into the regressive paradise of irresponsibility and implicit faith. He let them relax into a precivilized, presocial, infantile stage. He allowed them to hate and believe, to strike and obey, to march and feel as the masters of the world.

Hitler also offered concrete programs well calculated to catch the interests of the lower middle class. He was careful to stress in hundreds of electrifying speeches that he stood, point by point, for the exact opposite of everything that troubled the "little men" of Germany. Democracy was at fault, so he offered authoritarian government; class privilege and exploitation were resented, so he promised *Gemeinschaft*; in place of international cooperation and the League of Nations, associated with the *Versailles-Diktat*, he promised militant nationalism. Above all, he sensed the longing for a heroic leader, a longing as old as the Barbarossa legend, and as current as this memoir of 1934 written by a high school teacher:

I reached the conclusion that no party, but a single man alone could save Germany. This opinion was shared by others, for when the cornerstone of a monument was laid in my home town, the following lines were inscribed on it: "Descendants who read these words, know ye that we eagerly await the coming of the Man whose strong hand may restore order." ¹⁹⁸

Hitler also knew the attraction that a particular kind of socialism could have in thousands of households where the inflation and the Depression had wiped out bourgeois aspirations. Hitler's socialism had great appeal, for it allowed the lower middle class to escape a desperate dilemma: economic disaster had prevented a rise to bourgeois status, but social traditions prevented them from sinking into the *Lumpenproletariat*. Hitler's socialism permitted the Hans Schmidts to become socialists in a national system without becoming proletarianized or internationalized. His system was one in which all racial Germans could be members of one *Volksgemeinschaft*, a racial community in which social distinctions were blurred and rendered unimportant.

With remarkable adroitness, Hitler adjusted socialist slogans to make them fit the needs of the lower middle class. He changed Marxist hatred for the bourgeois to hatred for the Republic and the Jews. He agreed that Germans were victims of exploitation—but by the Jews. Like the socialists he provided a vision of future utopia—not of a classless society but of a racially equal *Volksgemeinschaft*. The world would yet be conquered—not by the proletariat but by "Brown battalions marching." The revolution would be completed—not by the dictatorship of the proletariat but by the dictatorship of the Führer. Hitler also confiscated and modified socialist symbols: the red flag was preserved in his swastika; "comrade" became a Nazi salutation; his Party's

1933

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The Past As Prologue: Hitler and History

the chords of middle-class sentiments. Two examples of hundreds of speeches must suffice to show how closely he identified with the masses. He too had been a common laborer, a soldier at the front; he too had known hunger and privation. He was proud to be one of his people:

When I speak to you today and thus to millions of other German workers, I have more right to do this than anyone else. I have grown out of you yourselves; once I myself stood among you, I was among you in the war for four and a half years and now I speak to you to whom I belong, with whom I feel myself to be bound still today and for whom in the final analysis I carry on the struggle. . . .

In my youth I was a worker like you, and then I worked my way up by industry, by study, and, I can say, by starving.

And again, his words flew like an arrow to their hearts:

We are so happy to be able to live among this people and I am proud to be permitted to be your Leader! So proud that I cannot imagine anything in this world that I would rather be. I should a thousand times rather be the last *Volksgenosse* [fellow countryman] among you than to be a king anywhere else. . . . When I drove through the streets just now and saw those hundreds, thousands, and millions of *Volksgenossen* to the right and to the left of me, from all enterprises and workshops, from all factories and offices, my heart beat faster and I thought to myself; that is our Germany! That is our people, our glorious German people, our beloved German Reich.²⁰⁴

HITLER AND THE "GERMAN CHARACTER"

Hitler's appeal went far beyond the lower middle class to embrace millions of Germans in all walks of life. An explanation for this enormous popularity must consider both the personality of Hitler and the character of the German people. For what has been said of Martin Luther was at least as true of Adolf Hitler: "It is inconceivable that he should have evoked so great a popular response unless he had succeeded in expressing the underlying, unconscious sentiments of large numbers of people and providing them with an acceptable solution to their . . . problem."²⁰⁵

Social psychologists, psychoanalysts, and cultural anthropologists have said that by 1933 the German people as a group were suffering from psychological problems which made them particularly responsive to some sort of authoritarian leader. Erik Erikson has called them "charisma hungry"; Eric Fromm found them to be sadomasochistic; Else Frenkel-Brunswick characterized them as "authoritarian personalities"; Kecskemeti and Lietes have spoken of the Germans' "compulsive

* All those white breasts, all those heavy eyes, all those German bloods, all those

1933
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There is other evidence of Hitler's masochistic impulses. He liked to talk about physical punishments and he liked to act them out. The German film star Renaté Mueller reported that when she was invited to spend the night with Hitler in the Chancellery, he first described in great detail the medieval and Gestapo techniques of torturing victims. Then, after they were undressed, Hitler "lay on the floor . . . condemned himself as unworthy, heaped all kinds of accusations on his own head, and just groveled around in an agonizing manner. The scene became intolerable to her, and she finally acceded to his wishes to kick him. This excited him greatly; he became more and more excited." ³¹¹

Hitler's sadomasochistic tendencies, we are suggesting, are consistent with a coprophilic perversion, for in it masochism and sadism are united. By having young ladies defecate or urinate on his head, Hitler degraded both himself and others. In this act he could unite with his victims, "who became the personification of [his own] depraved self, as the persecutor who attacks a part of himself in his victims." ³¹²

Hitler's fixation on the anus, and his special interest in feces, filth, and urine (see p. 148f) coincide with this sexual perversion. Sexual pleasure can be stimulated by the rectal mucous membrane and by the retention or expulsion of the feces. We know that Hitler liked to give himself enemas; it seems quite possible that his sexual behavior was similar to those patients with anal interests who, Otto Fenichel has shown, find it pleasurable "to defecate on another person or to have another person defecate on oneself." ³¹³ Hitler apparently enjoyed the reaction he got from women when he talked about "sewer water," which seems to have been his euphemism for urine. His secretaries were appropriately shocked, for example, when he told them that their lipstick was made from Parisian Abwasser. ³¹⁴ To compensate for this fascination with feces and filth, Hitler practiced, as we have noted, the most punctilious personal cleanliness.

He enjoyed talking about sex in general, but he was particularly interested in deviate sexual behavior. In a private letter, Kubizek reported that his friend chattered "by the hour" about "depraved [sexual] customs." ³¹⁵

He employed the same psychological defenses against perversion that he used against feelings of latent homosexuality and fears of Jewishness: denial, projection, and punishment. Only two examples of projection can be given here. In one particularly revealing turn of phrase, he accused Jewish journalism and literature of "splashing filth in the face of humanity." And his immediate reaction on seeing photographs depicting gross types of deviate sexual activity is worth remembering. He said that the males involved could not possibly be Germans: they must be of Jewish extraction. ³¹⁶

In a table conversation of 22 May 1942, he made a special point of lashing out against sexual deviants, insisting that they were a threat

* D.T. - Total separation between our acts and the conclusions ²⁴¹
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3, p. 148), and Martin Luther
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binette (Berlin, 1924), 4: 306.

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Spengler called the king the first national socialist. The Nazis accepted him and his son as their spiritual ancestors and proclaimed them "the conscience" of National Socialism.¹⁵

Frederick II, called Frederick the Great (1712–1786), had an even greater impact than his father upon Germany history and upon Adolf Hitler. Certainly no one in German history—before the advent of the Austrian—was hailed with such panegyric. He was *Friedrich der Einzige* (Frederick the Unique), who was "not merely the patron saint of Germany but the greatest monarch in modern history, with an honored place in the German Valhalla beside Luther and Goethe, Kant, Beethoven and Bismarck." Neubauer's *Lehrbuch*, a popular textbook which went through many editions between 1890–1914, taught German children to honor him as the ideal leader—a veritable paragon standing "on a solitary height above his people: the war lord and statesman, the philosopher and historian, the most powerful example of unqualified and complete devotion to the State."¹⁶

The reign of the famous son saw the continuation and intensification of attitudes and institutions associated with his father. Under Frederick the Great, the army and the bureaucracy, if anything, increased in social importance. But there was a notable difference. Unlike his father, the son exulted in war. In 1740 the father had signed a document giving the "sacred word of Prussia" that his country would not invade young Maria Theresa's province of Silesia. With the old man barely in his grave, Frederick attacked. His justification for the unprovoked assault on a neighbor's land was worthy of Adolf Hitler:

Let the ignorant and envious babble; they shall never form the compass by which I shall steer. . . . My object is glory; of this I am more enamoured than ever.¹⁷

This "rape of Silesia" helped to produce the Seven Years War, a war that would give Frederick an imperishable reputation as a field commander. His brilliant victories at Rossbach, Zorndorf, and Leuthen would be studied in the principal military academies of the world as examples of superb generalship. Napoleon called Leuthen an absolute "masterpiece . . . which would alone have sufficed to make Frederick immortal." Popular history added more accolades. He was remembered as the intrepid national hero who, although outnumbered 12-to-1 and surrounded by "those damn women" (Maria Theresa, Elizabeth of Russia, and Madame de Pompadour), proved that he could still conquer though half the world opposed him.

This is the memory that sustained Adolf Hitler in his last desperate days in the Berlin air raid shelter during the darkening spring of 1945, as he sat before the candlelit portrait of Frederick the Great frantically reading the German translation of Carlyle's multivolume biography hoping to find inspiration and waiting for a sign of deliverance.

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

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his power: liberals, Catholics, Social Democrats, and conservatives. By the adroit balancing of one group against another and by satisfying the basic needs of each, he converted opponents into supporters of his empire and its system of authoritarian paternalism. The opposition of the liberal middle class was swept away by an exultant tide of patriotism hailing Bismarck's military victories and the proclamation of a united Fatherland. Bismarck also was given credit for economic reforms, stable currency, and concessions to industry, which was making Imperial Germany incomparably the strongest economic power on the continent. As for the Catholics, after an ill-advised conflict with their Church and with the Catholic Center party, Bismarck—unlike Hitler—recognized his mistake, retreated adroitly, and gained Catholic support for his domestic and foreign policy. Future history would show a continuation of the Catholic Center's preference for authoritarian government to democracy. In a crucial vote in 1933 over whether the new chancellor, Adolf Hitler, should be given dictatorial powers, the Center cast the decisive vote for the "Enabling Act" which provided the legal basis for Hitler's dictatorship. Thus, in the Third Reich, as in the Second, the Catholic Center was not conspicuous for its defense of democracy.

Other opponents won over to Bismarck's Reich were the Marxian Social Democrats. Bismarck's method with them was similar to the technique he had used so successfully with the liberals. He gave them what they wanted; he killed them with kindness. He pushed through parliament the most sweeping social legislation in the contemporary world. This vaunted conservative became a pioneer of state socialism and thus sustained the paternalistic tradition of the authoritarian state (*Obrigkeitsstaat*), which would be extended in the National Socialism of the Third Reich. It is true that the Marxists continued to grow in numbers throughout the empire. But they were no longer a revolutionary party. Their words were the words of Marx, but their deeds were the actions of patriots.

In consolidating his Reich, Bismarck also confronted opposition from conservative Prussian particularists. He reassured them by promising that Prussian interests and attitudes would continue to dominate the power structure of the state—army, bureaucracy, industry, agriculture, banking, and the educational system. He kept his promise. The result was a conversion as remarkable as that of Marxian labor, Catholic Center, and the liberal middle class. Prussian conservatives for the first time became supporters of the idea of empire. National patriotism had become respectable. Indeed, it was now endorsed by so many diverse and influential groups that it was soon to become lethal.

Bismarck's legacy to the German people can be assessed in many different ways. It is certainly true that under the benevolent system of government he established, millions of people lived out their lives in

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relative comfort, security, industry reached remarkable lished in a world at peace. claimed, magnificent times with the author of a widely *of the People*, that their cou devised by modern man.⁴¹

Yet it is also fair to say lical cost to the German many's most perceptive ob said that Bismarck had "br The sociologist Max Weber behind a nation without t taught us to distrust our o would have smiled knowir wanted it just that way. Su of government were so int master them and run the s dition of Frederick the Gre. was an aphorism that admir.

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This generation was at "German condition"—a trac congenial to the acceptanc cluded glorification of the mocracy; belief that the Jew *Kultur*; endorsement of ra in the name of a Germanic *Gemeinschaft* take precede exaltation of military powe in German history, but it t the lives of young Adolf Hit

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fearing individual who could battle Communism for the Church.
. . . The anti-Semitism of the Nazis, as well as their anti-Marxism,
appealed to the Church . . . as a counterpoise to the paganism which
had developed after 1920.¹⁰⁴

It must be emphasized that after Hitler's dictatorship was estab-
lished many individual Christian clergymen—Protestant and Catholic
alike—opposed Nazi barbarities and were martyred for their convictions.
But the role played by the Christian churches in Hitler's advent and
consolidation of power forms one of the most deplorable pages in the
history of religion.

With a few notable exceptions, the news media opposed the Re-
public and welcomed Hitler. This was most strikingly true of the man
who by all odds was the most powerful publicist in Weimar Germany,
Alfred Hugenberg, who kept up a sustained, vitriolic, and effective at-
tack on every position taken by the democratic government. Hugenberg
had been Krupp's general manager and one of the founders of the Pan-
German League. During the war he had endorsed Germany's most ag-
gressive war plans; after the defeat he dedicated his fortune and
organizational ability to the task of subverting democracy. He pur-
chased a leading Berlin newspaper, newsreel rights, and a press service
which sent out stories and set editorial policy for the provincial press.
In one way or another, he gained control over some 1,600 newspapers
with millions of readers. He also owned Germany's largest and most
influential film corporation, UFA (*Universum Film Aktiengesellschaft*),
which controlled distribution of films to scores of theaters. In 1928,
when Hitler's fortunes were faltering, Hugenberg came to his assist-
ance. In the crisis of 1933, he helped tip the scales in Hitler's favor.
His promise to serve in a cabinet under Hitler made the idea of govern-
ment by the "Bohemian corporal" more palatable to the establishment
and a reluctant President Hindenburg.¹⁰⁵

Other influential journalists were also helpful. The editor and
publisher of the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten* were both enormously
impressed with Hitler after long interviews with him. They were con-
fident that any "rough edges" could easily be rubbed off, and that "men
like Hindenburg, von Papen and Hugenberg will be able to bring him to
reason." The *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* agreed, endorsed Hitler as
a foe of socialism, and urged that he be "brought into the team because
of his energy and enthusiasm. . . ." All thought it was unwise to take
his anti-Semitism too seriously, and all found in him a very healthy
alternative to the Weimar Republic, which they called "the loathsome
rule by party bosses."¹⁰⁶

Germany's educational system remained authoritarian, nationalist,
and unreconciled to democracy. The attitudes schoolteachers must

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have taken into the classrooms of the republic can be inferred from the alacrity with which they welcomed and supported Hitler. Of all the professions represented in the Nazi party, teachers—particularly in elementary schools—formed by far the largest group. About 97 percent of all schoolteachers became members of the Party or its affiliates, and many of them rose to positions of influence in the Third Reich, including Heinrich Himmler and Julius Streicher, along with some 3,000 local leaders of the Party. Altogether, more than 30 percent of the total leadership of the Party had been schoolteachers in the Weimar Republic.¹⁰⁷

During the Republic, schoolchildren were reminded in many visible ways of past glories and present shame: pictures of the emperor, famous generals, and Bismarck still looked grimly down on classrooms where imperial flags hung and imperial stencils decorated the *Herr Lehrers* chair. As late as 1926 it was necessary for a member of the Reichstag to defend the motion that the republican colors of black, red, and gold be permitted to fly over the schools of Germany. There was no holiday associated with the Republic or the liberal tradition. Neither of the two most memorable days in the school year was designed to foster democratic attitudes. On Versailles Day, 28 June, schools and universities were draped in black. The Founding Day of Bismarck's Reich continued to be celebrated on 18 January with stirring displays of military pomp. The establishment of the Republic was not celebrated. Indeed, in one Founding Day address the director of the University of Freiburg used the occasion to accuse the "usurper" President Ebert of "high treason."¹⁰⁸ Meanwhile, undergraduate social life in the universities continued to be dominated by dueling societies. Students joined patriotic professors in ridiculing the Republic and cultivating a spirit of radical racial nationalism, often coupled with anti-Semitism.

On the eve of an important national election, during the Nazis' final bid for power, a declaration was signed by 300 professors from all the universities of Germany expressing confidence in Adolf Hitler and promising him their support. It is true that the signators were of no great academic distinction, but it is also true that respected names of German intellectual life set forth no counterdeclaration. They were silent, for they did not wish to become involved in anything so sordid as politics. As a common saying in university circles had it, "Whoever is concerned with politics, has no culture; whoever has culture, has no concern for politics."¹⁰⁹

CONTRIBUTIONS OF WEIMAR INTELLECTUALS

Cultural life during the Weimar Republic produced a fascinating anomaly: dangerously destructive forces were at work at the very time that Germany was enjoying the most creative cultural flowering in its history. Creativity in all fields of human endeavor was simply astounding, as a few representative names attest: in architecture, Walter Gropius and the Bauhaus; in social studies, Max Weber, Karl Mannheim,

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Friedrich Meinecke, and Paul Hindemith, and Krich, Karl Barth, Ernst Cassirer; in science, Max Planck, Reimann and Leopold J. Papst; in literature, Theodor Gottfried Benn, along with Hermann Mannsthal, and Rainer Maria

Yet all these cultural freedom or democratic enthusiasm for the Revolution have been expected to see Ernst Cassirer, the influence but a great swindle. Friedrich Meinecke, calling themselves "ratio without enthusiasm or a rational necessity. The comment to a friend: "parliamentary democracy saillies peace. I said that Disdain for the revolution into a single phrase. Inter-

In the fall of 1971, had participated in the New York to reflect on the out melancholy. Hannah she had felt a "complete tion that something new produce optimism: "We I She and her friends all. She then added one of her a potent revolutionary force agreed that "a feeling of a fascination of his general popularity of Thomas Mann Magician. Leo Loewenthal: a government or as a society torn away from outdated new ones to accept." Germany to give order and direction be a model to follow."¹⁷¹

It has become a popular "the roots of Nazism" in the certainly can be found. Parliamentary institutions are the antidemocratic attitude

irony and the tragedy consisted in despising Hitler, yet—often unwittingly—helping to destroy the Republic. Journalists who saw themselves as ad Kurt Tucholsky. Kieksch, a Gestapo for his courageous anti-Hitler he wanted to destroy the y for a "new barbarism" to clear too despised Western liberalism rms like "liberty" and "human and biting satirist who was a nal *Die Weltbühne* (The World ic and in a free and humane so. But since he could find no politi-rt, he joined none and ridiculed ders were less than ideal, he tore in effect, though certainly not in ccess of the dictator he detested. st Hitler, "Tucholsky stood aside sed some help. All they got from

not so much divided left from to the middle. The two extremes Pachter, a socialist in his youth: ate; we too agreed that the Re-al contact with the masses; we ite; we too ridiculed the Republic blic had no style." 174 ht are important and can be ex-West, in part because the West-ated Versailles Treaty, but also res to be heirs of a long tradi-ith the degenerate civilization of toward: the left toward the new st and a renewed *Drang nach* recate intellect and extol *Lebens*-stressed emotions, instincts, and attitude was a truly remarkable mtic Heinrich von Kleist, who erse groups: the Nazis claimed nists called him a revolutionary; igious revivalists were attracted d that "to stand by Kleist is to be orbid reason for the attraction any people over so long a period ctability to the love affair with an mind . . . only three things

were clear about the Kleist crusade: its intensity, its confusion, and its exaltation of irrationality—its blissful death wish." 175

A romantic social vision beckoned both left and right, whether it was the socialist myth of a stateless, classless society or the nationalist myth of a Third Reich. This new Reich, it was fervently expected, would respond to three deeply felt desires: to establish a New Order of unspecified form but directed by a hero-leader; to solve all economic problems through some kind of authoritarian German socialism; and to respond to the spiritual crisis and weakening of traditional religion by a glowing Germanic faith.¹⁷⁶

Both left and right rejected political individualism and endorsed, often with ecstatic intensity, the concept of community, or *Gemeinschaft*. It is a fact of very considerable historic importance that in Germany both conservative nationalists and radical revolutionaries supported socialism and *Gemeinschaft*, whether they saw this community as being achieved in the classless society of Marx or the racial community of Hitler. Both agreed that the individual should be sacrificed to the demands of the group. Hitler responded brilliantly to this spiritual longing of conservatives and revolutionaries for an all-embracing, co-operative German community. Fritz Stern is quite right in noting that this very important aspect of the rise of Hitler has been overlooked by both Marxist and psychoanalytical explanations for the success of his movement.¹⁷⁷

Nazi emphasis on the primacy of community over the individual (as in Goebbels's slogan "*Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz*") also helps to explain how it was possible for so many German intellectuals to join the Nazi cult. Their support "would have been inconceivable," a German historian has written, "without the anti-democratic intellectual movement that preceded it, [which] in its contempt for everything liberal had blunted people's sensitivities to the inviolable rights of the individual and the preservation of human dignity." 178

These general themes are seen most clearly in the thought of three of the period's most influential writers, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (1876–1925), Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), and Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). All three illustrate what the noted German theologian and essayist Ernst Troeltsch had in mind when he concluded in 1922 that there was a "curious dualism" in the German mind. There was, he said, an abundance of Romanticism and lofty idealism; but there was also a form of realism pushed to the verge of cynicism and utter indifference to ideals and morality:

But what you will see above all is an inclination to make an astonishing combination of the two elements—in a word, to brutalize Romance, and to romanticize cynicism.¹⁷⁹

Like thousands of his generation, Moeller had participated in the prewar youth movement and had joyfully volunteered for the German

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and revolutionary alike. How any real notice to all their party growth.

* D.T. we were agreed, a German Reich, splendid, mysterious, larger than 321 was more of a secret dream to conservatives.

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they responded to him with enthusiasm. It was also comforting to damaged egos to hear that the German people were not merely equal to other nations but were the master race. *Die Herren Rasse*

Hitler's movement and its "dynamism of rancor" also promised something else: that deep-seated feelings of anxiety and fear could find an outlet in primitive hatred and aggression. As Fritz Stern has noted, "It is naive . . . to suppose that aggression must spring from lust of conquest. Fear too impels aggressive action."

The German middle class in 1930-1933 was gripped by what one writer has called *die grosse Angst*—an all-pervasive "great fear" of many things, including economic catastrophe, personal failure, social upheaval, moral decline, the Communist menace, the Jewish peril. Everywhere there was apprehension and alienation. Hitler understood. He personally felt their fears, for he too was a "little man" riven by alienation, self-doubt, and *Angst*. He played brilliantly upon the fears of others and convinced them that salvation lay through hatred and aggression.¹⁰⁰

Albert Speer, looking back from his prison cell in Spandau and attempting to fathom the strange personality of the man who had captivated him for so long, finally reached the conclusion that at the core of Hitler lay nothing but "pathological hatred." As a person who was himself consumed by hatred, Hitler knew its power to move others. One reason for his political success in 1933 was the stunningly effective way he applied the axiom he had laid down a decade earlier in *Mein Kampf*, when he wrote that hatred is more powerful than love and noted scornfully that the leaders of the Republic had done nothing whatever to cultivate the most valuable of all political qualities: "wrathful hatred." He promised that under his leadership "hate would become a single fiery sea of flames." He kept that promise. His confidant Joseph Goebbels recorded in his early diaries what he considered to be one of his master's best epigrams: "For our struggle, God gave us His abundant blessing. His most beautiful gift was the hate of our enemies, whom we too hate with all our heart." Years later, a Swiss diplomat noted that "the main energy of Hitler is the energy of hatred" and showed how he used this energy to his political advantage. Thousands of Germans were drawn to him, the Swiss said, because they too needed to hate and this man supplied that need. "Never," he said, had he "met any human capable of generating so terrific a condensation of envy, vituperation, and malice."¹⁰⁷

Hitler's general appeal to the lower middle class was well summarized by a thoughtful German observer:

Nazism contained an incomparable and unsurpassable combination of all those psychological elements which the masses needed . . . [Hitler] could not immediately give bread to the starving and wages to the unemployed but he absolved the weary, the desperate and the downtrodden from the heaviest burdens of their souls. He allowed them . . . to gather hope and to feel superior. He released

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them from the loads . . . led them back into the implicit faith. He let it fan the stage. He allowed them to obey, to march and fee

Hitler also offered consolation to the lower middle class of electrifying speeches that site of everything that troubled was at fault, so he offered that exploitation were resented, international cooperation and *Versailles-Diktat*, he promised the longing for a heroic legend, and as current as the teacher:

I reached the conclusion that could save Germany. It was the cornerstone of a new following lines were inscribed, know ye that we strong hand may restore

Hitler also knew the appeal could have in thousands of the proletariat had wiped out the great appeal, for it allowed the dilemma: economic disaster but social traditions prevented the proletariat. Hitler's socialism was in a national system internationalized. His system was members of one *Volksgeist* social distinctions were blurred.

With remarkable adroitness he made them fit the needs of the hate for the bourgeoisie to agree that Germans were v. Like the socialists he provided classless society but of a race would yet be conquered—not marching." The revolution was the ship of the proletariat but he also confiscated and modified served in his swastika; "comrade

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his orders, stinking black smoke would go up the chimneys of Auschwitz. Still later, in defeat, he would want all Germany to burn. At the end, amid the crash of Red Army artillery shells in Berlin, he would command that his own petrol-soaked body be set aflame. But on this overcast Monday night in 1933, the smell of burning oil rags was incense to the Psychopathic God.

them the confidence that of course
they would be able to handle
him in close quarters like
the Cabinet.

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—whatever his later protestations may have been—was well expressed by a statement that shows how totally he misjudged the Führer of the Nazis. On the very eve of the Third Reich, Brüning said: "If Hitler would become chancellor under normal conditions [sic], one could then regard the situation with a certain amount of calm." ²³⁶

That was precisely the problem. The leaders of the democracy in its most desperate hour were not attempting to stop the menace of a Hitler dictatorship or to exclude him from office; rather, all their political energies were expended in efforts to bring him into a cabinet—with each political faction trying to win him over to its side. Each group hoped that Hitler would supply the votes and remain the "prisoner" of his "superiors." All were confident that they knew how to handle him. It was also assumed that once he was involved in the government, the responsibilities of political power would teach him humility and moderation.

It has been said that the story of Hitler's rise to power is the story of his underestimation. It must also be said that "there would have been no story of Hitler at all had not outstanding men and forces estimated him highly—for their own purposes." ²³⁷

Never was vapid expectation more effectively exploited.

Thus was Germany delivered unto the Austrian. It was all perfectly legal. Late in the morning of 30 January 1933, Adolf Hitler took a great oath to preserve the Republic; he then placed his softly effeminate hands between the leathery palms of *Der alte Herr*, the senile Field Marshal-President, in an ancient German gesture of fealty and trust.

In the ecstatic city, a Catholic nun was heard to say, "What a blessing that friendly Herr Hitler has taken power! Praise be to God!" There was one act of protest. A little Jewish boy, driven half-mad by watching Storm Troopers whip his grandmother with lengths of garden hose, tried to beat off the Nazis with his fists. He was quickly silenced. Adolf Hitler, the failure of Linz and Vienna, could now fulfill his boyhood promise that he would become master of the Motherland, founder of a new Reich of the German nation.

That night he pushed back thoughts of death to stand, quivering with excitement, stiffly erect, on the balcony of the Chancellery. His eyes flashed and his face shone with the triumph of a man who had accomplished the impossible. He looked down on the Wilhelmstrasse, a sea of flames as wave after endless wave of torch-bearing followers, roaring the *Horst Wessel* song, surged below him.

The flames of that night were to become a symbol of his entire career. As an adolescent he had spoken reverently of the "Flame of Life"; as a street agitator he had demanded hatred so intense it would become "one single, fiery sea of flames"; a good speech, he said, was "a flaming javelin which sets the crowd afire." Later, fires that he lit would gut Warsaw, Rotterdam, Coventry, London, and Leningrad; on

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Hitler. "We were driven by the force of circumstance," one leader said pathetically in August 1933. "We were really only the passive object of developments." ²³⁴ The moderate socialists later protested that it was not their fault that Hitler came to power—their theoretical Marxist allies, the Communists, had cooperated with Hitler and attacked them instead of helping them. There is truth to the charge, but it overlooks the crucial fact that the Social Democrats themselves had done little to fulfill social promises and had done nothing when, in July 1932, Chancellor von Papen and his "Cabinet of the Barons" illegally seized the government of Prussia—two-thirds of Germany. At this time, as later, the moderates lacked the will to take effective action. Totally misjudging the nature of Hitler and his threat, they kept thinking that "the ultimate victory of the working class movement" was indeed inevitable, and that Hitler was merely a passing phenomenon. In accordance with that tradition, they put their faith in the "potential energy of a mass party" and kept reassuring themselves with that empty and amorphous slogan. A corollary of this belief was that Hitler, as the head of "reactionary forces," would of his own accord disintegrate along with his supporters, whereas the power of the working class was "indestructible." ²³⁵

The conservative parties of the right, which had spent so much of their energies vilifying the Republic, showed that they had no political program of their own except to devise ways to make accommodations with Hitler. By 1932, German conservatism was intellectually sterile and politically bankrupt.

The chancellor of the republic during the critical years of 1930–1932 was Dr. Heinrich Brüning of the Catholic Center Party. He has often been portrayed as an able political leader who struggled manfully against the Nazi tide. His record does not support that reputation. He made the critical political mistake of dissolving the Reichstag in 1930 and attempting to rule by emergency presidential decree, thus making his government dependent upon the whim of old President Hindenburg, who was increasingly influenced by a clique of military reactionaries. Brüning's myopic and stubborn policy of deflation exacerbated the Depression, idling factories and throwing millions of workers out on the street. The "Hunger Chancellor" did little to help democracy. The position he had maneuvered himself into between left and right produced this devastating political joke: "Why is Brüning like a guitar? Answer: Because he's held by the left hand and played by the right."

But Brüning may not have been merely inept. Recent studies have raised very serious questions about his purported commitment to democracy and opposition to Hitler. It is now clear that his chief hope as chancellor was to win Hitler's secret support for a restoration of the monarchy; that Cardinal Pacelli, later Pope Pius XII, urged Brüning, a devout Catholic, to make special accommodations with Hitler; and that Brüning himself assisted Hitler in writing one of the Führer's key speeches. The Weimar chancellor's attitude toward Hitler at this time

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personality helps explain why Hitler had become such a political force by the fall of 1932. But none of this explains *how* he actually became Führer of Germany. He was not voted into power by the German people, nor did he seize power, as Nazi legend later asserted, by a heroic *Machtergreifung*. Political power was handed to him in a sordid political deal.

He had tried three different ways to attain his goal. First, he had sought to seize power by coup d'état in 1923; he had failed in that memorable fiasco. Second, he had tried to win a mandate from the German people; but he had failed to win the simple majority he had promised President von Hindenburg. The best he could do in the summer of 1932 was to get 37.4 percent of the vote. And even after attaining the chancellorship, profiting from the Reichstag fire, and then utilizing all the wiles of Goebbels's propaganda machine, his own brilliant demagoguery, and the intimidating power of his Storm Troopers—even after all that, Hitler could get only 43.9 percent of the vote. A majority of the German people still withheld their confidence from him. True, they had given him more votes than anyone else. But not a majority.

After failing in these efforts, Hitler decided to get into power through intrigue and political deals. A. J. P. Taylor is correct: the answer to the question of *how* Hitler came to power lies less with Hitler and the Nazis than with other parties and politicians.²³¹ Every one of the political parties of the Republic made a contribution to the death of democracy and the victory of Hitler. There is considerable truth in Oswald Spengler's scathing comment about the much-trumpeted Nazi triumph: "That was no victory; there was no opposition."²³² The German Communist Party, for example, constituted by 1932 the strongest Communist movement in Europe. Yet it succumbed to Hitler without a struggle. By the summer of 1933 the KPD was dissolved, its leaders jailed, its funds confiscated. Among the reasons for this surprising failure was the strangely erratic policy emanating from Stalin's Kremlin. From 1924 to 1928, the orders were to cooperate with the moderate German Social Democrats; after 1928, orders went out to fight them as "Social Fascists." In this phase, Stalin actually cooperated with Hitler in order to undermine bourgeois democracy. The theory was that once fascism ("the last stage of monopoly capitalism") attained power, the time would be ripe for a final communist takeover. But after helping Hitler into power, the Communist Party took no action at all. "The Party which for fifteen years had talked of nothing but revolution failed when the crisis it had itself prescribed as the revolutionary moment came."²³³

The moderate Social Democrats, founders of the Republic and, until 1932, its largest party, were unable or unwilling to act effectively. Seized by apathy bordering on fatalism, they could not or would not act to stop

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Hitler. "We were driven by said pathetically in August object of developments."²³⁴ It was not their fault that Marxist allies, the Communists, them instead of helping them look the crucial fact that little to fulfill social promises Chancellor von Papen and the government of Prussia—later, the moderates lacked misjudging the nature of Hitler "the ultimate victory of the inevitable, and that Hitler was in accordance with that tradition, of a mass party" and kept the amorphous slogan. A corollary of "reactionary forces," would with his supporters, whereas "indestructible."²³⁵

The conservative parties their energies vilifying the Republic program of their own except with Hitler. By 1932, Germany and politically bankrupt.

The chancellor of the Republic 1932 was Dr. Heinrich Brüning often been portrayed as an ab against the Nazi tide. His record made the critical political mistake and attempting to rule by emergency his government dependent upon who was increasingly influential Brüning's myopic and stubborn repression, idling factories and street. The "Hunger Chancellor" he had maneuvered himself this devastating political joke: Because he's held by the left hand.

But Brüning may not have raised very serious questions democracy and opposition to Hitler's chancellor was to win Hitler's monarchy; that Cardinal Pacelli devout Catholic, to make speeches. The Weimar chancellor

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of this fury over the mere suggestion that a cherished wish might not be fulfilled may have derived ultimately from one all-important infantile hope: that his missing testicle would descend.

Predictably, boys who have genital defects as well as Oedipal problems develop castration anxieties of extraordinary dimensions. Hitler, we have noted, was beset by such fears. As Führer, the kind of punishment he chose to mete out reflects castration anxieties. Anyone found guilty of "causing ridicule of the Führer" was *beheaded*; artists who displeased him by using the wrong colors for skies and meadows were to be *castrated*.⁸³

Hitler also showed his apprehension about his sexual adequacy in other ways. He was actually frightened by stallions and bulls, traditional symbols of masculinity. But he liked very much to gaze at statues or pictures of them, "enviously admiring their strength and yet actually afraid of the animals themselves, who possessed those qualities which he lacked but most desired." From the pictures he seems to have derived vicarious "sexual strength—satisfactory substitute—until faced with the real thing, when the satisfaction turned to hate and fear."⁸⁴

For his new Chancellery, Hitler chose statues of stallions. Facing the garden and at either end of a colossal stretch of Egyptian-style columns were two gigantic prancing stallions by Josef Thorak; and the dominant statue in the cavernous "Marble Gallery" was a huge statue of a rearing stallion by Arnold Breker, the artist who also did the two heroic uncircumcised male nudes at the main entrance, symbolizing the Party and the Wehrmacht.

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An American journalist who toured the building noted that stallions also figured prominently in the hall, whose enormous length contained 14 magnificent Gobelin tapestries, all personally selected by Hitler and all but four showing horses. If the sexual parts of the animals in the tapestries were covered by foliage or other objects, Hitler privately called in experts to determine the sex from the animal's mane, nostrils, bone formation, or musculature. Then, in entertaining guests, Hitler would point to a partially hidden horse and ask a visitor its sex. If the guest could not answer, Hitler pointed out the reasons why he knew it was a stallion, concluding, "But you don't know anything about horses."⁸⁵ By playing this game, was Hitler trying to reassure himself by saying, in effect, that as with horses, a man could be very masculine without revealing his sexual equipment?

Bulls were also a favorite virility substitute. As a boy in Vienna, we recall, Hitler had written a dramatic sketch involving a bull being held by the horns. When he decorated his new Chancellery he saw to it that the garden was dominated by a heroic uncircumcised Nordic nude wrestling a bull by the horns. Apparently Hitler thought that bulls helped him overcome fears of sexual impotence, for one of the



A schoolmate's sketch of Hitler at age sixteen.

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through oral aggression is shown in a passage that throbs with passion and sexual symbolism:

1933 | Only a storm of burning *passion* [*Leidenschaft*] can turn people's destiny, but only he who harbors *passion* in himself can arouse *passion*.

Passion alone will give to him who is chosen by her the words that, like beats of a hammer, are able to open the doors to the heart of the people.

He to whom *passion* is denied and whose mouth remains closed is not chosen by Heaven as the prophet of his will.¹⁰⁸

A distinguished German female historian recalled attending a Nazi Party rally in 1933 and hearing Hitler's spontaneous exclamation to his audience after he had reached his rhetorical climax: "Aren't you as *enthralled* by me as I am by you? [*Bin ich nicht Euch so verfallen wie ihr mir?*]" The author adds, "The erotic character, not only of the words but also of the accompanying gestures, was unmistakable."¹⁰⁹

Hitler was fond of quoting one of the few lines he knew from Nietzsche: "Thou goest to women? Do not forget thy whip!" Whips, of course, are the traditional symbol and sign of sadomasochistic impulses. During the decade before he became chancellor, Hitler habitually carried heavy riding whips with which, in moments of excitement, he lashed about him, beat against his thighs, or whipped his hand as if he were a little boy being punished. The three whips he treasured most had been given to him by three motherly old ladies.¹⁰⁰

His sexual gratification—when not achieved through the sublimation of passionate demagogic triumphs—may have been attained by a massively masochistic practice, degrading alike to himself and to his sexual partner. He is reported to have ordered young women to squat over him and to urinate or defecate on his head while he watched (see below, Chapter 3).

Here, then, was the man called Führer and Messiah of the Germans. His image was that of awesome power; but as a person he was infantile and vulnerable, beset by childish fears and neurotic compulsions, torn by contradictions. He was an infallible dictator who anxiously sucked his little finger; who longed to create and lusted to destroy; who ordered the massacre of the innocents and fretted over the death of ravens and lobsters; who exalted women and debased them; who spoke the words of Jesus and hated all mankind.

This peculiar man was one of the most compelling personalities of history, and one of its greatest enigmas. What follows is an attempt to understand him and the forces that brought him power and victory, humiliation, and defeat.

CH 4

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INSIGHT INTO Hitler's per and his career as dictator m of his remarkable mind, his his ideas about life and poli when one realizes how oft torical reality.

Everyone who knew Hit memory and the extraordin could remember the tradema used in 1915; the names of 20 years previously; the stree political campaigns; the age and other data of every capit the names of the singers ar in Vienna as a youth; the na armaments down to the batt; the prelude to *Die Meistersir*, trating vibrato; he memorized the production figures per ma and Italy.

ne advance. I had to grin to say, 'If the Riefenstahl might as well leave.' So we which was all against his organized disappointment. a day or two later and g. However, she had made privileges from Hitler for her

his time. There is an entry signed in our Pienzenauer-mann, his then sweetheart lückner and his girl friend dse, Ingeborg Groen, who r-and Eva Braun. They nance of *Meistersinger* at dinner at the Four Seasons e Eva Braun. She was a less type who appears to s and a modest, diffident the counter at Heinrich d had certainly registered i and eager to please. We n there in any particular rthe other girls in order to

It took us right back to the be conductor that evening er had not liked his *tempi* on the subject. He could hm or whistle many of the ty heart, in order to show e house by then and the ws had lost its height due stooms. He thought it was herards and left it as a lofty ing that if I had had my

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thousand dollars back when I needed them it would have been another thing and that it was all very well for him to talk. But he reminisced charmingly about the old days and it was really a very pleasant party. I think it was almost the last time that I saw him in this mood.

The conversation kept coming back to the *Meistersinger* we had seen. It was probably Hitler's favourite opera and he was, of course, a completely Wagnerian figure himself. It would take three or four of the characters to make up his. There was a lot of Lohengrin, with its German connotations of impotence, something of the Flying Dutchman and a mixture of Hans Sachs and Walter von Stolzing. I could not help thinking, while he talked, of the Hans Sachs line about: '*ein Glühwurm fand sein Weibchen nicht, das hat den Schaden angericht* [a glow-worm did not find his mate and that was the cause of all the trouble].' Hitler never did find his mate. Eva Braun was no answer to the problem.

Before they left, Hitler signed his name with the words, 'on the first day of the New Year'. He looked up at me and said in a tone of suppressed excitement: "This year belongs to us. I will guarantee you that in writing." On January 4 came the famous meeting with von Papen at the house of the Cologne banker, Kurt von Schroeder, the final step in his path to power.

Three weeks later I was back in Berlin trying to get my foreign journalist friends through a police cordon into a Nazi mass meeting in the Lustgarten. It was just after the new Nazi electoral success in the State of Lippe. The policeman would not let us through. "But I am Dr. Hanfstaengl, the foreign press officer of the Nazi Party and these gentlemen have got to see this to file their stories," I told him in exasperation. "My orders are not to let anyone through," he said stubbornly. "But for heaven's sake, man, don't be so difficult. In another week we shall be in power, anyway," I shouted. He was not to be moved. "Come back in a week and I'll let you through then," he said. By that time my statement was true.

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CHAPTER XI

DISILLUSIONMENT AT NUREMBERG

Neurath versus Rosenberg—First brush with Goering—Reichstag fire fever—Goebbels at Potsdam—The one-man revolution—Interventions with Himmler—Hostages for a policy—No make-up for the Mitfords—The shape of things to come.

I FELT singularly unmoved by the clamour and hysteria of that January 30 in 1933 when the Nazi Party came to power. Certainly it was an exciting moment, but I had too many reservations concerning the dangerous turbulence of the radicals to feel unduly confident about the possible march of events. We were all standing around in the Kaiserhof while Hitler was with the President. He came back through shouting crowds and up in the lift to the first floor. "*Jetzt sind wir so weit*," he announced in a state of euphoria. We all crowded round, waiters and maids alike, to shake his hand. "Well, *Herr Reichskanzler*," I said, "at least I am not going to have to call you *Herr Oberregierungsrat* any more." Ribbentrop was there, already trying to put on Bismarckian airs, and Goering, of course, here, there and everywhere in his most resplendent uniform. I missed most of the junketing because I was pinned in my room by the foreign press and answering telephone calls from scores of acquaintances all over Germany, who suddenly remembered that they had been to school with me or had known my father and wanted to make their number with someone near the centre without delay.

That evening there was a big S.A. parade. They even played my march, *Young Heroes*, as they stamped down the Wilhelmstrasse, but any feeling of identification was rudely shattered the next morning. The offices in the Chancellery were somehow not yet ready for occupation and a wild flurry of discussions was still being carried on in the Kaiserhof. I was sitting down in the corner of one of the big

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reception-rooms, and diagonally opposite Hitler was in conversation with Frick. As I have found many times in my life, I was, acoustically speaking, strategically placed. Imagine my horror when I heard Hitler say: "The best thing to do with *Parteigenosse* Rosenberg is to put him as State Secretary in the Foreign Office."

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I felt as if I had been seared with a red-hot iron. This was how Hitler proposed to implement his countless evasive statements of intention to me concerning Rosenberg. How there would be no place for him in the Government, how his importance as editor of the *Beobachter* would diminish in the national scene. . . . I had to do something immediately. Almost running out of the room, I tore down to the Foreign Office and demanded to see von Neurath. I had never met him in my life, but after a short pause I was accompanied upstairs. "Your Excellency," I said, "I must tell you something of the utmost importance. You know who I am, I hope." "Yes, yes, you are the foreign press chief." "This is a very delicate matter for me and I must ask you to keep our conversation absolutely between ourselves." "Of course," he said, surprised and puzzled. "I have just come from the Kaiserhof, where I heard Hitler say that they are going to put Rosenberg in here as your State Secretary. Of course it is only a step to making him Foreign Minister. I beg you to sound the alarm here. Go and see the President, if necessary. This must be stopped at all costs." Even the phlegmatic Neurath was astonished. "I do not know how to understand you, Herr Hanfstaengl. Surely you are one of the better-known members of the Party?" "Certainly I am," I replied, "but where the good of Germany is concerned there are limits and this I will not stand for." Neurath must have moved fast, because the scheme came to nothing. As a sop, Rosenberg found himself set up in a sumptuous villa in the Tiergarten as head of the foreign policy section of the Party, which mercifully restricted his influence. Neurath was grateful for my intervention and we afterwards became close associates.

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It had been a bad start. Hitler had been very difficult to deal with for weeks. With power almost within his grasp, he listened only to suggestions which fed his mounting exaltation and swept aside any ideas of mine to give his coming assumption of office a more propitiatory air. There had been a very influential French journalist

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I then took an apartment for a short period in the Genthinerstrasse, and in the late autumn of 1933 moved into a charming house, almost a miniature *palais*, on the Pariser Platz, just by the Brandenburger Tor. That remained my Berlin home until the end.

I also found it expedient to appear in the Party uniform for the first time. I had always considered the dun-coloured affair the S.A. wore a monstrosity, so I took the liberty of designing my own. I sent for a superb length of chocolate-brown gaberdine from a London tailor and had it made up with a delicate little gold epaulette. Hitler had offered me a shirt and trousers out of the Party clothing-store, but if it was going to be tactically necessary to get out of my civilian clothes, I intended to do so on my own terms. My first appearance in it at a party given by Louis Lochner, the Associated Press correspondent, was, needless to state, the talk of the town.

If I interpose such minor details in a period of major revolution, it is not an attempt to dissociate myself from events. The Nazis had come to power with the declared intention of cleaning out the Augean stables of economic disaster, unemployment, corruption, Communism, the futile and purposeless haggling of 32 parties in the *Reichstag* and restoring national dignity and honour. That is what I believed in as a member of the Party, and I will not attempt to justify in hindsight the fact that I went along with many of the draconian measures introduced. I will risk Anglo-Saxon prejudice by saying that I compared the process to the hacking out of underbrush so that trees could grow again. What I did, as one individual, within the measure of the possible, was to intervene to the best of my ability wherever the impetus of revolution produced unpleasant excesses. Many others did as much and more than I did, and I at least escaped in the end with my life. To do these things at all I had somehow to retain my place at Hitler's elbow.

My first brush came with Goering. I had been hearing from Lochner and people in the diplomatic round stories about unpleasant goings-on at the Columbia House, down near Tempelhof airfield. The S.A. were said to have taken this over as a private prison and interrogation centre for political enemies, whom they were alleged to be beating up. Then a Graf Schönborn, whom I knew, called on me at the *Reichstag* President's palace and confirmed the story with

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specific details. I tackled Goering about it over breakfast. First of all he denied the whole thing. Then I suggested that we satisfy ourselves by a personal visit. Goering was evasive, then truculent, and finally demanded to know who had told me the story. I was unwilling to do so, but after extracting a promise that nothing would happen to the informant, named Schönborn. I should have known better, but then there was a lot I yet had to learn. Schönborn disappeared and was detained for several weeks. He was naturally not exactly grateful to me, but I had raised such hell that I had probably helped to get him out as much as I had to put him in. It was my first taste of how different things were to be from what many of us had hoped. Over the next three years I voiced my protests whenever I could. But no one should suppose that the rôle of King Canute is an easy one to play.

It was necessary often to work by the most devious means. When the Communist headquarters in the Liebknecht house was raided on February 24, Goering, as Prussian Minister of the Interior, had a flamboyant communiqué issued about the barrels of incriminating material concerning plans for world revolution which had been discovered. Harried by the press, I could get no details out of him. The next day I had lunch with Sir Horace Rumbold, the British ambassador. "If these suggestions are true, which I doubt," I told him, "surely one way of getting at the facts would be for the British Government to request details, especially as some of the territories in their Empire are alleged to be affected." Whether he took my advice or not I do not know as, two days later, the anti-Communist campaign reached its most spectacular peak.

It must be remembered that we were in the middle of a last great election campaign. On February 26 I accompanied Hitler on a wild twelve-hour plane flight during which he spoke at three widely separated cities. Late that evening we dined with Prince Viktor zu Wied and his wife at their home in the Kurfürstenstrasse. I could feel a cold coming on and before we left the Prince gave me a bottle of aquavit, with the advice to drink myself into a fever. I was so dog-tired that night that I did not start the cure, but the following afternoon I felt so shivery that I decided to go to bed in my room in Goering's palace and sample the remedy. The Goebbels had

invited me for later on myself, put on a couple ordered relays of hot liquid settled down to sweat. the next day, and I had

After an hour or so up to my nose, I could warmth coursing through when the telephone. It went on and on, no myself out of bed, no door. It was Brückner, "The Führer insists that wants you to play the position, said he had up I could not possibly come I was going back to me was starting to warm up too much, I thought, I dragged myself next calling. I was ruining I come along and sweat care to leave the ear-pi régime all over again.

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little gnome wanted know, was it nothing I could tell him to pass on? In the end I lost patience: "Tell him the *Reichstag* is on fire." "Hanfstaengl, is this one of your jokes?" Goebbels answered rather curtly. "If you think that, come down here and see for yourselves," and I hung up. I then called Sefton Delmer and Louis Lochner. No sooner had I put the receiver down when the bell shrilled again. It was Goebbels back: "I have just talked to the Führer and he wants to know what is really happening. No more of your jokes now." I lost my temper with him. "I tell you to come down here and see whether I am talking nonsense or not. The whole place is in flames and the fire-brigades are already here. I am going back to bed."

My room became like a railway station. Auwi came in, and then the Prince of Hesse. They were both staying in the palace. All I knew was that I was very annoyed at the ruin of my cure. "That's the end of that gas-works, anyway," I said. I suppose it was a callous remark, but I had always considered it an architectural abortion. The next day, of course, the Nazi newspapers came out with banner accusations that it was all the work of the Communists, and the notorious *affaire* was launched.

I am afraid this anecdote provides little new evidence of value. It was suggested later that I was one of the people who knew the whole story. Not only did the outbreak catch me in bed with a fever, but neither I, nor any of the other guests, nor any of the servants were aware of, or had noticed, any activity in the house to substantiate the theory that Ernst and his S.A. arsonists had entered the *Reichstag* through a tunnel from our cellars. On the other hand, it was a large building, they may have had a key to the coal-hole and worked completely unnoticed. What is not without interest, however, is the attitude of Goebbels and Hitler.

The little doctor was, of course, an accomplished liar, but if ever annoyance and suspicion were genuine in a man's voice, they were in his on the telephone that evening. For what the supposition is worth at this period of time, it would not surprise me in the least, on the strength of the evidence now available, that Goering planned the whole thing himself, necessarily with Hitler's knowledge, as a means of wresting a piece of initiative from his hated rival, Goebbels.

Whether Goering was idea. I did not see him.

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Whether Goering was in his palace that evening or not I have no
idea. I did not see him.

My own suspicions did not grow until I read, much later in the
year, the transcripts of the trial at Leipzig of Dimitroff and his
associates. I had been named in a book published in London as one
of those implicated in the *Reichstag* fire plot. I instituted proceedings
for libel through a solicitor named Kenneth Brown, who later
became my good friend. I was so appalled at the flimsy nature of
the evidence produced at the trial that I flew to London to tell
Brown to call off the action, but by that time the publishers had
climbed down anyway.

The Leipzig trial injured Goering's prestige badly. He was furious.
At lunch one day in the Chancellery he trumpeted: "*Mein Führer*,
it is an absolute disgrace the way these High Court judges are
behaving. You would think we were on trial, not the Communists."
Hitler's answer was revealing: "*Mein lieber Goering*," he said, "it
is only a question of time. We shall soon have those old fellows talk-
ing our language. They are all ripe for retirement anyway, and we
will put our own people in. But while *der Alte* [Hindenburg] is alive,
there is not much we can do about it."

I claim a small share of the credit for the fact that Dimitroff was
able to leave Germany alive after he had been found not guilty. In
response to President Roosevelt's message, I kept in close touch with
the American ambassador in Berlin, William E. Dodd. In many
ways he was an unsatisfactory representative. He was a modest little
Southern history professor, who ran his embassy on a shoe-string and
was probably trying to save money out of his pay. At a time when
it needed a robust millionaire to compete with the flamboyance of
the Nazis, he teetered round self-effacingly as if he was still on his
college campus. His mind and his prejudices were small. The fact
that I was a former Harvard man made him regard even me as
a Goddam-Yankee, but I did my best to help him exert what
influence he had. On one occasion I even arranged for him to have
a private interview with Hitler, without a member of the Foreign
Office present, which was, of course, contrary to all protocol.
Neurath, whose friendship I valued, was distinctly annoyed when he
heard of it, and indeed I might have saved myself the trouble.

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of 'ah, young so-and-so. . . I know his poor mother well'. I found the *Horst Wessel Lied* running through my head: '*Kameraden, die Rotfront und Reaktion erschossen. . .*'—the Red front had been liquidated. The Minister of Propaganda was already conditioning his master's mind for the coming fight with the 'forces of reaction'.

Hitler's mood on his arrival at the church had been determined for him. I do not need to describe the scene in detail, the empty Imperial throne, the Crown Prince, Hindenburg, old Field-Marshal Mackensen in the uniform of the Death's Head Hussars. . . This was the 'reaction' in full regalia. Hitler paid lip-service to the fusion of the old and the new, as for the time being he knew he must, but for the connoisseur there was a fresh note in his speech. I was standing with Hess not twenty feet away from him. "Now it is the heroic Weltanschauung which will illuminate the ideals of Germany's future. . ." I pulled myself together with a start. What was this? Where had I read that before? This was not Schopenhauer, who had been Hitler's philosophical god in the old Dietrich Eckart days. No, this was new. It was Nietzsche.

I thought back only a few months earlier to a visit he had paid during one of the election campaigns, while travelling from Weimar to Berlin, to the Villa Silberblick, where Nietzsche had died and where his widowed sister, aged 86, still lived. The rest of us had waited outside, for nearly an hour and a half. Hitler had gone in carrying his whip, but, to my astonishment, came tripping out with a slim little turn-of-the-century cane dangling from his fingers: "What a marvellous old lady," he said to me. "What vivacity and intelligence. A real personality. Look, she has given me her brother's last walking-stick as a souvenir, a great compliment. You should have been there, Hanfstaengl!"—which was his form of evasion when he had excluded me from anything.

The episode had clearly caused a deeper impression than the immediate involvement in the election campaign had permitted me to appreciate. Hitler's mind was a deep-running river. You could never tell when something it had absorbed would bob to the surface again. From that day at Potsdam the Nietzschean catch-phrases began to appear more frequently—*Wille zur Macht*, *Herrenvolk*, *Sklavenmoral*—the fight for the heroic life, against formal dead-

weight education, Christian passion. Schopenhauer, with buried for ever, and the Gai from a savage bowdlerization which Robespierre had given. Rousseau was repeated by Goethe. Political simplification of the Nor was that the only formidable display by the rejected historical hero had always been Goebbels' prompting, he appeared a coalition with these traditions subtly changed. From this time more as his model. The inspiration had characterized the great I limitless lust for universal power.

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passion. Schopenhauer, with his almost Buddhist gentleness, was
buried for ever, and the Gauleiters started to take their inspiration
from a savage bowdlerization of Nietzsche. The guillotine twist
which Robespierre had given to the teachings of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau was repeated by Goebbels, Hitler and the Gestapo in their
political simplification of the contradictory theories of Nietzsche.
Nor was that the only milestone reached at Potsdam. Until this
formidable display by the representatives of the old régime, Hitler's
historical hero had always been Frederick the Great. When, under
Goebbels' prompting, he appreciated the risks and restrictions which
a coalition with these traditional forces would entail, his allegiance
subtly changed. From this time on, Napoleon emerged more and
more as his model. The inspired sense of the art of the possible which
had characterized the great Prussian king became submerged in the
limitless lust for universal power of the Corsican.

No single man could halt the whirlwind of the revolution's pro-
gress. The political parties were banned, the trade unions seques-
trated, pressure put on the *Stahlhelm*, but many pillars of the
establishment remained, the Presidency, the *Reichswehr*, the Foreign
Office, the Civil Service. Those of us on the conservative side of the
fence had expected the agitation to diminish, not increase, but there
still seemed ample safeguards left to provide a fire-brigade once the
immediate conflagration had run its course. It should not be sup-
posed that these measures were thrashed out in conference or in the
cabinet, or that there was any real previous discussion in the party
concerning them. Most of us literally read about them in the news-
papers as they occurred. Hitler had his Enabling Law and was
acting with the powers it granted him. The whole thing was run like
the Grand National steeplechase. There was simply no occasion to
hear what one jockey said to the other as they came to each
hurdle.

In matters of policy the only field in which I dug in my heels was
that of foreign affairs. I was an ally of Neurath and an opponent of
Rosenberg and all he stood for. I also tried to maintain a measure
of sanity in religious affairs. If I attempted to criticize Hitler's other
coups to his face he would tell me it was none of my business and

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him it was clear that there would be a first-class international outcry unless the man was freed. Himmler gave me a name and number to ring, and it was fixed, just like that.

In another case, a Socialist deputy named Gerhart Seger had escaped to Scandinavia, but his English-born wife and child could not get an exit permit. Mrs. Mavis Tate, a British M.P., took up the case and even presented herself in my office. Again I settled the matter through Himmler. My only tangible reward, years later, when I was a British internee, was to learn that Mrs. Tate had stood up again in the House of Commons and opposed my release. There were scores of similar instances. One which Diels himself mentions, in his post-war memoirs, was State Secretary Pünder, the brother of a Cologne lawyer now prominent in the Bonn Federal Government. Other names which come to my mind are the family of Ganghofer, the Bavarian novelist, and Ludwig Wüllner, the *Lieder* singer.

Another man I was happy to help was Fritz Kreisler, the violinist. He was a Jew, but not in immediate danger. In fact Hitler was a great admirer of his playing. We were good friends and he had not only helped me with the orchestration of some of my marches, but worked up a melody of mine into one of the items in his repertoire, called *Canzonetta*. He read the shape of things to come and considered it prudent to emigrate to the United States. Through Schacht and Neurath, I was able to arrange for the transfer of his considerable fortune. Those of us who were in a position to help did what we could.

The pathetic thing was that many of us thought these embryo concentration camps were only a transitory manifestation. This was the version available even to those as near the inner circle of the Party as myself and information was so sparse it was difficult to disbelieve it. I took Philip Noel-Baker, a visiting British M.P., in to Hitler one day to broach the subject and myself brought up the suggestion that the agitation abroad might be stilled if one of the resident foreign consuls, in rotation, were permitted to report on the conditions under which such suspects were being held. Hitler took it quite calmly and said that it was a curious idea. He was not asking any of his consular personnel in England to visit British penitentiaries. The next time I was in the Chancellery, of course, I got hell.

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delighted. Then I saw Schacht. He was enthusiastic. With this back-
ing I decided to approach Hitler. I caught him after lunch one day
and we walked up and down diagonally across the terrace of the old
Chancellery, where coffee used to be served on fine summer and
autumn days. His response appalled me: "*Mein lieber Hanfstaengl*.
The die is cast. Events are taking on quite a different shape." "But
Herr Hitler," I protested, "this is our finest chance to deal with an
insoluble problem." "Do not waste my time, Hanfstaengl," he
answered sharply. "I need the Jews as hostages."

Trying to keep one's foot on the soft pedal had more of the quality
of asking a pile-driver not to make a noise. Nevertheless, I sought
allies wherever I could. One of these was General von Reichenau,
whose reputation as a rabid Nazi was not entirely deserved. He had
certainly been one of Hitler's most senior advocates in the *Reichs-
wehr* and, although he had been called to a high post in the War
Office, the excesses of the first year of power quickly disillusioned
him. I had known him for the best part of ten years. We had first
met with my young American military attaché friend, Truman-
Smith, when Reichenau was still a major. Now I returned the com-
pliment by persuading Reichenau to arrange for the return of
Colonel Truman-Smith to Berlin as American military attaché. I felt
every step to strengthen pro-American sentiments in Germany was
justified.

Reichenau and the *Reichswehr* were not only shocked by the
S.A.'s excesses, but increasingly perturbed at Roehm's pretensions to
incorporate them in the Army with himself as Defence Minister.
Nor was he impressed with the S.A.'s military potentialities. Some-
one had compared them with the freedom levies of 1813 against
Napoleon, but Reichenau was scornful: "I can assure you that the
Battles of Leipzig and Waterloo were won by the regular Prussian
infantry," he snapped. I found this a very useful argument on which
to play and was always giving Reichenau information from within
the Party on which the Army was often able to act with some success.
In return he passed on reports of his own in case I had the oppor-
tunity of working on Hitler. I was still closer to him than any of
them, although Hitler was annoyed to discover that I knew the
general so well: "The extraordinary thing about Hanfstaengl is that

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he seems to have friends and relations everywhere," he complained once in front of me. Having come from nowhere, it was something he could barely grasp. Another instance of the same sort of thing occurred when we all attended the inauguration of the Tannenberg memorial with Hindenburg in East Prussia. The old gentleman was very civil to me and talked in his deep bass voice about a cousin of mine of the same name whom he had known in Potsdam as an officer of the Guards Grenadier regiment. We stood tracing back genealogies for several minutes, to the utter fury and jealousy of Hitler's entourage.

Neurath was another prominent figure who responded to my confidences with his protection. He took me with him to the London economic conference in the summer of 1933, and helped me with currency through the Foreign Office on several other visits I made to England. These, I might say, were carried out entirely at my own expense. I wanted to give Hitler a true picture of opinion there and produce arguments which might at least induce caution in the field of foreign policy. I even tried to persuade him to arrange for an exchange of visits between the heads of State. Anything, I thought, to get him out, and try and normalize his viewpoint. The only immediate result was that Goering laid claim to the first invitation. If he was received by the King he thought he might get a British decoration to add to his collection.

I do not need to stress the point that important groups abroad, as well as within Germany, regarded Hitler at this time with distinct benevolence. Even Lloyd George, on whom I called, was no exception. He gave me a signed photograph to take back, on which he had inscribed: "To Chancellor Hitler, in admiration of his courage, determination and leadership." There were plenty of people prepared to acknowledge the new power which had arisen in Germany. During one visit to Berchtesgaden in the late summer I was detailed to help entertain Sir John Siddleley, the industrialist, and his wife. To this day I retain the memory of how he and Goering sat out on a balcony with great illustrations and blueprints of British military aircraft it was hoped Germany would buy. All, I might say, in flat contradiction to the terms of the Versailles Treaty.

It was during the same visit—I think it was when I went down to

get Hitler's approval for another example of the p take in the brutality wit Egon down with me, by was playing round in the and Goering: "Mein Fu had to sign twenty-two were very satisfied with reported to me. It had of clemency was exercised.

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1933

YEARS

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get Hitler's approval for my book of caricatures—that I was given another example of the pleasure which the Party leaders appeared to take in the brutality with which they wielded power. I had taken Egon down with me, by now an intelligent boy of twelve, and he was playing round in the bushes when he came up just behind Hitler and Goering: "*Mein Führer*," Hermann was saying, "I have just had to sign twenty-two death sentences for your approval." They were very satisfied with themselves, rubbing their hands, Egon reported to me. It had obviously become a matter of routine, and no clemency was exercised.

If I needed further indication of the way their minds were running, a conversation between Hitler and Goebbels, heard through the open door of the dining-room in the Chancellery, was all I needed: "As long as the old gentleman [Hindenburg] is alive," came Hitler's voice, "there are two things I cannot touch: the Army and the Foreign Office." Goebbels was quick to give a turn to the knife: "As far as that Potsdam bunch is concerned, *Mein Führer*, there is only one way to deal with them—line them up in rows against a wall and mow them down with machine-guns." So, of course, I went straight round to see Reichenau and told him the story.

It was the experience of power which turned Hitler into an irreconcilable fanatic. It took me most of 1933 to realize that the demon had entered into him. Even then many of us did not believe that the point of no return had been reached. We thought the impetus of the movement could be braked, the direction altered, even reserved. Whenever I saw Neurath, Schacht, Gürtner or General von Reichenau, which was frequently, we talked in the same tone. None of them had the *entrée* to Hitler which I still had, and in spite of my growing distaste, they begged me to remain where I was. Hitler had still not reached the point where he no longer talked over matters with those who enjoyed his confidence. The final decisions of a man in that position are often, in the last resort, taken in a matter of minutes, and if I happened to be there at that crucial moment there was always the possibility that the views I presented would prevail. The drawback was that the voice of reason was beginning to find less and less echo in his mind.

The final realization that Hitler and his movement had deceived

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to Hitler in an intelligent, constructive fashion. They were like the famous cavalry of Murat under Napoleon, which flew round the enemy like wasps without fighting. They would interrupt the middle of a conversation to show him a picture or bring him a piece of paper, or Hoffmann would intrude, taking his photographs.

It was the same with almost everybody, but particularly with anyone who was not a member of the old Party gang. It was the same in Berchtesgaden as it was in Berlin. Neurath complained to me one day: "I have just been down to the Berghof to try and get the Führer, but you know, Hanfstaengl, it is impossible to talk to him alone for more than two minutes on end. One of those louts is always barging in." Schacht said the same. And for me, who, in those first two years, was the only other person who was there almost every day, it was worse. Even Goering began again to call me the 'Questenberg in the camp', a phrase he had invented in 1923, which was a reference to the character in Schiller's *Wallenstein*, who is always recommending caution and delay and taking a long view of things. They had heard me complain time and time again about the S.A. and its excesses, about illegal goings-on which had been drawn to my attention and the necessity for discipline and consolidation. So they ganged up on me and in the end it became hopeless.

Hitler was as unpunctual and unpredictable as ever. There were no set hours. Sometimes he would appear at breakfast and sometimes he would not, filling himself up in his suite first with hot milk and gruel and digestive powders. Then he would come down for a few minutes, and if I had something on my mind this was often a good time to catch him. The day would start with reports from Lammers, who was head of the Chancellery, and Funk, who at that time was Goebbels' right-hand man in the Propaganda Ministry and gave him a review of the morning's news. Funk was committed after the war to the Allies' Spandau gaol, but he was a gifted fellow whom I never considered particularly dangerous. He had been a very good financial journalist in his time, and stood high in my estimation because he had a professional's contempt for Goebbels. He was quite influential because he knew a lot of the industrialists and had, in fact, found the funds which had paid the bills at the Kaiserhof. His weakness was drink. It ran in the family. An uncle of his, Alfred

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superficial varnish to the party. It became a constant strain to guess who was going to be there and what they were going to talk about. I used to wait for some dangerous piece of nonsense to get started and then try and put forward a more responsible point of view. But to achieve any result I had either to make a joke or play the *enfant terrible* with a mixture of flattery and insolence. One never knew when Hitler was going to break into some tirade. In the end I found it too difficult to keep up day after day. There were only two people I ever saw who could get Hitler aside alone. The first was Goering, who, if he had something on his mind when he came to lunch, would say, "Mein Führer, I simply must speak to you in private." The other one was Himmler, who used to saunter in, and the first thing we knew he had spent half an hour alone with Hitler in his down-stairs reception-room.

The environment of power had its contributory effect on Hitler's character. He sat in the inner circle of authority, surrounded by three rings of guards. The adulation involved in the Führer principle would have turned steadier heads than his. His information was filtered and he was exposed the whole time to the influence of Goebbels and the congenital radicals. He lost whatever contact with the ordinary people he had ever had. His public speeches became fewer and farther between, and where he had once synthesized the feelings of his audience he now preached to the converted. He was denied even that outlet. He did not really know what was going on in the world and used to call for all the German newspapers, overlooking the fact that they all came out of the one sausage factory, and read them all through, looking for the one thing he could not find, which was reality.

People who have read the collection of his remarks at table assume that he kept up this running fire of comment and commentary the whole time. It is simply not so. During my years at the Chancellery he would rail against the enemies of the régime in his old propaganda style, or talk about past campaigns, but there was no discussion of the progress of his revolution. It was only after the war had started, when there were no more meetings to rant at, and he had a new audience of generals, that he produced for posterity, probably at the suggestion of Bormann, the pearls of wisdom by which he

* It was amusing. He who used to have a better nose for the real story than any first-rate journalist now could not decipher the code underneath the talk.

* D.T. This was at my suggestion — I was always telling A.H. that Himmler was, in fact, most trustworthy and dedicated of his associates, and the one to be trusted above all. In turn, all of those promptings, persecutions, and infiltrations on the tanks of Hitler's pigswash came to me from the C.D. I had no particular interest in Himmler then.

Goebbels was wrong.

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wished to be remembered. It was done for deliberate effect and came long after my time.

Hitler's reaction to the old Bismarckian Chancellery—it was not rebuilt to look like Grand Central Station until later—was to denigrate his great predecessor. "He had no idea about architecture and the proper use of space," Hitler used to complain. "Imagine having the kitchens put into the ground floor." He would try systematically to reduce the stature of the Iron Chancellor, and on the most extraordinary grounds: "Old Bismarck had simply no idea how to deal with the Jewish problem," he said at table once. The entourage had, of course, no feeling for tradition or their surroundings at all. Schaub and Sepp Dietrich were indulging in some piece of uncouth horse-play on one of the old brocade sofas when I lost patience with them: "Can't you realize that Bismarck probably sat there," I told them. "You might at least try and behave properly." Hitler was in the room, but he just looked away and bit his nails.

The intellectual level was nil. To give an example: Schaub one day had come across some nude pictures of Mathilde Ludendorff, taken when that eccentric lady was attending a nature cure of some sort, and these were handed round with appreciative guffaws. In the evening things were a little better, as even Hitler had to do a certain amount of official entertaining, and occasionally I was called upon to do my act at the piano. It was no longer as frequent as it used to be, or as often as people in Berlin assumed. This was probably due to the fact that I had been giving a party in my own house once when Rudolf Hess rang up from the *Reichskanzlei* saying that the Führer wanted me to come and play for him. So I left my guests and went. It was the sort of sacrifice you had to make to keep in with the man. They knew perfectly well I was having a party myself and I am sure they did it deliberately.

The evening company had not yet degenerated, as it did later, when Goebbels brought his actress friends, and no decent woman would go there. Nor were the guests fully *gleichgeschaltet*. There was a very characterful elderly lady named Frau von Dirksen, who was, I think, the stepmother of the ambassador to Tokyo, who said to Hitler once in my hearing: "You must realize that I am and remain a monarchist. For me Wilhelm II is still the Kaiser." It

required quite a lot of courage Hitler had annoyed her with and how the time was coming in the stables of the foreign ministry

The whole place was always set. I would sometimes go to the switches, but Hitler would have been his ideal. It may have been his sight was weaker than I had gassed in the war, but it was and was completely insensitive to him a good photograph was I he really still liked in the evening have one shown almost ever his favourites was *King Kong*. It was, it may be remembered developed a Freudian tendency bigger than its hand, and the had Hitler absolutely spellbound.

His taste in literature still in a bookcase in the Thierschstrasse some occasion when I walked to lunch to find Hitler and the others. They were in the *patio* outside Hitler was holding a letter in his hand and I immediately recognized the writing. "So Ludwig II has signed do you know who wrote it?" that the hand was known to me. A man had come across it at a party suggesting that Hitler should write a sexual love-letter to a man. He was reading it through and I was to be deriving some vicarious pleasure from it.

My position was not easy. I was the one person of long experience in the foreign press correspondents.

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Chancellery - it was not until later - was to idea about architecture to complain. "Imagine floor." He would try on Chancellor, and on luck had simply no idea said at table once. The ition or their surround- indulging in some piece xade sofas when I lost Bismarck probably sat and behave properly." say and bit his nails.

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erated, as it did later, and no decent woman gleichgeschaltet. There Frau von Dirksen, who lor to Tokyo, who said realize that I am and is still the Kaiser." It

required quite a lot of courage to say that sort of thing, even in 1933. Hitler had annoyed her with a long philippic about the reactionaries and how the time was coming when he would clean out the augean stables of the foreign ministry.

The whole place was always a blaze of lights. It looked like a film set. I would sometimes go round trying to turn off some of the switches, but Hitler would have none of it. Shop-window lighting was his ideal. It may have had something to do with the fact that his sight was weaker than he ever admitted, as a result of being gassed in the war, but it was also true that he had no sense of colours and was completely insensitive to the effect of lights on them. For him a good photograph was better than a Leonardo da Vinci. What he really still liked in the evening was watching a film. He would have one shown almost every night in his private cinema. One of his favourites was King Kong, which he had run two or three times. It was, it may be remembered, the story of a gargantuan ape which developed a Freudian tenderness for a human female not much bigger than its hand, and then went beserk. A frightful story, but it had Hitler absolutely spellbound. He talked about it days.

His taste in literature still reminded me of the bottom shelf of the bookcase in the Thierschstrasse. We were down in Munich again on some occasion when I walked into the Osteria Bavaria restaurant for lunch to find Hitler and the entourage installed at one of the tables. They were in the patio outside, so it must have been in the summer. Hitler was holding a letter in his hand on heavy parchment paper, and I immediately recognized the bold and unmistakable handwriting. "So Ludwig II has sent you a letter," I chaffed him. "How do you know who wrote it?" he asked, nonplussed. So I explained that the hand was known to any student of Bavarian history. Hoffmann had come across it at some antique dealer's and probably was suggesting that Hitler should buy it. It was a superbly written homosexual love-letter to a manservant, and Hitler was fascinated by it. He was reading it through and gloating over the phrases. He seemed to be deriving some vicarious satisfaction from the text.

My position was not easy. Hitler kept me around because he felt I was the one person of long acquaintance who could deal with the foreign press correspondents on terms of equality and keep them out

* D. T. Seeing life in black and white rather than in colour was crucial to keeping control of him. Our

* King Kong - the force of the mighty.

It changed every relation by order of magnitude. He could see himself as compared to very many. So much so personally vulnerable.

most unstable clients are painters talents who are talented with a fine eye or a wild eye for color - particularly the East (although I have had breakdowns of communication with the best as well as the worst) the color sense from the Dammhoff and can't trust, and about their souls with incredible vehemence

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The numerous among of your need not private party, dignity, kg.

→ A. H. "Yes, but they can't reach her. We are the only story in the world that is worth watching." (1933)
 → Their independence means even more
 of his hair. He never understood their requirements or psychology or why I could not discipline them as Goebbels and Dietrich disciplined the German press. He thought they had only to be threatened with sanctions or expulsion to bring them to heel and somehow never comprehended that they could work perfectly well in any other country. I spent half my time protecting them, and in one case, with the help of Funk, managed to thwart a serious attempt by Goebbels to expel Knickerbocker. Hitler still listened to me from time to time, but was always careful not to give the *camarilla* the impression that he was taking my advice. He still regarded me in a way as his American expert, although he never absorbed the things I kept trying to tell him.

Once when there was a lunch for all the *Reichsstatthalter* at the Chancellery he suddenly dredged up from the past my suggestion of 1925 about a world tour. He had been giving one of his interminable résumés of the history of the Party, his favourite subject, and the appalling difficulties he had met in rebuilding it after Landsberg. "And what did our Mister Hanfstaengl suggest at the time, gentlemen? That I should abandon Germany and improve my mind abroad." This, of course, brought a great salvo of mocking laughter, so I expostulated and said what valuable experience it would have been for the post in which he now found himself. "What is America but millionaires, beauty queens, stupid records and Hollywood..." he broke in. "I see America from where I sit much more clearly than you have ever known it." The purest megalomania. Of all the guests, only von Epp gave me a slight understanding shrug. It was no good; Hitler never learnt. You could never get him alone, and as long as Schaub, or a Gauleiter, or a *Reichsstatthalter* was there, he started to bray as if he was at a public meeting. It was the only tone and milieu in which he felt at home.

His intransigence concerning foreign countries was almost pathological. Some time during 1933 Neurath had proposed that a useful service might be rendered by returning the famous head of Queen Nefertiti to the Egyptians. It had been found by German archaeologists and its restoration had, in fact, been called for in the Versailles Treaty. I supported the plan as a means of improving relations between Germany and the Middle East. "There you are,

→ to them
 "You are ignorant Hanfstaengl of the wisdom in the principles of such people."
 CIRCUS AT 1

our Mister Hanfstaengl wants to comment. I protested that the excuse for friendly negotiation saying that the fact that the V. of the bust was sufficient reason

Another example of the welbelated American diplomatic November 1933 as I recall. Hanover by train when he was from my compartment to tax staengl, your friends the Am Bolsheviks," he greeted me. "world in the same category," I years ago." Hitler was not to be now done so on her own is proc really wanted to do was find sc before the other members of the

My activities as foreign press ties to undermine my position. Arab professor who had written me to be presented to its subject characters out of the Old Testament him down to Bayreuth, where a barrage of scornful comments my companion. However, I was the garden Hitler was just dis young members of his youth companion he almost sank into if he had ever seen an Arab be a distinguished author who had Mohammed. Fortunately the co Arabic, so Hitler was no wiser th

Needless to say, the visit was a for weeks. I had to go through v I arranged an interview for a dependence of mind, as full rep and I was held to blame for ar

1933

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Shakespeare's phrase in *Macbeth* is the best description of him: 'There's daggers in men's smiles.' Goebbels worked with an equipment of superficial smiles and false bonhomie, getting his enemy in a web of ridiculousness and then suddenly exposing him in some discreditable light. "He's such a nice fellow really, but you know he said something the other day rather silly, ha-ha!" was the line with which he used to tantalize Hitler. And Hitler would say, "Well, what was it, then?" with Goebbels playing the mock friend and going on, "I ought not really to tell you, but. . . ." Then, of course, Hitler would explode, and when Goebbels had him fairly crawling up the wall he would start defending the man against this outburst, knowing full well that this would add fuel to Hitler's flames. I saw him take over the press division of Görtner's Ministry of Justice just that way.

Even Magda, whom he led a dog's life, was not spared his complexes. He had a private cinema-show in his house one time, and just as he was on his way out, up some highly polished wooden steps, to stand and greet his guests as they left, he slipped on his club foot and all but fell down. Magda managed to save him and pull him up beside her. After a moment to recover and before the whole company, he gripped her by the back of the neck and forced her right down to his knee and said, with that sort of mad laughter, "So, you saved my life that time. That seems to please you a lot." Anyone who did not witness the scene would never believe it, but those who did caught their breath at the depth of character depravity it revealed. I remember I had helped him once in similar circumstances at a public meeting when I was walking just behind him with Prince Auwi. You would have expected him to be grateful but, of course, it just fed his hatred.

With the rise of Goebbels, the importance of Rosenberg as a person waned, although there was little cause for consolation in that. He had set himself up in a sumptuous villa on the Tiergarten in charge of the foreign affairs section of the Party, ready to jump into Neurath's shoes. He paid a visit to London with great *réclame* and, praise be, made an awful fool of himself. After ostentatiously laying a wreath at the Cenotaph, someone threw it into the Thames for his pains. I only wish he had been thrown in after it. Hitler, who

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power. Hitler felt he could rely on him: "He is one of those people who do their duty with icy determination," he commented to me once. Himmler's background as an agricultural student explains much. You will seldom find country-people looking at the landscapes in the Munich Pinakothek, but they will go in droves to spend hours at the German museum of technical inventions. Instead of gazing at gold-framed landscapes by van Gogh, they would rather finger through the pages of the newest International Harvester catalogue and look at illustrations of new threshing-machines. Heinrich Himmler was of that type. To him Germany was nothing but a big estate, with himself in charge of its safety precautions. If something was deteriorating it had to be improved or discontinued, if something was sick it had to be quarantined, if it spread contagion it had to be sterilized or liquidated. Suffering beasts do not perturb a farmer overmuch. As a rule they do not belong to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Himmler inverted Darwin's theories as justification for turning human beings back into animals and saw himself as a sort of universal horse-doctor responsible for their selective breeding.

Himmler's prime virtue in Hitler's eyes was his unflinching loyalty. On some occasion I referred jokingly to him in his presence as 'our Fouché'. Himmler quite politely declined the allusion: "No, please, not that." He obviously felt that Fouché was too much the type of the political turncoat to be mentioned even jokingly in connexion with any man of honour.

Hess, in his ill-defined capacity as head of the Party liaison staff, tried to act as Hitler's middleman. His actions were disowned by Hitler so often that in the end he never took a decision, but put people off with vague promises of looking into the matter. Exasperated regional leaders coined a phrase to describe his attitude: 'Come unto me all ye that are weary and heavy laden, and I will do nothing.' Hess was already becoming highly peculiar and went in for vegetarianism, nature cures, and other weird beliefs. It got to the point where he would not go to bed without testing with a divining-rod whether there were any subterranean watercourses which conflicted with the direction of his couch. His wife used to complain: "I have as much experience out of our marriage as a

candidate for confinement was tidy, modest as he and Hess waged Party, and Borman became a nobody, none of his capacity as over from me. I won the Party."

The only thing that and jealousies. Good competition to make Roehm hated each Army. Even the person who had tried to tell which he described the old veterinary staff a *piesel*—a sort of without excuse at a birth was no end to it, like Hitler had said to shall take good care would tolerate no one never allow." With anything and he would

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I had been stunned Nuremberg that the and settling down in the contrary, only I furtively increasing regeneration of the goal. Hitler and a non-clerical, anti-Semitic were prepared to kick them into practical

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1 231

1933

The Child As Father to the Man

GOD: ADOLF HITLER

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youth. There was a brief change just after he became chancellor, when he had his office in the Wilhelmstrasse very close to that of the old Field Marshal-President von Hindenburg. While he was under the watchful eye of Hindenburg, Hitler felt—as he had with his own father—that he must toe the mark. His press attaché, Otto Dietrich, recalls that while Hindenburg was alive Hitler was punctual and even held cabinet meetings in the morning. But as soon as "the Old Gentleman" died he reverted to the life-style he had adopted after the death of his "Herr Vater."

Albert Speer was appalled by the sheer waste of time. Hour after hour and day after day of planning fantastic buildings; hundreds of picnics and pleasure trips in his car; fatuous nightly soliloquies filled with trivia about theater and diet and the training of dogs and misconceptions of history; one or two movies a night, followed by conversations of the most striking mediocrity. Speer himself often called on Hitler once or twice a week at midnight and, after the last movie run, chattered about art until three or four in the morning. After thus cataloguing the empty hours, Speer asks a sensible question: "When, I would often ask myself, did he really work?"²⁵⁴

HITLER'S LOVE AFFAIRS

During all these years, Hitler's relations with women continued to be influenced by his love for the woman whose picture hung over his bed in all his bedrooms. All his serious affairs involved mother substitutes who played the role of Klara to Adolf's Alois. Each of these women was as young in relation to Hitler as Klara had been in relation to her husband. In each case Hitler seems to have been attracted to the young woman because there was something else about her that reminded him of his mother. And in each case, there were manifestations of the sado-masochism which, to his mind, characterized his parents' relationship to each other.

Mimi Reiter

The memory of his vicarious adolescent love affair with Stefanie faded slowly over the years. There is no reliable record of Hitler's interest in a woman until 1926, when he was 37 years old. Then, while staying in the lovely Alpine village of Berchtesgaden, he was attracted by a pretty blond girl who clerked in her mother's dress shop on the ground floor of his hotel. She was 16. Her name was Maria Reiter, though Hitler, who preferred Austrian diminutives, called her Mimi, Mizzi, or Mizerl.²⁵⁵

1926

C GOD: ADOLF HITLER

impressed by Miss Unity Desdale. Often, and in front of Germanic woman." Miss Desdale's ideas, developed a cloying idealism, later married Sir Oswald Mosley at the Osteria Bavaria first had been welcomed to the table to his table conversation. He had the British ambassador, public with the Hitler salute dumbfounded he forgot his duty to attention, giving a crisp salute to Britannia!"²⁷⁷ Miss Mitford and a Union Jack. She was ruthlessly and indefatigably the symbol of her name: the "Ruler of the Seas." For this she gladly die. She very nearly

entered into a state of war with her life shattered. In despair, she shot herself in the head. She brought her flowers in the portrait of himself which she had been escorted by his per- covered. She died in England

act of more controversy and it has been asserted, varied was a homosexual, that he engaged in a particularly gross

show to pursue this matter in different interests, but because of her contribution that psycho- logical demonstration that sexual and integral part in personal- ity a person's social thinking, and the opportunity to observe

The Child As Father to the Man

persons analytically for any length of time is bound to receive the distinct impression that the intimate sexual life definitely marks the individual's attitude toward society."²⁷⁰

It is probable that we shall never know all the intimate details of Hitler's sex life. But of one thing we may be sure: those associates and biographers untrained and disinterested in psychology who assure us that Hitler was "in all respects sexually normal" are mistaken.* There is simply too much evidence against that conclusion.

Ever since the trauma of his infantile experiences, normal sexual intercourse had seemed frightening and repulsive to him. And yet, while repelled by sex, he was also intrigued by it. His absent-minded doodles and sketches are replete with sexual symbolism. *Mein Kampf* is filled with sexual imagery. Every chapter bespeaks a mind that is inordinantly excited by rape, prostitution, syphilis, and "the most disgusting" sexual practices. He wanted to look at sex. He was infatuated with von Stuck's sensuous paintings; he had a library of pornography; he had "blue" films made especially for his private viewing; and he drew pictures which "only a perverted voyeur could have committed to paper."²⁸⁰

The amount of time he devoted to talking about sex is a further indication that the subject was often on his mind. "Depraved" sexual practices were among his favorite topics of conversation as a young man; as chancellor, he would invite young women to confide in him about their sexual experiences, urging them to give him detailed descriptions. His own contribution to these conversations was to speak at length and with increasing excitement about his historical importance. Several of the chorus girls who spent nights with him reported that nothing much happened except that "Hitler sat around bragging the whole evening . . . of his greatness and power."²⁸¹

Much as he enjoyed seeing, hearing and, talking about sexual activity, he was usually careful to avoid physical contact with women of his own age. He delighted in caressing little girls, and he allowed motherly older women to stroke his hair or pat his cheek. But as a youth he had been outraged when it was suggested that he learn to dance; later, as chancellor, he refused to dance with anyone either in private parties or at state functions. He was horrified when a woman kissed

* Proponents of this view include Werner Maser (*Hitler*, 320, 431-438 and *passim*) and John Toland (*Adolf Hitler*, 137, 827, 892-893). Hitler's secretaries and valets also believed that rumors about sexual aberrations were "completely false." (Zoller, *Privat*, 107; and Linge, *Revue*, 26 December 1955). Eva Braun herself apparently told her sister that her sexual relations with Hitler were "completely normal." (Nerin Gun, letter to the editor, *Der Spiegel*, 11 December 1967). But she gave a very different impression to a close friend whom she had known since their schoolgirl days. To this friend, who became the wife of Hermann Esser, she confided disgustedly, "As far as his manhood is concerned, I get absolutely nothing from him. [Als Mann habe ich von ihm überhaupt nichts]." (Hanfstaengl interview, April, 1967).

(3)

1933

side of his ideology. The most
ere was his anticommunism;
onal presentations of himself
antirevolutionary, and even
Christianity.

in (more precisely, the his-
ent by a master historian. Its
o, no matter how briefly, ex-
a Soviet-like rule (as had the
19). Nor was it restricted to
lasses, who had much to fear
evolution. The main appeal of
conomic. There was the fear
nd where the prospects of a
el, the stronger current was
ling the rejection of an inter-
ho seemed to be among its

ocialist; of the two adjectives,
ecisive, than the latter. But he
ism, as well as of *international*
more of an appreciation of
alists than of capitalists and
ents of his in that regard. Nor
He knew that in order to come
communism of the German
old Hindenburg: "The Bol-
idly." He knew that this was
of argument would impress
like nine years before, when

ism among the working classes in
of Marx. It may also be of interest to
popular not when the power of the
Marxists were strongest but when
tries in the 1930s and in the United
Carthy years.

his revolutionary attempt was shot down in the Munich streets,
he would become the ruler of Germany legally, constitutionally,
democratically, and not against but with the support of the most
respectable people in Germany—at least in part because of their
anticommunism. It is significant that he continued using this theme
even after he became chancellor, and even after the election cam-
paign that finally led to his consolidation of power. On 14 Octo-
ber 1933 (and in a speech justifying Germany's departure from
the League of Nations), he said: "The Red revolt could have spread
across Germany like wildfire. . . . For eight months now we have
been waging a heroic struggle against the Communist threat to our
people. . . ." (This at a time when the Communists in Germany had
been annihilated, their leaders in prison or in exile.) On 27 June
1934 (three days before his move against Röhm, the "Night of the
Long Knives"), he received three Catholic bishops, to whom he
declared: "The defense of Europe against Bolshevism is our task for
the next two or three hundred years."*

He knew how to appeal to the conservatives. Already in *Mein
Kampf* he praised the Christian-populist Karl Lueger, "who knew
how to use the existing structures of power and authority, using
such older elements and institutions to the advantage of his own
movement." We saw that he sought, and gained, entry to conserva-
tive circles in Munich as early as 1920-21. In 1926, he fought and
won against the radical Gregor Strasser within the party, agreeing
to vote in favor of a restitution of properties to the former Ger-
man princes that had been taken from them in 1918—a cause dear
to the older German conservatives. In 1930, he said: "Against us
stands an older Germany. It is no longer our world, but we do not
wish to be torn away from this older Germany, because to it belong

*Cited by Klaus Scholder, *Die Kirchen und das Dritte Reich*, 8, 1985, 1, p. 246. He
would, of course, return to such arguments after his invasion of the Soviet Union in
June 1941, but at that time he would no longer do so in the service of domestic
politics but as an instrument of his statesmanship; while at the same time (again,
privately), he often expressed his admiration for Stalin, together with his contemp-
tuous hatred of the reactionary capitalists Churchill and Roosevelt. For more
details about this, see chapter 5.

1935

1933

1920

1930

1941

1929 (33) 38, 44

(3)

er 1934: "In Germany bayo-
government is supported by
I have not been imposed by
ple I have grown up, in the
return. My pride is that I
with greater right than I can
le."* Fest's insight is consid-
ish a tyranny [Gewaltherr-
er is insufficient to explain
be studied as [yet] another
en that Hitler himself said
wish to be one. Kershaw
"To suggest that Hitler's
aving aside difficulties with
ate only a partial truth."† In
tion that at least until 1938
but an authoritarian state,
orships in the Europe of the

urse, a difference between
es, between, say, Hitler's on
or Pilsudski's or Metaxas's
than one of nuances. Most
tain total control over per-
attention on *the state*, we
res Hitler's vision—and his
emporary dictators, including

ziti, was a creation of the
Renaissance Italy and then
years ago; in an age marked
narchy, aristocracy, democ-

racy—and that Hitler's vision of history and of the future entailed a radical break with the institutions of the Modern Age. He would have agreed with Tocqueville on one thing: that the age of democracy was now irreversible. One hundred years before Hitler's assumption of power, Tocqueville projected a new kind of tyranny, peculiar to the democratic age: the tyranny of a majority. What was perhaps peculiar to Hitler was his establishment of a tyranny not so much of but through a majority.* "The state"—i.e., state interests, the security of the state—was a sacrosanct term in the modern world, even in Stalin's Soviet Russia, at the latest by 1939.† But already in *Mein Kampf*, Hitler had written that "the state is but a means to the end" ["Der Staat ist ein Mittel zum Zweck"]. And—with all of the compromises he had to make for the sake of the state—he remained consistent about this priority till the end. In March 1920, he said: "For us the idea of the Volk is higher than the idea of the state." On 10 May 1933: "It is not an accident that reli-
gions are more stable than forms of states." On 6 April 1938, he put it tersely in a speech in Salzburg: "In the beginning was the Volk, and only then came the Reich." Or, in his significant speech to officers in the Platterhof in May 1944: "The state is only an enforced frame-work" [eine Zwangsform].‡ On 5 September 1934, in Nuremberg:

*Zitelmann (ЗІТ/В, p. 85) cites Haffner: In 1933, among the German majority there existed a widespread feeling of freedom, of being "relieved of [parliamentary] democracy." He adds: "Hopes for a revival of national greatness were joined with utopian aspirations for a better, more socially minded society. It may sound paradoxical: but the end of [parliamentary] democracy seemed to mean to many the beginning of true popular rule."

†The term *the state*, originally anathema not only to Marx but also to Lenin, had become sacrosanct in the Soviet Union by 1939. (It may even be argued that Stalin's 1936–39 purges signified in large part the transformation of a party bureaucracy into a state bureaucracy.) In any event, Stalin (who, the very opposite of Lenin, was not a revolutionary but a statesman) discovered the supreme importance of the state at the very time when Hitler found that supreme importance to be outdated—another example of the backwardness of Stalin's Communism compared with Hitler's National Socialism.

‡Jäckel (JHВ, p. 99) also cites МК: "The question of the external structure of the state . . . is not of principal importance, it only serves certain practical purposes." Haffner (HF/AN, p. 86) goes further—in my opinion, correctly—recognizing the significance that "in Hitler's political system the state plays an entirely subordinate part."

(2)

1932 (1933)

Statesman and Strategist

139

1933-4

st the judgment of the best-

ric—realization that Hitler
s was the return of the su-
ower was the prime key to
ahan (who was respected in
890s. That may have been
r. The motorization of mili-
leon's time the English, if
erable while they could sail
pire, landing here or there
s could move faster on land
ew (and he said so on many
is trench warfare of World
n the Western front in the
d not return. He was fasci-
The mobility of armor was
† Among his opponents the
later General, de Gaulle,
his; Franklin Roosevelt, as
r was the key to victory,"
l the Atlantic, but not in
this quickly. All the superi-
air) was not enough; Hitler
red on land. Perhaps Stalin
s been land animals.

to belittle Hitler as a strategist,
developed conceptions regarded
: "Undoubtedly Hitler was able,
rman Wehrmacht than even the
ible." Bullock, too (su, p. 588):
niversity or a staff college, had
their own game. It is customary
justly to be made responsible for
titled to the major share of the
not have it both ways."
il. He was able to recall many
nery of enemy warships. Fest (F,
ig predominance of sea power.

ON 30 JANUARY 1933, HITLER became the chancellor of a dark
and depressed nation whose depression, however, was unusual,
because it was not lethargic. On the contrary, millions of Germans
felt themselves gripped by a strange kind of agitation, not knowing
what to anticipate. Except for a minority who, with every reason,
envisaged the worst, most Germans soon accustomed themselves to
a new order that was both more and less radical than they had
expected. There was a radical break with their immediate political
past—this in spite of Hitler's proud insistence that a national revo-
lution was being accomplished without turmoil and bloodshed.
There was, however, a continuity—of sorts—in Germany's relations
with the rest of the world.

1933+

It was not only that the immense importance of Hitler's assump-
tion of power was inadequately understood by almost all foreign
observers. (This is evident from the articles and commentaries of for-
eign newspapers during the week following 30 January 1933.) Despite
the Depression, despite the very high rate of German unemployment,
despite the recurrent electoral and political crises through which Ger-
many passed in 1932, that year German foreign policy became more
assertive than at any time since 1918. The Lausanne agreement in
July 1932, which virtually put an end to all German "reparations," was
acknowledged both by the Wilhelmstrasse and by German public
opinion with a shrug of the shoulder; and at the more and more
desultory disarmament conferences in Geneva the German delega-
tion was increasingly stiff-necked and demanding. There is every
reason to believe that the power and prestige of Germany would
have risen in the 1930s even without Hitler; but a detailed exposi-
tion of this argument does not belong in this book. What does belong
is a brief discussion of how Hitler, in the service of his statesmanship,
made good use of the traditional and conservative personnel of the
German Foreign Ministry during the first five years of his rule*—

1932

"On one occasion, Goebbels criticized Hitler's foreign minister Neurath: Not a
Nazi, "he belongs to an entirely different world." Hider: No. "[Neurath] is seen in
the Anglo-Saxon world as a [gentleman]." (SP, p. 162.) Also p. 217: "Gentleman"
was an unusual word for Hitler to use."

1933+34

* D. T. "He was more radical and
certainly less radical than
the German people expected."
"I know that already."

ell as Bullock, put it: Hitler was popular revolutionary movement natives such as Papen.* Perhaps generally speaking, the statement is during the Historians' Contro- the National Socialists . . . could the voluntary support of a con- tes."† And by March 1933 many siderata of a Third Reich. This only an inevitable element for a a "faute de mieux," in place of had become eminently respec- contributed to his respectability

is a fair summary, and unexceptionable: on the German Right, who not only defence of the Republic but made Hitler the old ruling class of Imperial Germany the war or to the overthrow of the mon- created by the Republican regime which was of power and influence. . . . All this

Whatever may be said of individuals, empty and hostile to the regime they which was the pride of the biggest Party ally to the Republic." In 80, p. 120, Bul- but the considerate treatment Hitler re- munities of high treason in a state where commendation to mercy."

running evidence from the Goebbels ter—of Hitler's absolute conviction that

the summer of 1932, "conservatives" such Grosigk doubted whether a government

Field Marshal Mackensen was much. 1933. He was somewhat critical of my heart as a statesman, soldier, and had no political influence or following, a large estate to Mackensen. In Decem- nineteenth birthday. In 1941, he allowed and on a special train.

(2)

1933, 1936, 1941

(perhaps especially among the people at large); but the converse was also true: His respectability contributed to his power (perhaps especially among the conservative elements of German society)—or at least to the feebleness of resistance against him. As Heer concluded: "Neither in German Catholicism nor in the Vatican did Hitler meet an opponent who was worthy of him [der ihm gewachsen war]." Among all of the institutions, including the churches, of the Hitler era, the record of the Catholic Church—of some of the bishops and priests as well as some of the Catholic population—was, relatively speaking, the least compromised and was sometimes even inspiring. The historical literature devoted to that complicated subject is extensive. At the same time, some of the responses to Hitler by otherwise non-Nazi or even anti-Nazi members of the hierarchy are less than inspiring, especially in retrospect.†

1933

*HR, p. 471.

†A few random examples. Cardinal Faulhaber, archbishop of Munich, to Hitler at the signing of the 1933 Concordat: "What the old parliaments and parties had not been able to accomplish in sixty years, your far-seeing statesmanship achieved in six months on a world-historical level . . . a great deed of immeasurable blessing." In 1936, Faulhaber visited Hitler at the Berghof. He was much impressed, agreeing entirely with Hitler about the necessary worldwide fight against Bolshevism. "The Führer also demonstrated social and diplomatic manners worthy of a born sovereign." HR, pp. 282, 316: "Evidently the Austrian charm of the Führer had im- pressed the Cardinal." Faulhaber's strong pastoral letter against Communism (on 27 December 1936) was made at Hitler's request. In 1936 even the principled and anti-Nazi Cardinal Preysing of Berlin remarked: "National Socialism in Berlin has undoubtedly eliminated the very dangerous agitations of Socialism and Communism as well as many phenomena of smut and dirt [*Schmutz und Schund*] so very dangerous to religion and morality." In Joachim Kuroпка, ed., *Clemens August Graf von Galen. Neue Forschungen zum Leben und Wirken des Bischofs von Münster* (Mün- ster, 1992), p. 211. The weak Cardinal Bertram of Breslau, then president of the Catholic Bishops' Conference, sent fulsome congratulatory telegrams to Hitler on the latter's birthdays. (In 1939 he said: "I told the children: Heil Hitler—this is valid for this world; Praise be Jesus Christ—that is the tie between earth and heaven.") No neater formula can be imagined. Lukacs, *lew*, p. 465.)

Public respectability for many German hierarchs was inseparable from expres- sions of nationalism. Bishop Berning in a letter to Göring in March 1942: "The entire nation must stand united, to accomplish the final [!] victory over its ene- mies." Kuroпка, p. 357. About Bishop, later Cardinal, Galen's praise of the Ger- man invasion of Russia in 1941, in the same sermon in which he attacked the

(*)

1936

Scene

1941

1939

1941

He D.T. I had worked long and hard on circumstances which to say that

I kept turning his attention to fine examples of courtesy, gentle wit, self-deprecating irony of the modest sort, and attention to colour. He absorbed it all later in the way that a talented actor keeps adding valuable details to his role

evolution of his thinking in that regard. There were many committed and rigid racist and racial dogmatists among his early allies and followers. The dogmatic racists among the higher members of the Third Reich's hierarchy, such as Himmler, were numerous and important; their racial philosophy led to the establishment of various institutions. Yet Hitler did not share Himmler's "primitive biologism" (well put by Marlis Steinert). Schramm noted that he "had serious reservations about the glorification of the early period of the Germanic peoples—unlike many of his followers."* Speer cited Hitler's dismissal of Himmler's racist mysticism: "What nonsense! We have reached a time that leaves mysticism behind, and now he is beginning with his again. We might as well have stayed with the Church. That has tradition at least." A number of historians noted that Hitler did not take Alfred Rosenberg seriously at all, and that he was contemptuous of Rosenberg's cloudy book *Myth of the 20th Century*. According to Speer, Hitler said, "A step backward to medieval mythmaking!"† Heer cited one of Hitler's 1942 table talks, in which he expressed his pleasure with Cardinal Faulhaber's public protests against Rosenberg's screed.‡

Hitler's many—and there were many—statements about races are really statements about what he saw as national characteristics. There was a racist element in his thinking (as is true of almost every nationalist), but his governing obsessions were not biological. He knew of the relative lack of response among the German people to the racial propaganda put out in streams by Rosenberg and Himmler. National sentiments of superiority, where and when they existed among the German people, were cultural rather than racial. This is a subject of enormous significance and delicacy which lies largely unexplored. There was (and remains) a superficially slight but essentially profound difference between a folkish and a racist type of thinking.** The response that Hitler wished to evoke was the result of the former rather than the latter. And that reflected, too,

*SCH, p. 77.

†SP, pp. 108, 110.

‡HR, p. 406.

**See LEW, p. 397.

*about whom the racist
doubtless originated
the Volk culture
being, etcetera, etc
etc.*

the evolution—if that is recognition—of his own

In May 1944, to office Hitler said: "We have to deal with a race, and this is [speaking] about twenty [counterrevolutionary-b one and the same! No! component of blood, a h is very often composed of different racial kernels. particular talents."* And 1945, Hitler said: "Pride damentally, does not po matter of convenience, I view there is no such thing as the Jewish race. . . .†

NATIONALISM AND RACE
there a first-rate general
One reason for this is that
country more than international
not the place to expatriate
except to emphasize three
a nationalist than a racist
clusionary than racism—I

1933

*Speech of 26 May 1944, published in *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, not insist on the superiority of racial kernels, with a commercial among us, in the long run, and been absorbed racially by the German Volk gradually, step by

†*The Testament of Adolf Hitler* after AH/B). In these last recorded spiritual race."

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"C
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tol
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luc
vir
ec
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st
a
t
t

1942

D.T.
I made
certain
he
remained
sweet
to
Himmler's
face.
I did
not
trust
Himmler
at all.
He was
too
divided
to A.H.
too much
in love
and in
the way
of an
ever-loving wife

①

1933 ³⁶

which the strength of our nation rests. It will be the strong protector of Christianity as the basis of our common moral order, and of the family as the basic cell of the people and body of our nation." And on 15 February 1933, in Stuttgart: "They say today that Christendom is imperiled, that the Catholic faith is in danger. To this I answer: 'Finally there are Christians and not international atheists who are in charge in Germany.'" After his electoral empowerment Hitler went on with this theme. He spoke of the "Christian fundament of the state." On 1 May 1933: "We do not ask the Almighty: 'Lord, make us free!' We want to work, in brotherly understanding, struggling together, so that the hour comes when we may face the Lord and say: 'Lord, we have changed!'"† It was thus that Papen—perhaps sincerely but wrongly—could say that the Third Reich was "the Christian counter-movement to 1789"; that is, the counter-revolution to the French Enlightenment.

von Papen to von Hindenburg

This is not the place to detail the complicated and melancholy history of Hitler's relationship with the leaders of the German churches. It has been studied often, and described at times carefully and well. What belong here are a few examples of Hitler's continued acknowledgment of the importance of that relationship. During the previously mentioned June 1934 meeting with three archbishops (Gröber of Freiburg, Berning of Osnabrück, Bares of Berlin), Hitler said, "Never in this life will I lead a Kulturkampf." He was even able to impress anti-Nazi princes of the Church. (Thus Cardinal Faulhaber of Munich, after meeting Hitler in 1936: "The Führer is a master of diplomatic and social manners, as if he were a born monarch, if not better.")‡ In August 1941, Hitler ordered that no move should be undertaken against Archbishop von Galen of Münster, who had openly attacked the euthanasia practices of the government during a Sunday sermon. In the same month Hitler threatened the Gauleiter of Bavaria with removal and imprisonment

1936 *

*Cited in ZIT/PR, p. 13.

†Cited in HR, pp. 250, 262.

‡D, p. 119. Cardinal Faulhaber in his sermon on New Year's Eve, 1938, praised Hitler's "example of a simple, sober way of life, free of alcohol and nicotine. . . ." Cited in Lothar Gruchmann, "Korruption im Dritten Reich," vFZ, October 1994, p. 577.

because of the latter's stupidity from Bavarian schoolrooms. tive, included a sentence: "C not reconcilable." Hitler ordered the instant cancellation of the often during the war, he told the churches to task would. Then they would be properly liberated from their influence.

He knew what he was doing: ever duality may have existed within the German people. Cardinal) von Galen—still: Christian resistance against a sermon in August 1941, pra and Bolshevism. Here, how including the religious idea the ideas (and the rhetoric a

IN 1934, AFTER HIS EXPULSION from Germany, Otto Strasser put in order to avoid choosing Strasser's prophecy of Hitler's analysis of Hitler's purpose: eign policy was secondary in tent with his primary and j kind of unity of the German: from that of the great German wrote of "Das Primat der policy in the histories of n

*FR, p. 33.

†SCHRRB, p. 152.

‡The important element in the supreme importance of the state of the nation. (See chapter 4.)

4. P. T. I admit it. I enjoyed the remark. How hard I had worked on those early little petty bourgeois self-effacement and excessive over-mannered politeness, all so transparently false.

at least some

①

(1933) 1934

1933
1934

me to the fore in 1930 and after
man nationalism*—among all
those who were worst affected by
ic woes. "The workingmen have
ld not have been more wrong—
in 1914, and even more in the
mendable for having recognized
uddenly became part of every-
Communists began to speak in
happened in Germany in 1933
r quality of Proudhon's insight

over that of Marx—that people respond not to social contracts but
to realities of power.*

Hitler understood that thoroughly. Kershaw noted: "Only one of
the four general plebiscites to take place during the Third Reich did
not follow a major foreign-policy triumph. Externally, the Western
powers had not merely missed an opportunity of halting German
expansion: they had to witness the enormous popularity boost which
[the Rhineland occupation] had given Hitler."† One cannot, and
should not, blame the German people for being impressed with
how foreign statesmen treated and praised Hitler in the 1930s. At
the same time their mute acceptance—indeed, their approval—of
Hitler's brutal mass executions in June 1934 shocks us in retrospect.
As Haffner put it, "if one can speak of the collective guilt of the
German people, then perhaps this is where it all began."

"What kind of state was Germany during that time? Contrary to
widely held beliefs, it was not a one-party state, unlike the German
Democratic Republic or the Soviet Union, dominated by a highly
structured political party. The National Socialist Party had no Central
Committee, no Politburo, and Hitler never convened executive
committee meetings. . . . It was not the party that dominated the
state but Hitler who dominated everything, including the party.

Again Haffner, *HF/AT*, pp. 185–86: "The Germans in the Thirties became a
politically unified nation. It is a process that is still not fully understood, probably
because people like to forget that in the spring and early summer of 1933 some-
thing like a national coming together was indeed taking place, not necessarily behind
the National Socialist Party, but behind Adolf Hitler, behind the Führer as he was
beginning to be called." Also M. Broszat, *Nach Hitler*. Der schwierige Umgang mit
unserer Geschichte (M, 1986), p. 164: "The . . . populist attraction of National Social-
ism was more important than its ideological indoctrination of the masses."

"Or consider that Ferdinand Lassalle, the founder of German Socialism, told
Bismarck in 1863: "a secret . . . that the working class has an instinctive inclina-
tion to accept dictatorship." In Reinhold Schneider, *Der Balkon* (Frankfurt, 1959),
p. 120: "an insight of immense significance, that of the guilt and shame of twelve
years. . . ." Or Julius Fröbel, a German Liberal, in 1848: "The German nation had
enough of principles and doctrines, of literary reputations and a life devoted to
theory. What it wants is power, power, power; and who gives it power will be
revered, more than it dreams of."

†KER, p. 105. This was already so well before 1936: Hitler's rejection of the
League of Nations, or the Saar plebiscite, for example.

* D.T. I did not need the O.O. to tell me
that the moment was ripe. The people loved
Hitler and wanted more of him — when

that
in the
way.

anyone
stands
up.

D.T.

people want more of
him. They will give
any old up. He's not
the one.

same?

episode in Heiden, *HD*, pp. 231–32. In
braukeller in Munich, a good speech. A
ed, shouting, and then began to sing
and the chairman of the meeting stood
white with fury at the cowardice of this
year later he died. "The meeting was
organizers. . . . When Stresemann con-
"Herr Minister, one had to show these
they!" Instead of having shown them the
goal" to a ruffian, they abandoned their
us would Hitler come to power."
1933 there were still some Social Demo-
who applauded Hitler's foreign-policy
—probably sincerely, and not because

1988, p. 25: Germany was different
er by largely democratic means. "His-
Bracher's seminal work—worked out
January 1933, illuminating the responsi-
thus contributing essentially to [the his-
... On the other hand it did not
not to be found among the Papens, etc.,

people responsible for their regimes? In
a majority. In 1917, the Bolsheviks in
were not. But Hitler had a large plu-
—as a matter of fact, the July 1932 elec-
—except for Hindenburg's temporary

at least come to power, no one

As some German historians, as well as Bullock, put it: Hitler was appointed to power not through a popular revolutionary movement but through the intrigues of conservatives such as Papen. Perhaps for "not" I would put "less," but generally speaking, the statement is valid.† As Walter Euchner wrote during the Historians' Controversy: "Contrary to the Bolsheviks, the National Socialists . . . could accomplish their political aims with the voluntary support of a considerable part of the traditional elites."‡ And by March 1933 many of the latter responded to the desiderata of a Third Reich. This strange man, Hitler, was no longer only an inevitable element for a conservative and nationalist revival, a "faute de mieux," in place of something better, but someone who had become eminently respectable.** Thereafter Hitler's power contributed to his respectability

*Bullock's paragraph in *BU*, pp. 254-55, is a fair summary, and unexceptionable: "... the heaviest responsibility of all rests on the German Right, who not only failed to combine with the other parties in defence of the Republic but made Hitler their partner in a coalition government. The old ruling class of Imperial Germany had never reconciled itself to the loss of the war or to the overthrow of the monarchy in 1918. They were remarkably well treated by the Republican regime which followed. Many of them were left in positions of power and influence. . . . All this won neither their gratitude nor their loyalty. Whatever may be said of individuals, as a class they remained irreconcilable, contemptuous and hostile to the regime they continued to exploit. The word 'Nationalist,' which was the pride of the biggest Party of the Right, became synonymous with disloyalty to the Republic." In *BU*, p. 120, Bullock also makes a trenchant statement about the considerate treatment Hitler received at his 1924 trial: "Such were the penalties of high treason in a state where disloyalty to the regime was the surest recommendation to mercy."

†To this, however, we must add the stunning evidence from the Goebbels diaries—from 1930 and, in a way, even earlier—of Hitler's absolute conviction that he would be assuming power, sooner or later.

‡*HS*, p. 357. Fest noted that already in the summer of 1932, "conservatives" such as Papen, von Braun, and Schwerin von Krosigk doubted whether a government without Hitler could exist for long.

**One example: The old monarchist Field Marshal Mackensen was much impressed with Hitler at Potsdam in March 1933. He was somewhat critical of Hitler's mustache and hair but said "he won my heart as a statesman, soldier, and man." Even though men such as Mackensen had no political influence or following, Hitler understood them well. He awarded a large estate to Mackensen. In December 1939 he visited the aged martinet on his ninetieth birthday. In 1941, he allowed him to travel to the kaiser's funeral in Holland on a special train.

(perhaps especially among the respectable among the conservatives at least to the feebleness of "Neither in German Catholicism nor in the Protestant Church an opponent who was weak." Among all of the institutions of the Weimar era, the record of the Catholic Church as well as some of the Protestant churches speaking, the least complete. The historical literature is extensive. At the same time it is otherwise non-Nazi or even less than inspiring, especially

**HR*, p. 471.

†A few random examples. Cardinal Faulhaber, who had not been able to accomplish his mission in six months on a world-historical mission, visited Hitler in 1936. Faulhaber visited Hitler entirely with Hitler about the new Führer also demonstrated social responsibility. *HR*, pp. 282, 310. "Faulhaber pressed the Cardinal." Faulhaber (27 December 1936) was made at the anti-Nazi Cardinal Preysing of Breslau undoubtedly eliminated the very nism as well as many phenomena dangerous to religion and morality. *von Galen. Neue Forschungen zum 1. September*, 1992, p. 211. The weak Catholic Bishops' Conference, sent the latter's birthdays. (In 1939) he was valid for this world; Praised be J. heaven." No nearer formula can be

Public respectability for many (sions of nationalism. Bishop Bernini entire nation must stand united, to mies." Kuropka, p. 357. About Bishop man invasion of Russia in 1941, i

* D.T. I was able to point this out to him. Since he was already balanced back and forth on the question of whether to work with the conservatives (he could not bear their arrogant assumption that they were a class ennobled by the cosmos) it took a bit of doing, but he saw the political logic. He was, all considered, a genius at what came to political logic

(3)

1921-22, 1924-25, (1933-34)

Statesman and Strategist

147

1935

raw material of the Ural
ins of the Ukraine to be
ship the German people
39 he began to show his
t even in the Carpatho-

German-Russian improve-
39, that is, before Hitler's
id occupy what remained
decisive change of British
oland and the attempt to
Russia. Many things indi-
n-Russian alliance as un-
of 1939 he demonstrated
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oscow (except during the
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us then served him well).
contacts and negotiations
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is the triangular relation-
of 1939. The British and
their wish to bring Stalin
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sources indicated Hitler would
months." M. Tilea was not an

id at the news of the Hitler-
course, largely right, but while
German National Socialism

was still possible). Stalin was as secretive about his contacts with Berlin as behooved a sly Caucasian chieftain. It is significant that Hitler allowed hints to be dropped on occasion (as early as May) to the British and the French about the possibility of a German agreement with Russia.* Instructive, then, is his, often cited, conversation with the Swiss Carl J. Burckhardt on 11 August 1939, a few days before he approached Stalin directly. He told Burckhardt (who, he knew, was a partisan of some kind of German-British accommodation): "Everything I undertake is directed against Russia; if the West is too stupid and too blind to understand this, I shall be forced to seek an understanding with the Russians, defeat the West, and after its defeat turn with all of my forces against the Soviet Union. I need the Ukraine, so that they cannot starve us out, as during the last war." Many historians have described this statement as revelatory of Hitler's entire subsequent war strategy; Hillgruber described it as prophetic and farsighted [visionär].† In reality, it was Hitler's attempt (he knew that Burckhardt was listened to in London) to frighten the Western powers into abandoning Poland.

a scene

The attempt did not succeed. Nor did the news of the Hitler-Stalin pact eleven days later; nor his last attempts to "drive a wedge," as he himself put it, between the British and the Poles through his last, fraudulent, "offers" to Poland. Since the Poles refused to become German satellites, he would subdue them through war. With Britain and France he did not want war, and hoped that it might not come to that. But on 3 September 1939, Britain and France, however reluctantly, declared war on the Third Reich. Here was the first great and ultimately decisive failure of Hitler's statesmanship. Still, strategically it was not a decisive failure—at any rate, not yet. He knew that the British and the French were reluctant warriors. They might declare war, but beyond that, at least for the time being, they would do little or nothing. About that in the short run he was right.

*His ability to *divide et impera*—that is, not committing himself to one side or another for a time—existed already in 1921-22 and 1924-25 in the face of antagonisms within the party (and perhaps also in 1933-34, between the army and the SA.)

†HST, pp. 28-29. Also F, p. 801, and HF/A1, p. 224.

But the same as Munich in 1921.

(2)

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ric—realization that Hitler
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power was the prime key to
ahan (who was respected in
890s. That may have been
r. The motorization of mili-
leon's time the English, if
terable while they could sail
pire, landing here or there
s could move faster on land
ew (and he said so on many
s trench warfare of World
n the Western front in the
d not return. He was fasci-
The mobility of armor was
t Among his opponents the
later General, de Gaulle,
his; Franklin Roosevelt, as
r was the key to victory,"
l the Atlantic, but not in
this quickly. All the superi-
air) was not enough; Hitler
red on land. Perhaps Stalin
s been land animals.

s to belittle Hitler as a strategist,
developed conceptions regarded
o: "Undoubtedly Hitler was able,
rman Wehrmacht than even the
sible." Bullock, too (su, p. 588):
university or a staff college, had
their own game. It is customary
justly to be made responsible for
itted to the major share of the
not have it both ways."
ill. He was able to recall many
ery of enemy warships. Fest (F,
ig predominance of sea power.

ON 30 JANUARY 1933, HITLER became the chancellor of a dark
and depressed nation whose depression, however, was unusual,
because it was not lethargic. On the contrary, millions of Germans
felt themselves gripped by a strange kind of agitation, not knowing
what to anticipate. Except for a minority who, with every reason,
envisaged the worst, most Germans soon accustomed themselves to
a new order that was both more and less radical than they had
expected. There was a radical break with their immediate political
past—this in spite of Hitler's proud insistence that a national revo-
lution was being accomplished without turmoil and bloodshed.
There was, however, a continuity—of sorts—in Germany's relations
with the rest of the world.

1933*

It was not only that the immense importance of Hitler's assump-
tion of power was inadequately understood by almost all foreign
observers. (This is evident from the articles and commentaries of for-
eign newspapers during the week following 30 January 1933.) Despite
the Depression, despite the very high rate of German unemployment,
despite the recurrent electoral and political crises through which Ger-
many passed in 1932, that year German foreign policy became more
assertive than at any time since 1918. The Lausanne agreement in
July 1932, which virtually put an end to all German "reparations," was
acknowledged both by the Wilhelmstrasse and by German public
opinion with a shrug of the shoulder; and at the more and more
desultory disarmament conferences in Geneva the German delega-
tion was increasingly stiff-necked and demanding. There is every
reason to believe that the power and prestige of Germany would
have risen in the 1930s even without Hitler; but a detailed exposi-
tion of this argument does not belong in this book. What does belong
is a brief discussion of how Hitler, in the service of his statesmanship,
made good use of the traditional and conservative personnel of the
German Foreign Ministry during the first five years of his rule*—

1932

*On one occasion, Goebbels criticized Hitler's foreign minister Neurath: Not a
Nazi, "he belongs to an entirely different world." Hitler: No. "[Neurath] is seen in
the Anglo-Saxon world as a [gentleman]." (su, p. 162.) Also p. 217: "Gentleman"
was an unusual word for Hitler to use."

1933+34

Dr. T. "The more radical and
certainly less radical than
the German people expect."
"I know that already."

beliefs; but none of this meant that he had changed his own radical and revolutionary views. He was more than a demagogue; he was a populist. Often Hitler insisted that he was not a dictator. Dictators were petty tyrants,* often dependent on small coteries supporting them by force. He saw himself as the leader not of a determined minority but of a majority. "We National Socialists are the better democrats," he said several times during the years 1933-1935.† He agreed with Goebbels when the latter pronounced (in 1934) the existence of a "new Germanic democracy." While he was contemptuous and dismissive of parliamentary democracy and of the democratic "pretensions" of Great Britain and the United States during the war, in his speech on 30 January 1941 he said that "the National Socialist Revolution defeated democracy through democracy!"

Shocked and stunned as he was in 1918 by witnessing and living through the collapse of the German empire, Hitler was not a monarchist—even though before 1918 we have no evidence of his hostility to the Hohenzollerns (as contrasted with his consistent hostility to the Habsburgs). Because of his need for conservative support there were few—if any—antimonarchical statements by Hitler during the period 1929-33, or until well after his assumption of the chancellorship. There were German (especially North German) conservatives who as late as 1934 hoped that Hitler would consent to a restoration of the monarchy in Germany. But after Hindenburg's death, with his consolidation of the chancellorship and the presidency, his dismissals of the—for him long-antiquated—hereditary idea and the monarchical principle (and not only in Germany) began to accumulate. A significant—and, for him, revelatory—event was his state visit to Italy in May 1938. He was repelled by what he saw as the creaking ceremonials of the Italian royal house, the precedences of court society, the corruptions of the Roman aristocracy, the personal weaknesses of the Italian king. By having

"I am not a dictator and will never be one . . . any popinjay can rule as a dictator." Cited by Fest, F, p. 372.

†Zit/A gives many instances of such Hitler statements: p. 569, note 189. See also BU, p. 191, Hitler's "open letter" to Brüning, 13 December 1931: "You refuse, as a 'statesman', to admit that if we come to power legally we could then break through legality. Herr Chancellor, the fundamental thesis of democracy runs: 'All Power From The People.'"

allowed its continued existence, his friend Mussolini, what Hitler saw, and thought many of his confidants. The remnants of the surviving Social period; it had, after all, been Germany from the Hohenzollerns.

The Kaiser, William II, when the German army in offered him refuge in England (or word) did he demonstrate under the German occupation sent a congratulatory telegram. The phrase that his great turning through God's will by God!") Hitler was content to him?"† As far as he was Germany if he so wished. In a special train with the imperial Kaiser's funeral.

IN THE PREFACE OF HIS speculated: had Hitler suddenly and would perhaps still be mans in history.‡ Such a state but the reality of it would achievements—domestic and of his leadership of Germany

*HR, p. 417. In 1/W, p. 65, Irvinchies are at most capable of having empires are won only by revolution.

†Hermann Giesler, *Ein anderer* (after: GR), p. 393.

‡F, p. 25.

**Especially by a German generally addressed, but also by Deuerlein, and others); by Haffner

D. T. By
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to react
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his own.

1938

1929-33

1938

1933-1935

1941

①

1933-38, 1939

133-38
Reinhardt
sec 139

even as he also took care not to alienate that other traditionalist and conservative element of the former republic: the army. Only one or two German diplomats resigned from the foreign service after 1933 and before 1938. Still Hitler's belief in his ideology remained fundamental. It would be too simple to think that he had subordinated his revolutionary ideology to the interests of the state (something that Stalin would do in a crass and brutal manner, misunderstood by anti-Communist ideologues to this day). It would be more accurate to say that Hitler's Realpolitik* was a compound of ideological convictions and calculations of state interest, indeed to the very end—a compound in which he, at least, saw no contradictions.†

Those of Hitler's serious biographers who have felt compelled to acknowledge, and describe, the startlingly successful first six years of his chancellorship have concentrated mostly on his domestic achievements without, of course, ignoring those of his statesmanship in foreign policy—reasonably so, since the two were not separable.‡ While, on the one hand, his forging of a German national unity was the basis on which his foreign moves had to depend, on the other hand his popular support was steadily enhanced by his people's admiration of his foreign policy, which had led to such a

*The word "Realpolitik" was coined by the Heidelberg writer A. L. von Rochau in 1853, in his book *Grundsätze der Realpolitik*.

†Thus, for example, he would appoint the same Papen, for whose political ideas and tactics within Germany Hitler had little respect, to important foreign posts (in Vienna and Ankara), where Papen's canny abilities served Hitler well (at least until 1944). As a matter of fact, there were crucial occasions (such as in July 1940) when Hitler would call for Papen, if not for advice, then to hear him out. LEW, p. 334, note 15: "On one occasion, in 1939, Ribbentrop forbade members of the ministry to talk directly with Papen [GD, D, VIII, p. 330]—yet Papen continued to function under Hitler's protection."

‡Görlitz-Quint, 60, p. 513: "He applied the image of the party struggles [of the Weimar Republic] literally to foreign policy. He never realized that domestic and foreign policy are two entirely different matters." But are they? In this respect Irving's summary statement is, for once, more telling (i/w, p. xxiii): "In Hitler's view, Germany's [former] statesmen had put domestic strength too low in their priorities. . . . First he restored Germany's psychological unity; on this stable foundation he rebuilt her economic strength; and on that base in turn he built up the military might with which to enforce an active foreign policy."

great rise of German power was erroneous to assert it by and large, successful politics; and that these results of ideology over statesmanship he may have not something apart but part and parcel of the year, 1934, when Hitler seemed, at least for a while, this would not continue. 1934 may have been in some of his biographers at worst, delayed the process Mussolini would then do nor obstructed its event and statesmanship government Franco in the Spanish Civil War with China and Japan.‡ 1928 "book" he had emphasized German Reich needing it was more than realize rejoice at a naval treaty had some evidence to circles of England would

*Thus Fest, p. 836: "After returned to it." This is very doubtful.

†Fest is not correct about resisting Germany's further aggression. Hitler's Realpolitik dictated he was a tactician and showed policy: for years he did nothing keep [the civil war] going."

‡Toland, 70, p. 401: Hitler in 1936: "Admittedly spineless to justify German rearmament thing to do with his calculation

*D.T. He loved keeping someone who defied him always on tip-toe, always ready to march for him despite his deepest antagonism: "Give up an elevator toward heavy time," he remarked,

1933-39

3

had changed his own radical than a demagogue; he was a was not a dictator. Dictators on small coteries supporting leader not of a determined onal Socialists are the better ing the years 1933-1935.† He r pronounced (in 1934) the cy." While he was contemp- democracy and of the demo- and the United States during 1941 he said that "the National ty through democracy!" 1918 by witnessing and liv- nian empire, Hitler was not a 18 we have no evidence of contrasted with his consistent of his need for conservative imonarchical statements by until well after his assumption rman (especially North Ger- 1934 hoped that Hitler would archy in Germany. But after dation of the chancellorship b—for him long-antiquated— principle (and not only in ificant—and, for him, revela- in May 1938. He was repelled nals of the Italian royal house, e corruptions of the Roman of the Italian king. By having

any popinjay can rule as a dic- statements: p. 569, note 189. See g. 13 December 1931: "You refuse, power legally we could then break nral thesis of democracy runs: 'All

allowed its continued existence, by sharing his rule of Italy with the monarchy, his friend Mussolini had made a grave mistake. That is what Hitler saw, and thought, and found it now proper to express to many of his confidants. Then he decided to raise the pension pay- ments of the surviving Social Democratic ministers of the Weimar period; it had, after all, been their great merit, he said, to have freed Germany from the Hohenzollerns in 1918.*

The Kaiser, William II, was living in exile in Doorn, in Holland, when the German army invaded Holland in May 1940. Churchill offered him refuge in England, but William refused. Not by a single act (or word) did he demonstrate compassion for his Dutch hosts under the German occupation. When France capitulated, William sent a congratulatory telegram to Hitler, repeating the pious senti- mental phrase that his grandfather had uttered in 1870: "Welche Wendung durch Gottes Fügung!" ("What a turn of events ordained by God!") Hitler was contemptuous: "Didn't anything newer occur to him?"† As far as he was concerned, the Kaiser could return to Germany if he so wished. In June 1941 William died. Hitler allowed a special train with the imperial relatives to travel to Doorn for the Kaiser's funeral.

IN THE PREFACE OF HIS great biography in 1973, Joachim Fest speculated: had Hitler suddenly died in 1938, he would have been—and would perhaps still be—regarded as one of the greatest Ger- mans in history.‡ Such a statement may have shocked some readers, but the reality of it would be recognized by others.** For Hitler's achievements—domestic rather than foreign—during the six years of his leadership of Germany were extraordinary. Not only did he

*HJ, p. 417. In 1/w, p. 65, Irving cites Hitler on 23 November 1937: "Monar- chies are at most capable of hanging on to what has been conquered. World empires are won only by revolutionary movements."

†Hermann Giesler, *Ein anderer Hitler*, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1977 (here- after: GR), p. 393.

‡F, p. 25.

**Especially by a German generation to whom, of course, Fest's *Hitler* was mainly addressed, but also by many biographers who preceded Fest (Heiber, Deuerlein, and others); by Haffner later; and, more recently, by Zitelmann.

1938

1940

1933-39

1937

make Germany the greatest—and the most respected and feared—power in Europe; not only did he bring the Germans of Austria and Bohemia and Moravia, most of them enthusiastically willing, into a Greater Germany—surpassing the achievements of Bismarck, and all of this without a single shot fired, without a war. He brought prosperity and confidence to the Germans, the kind of prosperity that is a result of confidence. The thirties, after 1933, were sunny years for most Germans: something that remained in the memories of an entire generation among them. The concentration camps, the suppression of German Jews, the raucous vulgarity of Nazi propaganda were there, painfully sharp in the minds of an embittered minority; but how could they stack up against Hitler's creation of Prosperity, Greatness, Unity? After the war, shortly before he was hanged, Hans Frank wrote of the thirties in his memoir: "Über alles lagen Sonne, Glück, Jubel und Freude." ("Above everything there was sunshine, happiness, rejoicing, cheer.") A sentimental exaggeration: but not without some substance.

This is neither a history of the Third Reich nor a biography of Hitler, and this particular chapter is directed to the question of whether he really was a revolutionary; that is, to the character of his ideas and how they have been seen by historians. But ideas do not exist in the abstract; they are incarnated by human beings (contrary not only to the views of many intellectuals but contrary, too, to Hegel or Dostoyevsky, what men do to ideas is more important than what ideas do to men). Hegel's famous "Zeitgeist" may have assisted Hitler's coming to power; but in the end he created his own Zeitgeist, and pragmatically indeed. That was already true of his achievement of power.†

†FR, p. 320.

†Fest (F, p. 370): "Hitler's extraordinary ability to recognize situations, to see through conflicting interests, to realize weaknesses . . . his tactical sense [was at least as important] as were his rhetorical powers, to convince people. . . ." I find this more convincing than the otherwise judicious Kershaw, KER, p. 37: [In 1930–33] "the personal role played by Hitler is greatly overshadowed by matters and events beyond his control." Also KER, pp. 38, 45, 52: "External events—the Young Plan to adjust reparation payments, the Wall Street crash, and Brüning's entirely unnecessary decision to have an election in the summer of 1930—put

Thereafter he could boast the replacing his erstwhile opponents: mann wrote (about Hitler's decision day for German labor): "Not for were [actually] realizing demands had fought for long and in vain." various social matters National So for example in the improvement others, and of social security."*

The optimism and the confidence Germany in 1932, three were by 1939, the highest marriage rates in Germany, superseding even those Eastern Europe. The phenomena the thirties was even steeper than unreasonable to slur over these figures populationist policies. Of course offered social and financial benefits

the Nazis on the political map." And: "nomic crisis from 1929" the extreme Right support . . . might have remained so." would have continued to be an insignificant not believe this was so. But Kershaw is right the fixity of basic points of dogma with no vering. . . ." And 112: ". . . far from revolution would have made him putty in the hands rapidly have rendered him dispensable, however the realities of governmental power."

*ZIT/1A, pp. 87, 122. What remains [Hitler's] social policy, unlike National Socialism researched [studied] well enough." This Zitellmann, at least suggests some special for example, TO, p. 405: "Tuberculosis and other The criminal courts never had so little to do with occupants. It is a pleasure to observe the Even the poorest persons are better clothed cheerful faces testify to the psychology within them." Not entirely untrue—but in propaganda book in 1938, used by "Sir Arthur that Wilson was a notorious British Nazi

P.T.I.)
* A powerful economy depends on an increase in energy. This can occur when more money is being made externally—that is, the market keeps going up, as in 1928, or the late 90's in America. It will also happen if the middle class and working class have a lifting of depression and have more energy. ~~the~~ time is so escaping the conclusion. That is, of the few so persuaded the system that each attack on them was liberating to the energies of the average—especially the average imagination German.