

1930

1930

1930

Wade
Luhacs
JJB
Kenslow
Hendon

he Man

combin:
olf Hitle
e saw i
the cou
deviate
sues rai
ad the j
l histori
m and e
But th
rt an rel

clude th
cate on
because
it becau
Grs all

~~1907~~ **1930** ~~1940~~ ~~1950~~
 THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

to society and public decency." They should all be handed over to the Gestapo and severely punished:

Experience shows that unnatural offenders generally turn into homicidal maniacs; they must be rendered harmless however young they may be. I have therefore always been in favor of the strongest possible punishment of these antisocial elements.³¹⁷

Other aspects of Hitler's personality also fit what we know to be true about the psychopathology of sexual perversion. The infantilism we have found in him is one necessary ingredient. For as Freud was first to notice, "perverted sexuality is nothing else but infantile sexuality, magnified and separated into its component parts." Infantilism is clearly marked when, as with Hitler, the perversion involves a reversion to the anal stage.³¹⁸ Hitler's harrowing childhood memories of his primal scene experience and his monorchism clearly qualify as prerequisites for adult perversion, as set forth by the distinguished child psychoanalyst Phyllis Greenacre. "If I were to attempt a formula describing the development of perversion," she has written, the primary cause would lie in a disturbed mother-child relationship, "especially [one] involving the genitals. This becomes most significant . . . when castration anxiety is extraordinarily acute."³¹⁹

Psychoanalysts have shown that the mothers of boys who become sexual perverts often were overly stringent about toilet training. As we have noted, Klara Hitler had a reputation in Leonding and Linz for having had "the cleanest house in town" and keeping her children "absolutely spotless." It is interesting, and perhaps in this connection suggestive, that in one case of perversion described by an American analyst, the patient showed an identification with his mother: he displayed a desire "to have his sweetheart urinate in his presence while he encouraged her in a friendly way. He was playing the role of his mother who used to put him on the chamberpot when he was a baby."³²⁰

In his chapter on perversion in his standard work on psychoanalytic theory, Otto Fenichel lists three basic characteristics: patients with perversions tend to be infantile; they have unreconciled Oedipus complexes; and they all display castration anxiety. Indeed, Fenichel concludes: "Castration anxiety (and guilt feelings which are derivatives of castration anxiety) must be the decisive factor."³²¹ Adolf Hitler's lifelong concern about castration has already been mentioned perhaps too often.

If the clinical literature is correct in concluding that Oedipal problems, sadomasochism, infantilism, and castration anxiety are the marks of perversion, then Hitler certainly had all the chief symptoms. But there is a more specific reason why Adolf's symptoms were so intense and why a sexual perversion of the kind described was, psychologically, an appropriate response to sexual problems dating from his

9A 33
 The Child As Father to the Man

earliest years. The combination of trauma had given Adolf Hitler sexual intercourse. He saw that it must be applied to his own sexual energies in deviate

As with other issues raised certain that Hitler had the admitted that traditional historiography in saying that he was sexually normal but that the tary evidence of uncertain reliability data.

In short, we conclude that ladies urinate or defecate on this perversion not because it is completely convincing but because of the perversion fits all and public performance. It was his grandiose, moralistic public riddle self which pleaded for pulse for self-punishment, we : to have historic consequences.

Thus did the evils done man. We leave him now to conditions which helped bring him achieve a political goal without personality, time, and place. None can be understood apart from

In following the course of a fateful meeting with Adolf Hitler there was in the past that he the context of his times, the balanced man became a politician

Klara goes from clean to super clean after Adolf's birth.
 IA

check notes on P241

1942
 P. 6
 1942

from P241

D.T. much
 to much
 on a
 clean
 also

1930?

242 Indeed, how well he knew might take a look at (24) where he's convinced that castration is psychologically necessary to be gay?

1996

1941 - D.T. We can imagine Albert's habits in bed as a young girl that he married. He wonders she was so spotlessly clean - always had to scrub him scrubbing him out of her mouth. With Lindy soap. The baby's mother had to be - rejected by her. Later we found out of Paula about it notices

Important

IA

Don't know what page

check

P241 in WHITE

also p. 1
 back
 edit.

The Life of the Bee

after-taste, as it were, of her one marriage-flight, from the union of the male and female principle that thus comes to pass in her being. Here again nature, never so ingenious, so cunningly prudent and diverse, as when contriving her snares of love, will not have failed to provide a certain pleasure as a bait in the interest of the species. And yet let us pause for a moment, and not become the dupes of our own explanation. For indeed, to attribute an idea of this kind to nature, and regard that as sufficient, is like flinging a stone into an unfathomable gulf we may find in the depths of a grotto, and imagining that the sounds it creates as it falls shall answer our every question, or reveal to us aught beside the immensity of the abyss.

When we say to ourselves, "This thing is of nature's devising; it is she has ordained this marvel; those are her desires

30?
41?
A.H.'s
separate
into
two
gender

The Life of the Bee

solitary bees of the Gastrilegidæ family, that not only does the *Osmia* know in advance the sex of the egg she will lay, but that this sex is "optional for the mother, who decides it in accordance with the space of which she disposes; this space being often governed by chance and not to be modified; and she will deposit a male egg here and a female there." I shall not enter into the details of the great French entomologist's experiments, for they are exceedingly minute, and would take us too far. But whichever be the hypothesis we prefer to accept, either will serve to explain the queen's inclination to lay her eggs in workers' cells, without it being necessary to credit her with the least concern for the future.

It is not impossible that this slave-mother, whom we are inclined to pity, may be indeed a great amorist, a great voluptuary, deriving a certain enjoyment, an

130?
141?
2 Xeroth

ADOLF HITLER

lives by defending
and it may be that
title which he never
in another place is
November 1921, he de-
was born on 20 April
postal official [Post-
desire to emulate his fa-
of rivalry and the de-
calling, for example,
legal monastery Adolf
portunity of intoxicating
nient church festival. It
appeared to me to be
the village pastor had
his relationship with
which his own will tri-

ther might be . . . his
My father did not
nevertheless." . . .²⁰

will must prevail: first
and finally against

Hitler was 14, he ostenta-
man. Usually, when a
play a father role or
which the father would
look on negative iden-
ould have infuriated his
artist and dandy. Then
dropout and vagabond,
inherent.

cepted the challenge
did so in a way that
man: he too became a
In effect, Hitler was
allure. I'll show him in a
government official—I'll
break bureaucrats like

which he felt for his
figure of the Field Mar-
with his uniform, close-

The Child As Father to the Man

cropped hair, impressive mustache, and portly figure, was reminiscent of Adolf's own authoritarian father. Although he despised Hindenburg, Hitler spoke of him with respect, referring to him—as he had referred to his own father—as "The Old Gentleman" [der alte Herr]. Just as he had felt cowed by his father, so he dreaded a confrontation with Hindenburg. "The Old Gentleman," he said, "was totally hostile to everything we stood for. . . . The Old Gentleman had said to me, 'Herr Hitler I want to hear what kind of ideas you have.' It was horribly difficult [wahnstinnig schwer] in such an atmosphere to set forth my think-
ing. And again, using an expression he must have learned as a child, he warned his followers that "we must never do anything that would annoy [was verärger] the Old Gentleman." . . .²⁰

While his memoirs and conversations show respect for his father, hatred and fear also keep showing through. For whether or not he was justified in doing so, Adolf saw his father as a drunken and sadistic degenerate. He confided to an intimate that as a tender young lad he was forced to go and rescue his father from the clutches of alcohol, entering a "stinking smoke-filled tavern" in order to plead with his drunken father to come home. "Oh, that was the most shameful humili-
fating experience I have ever had. How well I know what a devil alcohol is. It was—because of my father—the greatest enemy of my youth!" . . .²¹

Hitler also sought sympathy from his secretaries by describing what a cruel person his father had been and how vicious had been his whippings. A secretary recalled, "He used to say, 'I never loved my father. I therefore feared him all the more. He had a terrible temper and often whipped me.'" He liked to relate how, as a young boy, he was fond of Karl May stories about Indians who proved their courage by refusing to cry out under torture. One day, as his father beat him with his cane and his frightened mother stood outside the door, Adolf counted the blows without a murmur and proudly reported, "My father gave me 230 blows!" After that, he recalled, his father never whipped him again.²²

How can one calculate the consequences of child beating? What psychological wounds scar the child's mind as he lies hurt in body and soul, sobbing and alone, battered by his own father and deserted by a noninterfering mother? The infant must learn to comfort himself; he can trust no one else; he is overwhelmed by terror, fear, rage, helplessness, hatred. Is it not possible that the hatred which Hitler later said was so important to his life was learned in childhood's rage—the help-
less hatred that sobbed: "If I were bigger, I would kill you!" Of such experiences, a prominent psychiatrist has said, are murderers made. Hitler would have agreed completely with the American criminal Caryl Chessman, who recalled the brutal whippings of his childhood and concluded that "there is nothing that sustains you like hate; it is better to be anything than to be afraid."²³

It is, of course, possible that Adolf Hitler's memories of a drunken and sadistic father were exaggerated in order to hide personal feelings

23 blows

137

he does it to impress his
mother. 1902 Climacteric whistling

IA

1930

Actually, in 1930, Hitler is very worried about the Jews from Graz, feels it is his terrible load. He will be defeated by a detail! ~~As~~ It opens him to get wealthy and wilder with Geli Raubal. In for a penny, in for a pound. If he's going to be ruined, he must have at least some crazy fun.

~~But~~ He believes there is a Jew in his background because he remembers the excitement he used to feel when he was visiting that Jewish musical family with Dora. That he felt very close to Jews.

10/03

~~1930~~ 1930 (1940) ~~(1940)~~ 90 33

1930

The beginning of the romance of
the young Jew whose ~~name~~ ^{name} by
the interesting determinations of
chance was Frankenberg - no
relation to Gray, but all the same!

~~Many~~ He tells the ~~she~~ folks to talk
of "Guess who I had lunch with
today," - a job that is making the
round of all the ~~the~~ Viennese
cafes about this time," and she,
to his amazement goes into hysterics,

1901

1930

1942

1990

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

to society and "public decency." They should all be handed over to the Gestapo and severely punished:

Experience shows that unnatural offenders generally turn into homicidal maniacs; they must be rendered harmless however young they may be. I have therefore always been in favor of the strongest possible punishment of these antisocial elements.³¹⁷

Other aspects of Hitler's personality also fit what we know to be true about the psychopathology of sexual perversion. The infantilism we have found in him is one necessary ingredient. For as Freud was first to notice, "perverted sexuality is nothing else but infantile sexuality, magnified and separated into its component parts." Infantilism is clearly marked when, as with Hitler, the perversion involves a reversion to the anal stage.³¹⁸ Hitler's harrowing childhood memories of his primal scene experience and his monorchism clearly qualify as prerequisites for adult perversion, as set forth by the distinguished child psychoanalyst Phyllis Greenacre. "If I were to attempt a formula describing the development of perversion," she has written, the primary cause would lie in a disturbed mother-child relationship, "especially [one] involving the genitals. This becomes most significant . . . when castration anxiety is extraordinarily acute."³¹⁹

Psychoanalysts have shown that the mothers of boys who become sexual perverts often were overly stringent about toilet training. As we have noted, Klara Hitler had a reputation in Leonding and Linz for having had "the cleanest house in town" and keeping her children "absolutely spotless." It is interesting, and perhaps in this connection suggestive, that in one case of perversion described by an American analyst, the patient showed an identification with his mother: he displayed a desire "to have his sweetheart urinate in his presence while he encouraged her in a friendly way. He was playing the role of his mother who used to put him on the chamberpot when he was a baby."³²⁰

In his chapter on perversion in his standard work on psychoanalytic theory, Otto Fenichel lists three basic characteristics: patients with perversions tend to be infantile; they have unreconciled Oedipus complexes, and they all display castration anxiety. Indeed, Fenichel concludes: "Castration anxiety (and guilt feelings which are derivatives of castration anxiety) must be the decisive factor."³²¹ Adolf Hitler's lifelong concern about castration has already been mentioned perhaps too often.

If the clinical literature is correct in concluding that Oedipal problems, sadomasochism, infantilism, and castration anxiety are the marks of perversion, then Hitler certainly had all the chief symptoms. But there is a more specific reason why Adolf's symptoms were so intense and why a sexual perversion of the kind described was, psychologically, an appropriate response to sexual problems dating from his

³⁴² Indeed, how well he knew might take a look at (P241) where he's convinced that deceit is psychologically have to be Jew?

D.T. We can imagine Alois' habits in bed as a strong girl that is married. No wonder she was so pathologically clean - she always had to scrub him scrubbing him subor her mouth with liquid soap. The Gallop mother had eye - secreted breast.

The Child As Father to the Man

earliest years. The combination of trauma had given Adolf Hitler sexual intercourse. He saw that must be avoided. He could his sexual energies in deviate

As with other issues raised certain that Hitler had the admitted that traditional history in saying that they can find it was sexually normal. But the tary evidence of uncertain religious data.

In short, we conclude that ladies urinate or defecate on this perversion not because pletely convincing but because dence. The perversion fits all and public performance. It was his grandiose, moralistic public ridden self which pleaded for pulse for self-punishment, we to have historic consequences.

Thus did the evils done man. We leave him now to conditions which helped bring him achieve a political goal without personality, time, and place. None can be understood apart from

In following the course of a fateful meeting with Adolf Hitler there was in the past that he the context of his times, the balanced man became a politician

Allois goes from clean to sub clean after Adolf's birth.

IA

check notes on P241

Important

IA

1923

(1930)

Hitler's posture of revolutionary legality toward Röhm, his putschist double, is a reminder that his legal course to power had also been his Putsch relaunched: it reversed the old means to the same end. That is, post-Putsch Hitler used the Weimar system to the avowed end of destroying it. In his oath of legality of September 1930 to the high court in Leipzig he allowed that, though his takeover was to be legal, "heads will roll" afterward.¹⁷⁷ That legal takeover rectified the traumatic Putsch, which he then repeated to a full finish through the "Röhm Putsch."

Hitler answered to Germany for the Röhm purge in terms of abscesses burnt out of the national flesh.¹⁷⁸ Thus he had worked off his Putsch trauma through the Röhm purge¹⁷⁹ only to align the Röhm purge with his Bloch trauma. But through the Putsch itself he had relived his gas trauma. For before the Putsch he had time and again equated his political struggle with his front-line wartime service, and after four years and a few weeks of that struggle he was once again disabled with several of his comrades-in-arms and evacuated under fire even as, in his view of it, the national cause was once again betrayed. In later years, closing the circle, he dated his stomach complaint, based on his mother's agony and his gas trauma combined, from the Röhm purge.¹⁸⁰ Could a psychic economy be tighter?

D

1920, 1928, 1930

headquarters in order "to disengage myself from his power of suggestion."⁹¹ Quisling's hypnosis needed periodic renewing. Besides, without such special exertions as on Quisling and such special susceptibility as Quisling's, Hitler produced "next to no impression" on non-Germans.⁹² Keitel's last reckoning mentioned Hitler's "suggestive power of persuasion incomprehensible to outsiders and especially to foreigners."⁹³ In fact the personal magic went with the national message. "On occasion Hitler simply cried out 'Germany! Germany! Germany!' to his audience and drew enthusiastic acclamation."⁹⁴ Who else could ever do that?

To repeat: the magic went with the message. So it was that, as far as the records disclose, Hitler's enthrallments of later co-workers began with him expounding his politics, usually from the rostrum. Speer's devotion was the least political on the surface, yet it started when the then teaching assistant in architecture succumbed to the "suggestive force of conviction" that Hitler conveyed in a speech at the university of Berlin in 1930. "This effect," Speer recollected decades later, "was far deeper than that of the speech itself, not much of which remained in my memory"⁹⁵: the rest had hit home. Hitler's seemingly least charismatized henchman was the deadly cynic Heydrich, yet in 1928 naval careerist Heydrich was enraptured by his first Hitler speech and told his sister: "He alone can save Germany."⁹⁶ Hess's infatuation was the most blatant: in one observer's overdrawn image, "Hess hangs with the eyes of a credulous child on the mouth of his deified leader."⁹⁷ This idolatry was thoroughly political from the outset, when the war veteran brooding over Germany's fate while studying geopolitics in Munich returned "radiant" from a Hitler meeting to his boardinghouse one evening in 1920. "Only the man, the man! He is all!" Hess explained.⁹⁸ That man also overcame Munich law student Hans Frank by "the irresistible power of his oratory" at a public meeting in January 1920: "He spoke everything out of his own soul and out of the soul of us all. . . . From that evening on," Frank related, "I was convinced . . . that Hitler alone, if anyone, could master German fate."⁹⁹ Hitler captivated cosmopolitan adven-

Speech
1930
Commence
was

1928

1920

giving the Hitler government short 45 seats for an absolute majority. Thus Hitler's government, like its three predecessors, was a so-called presidential cabinet.

A presidential cabinet was not provided for in the constitution, but had a legal basis in it through a combination of Articles 48 and 53. According to Article 48 the president could take any steps necessary to restore law and order should they be considerably disturbed or endangered. The president alone decided when that state of emergency had been reached and what measures could be taken. The constitution called for a law to provide detailed regulations for carrying out Article 48, but such a law was never passed. The president's power under Article 48 was restricted, however, by the stipulation that he inform the Reichstag immediately of any emergency measures taken; the Reichstag could in turn annul those measures by a simple majority vote. Thus the president's immense emergency powers could be nullified if and when the majority of the members of parliament so wished.

It was on this legal basis that Germany had been governed since March 30, 1930. Pursuant to Article 53 of the Weimar constitution the president had appointed three successive chancellors: Heinrich Brüning, Franz von Papen, and Kurt von Schleicher. None of them commanded the confidence of the Reichstag. But since the Reichstag's confidence did not need to be overtly expressed, only overtly denied, the chancellors governed so long as a vote of no confidence was not put. They governed with the backing, or confidence, of the president alone.

Laws were a different matter. The laws had to be passed by the Reichstag. If laws were needed and their passage was not likely, the president might issue decrees under Article 48 without having to justify his initiative by proving that public order was considerably disturbed or endangered. These decrees, which were called emergency decrees, did not have to be passed by the Reichstag. But, again, the Reichstag could annul

1930 1932

Hitler Comes to Power 5 B

them by a simple majority vote. If this happened, the government could no longer govern. Brüning's cabinet faced this challenge on July 18, 1930.

In this circumstance the president had still another weapon. According to Article 25 he could dissolve the Reichstag. Within sixty days of a dissolution a general election had to be held. Hindenburg dissolved the Reichstag on July 18, 1930, and made full use of the period of sixty days that followed. During this time his chancellor could continue to govern without fear of interference from the Reichstag. When the Reichstag reassembled after the election of September 14, however, the government found that its support in the parliament had decreased. Yet it was precisely because of the erosion of his support through the Nazi victory of September 14, 1930, that Brüning was able to remain in office for another eighteen months. In order to prevent Brüning's fall and Hitler's possible accession to the chancellorship, the majority of the Reichstag no longer used its right to put a vote of no confidence or to annul Brüning's numerous emergency decrees. The Reichstag was prepared to tolerate the chancellor. Brüning was finally dismissed by Hindenburg on May 30, 1932, and was succeeded by Papen. For the time being we shall not deal with the reasons for Brüning's dismissal or with the political and economic issues behind these developments, but shall continue merely to explain their constitutional implications.

Unlike Brüning's cabinet, Papen's ultraconservative cabinet could not expect to be tolerated by the Reichstag, and the Reichstag was again dissolved immediately after Papen was appointed. This gave him the chance of governing freely for fifty-seven days, until the election of July 31. He won another month's reprieve because the Reichstag was not bound to assemble until thirty days after the election, according to Article 23. When the Reichstag finally convened on August 30, it passed a vote of no confidence against Papen by the enormous majority of 512 voted against 42 with 5 abstentions.

1925, 1928, 1930

B 10 Hitler Comes to Power

could govern only in partnership with at least one party from the Weimar coalition.

The situation in the Weimar Republic in the 1920s had reached a stalemate. Neither of the two leading groups in German society was strong enough to govern the state alone, but each was strong enough to prevent the other from doing so. Since their differences stemmed from their principles, compromises were difficult. They recognized no common ground on which they could explain and settle normal conflicting interests. The stalemate, with its roots deep in German history, came to a head after the First World War. The Conservatives scored a victory in 1925 when Hindenburg was elected president. The Republicans, in turn, scored a victory in 1928 when they almost regained the majority in the Reichstag and a Social Democrat became chancellor once again.

None of these victories was decisive or broke the stalemate. But the Conservatives were alarmed at the success of the Left in 1928 and thereupon tried, with the help of the president, to regain the position they had held until 1918. Their chance came in March 1930 when the Social Democratic chancellor Hermann Müller and, with him, the last majority government of the Weimar Republic resigned.³ Hindenburg seized this opportunity to become independent of parliamentary majorities and to appoint Brüning. If we say that the downhill course that led to Hitler's appointment in January 1933 began with Brüning's appointment in March 1930, then we can also say that Hindenburg's undemocratic attitude contributed strongly to this development. Had Hindenburg been a convinced supporter of the parliamentary system of government he would have negotiated another majority government. Since he was not a supporter but an opponent of the parliamentary system, and since he particularly disliked the Social Democrats, he snatched the opportunity to get rid of them when it arose in March 1930.

1930, 1931, 1932

Hitler Comes to Power

II B

It is equally true that Hindenburg was able to appoint Brüning and the other, later minority, chancellors only because by March 1930 the Reichstag itself was no longer able to form a majority government. Had a majority chancellor been proposed, Hindenburg would most likely have appointed him and let him govern. He never envisaged a coup d'état or wished Hitler to come to power. He only sought to profit from the given situation, from what we have described as a stalemate. Today we know that the Müller cabinet, had it not broken up, could have survived the worst part of the international economic crisis with a sound parliamentary majority, since its legislative term did not expire until May 1932. Instead, the Reichstag was prematurely dissolved and in the elections of September 1930 Hitler won his first major breakthrough.

This is worth repeating. The Müller cabinet was not overthrown in March 1930; it resigned. It is well known that the coalition partners could not agree on a question of unemployment benefits. But to see this as the reason for the resignation of the cabinet would be to confuse the long-term cause with the immediate trigger. The crucial factor was the structural stalemate of the Weimar Republic. Under the conditions of a stalemate Hindenburg was able to appoint his conservative minority chancellors. When they were no longer tolerated by the Reichstag, the state became ungovernable. In the course of the periodic elections held in hopes of providing these minority chancellors with a majority, the Nazi party became instead the strongest party. Still Hindenburg refused to appoint Hitler after these elections; he declined explicitly in August 1931 and again in November 1932.

We have to ask, therefore, why he changed his mind in January 1933. The answer is clear. The Conservative party in the meantime had been persuaded to form a coalition with the Nazi party and Hitler had reduced his demands. Apart

ployment: more than six millions in 1932 and again in 1933. Translate these figures into terms of men standing hopelessly on the street corners of every industrial town in Germany; of houses without food or warmth; of boys and girls leaving school without any chance of a job, and one may begin to guess something of the incalculable human anxiety and embitterment burned into the minds of millions of ordinary German working men and women.

The social consequences of the depression were not limited to the working class. In many ways it affected the middle class and the lower middle class just as sharply, for they were threatened with the loss not only of their livelihood, but of their respectability. The middle classes had no trade unions or unemployment insurance, and poverty carried a stigma of degradation for them. When the small property holder, shopkeeper, or business man was forced to sell at depreciated values, anti-capitalist feeling against the combines, the trusts, and department stores spread widely amongst a class which had once owned, or still owned, property itself.

Nor was the impact of the slump limited to the towns. In many parts of Germany the peasants and farmers were in an angry and desperate mood, unable to get a fair return for their work, yet hard pressed to pay the interest on mortgages and loans or be turned out of their homes.

Millions of Germans saw the apparently solid framework of their existence cracking and crumbling. In such circumstances men are no longer amenable to the arguments of reason. In such circumstances men entertain fantastic fears, extravagant hatreds, and extravagant hopes. In such circumstances the extravagant demagoguery of Hitler began to attract a mass following as it had never done before.

It was already clear that the economic crisis would produce a political crisis as well—a crisis of the régime. The greatest weakness of the Weimar Republic

from the beginning had been a stable party basis for governments, absorbed in manoeuvring advantages, were not displeased. Weak governments suited them made those in power more assured and blackmail. But the movement faced with a major crisis, the sacrifice each class was to bear, the pay and wages were to be capital levy exacted, tariffs increased to landowners and farmers—was so bitter that the methods of government, which in Germany meant coalition by a process of political compromise, to provide the strong government so obviously needed.

Such a situation was much to the Nazis, who had been unremitting in the parliamentary republic and of government. They had already begun a campaign to win support to feel the depression, the farm pressed by Walther Darré, who had recently written a book the 'Life Source of the Nordic' Darré as the Party's agricultural commission to draw up a peasant was published over Hitler's name. It was marked not only by practical economic aid to the farming population its insistence upon the peasantry class in the community.

In the case of agriculture it was the support of both the big and small peasants, since these had a common interest in the demand for protection and a common grievance in their which were too preoccupied with

for the first time responded eagerly to attacks on the 'System' which left them without jobs, and to the display of energy, the demand for discipline, sacrifice, action and not talk, which was the theme of Nazi propaganda.

In 1930 the mood of a large section of the German nation was one of resentment. Hitler, with an almost inexhaustible fund of resentment in his own character to draw from, offered them a series of objects on which to lavish all the blame for their misfortunes. It was the Allies, especially the French, who were to blame; the Republic, with its corrupt and self-seeking politicians; the money barons, the bosses of big business, the speculators and the monopolists; the Reds and the Marxists, who fostered class hatred and kept the nation divided; above all, the Jews, who fattened and grew rich on the degradation and weakness of the German people. The old parties and politicians offered no redress; they were themselves contaminated with the evils of the system they supported. Germany must look to new men, to a new movement, to make her strong and feared, to restore to her people the dignity, security and prosperity which were their birthright.

To audiences weighed down with anxiety and a sense of helplessness Hitler cried: If the economic experts say this or that is impossible, to hell with economics. What counts is will, and if our will is hard and ruthless enough we can do anything. The Germans are the greatest people on earth. It is not your fault that you were defeated in the war and have suffered so much since. It is because you were betrayed in 1918 and have been exploited ever since by those who are envious of you and hate you; because you have been too honest and too patient. Let Germany awake and renew her strength, let her remember her greatness and recover her old position in the world, and for a start let's clear out the old gang in Berlin.

This is a fair summary and his lieutenants made the summer of 1930. Inception of the mood of people which was wholly of the other parties.

In the middle of September went to the polls. The Nazi seats in the Reichstag. From ninth the Nazis in the State.

Overnight, Hitler had gained importance. The first to interview him. The first of goodwill at length, and Rothermere welcomed him of the defences against

Now that the Nazis succeed the question arises going to make of it. In the next ten days after the whether he meant to Reichstag to discredit bring government to a seizure of power by force to come to power legally elections and postpone a after he had secured control of the State.

Almost certainly Hitler's position—but after, not before—was too impressed by the defeat in the streets, as judgement, in November the anticlimax of the barricade had to be obtained legally.

For various reasons this too openly. He had

agerly to attacks on the
without jobs, and to the
for discipline, sacrifice,
was the theme of Nazi

re section of the German
t. Hitler, with an almost
ment in his own charac-
in a series of objects on
e for their misfortunes.
the French, who were to
corrupt and self-seeking
s, the bosses of big busi-
e monopolists; the Reds
red class hatred and kept
the Jews, who fattened
idation and weakness of
parties and politicians of-
themselves contaminated
they supported. Germany
new movement, to make
estore to her people the
erity which were their

own with anxiety and a
ried: If the economic ex-
ossible, to hell with eco-
, and if our will is hard
do anything. The Ger-
e on earth. It is not your
ed in the war and have
is because you were be-
n exploited ever since by
u and hate you; because
nd too patient. Let Ger-
strength, let her remem-
er her old position in the
clear out the old gang in

This is a fair summary of the sort of speech Hitler and his lieutenants made in hundreds of meetings in the summer of 1930. It showed a psychological perception of the mood of a large section of the German people which was wholly lacking from the campaigns of the other parties.

In the middle of September thirty million Germans went to the polls. The results surprised even Hitler. Nazi seats in the Reichstag leaped from 12 to 107. From ninth the Nazis had become the second Party in the State.

Overnight, Hitler had become a politician of European importance. The foreign correspondents flocked to interview him. *The Times* printed his assurances of goodwill at length, while in the *Daily Mail* Lord Rothermere welcomed his success as a reinforcement of the defences against Bolshevism.

Now that the Nazis had won this great electoral success the question arose as to what use they were going to make of it. In a speech Hitler made at Munich ten days after the election he left it unclear whether he meant to use the Nazi faction in the Reichstag to discredit democratic institutions and bring government to a standstill, following this with a seizure of power by force; or whether he intended to come to power legally as a result of success in the elections and postpone any revolutionary action until after he had secured control of the machinery of the State.

Almost certainly Hitler meant to have his revolution—but after, not before, he came to power. He was too impressed by the power of the State to risk defeat in the streets, as he had, against his better judgement, in November 1923. The revolutionary romanticism of the barricades was out of date. Power had to be obtained legally.

For various reasons Hitler was unwilling to say this too openly. He had to consider its effect on his

claimed its brazen contempt for law. Hitler had therefore to take care that in his preoccupation with tactics he did not so far compromise the revolutionary character of his movement as to rob it of its attractive power.

The danger point was the S.A., which was to become the expression of the Party's revolutionary purpose. One of the favourite S.A. slogans was: 'Possession of the streets is the key to power in the State,' and from the beginning of 1930 the political struggle in the Reichstag and at elections was supplemented—in part replaced—by the street fights of the Party armies.

In the course of one of these gang feuds in February 1930, a young Berlin S.A. leader, Horst Wessel, was shot by the Communists. Goebbels skilfully built him up into the prototype of the martyred Nazi idealist, and Wessel's verses provided the S.A. with their marching song, the famous *Horst Wessel Lied*. In the first six months of 1930 the authorities issued a number of prohibitions against outdoor meetings, parades, and uniforms to check the growth of public disorder. But these measures proved ineffective; forbidden to wear their brown shirts, the Nazis paraded in white. Night after night they and the Communists marched in formation, broke up rival political meetings, beat up opponents, and raided each other's 'territory'. As the unemployment rose, the number of recruits mounted: the S.A. offered a meal and a uniform, companionship and excitement.

The key to the Nazi campaign was incessant activity, a sustained effort of propaganda and agitation all the year round. In this the S.A. had an essential part to play. But it was propaganda that Hitler had in mind; the S.A. were to be the shock troops of a revolution that was never to be made. Hitler's problem was to keep the spirit of the S.A. alive without allowing it to find an outlet in revolu-

The Years of Waiting,
tionary action; to use them yet never to let them compromise his plan of head-on collision with them all with the Army.

At the end of 1930 Hitler was for satisfaction. Party towards the four hundred Reichstag the Nazi—even had already shown their for Parliament by creations had to be frequent the S.A., by calculated Government to ban them on the Western Front.

Hitler was in no danger position to his leadership Party. Success alone would success no longer seemed the threshold of power.

At the beginning of 1931, already reinstated as a Field Marshal by Hitler to take over command of the S.A. He immediately made the S.A. by far the most effective fighting force of the Reich. The organization was close to the Army, with its own headquarters quite separate from the Army and its own training colleges. It opened at Munich in July 1931, and over the next year the S.A. numbered 250,000 men; a year later Hitler had 400,000 thousand.

The direction of the Party in 1932 was for all practical purposes in the hands of six men—Hitler himself, Goebbels, and Frick.

Party Leader, 1889-1933

apt for law. Hitler had in his preoccupation with promise the revolutionary as to rob it of its attrac-

e S.A., which was to be- Party's revolutionary pur-

S.A. slogans was: 'Pos- key to power in the State,' 1930 the political struggle actions was supplemented street fights of the Party

ese gang feuds in Febru- S.A. leader, Horst Wessel, nists. Goebbels skilfully ype of the martyred Nazi s provided the S.A. with imous *Horst Wessel Lied*. 1930 the authorities issued against outdoor meetings, eck the growth of public s proved ineffective; for- vn shirts, the Nazis pa- ter night they and the ormation, broke up rival p opponents, and raided the unemployment rose, unted: the S.A. offered a unionship and excitement. npaign was incessant ac- f propaganda and agita- this the S.A. had an es- it was propaganda that S.A. were to be the shock was never to be made, ep the spirit of the S.A. find an outlet in revolu-

The Years of Waiting, 1924-31 → 1930, 1931 87C
tionary action; to use them as a threat of civil war, yet never to let them get so far out of hand as to compromise his plan of coming to power without a head-on collision with the forces of the State, above all with the Army.

At the end of 1930 Hitler had considerable cause for satisfaction. Party membership was rising towards the four hundred thousand figure. In the Reichstag the Nazi—every man in brown uniform—had already shown their strength and their contempt for Parliament by creating such disorder that the sittings had to be frequently suspended. In the streets the S.A., by calculated hooliganism, had forced the Government to ban the anti-militarist film *All Quiet on the Western Front*.

Hitler was in no danger of underestimating the opposition to his leadership which still existed in the Party. Success alone would silence criticism, but now success no longer seemed impossible. He had reached the threshold of power.

At the beginning of January 1931, Ernst Röhm, already reinstated as a Party member, was requested by Hitler to take over new duties as Chief of Staff of the S.A. He immediately set to work to make the S.A. by far the most efficient of the Party armies. The organization was closely modelled on that of the Army, with its own headquarters and General Staff quite separate from the organization of the Party, and its own training college for S.A. and S.S. leaders, opened at Munich in June 1931. When Röhm took over, the S.A. numbered roughly a hundred thousand men; a year later Hitler could claim three hundred thousand.

The direction of the Party in the years 1931 and 1932 was for all practical purposes in the hands of six men—Hitler himself, Röhm, Gregor Strasser, Göring, Goebbels, and Frick. Röhm was important as

Febr. 1930

1929, Milch chose as his first action to tackle Göring about the whole "unseemly" bribery business. "You can't carry on like this," he pointed out, "if you have any hopes of rising to important positions in public life later." He suggested that they pay him one hundred thousand marks now as an advance on his services as a consultant until the present Reichstag session was over. "Milch," exclaimed Göring, who was a year his junior, "I'm very grateful. That is far more acceptable to me, and besides, my freedom of action is now greater. Thyssen," he explained with childlike openness, as Milch recalled in 1945, "has opened an account of fifty thousand Reichsmarks on my behalf. I can draw as much as I like. . . . It will always be replenished."

Covering all bases, the Lufthansa director indicated that he wanted to join the Nazi party. Hitler asked him—and other key aviation figures like Göring's old flying comrade Bruno Loerzer—to lie low. To "come out" as Nazis now would vitiate their usefulness. "Accordingly," noted party chief Rudolf Hess five years later, "both [Milch and Loerzer] agreed not to join until the party came to power . . . and they handed their [secret] applications in to Göring."

Göring held no Nazi party office, and never would, but Hitler now shifted him onto the stage of high politics in his behalf, ordering him to win over Berlin's high society while Joseph Goebbels fought the battle for the streets. Aided by his Swedish countess wife, Göring drew easily on his blue-blooded wartime contacts, and the Nazi movement snowballed. The crown prince had been his army commander; the prince's younger brother, Prince August-Wilhelm ("Auwi"), fell for Carin and joined the party after Göring introduced him to Hitler; dressed in the uniform of an SA colonel, Auwi would stomp the election platforms at Göring's side. Soon the portly figure of Prince Eitel-Friedrich was also decked out in party uniform.

Carin described the social whirl in name-dropping letters to her mother. "Neither of us," she wrote loftily on the last day of February 1930, "would bear common parties today. The Wieds"—Prince Viktor and Princess Marie-Elisabeth zu Wied—"want to get their whole circle of friends interested in the Hitler movement and Hermann is absolutely bombarded with questions, opinions, and comments. Everybody tries to spot flaws in Hitler and criticize his program. Poor Hermann has to talk, talk, and answer questions until he's fit to drop. But all the time I can see that the circle around us is expanding, and that we've won over a lot of them to Hitler and his cause"—and she went on to mention one prince who was forty, chairbound, and paralyzed, "the poor fellow," but always got wheeled in to the meetings that Göring addressed.

Sometimes, those audiences were twenty thousand or even thirty thousand strong. Göring's style was demagogic rather than analytical, but, with unemployment touching four million, audiences found style less important than content now. "We shall flatten our opponents!" he would roar, and sit down

1930

to thunderous applause. He took shirt, with his blue Pour le Mérite leather necktie. Ploughing his fur he spoke at Magdeburg, Frankfurt together so as not to crack up. A mother had urged to join him, collapses like a wounded man after.

Later that summer she fell ill at Bad Kreuth, on Lake Tegernsee, and climbing with him in the mountains.

The rival parties were now fighting's speeches took on a more colorful reported that speaking at the Kroll Palace the Weimar Constitution and the president of the interior a bottom-sparker [?] ized police official. "He referred to as 'that guy Curtius,'" he added; Wilhelm Groener, Göring had so far had been to advance from despatches mass audience, the police report said the salute at the Constitution Day 1930 hat on his head and a peacock's feathers anatomy." For this lèse majesté the one of the richest men in Europe—

The Nazi campaign paid off. On won 107 of the seats. It was a landslide.

Taking Thomas von Kantzow with Hitler at Jena the next day. In his lively amusing vignette of his stepfather's

Hitler is here. Hermann speaks is so enthusiastic that they could feet of Hitler and Hermann, speak out.

Hitler is very busy, so it is to him. "Wait, watch this!" says a tall, pretty blond actress from Hitler. She is tickled pink and relaxation . . . They chat for so finds it easier to approach Hitler he has.

During those exhilarating weeks Göring ridden the political tide, but had left it

* D. T. From Deep
analysis of the
debates of Hitler

to tackle Göring about the whole "un-
carry on like this," he pointed out,
important positions in public life later."
hundred thousand marks now as an
ant until the present Reichstag session
ing, who was a year his junior, "I'm
stable to me, and besides, my freedom
he explained with childlike openness,
ed an account of fifty thousand Reichs-
much as I like. . . . It will always be

director indicated that he wanted to join
d other key aviation figures like Göring's
to lie low. To "come out" as Nazis
Accordingly," noted party chief Rudolf
and Loerzer] agreed not to join until the
handed their [secret] applications in to

and never would, but Hitler now shifted
in his behalf, ordering him to win over
Joebbels fought the battle for the streets.
Göring drew easily on his blue-blooded
movement snowballed. The crown prince
Prince's younger brother, Prince August-
and joined the party after Göring intro-
uniform of an SA colonel, Auwi would
ig's side. Soon the portly figure of Prince
in party uniform.

in name-dropping letters to her mother.
n the last day of February 1930, "would
eds"—Prince Viktor and Princess Marie-
their whole circle of friends interested in
is absolutely bombarded with questions,
y tries to spot flaws in Hitler and criticize
alk, talk, talk and answer questions until
see that the circle around us is expanding,
hem to Hitler and his cause"—and she
o was forty, chairbound, and paralyzed,
wheeled in to the meetings that Göring

twenty thousand or even thirty thousand
gic rather than analytical, but, with un-
audiences found style less important than
opponents!" he would roar, and sit down

to thunderous applause. He took to wearing the party's now-universal brown
shirt, with his blue Pour le Mérite slung nonchalantly over a dark brown
leather necktie. Ploughing his furrow across the German election landscape,
he spoke at Magdeburg, Frankfurt, Plauen, and Mannheim, pulling himself
together so as not to crack up during each speech, as Carin—whom her
mother had urged to join him in Germany—wrote on June 2. "But he
collapses like a wounded man afterward."

Later that summer she fell ill again. He transported her to the hospital at
Bad Kreuth, on Lake Tegernsee, and took her son under his wing, walking
and climbing with him in the mountains.

The rival parties were now fighting over 577 seats in the Reichstag. Gör-
ing's speeches took on a more combative style. On August 8, police agents
reported that speaking at the Krone Circus in Munich Göring had defamed
the Weimar Constitution and the present government. "He called the minister
of the interior a bottom-spanker [Steiss-Trommler]," reported one scandal-
ized police official. "He referred to the foreign minister [Dr. Julius Curtius]
as 'that guy Curtius,' " he added; and as for the defense minister, General
Wilhelm Groener, Göring had scoffed that his only combat experience so
far had been to advance from desk to desk. To hoots of laughter from his
mass audience, the police report said, Göring had advised Groener to take
the salute at the Constitution Day parade in two days' time "with a slouch
hat on his head and a peacock's feather sticking out of a certain part of his
anatomy." For this lèse majesté the courts fined Göring—soon to become
one of the richest men in Europe—three hundred marks.

The Nazi campaign paid off. On election day, September 14, 1930, they
won 107 of the seats. It was a landslide.

Taking Thomas von Kantzow with him, Hermann went to congratulate
Hitler at Jena the next day. In his little green pocket diary the lad wrote an
amusing vignette of his stepfather's sly tactics:

Hitler is here. Hermann speaks from a balcony and everybody
is so enthusiastic that they could have thrown themselves at the
feet of Hitler and Hermann, so the police have their work cut
out.

Hitler is very busy, so it is difficult for Hermann to speak to
him. "Wait, watch this!" says Hermann and goes chasing after
a tall, pretty blond actress from Munich, whom he takes over to
Hitler. She is tickled pink and Hitler gets a delightful moment of
relaxation . . . They chat for some time, after which Hermann
finds it easier to approach Hitler about the important questions
he has.

During those exhilarating weeks Göring had not seen much of Carin. He had
ridden the political tide, but had left her more or less stranded in her sana-

* D.T. From deep out of each storm
trudged out the color scale to the
depths of shit in sympathetic ink.

Oct 1930 / Jan 1931

torium. Later that summer, the doctors let her go home, though with strict reservations (to which she paid little heed).

As the second-largest faction in the Reichstag now, in the autumn of 1930 the Nazi party was entitled to the office of deputy speaker (*Vizepräsident*). Hitler gave this plum job to Göring, which betokened his growing importance to the movement in Berlin. He appointed Göring his political trustee in the capital—which was, as Göring later pointed out, a very important post, enabling him to exploit his contacts there. "I was on the best of terms with Hindenburg, the armed forces, big industry, and the Catholic Church," he claimed; Hitler had authorized him to begin "wheeling and dealing," because the party now meant to win power by legitimate means: "Precisely how was irrelevant—whether with the help of the left or the right?"

When the new Reichstag opened on October 13, 1930, he marched in at the head of the 107 Nazi deputies, all wearing brown shirts, and took his seat in the deputy speaker's chair. Afterward, the party's leadership and financial backers celebrated in the Göring apartment. "Reichstag opening," wrote airline-director Erhard Milch in his pocket diary. "Tumult. Evening at the Görings' with Hitler, Goebbels, August-Wilhelm of Prussia, Prince zu Wied and wife, the Niemanns, [chief photographer Heinrich] Hoffmann and daughter [Henrietta], the Hesses, Körner, Frick and Epp."

The only blight on Hermann's blossoming political career now was the failing health of Carin, the all-important hostess at these gatherings. On Christmas Eve she fainted as the presents were being unwrapped and rolled off the sofa onto the floor. For days after that she languished in bed with a fever, but she managed to struggle to her feet, waxy-featured and frail body trembling, for a dinner party on January 5, 1931, in honor of Hitler, Thyssen, and steel King Alfred Krupp, together with the country's leading men of finance. Banker Hjalmar Schacht, knowing nothing of her illness, was struck at the bareness of the repast—pea soup with pork, followed by Swedish apple pie. She retired to the sofa afterward, listening apathetically to their conversation.

Göring steeled himself against her physical decline. The political battle remained paramount to the Nazis, and they took support from whatever quarter they could get it. The harassed chancellor, Dr. Heinrich Brüning, later alleged (in a letter to Winston Churchill) that he found out that the Nazis were being financed by the Jewish general managers of two big Berlin banks, "one of them the leader of Zionism in Germany." On January 16, 1931, Göring joined Hitler's discussions with Brüning, who was vainly trying to hammer out a deal with the Nazis; then he and Carin left to visit the former kaiser at his place of exile, Doorn in Holland.

"Hermann and Mama have just left," wrote Thomas, who was visiting Germany again, in his green pocket diary. "It is eleven P.M. I went to the [Berlin] Zoo station with them and waved good-bye. We hope to profit by winning the kaiser over to the party, the kind of thing Hermann is adept at."

1930/31

The former empress was ho could hardly climb the stairs envelope for her to recuperate seventy-year-old kaiser spright Göring. "They flew at each other. Both are excitable and so lively probably never heard anybody was a bit too much for him so kaiser toasted the "coming Re the "coming king," he was c several contenders.

A week later Carin seemed to neither pulse nor heartbeat. He stimulants. Lying at peace (she hear them announcing to her by prying open her eyelids. She was lustrous and beautiful. "My so one short instant of time." Ther Hermann's sorrowing gaze again

If Mama had died (com would have broken down c know how he would have dangerous given his smold stronger . . . and that we r leading a healthier, more r

Goebbels, Hitler's gauleiter (loc at Göring's flamboyant method: February 18, 1931, Goebbels mar of an optimist—"He banks too i get results by consistent hard w many levels in Berlin. Behind th with the Italian ambassador, Ba intercepted one telegram from the revealing that Göring had apparent tag's foreign-affairs committee (o embassy.

Göring airily denied the allegati 1931—instructed by Hitler to assu pagan in intent—he had no difficu It was all very different from his b years before.

1930

ing through mangled teeth, evening, after all!"

regime insisted that "these knowledge of Adolf Hitler." read and organized, many *Hitler das nur wusste!*" (If one would learn that Adolf for every debauch. He was

ould have failed to see what Berliners were aware of the pre-empt any negative re- sses; State Secretary Bern- German heads of missions ming influence."

of "dominating" the scene. The fact is that in 1933, were less than 1 percent two million. In Berlin, born, or less than 4 percent. and Jewish or part-Jewish and doctors, or about 17

ary of Berlin, Adolf Hitler the other Conservatives in by them. On February 1, ruary 4 he dissolved the the aid of his fellow Nazi rick, and Göring, now the p police officials and in- tagmus von Levetzov, and in as auxiliary police.

urned. Of all the possible likely is that the fire was named Marinus van der and Troopers, who used roring's new official resi- Helldorf was again at e been involved. An SA that he and twenty-three spect, one wonders how

the burning of any building, no matter how important, could so disrupt the political process. The burning of the Houses of Parliament or the Capitol would not shatter Britain or the United States. Two notes of murderous finality trailed after the Reichstag fire. Berlin's fire chief, Walter Gemp, was arrested and "found shot" in his cell. It is assumed he knew too much. Then Hanussen, the nightclub clairvoyant, who had advised Hitler before the Cologne meeting and was said to have "recruited" van der Lubbe for his friend von Helldorf, was found shot to death in the woods near Berlin.²⁹

On March 7, using an emergency decree for the second time since his appointment on January 30, Hitler ordered five thousand people in Prussia and two thousand in the Rhineland arrested "for the defense of the state." On March 16, Hitler convinced the old marshal that the country needed a minister for "enlightenment and propaganda" and Dr. Joseph Goebbels joined the cabinet. Then came Goebbels's invention, the hypocritical Potsdam Act of State. To attest to the cleverness of the man, it was he who insisted that the old Junkers and the military appear at Potsdam's Garrison Church in full parade uniforms, with decorations and swords and sashes, while Hitler wore a modest black civilian cutaway coat and striped trousers. It was time to lull the conservatives and the world by making a calming, obedient "statement." It was short-lived.³⁰

After a downpour on that March 20, the sun shone on Potsdam. Hitler made a subdued speech, dwelling on his deep respect for Prussian tradition. At the end of the sham Hitler pledged peace and shook hands, respectfully, with the old marshal. The Reichswehr gave an outstanding display in the parade that followed.

On March 23, the Reichstag reconvened at the lavish Kroll Opera House and heard Hitler address the assembly, which was packed with SA and SS uniforms and presided over by Göring. Hitler promised to:

1. Respect property and individual initiative.
2. Grant a debt moratorium to farmers.
3. Aid the middle class.
4. Increase the number of jobs.
5. Give special attention to the Reichswehr.
6. Work for peace.

Then he demanded absolute power to carry out his program without presidential endorsements. Courageously, the senior Social Democratic delegate, Otto Wels, refused to vote for the full powers Hitler demanded. The chancellor launched a vicious attack on him. The

1930-31

1901-1914
hup 1930-31

15: Maria Magdalena Quandt

MAGDA Quandt was later the object of much malicious tittle-tattle. 'She was first married to a crook,' sneered Prince Otto von Bismarck, a German diplomat, 'and earned money through prostitution. Later she became Goebbels' friend, but this did not prevent her from going to bed with many of the habitués of the party meetings at the Sport Palace. . . . Now she goes around looking for men, and when she does not suffice there is also her sister-in-law [Ello Quandt], who is another whore.'¹

None of this was true. Magda had been born in Berlin on November 11, 1901. She believed her father was Oskar Ritschel, an engineer and inventor, of strict catholic upbringing. Her mother Auguste Behrend was twenty-two, an unmarried servant girl of the evangelical-lutheran faith working for a family in Berlin's upmarket Bülow Strasse.² In fact she later gave this street as Magda's birthplace, while her birth certificate puts it in a working class suburb at No. 25 Katzeler Strasse.³ Auguste was in Goebbels' words a frightful person;⁴ she was probably never married to Ritschel. In later years she was curiously vague about their divorce, stating that it was when Magda was 'about three'—the word 'about' seems to cast doubt upon the precision of the matrimony itself.⁵ It is unlikely that a man of Ritschel's standing would have married a servant girl.⁶ In a codicil to his will he mentioned his first wife Hedwig, but no others.⁷ To Goebbels, Ritschel was always a *Schubiak* (a scoundrel) and 'wretched prig.'⁸

Since Ritschel was living in Belgium, Auguste chose the infant's names herself—Johanna Maria Magdalena, or Magda for short. Ritschel arranged for the girl to be raised from 1906 in a convent at Thild in Belgium. Auguste visited her behind these forbidding and often chilly walls with Friedländer, her Jewish boyfriend whom she had (perhaps) married in 1908.⁹ Upset by the draftiness of Magda's dormitories her mother transferred her to another convent, at Villevoorde.

Her placid existence was interrupted by the Great War. The expatriates in Brussels were shipped home to Germany in evil-smelling cattle trucks. It took six days for the Friedländer family—they had all adopted his name—to reach Berlin. In a refugee camp an East Prussian woman, a Mrs Kowalsky, read Magda's palm. 'You will one day be a Queen of Life,' she pronounced. 'But the ending is fearful.' Magda, always a romantic, often retold this prophecy. She dramatized it sometimes,

more
to 1945

1914-1927 Kac/10 1930-31

making the fortune-teller a gypsy, and having her appear mysteriously aboard the refugee train. Friedländer became manager (or perhaps only an employee) of the four-star Eden hotel in Berlin.¹⁰ Their milieu was Jewish: Magda's first real friend was Lisa Arlosorov, whose parents were Russian Jews living in Wilmersdorf. Ritschel paid for his daughter to attend Berlin's Kollmorgen lycée and sent her three hundred marks as monthly pocket money.¹¹ Friedländer, the German Jew, faded from the picture and history does not relate what became of him.

In the autumn of 1919 Magda Friedländer matriculated and was found a place at the exclusive Holzhausen ladies' college near Goslar. Even at nineteen she was a girl of considerable presence. Traveling down to Goslar on February 18, 1920 she shared the reserved compartment of a Dr Günther Quandt, a prematurely balding, wealthy entrepreneur just twice her age.¹² His first wife had died in a 'flu epidemic two years before, leaving him with two baby sons Hellmut and Herbert; he related all this to Magda during the train journey. Strongly taken by this teenage girl with the foreign allure, he visited the college more than once, claiming to be her uncle, and took the matron and Magda out in his open landau.¹³ She dropped out of college, and phoned him instead; one thing led to another, she invited her mother out to his lakeside villa at Babelsberg, outside Berlin. Events moved rapidly toward matrimony. As a first step Quandt required her birth certificate to be amended so that she was declared the *legitimate* daughter of Ritschel, to expunge the undesirable name Friedländer.¹⁴ Ritschel lodged the necessary application in mid-1920.¹⁵ As a second step, Quandt required his bride to embrace the protestant faith. They were married on January 4, 1921 at Ritschel's parental house in Godesberg. After the honeymoon, said her mother later, Magda rushed into her arms wailing, 'How could you have let me marry him!'¹⁶ But as their first and only child Harald was born just ten months later the matrimonial ardor evidently flickered just long enough.¹⁷

"Wall Street
Journal
Berlin"

Günther Quandt was old for his age. Escorting her to concerts or the theater he usually fell asleep behind the *Berliner Börsenzeitung*. The boardroom was his true world. Once when she, with girlish pride, produced her meticulous household accounts he absent-mindedly signed them in red ink, 'Seen and approved. Günther Quandt.' She rapidly tired of his company. Even when he went on business trips to exotic locations like Egypt or Palestine she was reluctant to go with him. He wrote her regularly from abroad, she replied only once.¹⁸

She began a furtive relationship with his eldest son Hellmut. Sexually unfulfilled, the twenty-three-year-old Magda was fatally attracted to this gifted and delicate young man, then aged only eighteen. Her husband found it wise to send young Hellmut to complete his studies in London and Paris. After an operation for appendicitis in Paris, complications set in and Hellmut died tragically in her arms in 1927. Heartbroken, she accompanied her husband on a six-month tour of the Americas, taking their big red Maybach car everywhere they went. Standing next to the balding, blazered, bow-tied millionaire Quandt this bored, blue-eyed

blonde was a star attraction in high society on both sides of the Border. Something intimate evidently passed between Magda and the former President Herbert Hoover's nephew, because he came to Berlin after her estrangement from Quandt and pleaded with her to marry him.¹⁹

Back in Berlin Quandt had settled down and purchased a roomy winter home in Charlottenburg, while keeping on their new villa at New Babelsberg for the summer. Magda took refuge from her boredom in books—buying a ten-volume Buddhist catechism one day in Leipzig—and waited from store to store, from one empty social event to the next until she could stand it no longer.²⁰ In the summer of 1929 she embarked on an affair with a thirty-year old law student, a Jew.²¹ She pleaded in vain with Quandt to release her. Hoping to catch him in some infidelity, she had him watched, but equally in vain. The student was a perfect and attentive lover, plying her with flowers, and she accompanied him on a trip to the Hotel Dreesen at Godesberg. This time however Quandt had hired the detectives; after reading their report, he threw her out.

Penniless and unemployed Magda returned to her mother while she negotiated a settlement with Quandt. Ello Quandt, her sister-in-law, advised her to blackmail her aging husband about a bundle of papers she had found.²² It proved unnecessary, however. He remained a perfect gentleman, agreed to a divorce, and willingly accepted the fiction that he had contributed to the breakdown of the marriage. 'Do we not all,' he would write, 'at times assume the blame, when in fact we are not in the wrong?'²³ Until she should remarry he granted her custody of their son, a lavish four-thousand-mark monthly allowance, and fifty thousand marks to purchase a house. She leased a seven-room luxury apartment at No. 2 Reichskanzler Platz in West Berlin.

There could be no question of marrying her unemployed student lover—marriage to anybody would cut off her alimony cornucopia. So she lived, loved, and traveled around as her law student's paramour while privately planning her future—without him. Drinking heavily one evening at the Nordic Ring club she met the Hohenzollern Prince August-Wilhelm (Goebbels' comrade, 'Auwi,' who had now joined the S.A. with a suitably high rank). The prince suggested that the party needed people like her. She heard Goebbels speak soon after; fascinated, she enrolled at the Nazi party's minuscule West End branch run by the young engineer's son Karl Hanke. Her Party membership dated from September 1, 1930.²⁴ She found herself taking charge of the local Women's Order. From there she gravitated to headquarters at No. 10 Hedemann Strasse. With her above-average education she was appointed secretary to Dr Hans Meinshausen, Goebbels' deputy as gauleiter.²⁵

Goebbels, it must be said, had little going for him at this time. He was a cripple; his total monthly salary was one-eighth of Magda's monthly alimony; but she heard him speak again, and she passed him once as he came limping up the steps. 'I thought I might almost catch fire,' she told her mother excitedly, 'under this man's searching, almost devouring, gaze.'²⁶ She told Ello Quandt that to judge by his suit Goebbels was

1929 → 1930

12: Hold the Flag High

WITH only five dead by the end of 1929 Berlin had as yet few Nazi martyrs.¹ But the war in the streets was intensifying. Sometimes Goebbels found somebody in the HQ's kitchen being treated for stab injuries; bullet wounds increased.² As he was visiting Edmund Behnke, an S.A. man slowly dying from the original Pharus Rooms brawl, another man was brought in with a slashed forehead.³ On November 4 communists murdered Gerhard Weber; on December 14 a communist gunned down Walter Fischer during a raid on an S.A. office. Capitalizing on these martyrs, Goebbels organized ever larger funerals. At Fischer's he spoke alongside Göring, Prince August-Wilhelm, and Horst Wessel.⁴ Spending Christmas with his now widowed mother he heard that their opponents had slit the throat of yet another S.A. man, the bookbinder Fritz Radloff, and New Year's Eve found him at a rainsoaked cemetery burying Radloff too.

No murder really fired the imagination of the party so much as that, when his time came, of young Horst Wessel himself. Goebbels had considered him one of his most promising apostles, although still only twenty-two.⁵ But he was a marked man. Wessel's No. 5 Sturm had angered the communist high command by recruiting freely from their ranks. More recently, according to Stennes, he had fallen in with bad company. He dropped out of his law studies and was working as a laborer.⁶ Perhaps this was no more than youthful rebellion—his late father had been an evangelical pastor and freemason. Against his mother's wishes he had moved into a sleazy attic room at No. 62 Grosse Frankfurter Strasse with his girlfriend Erna Janichen, whom he had rescued from the streets.⁷ That December his brother Werner had frozen to death in the mountains; Goebbels buried him with a torchlight parade routed provocatively past the communists' Karl Liebknecht building. On the evening of January 14 the enemy squared accounts with Horst: a dozen communists and Jews beset his lodgings; the carpenter Albrecht Höhler, Salomon Epstein, and another man raced upstairs and hammered on his door. When Wessel, inside with Erna and another girl, opened up, Höhler shouted "Hands up!" and discharged a nine-millimeter Parabellum pistol into his face, blowing away his jaw. Seizing papers and a gun from Wessel's locked cupboard (his disaffected landlady, widow of a communist, had oblige them with the keys) the attackers escaped; Höhler kicked the prostrate Wessel as he ran out, yelling, "You know what that's for!" The

1930

communist HQ put a well-oiled escape plan into action for Höhler, providing refuges in two Jewish households and then funds and a forged passport to flee to Prague.⁸

Horst Wessel clung to life in the hospital for weeks. Goebbels visited him often; he mused that this was the stuff of a real Dostoyevsky novel—'The Idiot, the Workers, the Harlot, the Bourgeois Family.'⁹

Once Wessel croaked, 'We must go on!'¹⁰

Foolishly returning to Berlin, Höhler was arrested and confessed.¹¹

The aftermath was a textbook example of the brilliant disinformation techniques used by Goebbels' opponents. The defense lawyer hired by the communists, Löwenthal, started a whispering campaign to smear Wessel as Erna's pimp.¹² Thus he could portray Höhler's motives as purely personal. The 'Judenpresse' seized on this tidbit. Communist playwright Bertolt Brecht mocked, 'In the search for a fitting hero who really personified the movement, the National Socialists opted, after considerable deliberation, for a pimp.' Goebbels gritted his teeth and fought back: he now had the one real martyr the movement needed. On February 7 he had the Horst Wessel anthem, 'Hold the Flag High,' sung by massed choirs at the end of a Sport Palace rally. Visiting the hospital he urged the young man not to give up the fight to live, but he died sixteen days later. 'Thou shalt live on with us,' wrote Goebbels mawkishly after visiting the death bed, 'and shalt partake in our victory.'¹³

He ordained a colossal funeral parade for March 1, and Hitler himself promised to attend. Fearing major disturbances Dr Weiss banned it, allowing only ten cars in the cortège and a ceremony confined to the walled Nikolai cemetery itself. Police officers confiscated the flag draping the coffin. Communists, out in force along the route, snatched the wreaths from the horse-drawn hearse and sang the 'Internationale'.¹⁴ At the cemetery Goebbels found a large slogan painted on the wall: 'A FINAL HEIL HITLER TO WESSEL THE PIMP!' He swallowed his fury. As the coffin sank into the ground a thousand throats defiantly roared the anthem that bore its murdered composer's name. In ten years, Goebbels prophesied to the S.A. men parading within the cemetery walls, in one of the finest speeches he ever delivered, that anthem would be sung by every schoolchild, by every factory worker, and by every marching soldier in Germany.¹⁵ A barrage of rocks came flying over the wall from the jeering mob outside. 'They rampage,' recorded Goebbels upon his return home: 'And we win.'¹⁶

HITLER had missed the funeral; he had decided to spend the weekend at his Obersalzberg cottage with Geli instead. Goebbels took this very hard. He felt he had got to know Hitler better, and deprecated his indolent, undependable, indecisive personality.¹⁷ He believed that Göring shared this view. 'He [Hitler] works too little,' wrote Goebbels, 'and then the woman, the women!' How many promises Hitler had now given him and broken: to attend the Horst Wessel funeral; to break with Otto Strasser; to enable *Angriff* to appear as a daily newspaper; and to appoint him

March 1, 1930

Reich propaganda director—these were only some of them.¹⁸

Delayed by obstructionism from Munich Goebbels had failed to upgrade *Angriff* as planned to a daily newspaper in January 1930.¹⁹ That month the Strassers announced that they would publish a daily in Berlin, *National Sozialist*, from March 1. Since it would flaunt the party's swastika emblem it would be a lethal stab in the back for Goebbels. He protested to Hitler.²⁰ Characteristically, Hitler did not even reply. 'He lacks the courage to take decisions,' Goebbels deduced.²¹ Finally Munich phoned, inviting him down to talk it over with Hitler. Goebbels set off determined to threaten resignation.²² Hitler however claimed to know nothing of the Strassers' newspaper plan; he feigned a convincing rage about Otto's 'disloyalty,' a rather smaller rage about his brother Gregor, and, with the beloved Geli at his side, comforted the gauleiter, saying he would publish *VB* in Berlin. 'That puts Strasser up against the wall,' wrote Goebbels maliciously, 'just where he wanted to put me.'²³ He returned to Berlin appeased. In fact, Hitler's subsequent announcement of his plan seemed even to disavow Goebbels.²⁴ There were howls of glee from Berlin's organized Jewish community and particularly from their *Central-Verein Zeitung*.

An open breach with Munich threatened. Hitler had promised to squelch Otto Strasser's plans to publish his daily newspaper; the Strasser brothers continued however to announce it as coming.²⁵ No sooner had Hitler persuaded the *VB* to publish an item on Goebbels' behalf than the Strassers talked their Führer round again.²⁶ Their new daily newspaper hit the streets on March 1, the day of Horst Wessel's funeral. Hitler's capitulation to the Strassers was evidently one reason why he dared not show his face in Goebbels' city.

Immediately after the ceremony Goebbels phoned him and drafted another letter threatening resignation. He sent Göring down to Bavaria carrying this ultimatum. Hitler offered still more promises to be conveyed back to Goebbels.²⁷ He repeated in particular the offer to make Goebbels Reich propaganda director ('for the umpteenth time!' commented Goebbels sarcastically, learning of this). His faith in Hitler was cooling.²⁸

SEVERAL times his diary carried signs that the Nazis were gaining support in Berlin's regular police force.²⁹ Half of them were former army officers. While Dr Bernhard Weiss seemed secure in office, to Goebbels' delight his political superior Albert Grzesinski was suddenly obliged to resign—on the day of the Horst Wessel funeral—because of his marital irregularities. 'That,' Goebbels triumphed, 'is one swine down.'³⁰

He had relied hitherto on his parliamentary immunity to protect him. On February 11, 1930 the Reichstag took the first steps to revoke his immunity in three cases. 'I'll probably be spending the next years in the clink,' he gloomily reflected.³¹ His benefactress, the dowager Viktoria von Dirksen, asked Prince August-Wilhelm to contact the lawyer Count Rüdiger von der Goltz. Goltz, an imposing figure who had lost a leg in the war, would act for Goebbels, three years his junior, in many of the

March 13, 1933

coming court battles. They met over dinner at the Dirksen home in Margarethen Strasse. When Goebbels boasted that his Nazis were willing to die for their ideals, one guest, Baron Freytag von Loringhoven, murmured, 'I am sure some might be prepared to die for the D.N.V.P. cause.'

'Indeed,' mocked Goebbels, 'but only of old age!'³²

The most serious allegation was that of high treason, and on March 10 the Reichstag revoked his immunity on that charge. Meanwhile despite its crippling financial provisions the government passed the Young Plan into law and President von Hindenburg signed it. Anticipating violent opposition, the government revived the hated Law for the Protection of the Republic. Goebbels led the parliamentary protest on March 13.³³ Rounding on Carl Severing, the minister of the interior, he evoked laughter when he recalled that it was Gustav Noske, a predecessor, who had once said, 'Even an ass can rule by state of emergency.'³⁴ And that was precisely what this new law was. 'It is no coincidence,' he shrieked, 'that the Law for the Protection of the Republic is being given its second reading precisely one day after the Young Law is enacted.' 'You yourself point out that in the course of the Young Plan economic hardships are inevitable, and that two or three millions will become permanently unemployed in Germany.' This, he said, revealed the law in its true light—'A law against the unemployed. ... You promised Freedom, Beauty and, Dignity.'

Several times the Speaker reprimanded him. 'Marxism,' declared Goebbels, 'tried before the war to destroy an honest state with dishonest means. We want to get rid of a dishonest state with honest means.'

There were screams of fury. He was ordered to sit down, and the Social Democrats cheered.

The new law was certainly repressive. It was designed to choke even the parliamentary opposition: under it, any prison sentence rendered a person unfit for public office: Dr Weiss's police were empowered to dissolve any political association and to confiscate its entire assets. The crisis however continued, and Dr Heinrich Brüning became chancellor.

Loss of immunity therefore threatened Goebbels with far-reaching consequences. Apart from the old allegation of high treason the files which the police now avidly dusted off concerned a ragbag of misdemeanors, many of them centering on his efforts to puncture Dr Weiss's pride and vanity.³⁵ Weiss was publicly considered the 'uncrowned king' of Berlin, and in Weimar Germany as in many authoritarian states the offense of *lèse-majesté* was taken dreadfully seriously. Worse, on October 20 *Angriff* had referred to the then Prussian minister of the interior as 'Comrade Grzesinski, born in the House of Cohn.' The court summons in this latter case survives in the archives, a cheaply printed form folded into an envelope and stamped 'MOABIT CRIMINAL COURT.'³⁶ More summonses seemed to arrive by every mail—on April 14 he counted nine, including the one alleging high treason. 'A fine show this is going to be,' he wrote in his diary. Several times he simply refused to testify, and the hearings ended with the judge in a deeply satisfying fury.³⁷

1930

The most delicate case against Goebbels involved the president; a recent article and caricature in *Angriff* had asked 'Is Hindenburg still alive?'³⁸ The writ from the Field Marshal disturbed him, and he cursed the editorial staff of *Angriff* for saddling him with this case.³⁹ Hindenburg's personal prestige was very great, even though by modern standards of journalism the article was quite tame. It had appealed to Hindenburg to invoke his presidential powers to block the ruinous Young Plan:

'But even the remaining personal admirers and friends of Hindenburg,' the article had said, 'entertain few illusions about any activity to be expected from him in this direction. Here as in every other similar situation Mr von Hindenburg will do whatever his Jewish and marxist advisers ask of him.'

Goebbels was all for pleading justification (Ritter von Epp had provided him with 'annihilating material' about the field marshal).⁴⁰ Goltz discouraged this. Goebbels drafted his own defense speech and looked forward to the court hearing set down for the last day of May 1930. On the eve of the trial however Goltz brought him the unwelcome news that two of the three judges were Jewish. He challenged them right away, but his motion for recusal was denied. 'Then,' he recorded immodestly in his diary, 'I speak: ninety minutes and I am in tip-top form. The whole court is deeply impressed. The prosecutor demands nine months' prison. Goltz speaks, very effective.'⁴¹

After a two-hour recess the judges announced their verdict—a trifling fine of eight hundred marks. Their judgment all but exonerated Goebbels, who wrote, 'I could have yelped with joy.' Only the cartoon was considered libelous inasmuch as it portrayed one arm of Hindenburg's presidential throne as a Jewish-nosed, Star-of-David-wearing gargoyle. No longer mentioning that the judges who had served him so fairly were themselves Jewish, Dr Goebbels recorded in his diary only the wonderful propaganda effect of this 'victory.' The news even made the far-away columns of the *New York Times*.⁴²

Lunching during the long recess with Hermann Göring, and noticed that the aviator was by no means comfortable with Goebbels' attack on the old warrior. His attitude to Göring was now one of scorn tinged with envy. Relying on his war record Göring had established himself firmly in Berlin's society; still lacking home comforts of his own, Goebbels often spent his evenings with Hermann and Carin and one or other of the Nazi princes.⁴³ His own principles had begun to fray from exposure to the corrupt, blue-blood-loving Göring. He must have realized that Göring could only finance his lifestyle with hefty bribes from the aviation industry, precisely the kind of behavior that Goebbels thundered against when detected in Jews like the financiers Max Sklarek or Julius Barmat. In March Göring grandly offered to procure a new car for Goebbels; this offer proved as empty as the apartment he had promised earlier.⁴⁴

When Easter came in 1930 Göring invited him along to visit his Swedish in-laws. They made a memorable couple—the swaggering

aviator and the diminutive figure limping at his side. It was Dr Goebbels' first trip overseas. Every time he awoke the train seemed to be passing a boulder strewn landscape. The Swedes themselves made up for it. He lusted greedily after the statuesque blonde women, and concluded that they were superior to their menfolk. The Swedish men were doormats, from their monarch downward, 'German on the outside,' he wrote, 'half-Jews within.'⁴⁵ When he left the Görings he decided that Carin was 'on the verge of' tears and added, using his coded doublespeak, 'She is fond of me' (meaning, he was of her); and more meaningfully, 'I revere her like a mother.' Hermann Göring, he decided, was a good sport.⁴⁶

Hitler's birthday came during the absence. Goebbels did not write his customary eulogy. He was still aggrieved about the Strassers. By mid-March sales of the Strassers' new daily *National Sozialist* in Berlin were soaring, and both *Angriff* and *Völkischer Beobachter* were in difficulties. Reluctant to carry out his threat of resigning, Goebbels wrote: 'Munich, and that includes the chief, have run out of credit with me.' He added, 'Hitler hides away, he takes no decisions. . . . He just lets things drift.'⁴⁷ His office manager Franz Wilke returned from Munich with more empty Hitler promises.⁴⁸ Himmler came and assured Goebbels that Hitler really wanted him as Reich propaganda director. Goebbels had heard that before.⁴⁹ He had brooded for months on Hitler and his broken promises. 'He doesn't dare make a move against Strasser,' he noted. 'What's going to happen later when he has to act the dictator in Germany?'⁵⁰ When Hitler suddenly surfaced in Berlin for a conference with Hugenberg and the D.N.V.P. on ways of bringing the government crisis to a head, Goebbels tackled him, taking along Göring for moral support. He frankly accused the Führer of letting things drift. A second meeting with Hitler left Goebbels with the impression that he was losing his nerve. In the event, Hugenberg's party refused to join Hitler in forcing a vote of confidence.⁵¹

The government's crisis peaked on April 12. Brüning just survived, his majority reduced to seven. On April 14, his majority slumped still further to three; but again he survived. Hitler, who had hurried to Berlin, returned to Munich. None of their opponents wanted an election from which only the Nazis and communists were likely to profit.

As the depression bit deeper Hitler's party had begun to expand. It ended 1930 with 389,000 registered members. Dr Goebbels doubled his gau's membership, although the wealthier districts were still sparsely represented: the huge West End Ortsgruppe (local) extending from Schloss Strasse to Pichelsdorf and from the grimy Siemensstadt industrial suburb to Halensee still yielded only forty-five members.

Late in April 1930 Goebbels learned while in Munich that Hitler had at last reprimanded Gregor Strasser. The Führer confirmed that he had issued an ultimatum to Strasser to drop either his newspaper in Berlin or the Organization Department in Munich. Since everybody now had their eyes on Reichstag seats, Hitler had regained his influence. 'Thank

1930

goodness,' wrote Goebbels. 'Everybody is right behind him. Strasser ... sits there like guilt personified. Hitler has strung him up—courteous to the last rung of the scaffold.' Then came the moment that Goebbels had badgered for. Hitler announced—'amid,' if Goebbels is to be believed, 'a breathless hush'—his appointment as the party's national chief of propaganda.⁵² With it went the rank of Reichsleiter, making him one of a very select body indeed. Goebbels saw Strasser go pale. Afterward, the whole bunch except for Himmler came round to Goebbels' side.

The Berlin gau HQ now had about thirty on its payroll, including Muchow, who was in charge of perfecting the factory cell-system. Goebbels had twice been able to raise their pay.⁵³ He began looking round for larger premises, perhaps even an entire building.⁵⁴ Cleverly mollifying him, the party's national HQ purchased for him a brand new open Mercedes with a supercharged engine. He was still a big-car enthusiast like all the top Nazis.⁵⁵

His own modest budget was quite strained. His brother Konrad's business had folded, leaving Hans and Joseph as providers for their mother. 'I want to look after Mother as best I can,' wrote Goebbels. 'Good old Mum, she deserves an old age free of worries.'⁵⁶ The glittering Mercedes soaked up his income, however. It was an essential mobile display of might and rank, with some of the attributes of a tank as well. One night after his S.A. men had killed three communists he was driving with six Brownshirts to a parade when he was recognized by his enemies—'My heart missed a beat,' he recorded, 'but our magnificent Supercharger rampaged triumphantly through the howling mob.'⁵⁷

His disenchantment with his Führer continued. Horst Wessel's mother complained that Hitler had not written even one line of sympathy. Privately Goebbels blamed Hitler's waywardness on his 'womanizing.'⁵⁸ Two days after the new Mercedes arrived, Hitler came back to Berlin to speak at the Sport Palace. He again brought his young niece Geli. Goebbels again pleaded with him to kill off the rival newspaper *National Sozialist*. From the Berlin gauleiter's new offices Hitler phoned Otto Strasser and forbade him to sell the newspaper that evening.⁵⁹ But Otto proved more slippery than that. True, he undertook to sell off the newspaper to Hitler's publisher Max Amann and to cease publication from the twentieth; but he broke both promises. On May 21 Hitler returned to Berlin for a showdown. This time even Gregor disowned his brother Otto. Hitler threatened open war against them.⁶⁰

Goebbels returned to the fold. In Munich Hitler enthusiastically showed him his plans for the Brown House, the party's new national HQ. It seemed rather over-opulent even to Goebbels.⁶¹

WHEREAS the departed Social Democratic chancellor Heinrich Müller—unlovingly described by Goebbels as having 'a badly rusted voice well oiled by slime'—had ruled by the truncheon, Brüning's two years in office would be marked by emergency laws and prohibitions. On April 1 Hanover banned the activities of the Hitler Youth. On June 5 Bavaria

* D.T. In these years, Hitler, women the O.C. considerably, ~~the~~ and Goebbels and Brüning are considered as successors.

June 21, 1930

HOLD THE FLAG HIGH 97

banned political uniforms—in theory those of all parties, in practice only of the Nazis. On June 11, as Goebbels had anticipated, Prussia's new minister of the interior Dr Heinrich Waentig banned the S.A.'s brown shirts, and two weeks later Prussia forbade its civil servants to join the Hitler party. Attired in white shirts with beer-bottle rings as badges, one thousand of Stennes' S.A. men marched through Charlottenburg that evening and Friedrichshain two days later. The police had to adopt ludicrous tactics to enforce the bans.⁶² Goebbels no longer feared them. He had their measure. 'The real enemy,' he recognized, 'is at our rear'—meaning the Strasser faction.⁶³

The Strassers' newspaper continued to appear, spiced with cruel remarks about Goebbels and his cult of personality. Several section heads (Kreisleiter) declared for Otto Strasser. Goebbels blamed Hitler and his procrastination, and meeting him in Leipzig he told him so. Hitler again promised to take action.⁶⁴ Sick with worry, Goebbels wrote: 'Hitler's got to act—he's got to. Or there'll be a catastrophe.' He found out which of his men were traitors, and lodged complaints with the Party's powerful arbitration committee, particularly about Eugen Mossakowsky, editor of the *N.S. Pressekonferenz* and two section heads. Mossakowsky had done something unforgivable: at gauleiter conferences in Berlin and Brandenburg he had accused Goebbels of lying about his heroism during the Ruhr struggle and of forging documents to make his entry into the party seem earlier than it was. These were sore points for Goebbels. Hitler told Göring that he would authorize the Strassers' expulsion on Monday the twenty-third, and personally confirmed this to Goebbels while electioneering at Plauen in Saxony on June 21.⁶⁵

Again however he did not act. When Goebbels phoned him he said he preferred to wait. 'Typical Hitler,' wrote Goebbels. 'Rampant at Plauen, and procrastinating here.'⁶⁶ With Hitler's permission however he expelled the mutinous small fry like Mossakowsky. Mossakowsky pre-empted his expulsion by issuing a statement through the wire services repeating all the lies, and several cruel truths, about Goebbels before resigning.⁶⁷

Gregor Strasser saw the storm signals and assured Goebbels he had broken with his brother Otto. Goebbels trusted none of them. 'If only we had acted in February!' he wailed. The entropy inside his organization increased. There were disturbing reports from Neukölln of scuffles between rival S.A. fractions. Hitler ('the familiar old Hitler... the eternal procrastinator!') kept a low profile. Göring told Goebbels that he too was shattered by Hitler's disloyalty. But the very next day, June 30, he phoned Goebbels: victory was theirs. Hitler had now written a powerful open letter excoriating both Strasser brothers. Gregor laid down the editorship of his newspaper and survived; Otto was expelled from the party. As Hitler's bluntly phrased letter was read out at a Berlin party meeting there were shouts from the floor of 'String 'em up!' Three disgruntled *Angriff* employees left the hall, but that was all. The meeting ended with a spectacular vote of confidence in Hitler and Goebbels. Goebbels

June 21
1930

June
30, 1930

→ The death of Beck is, as D. E. says,
it's a reflection of the O.D.'s final
determination.

1930

June 30,
1930

persuaded the Führer to decree that Kampf Verlag was an enemy of the party. With that, Otto Strasser's goose was cooked.⁶⁸

ONE problem which remained for Dr Goebbels that summer was the law courts. Dr Weiss was determined to see him serve his two months in jail. On May 13 the prosecutors confidentially asked the Reichstag if it was still formally in session.⁶⁹ On Goltz's advice Goebbels persuaded Dr Leonardo Conti, the gau's medical officer, to sign a sick note. That would give him four weeks' grace. The prosecutor's office demanded an independent examination. The mailman brought to Goebbels' Württembergische Strasse lodgings a new summons, for libeling Albert Grzesinski (by calling him 'Cohn'); it was returned to the courthouse with a note, 'Gone away,' and 'no forwarding requested.'⁷⁰

His relations with women have come to a similar impasse. Visiting Anka in January 1930 he has failed to detect that she is four months pregnant by yet another man. Returning to Weimar in June he checks into the Elephant hotel and sends her tulips and a card. 'Can I call round?' it reads.⁷¹ A half-cocked but still platonic episode begins in June when Lucie Kammer, a young shorthand secretary ('still a pure child') with a much older, unloved, and now mortally ill husband comes to the gauleiter with her marital problems; he rapidly grasps that she loves him.⁷² A few days later he decides that Princess zu Wied loves him too; at the Görings he meets the Baroness Erika von Paleske and records that 'Ika' (because there is already another Erika in his ménage) also loves him. His phone jangles all day—Charlotte, Xenia, Lucie—'Always the same,' he whimpers in his diary. 'I am a victim.' Women are a plague upon him. 'But they are an incredible stimulation to work,' he confesses. What he fears is losing his liberty. He writes about Ika that August, 'She comes on too strong. ... Thank goodness we were sitting out in the open.'⁷³

July 18,
1930

He is vacationing—or hiding—at Erika's house in the forest when word comes on July 18, 1930 that Brüning's government is in difficulties. Tonak rushes him back to the Reichstag building in the Mercedes Supercharger. Goebbels romanticizes that his one vote may seal Brüning's fate. In fact Brüning dissolves the Reichstag. As the communist deputies roar the 'Internationale,' Goebbels slips out of the building, naked to the law, even his residual parliamentary immunity annulled.

Sept 14, 1930

13: His Week in Court

SO FAR Dr Goebbels had had to face no real challenge as gauleiter. But, as the new Reichstag election of September 14, 1930 approached, the rift between his gau's officers and the impoverished and disgruntled fistfighters of the Berlin S.A. came to a head. Most of the S.A. men were unemployed. They saw no signs that Hitler intended to allow them any tangible reward for their bravery. Battered and bruised, they watched bitterly as the party squandered considerable sums on the Brown House, its national HQ, in Munich. Recognizing this, Hitler had ordered the gauleiters to enforce a twenty-pfennig monthly levy on each party member to support their local S.A. men; Goebbels sympathized with them. He ordered an additional ten-pfennig levy in Berlin—the S.A. *Groschen* as it was known.² 'We shall reach our goals only on the basis of the S.A.,' he asserted at one confidential meeting.³

Sept 14

The S.A. however wanted to get at the pork-barrel now, and they were not prepared to wait. The result would be the first full-scale S.A. mutiny, during the heat of the summer in Berlin.

Captain Walter Stennes, the ex-army officer who as supreme S.A. commander (Ost) 'Ost' commanded twenty-five thousand of these disaffected men east of the river Elbe, shared many of Dr Goebbels' political views. He had dubbed the gauleiter the Nazis' Joseph Stalin, responsible for preserving the purity of the movement's ideals. Both deprecated Hitler's legalistic approach to power. Though not as radically left-wing as the gauleiter, Stennes was like him an activist and revolutionary.

Goebbels was torn between instinct and logic. Captain Stennes and the S.A. represented manpower and muscle—but Hitler and Munich held promise of power, office, and ever bigger automobiles. Late in July Hitler called a secret conference to decide the official list of Nazi candidates. Goebbels was amused to see how tame Strasser and the other fractious big-shots suddenly became. They finally agreed a list of one hundred names (though not in their wildest dreams did they expect to win so many seats).⁵

The list brought the problems with the S.A. to a head. Stennes sent to the national supreme S.A. commander, Franz von Pfeffer, a letter asking for safe Reichstag seats for three S.A. men.⁶ But Hitler was opposed to allowing the S.A. any more political clout than it already had. On August 1 Stennes mentioned in his diary reports from his subordinate commanders that relations between the S.A. and Munich were becoming intolerable.

Aug 1930

He invited his boss, Pfeffer, to Berlin at once. Meanwhile on the second his S.A. commanders reiterated their demands for Reichstag seats. The next day Pfeffer revealed that Hitler was on the contrary talking of curbing the S.A. back to what they could afford.

Financial prudence did not commend itself to the Brownshirt rednecks. 'This shows,' reported Stennes' chief of staff, 'that the objectives of the Reich director [i.e. Pfeffer in Munich] are no longer those of old.' This was true. Hitler intended to attain power by strictly legal means. In Munich Goebbels, now Reich propaganda director, briefed his deputy Himmler on the broad outlines of the election campaign, then returned to Berlin. Nationwide over the next two months the glaring red and black Nazi election posters would invade telegraph poles, billboards, and newspapers.⁷ He printed millions of leaflets to be sold to Nazis at one pfennig each. Sleepless with work and worry, his nerves tautened, frayed, and snapped. At the beginning of August 1930 one thousand of his officials—so rapidly was the party now expanding—packed into a pre-election conference. From tram conductor to princess, every rank of society was active in the party's campaign.⁸ In this election battle Goebbels would organize twenty thousand meetings up and down the country; in Berlin he would stage twenty-four mass meetings on the last two days alone.

The ruling Social Democrats tried to bury Goebbels with court actions. The Hindenburg case was revived along with the ancient charges of high treason. Seven more summonses arrived, accusing Goebbels of having libeled the Prussian prime minister Dr Otto Braun,⁹ Albert Grzesinski, municipal officials, and the entire Jewish community.¹⁰ Fearing summary imprisonment he stockpiled a batch of articles for *Angriff*; on August 3 he was notified of ten more court dates ('with the gentlemen of *Angriff* to blame for most of them').¹¹

While the S.A. built up an ugly steam-head in his rear, Goebbels was fighting a nationwide election campaign and preparing half a dozen trial defenses. Thus the S.A. could hardly have chosen a less propitious moment to strike. Stennes, a sheaf of resignation letters from his commanders in his pocket, wrote to Pfeffer that his S.A. had a right to a hearing from Hitler. He got no reply. He then tackled Goebbels and threatened to withdraw his S.A. commanders—the Berlin S.A. would then shrink from fifteen thousand to perhaps three thousand, he predicted. Goebbels exploded; Hitler described the S.A.'s actions to Pfeffer as 'mutiny and conspiracy.' Believing that Stennes' clumsy intrigues were at the bottom of the S.A.'s unrest, Goebbels tackled the top S.A. commanders in Berlin like Bruno Wetzel; he too spoke of mutiny, comfortable in the knowledge that he had Hitler behind him.¹² A few days later Stennes took an S.A. delegation down to Munich, where he demanded to see Hitler. For two days they waited in the lobby. Loyal S.S. men barred the way. Goebbels, worried, discussed the gathering crisis with Goring. 'I don't trust Stennes at all,' he warned his diary. 'So let's keep an eye on him!'¹³

pre-
Reich

Aug 14, 1930

HIS WEEK IN COURT 101

HIS week in court arrived on Tuesday August 12, beginning with the Otto Braun libel action in Hanover. The Hindenburg appeal was set down for Thursday in Berlin.¹⁴ President Hindenburg let it be known that he would drop the case if they could agree on a joint statement; they could not.

On the twelfth he and his lawyer Goltz took the morning train to Hanover. An eager crowd of Nazis met them at the station along with the local gauleiter Bernhard Rust and his S.A. commander Viktor Lutze, one of the few who were refusing to truckle to Stennes. The rowdy procession swept the one-legged Goltz and his lame client along to the courthouse. The charge was that Goebbels had accused Braun of taking bribes from 'Galician spivs.' Three police agents swore on oath that he had said this; supported by witnesses, Goebbels admitted having accused *Bauer*, the former Social Democrat Reich chancellor, of taking bribes. The prosecutor demanded nine months' prison, arguing that if Goebbels had libeled Hindenburg he was quite capable of having libeled the prime minister. Goltz pointed out that even the Jewish arch-swindler Julius Barmat had been sentenced to only eleven months, with half remitted. Goebbels was acquitted and awarded his costs. Instead of a jail term he had won huge publicity. Burly S.A. men chaired him out of the courtroom, singing the Horst Wessel anthem; he went off to carouse with Lutze, their commander.¹⁵

One down, three to go. On Thursday the fourteenth the court heard his appeal in the Hindenburg case. The prosecutor again demanded a nine-month prison sentence. Goltz however read out a letter from Hindenburg—the president himself wanted to withdraw the original complaint. As that was not possible, he now considered the matter closed and had 'no interest' in punishing Dr Goebbels.¹⁶ The public prosecutor snapped that he, and not Hindenburg, represented the state in this courtroom. The judge disagreed; he too acquitted Dr Goebbels, finding that his statements had been made in the public interest. Goebbels could see that the newspapermen were stunned by this renewed victory.¹⁷

Still a free man he prepared for the third day in the courthouse at Moabit on Friday the fifteenth. The plaintiffs here were the Reich government and ex-chancellor Hermann Müller, charging that in *Angriff* in December 1929 he had labeled the Social Democrats a bunch of hired traitors. The elderly judge Dr Toelke invited him to justify the words, and Goebbels did so with relish, emphasizing how the Social Democrats had signed away Germany's birthright in the postwar treaties while deceiving their own people. Goltz told of how the Social Democrat governments of Saxony, Thuringia, and Prussia had sabotaged the government's postwar struggle for the Ruhr, how Saxony's prime minister had betrayed government secrets to France, how the Social Democrats had thwarted attempts to rescue Schlageter from execution, and how their Philipp Scheidemann had betrayed details of the Reichswehr's violations of Versailles.

Judge Toelke was aghast. 'If we are to hear *evidence* for all these claims,'

14.

1930

he stammered, '—well, I have two months from nine A.M. to six P.M., but—'

'Dr Goebbels,' interrupted Goltz, 'has stated openly what millions think. He wants to justify his allegations. He is at the court's disposal. *We have the time!*'

Goebbels had already brought a platoon of military witnesses into court, but the judge refused to allow them. Goltz solemnly picked up his crutch and hobbled out. The prosecutor asked for a six-month sentence on Goebbels. The court reserved its judgment, and moved on without a break to the Grzesinski libel action.¹⁸

Aug 16

That Saturday, August 16, Goebbels expected to go to prison. Instead the court stipulated modest fines of six hundred and four hundred marks for libeling the government and Müller, and four hundred for Grzesinski. This was cheap publicity indeed.

'These demanding court actions are doing my gut no good,' wrote Goebbels. 'It's enough to throw up.'

Aug 17

Three down: the court moved on to the next charge, of incitement to violence, and handed down another petty fine, of three hundred marks.

'Let them give their verdict,' wrote Goebbels grimly on the seventeenth.¹⁷ 'We shall utter our verdict on September 14—election day.'

He visited his mother at Rheydt. Berlin phoned him there—four more court summonses had arrived. By the time of his return the number had doubled to eight. Braun and Grzesinski had both appealed for stiffer sentences; Goebbels was now also accused of having, in a speech at Prerow in July 1929, called the Reich's war standard 'a Jewish flag, a dirt rag,' and any republic that it stood for a 'Jew republic.'¹⁹ He decided to ignore these fresh trials. Court officials demanded to see him. He refused—he was now planning the biggest Sport Palace meetings of the campaign. 'The courts,' he recorded, 'are now hounding me with summonses. I've got a thick skin. I won't budge.'²⁰

By the late summer of 1930 there were signs that his diaries had begun concealing his true anxiety about the S.A. The incriminating notebooks might have been snatched at any time by communists, the S.A., or the police. Thus the diary avowed that he shared the S.A.'s indignation. In reality he got his office manager Franz Wilke to take precautions against them. This became more urgent as rumors multiplied that Stennes was planning to issue an ultimatum to Munich. Dr Leonardo Conti, the S.A.'s chief physician, warned both Hitler and Goebbels that Stennes was up to no good.²¹ At the end of August, realizing that he could not curb his underlings' revolutionary passions, Pfeffer resigned.²²

Stennes waited until Goebbels was away in Dresden, then called his commanders together. Melitta Wiedemann, features editor of *Angriff*, could see him through the windows one floor below standing in a white cap at the head of a table round which crowded Berlin's S.A. commanders. There were growls of approval as Stennes proposed they go on

1930

strike immediately unless Hitler accepted their demands for a bigger slice of the action.²³

By telephone Goebbels heard from Berlin that the S.A. commanders had collected their ragged regiments (*Standarten*) for a confrontation with both Berlin (Goebbels) and Munich (Hitler). This put at risk the big Sport Palace election meeting on Friday the twenty-ninth. Back in Berlin on Thursday Goebbels found Stennes demanding three Reichstag seats and more funds. Otherwise, in best trades-union jargon, he could not guarantee that his S.A. lads would not break up Goebbels' meeting, an 'unparalleled impertinence' in the gauleiter's view.

It was an ugly situation. Goebbels phoned Munich and advised them to play for time. They could *appear* to yield to Stennes' demands, fight the election, then take revenge on him. Hitler however said he did not propose to yield anything. Goebbels swooned with rage: Hitler had lost touch with reality—fifteen thousand S.A. in Berlin were threatening violence against him and his embattled HQ. He left for Hamburg that evening. In his absence thirty S.A. men appeared at the Hedemann Strasse HQ with the intention of giving Franz Wilke the kind of head massage in which they specialized. Only the intervention of Stennes himself, according to his diary, prevented a rough-house. 'The S.A. commanders,' he dictated, 'left no doubt that, far from protecting today's Sport Palace meeting of General [Karl] Litzmann, Dr [Wilhelm] Frick, and Dr Goebbels, the S.A. men of the Gau Sturm intended to smash it up.' Stennes ordered them to assemble in a beerhall at Hasenheide instead, to receive special orders from him (which his diary does not specify).

Wilke reacted by moving a reliable S.S. guard unit into the HQ building. Goebbels discreetly left by car the next morning, Saturday the thirtieth, for Breslau. Stennes ordered his commanders to meet him at Hedemann Strasse. As they were meeting here, they found an S.S. man, Hertel, writing notes on their conference from the locked room next door, 'on orders from above.'²⁴ An S.A. unit bloodily evicted the S.S. men, though not before one of them, Walter Kern, had alerted the police.²⁵ Dr Bernhard Weiss sent a massive force round within minutes, who hauled off the S.A. trespassers.

An urgent telegram notified Goebbels in Breslau. He phoned Hitler at Bayreuth; Hitler said he would come to Berlin at once.²⁶ Back in the capital Goebbels found his HQ a shambles. There were bloodstains everywhere. Unshaven and baggy-eyed, Hitler, Himmler, and Hess reached Berlin around eleven A.M. and checked into an hotel near Potsdamer Platz.²⁷ Hitler asked Wilke for a full report, then toured the city's S.A. units to test morale.²⁸ He was jeered at some locations. That evening he invited the lesser commanders, and then Berlin's S.A. Oberführer Wetzel, to meet him in Goebbels' apartment. Hitler, Goebbels, Göring, and Himmler were present, but not Stennes. 'The Berlin S.A. commanders,' recalled Himmler, 'trooped into Dr Goebbels' apartment that afternoon and acted in an incredibly rowdy manner toward the Führer.

Read
negat
as Geli?

1930

Gangs of S.A. men were chorusing slogans outside in the street. Stennes had probably staged the whole thing.²⁷ For two hours they bandied allegations and counter-allegations. Rudolf Hess mentioned the odd fact that Stennes had a gun permit issued by the head of the political police, Wündisch, and implied that he was a police agent (a belief which Goebbels came to share).²⁸ Hitler ruled that Stennes would have to go. In the middle of the night however a Herculean figure, Richard Harwardt, probably the toughest man in the Berlin Sturmabteilung (S.A.), came clattering upstairs into Goebbels' apartment, flung a salute, and roared: 'Adolf, don't get tough with your own S.A.!'²⁹

Urged by Harwardt to give Stennes himself a hearing, Hitler reluctantly agreed. It lasted until six a.m., when Hitler sent for all the S.A. commanders once more and declared that he was going to cut their Brown army rigorously in size.

This was getting nowhere. Goebbels left to snatch an hour's sleep—he had to be in court for yet another libel action that morning (he refused to offer any defense, was sentenced to prison, appealed).³¹ Exhausted and almost asleep on his feet he pleaded with Hitler once again to promise the S.A. whatever they demanded.³² Winning the election must come first.

Sept 1

It was now Monday September 1. According to Goebbels' diary, at four P.M. Hitler took the decision he had urged: Stennes should stay. But he would dismiss Pfeffer as supreme commander, despite his resignation, and take over the S.A. himself (with the notorious Ernst Röhm as his chief of staff).³³ A letter went to Stennes, and Stennes pledged loyalty. Taking selected S.S. men as an escort, Hitler spoke in the Veterans' Building to 'his' entire Berlin S.A., promising to meet Stennes' fundamental demands. Police observers reported that Hitler, his voice cracking, appealed for unswerving loyalty: 'Let us pray in this hour that nothing can divide us, and that God will help us against the Devil!' screamed Hitler. 'Almighty Lord, bless our fight!'—and the roars of Heil, so the police reported, had died away as the audience noticed their Führer's hands folded seemingly in prayer.³⁴ The Görings threw a little reception at Badensche Strasse afterwards. Stennes was not invited. The whole reconciliation had been a charade, as Goebbels had recommended to Hitler. This became plain from remarks made by the top Nazis at the reception.³⁵ 'Everything shipshape,' wrote Goebbels later that day. 'That's the end of the Stennes putsch.'³⁶ They would, he added, be drawing the necessary conclusions after the election. The campaign resumed.

*

GERMANY had never seen a battle like this. Over the last two weeks the Nazis staged hundreds of dramatic meetings—in the open air, in halls, by night, in marquees, by torchlight. Goebbels willingly spoke side by side with Gregor Strasser.³⁷ His HQ printed tens of millions of leaflets. The streets were carpeted with them. Sixty truckloads of Nazis careered around the capital tossing out pamphlets; Goebbels clambered from truck to truck, haranguing pedestrians through an amplifier and whipping

* Yes, he was sensitive indeed—the
G.D. was indeed debating whether
to submit to...

1930

on his men. The posters clearly betrayed his own handiwork. One contrasted unlovely photographs of all their thick-lensed oppressors—pride of place being given to Dr Weiss—with majestic studio portraits of the top eleven Nazis. As for his own likeness, Goebbels placed this right next to Hitler's.³⁸

Unemployment had been two million as the year opened. It would reach 4,380,000 as the year ended. 'Out with this rabble!' cried Goebbels in *Angriff*. He hoped for a quarter of a million Nazi voters in Berlin. When Hitler came to the Sport Palace on September 10, one hundred thousand people applied for tickets. The photos show him with clenched fists raised, orating into a box microphone some three feet in front of him (in Hermann Schäfer, Goebbels had now gained one of Europe's finest public-address system technicians).³⁹ 'With fanaticism like this,' wrote Goebbels afterward, 'a nation can and will rouse itself again.' He attributed the public curiosity to the S.A. mutiny. 'The S.A. must give up all political ambitions,' he wrote after discussing the problem over supper with Hitler and Göring (now the party's liaison to the S.A.).⁴⁰ All three—Hitler, Goebbels, and Stennes—were to be seen amiably sharing a meal the next day.⁴¹ On the final electioneering day, the twelfth, the little gauleiter spoke at seven meetings—motoring in his Mercedes Super-charger from hall to hall, flanked by motorcycle outriders.

'Keep calm!' he admonished himself. He had rented the Sport Palace for election night itself, September 14, 1930. By mid-evening the cavernous hall was rocking with cheers as the first results came in. Hitler had banked on winning fifty seats, or eighty at most. As midnight approached, the Nazis had already won 103.⁴² Exultant young men jogged around the hall with Goebbels on their shoulders. The final tally was 6,406,397 votes, entitling the Nazis to 107 seats. Suddenly the Nazis were the strongest party in Germany after the Social Democrats. This was democracy with a vengeance. The communists however had also increased their share, from 10.6 to 13.1 percent. (In Berlin the Nazis, with over 360,000 votes, had won 12.8 percent of the vote.) 'Hot months lie ahead,' predicted Goebbels. 'The communists have gained too.'⁴³

He is in grave danger of arrest. A month will pass before the Reichstag convenes and he is immune again.

He needs to empty his fevered brain, and for this purpose female company is ideal. He flirts with Xenia ('the best of all'), he escorts Carin Göring, he accompanies the delightful Potempa twins, or phones Charlotte, and he gets to know not only the Weimar architect Professor Paul Schultze-Naumburg but his lovely wife as well, and decides as often as he needs to that they are all madly in love with him.⁴⁴

Horrified by the Nazis' election victories, Dr Weiss's police show him no mercy. Five days after the election baton-wielding police fling Goebbels down the steps of a police station as he protests at their treatment of an S.A. man brought in for questioning.⁴⁵ The courts set down five new cases for—surely no coincidence—Monday October 13,

Sept 10.

12.

14.

Oct 13.

Oct 13, (930

106 II: THE GAULEITER OF BERLIN

the very afternoon that the Reichstag is due to swear him in. The police are ordered to bring him in by force if need be. He takes refuge out at Erika's forest cottage, armed with a dispensation from his doctor. He hunkers down in the back of the Potempas' car to go to Weimar where Hitler speaks in the National Theater, with Göring following as a somewhat implausible decoy in the Supercharger. 'What wizard fellows these fliers are!' enthuses Goebbels, changing his mind yet again.

He drives back from Thuringia that Sunday night in the Schultze-Naumburgs' car, squeezed enjoyably between the professor's comely wife and her stepdaughter Babette; he sleeps at the Schultze-Naumburgs' and it is just as well, for Dr Weiss's police are meanwhile ransacking his lodgings in Württembergische Strasse and lying in wait for him.

October 13 comes. He lies doggo all morning writing up his diary. 'In three hours I am immune again, thank God!' As Berlin's Nazis go on an orgy of destruction through the West End, smashing the windows of Jewish-owned stores on the Potsdamer Platz and in Kurfürstendamm—an inspired move by the gauleiter to distract 'Isidor'—he is driven at breakneck speed over to the Reichstag.

'Portal zwei!' he shouts. Plainclothes detectives see him hobbling frantically up the long flight of steps to Door Two, wearing a light raincoat buttoned tightly to his neck, and grab at him just as he lurches through the great doors. The gau official Hanno Konopath and a Reichstag flunky get a firm grip on him and bundle him inside.⁴⁶

They have torn off his coat. Beneath it for the first time he is wearing the forbidden uniform of the Nazi party. He is once more immune, and he can do and say as he likes.

Oct 13.

1930

14: A Blonde in the Archives

AFTER all the other deputies had taken their seats the Nazis marched in. Like Dr Goebbels, all were wearing the forbidden brown shirt. A cacophony of insults greeted them. Five days later Chancellor Brüning set out his economic program. To packed benches the bullheaded, broadshouldered Gregor Strasser delivered one of the best speeches of his life. Even Goebbels was impressed. 'The House pays the closest attention,' he wrote with more than a soupçon of envy. 'Thus he's back again, firmly in the saddle.' The Nazis called repeatedly for votes of no confidence in Brüning. The Reichstag was then adjourned until early December.

Goebbels was bored with it already. The fight had been the fun. 'The toxic haze of parliaments is not the right air for me,' he decided. 'I can't breathe there.' Back at his lodgings he revived himself with whiffs of the Lieder of Brahms and Wolff, to which he provided his own piano accompaniment.²

With the political wind in Germany now beginning to blow Brown, the highest police officials faced an ugly option: to smash the Nazis or to join them. The first alternative entailed facing the risk that the Nazis would gain power. Increasingly the middle-ranking officers decided that Germany's future lay with Goebbels and Hitler. According to Berlin's *Acht-Uhr Abendblatt* at least one senior police officer had been seen cheering the Nazis on during the riots of October 13, 1930 and singing a Nazi song. Albert Grzesinski wrote to Prussia's prime minister Braun that evening, protesting against this 'deliberate' breakdown of police authority.³ 'In grave times like these,' he wrote, 'what counts is being tough—tough as nails.' If Schutzpolizei commander Heimannsberg himself proved guilty then he too must go. 'If,' wrote Grzesinski, getting to his real point, 'Comrade Zörgiebel [Berlin's police president] stands up for both these officers, we must not spare him either.' Braun agreed; he dismissed Waentig as minister of the interior as well as Zörgiebel, appointing Grzesinski in the latter's place. 'It's going to be some winter,' commented a wry Goebbels in his diary. 'But if these bastards think they can get us down with terror and persecution they've got another think coming.'⁴

The mood at Alexander Platz, the brownstone police HQ in Berlin, was jubilant. Dr Weiss personally welcomed back his fellow socialist Grzesinski at a little police ceremony. 'When we heard it was you,' said

1930

the oily Dr Weiss, the real power behind the scenes, 'we all cheered.'⁵

He had turned thirty-three. That month he recorded his first radio broadcast, debating international art with the renowned left-wing stage director Erwin Piscator. A new friend, Arnolt Bronnen, arranged both this interview and another two days later on neutrality in broadcasting and the cowardice of governments.⁶ Fritz Prang, his old schoolfriend, had given him a splendid radio and he sat up late marveling at the sounds coming from Rome or Copenhagen. Preferring the aristocracy to carry his bags for him, he had taken on the upright young Count Karl-Hubert Schimmellmann as his private secretary.⁷

His party HQ in Hedemann Strasse was turning into a fortress. From the reception area one door to the right led to the quarters of the increasingly ill-humored S.A., the other to the left to his gau headquarters. Uniformed men stood guard on each door. Visitors were taken through a locked and guarded doorway at the end of a short passage, past a long suite of rooms separated by shoulder-high glass partitions, to a side chamber off which more locked doors concealed three large rooms; in the very last of these sat the gauleiter, Dr Goebbels, in an otherwise empty room at a desk a full ten yards from the door. He could reach this room via a side staircase directly from the yard door where his new Mercedes delivered him each day.

Nov 1.

He installed the editorial offices of *Angriff* on the first floor of this building. From November 1, 1930 it appeared as a daily. Its masthead now read, 'Berlin's German evening paper.' Months of wearying negotiations with Max Amann had preceded this innovation. Goebbels mistrusted the party's publisher, but in September a deal had been worked out giving Franz Eher Verlag 60 percent of the stock in *Angriff* and the gau 40 percent. Goebbels retained editorial control.⁸ The new rotary presses had been assembled at the printers, Süsserott & Co. That afternoon, November 1, Dr Goebbels found the printers' yard crowded with his *Angriff* salesmen all wearing smart uniforms with the newspaper's name picked out in silver on their red cap-bands. The presses glistened with chrome and oil like a locomotive at a station. He gave a signal to start the presses rolling. Everybody saluted, and Horst Wessel's anthem echoed until drowned by the whirring and clanking machinery.

Nov 3.

Now a daily, the newspaper differed little from its predecessor except in topicality. Goebbels demanded relentless personal attacks on Dr Weiss, and the editor Dr Lippert complied. On November 3 the robust headline read 'BERNHARD WEISS ALLOCATES NIGHTCLUB CONCESSIONS: HIS BROTHER GETS THE BRIBES.' The story dealt with Weiss's murky dealings with his criminal brother Conrad and an unrelated Jewish night-club owner called Taube Weiss. On the sixth, as his headlines rhetorically asked 'BERNHARD WEISS TO RESIGN?', Goebbels privately rejoiced in his diary: 'Isidor is being destroyed.' On November 8 *Angriff* reported that a communist had punched Zörgiebel in the face: 'Sometimes,' the newspaper editorialized, 'though not often, the acts of the communists are not entirely unwelcome to us.'⁹ For this licentious remark Grzesinski banned *Angriff* for one

Nov 8.

1930

week.¹⁰ Goebbels was livid; his newspaper would be banned on fifteen more occasions before August 1932, for periods ranging from three days to six weeks. Grzesinski, bolder than his predecessor, banned several Goebbels meetings too. Rumors abounded that he would soon ban the party as well. Goebbels doubted the police would really try that now.

Later in November the Sport Palace audience was treated to a double bill as he and Göring harangued them. 'I make short work of the Social Democrats,' recorded Goebbels. 'The giant arena thunders with rage, hatred, and screams of revenge.... How much further can this be pushed?'¹¹ He envied Göring his easy access to wealth and high society. Already however a perceptible frost was settling over their relations. On

October 9 he had written of Göring, 'He is a true comrade—but not devoid of ambition.' The day after the Reichstag had reconvened he commented privately, 'I rather fear that Fatso Gregor [Strasser] and Fatso Göring may shortly hit it off together.'¹² Admittedly the aviator had introduced him to several useful contacts like Fritz Thyssen, the steel baron; the former airman Erich Niemann, head of Mannesmann Steel, and Wilhelm Tengelmann (Ruhr Coal). They would inject badly needed funds into the party in Berlin.¹³ But Hitler had now appointed Göring his personal viceroy in Berlin. This was bound to lead to friction with the gauleiter. As a Reichsleiter Goebbels in fact ranked somewhat higher than Göring in the party, and a harder tone of mordant criticism crept into the diary entries.¹⁴ Viktoria von Dirksen revealed confidentially to him that Göring was still having problems beating the recurring morphine addiction inflicted on him by Austrian doctors in 1923. Having already made observations about the aviator's evident corruption, he made a note to keep an eye on him.¹⁵

Oct 9.

ENTERING his HQ one day in November 1930 Goebbels sees a platinum blonde coming down the steps.

'Donnerwetter, Schimmel!' he exclaims to his private secretary. 'Who was that?'

The blonde is working in his press-clippings section. The next day he sends for her, to work on his confidential archives. She turns out to be wealthy, married, and twenty-nine—much older than his usual preference. She rates another diary mention on the fourteenth, helping to sort out early photographs.¹⁶

Thus he has finally met the woman he will marry. Other females will flit across his stage as, aged thirty-three, he belatedly approaches manhood. (He has detected the first gray hairs.) There is his former secretary, the 'wondrous, goodly, attractive, and affectionate' Ilse Stahl, who stays over one evening until six A.M.; 'and,' he writes, 'wholly sexually innocent, at that.'¹⁷ She blushes the next day and he scribbles her a note, 'Phone me at seven.' But that evening he has a visit from another, the blonde actress Hella Koch, who is already married.¹⁸ His roaming eye alights on Olga Förster, the fiancée of his new friend the broadcaster Arnolt Bronnen. Olga, another petite actress, visits him alone a few days

Hagla

Dec 5, 1930

110 II: THE GAULEITER OF BERLIN

later and tries a much worn female ploy—she is engaged, she sighs, but does not really love her Arnolt. 'But me,' records Goebbels smugly, 'she likes a lot.' He thinks of her that evening as he addresses the gau's Women's Order—the women all 'well behaved' and the girls all 'spotless.'¹⁹ He invites Bronnen and his Olga to the movies and she visits him again the next day. She wheels out every available weapon in the arsenal of female seduction.²⁰

He is a sitting duck. He is nest-building for the new apartment that he and Xenia have found at Steglitz—No. 11 am Bäkequell. He browses the furniture stores, determined to create a drawing room to rival Carin Göring's.²¹ His female admirers often come to see his performance in the Reichstag. And perform at last he does: on December 6 the 'touching' and 'devoted' Olga Förster comes round. 'She loves me madly,' he résumés afterwards, to which he adds a nonchalant parenthesis: '(1, 2).' Five days later Olga comes again—as indeed does Goebbels, not once, twice, but thrice: '(3, 4, 5)'.²² A week later she marries her Arnolt Bronnen and that is that. 'No regrets,' writes Goebbels; not once, but twice²³—although it does pain him when a gossip columnist gets hold of the story and phones him about rumors that Olga's new husband has Jewish blood; Bronnen assures Goebbels it is not so.²⁴

For two months after his seduction Goebbels' private life is a flurry of former girlfriends. He has some catching up to do. He treats them, one hopes, more kindly than he writes of them in his diary. Helping move to Steglitz, Ilse is crowned by a falling equestrian bronze and her head bleeds profusely. 'She yammers on all evening,' he writes heartlessly. 'I am quite reactionary,' he confesses to the Bronnens. 'Having, and raising, children is a job for life. My mother is the woman I most revere ... so close to life. Today women want a say in everything, they just don't want children any more. They call it emancipation.'²⁵

IN December 1930 Goebbels staged his most effective propaganda demonstration yet, against the Ufa film version of *All Quiet on the Western Front*. The film was pacifist and anti-German (its author had already emigrated). In one scene, German soldiers were depicted haggling with a dying comrade whose legs had been shot away, over who should inherit his new boots. At its first public showing on the fifth, Goebbels' S.A. men emptied the cinema with stink bombs and live mice.²⁶ The Nazis found Berlin's police, many of them ex-army officers, in broad sympathy with them. *Angriff* reported laconically that their Doctor had been present 'for informational purposes,' and planned to see the rest of the film for informational purposes 'on Sunday evening.' His men took the hint and trashed the movie theater while thousands of cheering Berliners looked on. The management canceled the next performance after that. Even *Mosse's Berliner Tageblatt* dared not to criticize, because this time the gauleiter had the people behind him.²⁷ On the seventh the movie theater tried again. Goebbels staged another 'spontaneous' riot.²⁸ He called for further protests the next night. The police cordoned off entire districts.

Dec 5.

"a. Hatz"

Dec 7.

1930

This time, he estimated, forty thousand Berliners turned out to protest against the film; opposing newspapers put the figure at six thousand.²⁹ Under pressure from Grzesinski the Prussian minister of the interior Severing banned all open-air demonstrations.³⁰ On the eleventh the Reichstag itself debated the situation. Goebbels was evicted from the building, but the victory was his. At four P.M. the Brüning government ordered the objectionable film withdrawn from distribution 'because of the danger to Germany's image abroad,' then adjourned until February 3, 1931.³¹

'We are going to be on the verge of power soon,' assessed Goebbels on December 2, 1930. 'But what then? A tricky question.' He mistrusted the alliance that Hitler was forming. Strasser warned the Nazi Reichstag bloc that they were making too much headway in bourgeois circles and that this would taint the party's image ('Bravo, Strasser,' observed Goebbels to himself). At a function at the Görings' afterward he had a long talk with Strasser, trying to find common ground with this impressive politician. 'I want to bury the hatchet,' wrote Goebbels, 'and I think he does too.'³²

He celebrated a pagan Christmas with the S.A. around a Yuletide bonfire at Schönerlinde. But he spent Christmas Eve with the Görings, who had less time for such pagan rites. Carin gave him a fine porcelain bowl, decorated with white mice. Her husband's morphine addiction caused him real concern, and he mentioned it to Hitler. Hitler said he would take Göring under his wing.³³

Turning to grand strategy Goebbels warned that their party was in danger of losing momentum—it was approaching freezing point, as he put it. 'We must start a crescendo of operations.' And he did: in July the *Red Flag* had challenged him to a public debate, knowing full well that for him to accept would be to invite arrest. His immunity restored, he now challenged both the Social Democrats and the communists to debate before a working-class audience at Friedrichshain. A thousand communists turned up on January 22, 1931. Their ace propagandist Walter Ulbricht spoke for nearly an hour; the communists then pitched into their rivals with chair legs and broken bottles; while Goebbels and his Nazis held their ground, in Goebbels' narrative, Ulbricht fled 'whimpering' to the S.A. stewards for protection, before leaving the hall with his jacket over his head. 'They banked on brawn instead of brain,' mocked Goebbels in *Angriff*, 'then found that where they had arms, our S.A. men didn't exactly have liverwursts dangling at their sides.' There were over one hundred injured including his chauffeur Kunisch and Olga Bronnen, who was taken to hospital with concussion.³⁴

A QUAVERING voice phones him in the small hours, after the riot: Olga, calling from the hospital. Goebbels remains callous and aloof.³⁵ Ilse Hess writes, chiding him for his attitude to women and holding up Carin Göring as a shining example of feminine supportiveness. Goebbels replies

Jan 1st
1930 → 1931

112 II: THE GAULEITER OF BERLIN

evasively, promising to look the Hesses up more often in 1931. He plans to spend three days every fortnight down in Munich then. 'Unfortunately my sister won't be able to come either to Munich or Berlin,' his letter continues. 'She has to keep my mother company—she's feeling very lonely since my father died.'³⁶ For the first time since he was at university he has not gone home for Christmas, guiltily suggesting in his diary that he must spare his mother the risk.³⁷

Jan 1. 1931
He moves into middle-class Steglitz on the first day of 1931. It is a well-appointed two-room apartment. Meanwhile one woman has by her beauty and sheer force of personality crowded out her juniors—Magda Quandt, the platinum blonde working in his private archives, which consist of press clippings from all over the world. There is a perfumed classiness about her. She finds herself drawn toward this Savonarola who has set all Berlin by the ears. Late in January his diary records that she is bringing her work on the archives round to his new Steglitz apartment. 'Knowledge is power,' he explains to Magda, gesturing toward the clippings files.³⁸

She reminds him inevitably of a younger, classier Anka. The other girls' names gradually fade from the diary's pages. Charlotte stalks around with a face like thunder.

When Magda visits him again, Goebbels finds himself wishing that she were in love with him.³⁹

Two weeks later, the wish becomes father of the deed.

1931
that says it all.⁷ He was fined two hundred marks on one count, fifteen hundred marks for having picked on Weiss 'because of his Jewish origins,' still running a high fever, he limped out. He suspected traitors everywhere. 'Keep on marching' he penned into his diary. 'Don't look back!'⁸ There seemed no end to the court actions. On the seventeenth he was fined two thousand marks, then five hundred, and finally one hundred more for contempt of court. More summonses were heaped onto his desk.⁹ He resolved to take revenge on all the Isidors of this world when the time came.

A severe depression seized him, a mental crisis which he acknowledged only when he deemed that it had passed.¹⁰ Magda's shenanigans had triggered it. There was a 'shadow' still lurking around her apartment. Apparently she had had a stormier past than the comparatively innocent Dr Goebbels had suspected. Insane with jealousy, he trusted nobody. The word *spies* surfaced more often in his diary. He searched for them at his HQ, he even suspected Hinkel; his political life seemed more arduous than ever, a constant round of strange hotel beds briefly sighted at three A.M., of six A.M. railroad platforms for the return to Berlin, of persecution, court hearings, prohibitions, and the constant fear of violence or even assassination.¹¹

Grzesinski enforced a new three-month ban on Goebbels speaking—which sometimes meant listening to the pompous and vapid Hermann Göring standing in for him. Hitler now entrusted the aviator Göring with important missions abroad. In May 1931 he visited Rome and returned with a signed photograph of Mussolini for the Führer. 'Jack of all trades,' sniffed Goebbels, meaning master of none.¹²

Eight more court appearances faced him late that April. 'Maddening,' he recorded. 'But I'm not going to lose my nerve.'¹³ At Itzehoe near Hamburg he faced a four-month prison sentence but was acquitted.¹⁴ Squirring under Grzesinski's speaking ban, on April 25 he reluctantly signed an undertaking not to make fun of the police observers assigned to his meetings any more.¹⁵ Another hearing was scheduled at Moabit for April 27. He notified the court however that he could not miss an important Nazi meeting in Munich. But the Berlin courts had issued a bench warrant after his non-appearance. As he was eating at the Rose Garden hotel three detectives arrested him and escorted him to the night train to Berlin. 'So much for immunity!' he fumed. 'With a Barmat, a Sklarek and a Kutisker,' declared *Angriff* that morning, referring to the Jewish racketeers, 'they didn't go to such lengths. But then they weren't the elected representatives of sixty thousand *Germans*—just major embezzlers!'¹⁶ Press photographers crowded the platform as the train arrived back in Berlin. 'The *Judenpresse* is howling with joy,' Goebbels noted. In Room 664 at the Moabit courthouse (*Angriff* helpfully told its readers where the eight new cases were to be heard) the world's press awaited him.¹⁷ He told the judges what he thought of them, then sat down and refused to speak another word. He was given a month's suspended jail sentence, and heavy fines. Choking with rage he lodged an appeal.¹⁸ To

his lawyer he snarled, indicating the prosecutor Dr Stenig, 'Let's make a note of that man for later.'¹⁹

May brought still more cases.²⁰ But daylight was filtering into this long dark tunnel of police harassment. On June 12 he was again acquitted. 'The courts,' he gloated, 'are getting to whiff of things to come'—a reference to the growing likelihood that Brüning's days in office were numbered. 'Then it's our turn.'²¹

KEEPING a tryst with Magda at the five-star Kaiserhof hotel, he recognizes that the other man, the 'Shadow,' is still coming between them.²² Fretting, he spends his evenings alone at Steglitz fingering his piano keyboard, leafing idly through a book, or fitfully dozing. He phones countless times without reaching her. After one colossal Sport Palace gathering she invites him back to her own luxurious apartment for the first time. The Shadow has gone. Her elegant suite of seven rooms includes a music room, and quarters for her guests and servants. He decides that the worst is over between them. His diary soon finds him making plans for the future with her: and he is no longer keeping score.²³

Shadows flit in and out from his own past. Magda remains a vexatious enigma still, often inexplicably unpunctual for their dates. Once she tells him that 'a stranger' has warned her that Dr Goebbels is a Jew, and has shown her an original letter 'stolen from the gau HQ files' written a decade earlier by Goebbels to Director Cohnen, a family friend at Mönchen-Gladbach. Cohnen was the gauleiter's *real* father, suggests the stranger, who also mentions Peter Simons, the husband of Goebbels' maternal aunt Anna. 'This is what I have to put up with,' winces Goebbels, puzzling over the stranger's identity.²⁴ (The 'stolen' document is probably a product of Magda's own feline snooping around while working in his personal archives, but this evidently does not occur to him.)

The two spend Whitsun on her ex-husband's estate Severin in Mecklenburg. Günther Quandt's manager, a leading local Nazi, lets them in. Alone at last they iron out their remaining differences. Sometimes she still wounds him with an ill-considered word, but the wound soon heals.²⁵ He longs for a hearth and home. He begins talking about setting up a matrimonial home when victory is theirs; this is comfortingly vague, and she goes along with that.²⁶ After he returns to Berlin—alone, as she has asked to stay on for another day in this country idyll—he writes, 'When we have conquered the Reich we shall become man and wife.'²⁷ In fact Magda probably entertained little real ambition to harness her uxorial ambitions to such an uncertain chariot. He writes her a real love letter—the first such essay in ten years.²⁸ Visiting her to give her a clock a few days later, he is thunderstruck to find the Shadow still living there; Magda tells him that since the student will not budge, she is moving out and will have the police evict the trespasser.²⁹ As a sop to Goebbels, she agrees he shall have the right to walk young Harald to the Herder school across the square.

After speaking at Erfurt Goebbels meets Anka Stalherm and breaks

the news about Magda to her. He is pleased to see that Anka goes to pieces. She wants not to believe him, thinks she can hook him back even now. But it is too late—'I am with Magda,' he vows to his diary, 'and shall stay with her.'³⁰ When his latest book *Struggle for Berlin* appears later in the year, he will have it mailed to Anka with a typed note ('Dear Party member ...') signed by his secretary.³¹

THE police lifted the speaking ban on May 1, 1931; and how the thousands cheered when he rose at the Sport Palace that evening. But the ban had hurt. His gau was in debt.³² He decided on a two-month plan to double membership. By mid-June 1931 it had risen to about twenty thousand.³³

Angriff too was entering troubled times. On May 4 the editor Dagobert Dürr had finally begun serving his two-month sentence for libeling Dr Weiss. Each visit in jail was a reminder to Goebbels of the volcano rim around which he himself was dancing.³⁴ He found he had much more in common with the ordinary S.A. men than with the party's self-important aristocracy. 'We are still a worker's party,' he wrote. Göring irritated him the most. At a rally in Saxony he cold-shouldered the former aviator. 'He's sick,' he felt. 'Looks a wreck.'³⁵ 'He really does go creeping up Hitler's arse,' he added crudely. 'Were he not so fat he might succeed, too.' In Munich for a leadership conference on June 9 however he found himself arguing alone against this 'disgusting ... big-mouthed slob.' 'I have few friends in the party,' he realized, yet again. 'Virtually just Hitler.'³⁶

As the recession bit deeper, the central parties in the government flailed at the parties on the left and right. On June 16 Brüning enacted an emergency press decree. Berlin's police chief Grzesinski boasted, 'My powers have been augmented just as I desired.' The next fourteen days would see the prohibition of *Angriff*, the *VB*, and a string of other papers, Nazi and bourgeois alike. The press protested vigorously. When the *Frankfurter Post* was banned, the rival *Frankfurter Zeitung* bravely reprinted the offending sentences for its readers to judge.³⁷ *Angriff* reappeared on the nineteenth.

Hitler himself started spending more time in Berlin. Police agents sighted him with Goebbels at the Kaiserhof on May 9.³⁸ Jealous of their intimacy, Goebbels' rivals continued to spread rumors of his imminent resignation. He published a defiant denial.³⁹ That same evening he staged the gau's annual general meeting at the Sport Palace—the first time that any party had dared to hire the huge arena for such a purpose. He blamed Himmler, who had taken over leadership of the S.S. from Erhard Heiden, for the rumors; he found that the S.S. was now spying on his HQ and demanded, visiting Munich on July 2, that they desist. After speaking to forty thousand at Dresden's cycle-racetrack⁴⁰ he set off on a month's seaside vacation; he took Magda—'she is a lady, a woman, and a lover'—and a secretary Ilsa Bettge, whose role, was less clearly defined.

* He thinks of how ugly Anka is at bottom
angry girl with beautiful green eyes.

July 1931

THE STRANGER AND THE SHADOW 127

With Goebbels temporarily absent, on August 1 Hitler appointed the virtually unknown journalist Dr Otto Dietrich as chief of his new Press Office. Dietrich, six weeks older than Goebbels, had got to know Hitler only recently, while working for the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*. Goebbels loathed all journalists; but for Dietrich he would reserve a very special fury until the end.⁴¹

THAT July he spends five weeks with Magda in a cottage on the cliffs at Sankt Peter listening to storm rains pounding the roof while the gray-white waves of the North Sea lash the rocks below. He makes love to her, he plays the piano, and he begins a new book, *The Struggle for Berlin*, dictating a new chapter every day or so.

Unemployment has passed the five-million mark. Brüning's miseries are music to Goebbels' ears. He bickers sometimes with Magda, probing remorselessly into the darker crannies of her past. He dredges up noisome episodes, which he attributes to her wayward manner and tries to forget.⁴² The more she teases him with stories of past lovers, the more helplessly jealous he becomes. It seems that some of these old flames are not extinguished even now.⁴³ No matter how loving Magda is, he cannot forget that before him she loved another. 'She has loved too much,' he writes, 'and keeps telling me only the half of it. And I lie awake until the small hours lashed by jealousy.'⁴⁴ Driven by these powerful emotional engines he has completed three hundred pages of the manuscript when he returns to Berlin: he truly loves Magda, but a shadow still darkens the horizon.

IMPORTANT new faces met him at his gau HQ. The dynamic, heavily built, square-jawed Karl Hanke, aged twenty-seven, was his new chief of organization.⁴⁵ He had a dry, ironic manner that belied his tough, no-nonsense attitude. Berlin's new propaganda chief was Karoly Kampmann; determined to force back the rising Munich tide of bourgeois *Reaktion*—best translated by the word 'diehards'—Goebbels ordered Kampmann to concentrate his efforts on recruiting new members from Berlin's factory floors.⁴⁶ Millions of leaflets and stickers were printed with the new slogan, 'Into the factories!'⁴⁷ That was the only place, Goebbels would write, where the workers could be won over—and he intended to gain ten thousand new members in the next three months.⁴⁸ In consequence of this shift of emphasis to the factory floor, the regular pace of his public propaganda slowed down that autumn; in October, his gau would stage only 125 public meetings.⁴⁹

DURING 1931 the political violence worsened. Since May 1930 there had been twenty-nine political murders in Berlin alone—including twelve communists, six Nazis, one Stahlhelm member, two Social Democrats, and four policemen.⁵⁰ In July 1931 Ernst Röhm put a new man in charge of Berlin's S.A., the thirty-four-year-old aristocrat Count Wolf Heinrich von Helldorff. Helldorff had joined the party only in August 1930;

1931

Goebbels, meeting him a month later, had not liked him at the time. A whiff of perfume caught his nostrils, and he wondered if Helldorff were a poofter like the rest. He had since then tackled Hitler about Röhm's homosexuality, about which a Munich newspaper had made headlines in June.⁵¹ Goebbels concluded that Helldorff's appointment was a backdoor affair with Röhm and his bisexual adjutant Karl Ernst. 'The future of the S.A. looks grim to me,' wrote Goebbels. '§175 [the clause of the penal code on homosexuality] casts its shadow right across it.'⁵²

Yet he soon came round to liking, even adoring, Helldorff, forming an enduring friendship with the scoundrel which, in the words of the Spanish proverb, tells us much about Goebbels himself. Born on October 14, 1896, the arrogant, wastrel son of a blue-blooded landowner, Helldorff was a thoroughly nasty piece of work, a bully, a Jew-baiter, and a murderer. Police records showed one warrant against him in 1922 for manslaughter, and another for carrying an unlicensed weapon.⁵³ During the Stennes revolt he had sided with the insurgents, saying 'Hitler is a traitor.'⁵⁴ None of this appeared to bother Goebbels. Early in September 1931 he briefed Helldorff and his chief of staff Karl Ernst to stage an operation—ostensibly a demonstration by the unemployed—to rough up Jews along Kurfürstendamm on their New Year's day, Yom Kippur.⁵⁵ On the chosen day, September 12, Helldorff cruised up and down the boulevard in his green Opel, according to police reports, directing his stormtroopers, who were disguised as ordinary passers-by, to set on anybody who looked like a Jew.⁵⁶ The police however had been tipped off—one disgruntled S.A. man in Potsdam said later that it was odd that the police learned what had happened at a secret briefing attended *only* by Goebbels, Helldorff, and Ernst⁵⁷—and arrested Helldorff with Ernst, another member of his staff Heini Gewehr, and thirty-four other S.A. men.⁵⁸ (More likely the informer was Goebbels' own secretary Ilse Stahl.)⁵⁹ The police docked six days later described Helldorff's private life as messy—he was swamped with unpaid bills, currently separated from his wife, and not on speaking terms with his family, and he had all but bankrupted his family estate at Wolmirstedt. The court sentenced him to six months in prison as ringleader of the riot but he did not serve one day.⁶⁰ At Helldorff's appeal in January Goebbels stood by his new friend, screamed at the prosecutor Dr Stenig, outrageously insulted the court, demanded that the chief of police produce his informant as a witness, and flatly refused to testify otherwise, bringing about the collapse of the prosecution case and earning a fine of five hundred marks for contempt. Helldorff's sentence was reduced to a piffling fine of one hundred marks.⁶¹ (His lawyer was Roland Freisler, whom he would meet again under different circumstances after July 20, 1944.) Helldorff's streetfighters were less fortunate: they received prison sentences of up to two years for affray.⁶² This inequality widened the breach between Goebbels and the S.A. men, and that winter saw several intemperate leaflets circulating in Berlin claiming that he and Helldorff had left them in the lurch.⁶³

I
snij
and
riot
raisb
tr
gr
st
al
w
diSt
emp
Grz
and
tossi
uner
builtTr
quar
his r
Bury
he re
of th
Röhr
their
that l
Quar
Nazi
GernTHE
politi
Carin
with r
office
camp
Goeb
Röhm
with
nearly
Magd
says t
invites

Sept 11, 1931

THE STRANGER AND THE SHADOW 129

His attitude toward the S.A. officers became ambivalent. He began sniping against Röhm.⁶⁴ But he kept up his support for the 'army's' rank and file. On September 11, 1931—the day before the Kurfürstendamm riot—he resorted to his old propaganda tricks at a Sport Palace fund-raiser for the S.A. clinic, at which he presented six recent S.A. casualties.

On Goebbels' instructions [wrote one of the six] we were given brand-new white hospital gowns and the staff at the party clinic began to bandage us. One of us who just had a bad headache was given a gigantic turban bandage. Another ... who had been kicked in the stomach was given a large and totally pointless bandage around his abdomen. As we entered the Sport Palace it was announced that we were the 'victims of political terrorism.' The resulting applause was deafening.⁶⁵

Still ruling by emergency decree, on October 6 Chancellor Brüning empowered the police to shut down 'dens of activities hostile to the state.' Grzesinski and Weiss immediately sent in their police to evict the S.A. and S.S. from the hostels that Goebbels had set up for them in Berlin, tossing the beds and furniture into the street. Hundreds of Nazis, already unemployed, now became homeless too. The steam-head of hatred slowly built up pressure.

To the authorities' distress Adolf Hitler now moved his political headquarters away from Munich—where a personal tragedy, the suicide of his niece Geli in his apartment, had deeply shocked him—to Berlin. Burying for ever the womanizing, indolent, procrastinating Hitler of old, he retained a suite of rooms in the Kaiserhof hotel, within leering distance of the Reich chancellery. Here he held court with his henchmen like Röhm, Hess, and Julius Schaub. Grzesinski and Weiss were shocked by their government's lack of dignity in tolerating this; their agents learned that Hitler was meeting millionaire businessmen including even Günther Quandt at the Kaiserhof, and that they were pouring money into the Nazi coffers having accepted that Brüning was not going to rescue Germany.⁶⁶

THE locals jostle and vie with each other for Hitler's ear. Göring, his political attaché in Berlin, is also overshadowed by tragedy, as his wife Carin has now contracted her final illness and returned to Stockholm with no hope of recovering. Goebbels tries to buy from the prosecutor's office the documents incriminating Röhm. Röhm, stung by Goebbels' campaign against him, tells Hitler that all Berlin is gossiping about Goebbels' affair with the former Mrs Quandt.⁶⁷ But this backfires on Röhm, as Goebbels now often hangs around the lobby of the Kaiserhof with Magda taking tea. Once they send young Harald Quandt, now nearly ten, upstairs to see the Führer wearing the little blue uniform Magda has sewn for him. Harald gives Hitler the appropriate salute and says that he feels twice as strong when wearing a uniform. Goebbels invites Hitler downstairs to meet Magda—the divorced wife of the

Oct 6.

scene

industrialist you saw earlier,' he adds. A stickler for etiquette, Hitler asks Göring whether there is any reason why he should not be seen with Magda. 'No,' admits Göring, 'but you can't be too careful with a "Madame Pompadour."' The name means nothing to Hitler, and he does not grasp that Magda is in a relationship with his propaganda chief.⁶⁸

Thus the three points of an extraordinary triangle converge—Hitler, Magda, and Goebbels. Over tea Magda, not quite thirty, and the freshly bereaved Hitler, twelve years her senior, feast their eyes on each other. To Hitler she looks uncannily like Geli;⁶⁹ while Magda, imbued by this time with Nazi lore, feels she is in the presence of a demi-god. Hours later, in his upstairs suite, Hitler remarks to his henchmen that in Geli he believed he had found something almost divine. 'I thought these feelings were dead and buried,' he adds. 'But today these same feelings have suddenly overwhelmed me again.'

For an instant he seems to have fantasized about Magda; she told her mother that he had made cautious and discreet advances to her.⁷⁰ His reverie lasts however only a few hours. After midnight he learns that Magda has casually invited Schaub, the S.S. commander Sepp Dietrich, and his chauffeur back to her apartment for drinks; Dr Goebbels then shows up there, letting himself in with a key, and declares stiffly that he is somewhat surprised to find them there at such a late hour. Hitler is clearly astonished to hear this from them: Goebbels, that limping little runt, has won this Germanic beauty? He pulls a wry face and tries to laugh off his disappointment. 'It was just a brief relapse,' he confesses to an aide.⁷¹

Carin Göring died early on October 17. Hitler took this fresh personal loss hard and again spoke wistfully to the Nazi economics adviser Dr Otto Wagener about Magda Quandt. 'This woman,' he mused, 'might yet play a role in my life. . . . She could become a second Geli for me. It's a pity,' he continued, thinking out loud, 'that she is not married.' He was worried about appearances. Wagener took the hint, and we have his probably reliable account of what followed. That day, October 17, and the next Hitler and Goebbels were both due to attend a rally by the S.A. at Brunswick. Wagener invited Magda to go in his large 100-horsepower Horch.⁷² On the drive over, Wagener stopped for a picnic and put an unusual proposition to her: Hitler, he said, was a rare genius who needed a woman's gentle influence; she must be able to help the Führer to find himself as a human being—somebody to accompany him to the opera, and to entertain him to tea with the finest porcelain. 'This woman could be you.'

'But I would have to be married to somebody,' she pointed out.

'Correct,' he said, and mentioned Goebbels. Magda was hesitant. 'But for Adolf Hitler,' she bravely announced, 'I am willing to do anything.' She promised to keep Wagener informed.

It seems to have been an unusual bargain all round. Magda later told her sister-in-law Ello Quandt that Goebbels attached one condition to their marriage, if he was *quasi* to share her with Hitler, namely that he

be allowed emotional
to say that
have come
their engage
'The mood
three peopl

THE Reichs
October 13.
to size him
to concert t
opposition
'Harzburg
entered the
out again.

By the en
a desperate
determined
issued still
prohibiting
Hitler held
Hansfraengl
was conferri
and Fritz Th
journalists.
conference
Prussia as pe
on the midc
disapproved

HITLER had
Platz more
welcomed th
fortune-hunt
with Goebbe
moved perm
phere there,
household. S
him, while h
admire the c
casually, 'I w
take over and

The Goebt
and convert
the catholic
was denied.

after
Oct 17.

1931

be allowed extra-marital adventures; a man of his vitality needed this emotional leeway, he argued.⁷³ Early in November she phoned Wagener to say that they would both be coming to Munich a few days later: 'I have come to keep my promise.' Over lunch with Hitler they announced their engagement and he attended their little hotel celebration afterwards. 'The mood was so carefree,' recalled Wagener, 'that I had the feeling that three people had at last found happiness.'

THE Reichstag was due to reconvene after its seven-month recess on October 13, 1931. On the tenth President von Hindenburg sent for Hitler to size him up. He was not impressed. On the following day, in an attempt to concert their opposition, Hitler chaired a meeting with the bourgeois opposition leaders at Bad Harzburg. The upshot was the formation of a 'Harzburg Front' against Brüning. On the fourteenth the Nazis re-entered the Reichstag, but only briefly because two days later they walked out again.

Oct 13.

By the end of the year there were 5,660,000 registered unemployed—a desperate people turning to the Nazis for their salvation, and a regime determined to stay in office by hook or by crook. On December 8 Brüning issued still more emergency decrees, banning political uniforms and prohibiting all political assemblies until the new year. Two days later Hitler held court again at the Kaiserhof with Röhm, Hess, Ernst 'Putzi' Hanfstaengl and Schaub; the next day police HQ learned that Hitler was conferring all morning with the Ruhr steel millionaires Albert Vögler and Fritz Thyssen, and planned to hold a press conference with American journalists. Grzesinski pleaded with Severing to ban at least the press conference as an 'illegal assembly,' or failing that to deport Hitler from Prussia as *persona non grata*: the Berlin police could then forcibly put him on the midday train to Munich. President von Hindenburg however disapproved—another sign that the Nazis were coming in from the cold.

HITLER had begun visiting Magda Quandt's apartment on Reichskanzler Platz more often than Göring's. Both Goebbels and Gregor Strasser welcomed this—the Görings, said Strasser, had always had a houseful of fortune-hunters hoping to meet the Führer. ('I myself get on quite well with Goebbels,' Strasser told Wagener.) With Carin now dead, Göring moved permanently into the Kaiserhof. Fleeing from the political atmosphere there, Hitler became a still more frequent visitor to Magda's household. She served her home-baked pastries to Hitler and fussed over him, while he relaxed and expatiated upon the credens who claimed to admire the degenerate modern works of art. 'Dr Goebbels,' he said casually, 'I want you to think over how we're to stop this rot when we take over and you're in charge of all government propaganda.'

The Goebbels wedding was fixed for December 19, 1931. As a divorcee and convert to protestantism, Magda could not marry under the rites of the catholic church. Goebbels' plea to the bishop of Berlin for a waiver was denied. Marrying as a protestant, he would be excommunicated.

Dec 19.

Dec 19, 1931

132 II: THE GAULEITER OF BERLIN

'He thereupon saw no further reason to pay their church tax,' said Hitler years later, mocking the church's hypocrisy. 'But the church informed him that excommunication . . . did not affect the obligation to pay up as before.'⁷⁴

Hitler acted as one witness, and General von Epp as the other. Since a Berlin wedding was out of the question—the communists would have raised mayhem—it was solemnized at Severin, the Quandt estate in Mecklenburg. Quandt did not hear about this until afterwards; he stopped paying alimony forthwith.⁷⁵ The village notary of Goldenbow performed the legal ceremony, then Dr Wenzel, a pastor from Berlin, officiated at the protestant ceremony in the chapel at nearby Frauenmark; a swastika banner draped the altar.⁷⁶ Magda's mother came, but not her father, who disapproved of Goebbels; she had stitched together a little brown S.A. uniform for her son Harald to wear as a pageboy. 'We accept the obligation to bring up our children in the evangelical-lutheran faith,' the couple affirmed.⁷⁷

As for Joseph Goebbels, if Magda had looked closely, she would have seen that her new husband was wearing a gold tiepin shaped like a wolf's head—a gift, he had once told a friend, from a girl he had become very fond of at university.⁷⁸

17: T

LEAVIN
with t
thous.
of his diaries
Reich Chance

Textual co:
on Nazi micr
severely than
diary's twent
'30,000' in f
the right clas
Essen, and a
has the work
so he writes,
gentlemen.⁶

with far great
than does the

As for Hitl
a clear-thinki
for tactical ad
power,' write:
the image of
demagogue fr
Führer is the
of Hitler's fin
his greatness,

In editing
Strasser lurks
unrecognizab
has in fact w
organization
man's name is
is a boring ar
opponents m
Göring too is
phine addicti
and powerful

17: The Man of Tomorrow

LEAVING Magda alone, Dr Goebbels spent Christmas Eve 1931 with the S.A. Nationwide, the party now had over eight hundred thousand members. Two years later he published a popular edition of his diaries for the coming months entitled *From the Kaiserhof to the Reich Chancellery*. The book would sell half a million copies by 1939.¹

Textual comparison with the handwritten original, which has survived on Nazi microfiches in Moscow,² shows that Goebbels edited them less severely than his critics believed. There are the usual exaggerations. The diary's twenty thousand people listening to him speak in Leipzig become '30,000' in *Kaiserhof*.³ His meetings are always 'overflowing,' and with the right class of people, 'almost all artisans';⁴ 'virtually only workers' in Essen, and a Sport Palace 'brimming with workers' in Berlin.⁵ 'He who has the working man,' he pronounces, 'has the people.' He learns more, so he writes, from a sleeping-car conductor than from far more august gentlemen.⁶ The published diary also treats President von Hindenburg with far greater respect ('this venerable figure' and 'the grand old man') than does the original handwritten text.

As for Hitler, the image that Goebbels offers readers of his book is of a clear-thinking, resolute, pragmatic Führer who never hesitates unless for tactical advantage. 'He has the tougher nerves and the greater staying power,' writes Goebbels in his book.⁸ Banished from the printed page is the image of Hitler Cunctator, the prevaricating Munich coffeeshop demagogue familiar from the handwritten diaries of previous years. 'The Führer is the best raconteur I know,' he writes.⁹ 'Wonderful,' he writes of Hitler's final appointment as chancellor, 'how simple the Führer is in his greatness, and how great in his simplicity.'¹⁰

In editing *Kaiserhof* he has however settled a few old scores. Gregor Strasser lurks through his apparently clairvoyant essay as a sinister figure unrecognizable as the man of bonhomie and talent of whom Goebbels has in fact written so recently in the diary. 'There is one man in the organization trusted by nobody,' he thunders in *Kaiserhof*. 'And this man's name is Gregor Strasser!'¹¹ Unlike the real man, the book's Strasser is a boring and ineffective speaker, 'the one of our number whom our opponents most love—which tells strongly against him.'¹² Hermann Göring too is barely recognizable. Gone are the references to his morphine addiction; no longer a 'mound of frozen crap,' Göring is a massive and powerful speaker against defense minister Wilhelm Groener.¹³ In

The
nerves
of the
diary

one handwritten entry he has called Göring an arch prig (*urpampig*); the published entry reads, 'I find myself agreeing with Goering [*sic*] on all fundamental and tactical issues'.¹⁴ The difference is that by 1934, the year of publication, Göring has become a very dangerous man indeed to cross.

The published diary represents its author, Goebbels, as the one comrade whom Hitler trusts and regularly consults: two men sitting like spiders in the center of the Kaiserhof web, watching as their pawns move to topple first Groener, then Brüning himself in the late spring of 1932.¹⁵ There is no trace in it of the depression that laid the gauleiter low the year before, and only the most antiseptic glimpses of his private life.¹⁶ The book records the gau's crippling financial plight,¹⁷ but suppresses any reference to the excesses which the private diary reveals—for instance his craze for the latest automobiles. On May 22 the diary notes, 'The gentlemen from Mercedes come to beg forgiveness. I am to get new coachwork [for the Opel Nuremberg] and a new Mercedes open tourer. Now, that's talking!'¹⁸

The published text also casts a discreet veil over Hitler's private life. On the anniversary of Geli's suicide, Hitler tearfully visits her grave in Vienna.¹⁹ In *Kaiserhof* however he is shown only as driving there for 'a private visit.' There is more: The real diary shows that contrary to popular belief Miss Eva Braun, the blonde laboratory assistant of Hitler's photographer, did not step straight into Geli's shoes, but that a Miss Weinrich briefly claimed Hitler's attentions first. 'So that's Hitler's pet,' notes Goebbels. 'Poor taste. Glum girl. Moist hands. Br!' He finds her lurching with Hitler at the Osteria restaurant the next day. 'Pig stupid,' Goebbels decides, before allowing more charitably: 'How great Hitler's longing for a woman must be!' He wondered what his chief saw in this little flibbertigibbet—he ought to find a more respectable lady friend.²⁰ There is not even a hint of this in the published *Kaiserhof* of course.

NINETEEN thirty-two would be a year of elections—one presidential, two Reichstag, and five provincial. In most the National Socialists would increase their vote. Goebbels brought the national propaganda directorate permanently to Berlin from March 1, and campaigned tirelessly. He now had a vast following in the capital. The regime could no longer ignore the Nazis. Brüning actually invited Hitler for talks about extending Hindenburg's term of office.²¹ After discussing it with his partners in the Harzburg Front, Hitler published his refusal in the *Völkischer Beobachter*, insisting on a new presidential election.²²

To Brüning's embarrassment, deputy police chief 'Isidor' Weiss chose this moment to ban *Angriff* for the tenth time in a year, for inciting contempt of the Jews—in 1932 there were 172,672 Jews among Berlin's 4,024,165 population.²³ On January 8 he shut down a meeting at the Sport Palace just as Goebbels had begun speaking to fifteen thousand people, for inciting contempt of Weiss in particular.²⁴ Enraged by Goebbels' behavior in court two weeks later during the Helldorff appeal

hearing court—also tele deputy proviso

At the until the and by he deeded on the p

The t dered d and the old Her distribu whelme Nazi fro Strasse, personal and the to the m gray twil The deli day he b down in

ONE ever chain-sm 'Hitler h unexpect out with his decis stormtro Röhm he only in d publishe

Police becoming pretense 'that milli shameful the gover represent interests v bels made Grzesinsk to violent

Sept 1930

REICHSFÜHRER S.S.

29 U

Party. Hitler's instinctive sense of caution and self-protection led him to counterbalance the growing powers of his subordinates by creating for them overlapping functions, so that they expended their excess energies in the exercise of mutual distrust, and were to a considerable extent neutralized through their own intrigue. He encouraged the development of the S.S. not only because it provided the movement with a superior, class-conscious force that encouraged former officers and men of the upper class to join its ranks, but also because the rapid increase of its numbers helped to counterbalance the unruly private army of the S.A. This numbered by 1930 some 100,000 men, drawn mostly from the unemployed, and it was giving Hitler considerable trouble at the very time when he needed the support of the right-wing politicians and industrialists.

The 'left' and 'right' wings of the Party were in a state of open dissension, and in September 1930, the month of the elections in which the Party hoped to win many more seats in the Reichstag, the S.A. went so far as to storm the Party offices in Berlin so as to give an open demonstration of their anger when Otto Strasser, the man they regarded as their champion, was dismissed from the Party. He and Stennes were embarrassing Hitler's attempts to win support from the Right. Only firm action by Hitler had stopped a catastrophe: to placate these unruly men he made himself Commander of the S.A. Exploiting the crisis of the unemployed, the Nazis won a substantial victory at the polls which entitled them to 107 seats in the Reichstag. It was then, in January 1931, that Hitler called on his old supporter Roehm, who had been working as a military instructor in Bolivia, to return to Germany and become Chief of Staff of the S.A. This appointment introduced a new, intrusive figure into the private world of Himmler and Heydrich. Roehm, a professional soldier, able and ambitious, imposed a new discipline on the S.A., of which the S.S. remained a part, while at the same time he entered into the round of political intrigue of which Göring was the principal agent and Goebbels the propagandist. The fact that Roehm was a notorious homosexual was to prove invaluable for Heydrich's files, but in the meantime it became obvious that Himmler's position in the Party and his relationship to Hitler and the other leaders must be more clearly worked out.⁸

Himmler never became a member of Hitler's more intimate social circle, certainly never in the sense that Goebbels or Göring rivalled each other in entertaining the leader, taking meals with him or

Sept
1930

Jan
1931

LEF HITLER

the first spark
to identify
some part of

early 1930s
his audience

the German
as and pro-
st be welded

class, who
ons. . . . To
in the Ger-
and I strug-

community
expect that

an appeal to
illusion of
ailed to ap-
when it ac-
years ago,
of men and
for any act
agrees; he
to handle
erstand the

te myths or
for exam-
en he said,
men cause,"
Nazis. But
was sym-

The Past As Prologue: Hitler and History

bolically true, the Resistance became a fact of historic force. Hitler too knew how desperately his people wanted to believe in heroic myths. He articulated them and made them his own. By the alchemy of his charisma and the force of his propaganda, the most cherished myths of German history became Nazified and irresistible to millions of Germans. He was the long-awaited Barbarossa, the Savior who would fulfill the yearnings of the centuries and create a new Reich of the German Nation.

And Hitler offered more than new forms for old legends. He provided a new system of values which justified a new morality. Psychologists would call it "an alternative superego system." It can also be seen as a secular religion, complete with Messiah, a holy book, a cross, the trappings of religious pageantry, a priesthood of black-robed and anointed elite, excommunication and death for heretics, and the millennial promise of the Thousand Year Reich.

Thus Hitler succeeded, in part, because he appeared to many Germans as a godlike Messiah. In the historic context of national humiliation and despair, his religion seemed a vast improvement over the old. Where Christianity called for love and reconciliation, Hitler sanctified hatred and revenge; where Christianity demanded that God be loved with mind as well as heart, Hitler dispensed with reason and required that the Führer be accepted by faith and faith alone; where Christ preached individual responsibility and freedom of will, Hitler provided an escape from freedom into authority. The essence of Hitler's appeal was set forth long ago by Dostoyevsky in the Inquisitor General's confrontation with the returning Christ: "We too have a right to preach a mystery, and to teach them that it's not the free judgment of their hearts, not love that matters, but a mystery which they must follow blindly. . . . So we have done. We have corrected Thy work and have founded it upon miracle, mystery and authority. And men rejoiced that they were again led like sheep." 230

Hitler's "Seizure of Power"

Das war kein Sieg, denn die Gegner fehlten.
—Oswald Spengler (1933)

From reading this chapter, one might think that Hitler's attainment of power in 1933 was a foregone conclusion. Apparently all German history had been conspiring to aid him; the economic, social, and psychological crisis following 1930 was obviously pushing him along; the magic of his personality did the rest. And thus was Hitler hailed as savior and swept into power by a mesmerized and ecstatic people. But it did not happen that way. The strange career of Adolf Hitler provides many insights into the vagaries of history, and this is one of them: not even he was inevitable.

The combination of past history, present crisis, and charismatic

D.T. That was my role contribution
How much was people in need
... .. super ego which could console

1930

*
their no clear conclusion that question
rather than speaking both into the undeniable joyless mind

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

1930

approach to an intimate: "When I appeal . . . for sacrifice, the first spark is struck. The humbler the people are, the greater the craving to identify themselves with a cause bigger than themselves . . . [to] become part of an irresistible movement embracing all classes."²²⁷

He worked out this formula in public speeches of the early 1930s when, over and over again, he sounded the call he knew his audience wanted most to hear:

We are determined to create a new community out of the German peoples—a community formed of men of every status and profession and of every so-called class. . . . All classes must be welded together into a single German nation.

And again a few months later:

You could look upon me as the man who belongs to no class, who belongs to no group, who is above all such considerations. . . . To me, everyone is entirely equal. . . . I am interested only in the German people. I belong exclusively to the German people and I struggle for the German people.

And again, after coming to power:

Only when the entire German people becomes a single community of sacrifice [*Opfergemeinschaft*] can we hope and expect that Providence will stand by us in the future.²²⁸

By the millions, Germans heard him and believed.

HITLER AS MYTH FULFILLMENT

Political realists have said that Hitler's appeal was an appeal to illusions—the illusion of a nonexistent Jewish menace, the illusion of the infallible Führer. The realists are right. But they have failed to appreciate the power of illusion in human affairs especially when it acquires the force of myth. As Georges Sorel noticed many years ago, illusions are stronger than facts, and myths shape the lives of men and nations. "Guided by the myth," he wrote, a society "is ready for any act of heroic aggressiveness." The psychoanalyst Rollo May agrees; he stresses the power of myth to "give a person the ability to handle anxiety, to face death, to deal with guilt. . . . We don't understand the power of the thirst for myth."²²⁹

Effective political leaders who do understand either create myths or manipulate them for their own purposes. Charles de Gaulle, for example, in appealing to Frenchmen in 1940 created a myth. When he said, "I in London, you at home are united in resistance in a common cause," there was in fact at that time no such French resistance to the Nazis. But when Frenchmen came to believe that the factually false was sym-

The Past As Prologue: Hitl

bolically true, the Resi too knew how desperate He articulated them an charisma and the force German history became He was the long-awaite yearnings of the centu Nation.

And Hitler offered vided a new system of gists would call it "an a as a secular religion, cc trappings of religious anointed elite, excomm lenial promise of the T

Thus Hitler succe Germans as a godlike humiliation and despair the old. Where Christi sanctified hatred and re be loved with mind as v required that the Führe Christ preached individ provided an escape from: appeal was set forth long; confrontation with the r a mystery, and to teach hearts, not love that m blindly. . . . So we have founded it upon mirac that they were again led

Hitler's "Seizure of Po

From reading this c of power in 1933 was a t tory had been conspiring logical crisis following magic of his personality savior and swept into pe it did not happen that w many insights into the not even he was inevitab The combination b

D.P. That is
How much
of a new's

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

in, with the last name fortuitously misspelled: "Georg Hitler, Cath. religion, resident in Spital." Nepomuk and his relatives carefully made their X's, and the deed was done. The priest, Father Josef Zahnschirm, did not sign the book; but on the basis of comparison with other examples of his handwriting it can be affirmed that he, as the parish priest from 1867 to 1886, did indeed fill out the form.³

We must guess at the reasons why Nepomuk Hiedler made the effort to have his foster son's last name changed. He may simply have decided to comply with the wishes of a boy who had turned out so well; he may have been glad to have him bear his own family's name rather than that of the feckless Schickelgrubers. Nepomuk himself had sired no sons to carry on the name, and the old man may have been more than willing to have the sexually robust Alois assume that pleasant task. Then, too, if Alois's natural father had really been a Jew, as some rumormongers were suggesting, both the proud old farmer and the rising government official might have been anxious to "legitimize" the name in an undeniably Christian record book. At any rate, history was not given the opportunity to turn at this quiet crossroad in rural Austria. If the name had not been changed to Hitler that autumn day, the son of Alois might not have prospered so well politically. It is a bit difficult to cry with fanatic intensity "Heil Schickelgruber!"

A JEWISH GRANDFATHER?

1930
One day toward the end of 1930, Adolf Hitler called in his private lawyer, Hans Frank, for urgent personal consultation.* Hitler had sent for him because he was about to be blackmailed by a relative who claimed to have special information that the Führer had a Jewish grandfather. Hitler was so disturbed by the threat of such a disclosure that he ordered his lawyer to investigate. Frank did so and discovered, he said, that Hitler's father had indeed been the illegitimate son of Maria Anna Schickelgruber, who had worked as a domestic in Graz "in the home of a Jewish family by the name of Frankenberger." From the day her baby—Hitler's father, Alois—was born until the boy was 14, Frankenberger paid money for the support of the child. According to Frank, when Hitler was confronted with this evidence, he said that the story of a Graz Jew's being his own grandfather was a total and complete lie. He knew it was because his grandmother had told him so.

* Frank would later be given special privileges and power in the Third Reich as president of the Academy of German Law, member of the Reichstag, leader of the National Socialist Lawyer's Association, SS *Obergruppenführer*, and governor-general of Poland. Before he was hanged as a war criminal at Nuremberg, he told this story in his memoirs.

The Child As Father to the Man

She had accepted the money poor.⁴

Despite Frank's reputation seem to be reason for believing condemned man who had come to expiate his sins. He had to or to invent the story. That grandmother assured him that grandmother, Maria Anna Schickelgruber, before he was born—is not is that Hitler made no attempt to receive money over many years produced must have been forced Hitler to admit the part involved with his own grandfather. Frank said it was based on Schickelgruber and Frankenberger's time in the possession of a riage. But Frank did not say letters, and they have never corroborate Frank's statement servant girl in the household indeed, such a family ever existed. German historians and Hitler's paternal grandfather Their industry is laudable, but important and it is almost certain we probably never will know father. The more important question

* The research of Nikolaus Preradovic casts further doubt on the story. I found a Jewish grandfather—called by Hitler's step-nephew, William I in 1939. Preradovic discovered that there is no record of either a Frank or records of the Jewish congregation. Hitler's father, Alois, was born in Graz but in the entire province there. The Jews were driven out of Graz until after 1856. The name of Leopold, was found. But he was Bavaria, he had moved to Graz, according to one story would be in the year 1837, when the then lived of a child. If he was indeed, he must have been "a remnant" (1957). Simon Wiesenthal, who knows backgrounds as anyone, says he has found no trace of a Jew named to the editor, *Spiegel*, no. 23, Aug.

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

He played games with his knowledge, betting that a specific item in his vast store of information was correct. Almost invariably it was, and Hitler was happy as a schoolboy to be told he had the right answer. "I often asked myself," a secretary recalls, "how one human brain could preserve so many facts."¹

Hitler used his phenomenal memory as a weapon in his system of personality defense. It helped him in his efforts to convince himself and others that he really was a person of great intellectual ability, in no way inferior to those who were better educated or better trained. After impressing a naval aide with an incredible recitation of statistics on naval ordnance, he said, "Bear in mind that my brain works in about the same way as a calculating machine."² It was a fairly accurate description. Medical doctors were equally impressed. A German physician who was in Hitler's entourage for many years said that the Führer's knowledge of medicine and biology was technical and detailed and "went far beyond that of the average intelligent layman." And another doctor concluded, "In ten years I was not able to catch him in a single factual error."³

Hitler also used his data bank as a defensive weapon to ward off displeasing arguments. When field commanders on the Eastern Front pointed out the strength of the enemy, Hitler would either dismiss their argument as irrelevant—his steel-like will would overcome all problems—or overwhelm the doubter with production statistics and precise weaknesses in the armament of the enemy. Or he would undercut and embarrass commanders by demanding from them information that they simply could not remember. If, for example, they raised objections to a tactical plan, he would bombard them with questions such as the name and rank of each of their subordinate commanders or the military decorations each was entitled to wear. When a field commander admitted ignorance of these matters, Hitler would provide the answers triumphantly and announce that he had more knowledge of their sector than they had.⁴

He had little interest in coming to grips with difficult intellectual problems, and had the habit of repeating the same question about a complex historical event without making an effort to investigate the answer. In January 1942 he observed, "I often wonder why the ancient world collapsed." Months later, in September, he asked the same question in exactly the same words: "I often wonder why the ancient world collapsed." It apparently did not occur to him to study the problem in the available historical literature, or to invite historians to discuss the question with him.⁵

Although he lacked all formal training in history, Hitler planned in 1919 to write a huge work dealing with the origins and development of mankind. He entitled it, with habitual modesty, *Die Monumentalgeschichte der Menschheit* (Monumental History of Humanity). The book was never completed, but the Federal Archives in Coblenz contain records of Hitler's original notations for it, as well as page after

56 * D.T. Indeed he was using my calculating machine in Germany with his own.

The Intellectual World of Adolf H

page of notes for speeches in 1 author's basic ideas, and his them into practice. The centr. his later political thinking: all of conflict between Aryans and tion is this: "Racial purity is coming of a 'new Reich' wh expressed the need for 'unm and insisted that salvation genius."⁶

Hitler shows here a char political asset. He was what plifier." Neither innovative no capacity to simplify ideas ar gans and programs while, at he was thereby achieving a hi

That Hitler's mind work logic is illustrated in a rare tr ist just before coming to powe out that Hitler had no elect the Nazi leader set forth his inate the government. By his entitled him to 75 percent of t

Under the rules of demo 37% of the total vote w necessary to govern. Th of the power and my op the business of governm this takes no account o investment is worth twic are in reality worth 30 m

His capacity to simplify the confusions of complex e demonstrated as soon as he g noted that Hitler had the ins at the right time. Immediate coordinated policy of deficit : Roosevelt he "sensed that n policy," but he went well bey actions. To those who objec economics to understand wh: tongue only partly in cheek, great thing not to understan stand." A careful student of

* The intensity twice the am of other re

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

Munich apartment one winter day in 1937 to examine and measure his head. The leader of the group, who must have been acutely embarrassed by the whole affair, was Professor Ferdinand Sauerbruch, a surgeon of international reputation. He was obliged to watch as phrenologists and craniologists, armed with all manner of calipers and tapes, took meticulous measurements of every conceivable part of the Führer's skull. They measured from ear to ear; from forehead to vertebrae; from eye socket to eye socket; from eye to ear; from ear to chin. . . . All measurements were annotated and compared with those computed from the death masks or portraits of famous people. Hitler was as delighted as a child to hear his experts proclaim that he had certain measurements remarkably like those of Frederick the Great or Bismarck or Napoleon. He nodded benignly and said, "Yes, yes, record it all." Posterity seems to have been deprived of the annotated drawings that were made on that day.¹⁰

What was there about Hitler's past that made him so concerned about his head, eyes, hands, and nostrils? Why did he play that staring game with dinner guests?

PERSONAL QUALITIES

Childishness

One of the striking personal characteristics of this political giant who bestrode Europe for a decade was his infantilism. There was in him little capacity for mental, emotional, artistic, or sexual growth. The tastes, opinions, and life-style of the chancellor were those of the child and adolescent of Leonding, Linz, and Vienna.

He sought to cling to his childhood by remembering it in dozens of sentimental soliloquies about his boyhood escapades; he was convinced that a magic elixir of youth really did exist, and he thought seriously of sending an expedition to India to find it. He became a vegetarian partly because he believed that a diet which (he reminded his secretaries) prolonged the lives of elephants would also add to his own.

Like a child, he sought oral gratification by sucking inordinate amounts of sweets and chocolates. The granddaughter of Richard Wagner remembered that as a little girl she and her sisters were fascinated by the amount of sugar and chocolates Hitler consumed while visiting their mother. He told them that he ate two pounds of chocolates every day. They waited expectantly for him to miscount the number of teaspoonfuls of sugar he invariably put in his tea, but he never miscalculated. Always there were seven—it was his favorite number. His valet

The Image and the Man

recalls that his master was moments of tension. During a "room, down several chocolates, of agitation, the leader of the sucking his little finger."¹¹

The child of Leonding like adult enjoyed doing the same record the Führer's enthusiasms Württemberg, Hitler "was like whistling." On a picnic to the taneous child—enthusiastic and Hitler took boyish delight when female performers were favorite diversion was movies. recalled that Hitler had given German and all foreign films routine was to see at least one if war effort was to give up his b he saw only newsreels; after S of films he saw, two were parti the Seven Dwarfs, which was was absolutely enthralled by little blond girl no bigger than days. His favorite movie actresses

The Führer liked to play (Beaver Game), was played se train. Anyone who saw a ma counted up his triumphs. Th assures us, when the Führer vented a game of bowling pla balls and if he knocked down turn; if he failed, the game w could undress and dress hims Hitler's bedroom—would stanc "Los!" When Hitler had finish rush out of the room to see if I

He enjoyed games that h fective actor and an excellen poked fun at the one-armed p press director who was deaf, I ordinates by having someone c "Führer orders" while he whis intimidate the victim.¹⁵

There was nothing childli they were executed with a mat remarkable ability to exploit instinctive reaction to his tri

HIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

to have the war while he was each to the commanders of his of the need for war and the Essentially all depends on me, talents. . . . My existence is to be eliminated at any time by how much longer I shall live. one of the Party leaders he con- glasses. Therefore I prefer to than at sixty." 48

imperishable memories and to raise a generation of from the fear that beset their learn to overcome the fear of der insisted, who was afraid of give everything else." 49

would bring a continuation of that he would live on longer in keep my hold on people after they look up at and go home to and in the mere form of death. another occasion, he told his in history. I have to gain im- perishes in the process." 50

throughout his life. As a boy, ed his love, he plotted a dual Munich Putsch, he drew three victorious with me or die with sets in my pistol: three for my the last bullet is for me." And all, "Morning will either find a or us dead." After the Party's said despondently to Goebbels an end of it all within three on this period of dejection and myself because there was no quittance confirmed that Hitler in 1933. "He said that he could at him and that 'I'll put an end

with Wehrmacht leaders on ing concern with his own sui- in the midst of an oration about he shouted, "When one's nerves y I can't go on' and shoot one- to the story he had so often

The Image and the Man

told of a lovely woman, "a really beautiful woman," who was insulted by her husband and told to leave. "So the woman goes off, writes a letter of farewell, and shoots herself." A few minutes later he told the story of yet another beautiful woman whose husband had died: "She said she couldn't go on living, in spite of her children. Then she shot herself. That's what a woman can do. She's got the strength and soldiers haven't." Hitler's comments about suicidal women may have reflected his experience with Eva Braun, who understood him better than most people. He had first met her in 1930 but had paid her scant attention until first in 1932 and again in 1935 she attempted to kill herself. Hitler was so impressed that he invited her to move into the Berghof. In 1938, when he became momentarily infatuated with Miss Unity Mitford, Fräulein Braun again threatened suicide and Hitler immediately restored her to favor. As we shall see, five of the six women with whom Hitler had intimate relations committed suicide—or came perilously close to doing so.⁵²

Among the many childish games Adolf Hitler played was a form of substitute suicide. He disliked tying his own necktie and had his valet do it for him. Hitler made a game of it—but one that he took very seriously. He would hold his breath and count slowly to ten. If Linge could finish the knot before Hitler had finished counting, the Führer was greatly relieved.⁵³

Decapitation was the form of death which particularly fascinated Hitler. He spoke often of severed heads. Not only did he make his famous promise that when he came to power "heads will roll in the sand," but a statement years before to an intimate suggests that he sometimes thought of the possibility of his own decapitation. On 24 July 1926 he confided, "My head will not roll in the sand until I have completed my mission." 54

When Hitler flipped a coin to determine whether he should go on a picnic, heads did not win. Heads invariably lost.

When he was asked what he would do upon first landing in England, he replied without hesitation that he wanted most to see the place where Henry VIII chopped off the heads of his wives.

When Hitler designed a sort of promissory note for the Party in the mid-1920s—redeemable when he became ruler of Germany—he showed an idealized German warrior holding in his right hand a sword dripping blood, and in his left hand the severed head of a woman suspended by her blond hair. Under the picture in heavy Gothic type was printed "Warrior of the Truth, Behead the Lie." It is noteworthy that the Warrior is enjoined not to fight, not to pierce, but to decapitate the young lady.⁵⁵

Hitler's definition of politics was one that does not seem to have occurred to Aristotle, Jefferson, Gladstone, or Lincoln: "Politics is like a harlot; if you love her unsuccessfully she bites your head off."⁵⁶

The historic figures he particularly admired were associated in his

The Image and the Man

others had to die, it is clearer than ever that the fate of Germany lies in my hands." 75

His version of human history was essentially one of religious mythology. He believed that a pure German people had lived in an early Garden of Eden. But this pure race had been attacked by the Devil, made incarnate in the form of the Jew. Indeed, he said explicitly that "the Jew is the personification of the Devil and of all evil." And thus he reached his conclusion that in fighting the Devil he was doing the work of Almighty God. In Hitler's theology, a different original sin replaced the one committed in the biblical Garden of Eden. "The mixture of the races is the original sin [*Erbsünde*] of this world," he claimed. "The sins against blood and race are the original sins of this world." He thought of World War II in eschatological terms, and saw himself as the commander of the forces of good standing at Armageddon and battling the forces of Satan. "Often it seems to me as if we are all being tested by the Devil and Satan, and we must pass through Hell together until we finally obtain ultimate victory." 76

He did not view the Party and the Reich merely as secular organizations. "I consider those who establish or destroy a religion much greater than those who establish a State, to say nothing of founding a Party," he had written in *Mein Kampf*. And years later he told his followers, "We are not a movement, rather we are a religion." 76

The institutional pattern he used for creating his New Order was the Roman Catholic Church, which had so greatly impressed him. As a boy he had dreamed of being an abbot. When he became Führer, however, he raised his sights and saw himself as a political Pope with an apostolic succession. He announced to a closed meeting of the faithful in the Brown House during 1930: "I hereby set forth for myself and my successors in the leadership of the Party the claim of political infallibility. I hope the world will grow as accustomed to that claim as it has to the claim of the Holy Father."

He also fancied himself as a religious leader of the non-Christian world he planned to conquer. "I'm going to become a religious figure. Soon I'll be the great chief of the Tartars. Already Arabs and Moroccans are mingling my name with their prayers." 77

Hitler saw striking parallels between his Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment and the Church's Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (*Congregatio de Propaganda Fide*). He remarked that his task was not to communicate knowledge "but holy conviction and unconditional faith." He viewed the 25 articles of his Party as "The dogma of our faith" and the "rock" upon which the Party was built.⁷⁸ Hitler's proclamation of the "Thousand Year Reich" has religious resonance. He was also fond of speaking of the "inseparable Trinity" of State, Movement, and Volk. As the sign and symbol of his movement Hitler chose a special type of cross, and personally modified the design of this *Hakenkreuz*.

* D. R. I told him that because
absolutely correct and
that, together, resulting all
temptation we would obtain victory

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

The colossal Assembly Hall planned for his new capital of Germania should be seen as a secular cathedral rather than a civic building. The dome was to be large enough to encompass the Dome of St. Peter's seven times—a favorite number. As Albert Speer has noted, "It was basically a hall of worship. . . without such cult significance the motivation for Hitler's main structure would have been senseless and unintelligible."⁷⁰

In reminiscing about the institutions and ideas that had influenced him, Hitler said that he had learned a great deal from Marxist terrorism, from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and from the Freemasons. But, he concluded, "Above all, I have learned from the Jesuit order." Certainly the oath of direct obedience to the Führer was strikingly reminiscent of the special oath that Jesuits swear to the Pope. Moreover, Hitler spoke of his elite SS, who wore the sacred symbol and dressed in black, as his Society of Jesus. He also ordered SS officers to study the *Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola* for training in the rigid discipline of the faith.⁸⁰

The close parallel between commitment to God and the sacred oath of allegiance to Hitler is seen in a description of public oath-taking recorded in the Nazi newspaper *Westdeutscher Beobachter*:

Yesterday witnessed the profession of the religion of the blood in all its imposing reality . . . whoever has sworn his oath of allegiance to Hitler has pledged himself unto death to this sublime idea.⁸¹

The bolts of excommunication and anathema which Hitler hurled against nonbelievers and heretics were not unlike those of a Gregory VII:

Woe to them who do not believe. These people have sinned . . . sinned against all of life . . . it is a miracle of faith that Germany has been saved. Today more than ever it is the duty of the Party to remember this National Socialist confession of faith [*Glaubensbekenntnis*] and to bear it forward as our holy [*heiliges*] sign of our battle and our victory.⁸²

The Nazis, like the Catholics, had their prophets, saints, and martyrs. The Führer sanctified his disciples who fell during the Beer Hall Putsch when he said, in dedicating their memorial, that their death would bring forth "a true belief in the resurrection of their people . . . the blood that they shed becomes the baptismal water of the Third Reich."⁸³

Hitler's holy reliquary was the Brown House, containing the sacred Blood Flag which had been borne by the martyrs of 9 November 1923. It was Hitler and Hitler alone who could perform the priestly ritual of touching the Blood Flag to the standards of the Brown Shirts.

30

The Image and the Man

Hitler substituted Nazi holidays. The Nazi holidays include in the year he referred to as April, his own birthday and the day of the founding of the Reich, and the day of the kind of Nazi Good Friday, the day of the death of the Witness [*Blutzeuge*] of the movement.

Hitler also provided the day of the founding of the Reich and *Mein Kampf*, instead of the homes of thousands of German people of the regime, the Nazis chose the day of the founding of the Reich as the appropriate wedding gift for the Führer.

The parallel between Hitler and the Catholic Church is seen in German schools. On 16 March 1933, a declaration approved by Hitler's propaganda:

Jesus and Hitler. As Jesus was the German people persecuted, but while Jesus was the Chancellorship . . . Jesus was the earth.

The League of German Lord's Prayer which was a statement of him as a deity:

Adolf Hitler, you are our enemy tremble. Thy Thy earth. Let us hear daily for we will obey to the end Hitler!⁸⁴

And smaller children were taught:

Führer, my Führer, send me throughout my life deepest need, I thank thee my side and never leave Heil my Führer!⁸⁵

Hitler's disciples seem to be popularizing these new words German people:

Silent night! He is calm. All

* D. T. J. J. J.

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

cludes that he was one of the most underestimated statesmen of the twentieth century, a man who "succeeded spectacularly in the area of economic recovery."⁹

One is less impressed with the quality of Hitler's mind as it ranged over a vast number of subjects in the so-called *Tischgespräche*—the nightly disquisitions he gave to captive audiences at field headquarters during the war. Notes were dutifully taken by members of his entourage who had been told to preserve the pronouncements of their leader for posterity. While only a small fraction of the total *pensée* has been preserved, and only a few samples can be given here, they are enough to show Hitler's confidence in his ability to speak authoritatively on almost any topic.

He felt particularly knowledgeable about American history and social life: "In the single year, 1641, fifty thousand Irish left for North America.* . . . Transplant a German to Kiev, and he remains a German. But transplant him to Miami, and you make a degenerate of him—in other words, an American. . . . Everything about the behavior of American society reveals that it's half-Judaized and the other half Negritized. . . . You can't imagine anything as miserable or degenerate as [American] farmers. . . ."

Although he had never mastered his own language and knew no other, he considered himself an expert on linguistics and literary criticism. "The English language," he said, "is incapable of expressing a poetic or philosophic idea. . . . One hour of instruction in French once a week is quite enough. . . . The three greatest books in the world are *Gulliver's Travels*, *Don Quixote*, and *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. . . . In no country is Shakespeare so badly acted as in England."

He had strong views about art: "Anyone who sees and paints a sky green and pastures blue ought to be sterilized."¹⁰

He often lectured his entourage on philosophy, theology, and biblical studies: "It is on the foundation of Kant's theory of knowledge that Schopenhauer built the edifice of his philosophy, and it is Schopenhauer who annihilated the pragmatism of Hegel. . . . It is certain that Jesus was not a Jew. The Jews, by the way, regarded Him as the son of a whore—of a whore and a Roman soldier. . . . When Paul preached in Athens in favor of the Jews, Athenians shook with laughter. . . . It's impossible to escape the problem of God. When I have time, I'll work out the formulae. . . ."

History and cultural anthropology were among his stronger suits: "Russia has never suffered a famine. . . . To label the Bulgarians as Slavs is pure nonsense; originally they were Turkomans. The same applies to the Czechs. It is enough for a Czech to grow a mustache for anyone to see, from the way it droops, that his origin is Mongolian.

* In point of fact, there was virtually no Irish immigration to America in 1641. The total population, including whites and blacks, in all colonies in America was about 26,600 in the year 1640. Ten years later the total population was 50,400. See *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to the Present*, 756.

The Intellectual World of Adolf Hi

. . . The favorite soup in German soldiers had a horror of eating teeth. . . ."

He was also proud of his knowledge: "No one in the pressure. Their constant brawl Now, thanks to the safety razor . . . It has been proved that a will cure beri-beri within a week basically on the whale for its —even if they have but a million veins—produce regularly at least as much as the best possible product." He was also proud of his knowledge: "No one in the pressure. Their constant brawl Now, thanks to the safety razor . . . It has been proved that a will cure beri-beri within a week basically on the whale for its —even if they have but a million veins—produce regularly at least as much as the best possible product."

Under the rubric of military expertise might be included the move a piano by himself. . . . beauty . . . I can claim that faith

That humor was not suggested by the observation that But pride often goes before a fall.

A perceptive and heroic hours of Hitler's verbal barrage last days in the Berlin air raid thing was missing. "Even to feeling is that in this whole humane note—the magnanimity

HITLER'S READING

Presumably the books that a sight into his intellectual interest in Hitler's case the clues are not easily determined.

He liked to give the impression who devoured "mountains of books" though they show a very consistent, do not reveal that he had

H
be

I

HITLER GOD: ADOLF HITLER

intolerant . . . and peremptorily
the complete transformation of
ideas.

—Adolf Hitler

was worth talking about de-
his personality. Those who
conclude that a discussion
pointless. He was, it is said,
by lust for power, he used
it did not.
argument has been given in a

at it has its goals. . . . One
take of power, but it has a
pure wielding of power. One
it is not devoid of intelligible
might say with Polonius that
though madness it is.⁴⁷

Hitler's ideology also point
ed contempt for ideas and
the question of where the
found: "It is written on the
And his more famous com-
e, 'I release the safety catch

ideas were not original. His
Semitism, and will to power
history. And it is emphasized
e or destructive, in the entire
it is both naive and irrelevant

fferently—as a man of con-
has noticed, "an intellectual,
a world of his own thought
ents of his power."⁴⁸
when the occasion required,
ellian but as an instrument
st important, he established

the mouth of the Freikorps martyr
st produced in 1933, but it was

*ified my
ing respectfully,
notion I offered,*

The Intellectual World of Adolf Hitler

his government on the basis of those ideas. Indeed, seldom in human history has the theory of a government been so ruthlessly consistent with its practice; never have ideas been more fully implemented in a society. His ideas on racism determined the laws, the art, the education, and the wage scales of the Third Reich. They determined that physics in the universities must be taught without Einstein, and psychology without Freud. They decided whether millions of people would live or die. A distinguished student of the Third Reich is justified in concluding that the role of ideas was of crucial importance in the development of Hitler's government, and that the history of those ideas is the history of their underestimation.⁴⁹

Leaders of Western democracies in the 1930s—and later histori-
ans such as A. J. P. Taylor—underestimated Hitler disastrously and
misunderstood him almost completely because they thought (quite
rightly) that his ideas were ridiculous and beneath contempt. They
failed to realize that Hitler believed in those ideas. They greatly over-
estimated his opportunistic and manipulative side and underestimated
his commitment to ideology. It is of the utmost importance to empha-
size that Hitler was a man both of contrivance and conviction, an op-
portunist and a fanatic. His foreign policy is not explicable without
understanding that duality. Nor is his massacre of the Jews. The hard
historic fact about the genocide is that it was not caused by the
exigencies of war, nor was it a political maneuver to cope with internal
unrest and domestic conflict. These people were killed as the result of
one of Hitler's ideas: the idea of a superior race and the need to ex-
terminate what he considered to be the vermin that were attacking it.
The horror of Hitler was this: he meant what he said, he lived by his
ideals, he practiced what he preached.

Upon occasion, it is true, Hitler manipulated his ideas and made
exceptions to them in the name of expediency. After Pearl Harbor he
hailed the Japanese as "Asian Nordics" and exempted them from the
social and civil disabilities of his racial laws. A favorite Jewish vegetar-
ian cook was surprised to discover that her ancestors had all been
Aryanized by one of the Führer's decrees, and Göring was permitted to
announce "I determine what constitutes being a Jew." But those were
exceptions. Seen collectively, his ideas form one cohesive structure of
"staggering logicity and consistency."⁵⁰

Those who seek to understand Hitler's personality must study his
political thinking, for it often gave expression, sometimes in ways that
he was not aware of, to his deep-seated psychological impulses and de-
sires. Hitler was no exception to the truth that a political theorist's
ideas about society are rooted in his conception of man. Hitler con-
sidered mankind treacherous, irrational, base, and generally incapable
of judgment. The people were "as stupid as they are forgetful"; they
were "weak and bestial" or "lazy and cowardly." He spoke of the
"granite like stupidity of humanity" and "the great stupid mutton-herd
of our sheep-like people."⁵¹

*I and it freed him to believe that
the foundation agents of the devil.*

1930

IDEOLOGY

Our ideology is intolerant . . . and peremptorily demands . . . the complete transformation of public life to its ideas.

—Adolf Hitler

Whether one considers Hitler's political ideas worth talking about depends, in part, on one's interpretation of his personality. Those who see him as a person of adroit calculation conclude that a discussion of his guiding ideas is both perverse and pointless. He was, it is said, an opportunist pure and simple. Driven by lust for power, he used any idea that helped him and abandoned it if it did not.

The most perceptive reply to this argument has been given in a valuable study of Hitler's *Weltanschauung*:

. . . one may call this opportunism, but it has its goals. . . . One may call this power politics for the sake of power, but it has a clearly defined purpose beyond the pure wielding of power. One may call it lacking in principles, but it is not devoid of intelligible considerations of principles. . . . One might say with Polonius that there is method in this madness, even though madness it is.⁴⁷

Those who minimize the importance of Hitler's ideology also point out that the whole Nazi movement showed contempt for ideas and stressed activism. Thus Göring's reply to the question of where the philosophy of National Socialism could be found: "It is written on the faces of the marching Storm Troopers." And his more famous comment: "Every time I hear the word 'culture,' I release the safety catch on my revolver."

It has also been noted that Hitler's ideas were not original. His crude concepts of militarism, race, anti-Semitism, and will to power have run pandemically through German history. And it is emphasized that there is not one new idea, constructive or destructive, in the entire movement. Hence, according to this view, it is both naive and irrelevant to talk seriously about his political ideas.

But one can also see Hitler quite differently—as a man of conviction. Basically he was, as Alan Bullock has noticed, "an intellectual, in a double sense, that he lived intensely in a world of his own thought and that words and ideas were the instruments of his power."⁴⁸

While he could be an opportunist when the occasion required, he saw himself finally not as a Machiavellian but as an instrument of God. He believed in his ideas. And most important, he established

⁴⁷ Actually the comment was first put in the mouth of the *Freikorps* martyr Albert Leo Schlageter in a play by Hanns Johst produced in 1933, but it was appropriated by the Nazis.

74 → *Due to this simplified my task. He was, in consequence, a respectful, even reverential to the nation's officials,*

The Intellectual World of Adolf

his government on the basis history has the theory of a with its practice; never has a society. His ideas on racism, and the wage scales physics in the universities chology without Freud. I would live or die. A distinction in concluding that the role development of Hitler's ideas is the history of their

Leaders of Western democrats such as A. J. P. Taylor misunderstood him almost rightly) that his ideas were failed to realize that Hitler estimated his opportunistic his commitment to ideology size that Hitler was a man opportunist and a fanatic. His understanding that duality, historic fact about the exigencies of war, nor was unrest and domestic conflict one of Hitler's ideas: the terminate what he considers. The horror of Hitler was the ideals, he practiced what he

Upon occasion, it is true exceptions to them in the: hailed the Japanese as "As social and civil disabilities tarian cook was surprised Aryanized by one of the Führer announce "I determine with exceptions. Seen collectively "staggering logicity and c

Those who seek to understand political thinking, for it often he was not aware of, to his sires. Hitler was no exception ideas about society are reconsidered mankind treacherous of judgment. The people were "weak and bestial" "granite like stupidity of his of our sheep-like people."⁵¹

→ *and it is the same*

③

1930

side of his ideology. The most
ere was his anticommunism;
onal presentations of himself
antirevolutionary, and even
Christianity.

ism (more precisely, the his-
ent by a master historian. Its
no, no matter how briefly, ex-
a Soviet-like rule (as had the
19). Nor was it restricted to
lasses, who had much to fear
evolution. The main appeal of
conomic. There was the fear
dd where the prospects of a
the stronger current was
ing the rejection of an inter-
io seemed to be among its

ocialist; of the two adjectives,
ecisive, than the latter. But he
ism, as well as of *international*
more of an appreciation of
alists than of capitalists and
nts of his in that regard. Not
he knew that in order to come
communism of the German
old Hindenburg: "The Bol-
ldly." He knew that this was
of argument would impress
like nine years before, when

ism among the working classes in
of Marx. It may also be of interest to
popular not when the power of the
Marxists were strongest but when
tries in the 1930s and in the United
McCarthy years.

his revolutionary attempt was shot down in the Munich streets,
he would become the ruler of Germany legally, constitutionally,
democratically, and not against but with the support of the most
respectable people in Germany—at least in part because of their
anticommunism. It is significant that he continued using this theme
even after he became chancellor, and even after the election cam-
paign that finally led to his consolidation of power. On 14 Octo-
ber 1933 (and in a speech justifying Germany's departure from
the League of Nations), he said: "The Red revolt could have spread
across Germany like wildfire. . . . For eight months now we have
been waging a heroic struggle against the Communist threat to our
people. . . ." (This at a time when the Communists in Germany had
been annihilated, their leaders in prison or in exile.) On 27 June
1934 (three days before his move against Röhm, the "Night of the
Long Knives"), he received three Catholic bishops, to whom he
declared: "The defense of Europe against Bolshevism is our task for
the next two or three hundred years."

He knew how to appeal to the conservatives. Already in *Mein
Kampf* he praised the Christian-populist Karl Lueger, "who knew
how to use the existing structures of power and authority, using
such older elements and institutions to the advantage of his own
movement." We saw that he sought, and gained, entry to conserva-
tive circles in Munich as early as 1920-21. In 1926, he fought and
won against the radical Gregor Strasser within the party, agreeing
to vote in favor of a restitution of properties to the former Ger-
man princes that had been taken from them in 1918—a cause dear
to the older German conservatives. In 1930, he said: "Against us
stands an older Germany. It is no longer our world, but we do not
wish to be torn away from this older Germany, because to it belong

*Cited by Klaus Scholder, *Die Kirchen und das Dritte Reich*, 8, 1985, 1, p. 246. He
would, of course, return to such arguments after his invasion of the Soviet Union in
June 1941, but at that time he would no longer do so in the service of domestic
politics but as an instrument of his statesmanship; while at the same time (again,
privately), he often expressed his admiration for Stalin, together with his contemp-
tuous hatred of the reactionary capitalists Churchill and Roosevelt. For more
details about this, see chapter 5.

1935

1933

1920

1930

1941

(2)

1923

1930

1933

of the difference between mentality and ideology. For Hitler expected more of the mentality*—of the mental habits and the predictable mental reactions—of the German people than of their wholesale acceptance of the National Socialist ideology. As he wrote in *Mein Kampf*: "To lead means to be able to move the masses."

(actions not sentiments)

1913

BUT ENOUGH OF THESE methodological—or, more properly, epistemological—considerations. Our subject is Hitler's popularity, and its variations.† To begin with, there are serious reasons to question the widely accepted thesis, according to which the 1930–33 Depression not only contributed to but made it possible for Hitler to acquire power. We know that a most important step—literally a breakthrough—in his fortunes was the September 1930 Reichstag election, when the National Socialists received nearly seven times more votes than they did two years before—from less than 3 to almost 19 percent of all votes cast. Yet historians have devoted relatively little attention to the already rapid increase of National Socialist votes in the summer of 1929 and in early 1930 in the municipal and state elections (in Saxony, Mecklenburg, Baden, for instance), rising at times to 13 or 14 percent. This happened before the worldwide Depression and the tide of unemployment in Weimar Germany. Some historians have remarked that during his crucial ascent from 1930 to 1933, which coincided with the worst years of the Depression, Hitler had no definite economic program—in other words, his appeal was not primarily, and perhaps

1930

(*)

1931

*"Mentality," here, is not altogether identical with the now fashionable use of *mentalités* among historians. This is a greatly overdue recognition (especially among French academics) of the fatal shortcomings of a materialist philosophy and reconstruction of history. Admittedly a difficult task, calling for sensitive minds and perspectives, it must mean more than particular references to the "mental climate" of a certain place and time.

†Steinert, in *ST/HR/D*, p. 336, makes the convincing argument against those who have claimed that Hitler's success was due to his radio speeches and that he would have been greatly handicapped by his television image. As Goebbels proved, pictorial materials were more easily manipulated and on occasion falsified than was voice or text.

(*) This is also the Celi Raubal period and A. H. identifies his success with her presence.

ents.* (Also, belief in Hitler not always the same thing.) necessarily, true that a mass is components. In many ways a numbers are men and women, as, former monarchists and interesting question is how a nationalist voter became either a Hitler. A further difficulty "Volksgefühl," "Volksstim" employed by Zitelmann), into English ("popular" or "folk"), and are undefinable and a particular problem, whichacies of German rhetoric—public statements and publications, for example, French or British brutal as the German; but was different. Here we must speech is not only an expression of patterns of speech have an relation habits and patterns of

a necessary recognition: that

but this: His book "is about the outright opponents, whose attitude ideological penetration and yet in: The picture painted is not a

of German generals and other of the gradual (though rapid) Third Reich in 1933 is, as yet, as Tocqueville and Fontane gave in Paris or in Berlin, but such as I attempted to express earlier, large numbers of people were not

①

*1939

1930-31

Hitler the latter was dominant. Revolutionaries often claim to be representatives of youth; this was true of Fascists as well as National Socialists, including Mussolini and the Spanish José Antonio Primo da Rivera, whose emphasis on youth was even stronger than Hitler's. But Hitler put much more of his cult of youth into practice than Mussolini did. Oddly enough, the impression he gave of himself was seldom (surely not after 1923) that of a particularly youthful person. But his party and his movement were youthful: In 1931, in Berlin 70 percent of the SA were men under thirty, and in the Reichstag in 1930, 60 percent of the National Socialist deputies were under forty, while only 10 percent of the Social Democrats were. The German exile Karl Otten wrote an incisive paragraph about Hitler's appeal to German youth: "The young truly love Hitler, in almost limitless ecstatic admiration. Not only because he understands their childish impulses and even encourages them. The Wild West games [*Indianerspiele*] of the young serve as a preparation for war."* Hitler seems to have been the creator of a free country of the young. Before them he plays not the role of a severe father but of a mother, a source of many pleasures and of love. He allows them pseudo-revolutionary freedom for their biological and sexual impulses, adding to his appeal.†

Yet much of the new order depended on an increase of administration, the cult of youth notwithstanding. In 1939, Hitler wanted every young German to spend at least one month each year at manual labor, preferably on the land—a clear break with the sedentary bourgeois era. Still, the portion of the people who lived on the land and were engaged in agriculture was falling (it was 30.5 percent in 1925 and 26.1 percent in 1939). The portion of those who were employed in industry was exactly the same in 1939 as it was in 1925 (42.1 percent); what increased was the section of the population employed in administration and services, from 6.6 percent in 1925 to 10.4 percent in 1939. A new amorphous middle class was coming into being whose competences were not always clearly categorizable but whose style of life became increasingly modern.

*About Hitler and the American Wild West, see p. 155.

†Cited by Scholdt, *scho*, p. 660.

THERE WERE DUALITIES in Hitler's life. One that is often understood by biographers than by psychologists resided in his dual ambition more precisely—the nation no Nero, for whom art was more seriously than that. I can detect both modern and reactionary elements.

Hitler's interest in art was to be a painter; and then Churchill, whose discovery, at the suggestion of depressive break in his career, was a diversion, superb relaxation in literature and poetry by a statesman one of whose roles was a statesman and an artist (though a more serious tone than the end of his life, Hitler made of his tasks as a national leader to build.

He would destroy people architecture, and architecture painting or music—that he markable achievements.† I know or dismissed, and that this is to gain it further. Allow me to

*See also Gert Kalow, *Hitler—da*

†This issue is, of course, inseparable from the remnant of materials of Speer (also ship of Speer and Hitler. About this: *Battle with the Truth*, 1, 1995.

*P.T. I don't for the oppressing the Jews and political enemies, it would have been a good and interesting society. I began to

think again of Goethe's Faust, Part I. What did it propose, after all, but that a devil's contract offered everything provided one was true to a clause, a blasphemous clause. Our clause would confess I did not understand the O.V.'s reasoning was that the persecution of the Jews must continue to increase

①

1930-32
1944

whose main concern with a potential national disunity came after his great achievement of establishing a powerful German state. As early as 1923, Hitler decided (and instructed the party accordingly) that the struggle against the then French occupation of the Ruhr was secondary; the first task was to achieve the national revolution at home before driving out the foreign occupier—and not only because in 1923 Germany was too weak to risk a war with the French. His political realism, especially after 1923,* was apparent in his continued priority of "Innenpolitik." Reminiscing about the years 1930-32, he said that Chancellor Brüning was "a man of some talent; but his greatest mistake was to attempt successes in foreign policy and thereby increase his popularity, whereas he [the Führer] proceeded exactly in the opposite way, knowing that foreign policy can never be successful when the domestic political conditions for it are not at hand."†

Notwithstanding all of the necessary reservations about Rauschning's authenticity, his attribution of the following statement to Hitler sounds like a true and clear reflection of Hitler's mind. Upon the question of whether he was planning to nationalize German industry, Hitler is supposed to have said: "Why should I nationalize the industries? I will nationalize the people"—a trenchant expression of his political principles. To the assembled industrialists in Düsseldorf on 27 January 1932, he said: "It was not that German industry had triumphed world-wide, after which came the development of German state power [*Machtentwicklung*]; then, too, German power had achieved the main conditions for the later blossoming of German industry." And in a speech in 1937: "If the German industrialists were to tell me: 'We cannot do this,' then I would say to them: 'Good—so I will take this up, because it has to be done.' But

*Bullock (BV, p. 314) recognized Hitler's realism in 1923: His insistence that the first task was to overthrow the republic "rather than to waste German strength in a fight with the French which the Germans were bound to lose" was sound; but Bullock was wrong (p. 93, note 1) in drawing a parallel between Hitler and Lenin ("both wishing to achieve the revolution at home before driving the foreign invader out"). In F, p. 430, Fest remarked on the primacy of domestic policy, though he did not sufficiently emphasize Hitler's successful anti-Communist propaganda.

†Koeppen notes, 18 September 1941, p. 13.

when the industry tells me not to have to take it upon difference whether Krupp right when he wrote that Economics than people believe as has been his wont: "Ov Reich Cabinet came to re more convincingly, produc not ignorant of economics; of German unemployment gigantic rearmament progr clearly seen by Simone We 1942: "If Hitler despises ecc he understands nothing abo the notions of simple commu can be called inspired since economy is not an independ have laws, since in economy ruled by force. . . . It seems ceives, and conceives clearly. He possesses an exact notion

From the revolutionary dr to the head of the state and stages in Hitler's career. M after his assumption to pow because of the exigencies of seen that he was willing to g

*The first quote by Heer, HR, p. 11/w, p. 21.

†Haffner, HF/AN, pp. 28-29: "We really Hitler's achievement? In spite have to reply in the affirmative. It is to 1933, had played virtually no part economic miracle was not simply du the Third Reich was producing guns

**Quoted by Simone Petrément, also Peter Drucker, *The End of Econo* have been read by Churchill with int

* D. to the real
the increase of d
working class, a
appreciation of

①

1930-33 1942-44

The Jews: Tragedy and Mystery 189

d the great significance of the
herwise were but yet another
Also significant is the fact that
g" in his wartime speeches
e, perhaps consciously, mis-
g to the date of his speech as
ar began—obviously wishing
l and inescapable connection
ced upon him. For about two
ion—of Jews from the Greater
with the first drafts of plans
aps to Madagascar; and then,
er change.† The invasion of
the war—involved new prob-
of Eastern European Jews in
y Germany, and the closing
ion overseas. Some time in
ordered or approved a Final
f Jews took place during the
ern Europe, while the Final
extermination of most Jews
ed and drafted and finally set
ions at the Wannsee Confer-
the Jews who were murdered

the international Jewish financiers
plunging the nations into a world
of the earth and the victory of Jewry,
Europe" (my italics).
be removed not like a piece of fur-
but like a stain that is removed by

December 1941. Its postponement
frican entry into the war. Hitler's
this table conversation of 27 January
must disappear from Europe! At
s. They will always remain an ele-
this in the lives of nations as they
Switzerland and Sweden. [My italics.]
most dangerous. Five thousand Jews

during World War II were killed between the summer of 1942 and the fall of 1944. In October 1944, Himmler ordered the termination of the gassing—probably not against Hitler's intentions or behind his back. Still, Hitler insisted on—and, from all existing evidence, believed in—the inseparable and principal responsibility of Jews for the war, whence his exhortation to the German people in his last-minute testament.

This summary of a sequence of events will, I think, be accepted by most serious historians without reservations. But to this we must add some details that may suggest the complicated character of Hitler's intentions.* To begin with, categorical and unyielding as his condemnation of Jews was, allowing for no exceptions, on several occasions in the 1930s he did permit or order the exemption of men and women of Jewish ancestry in individual cases.† Yet there was not the least semblance of such mitigations in his speeches and public expressions. What is at work here is not a clearly Machiavellian

briefly in all kinds of Swedish positions. That much easier to extract them! We have reasons enough for that. . . ." My italics should suggest the duality within Hitler. On the one hand, Hitler refers to the deportation of Jews to Siberia (about which he talked on other occasions, too), not about their physical extermination. At the same time, his intention to comb through Europe to extract all Jews from everywhere is entirely in accord with the expressed intentions of the protocol of the Wannsee Conference.

*Carr, c, p. 93: "Just as one must pay due regard to 'alternative' foreign policies which to some extent modified Hitler's own concepts, so, too, in studying the Holocaust we must allow the possibility that there were other 'final solutions' before the gas chambers."

†Between the two crucial elections of September 1930 and March 1933, he did not strongly emphasize anti-Semitism in his speeches. On one occasion he said that "well-meaning Jews" may stay in Germany, "once they demonstrate their proper behavior [*Wohlverhalten*]." Heiden (HD, p. 347) cites a Hitler remark about the comic actor Felix Bressart: "Pity that this Bressart is a Jew!" Görlitz-Quint (GQ, pp. 362-63) mention that on 27 January 1933 Papen supported and Hitler agreed to a cabinet post for the nationalist Theodor Düstberg, who had a Jewish grandfather. On several occasions, he (as late as 1940) ordered the reactivation of half-Jewish officers in the armed services (examples of this in Admiral Raeder's memoirs, Erich Raeder, *My Life*, Annapolis, Md., 1960, pp. 263-64). Also, when it came to the Nuremberg laws, he did not approve the plans of the Party to equate half-Jews with Jews. Schleunes in *The Twisted Road to Auschwitz*, p. 131: "Hitler's hand appeared occasionally at crucial moments, but it was usually a vacillating and indecisive one. He did not delegate responsibility for Jewish policy, nor did he keep a close check on it." *

* It was an emotional check-point,
there to justify his ego rather than a
call to immediate action.

His ego defended on the unity
of feeling he could arouse.

also in mem.

1930-5

Hitler's wars were so very different. (Also, Hitler was a Clausewitzian in the reverse sense, too, waging politics as if it were war.)

In addition—superseding both Napoleon's and Clausewitz's realistic recognition of the supreme importance of morale in war—Hitler was an idealist determinist, which is perhaps a peculiarly German inclination. He believed (as had Schopenhauer and Nietzsche) in the supreme importance of will; and also in the supreme power of ideas. He thought that in the streets of German cities as well as in the arena of politics, his National Socialist storm troopers must, and would, win: that one National Socialist street fighter was worth two or three of his Communist or Socialist opponents, not only because he was better disciplined and trained but because of the superior force of his convictions and ideas. He believed that the war in Europe was but the repetition on a larger scale of what had happened within Germany in 1928–33: that a German fighting man was worth two English or three French or four Russian soldiers because of the superior nature and strength of the idea which he incarnated. And that was why Germany had to win this war against her numerous enemies, just as the National Socialists had had to win, and indeed had won, their war against their enemies within Germany.* This conviction carried Hitler very far: but not far enough. Yet this was one instance in which there was probably no difference between his publicly expressed and his most private beliefs; in this kind of determinist idealism he seems to have believed till the end.†

At the same time, Hitler's convictions were sustained, assisted,

*Fest cites Hitler on the British appeasers (F, p. 801): "meine Hugenberger," "the likes of Hugenberg" (or "my Hugenbergs"), Hugenberg having been the German nationalist conservative who went along with Hitler hoping to get his own way, and then was easily discarded.

†He was, like most successful military leaders, an innovator; but, true to himself, he was more convinced of the importance of military morale than of that of new weapons. In this respect there was, again, a difference between his public statements and his private beliefs. It was to others that he would occasionally suggest the decisive importance of "wonder weapons," while there is little evidence that he privately shared the breathless expectations attributed to them. Steinert (ST, p. 538) exaggerates Hitler's trust in new weapons (his "puerile illusions"). Jäckel (JHW, p. 149) is probably right: There comes a time when Hitler "no longer believes in what he says," though Jäckel does not apply this to the 1943–45 years.

and served by a knowledge which he was not wanting. His private and incomplete, was no military service during the First World War. He was a fast reader of all sorts of books. He was perhaps most important, he had absorbing and retaining a memory which would sometimes amaze his contemporaries. There were campaign decisions which were wrong; but there were many

*A few examples. Lukacs, LEW, p. 104, cites "ambassadors' dispatches, was never called from spies. In early July 1940 agents and the transcripts of monitored conversations. In the spring of 1941 he wanted and got agents working within the Soviet command. But Hitler was acutely interested." American opponents of Roosevelt drew upon an article from an issue (Marc Irving describes the "Forschungsamt" processes; but this is an exaggeration.

†Schramm (SCH, p. 104) cites Jodl details: "It was due to him personally, 37-mm. and 50-mm. guns in time, as were replaced with the long 75-mm. the 'Königstiger' . . . were developed p. 106: "This degree of technological engineering that Hitler had never had any practical experience in industry together with iron diligence and a strong self-discipline Hitler began to impose on the army. p. 78: "It is quite clear that Hitler's matters beyond his ken. On the broad grasp of military strategy and warfare that one would not expect in a layman Kershaw is less convincing. KER, weapons derived from the technological developments of the 1920s. Moreover, he was scarcely scientific and technological principles of strategy, *passim*, about many examples, including bunkers: planned by Hitler to the last sketches, but well developed."

* D.T. I did not have to explain it to him. He could speak to his street fighters of superior force of conviction, but what was really involved was deeper, free of conviction. The Communists in almost all such fallacies could not dare to recognize how much individual greed was also in them.

1930

children, no entry was to be made in the register under 'Father' even though the mother supplied a name, for the reason that in the circumstances her uncorroborated statement might be open to doubt. Only if the man she named appeared in person accompanied by two witnesses, and accepted the child as his own, could his name be entered in the baptismal register.

There is every reason to accept the accuracy of these, as of all similar entries, for, until the annexation of Austria by Germany in 1938, the registration of the population had from time immemorial been carried out by the Church. The incumbent of a parish was both priest and State-appointed registrar and in the latter capacity he was answerable to the secular authorities. His legal obligation to maintain separate registers for births, marriages and deaths dated from an Imperial Decree of 1784.

Was Adolf Hitler's grandfather a Jew?

Though it may yet be established, the identity of Alois Schicklgruber's father—that is, of Adolf Hitler's paternal grandfather—has to this day remained unknown. It was asserted by Hans Frank, the former Reich Minister of Justice, that he was a Jew. It may well have been so. In his book, *At the Gallows-Foot: An Interpretation of Hitler and his Age*, which he wrote when under sentence of death in Nürnberg Prison, Frank stated:

'It must have been towards the end of 1930 when one day in Munich Hitler sent for me. He was in his flat in the Prinz-regentenstrasse. He showed me a letter—a nauseating attempt at blackmail, he said, on the part of one of his most objectionable relations. It concerned his, Hitler's, ancestry. If I am not mistaken, the letter was from a son of Hitler's step-brother, Alois.¹ It contained an innuendo to the effect that "in view of certain statements made in the Press" it would no doubt be felt desirable that "certain facts connected with our family" should not be shouted from the roof-tops. The statements referred to amounted to the suggestion that as Hitler had

¹ I.e. William Patrick Hitler.

usgedinge-
daughters,
id left to
wing the
: first in-
t hear of
turned to

munities,
leper and
loor shut
lter in her
hlager by
lf-past ten
1 to a son.
ol. 7, page

c 10.30 a.m.

unmarried
ruber, farmer
use Theresa
ichs, Strones

ner in Strones

d, of Klein-

ter opposite
ould be, for
fillegitimate

1930

Jewish blood in his veins, he had small right to be anti-semitic, but they had been couched in such general terms that no action had been called for. These veiled allusions from one of Hitler's own relatives were more sinister, however, and on his instructions I proceeded to follow them up.¹

Frank went on to say that (as we already know) Adolf Hitler's father was the illegitimate son of a woman named Schicklgruber. This woman, Frank discovered, had been in domestic service as a cook in Graz.

'At the time her baby was born,' she was with a Jewish family in Graz by the name of Frankenberger, and the curious fact is this: starting on the day the child was born and continuing right up to its fourteenth year, Frankenberger senior paid maintenance to the mother on behalf of his nineteen-year-old son. The Frankenbers continued to correspond with her for many years and underlying everything they said in their letters was the tacit understanding that the woman Schicklgruber's baby had been begotten in circumstances which made it a duty of the Frankenbers to pay for its maintenance.'

According to Hans Frank, then, his investigations resulted in the discovery that Adolf Hitler himself was one-quarter Jewish. What proof is there that this was so? The answer is that unless and until fresh facts come to light, the assertion can neither be proved nor disproved, but such evidence as we have tends to confirm it.

In his book Frank went on to state that the correspondence between Marianne Schicklgruber and the Frankenbers was for some time in the possession of a lady related to Adolf Hitler by marriage through the Raubals (Leo Raubal married Adolf's half-sister, Angela). This lady, said Frank, lived in Wetzelsdorf near Graz. But the letters have never come to light and Frank does not make clear whether he himself ever saw them. There is nothing,

¹ As we have seen, the child was born in Dollersheim, not in Graz.

1930

either, to corroborate Frank's statement that Marianne Schicklgruber received money from an unknown source for the maintenance of her son, or that she was in domestic service in Graz, or that she worked for a family named Frankenberger, or, for that matter, Frankenreiter, which was the name given by William Patrick Hitler in an article entitled 'Mon Oncle Adolphe' published in August 1939, in *Paris-Soir*. And as Frank did not state the source of his information, we are not in a position to assess its reliability directly. Indirectly, however, we have a most valuable indication in Hitler's reaction when Frank made his report, for it may be assumed that Hitler had no prior knowledge even of the possibility of his part-Jewish ancestry, or otherwise he would not have taken the risk of instructing Frank to make enquiries.

'Adolf Hitler' wrote Frank, 'said he knew that his father was not the child of the Schicklgruber woman by the Graz Jew, he knew it from what his father and his grandmother had told him. He knew that his father sprang from the pre-marital relations between his grandmother and the man whom she later married. But they were both poor and the maintenance money which the Jew paid over a number of years was an extremely desirable supplement to the poverty-stricken household. He was well able to pay and for that reason it had been stated that he was the father, and the Jew paid, without going to court, probably because he could not face the publicity that a legal settlement would have entailed.'

Assuming that Hitler was correctly reported in this account of Frank's—and Frank can have had no conceivable reason for misquoting him, at any rate intentionally—the first point that emerges is that, whether or not Hitler had ever heard of 'the Jew from Graz' before, he did not know and had no evidence to prove that the Jew was not his grandfather. For he was lying when he claimed that he had it on the word of his father and his grandmother, the latter having died over forty years before he was

can

1930
born, and his father when he was not yet fourteen, and it is inconceivable that any father, let alone a man of Alois Hitler's reserved and rigid character, would have remarked to his young son, 'Whatever you may hear to the contrary, your grandfather was not a Jew.' In fact, as we have already noted, Hitler would hardly have caused Frank to investigate his ancestry if there was any suspicion in his mind that his nephew's innuendos might be true. Hitler's unsavoury explanation to Frank must, then, have been concocted on the spur of the moment with the intention of, firstly, giving Frank to believe that Hitler already knew the story of the Jew, and, secondly, of discrediting it. Finally and most important of all, it should be noted that Hitler made no attempt to deny that his grandmother had had some kind of a relationship with 'the Graz Jew' or that the Jew had given her money at regular intervals over a considerable period—and yet Frank's report was the first he had ever heard of either the Jew or his money. The conclusion is inescapable that the evidence which Frank produced must have been solid beyond all possibility of denial. Then what evidence? The letters, perhaps...

As might be expected, Hans Frank hovers between the conviction that Hitler's Jewish ancestry had been proved and a reluctance to reject completely the Führer's denial. At one moment Frank states:

Frank to Hitler
"Admittedly, this whole business was extremely painful, but who would wish to saddle a man with the sins of his grandparents?"

And elsewhere:

"I must say that it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that Hitler's father was, in fact, half Jewish on account of the association of his unmarried mother with the Graz Jew."

In giving his story to posterity, Frank had no desire to defame Hitler. On the contrary he wanted to exonerate him,

at least partially, from the accusation of persecuting the Jews. Frank wrote that Hitler's hatred of the Jews was conditioned by an essential psychosis of relationship-hatred which had become an unfortunate heritage of his very nature—and that, on this account, Hitler must not be too severely judged... in fact, the defending counsel claims mitigating circumstances.

There can, furthermore, be no question that the documents at Frank's disposal contained hostile inventions, since stories of such a sort are not invented especially when, for the interested parties, there is absolutely no point in fabricating 'evidence'. The documents examined by Frank, dated, indeed, from a time long before Hitler's birth.

Almost as important as Frank's report is the evidence presented by Hitler's nephew, William Patrick Hitler, who in his articles in the French newspaper *Paris-Soir* in 1939 also maintained that Hitler was of Jewish origin.

In the *Spiegel* of 12th June 1957 appeared an article in which it was stated that a Dr. Preradović of Graz had been induced by the German edition of this book to undertake investigations which led him to the conclusion that, at the time when Adolf Hitler's father was born, there were no Jews living in the town of Graz, or in the whole province of Styria. In those days, admittedly, it was forbidden for Jews to reside in the province, but we may enquire, first of all, how many Jews resided there illegally, and secondly, whether the family of Adolf Hitler's grandfather were not converted Jews professing Christianity. These questions are left unanswered by Dr. Preradović.

In the third volume of his work, *Herrschaft oder Freiheit* (p. 701), Professor A. Rüstow considers that the proof for the Jewish origin is as good as established. This is also my opinion.

It remains to consider the probable effect on Hitler of this sudden revelation of his Jewish ancestry. On the assumption that Frank's story is substantially true, Hitler must have lived with the knowledge from approximately 1931 onwards, and with the certain prospect that if any of his nearest relatives talked, his entire prestige would collapse overnight. For a man of his character,

* D. R. there is always the possibility that Marianne was having affairs with someone in the general family and also Hermann, and practically

0930

that the child * belonged to the Frank family for the sake of the money when asked the did not want ✓

1930 Frank - his fear

from the same family of Hiedlers of which the two members, Johann Georg Hiedler and Johann Nepomuk Hiedler, are already familiar to us. Before explaining her genealogy, therefore, it will be appropriate to consider the origins of the Hiedlers.

Despite every effort on the part of Hitlerites and others, no amount of ingenuity can provide the name, Hitler, with a plausible German derivation. The suggestion, for example, that 'Hitler' can be derived from 'Hütte', a hut, and mean a 'hutter', or 'hut owner', is clearly wrong. 'Hütte' can develop into 'Hittner' or 'Hüttner', but not 'Hüttler'.

The more devout Nazis insisted, of course, that 'Hitler' was derived from 'Hirt', a shepherd, the name itself thus indicating that a Hitler was destined to become the 'shepherd of all Germans'. This is nonsense. 'Hirt' can become 'Hiater' or 'Hieter', but never 'Hitler'. Neither can the name be derived from 'Hüter', a protector or guardian.

In all probability, the name is derived from the Czech 'Hidlar' or 'Hidlarček', which are both common forms. Documents show that families bearing variants of the name settled in the Waldviertel area of the north-western part of Lower Austria as early as 1430. In course of time the name underwent a wide variety of spellings: Hydler (1435), Hytler (1457), Hidler (1540), Hietler (1568), Huetler (1571), Hüttler (1581), Hüettler (1585), Huetler (1609), Hiedler (1627), Hietler (1640), Huedler (1681), Hitler (1702), Hütler (1751), Hittler (1755). Some of these variants occur in Hitler's family tree.

The evidence that the Hitlers were originally Czechs is not conclusive, but amounts to a strong probability. For centuries the Waldviertel area was contested frontier land between Bohemia and Austria. During the reign of Ottokar, for example, in the thirteenth century, there was a considerable influx of Czech settlers. Spital, near Weitra, the home of that branch of the Hitlers with which we are immediately concerned, was settled by the Knights of the Order of St. John mainly with Czechs, and was one of the prebends from which the Cathedral of Prague drew its revenues. The earliest document which mentions the

family concerns the sa Thaya' in 1435 by the Hydler and his wife. when many Czech recent documentary records Jans Hytler is mentioned the Bohemian frontier.

Apart from a few until the birth, about farmer and 'judge' (eq District of Zwettl, and had at least eleven children named Prinz—a name Adolf Hitler's godfather.

Gradually the Hiedler the eight hundred name given in Koppensteine German. In course of time the Bohemian frontier, Zwettl and Gmünd. They lived in Spital, near Weitra.

The head of this family small landowner who came Weitra. In 1786 Martin, also owned land near Spital marriage, two only near Nepomuk, both of whom

Klara Pölzl (Adolf's mother)

Johann Nepomuk Hitler's foster-father. He his mother's side, as well

Alois Hitler (Adolf's father) in Spital from the age of up with Nepomuk's third Maria Decker, namely Joseph

1930

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

Germans toiled by the sweat of their brow, Jews "stuff themselves, guzzle and sit around the stove . . . fart and roast pears [a proverbial expression for laziness] . . . they fleece us of our money and goods." He had specific ideas for dealing with "this depraved and damned people of the Jews." Luther's program, which Hitler would carry out in every detail, was set forth in 1543:

First, to set fire to their synagogues or schools. . . .
 Second, I advise that their houses also be razed and destroyed. . . .
 Third, I advise that all their prayer books and Talmudic writings, in which such adultery, lies, cursing and blasphemy are taught, be taken from them. . . .
 Fourth, I advise that their Rabbis be forbidden to teach henceforth on pain of loss of life and limb. . . .
 Fifth, I advise that safe-conduct on the highways be abolished completely for the Jews. . . .
 Sixth, I advise that . . . all cash and treasure of silver and gold be taken from them. . . .
 Seventh, . . . Let whosoever can, throw brimstone and pitch upon them, so much the better . . . and if this be not enough, let them be driven like mad dogs out of the land. . . .⁸

It is one of those jarring accidents of chronology that Hitler launched his first pogrom against the Jews, known as *Kristallnacht*, setting fire to their synagogues and schools, on the night of 9-10 November 1938—on Luther's birthday.

As far as Germany's future political health was concerned, Luther's most baneful legacy was his conception of the dual nature of man and, correspondingly, the necessity for two governments—one secular, one spiritual. Man was both physical and spiritual, "outer" and "inner." The outer person was subject to the physical environment and earthly powers. In this world man was never free. Spiritual, "inner" man, however, could—through faith—be set free, justified, and saved. The state ought not to intervene in this world of faith and the inner man.

As the doctrine was preached in Germany by generations of Lutheran pastors and practiced by Lutheran statesmen, this dualism entailed a separation between private and public morality. The individual Christian believer should practice the beatitudes and be loving, kind, forgiving, and honest in his private and personal life. But there was also an external kind of public morality: the state, for "reasons of state," might be crafty, ruthless, harsh, and cruel. As long as the state did not interfere with the spiritual life of the "inner man," it must be obeyed. A student of the Resistance Movement to Hitler has concluded that this doctrine had the effect of deterring Lutheran opposition to Nazi tyranny.⁹ Certainly there were many individual acts of heroic resistance among German Protestants, as there were among Catholics. But the Lutheran Church as such did not protest when Nazis carried out

The Past As Prologue:

pernicious programs that such actions too was the legitimate claim, again, is "Reich." The secular realm was Luther, Protestant found themselves ac- morally grotesque gr- der had nothing to Christian.

Martin Luther's contributions to the contributions far gre another legacy point Hitler's Holocaust, c- influenced the politi way that, after care only as fateful."¹⁰

The Thirty Years

Amid the disaster the first and clearest would rescue their mighty Reich of the C

During three ter ground for pillaging and Bohemia. When land lay in ruin, far had simply disappea of battle, hunger, dis ing the Thirty Years'

The entire popu- dle class, which in was strengthening th solid political bulwa The Netherlands pr still smile down from officially and collect nesses [Hooge Mooge they had good reas- invaders, established perhaps the most civ

England too was and the squirearchy

250

* D.T. I would ~~blame~~ Read him to such books whenever the political measures to make friends w the Jews out took him. And these pleasures were large in 1930.

It's the way in which A.B. key himself

Score
Hitler
Chosen
the
date.
Quoted
Luther
1938

1543

1930

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

the cement that bound the whole structure of society into an entity. . . . In school, in a tavern, in street cleaning, in the mayor's office, one found the same bristling efficiency; the same rigorous discipline, and the same hierarchical consciousness.¹¹¹

One of the most important means of impressing German citizens with military ideals was through the Reserve Officer Corps. Traditionally the Officer Corps had been the preserve of the agrarian Junkers, and during the empire they continued, by and large, to supply officers to the army. But selected members of the middle class were now given the privilege of participating in the "highest pride of the nation" by becoming reserve officers. So great was the status value that many middle-class fathers impoverished themselves to get their sons into the reserve of a prestigious regiment and thus to become a "privileged man" (*Vornehmer Mann*). No liberals or Jews or other "unreliable elements" were permitted to enter.

The attitude of civilians to reserve officers was given classical expression in Zuckmayer's play *Der Hauptmann von Köpenick*. The hero listens with approval to a tailor's observation:

Na, so you have managed to become a Reserve Lieutenant—that is the chief thing—that is the thing you must be these days—socially, professionally, in every connection! The doctorate is the visiting card, but the Reserve Commission is the open door—that's the essential thing these days!¹¹²

Two incidents in the lives of distinguished Germans illustrate the importance to them of a reserve officer's commission. A professor who was to be given a high honor on the occasion of his 75th birthday was asked what gift would give him the most pleasure. It was supposed that he would wish to attain the rank of privy counselor (*Wirklicher Geheimrat*), a position that carried the title of "Excellency" and the highest civil distinction of the time. But the professor had no such honor in mind. The learned old gentleman wanted above all to be promoted from first lieutenant to captain in the Army Reserve. In the second case, the chancellor of Germany, Bethmann-Hollweg, thought it appropriate to don his uniform of reserve major in making his first appearance before the parliament of his country. These, and many other civilians, were showing that a staff officer of the Imperial Army was quite correct in observing that "militarism is the state of mind of the civilian."¹¹³

A contrast in political and social attitudes between England and Germany is suggested in the different classes each nation tended to emulate. The English aristocracy and royalty of the 19th century adopted the standards and manners of the middle class. Victoria became the "British Empire's number one bourgeoisie," and her son Edward was as *bürgerlich* as he could possibly be. In Germany, however, the middle class enjoyed no such pride of place or self-confidence. They

The Past As Prologue: Hitler and

sought their social norms (Army and the Junker aristocracy).

The Imperial Army's in values to include foreign power "they alone had the right topire."¹¹⁴ The military elite 1917 when Generals Ludendorff and Hindenburg seized military dictatorship. Ludendorff's power he would later transfer to Hitler in their effort to seize the determined foreign policy the Soviet Union; he dismissed the determined wages and honor tourage. In short, "the Army, the State."¹¹⁵ But the Army's a general precedent for authoritarian Command wanted a particularly so distinctly proto-Fascist that important segments of German society.

This military dictatorship of Bismarck's Second Reich for the more vicious militarism.

Family Life and Education

Family life and public shaping the attitudes of men born and raised at the zenith of the Great War and form a legacy bequeathed particularly to those generations of the uprooted and displaced.

The family experience of Adolf Hitler's. An authoritarian mother, like Klara Hitler, was often trying ineffectively to suppress the punishments of the awe-inspiring

¹¹⁰ Specifically, leaders of the primitive nationalism, and leader of the authoritarian state in the name of Volk, appealed to the masses but preserved the state. (See especially Martin Kitchen, *Ideology: The Political Ideas of Hitler*, 8 (September 1975), 216.

1890s

Geli
Raubal
+ the V.D.They
could
see
the
placeV.D. Do
you
think
that's
fair.Geli!
Not for
you, but
for them,
it's fair.

They want to get ahead

294
V.D. what if you were married to me,
Geli! then you could know that I love you
alot because that other things would
certainly be in our way.

See
Jehynga
19

1930 ~~1935~~ 1932
HITLER'S VIENNA ~~The Jew Frank
is emigrating.~~

stories like this, Frank tried to explain Hitler's hatred of the Jews as the result of a condition he called "psychotic hatred of one's relatives due to a rebellion of one's blood."

To be sure, around 1830 there were no Jews living in Graz. After the expulsion of the Jewish community around 1500 under Maximilian I, the Styrian estates successfully blocked new Jewish settlements. Under Joseph II, in the late eighteenth century, Jews were again allowed to visit Graz, but only during the market season and for no longer than twenty-four hours at a time. Not until the passing of the basic laws of 1849 were Jews finally allowed to settle in Styria. From 1856 on Graz's Jewish community kept a community register.

Furthermore, during the period in question, in 1836-37, there was no family in Graz by the name of Frankenberger, not even a non-Jewish one. To be sure, there were families by the name of Schicklgruber, but neither a Maria Anna nor an Anna Maria.²¹⁴ The supposedly compromising correspondence never turned up, and no one ever mentioned it. Neither were there any indications ever for child-support payments to the child's mother, who after all gave the boy to her brother-in-law after she got married, lived in poverty, and died when Alois was ten. And, most important, there is not the slightest indication that Maria Anna Schicklgruber ever left Waldviertel. Accepting employment in faraway Graz would have constituted an extraordinary step, which certainly would not have remained unnoticed within the Waldviertel circle of relatives. Migrating workers from Waldviertel typically went to Vienna, which is sixty miles away, or Linz, which is even closer, but hardly to Graz, which is twice as far away, beyond the Semmering. This would have been particularly unusual for maids, who around 1830 traveled on foot.

When her son was born, dirt-poor Maria Anna Schicklgruber was already forty-one years of age—which was considered rather old in the nineteenth century—and surely not exactly what people could afford in some rich houses: a young, poor, and, considering the danger of infection, if possible innocent maid from the country who was supposed to introduce the son of the household to "love"—and who then would not be able to fend off the other members of the family either. Furthermore, Frank displayed such ignorance about Hitler's family relations that it is hard to believe Hitler was his source of information.

But now let us turn to Hitler's blackmailing relative, who supposedly was the reason for his desire to find out what happened. This must clearly be William Patrick Hitler, born in 1911, the son of an Irish mother and Hitler's half-brother Alois Jr. Shortly after the birth of the child, Alois disappeared—making his wife and child believe for years that he was

FROM THE PROVVI

dead—and remarried in Germany bigamy.

When Hitler became famous not know, saw their chance to make papers in England as "Hitler's real had nineteen-year-old Patrick, who in Munich, where he told him and them to do things like that. He is should not believe they could be oots!" he was quoted to have shout carefully I have always kept my pi the press! People must not know I'm from and who my family is. I word to come out about these this sudden there's a nephew! A nephew will sic snoopers on the tracks of. 1939 Patrick Hitler even said that his anger shed tears.²¹⁵

Later Hitler tried to deny that a criminal record. He said that Alo orphan raised by the family. Yet tism as proof, according to which I wife of Alois Hitler Sr., who had

There was no getting rid of F Patrick traveled to Berlin to ask father's certificate of baptism sufficient as blackmail, pay. I gave him money, but he left no familial relations.

After almost six years in Berlin uary 1939, shedding any restraint thin content, his interviews cre: "Why I Hate My Uncle,"²¹⁷ and emigrated to the United States, w tours about his "Uncle Adolf." Pat her "private war against the Hitler so after the war started.²¹⁸

None of these interviews eve father. How much money Patrick: story! In an interview with the Se nephew also vehemently denied

* debates which
to dissolve

19mc
Drop the
Jewings
family
until
Frank
comes
to the house
conclusion
as Hitler
to keep
Hitler
the book.

D.K.
If it would be asked why I did not immediately disabuse our Adolf of what Frank was doing to him, he it understood that we have recurring difficulties with the input of our human minds in another, like an spirit after all, and they are materials. Often, if the timing of our insinuation is not precise and comely, we can for such periods feel as if we are upon rocks. That is why the D.K. gave the brain its mechanism.

for discussion. I suspect we are left wondering from which when people with a long history of obsession. Curious time, but we can't read the book but they say you are a Jew. to as personality. I saw poor Adolf unable to buy a house.

late 1930

the most serious speculation about Hitler's supposed Jewish background has occurred since the Second World War, and is directly traceable to the memoirs of the leading Nazi lawyer and Governor General of Poland, Hans Frank, dictated in his Nuremberg cell while awaiting the hangman.

Frank claimed that he had been called in by Hitler towards the end of 1930 and shown a letter from his nephew William Patrick Hitler (the son of his half-brother Alois, who had been briefly married to an Irish woman) threatening, in connection with the press stories circulating about Hitler's background, to expose the fact that Hitler had Jewish blood flowing in his veins. Allegedly commissioned by Hitler to look into his family history, Frank reportedly discovered that Maria Anna Schicklgruber had given birth to her child while serving as a cook in the home of a Jewish family called Frankenberger in Graz. Not only that: Frankenberger senior had reputedly paid regular instalments to support the child on behalf of his son, around nineteen years old at the birth, until the child's fourteenth birthday. Letters were allegedly exchanged for years between Maria Anna Schicklgruber and the Frankenbergers. According to Frank, Hitler declared that he knew, from what his father and grandmother had said, that his grandfather was not the Jew from Graz, but because his grandmother and her subsequent husband were so poor they had conned the Jew into believing he was the father and into paying for the boy's support.²⁴

Frank's story gained wide circulation in the 1950s.²⁵ But it simply does not stand up. There was no Jewish family called Frankenberger in Graz during the 1830s. In fact, there were no Jews at all in the whole of Styria at the time, since Jews were not permitted in that part of Austria until the 1860s. A family named Frankenreiter did live there, but was not Jewish. There is no evidence that Maria Anna was ever in Graz, let alone was employed by the butcher Leopold Frankenreiter. No correspondence between Maria Anna and a family called Frankenberger or Frankenreiter has ever turned up. The son of Leopold Frankenreiter and alleged father of the baby (according to Frank's story and accepting that he had merely confused names) for whom Frankenreiter was seemingly prepared to pay child support for thirteen years was ten years old at the time of Alois's birth. The Frankenreiter family had moreover hit upon such hard times that payment of any support to Maria Anna Schicklgruber would have been inconceivable.²⁶ Equally lacking in credibility is Frank's comment that Hitler had learnt from his grandmother that there was no truth in the Graz story: his grandmother had been dead for over forty years at the time of Hitler's birth. And whether in fact Hitler received a blackmail letter from his nephew in 1930

is also doubtful. If such was the case, a nuisance of himself by scrounging to survive the next few years which he had to be able to leave the country 'revelations', when they came in a lifetime nothing about the Graz story.²⁸ Ninquiries into Hitler's family background any reference to the alleged Graz birth new skeletons in the cupboard. However when he was waiting for the hangman's crisis,³⁰ are full of inaccuracies and regard to the story of Hitler's alleged grandfather, whoever he was.

The only serious contenders for it therefore, Johann Georg Hiedler and The official version always declared just The evidence is insufficient to know though there is no firm reason to believe Georg Hiedler.³² In any case, as regards were Nepomuk his grandfather, the more incestuous than if his grandfather was also the grandfather of Adolf

Klara Pölzl, who was to become Adolf's only three surviving children out of and Theresia - from the marriage of Hüttler, with Johann Baptist Pölzl, also grew up on the adjacent farm to their mother, Johanna, and her aunt Maria Alois Schicklgruber in Nepomuk's name and legitimization in 1876, also cousins. In 1876, aged sixteen, Klara moved to Braunau am Inn to join the

By this time, Alois was a well-respected personal affairs were, however, less so eventually marry three times, first then to women young enough to be his last two marriages would give him die in infancy. It was a private life for a provincial customs officer.³⁶ H

Chosen average men in positions of mastery. That is the meaning of the S.S., which represents the model of National Socialist education. These men are not—and are not supposed to be—great individuals, but 'good material' for the fabrication of a race, as Chamberlain put it. Therefore, their 'honor is loyalty'; that is, obedience toward the few who really rule and lead. 'Few flames burn in Germany,' Goebbels once said of these top personalities, naturally counting himself among them; 'the rest are only illumined by their glow'—he wrote these words of contempt in his diary after returning from a meeting of party officials (1932), where he had seen the good material assembled.

The S.S. was stamped forever by the reason for its founding: Hitler's need to control an undisciplined party by founding a new party. The National Socialist despises his fellow-Germans, the S.A. man the other National Socialists, the S.S. man the S.A. men. His task is to supervise and spy on the whole party for his leader. The first service code of the S.S. lists among its tasks, protection of the Führer, a promotion of understanding within the ranks; information service. The last two terms mean espionage within and outside the party.

1930 In 1930, Hitler surprised a circle of his friends by asking them if they had read the just-published autobiography of Leon Trotsky, the great Jewish leader of the Russian Revolution, and what they thought of it. As might have been expected, the answer was: 'Yes . . . loathsome book . . . memoirs of Satan. . . .' To which Hitler replied: 'Loathsome? Brilliant! I have learned a great deal from it, and so can you.' Himmler, however, remarked that he had not only read Trotsky but studied all available literature about the political police in Russia, the Tsarist Ochrana, the Bolshevik Cheka and G.P.U.; and he believed that if such a task should ever fall to his lot, he could perform it better than the Russians.

With this in mind he drilled his troop, imbued it with his Führer's arrogance and contempt of humanity, thus arming its men with the moral force to massacre their own people as well as foreigners, and to regard this as absolutely necessary. At a time when the party still meant nothing, Himmler's service regulations ordered that once a month at least the men must attend a confi-

dential local party meeting; at these meetings nor leave the room like common mortals, and part in the discussion; for 'the nobility keep material does not discuss, but only obeys and c sibility upward, in command downward,' as finest and most venomous flower of his conte the contempt of their own person that is e material: not only ruthless struggle to the d grave failure, suicide.

positions of mastery. That is the meaning of the model of National Socialist education—and are not supposed to be—great material for the fabrication of a race, as before, their 'honor is loyalty'; that is, obedience, really rule and lead. 'Few flames burn in the said of these top personalities, nurturing them; the rest are only illumined by the words of contempt in his diary after the of party officials (1932), where he had stumbled.

forever by the reason for its founding: an undisciplined party by founding a new nationalist despises his fellow-Germans, the National Socialists, the S.S. man the S.A. advise and spy on the whole party for the code of the S.S. lists among its tasks, promotion of understanding within the party. The last two terms mean espionage

by a circle of his friends by asking them published autobiography of Leon Trotzky, the Russian Revolution, and what they have been expected, the answer was: 'Yes, memoirs of Satan. . . . To which Hitler answered! I have learned a great deal from him, however, remarked that he had not studied all available literature about the Tsarist Ochrana, the Bolshevik Cheka and that if such a task should ever fall to better than the Russians.

drilled his troop, imbued it with his contempt of humanity, thus arming its to massacre their own people as well as his as absolutely necessary. At a time nothing, Himmler's service regulations at least the men must attend a confi-

dential local party meeting; at these meetings they must not smoke nor leave the room like common mortals, and above all never take part in the discussion; for 'the nobility keeps silence.' The good material does not discuss, but only obeys and commands, 'in responsibility upward, in command downward,' as Hitler put it. The finest and most venomous flower of his contempt for humanity is the contempt of their own person that is expected of the good material: not only ruthless struggle to the death, but, in case of grave failure, suicide.

1930

?

names each year, but with all their baptism they have remained in reality circumsised.' When the laughter had died down, he continued, 'Parties cannot save Germany, but only a man—the unknown soldier of the World War.'

The great day had dawned for the uprooted, unbalanced men who had no other occupation than addressing the masses in smoky beer halls; who had lost their normal livelihood, sold their businesses, given up their jobs; who bore no responsibility in public life and felt responsible for nothing. They had become more than a type; they were a marching, blackjack-swinging machine. 'If today in Germany a question arises,' said Hitler, 'I never have to speak with my editor-in-chief, my collaborators or my *gauleiters*, for tomorrow this question will be answered in the same way by dozens of party speakers. Philosophy as the granite foundation of thought forces them to the same conclusions'—the inevitable conclusion that the Jews are to blame for everything.

How profoundly the state of mind of the German people had changed by 1930 can be seen in the sharp curve described by the barometer of National Socialist propaganda. All the sage plans for coming to power as a minority were forgotten. Resistance to parliament suddenly ceased. The contemptuous speeches about the broad mass of zeros died down. Instead, the party's election proclamation ran: 'We shall overthrow the present parliamentary régime of the destroyers of our people in a legal way with legal means, through the soundness of our idea. . . .'

In 1930, the great political vision of the Wise Men of Zion was fulfilled in Germany. 'We know,' said Hitler on July 27, 1930, to the party leaders assembled in Munich, 'that no election can finally decide the fate of the nation. It is not parliamentary majorities that decide the fate of nations—they can destroy nations. But we know that in these elections democracy must be destroyed with the weapons of democracy.'

Formerly he had hoped to subdue the German people with the help of the Reichswehr; the fact was that the Reichswehr, led by Wilhelm Groener, did not accept National Socialists in its ranks. But Hitler now saw his great democratic star rising in the political sky, and he began to speculate on the idea that his Brown Shirts

with the help of the German people could su This he proved to himself and his audience with none too accurate figures:

'Herr Groener can do what he likes. We Herr Groener need only reckon: In 1919 we were sixty-four; in 1921, three thousand; in 1922 1923, thirty thousand.' Then came the moment fully announce: 'In 1925 we were again one thousand; in 1927, over forty thousand; in 1929, over a hundred and twenty thousand; we are over two hundred thousand. Herr Groener will be five hundred and six hundred thousand, when a radiant Brown majority will enter the Herr Groener: at Philippi we shall meet again.'

For years Hitler himself had not understood be conquered by democracy; small wonder or less faithful never understood it. They continuation of the revolutionary course. I complainants summarily out of the party, head. Strasser and his supporters had long 'legal' course; when the conflict grew serious, usually happens in such cases, left him in the elder brother Gregor, who felt himself excluded undesired adventures by the undisciplined 'drugstore,' said Gregor; 'and put all my money am now dependent on my Reichstag mandate my mandate, it's all over.' In an open letter Strasser a 'parlor Bolshevik'; his adherents uprooted literati, political boy scouts.' 'We went on, 'and anyone who doesn't like the movement as laid down by me should not should get out of it.' Then he commanded to throw Otto Strasser and his supporters 'ruthless' ception out of the party' (July 4, 1930), which greatest pleasure. Otto Strasser's supporters claimed, to be sure, that he was the true Hitler had betrayed National Socialism, and

their baptism they have remained. So the laughter had died down, he continued, many, but only a man—the unobtainable.

For the uprooted, unbalanced men, man addressing the masses in smoky normal livelihood, sold their business bore no responsibility in public life. They had become more than a rickshaw-swinging machine. 'If today,' said Hitler, 'I never have to speak collaborators or my *gauleiters*, for to answer in the same way by dozens is the granite foundation of thought'—the inevitable conclusion that thing.

Of mind of the German people had the sharp curve described by the propaganda. All the sage plans for were forgotten. Resistance to par: contemptuous speeches about the. Instead, the party's election proclamation the present parliamentary régime in a legal way with legal means, idea. . . .

vision of the Wise Men of Zion was v,' said Hitler on July 27, 1930, to the Munich, 'that no election can finally t is not parliamentary majorities that they can destroy nations. But we democracy must be destroyed with the

subdue the German people with the act was that the Reichswehr, led by cept National Socialists in its ranks. democratic star rising in the political e on the idea that his Brown Shirts

with the help of the German people could subdue the Reichswehr. This he proved to himself and his audience with impressive, though none too accurate figures:

'Herr Groener can do what he likes. We do not need a *putsch*. Herr Groener need only reckon: In 1919 we were seven men; in 1920, sixty-four; in 1921, three thousand; in 1922, seven thousand; in 1923, thirty thousand.' Then came the moment when he could joyfully announce: 'In 1925 we were again one man. In 1926, seventeen thousand; in 1927, over forty thousand; in 1928, over sixty thousand; in 1929, over a hundred and twenty thousand; today (March, 1930), we are over two hundred thousand. Herr Groener, in two years we will be five hundred and six hundred thousand. And a time will come when a radiant Brown majority will enter the Reichstag, and then, Herr Groener: at Philippi we shall meet again!'

For years Hitler himself had not understood that democracy must be conquered by democracy; small wonder that some of his more or less faithful never understood it. They grumbled, demanded continuation of the revolutionary course. Hitler threw the chief complainants summarily out of the party, Otto Strasser at their head. Strasser and his supporters had long opposed the party's 'legal' course; when the conflict grew serious, most of his friends, as usually happens in such cases, left him in the lurch, including his elder brother Gregor, who felt himself exposed and drawn into undesired adventures by the undisciplined Otto. 'I have sold my drugstore,' said Gregor; 'and put all my money into the party. I am now dependent on my Reichstag mandate; if Hitler takes away my mandate, it's all over.' In an open letter Hitler called Otto Strasser a 'parlor Bolshevik'; his adherents were 'doctrinaire fools, uprooted literati, political boy scouts.' 'We founded the party,' he went on, 'and anyone who doesn't like the essential content of the movement as laid down by me should not enter the movement or should get out of it.' Then he commanded his faithful Goebbels to throw Otto Strasser and his supporters 'ruthlessly and without exception out of the party' (July 4, 1930), which Goebbels did with the greatest pleasure. Otto Strasser's supporters were but few; he claimed, to be sure, that he was the true National Socialist, that Hitler had betrayed National Socialism, and he attempted to set

1930

?

their baptism they have remained
the laughter had died down, he con-
te rmany, but only a man—the un-
ob ar.

for the uprooted, unbalanced men
ian addressing the masses in smoky
normal livelihood, sold their busi-
u bore no responsibility in public life
h g. They had become more than a
c g. They had become more than a
c kjack-swinging machine. 'If today
said Hitler, 'I never have to speak
laborators or my *gauleiters*, for to-
answered in the same way by dozens
s the granite foundation of thought
ons—the inevitable conclusion that
thing.

f mind of the German people had
n the sharp curve described by the
propaganda. All the sage plans for
were forgotten. Resistance to par-
contemptuous speeches about the
. Instead, the party's election procla-
w the present parliamentary régime
e in a legal way with legal means,
idea. . . .

ision of the Wise Men of Zion was
v,' said Hitler on July 27, 1930, to the
unich, 'that no election can finally
t is not parliamentary majorities that
they can destroy nations. But we
mocracy must be destroyed with the

subdue the German people with the
act was that the Reichswehr, led by
cept National Socialists in its ranks.
democratic star rising in the political
e on the idea that his Brown Shirts

with the help of the German people could subdue the Reichswehr.
This he proved to himself and his audience with impressive, though
none too accurate figures:

'Herr Groener can do what he likes. We do not need a *putsch*.
Herr Groener need only reckon: In 1919 we were seven men; in 1920,
sixty-four; in 1921, three thousand; in 1922, seven thousand; in
1923, thirty thousand.' Then came the moment when he could joy-
fully announce: 'In 1925 we were again one man. In 1926, seventeen
thousand; in 1927, over forty thousand; in 1928, over sixty thousand;
in 1929, over a hundred and twenty thousand; today (March, 1930),
we are over two hundred thousand. Herr Groener, in two years we
will be five hundred and six hundred thousand. And a time will come
when a radiant Brown majority will enter the Reichstag, and then,
Herr Groener: at Philippi we shall meet again!'

For years Hitler himself had not understood that democracy must
be conquered by democracy; small wonder that some of his more
or less faithful never understood it. They grumbled, demanded
continuation of the revolutionary course. Hitler threw the chief
complainants summarily out of the party, Otto Strasser at their
head. Strasser and his supporters had long opposed the party's
'legal' course; when the conflict grew serious, most of his friends, as
usually happens in such cases, left him in the lurch, including his
elder brother Gregor, who felt himself exposed and drawn into
undesired adventures by the undisciplined Otto. 'I have sold my
drugstore,' said Gregor; 'and put all my money into the party. I
am now dependent on my Reichstag mandate; if Hitler takes away
my mandate, it's all over.' In an open letter Hitler called Otto
Strasser a 'parlor Bolshevik'; his adherents were 'doctrinaire fools,
uprooted literati, political boy scouts.' 'We founded the party,' he
went on, 'and anyone who doesn't like the essential content of the
movement as laid down by me should not enter the movement or
should get out of it.' Then he commanded his faithful Goebbels to
throw Otto Strasser and his supporters 'ruthlessly and without ex-
ception out of the party' (July 4, 1930), which Goebbels did with the
greatest pleasure. Otto Strasser's supporters were but few; he
claimed, to be sure, that he was the true National Socialist, that
Hitler had betrayed National Socialism, and he attempted to set

1930
?

Socialist Party. But the attempt failed, his ter group; Otto Strasser's daily degenerated cbbels was able to develop his weekly *Angriff*

ebbellion of the Berlin S.A. shortly before the ul were primarily concerned about money; they had not been put forward as Reichstag 'ospect of a monthly salary amounting to six ts. For the first time, Himmler's Black S.S. A., but were so badly beaten that they had r help. Hitler rushed to Berlin, drove from nd even burst into tears to melt the hardened shirts. As a weightier argument he poured g the whole party to a 'special tax' for the e for the misunderstanding between himself leaders, who had forced themselves between Never had there been so glowing an oppor- ie Brown Shirts. Pfeffer was deposed and med supreme command of his private army, de: Oberster S.A. Führer (Supreme S.A. s 'Osaf.'

A. leader now showed the shaken bourgeois party of Hugenberg, what it meant to be , Hitler's propaganda seemed directed against nst the Social Democrats, and finally against y. But even the most sensational, brutal, well- had astonishingly little effect against these ons, and the figures show that the adherents and the Center stood firmly by their parties. 30, the nationalist groups, especially Hugeno- nals, wedged in between democratic and rties, became chaff, and this chaff flew to

red in 1930 was no hysterical crash as in 1923. ched slowly like an inexorable doom, gripping ost before their outward circumstances. It ls lles between the rising economic distress and

the increase in Hitler's adherents. In autumn, 1929, when Hitler was emerging from the years of defeat and preparing the 'popular decision' against the Young Plan, a German miner earned an average of 602 marks in a quarter of a year (third quarter, 1929). Hitler was still of little importance. A year later, the miner's wage had gone down to 548 marks, and Hitler achieved his first great electoral success; one more year and the miner's pay had dwindled to 497 marks, and Hitler's vote increased. We shall see that Hitler's strength began to fall off as soon as wages started to rise a little.

Some observers maintain that Hitler's successes were, in part at least, due to the enormous financial aid given him by German and foreign capital. Actually the funds were attracted by success, rather than the other way around. There is also a widespread theory that the petty bourgeoisie, ruined by 'monopoly capital,' 'dispossessed' and reduced to a proletarian condition they themselves did not understand, created the pseudo-revolutionary solution of fascism. It is true that this class fought a desperate struggle against its doom; but the class was already vanishing, while other allegiances and lines of demarcation were developing.

In 1930, 4,600,000 new German voters went to the polls; most of these were young people, a new mass in the life of the nation. With these young people came a new human type; the man who could not and did not want to be counted among any definite social class. This youth had not lost its class like the lieutenants of 1919; it had never had a class. Those born in 1910 and later came of age at a time when work was rare, when the crisis had thrown millions out on the streets; the youngest, in particular, found virtually no jobs. The young man, beginning his adult life without work and remaining unemployed for years, became perhaps the most heart-breaking of social types. Between fourteen and seventeen he may have learned a trade, or he may have studied until twenty-two if his parents had the means; in both cases there was great possibility that he would then begin to vegetate without work or hope, or, if he was employed, that his wages would be less than he needed to live. These young people had frequently grown up in families which had fallen from one catastrophe into another; the father had often been killed in the war, the mother found herself unable to

1930

7

support the children and had no authority over them. From such families the youth could get no view of life, no traditional class conceptions. The best that this youth could derive from its situation was a radical will to get ahead, which in many turned into criminality, in most into a demand for new group loyalties, often into both. In a song that became very popular after 1930, this generation boasted of being 'shameless to the testicles,' and 'even if the shopkeepers and cynics laugh at us, our sun does not go down'; this song, it goes without saying, was taken over by the S.A.

These young people of 1930 contributed a great mass inclined to fuse with the human type we have encountered since 1919 in the murderers' army. It would be absolutely false to say that they brought with them the bulk of German youth, but surely an appreciable proportion. At all events, it is here, in the cynicism of this youth, and not in the rage of the 'dispossessed petty bourgeois,' that we must seek the origin of the human type which later buried their fellow men alive in stone coffins, struck out their eyes, shot them down by the score. Material misery doubtless helped to release this barbarism; but since such barbarism is frequent in history, though comparatively rare in the last hundred years, it can scarcely be derived from the social structure of the last century; and no one will seriously try to explain the philosophy and behavior of an S.S. man by the fact that the S.S. man is a baker or stationer. The whole popular concept of class is an intellectual left-over from a period when men were confined to distinct occupations or groups all their lives and often for generations on end.

The type which came to the fore in 1930 was rapidly departing from the old class concepts. He was led by the declassed of *all* classes, the armed bohemians. The worn-out occupational and class concepts had concealed the decisive phenomenon, a new human type, which now revealed himself in a brown or a black shirt, with pistol, club, and torture chamber: the armed intellectual. This total disregard of humanity is born not from bloodthirstiness, but from cold calculation—for the vilest horrors of this age have been perpetrated out of cold intellectual calculation and not out of bestial cruelty.

In this era of general failure, in which the state became all-power-

ful and yet accomplished nothing except to halve property holdings, to destroy lively the ideal state of the intellectuals was the state, 'on accomplishment, on energy.'

In the technological sphere, the war dan and Germany's technical apparatus was act the war. But the social apparatus was del unable to administer the new technology. tion of 1930 no longer recognized and acc the part of the state. That is the great devel place in Germany. It was natural that unk be active in bringing it about; that it shoul from the Viennese lodging-house, this N drawing all the problems and passions of the suction of an empty personality—this for Germany, and not only for Germany. was foreseen that the great achievements o would some day have to be utilized mori tributed more justly; the time for this was class, through an arduous process of edu into a position of intellectual leadership. process of transformation was introduced its consequences, that the armed human years were first to take possession of the many people to the great aspects of our c evitable. Great progress begins with abus have often been the pioneers of civilizatio

Men sought new faith, some sought nev through Germany in August and Septe eyes, saw the landslide coming. But to t government, to Schleicher, to Brüning, to an unexpected blow when, on the eve turned out that Hitler had obtained a si 6,400,000, or a hundred and seven seats in spread the rumor that a march of the S.A. pected at any hour. Stocks fell sharply and other foreign creditors began to call

the catastrophe which he had so

of the Fascist Party wrote that Germany national rebirth'; Hitler was 'a men's souls.' The young people of o further use for the principles of elves liberalism, democracy, and *Popolo d'Italia*, was not entirely h of responsibility for Hitler: their reaties, the reinforcement of the e, the hopeless defeat of the Left weakened the position of the Left

Hitler's victory came from England. England's biggest newspaper, the d spoke with Hitler, who was ex- of the late 'Jew Northcliffe.' The : he had found Europe's man of ich appeared simultaneously in the *Beobachter*. It runs in part (re-

y the shift of political power to the at it has all sorts of political advan- a reinforced wall against Bolshevism. er that the Soviet campaign against dvance to Germany and thus achieve ic strategic center of Europe. . . . If National Socialists had not worked was a great likelihood that the cause mportant progress and that this party e strongest party. . . . Enlightened ce should therefore give the National the services which they have per- Under Hitler's supervision, German ainst the corruption of Communism. n founding the United Empire Party ce the best thing for the welfare of any were to have a government, im-

bued with the same healthy principles by which Mussolini in the last eight years has renewed Italy. And I see no need for Great Britain and France to maintain an unfriendly attitude toward the efforts of the National Socialists in the field of foreign affairs. Their complaint that Germany, alone among the Great Powers, is disarmed, has just grounds. In Part Five of the Versailles Pact, the Allies obligate themselves to gradual disarmament. The disarmament of Germany was intended only as a prelude to a general renunciation of military power. While the German armed forces have been limited to a hundred thousand men and a few ships for coastal defense, Germany's neighbors have steadily increased their armaments. To subject a solid mass of more than seventy million patriotic and extremely able men and women in the real center of Europe to such a lasting sense of bitter injustice, is like opening the gascock in a sealed room. Sooner or later there must be an explosion. In their own interests the Allied Powers should open the tightly sealed windows behind which German rancor is gathering. . . .

On October 23 of the same year, Mussolini addressed the assembled leadership of the Fascist Party in the Palazzo Venezia in Rome. He referred to the statement once attributed to him that fascism was not an 'article of export.' Such words, he declared, were 'too banal' for him; they betrayed the style of the commercial press and were therefore not by him: '*La frase che il fascismo non e merce d'esportazione, non e mia*,' though this very phrase may be found in Volume VI of his collected writings and speeches. Well, at any rate, he would now correct it. Today, he declared, fascism was 'the order of the day in all countries'; in detail, to be sure, it was Italian, but in its ideas, doctrine, realization, it was universal; it could, therefore, be foreseen that in the future all Europe would solve the problem of the modern state in a fascist sense; it would be a Europe with institutions inspired by the theory and practice of fascism; it would be '*una Europa fascista*.'

1930

7.

coming British-American War, or—each year anew—the imminent collapse of Soviet Russia; whether he was flaying the 'Jewish' banking system of the United States, reviling his future friend Lord Rothermere as a Jew, or venturing the prophecy that France would never evacuate the Rhineland—he was always conspicuous for his hostility to hard facts, his fear of checkable details; and he has still to make a speech adducing names, places, dates, or literal quotations in any factual controversy. Occasionally, in the responsible post of Chancellor, he has sensed this deficiency and attempted to prove a point with heaps of figures, mostly referring to the economic successes of his régime. Anyone with even the slightest statistical experience can observe that Hitler does not understand his own algebra, and certainly never studied his own figures. The lack of demonstrable reality in nearly all his utterances permits us to characterize the unquestionable intellectual power which carried him so far and so high as a stream in which all substance is pulverized.

1930
No, he will not founder on the cliffs of reality. Something which may be called instinct will almost always indicate to him the facts which he can calmly neglect, spring over, disregard, without disturbing his course. But should he ever encounter a state of affairs over which it is impossible to glide with lifted oars, should a really obstructing problem ever appear in his path, he will adapt himself to this unexpected resistance with such a power of self-transformation that his closest friends will hardly recognize him. This happened, for example, in 1930, when he suddenly developed an enthusiasm for legality and democracy in Germany, and in 1933, when he became a peace enthusiast in world affairs.

Hitler's indifference to facts which he does not regard as vitally important explains his strange relation to books. He does not allow them to instruct him, but only to confirm his opinions. He has given us his ideas on how books should be read: Do not read too much, for that will only give you useless ballast; this kind of learning only removes you from the world. Feeling, however, enables the expert reader 'to perceive at once everything which in his opinion is fit to be permanently retained as expedient or generally worth knowing.' The material read 'is meaningfully fitted into the

picture, which is somehow always present in advance of the mind has created with regard to this or that.

The purpose of books is to say yes. As a young man in his own story, he began to read the 'main document'. Let us suppose he was referring to Karl Marx's *Capital*: 'If I arrived at my goal more rapidly than I at first have dared to think, it was solely due to my lack of thought at that time not yet very profound, knowledge of the question. It alone enabled me to draw a practical line between reality and the theoretical boasting of the Social Democracy, since it had taught me to speak the language of the Jewish people, who talk to hide, and whose thoughts, and whose real aim is therefore not the lines, but slumbers well hidden between them.'

In other words, after reading a few dozen pages he closed the thick volume forever. But there is a grain of truth in what he treated other books, more important for him, in his own story. He virtually never quotes a single word from a classic. He cited a few sentences from Clausewitz, the military genius, but these were often printed in cheap little pamphlets. In a period of twenty years he only once has recourse to Germany's greatest author, Goethe, and then on an anti-Semitic passage in which Goethe rejects mixture between Christians and Jews—it seems certain that it was gleaned from some anti-Semitic tract, and not from Goethe's works. 'You would be astonished,' said a man who knew Adolf Hitler's library. 'Whole walls full of the books. And all of them unread.' He could not find time to look at Rosenberg's important and dangerous manifesto, 'The Bomb', sight unseen, hoping that not a word was wrong.

Years later, a Polish journalist, by way of testing Hitler, asked him frankly: 'What great minds of the past have had a decisive influence on Your Excellency in an intellectual matter?' Hitler replied: 'It is hard to list the number of those great minds of the past which have furnished fertilizing contributions to my ideas. Our whole body of views arises in overwhelming

merican War, or—each year anew—the im-
Soviet Russia; whether he was slaying the
tem of the United States, reviling his future
ere as a Jew, or venturing the prophecy that
evacuate the Rhineland—he was always con-
fidence to hard facts, his fear of checkable de-
ficiency to make a speech adducing names, places,
figures in any factual controversy. Occasionally,
as of Chancellor, he has sensed this deficiency
above a point with heaps of figures, mostly re-
cent successes of his régime. Anyone with even
little experience can observe that Hitler does not
do algebra, and certainly never studied his own
demonstrable reality in nearly all his utter-
ances, characterize the unquestionable intellectual
level of him so far and so high as a stream in which
he is eroded.

under on the cliffs of reality. Something which
he will almost always indicate to him the facts
which neglect, spring over, disregard, without dis-
cussion. But should he ever encounter a state of affairs
impossible to glide with lifted oars, should a really
new thing ever appear in his path, he will adapt himself
with assistance with such a power of self-transformation
that his friends will hardly recognize him. This hap-
pened in 1930, when he suddenly developed an en-
thusiasm for democracy in Germany, and in 1933, when
he was an enthusiast in world affairs.

He goes to facts which he does not regard as vitally
important, his strange relation to books. He does not allow
himself, but only to confirm his opinions. He has
no idea how books should be read: Do not read too
much, only give you useless ballast; this kind of learn-
ing from the world. Feeling, however, enables
him to perceive at once everything which in his
mind is permanently retained as expedient or generally
useful material read 'is meaningfully fitted into the

picture, which is somehow always present in advance, and which
the mind has created with regard to this or that matter.'

The purpose of books is to say yes. As a young man, according to
his own story, he began to read the 'main documents' of Marxism.
Let us suppose he was referring to Karl Marx's monumental
Capital: 'If I arrived at my goal more rapidly than I myself may
at first have dared to think, it was solely due to my newly acquired,
though at that time not yet very profound, knowledge of the Jewish
question. It alone enabled me to draw a practical comparison be-
tween reality and the theoretical boasting of the founding fathers
of Social Democracy, since it had taught me to understand the
language of the Jewish people, who talk to hide, or at least to veil,
their thoughts, and whose real aim is therefore not to be found in
the lines, but slumbers well hidden between them.'

In other words, after reading a few dozen pages at most, he
closed the thick volume forever. But there is a grave suspicion that
he treated other books, more important for him, in the same way.
He virtually never quotes a single word from a classic author. Once
he cited a few sentences from Clausewitz, the military theoretician,
but these were often printed in cheap little pamphlets. Over a
period of twenty years he only once has recourse to the authority of
Germany's greatest author, Goethe, and then only to quote an
anti-Semitic passage in which Goethe rejects mixed marriage be-
tween Christians and Jews—it seems certain that this treasure was
gleaned from some anti-Semitic tract, and not from the original.
'You would be astonished,' said a man who knew him well, 'to see
Adolf Hitler's library. Whole walls full of the most beautiful
books. And all of them unread.' He could not force himself to
look at Rosenberg's important and dangerous manuscript; he re-
leased the bomb, sight unseen, hoping that nothing would go
wrong.

Years later, a Polish journalist, by way of testing his learning,
asked him frankly: 'What great minds of the past have exerted a
decisive influence on Your Excellency in an intellectual sense?'
Hitler replied: 'It is hard to list the number of those minds in the
past which have furnished fertilizing contributions to every great
idea. Our whole body of views arises in overwhelming part from:

1920

?

1930

?

the results of the intellectual work of the past, and in smaller part on the basis of our own discoveries. The decisive factor is only to organize the intellectual heritage handed down by the great minds of former times in a sensible, expedient way, and to draw the resulting logical consequences from them. For of what avail is all knowledge if we do not possess the courage to make use of it? By drawing the practical political consequences from a huge sum of intellectual and scientific ideas and insights, we have overcome an inertia that had grown totally sterile, and given to our national life a new and, as I am convinced, decisive impetus.'

What an answer! He has learned neither from the living nor the dead. Here he laid himself bare, a rambling barbarian soul, without bond or loyalty, burdened with no intellectual possessions, obligated to no one; a child of nature who would be quite capable of frying a chop over a Stradivarius violin, and boasting that he had sensibly and expediently organized a spiritual heritage.

That is his intellectual armament. But he had a wisdom all his own. When he related horror stories about the Wise Men of Zion, a skeptical henchman might protest: 'Adolf, you can't tell people such stuff!' Then he would smilingly reply: 'You can tell people anything!' And the skeptic was suddenly seized with the terrible suspicion, subjecting the whole world to doubt: perhaps he is wiser than all of us! Hitler's deepest wisdom consists in his conviction, gathered from the world sense of the modern intellectual, that everything is possible, that all problems are capable of solution, and that — and this is the most important — the big things are the easiest; but this cannot be reasoned out, it can only be demonstrated.

In great questions and conflicts, every attempt at proof or deduction soon leads to ultimate beliefs beyond the realm of the demonstrable — to basic conceptions regarding the world and man; and Hitler cannot afford to speak publicly of his basic conceptions. They arise from a deep contempt of human nature and run sharply counter to the comforting self-confidence which he then was trying to instill in the masses. When he calls upon them to demonstrate their noble breed and heroic nature by staking their health and their life, he means essentially: for you rabble are worthy of nothing better; and this attitude would come out in the end if

he were to pursue his conclusions, statements, commands, step by step, back to their sources. Finally he has never concealed his contempt of men, always giving those present to understand that he is superior to them. But he cannot very well reveal and narrate his contempt for humanity: his own person. His belief in human vileness is self-observation. Of his humanity because, as an historical phenomenon, his own star, he expects superhuman things of him. In the contemplation of human affairs, all logic ultimately human individual; a logical analysis of National Socialism would have to end with an analysis of Hitler's innermost, his unconscious resistance to logic and factuality.

It is not unusual that a man should wish to conceal his real person; all public activity consists in projecting one's own personality into certain qualities and effects, pressing other aspects of one's nature; to a certain extent a phenomenon occurs even in private relations between man and man, and this line of falsehood in human relations for the pessimistic conception of man as a sinful being. Hitler's special trait is his concentration on greatness as the source of his power. When suddenly this man, who has been standing around, now and then muttering, by no means dominates the conversation, is seized by a great idea and begins to speak, filling the room with his ringing interruptions or contradictions by his dominating statements, spreading cold shivers among those present by his declarations, lifting every subject of conversation to the level of greatness; then the listener is filled with awe and the phenomenon has entered the room. This thunder has not been there before; this is not the same timid man with his contracted shoulders. He is capable of this transformation in the personal interview and facing an audience of half a million. The magic power of this image of greatness emanating from his nullity greatly appealed to the German people. In the War, when this people, oppressed by their own

1930-32
 aimless, unsuccessful, and heartless attack on the poor people; Brüning decreased wages by violent decrees, supposedly lowered prices too, but not enough—and despite all the efforts and sacrifices of those who were still employed, more and more workers were discharged. From 1930 to 1932, according to the official estimate, the number of unemployed rose from three millions to over six millions, actually to far more than seven millions; and since German industry had a tendency to keep its workers even in hard times, this unemployment figure showed a graver economic distress than would have been the case in other countries.

There stood the wonderful smelting furnaces of Fritz Thyssen and his like, capable of producing twice as much steel as England, now useless, cold and still. Kirdorf's precious coal lay in great heaps around the mines and found no buyers; while the unemployed miners spent the winter in unheated rooms, at times banding together to break through the fence and seize as much fuel as they could carry. In the summer of 1930, gas broke through the walls of the Wenceslaus Mine near Waldenburg in Silesia, and three hundred miners were asphyxiated; rows of corpses were found with raised faces; they had died trying to snatch a last breath of air above the layer of gas. The mine had been a death trap; it should have been closed long before, and now the authorities did officially close it. Three thousand miners were unemployed, and in the collapsing economy found no other work. They banded together and petitioned; for three years they sent memoranda to the ministry, sent delegations to Berlin, addressed proclamations to the German people: they wanted their death mine reopened; it was better to live in constant fear of death than to suffer the constant hunger of their families.

In the woods around Berlin tent colonies sprang up; here lived unemployed who could not pay their rent in town. Straight streets ran through the camps; the residents shared such tasks as removal of garbage; there were community kitchens. Discipline and order prevailed. But in the fields around Berlin the peasants posted guards with loaded rifles; for large troops of starving men came from the city, flung themselves on the potato fields, and carried the potatoes away in sacks—this in broad daylight, while the traffic

rolled by on the roads. Often the guards were powerless against the famished and desperate men, who had seen the last remnants of property of their families and had never learned the meaning of hunger; the residential sections were full of the poor people, who had never dreamed that they would be singing for bread. It was still good times when they could crowd in long, gray, shabby coats outside the so-called employment office; a little booklet at a window, and a grumbling stamp certifying that they had presented themselves and asked for work. This entitled them to an unemployment benefit which might amount to as much as seventy percent of their wages. When the gray, shabby army swelled beyond the limits allowed to come only twice a week; but after unemployment a person was transferred into the ranks of the unemployed, the benefits were much smaller and actually without the aid of state charity. Originally what he received was a small benefit; he had paid for it in good times by a contribution from his wages. Little by little, it became a pittance. Everyone expected help from the state in his time of need. When the economy collapsed, the state became the symbol of the collapse. Unable to collect their rents, banks no longer pay interest on their mortgages; a farmer in the Rhineland took to living in his quarry, because he could not go on; barbers were starving because they could not afford to be shaved; a stationer lost his custom because he could not afford to raise the price of his goods; a drygoods shop was crushed by a fall in the price of its goods. The state had to help, raise a subsidy fund with pleas to pass a law against department stores, which it finally did. As in 1923, millions of unemployed and collapses gave rise again to a feeling of the powerlessness of man and divinity. It was a feeling that fluctuated between hope and fear; the optimist, according to a widespread joke, said: "This winter we'll all go begging." The pessimist inquired: "What will we do?"

The industrialists were afraid to produce, because

and heartless attack on the poor people; laws by violent decrees, supposedly lowered wages—and despite all the efforts and sacrifice still employed, more and more workers. In 1930 to 1932, according to the official estimate, unemployed rose from three millions to over ten million; far more than seven millions; and since then a tendency to keep its workers even in hard times. A recent figure showed a graver economic distress than in the case in other countries.

Wonderful smelting furnaces of Fritz Thyssen producing twice as much steel as England, still. Kirdorf's precious coal lay in great heaps found no buyers; while the unemployed sat in unheated rooms, at times banding together to break the fence and seize as much fuel as they could. In summer of 1930, gas broke through the walls of a house near Waldenburg in Silesia, and three hundred people suffocated; rows of corpses were found with their hands tied trying to snatch a last breath of air above the mine. The mine had been a death trap; it should have been closed, and now the authorities did officially close it. Thousands were unemployed, and in the collapsing economy their work. They banded together and petitioned; they sent memoranda to the ministry, sent addresses, proclamations to the German people. The death mine reopened; it was better to live in misery than to suffer the constant hunger of their

In Berlin tent colonies sprang up; here lived the homeless; they did not pay their rent in town. Straight streets were closed; the residents shared such tasks as removal of refuse; community kitchens. Discipline and order were maintained in the fields around Berlin the peasants posted sentries; for large troops of starving men came to the potato fields, and carried the potatoes—this in broad daylight, while the traffic

rolled by on the roads. Often the guards with their rifles were powerless against the famished and desperate marauders. Young men, who had seen the last remnants of property dwindle away in their families and had never learned the meaning of work, wandered through the countryside in bands, literally singing with hunger; the residential sections were full of the terrible singing of poor people, who had never dreamed that they would some day be singing for bread. It was still good times for the unemployed when they could crowd in long, gray, shabby lines on the pavement outside the so-called employment offices; they presented a little booklet at a window, and a grumbling official pasted in a stamp certifying that they had presented themselves and had vainly asked for work. This entitled them to an unemployment benefit, which might amount to as much as seventy marks in a month. When the gray, shabby army swelled beyond measure, they were allowed to come only twice a week; but after thirteen weeks of unemployment a person was transferred into another class, where the benefits were much smaller and actually were based on a kind of state charity. Originally what he received had been an insurance benefit; he had paid for it in good times by a compulsory deduction from his wages. Little by little, it became a gift from the state.

Everyone expected help from the state in his distress; when the economy collapsed, the state became the symbol of security, sustenance, productivity. Unable to collect their rents, landlords could no longer pay interest on their mortgages; a quarry-owner in the Rhineland took to living in his quarry, because no building was going on; barbers were starving because their customers could not afford to be shaved; a stationer lost his customers to a new one-price store; a drygoods shop was crushed by a near-by department store. The state had to help, raise a subsidy fund, and was besieged with pleas to pass a law against department stores and one-price stores, which it finally did. As in 1923, millions of personal failures and collapses gave rise again to a feeling of the state's omnipotence and divinity. It was a feeling that fluctuated between confidence and fear; the optimist, according to a widespread joke, predicted: Next winter we'll all go begging. The pessimist inquired: From whom?

The industrialists were afraid to produce, because production was

1930-

32

bound to bring loss at a time when the masses whom they did not employ had no money with which to purchase. The sight of this worthless wealth breathed a spectral life into men's doubts about the existing society. So the employer lost money if he put men to work; well, then, let him lose money. Production just had to be given a push; in this time of universal want there could be no lack of use for whatever was produced. This production might not be so carefully calculated as before; it might cost more; the state could stretch its credit, increase the circulation of money — this could be called inflation, but it would fill stomachs. German labor leaders seized on the new gospel of American employers: the capitalist economy, they said, would find markets and prosper if it paid higher wages to more workers, thus giving them purchasing power — though Karl Marx had taught that a capitalist economy thrived precisely by paying the workers as little as possible. The German Socialists who demanded the increase of mass purchasing power actually did admit their desertion from Marxism indirectly, by saying that at the moment they did not want to destroy capitalism, but to be the doctor at its sickbed; thus, far better than the founders of Marxism, they saw the true sense of the class struggle, which is waged to win a larger share in capitalism for the proletariat.

Brüning and his advisers, however, were stricken with panic by the specter of a new inflation, and were prepared to accept any other, equally catastrophic, destruction of the economy, provided only that the Reichsmark remained the Reichsmark. Thus Germany was governed against the masses, who did not inwardly accept the crisis, who had 'discovered' the bluff. As Gregor Strasser expressed it in the Reichstag, they expected the state 'to be able to restore an honest living for work honestly performed'; they expected this state to exert a power it did not possess, and so the time was ripe for a new state.

This was the profoundest reason why the majority of the Reichstag no longer followed any government. Brüning was conducting a business which presumably ran counter to his own nature. The solemn, embittered man, who let no one, least of all the people, see the thoughts hidden behind his spectacles, must sometimes have shuddered inwardly at his own attempts to preserve the economic

age. He had started on this course half unawares by a small group of his closest co-workers, and by tradition. He had to promulgate his laws in opposition as presidential decrees. To be sure, the largest debt of the Reich, the Social Democratic Party, felt constrained to throw him; for Brüning seemed the last defense. But in this hopeless attempt Social Democracy was out in the end averting the catastrophe. While already under the domination of dictatorship, Brüning himself Germany's 'last parliamentary chancellor.'

The German collapse, which tore down the authority raised up the authority of violence in its stead. A dictatorship seemed to be arising, similar to the one which had been raised up in 1933. Inconspicuously, inexorably, had for a short time Seeckt in 1923. People should not be so afraid of dictatorship, said the retired general, who had defected from politics, and had even permitted Seeckt to elect him to the Reichstag. No one was to be afraid of tyranny, he insisted; dictatorship was only the 'natural' form of democracy and parliamentarianism in the event that this parliament cannot agree; but it must be limited. What the Reichswehr really wanted was a functional democracy. When the democracies had won the day, the generals found it timely that Germany should have a strong state form. When Seeckt spoke of dictatorship, the Reichswehr must force the disintegration of the political function; and the foreign policy should be the general, who had learnt that even victory should be 'reconciliation, peace, co-operation.'

Against the Reichswehr, if things grew serious, no resistance; on this friend and foe were agreed well for the political parties, sensing the new order. Their private armies with pistols and infernal machines march and swagger; but once force began to be used, machine guns and artillery of the army would be sure, there was a second armed force that was not the police of the various states, especially Prussia

ons at a time when the masses whom they did not
 fagony with which to purchase. The sight of this
 reathed a spectral life into men's doubts about the
 and the employer lost money if he put men to work;
 and lose money. Production just had to be given
 ige of universal want there could be no lack of use
 urproduced. This production might not be so care-
 at's before; it might cost more; the state could
 ncrease the circulation of money — this could be
 fit it would fill stomachs. German labor leaders
 by gospel of American employers: the capitalist
 cid, would find markets and prosper if it paid
 thore workers, thus giving them purchasing power
 d marx had taught that a capitalist economy throve
 ig the workers as little as possible. The German
 eanded the increase of mass purchasing power
 their desertion from Marxism indirectly, by say-
 oment they did not want to destroy capitalism,
 or at its sickbed; thus, far better than the founders
 saw the true sense of the class struggle, which is
 urger share in capitalism for the proletariat.
 advisers, however, were stricken with panic by the
 nflation, and were prepared to accept any other,
 ic, destruction of the economy, provided only that
 emained the Reichsmark. Thus Germany was
 he masses, who did not inwardly accept the crisis,
 ed' the bluff. As Gregor Strasser expressed it in the
 pected the state 'to be able to restore an honest
 onestly performed'; they expected this state to
 id not possess, and so the time was ripe for a new

ofoundest reason why the majority of the Reichs-
 owed any government. Brüning was conducting a
 resumably ran counter to his own nature. The
 d man, who let no one, least of all the people, see
 len behind his spectacles, must sometimes have
 lly at his own attempts to preserve the economic

age. He had started on this course half unawares, followed only
 by a small group of his closest co-workers, and by them with hesi-
 tation. He had to promulgate his laws in opposition to parliament,
 as presidential decrees. To be sure, the largest democratic party of
 the Reich, the Social Democratic Party, felt constrained not to over-
 throw him; for Brüning seemed the last defense against Hitler.
 But in this hopeless attempt Social Democracy used itself up, with-
 out in the end averting the catastrophe. While half Europe was
 already under the domination of dictatorship, Brüning called him-
 self Germany's 'last parliamentary chancellor.'

1930-32?

The German collapse, which tore down the authority of the laws,
raised up the authority of violence in its stead. A new Reichswehr
 dictatorship seemed to be arising, similar to the one which, simply,
 inconspicuously, inexorably, had for a short time been exerted by
 Seeckt in 1923. People should not be so afraid of this hobgoblin of
 dictatorship, said the retired general, who had defeated Hitler. He
 had gone into politics, and had even permitted Stresemann's party
 to elect him to the Reichstag. No one was thinking of bloody
 tyranny, he insisted; dictatorship was only the 'natural reverse side
 of democracy and parliamentarianism in the event that the forces in
 this parliament cannot agree; but it must be limited to emergency.'
 What the Reichswehr really wanted was a functioning but obedient
 democracy. When the democracies had won the World War, the
 generals found it timely that Germany should have a try at this vic-
 torious state form. When Seeckt spoke of dictatorship, he meant
 that the Reichswehr must force the disintegrating parliament to
 perform its political function; and the foreign policy of Germany,
 said the general, who had learnt that even victorious war not al-
 ways pays, should be 'reconciliation, peace, co-operation.'

Against the Reichswehr, if things grew serious, there could be
 no resistance; on this friend and foe were agreed. It was all very
 well for the political parties, sensing the new conditions, to arm
 their private armies with pistols and infernal machines, and have
 them march and swagger; but once force began to speak, only the
 machine guns and artillery of the army would be heard. To be
 sure, there was a second armed force that was not to be despised:
 the police of the various states, especially Prussia, which disposed

of some fifty thousand men with military training; and this Prussian police was, according to the law, entirely, though in reality only partially, in the hands of that group of trade-union secretaries, government officials, and parliamentarians which constituted the leadership of the Social Democrats and governed Prussia. But against a determined Reichswehr there could be no reliance on this troop.

But what was the Reichswehr determined to do, and to what lengths would it go—this was the question. 'Generals!' cried Hitler to the leaders of the Reichswehr in one of his speeches, 'with a hundred thousand men you cannot wage a foreign war, but you can give the state a new form. It lies partly in the hands of the army which tendency will be victorious in Germany; Marxism or ourselves.' The Reichswehr's answer was that National Socialism began 'to show Russian character,' as one of its spokesmen put it.

As a matter of fact, the Nazis began to undermine and to destroy the state from inside; especially to destroy the loyalty of its servants, armed and unarmed. They had their helpers, most of them carefully concealed in the ministries and other government offices; they gathered information about the inner movements and decisions of the state and accumulated their treasure of state secrets in a party office which was headed by a man at that time almost unknown to the outside world: Rudolf Hess, the 'private secretary.' A minister wrote a decree that National Socialist meetings must be watched by the secret police; the National Socialist gamblers in a provincial city knew this even before the police president, and informed the members of the secret police, for they too were secret National Socialists. One of the most popular ministers, in private life rather a good, harmless soul, had a mistress—she actually was a National Socialist spy. To be sure, this minister also had his spies among the National Socialists, but it can be said that the results were disappointing. A spying state against a spying political party—public opinion already took this feature of the silent civil war as a matter of course. Probably by far the most efficient spy system had been built up by Schleicher; he spied on his own superiors, on the ministers of the Reich, on Brüning himself, and tapped their telephone wires. One day Brüning, sitting with a visitor in his studio in the chancellery, suddenly sprang up, ran to the door, ran through the

hall, ran up the stairs, and then came back, di
'They escaped. . . . Over there, that part belongs

The S.A. strove persistently to penetrate the Reichswehr. Tested members were formally d party, then volunteered for the small professi new military atmosphere they were sometime loyalties, but sometimes they proved excellent agitators. Their party made it its business to ce by constant presents, tobacco and food. To be still remained sharply aloof from the Uprooted despised them and threatened them. But the li tains, in the gray dullness of their unpromising 1923, were attracted by the hope that Hitler wou a big army which would transform lieutenants captains into majors, the majors into colonels; these officers were not only desperate patriots, b in need of money. A large section of them came had lost its fortune in the inflation; they led sor private lives on monthly salaries of two hundred r and complained bitterly that the German officer social lion he had been. It was a new society, pl geois and unfeudal; it set new social types, f writers for instance, higher than the members o which, after all, had lost the war. But all this wa if there was a big army again, with high ranks and Hitler promised to create this army.

Thus it happened that National Socialist cells' young officers. One of them, Lieutenant Wilhel pressed the mood among these young armed in tember, 1930, in a newspaper article of great : actual purpose of the Reichswehr,' he said, 'to b military idea and the basic troop for the future pales. The need of earning bread becomes all-in turn into officials, officers become candidates fo remains is a police troop.' This, in the eyes of th for whom the World War was not yet over, was thing that could happen; the army was threat

on sand men with military training; and this Prus-
 fac- according to the law, entirely, though in reality only
 nds of that group of trade-union secretaries, gov-
 and parliamentarians which constituted the leader-
 at Democrats and governed Prussia. But against a
 ig- wehr there could be no reliance on this troop.
 tr- the Reichswehr determined to do, and to what
 at go—this was the question. 'Generals' cried
 ns of the Reichswehr in one of his speeches, 'with
 pd men you cannot wage a foreign war, but you
 t a new form. It lies partly in the hands of the
 cny will be victorious in Germany; Marxism or
 d Reichswehr's answer was that National Socialism
 d Russian character,' as one of its spokesmen put it.
 ic- act, the Nazis began to undermine and to destroy
 e- ide; especially to destroy the loyalty of its serv-
 - armed. They had their helpers, most of them
 ! in the ministries and other government offices;
 r- mation about the inner movements and decisions
 , cumulated their treasure of state secrets in a party
 eaded by a man at that time almost unknown to
 : Rudolf Hess, the 'private secretary.' A minister
 , at National Socialist meetings must be watched
 e; the National Socialist *gambler* in a provincial
on before the police president, and informed the
secret police, for they too were secret National
the most popular ministers, in private life rather
soul, had a mistress—she actually was a National
be sure, this minister also had his spies among the
s, but it can be said that the results were disap-
ag state against a spying political party—public
ok this feature of the silent civil war as a matter
ly by far the most efficient spy system had been
cher; he spied on his own superiors, on the minis-
on Brüning himself, and tapped their telephone
Brüning, sitting with a visitor in his studio in the
only sprang up, ran to the door, ran through the

hall, ran up the stairs, and then came back, disappointed, saying:
 'They escaped. . . . Over there, that part belongs to the Reichswehr.'

The S.A. strove persistently to penetrate the lower ranks of the
 Reichswehr. Tested members were formally discharged from the
 party, then volunteered for the small professional army. In the
 new military atmosphere they were sometimes lost to their old
 loyalties, but sometimes they proved excellent listening-posts and
 agitators. Their party made it its business to cement their loyalties
 by constant presents, tobacco and food. To be sure, the generals
 still remained 'sharply aloof from the Uprooted and Disinherited,'
 despised them and threatened them. But the lieutenants and cap-
 tains, in the gray dullness of their unpromising service, again, as in
 1923, were attracted by the hope that Hitler would some day create
 a big army which would transform lieutenants into captains, the
 captains into majors, the majors into colonels and generals. For
 these officers were not only desperate patriots, but also poor devils
 in need of money. A large section of them came from the class that
 had lost its fortune in the inflation; they led somewhat threadbare
 private lives on monthly salaries of two hundred marks and upward,
 and complained bitterly that the German officer was no longer the
 social lion he had been. It was a new society, plutocratic but bour-
 geois and unfeudal; it set new social types, famous artists and
 writers for instance, higher than the members of that armed class
 which, after all, had lost the war. But all this was bound to change
 if there was a big army again, with high ranks and high salaries; and
 Hitler promised to create this army.

Thus it happened that National Socialist cells formed among the
 young officers. One of them, Lieutenant Wilhelm Scheringer, ex-
 pressed the mood among these young armed intellectuals in Sep-
 tember, 1930, in a newspaper article of great significance. 'The
 actual purpose of the Reichswehr,' he said, 'to be a citadel of the
 military idea and the basic troop for the future war of liberation,
 pales. The need of earning bread becomes all-important. Soldiers
 turn into officials, officers become candidates for pensions. What
 remains is a police troop.' This, in the eyes of these desperate men,
 for whom the World War was not yet over, was the most terrible
 thing that could happen; the army was threatening to forget the

1930
?

Syd

1930

war. It was absurd, said Scheringer, to regard the Reichswehr as a fire-spitting body of a hundred thousand chosen ruffians and warriors. 'People think the old staff corporal is an impassioned soldier. They don't bother to ask where he is to get passion after ten or twelve years' service in the barracks. . . . They know nothing of the tragedy of the four words: twelve years as subalterns. . . . Let the old men be silent. They have their lives behind them, ours are just beginning. A lost war, an impotent state, a hopeless system, an enslavement enduring fifty-nine years, a Reich at the brink of the abyss, that is our life. And they are to blame. . . . Consequently, we have the right to fight with all means for our freedom and that of our children. The world may be sure that we are determined to do so, and we shall be victorious just as surely as France is a dying nation.'

There it was again—the struggle of the lieutenants against the generals. Shortly before his electoral victory in September, 1930, Hitler delivered a speech full of strange extravagant hopes. A National Socialist, he said, would have to be entrusted with the Reichswehr Ministry. This was about the worst threat he could make to the Reichswehr: to be ruled by a political party, and the party of the former Reichswehr spy at that. But this was necessary, said Hitler, using an argument familiar to the generals; because 'we want to be in a position to guarantee that our people will assume a form of government which will make a second November, 1918, impossible in the foreseeable future.'

Röhm named the various 'standards,' as the units (about the size of a regiment) of the S.A., the 'Brown People's Army,' were called, after the regiments of the old German army stationed in the same localities. It was really a people's troop. In his service regulation, Röhm based the whole gigantic organization on a tiny unit, the so-called '*schar*' (squad); such a squad was formed when somewhere a leader arose of his own accord 'and set up the squad.' The squad, according to the regulations, should 'consist of comrades who join together from a common conviction and a common bond, based on childhood friendship, school camaraderie, or similar working conditions'—with a straight face Röhm forbade the admission of hard drinkers, dope addicts, and homosexuals. Once the squad was

founded, the leader had to report his organ S.A. leader, and had to be confirmed by him S.A. was stronger by four to twelve men. In the squad bore his name for all time. Three a 'troop,' two to three troops a 'storm'; the storm to a hundred and twenty men, was and is the fighting cell of the Brown Army. Up to 1930 troops had maintained themselves with difficulty in the crisis they rapidly grew to be storms, the 'standards' (a thousand to three thousand men) the 'brigade' and the 'group' (later *Obergruppe* which counted up to a hundred thousand men) the S.A. included approximately one hundred Exactly a year later, Hitler claimed over a sand, while the party membership stood at eight Another year later, shortly before Hitler came to power, he claimed eight hundred thousand storm *Obergruppen*.

Was this already the workers' army which it had desired? The truth was that the Reichswehr had not always stuck to the original concept of supreme captain, or of Röhm, its own rebellious: its outgrown former tool. 'The era of mass arms had said; 'the future will bring small, highly effective are suited to carrying out quick and decisive operations' be 'the aim of a modern strategy to bring about mobile, expert, and maneuverable forces, before set in motion'; this small army of the future numerically superior but qualitatively inferior must but above all will prevent it from forming solid and a mass army in the old sense 'is therefore the worst sense, when confronted by a small number of technicians. . . . Therefore the modern small army long-term professional soldiers; as far as possible The rest of the nation has to serve on the home front to produce the most modern equipment; for armament was not to have large, probably obscure

ER Scheringer, to regard the Reichswehr as a
 on hundred thousand chosen ruffians and war-
 fac old staff corporal is an impassioned soldier.
 sk where he is to get passion after ten or
 im the barracks. . . . They know nothing of
 ut words: twelve years as subalterns. . . . Let
 18 They have their lives behind them, ours are
 at war, an impotent state, a hopeless system, an
 at fifty-nine years, a Reich at the brink of the
 20 And they are to blame. . . . Consequently,
 Pht with all means for our freedom and that
 c the world may be sure that we are determined
 d to be victorious just as surely as France is a

1 the struggle of the lieutenants against the
 ic his electoral victory in September, 1930,
 e h full of strange extravagant hopes. A Na-
 d, would have to be entrusted with the
 This was about the worst threat he could
 r: to be ruled by a political party, and the
 chswehr spy at that. But this was necessary,
 yment familiar to the generals; because 'we
 to guarantee that our people will assume a
 hich will make a second November, 1918,
 eable future.'

ious 'standards,' as the units (about the size
 A., the 'Brown People's Army,' were called,
 he old German army stationed in the same
 a people's troop. In his service regulation,
 gigantic organization on a tiny unit, the so-
 such a squad was formed when somewhere
 n accord 'and set up the squad.' The squad,
 tions, should 'consist of comrades who join
 on conviction and a common bond, based on
 school camaraderie, or similar working con-
 nt face Röhm forbade the admission of hard
 , and homosexuals. Once the squad was

founded, the leader had to report his organization to a higher
 S.A. leader, and had to be confirmed by him — and thereupon the
 S.A. was stronger by four to twelve men. In honor of the founder,
 the squad bore his name for all time. Three to six squads formed
a 'troop,' two to three troops a 'storm'; the storm, embracing seventy
 to a hundred and twenty men, was and is the actual marching and
 fighting cell of the Brown Army. Up to 1930, scant squads and
 troops had maintained themselves with difficulty in many places; 1930
 in the crisis they rapidly grew to be storms, the storms grew into
'standards' (a thousand to three thousand men) — and so on up to
the 'brigade' and the 'group' (later Obergruppe or 'superior group'),
which counted up to a hundred thousand men. By January, 1931,
 the S.A. included approximately one hundred thousand men.
 Exactly a year later, Hitler claimed over three hundred thou-
sand, while the party membership stood at eight hundred thousand.
 Another year later, shortly before Hitler came to power, Röhm
 mustered some eight hundred thousand storm troopers in his eight
Obergruppen.

Was this already the workers' army which the Reichswehr once
 had desired? The truth was that the Reichswehr — its leadership —
 had not always stuck to the original concept of Ludendorff, its lost
 supreme captain, or of Röhm, its own rebellious spirit, or of Hitler,
 its outgrown former tool. 'The era of mass armies is over,' Seeckt
 had said; 'the future will bring small, highly efficient armies which
 are suited to carrying out quick and decisive operations'; it would
 be 'the aim of a modern strategy to bring about a decision with
 mobile, expert, and maneuverable forces, before any masses can be
 set in motion'; this small army of the future would not 'let the
 numerically superior but qualitatively inferior mass deploy its forces,
 but above all will prevent it from forming solid material fronts';
 and a mass army in the old sense 'is therefore cannon fodder in the
 worst sense, when confronted by a small number of trained tech-
 nicians. . . . Therefore the modern small army must consist of
 long-term professional soldiers; as far as possible of volunteers.'
 The rest of the nation has to serve on the home front and constantly
 to produce the most modern equipment; for the secret of good
armament was not to have large, probably obsolete stocks of arms

at the time of the declaration of war, but to dispose of an industry which could quickly manufacture the most up-to-date arms in large quantities.

1930
* This conception of the small, superior elite army far above the rest of the nation was anathema to Hitler's military advisers. In the *Wehrpolitische Vereinigung* former Colonel Konstantin Hierl had delivered vehement diatribes against Seeckt, and one day Hitler himself, to the astonishment of all present, had given a lecture full of military wisdom; had denied that the next war would be decided by clouds of gas, armored planes, or endless swarms of tanks; no, it would be decided finally by the single man 'who was prepared to die for his cause.' He had complained that the professional soldiers still did not realize what this meant; and just this was why they were unable to understand what the S.A. was for: 'to inspire the men with an idea for which they could die'; and this single man was nothing but 'the whole mass of our people.'

* This was the double talk of propaganda adapted to circumstances; for when Hitler spoke to his inner circle he admonished them to consider themselves as the elite, high above the masses; but when he talked with the generals he himself spoke for the masses.

Without a doubt the fight for men sharpened more and more to a fight for the workers, for the mighty human mass which would have the final say about the destiny of the modern labor state. The Communists tried to build up a shock army in the big factories. On the day of the great revolutionary reckoning, this shock army would take over the factories, halt work, and seize the machines, electric plants, and waterworks as strategic pledges; from the conquered factories they would send the masses into the streets, and occupy first the suburbs of the big cities, then the centers of political power. That is how civil war is waged. The great factories are the heart of capitalist society, as Marx and Engels have taught, and this heart lies in the open hand of the workers, who, in the words of the *Communist Manifesto* of 1847, have a world to gain, but nothing to lose but their chains. The workers—this is the central idea of this whole philosophy of the revolution—need only become conscious of their power. In this they were obstructed by only one force, of this the Communists were convinced, and this force was

the Social Democratic Party with its unions—the Communists insisted in dead earnest that the National Socialist wave was engulfing them—of the workers. Therefore, the main attack, directed, not against the National Socialists Fascists, but against the Social Democrats—

To be sure, the Social Democrats and the unionary aim and hence no plan for the civil approaching. And even if there had been had no suitable organization. The unions factories but by trades; hence a rapid mobilization was impossible. But the pusillanimity of merely reflected the condition of the world. The worker who still had a job did have; and Engels notwithstanding. In this period meant all the world to him. The best way keep his nose to the grindstone, to say no. Six or eight millions were standing outside and all that awaited the dismissed proletariat endless gray lines at the employment office announced a general strike, could he be left with the little piece of world which he defended with his silence and renunciation? of the most elementary comforts, cut off increasing poverty from the culture to which he exhausted himself morally in a mercile unwittingly he himself was a fragment of age which in Hitler's phrase 'filled no one

The National Socialists, on the other hand, every hour to their S.A. These desperate either. 'When you are scared,' Röhm used that the others are just as scared as you them not to be soft, for the soldiers in the times greater hardships. But civil war is not by vacillating weaklings—and the secret arms in any way possible. For this purpose tool. Precisely because the National Social

* D. T. The trick was to steal the more advanced understandings of the Q.

on of war, but to dispose of an industry
facture the most up-to-date arms in large

small, superior elite army far above the
athema to Hitler's military advisers. In
igning former Colonel Konstantin Hierl
tribes against Seeckt, and one day Hitler
at of all present, had given a lecture full
nied that the next war would be decided
planes, or endless swarms of tanks; no,
by the single man 'who was prepared to
complained that the professional soldiers
this meant; and just this was why they
d what the S.A. was for: 'to inspire the
ch they could die'; and this single man
e mass of our people.'

of propaganda adapted to circumstances;
his inner circle he admonished them to
elite, high above the masses; but when he
re himself spoke for the masses.

ht for men sharpened more and more to
or the mighty human mass which would
ie destiny of the modern labor state. The
up a shock army in the big factories. On
tionary reckoning, this shock army would
ult work, and seize the machines, electric
is strategic pledges; from the conquered
l the masses into the streets, and occupy
; cities, then the centers of political power.
aged. The great factories are the heart of
and Engels have taught, and this heart
the workers, who, in the words of the
1847, have a world to gain, but noth-
ains. The workers—this is the central
phy of the revolution—need only become

In this they were obstructed by only one
unists were convinced, and this force was

*he was to steal the
? understanding of the D*

the Social Democratic Party with its unions. The Social Demo-
crats—the Communists insisted in dead earnest even as the Na-
tional Socialist wave was engulfing them—were the chief enemy
of the workers. Therefore, the main attack of the Communists was
directed, not against the National Socialists or, as they put it, the
Fascists, but against the Social Democrats—the 'Social Fascists.'

To be sure, the Social Democrats and the unions had no revolu-
tionary aim and hence no plan for the civil war that was obviously
approaching. And even if there had been a plan, up to 1932 they
had no suitable organization. The unions were not organized by
factories but by trades; hence a rapid mobilization of the masses
was impossible. But the pusillanimity of the Social Democrats
merely reflected the condition of the working masses themselves.
The worker who still had a job did have something to lose, Marx
and Engels notwithstanding. In this period of hopelessness his job
meant all the world to him. The best way to safeguard it was to
keep his nose to the grindstone, to say nothing and hear nothing.
Six or eight millions were standing outside waiting for this job;
and all that awaited the dismissed proletarian was a place in the
endless gray lines at the employment offices. If one day the sirens
announced a general strike, could he be expected to stand up and
leave the little piece of world which he had so painstakingly de-
fended with his silence and renunciation? Robbed more and more
of the most elementary comforts, cut off more and more by in-
creasing poverty from the culture to which he had been so attached.

he exhausted himself morally in a merciless struggle for existence;
unwittingly he himself was a fragment of the declining economic
age which in Hitler's phrase 'filled no one with enthusiasm to die.'

The National Socialists, on the other hand, preached death at
every hour to their S.A. These desperate men were not all heroes
either. 'When you are scared,' Röhm used to say, 'always remember
that the others are just as scared as you are!' And Hitler taught
them not to be soft, for the soldiers in the field had borne a thousand
times greater hardships. But civil war is not won by heroes; it is lost
by vacillating weaklings—and the secret is to frighten these cow-
ards in any way possible. For this purpose the S.A. was the right
tool. Precisely because the National Socialists for the present were

1930

?

1930
? unable to gain power over the factories and those workers who were still employed, the Brown Storm battalions were able to gather in that human type which was most usable, most supple, a type ready for all extremes: the bohemian of the proletariat, the unemployed. In normal times these would have been chaff, living at the edge of society; but now, if they were not the strongest, they were the most determined tenth of the nation. This tenth really had nothing to lose, often not even ideals. A part of these men believed neither in God nor in human rights nor in the classless society, and almost with pride Hitler declared: 'If this process of moral disintegration lasts much longer, the nation will fall apart and only egoism will be left. . . . That is why we have in our ranks hundreds of thousands whose life would have no sense and purpose if National Socialism had not given them a sense and purpose [several minutes of applause]. . . . You are nothing, your nation is everything!'

The sense and purpose of life for tens if not hundreds of thousands was to sit day after day in the 'storm centers' which the National Socialists had strewn all over the country. The storm centers were their headquarters, for the most part back rooms of beer halls. Both proprietor and customers had sworn loyalty to Adolf Hitler, for beer-hall proprietors have at all times been the faithful voice of the people. There sat the unemployed in their coarse brown breeches and discolored yellow shirts for many hours of the day over their half-empty beer mugs; at mealtimes they were fed for a few pfennigs from a great iron kettle that simmered in the laundry room; their uniform, often the only suit they possessed, had been sold to them by the 'field ordnance department' of the S.A. on credit. Every day—later twice a week—they spent several hours at their 'employment office' and with the money received from the state they paid the ordnance department for their uniforms and meals. Thus, Hitler's private army maintained itself as a sum of innumerable little groups defending themselves in common against cold and hunger, financed by the state they were planning to overthrow.

But when the whistle blew in the back room of the beer hall; when the squad leader cried, 'Attention!' then these men rotting in inactivity sprang up, formed ranks, and stood at attention while a

man in high boots and armed with a horsewhip should listen! . . . In the name of the Führer, the chi ordered . . . ' And they marched off. For wherever marching, it could only be better. Suddenly one of them in his hand, he hardly knew how it had got there; in a house door with a dozen others, he found himself in a room, he didn't know where; the pistol went off, a bang on the floor, he didn't know who. This is no account of the notorious murder in the village of Pöchlitz. One December night in Berlin boxes in which some were moving were pressed into the hands of a few men; they were led into a movie house in the center suddenly a whistle shrilled in the darkness, they stood opened their boxes, and hundreds of white mice ran out. Women jumped up on chairs and railings, following its way through one of the aisles. Outside, uproar answered the noise within; thousands who had been in silence suddenly began to yell. Joseph Goebbels stood in the mobile, saluting and shouting. With a thousand roar the crowd shouted its reply. This went on for several hours. The government capitulated and did what Goebbels had demanded with his white mice and snakes: it distorted the picture that was running in the movie house. It is an anti-war picture, written by a German and called 'The Last Days of Pompeii', millions of other Germans, a picture revealing war in all its horror: *All Quiet on the Western Front*, adapted from the best-selling novel.

Could these rowdies be expected to inspire the confidence that the gray revolutionary horror of 1918 had repeated? On October 14, 1930, the hundred and thirty Socialists in parliament, at the behest of Strasser, Feiler introduced a bill to limit the interest rates to four per cent more, 'the entire property of the bank and stock exchange . . . must be expropriated without indemnification from the German people as a whole'; the same should be the property of all eastern Jews, of all 'persons of foreign general, and 'the large banks must be taken over by the

* someone on the inside
them in free

out delay.' Strasser, Feder, and Frick had for years put forward this suggestion at every new session of the Reichstag, and no one had paid much attention to the little group. But now a hundred and seven deputies, a sixth of parliament, were demanding the expropriation of the banks, and the bourgeois public, Hitler's financial backers among them, was shocked: that was Bolshevism!

So these were the aims of the mouse and snake heroes, the libertarian bands, the Brown People's Army! Goebbels had been speaking of it for years — '... certainly we fight with Marxist methods, only we will do it better than the Marxists' — but who had listened?

For a long time it had been one of his favorite images to say that the National Socialists would one day 'mount the barricades.' He had been looking for a poet and musician to provide a revolutionary song, 'whose chords would ring out on the barricades of freedom.' At length he found his poet of the barricades. It was the son of a Protestant military chaplain named Wessel, a student, National Socialist, and storm trooper. This young Horst Wessel was the exact mixture of ruffian and idealist that constitutes the armed bohemian. As a student, he suddenly broke with his family and student connections, to lead the life which in his opinion was suitable for a young savior of the lost national soul; he lived in a slum section of Berlin with a girl who had formerly been a prostitute.

It was an exaggeration to call this minister's son a pimp, but it is true that he lived, fought, and finally died surrounded by pimps. He was the leader of the S.A. in his neighborhood, a militant and extremely successful leader. A gang, doubtless instigated by Communists and later hidden by Communists for a time, forced their way into his room in February, 1930, and killed him. After his death, Goebbels blew up this somewhat shady hero into a National Socialist legend; after all, he had died for the party. Horst Wessel had left behind him a marching song, three stanzas not unskillfully pieced together from the party's most familiar slogans; he had borrowed the melody from various existing tunes. The rather melancholy, unpretentious piece became the party's official song; later the 'Horst Wessel Song' became a second national anthem. Two of the lines in the last stanza ran: 'For the last time the rifle is loaded ... Soon Hitler banners will wave over the barricades. ...'

With horror the generals and their officers: singing when the army's machine guns would against the people — an army in ferment against the people! Hitler impressed it upon them as often away from the present state the machine gun, the hand-grenade, the police, take away leave the present state to the love of its citizen what remains of it!

Many officers would doubtless have been ashamed of their own people again — even if this people had no banner. They had expected the republican state from this. What Hitler wanted to say was: I can save you. Therefore he took all possible generals not to judge his party by the mice and about rifle and barricades were removed from Song' — presumably by the author himself.

For the last time the call to arms rings. Hitler banners will fly over all the streets. ... do more than that to prove that he planned discipline of the army. In one case, for example, leaders proceeded sharply against their enemies among the lieutenants; Hitler utilized the himself from these enemies and detractors: tenant and secret National Socialist, was arrested comrades on the drill-ground; from prison he article. Asked if he were a National Socialist was. Hence, the prosecution continued, he had able party that wanted to overthrow the government. Scheringer was defended by Doctor Hans Frank, personal friend of Hitler's and almost slavishly devoted. He was a young man of the post-war generation insisted that his party did not want to overthrow violence; to prove this, Hitler, who led the party ready to take oath in court. Frank obtained to appear as a witness, and Der Führer delivered his hesitation: 'If we have two or three more of the Socialist Movement will have the majority!'

der, and Frick had for years put forward new session of the Reichstag, and no one in the little group. But now a hundredth of parliament, were demanding the ex-ecution, and the bourgeois public, Hitler's financial as shocked: that was Bolshevism! It was of the mouse and snake heroes, the liber-ation of the People's Army! Goebbels had been speak-ing, 'certainly we fight with Marxist methods, unlike the Marxists'—but who had listened? He was one of his favorite images to say that one day 'mount the barricades.' He was a poet and musician to provide a revolutionary song to ring out on the barricades of freedom.' He was the poet of the barricades. It was the son of a plain named Wessel, a student, National Socialist worker. This young Horst Wessel was the son and idealist that constitutes the armed soldier, he suddenly broke with his family and led the life which in his opinion was suited to the lost national soul; he lived in a slum a girl who had formerly been a prostitute. to call this minister's son a pimp, but it is true and finally died surrounded by pimps. He was a N.S.A. in his neighborhood, a militant and ex-ecutioner. A gang, doubtless instigated by Com-munists for a time, forced their way in February, 1930, and killed him. After his death this somewhat shady hero into a National Socialist, he had died for the party. Horst Wessel had written the song, three stanzas not unskillfully the party's most familiar slogans; he had borrowed various existing tunes. The rather melan-cholic became the party's official song; later the song became a second national anthem. Two of the stanzas ran: 'For the last time the rifle is loaded and the flags will wave over the barricades. . . .'

With horror the generals and their officers saw the day approach-ing when the army's machine guns would be the last bulwark against the people—an army in ferment against a people in ferment! Hitler impressed it upon them as often as he could: 'Take away from the present state the machine gun, take away the canon, the hand-grenade, the police, take away the Reichswehr, and leave the present state to the love of its citizens—and you will see what remains of it!'

Many officers would doubtless have been ashamed to fire on their own people again—even if this people had marched under the Red banner. They had expected the republican state to save them at least from this. What Hitler wanted to say was: Not the republic, only I can save you. Therefore he took all possible pains to persuade the generals not to judge his party by the mice and snakes. The verses about rifle and barricades were removed from the 'Horst Wessel Song'—presumably by the author himself. The text now ran: '... For the last time the call to arms rings out ... Soon the Hitler banners will fly over all the streets. . . .' And Hitler would do more than that to prove that he planned no attack on the discipline of the army. In one case, for example, the Reichswehr leaders proceeded sharply against their enemies and detractors among the lieutenants; Hitler utilized the occasion to dissociate himself from these enemies and detractors. Scheringer, the lieutenant and secret National Socialist, was arrested with two of his comrades on the drill-ground; from prison he wrote his memorable article. Asked if he were a National Socialist, he admitted that he was. Hence, the prosecution continued, he belonged to a treasonable party that wanted to overthrow the government by violence. Scheringer was defended by Doctor Hans Frank of Munich, a personal friend of Hitler's and almost slavishly devoted to him; Frank was a young man of the post-war generation. At the trial he insisted that his party did not want to overthrow the government by violence; to prove this, Hitler, who led the party as a dictator, was ready to take oath in court. Frank obtained permission for Hitler to appear as a witness, and Der Führer delivered his oath without hesitation: 'If we have two or three more elections, the National Socialist Movement will have the majority in the Reichstag and

1930

?

1931

Heiden
White
Haug

Books in this file

The Oiling Empire - Haffner

The Life & Death of A.H. - Poyner

Q. M. D. Bues

→ to ~~have~~ per-
verse the
weight of their
outlook

It was long thought that a queen mated but once. Now it is known that she may have many partners, seventeen in one study, but usually considerably fewer. She continues to mate until she has stored sperm enough to last her lifetime. Queens have been found with up to 7.5 million sperm, averaging about 5.5 million.

The triumphant male's organ still dangling from her, the now-fertile queen returns to the hive, a true femme fatale widowed in the conjugal act. Some researchers say she is received with wild excitement and joy, the exuberant workers eagerly removing the drone genitals and grooming her with their tongues. Others claim this is so much romantic nonsense and she is greeted with no unusual show of emotion. I do not know. I have never witnessed a nuptial homecoming.

Which version are we to believe? We must accept that which appeals to our own nature. The reception may vary from hive to hive, depending on how vital the mating flight is to the future of the hive. It seems reasonable enough to believe that a weak colony, dependent on the queen's successful return, would display a certain jubilation. In her now-fertile body is their future as a colony. For stronger colonies, with reserve princesses in waiting, who is to say what raptures they may express or suppress?

But what of the drones, defeated in the chase and now returned home? What do they think when they see the newly fertile queen return with her bizarre trophy? Will they push quite so hard to catch the next virgin who entices them? And what of the presiding hive mother? For her this moment of triumph can have only one ending. What, if anything, does she think?

FORTY-THREE



The mating flight does more than transform the princess into a queen. She takes on a new personality, no longer a flighty virgin running aimlessly about, almost unnoticed; she has matured physically, now lighter in color, suddenly grown longer, and assumes a stately quality, suggesting a sense of self or pride in her new role. The colony responds to this change and pays her homage as befits her new status and responsibility. Our giddy princess is now a queen in both name and fact.

If there is an old queen in the hive, or rival princesses, the new queen quickly disposes of them, making her the sole mother of the hive. In her spermatheca are the millions of sperm, and from her ovaries will come the outpouring of eggs. About forty-eight hours after mating she can start laying. At first, lacking experience and technique, she may deposit two or more eggs in a single cell, lay in an irregular pattern, or deposit drone eggs in worker cells or worker eggs in drone cells, with somewhat odd results, but soon she has the hang of it.

If she laid all of the eggs theoretically possible, about 2,000 in a twenty-four-hour period, it would amount to one very 43.2 seconds. If all eggs developed, in a week there would be 14,000 new bees, in three weeks 42,000, and in five weeks 70,000. Fortunately these figures are only theoretical or soon the world would be awash in bees. The queen, in fact, does not lay steadily at such a rapid rate, each queen developing her own pace and rhythm. Some eggs never hatch, and old bees keep dying off. The mathematics of calculator and laboratory are seldom those of nature. Bee colonies rarely exceed 80,000 or 100,000, at most.

AH
1931
after
death
of
Gelli-

MBF

the whip being
and the father - later
and the mother - later
*
1894
at the time of his birth
the father was a
drunken man
and the mother was
a woman of
1894

1894 also 1931 or 1932 1900-02
1894 THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

1893
The Child As Father to the Men

of guilt engendered by his wish to destroy his father. He may have tried to justify to others and to himself his bitter hatred by insisting that Alois was a cruel and vicious man who deserved a son's animosity. It may be objected that even if young Hitler was beaten by his father, many other children in Austria were certainly whipped without, apparently, resulting in the psychic scars that Hitler suffered. "Well," one might say, "all boys in Austria were beaten on their backsides, so what's the difference?" The difference, as Erik Erikson has noted in his study of Luther, is this: with Hitler, as with Luther, a sensitive man remembered those punishments and talked bitterly about them later, showing that the whippings had indeed have an effect on his development. Erikson wrote: "The assertion that the cause was too common to have an uncommon effect on one individual is neither clinically nor biographically valid. We must try to ascertain the relationship of cause and effect and see if a unique element may have given the common event a specific meaning." In Hitler's case, as in Luther's, the fact that the whippings were remembered and resented, and that he hated his father for giving them, indicates that they had an uncommon effect upon him.

The workings of hatred and love, of pleasure and pain, are complex. Hatred may be a distortion of love: pleasure may be sought through pain. Consciously, Adolf certainly resented the beatings and hated his father for hurting him; unconsciously, he may have desired the punishment as a way of winning his father's attention and love. We are suggesting the possibility that the sadomasochism we shall observe in the adult Hitler had its beginnings here. Clinical studies have shown that often, as children, people with masochistic tendencies baited their fathers into whipping them. "The desire to be punished or humiliated," a specialist in the pathology of masochism has written, is another way of "wanting to be loved... being beaten and being loved are fused into one single masochistic expression."

As with all little boys, Adolf's image of his father was heavily influenced by the picture he had of his father's sexual relations with his mother. For Hitler this memory was traumatic because, as we shall soon see, Adolf at the age of three had seen—or imagined that he had seen—his drunken father rape his beloved young mother.

He still is the pain + excitement of thinking of Alois on Klara.

THE MOTHER: KLARA POLZL HITLER

Unhappiness was the lot of Klara Polzl, the woman who was to become Adolf Hitler's mother. All her life she was pushed about to accommodate the wishes of others.

At the age of 16 she left the family farm to become a member of

Alois's household. Then she w demand of her employer's con was stricken with tuberculosis small children who belonged her. "Strangely enough," one does not seem to have aroused Fanni in Ranshofen and joined to nurse her back to health."

Rather than proving that saintly kindness and endurance strated her capacity to suppress refusal to help her rival and to have been the more direct at she had received." It is of course peasant culture dominated by natural behavior what a more tolerated. But there is no indication of this. She was not a saintly woman. She was a woman of control and subtle complexity not only resentment and rage but had been living with him in before the marriage. She was carefully instructed in the catechisms of the little community of opportunity to forget her sins Klara, the devoted Catholic, felt her transgressions against her younger second wife Fanni. As women had been stuck down on living with their husband and the need for penance and alone despite the presence of her lot: five children and abject obedience to nesses to bear gossip and scandal tured into the streets of the town

Klara began her married life Fanni's children, Alois Jr., age 1, then 2, was added the care of her after his birth, a second child, Otto, who died within a few days surviving children contracted di

The interpretation of Klara H Bromberg, M.D. "Hitler's Childhood. (1974). I have also profited from Hitler's childhood and family life.

138

In a certain real sense—that is, of psychological reality, AH does see official authority as having some power.

he sees his father as the spirit of official authority, in will tremble inside on being presented at last to Hindenburg and the old goat, all but surely, nonetheless, causes his fear, Adolf is in a sick rage as he sees

when he came to power, transfer in his own hands 1931 1932 to have pre-serve the weight of official authority

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL GOD: ADOLF HITLER

guilt engendered by his wish to destroy his father. He may have tried to justify to others and to himself his bitter hatred by insisting that Alois was a cruel and vicious man who deserved a son's animosity. It may be objected that even if young Hitler was beaten by his father, many other children in Austria were certainly whipped without, apparently, receiving the psychic scars that Hitler suffered. "Well," one might say, "all boys in Austria were beaten on their backsides, so what's the difference?" The difference, as Erik Erikson has noted in his study of Luther, is this: with Hitler, as with Luther, a sensitive man remembered those punishments and talked bitterly about them later, showing that the whippings had indeed have an effect on his development. Erikson wrote: "The assertion that the cause was too common to have an uncommon effect on one individual is neither clinically nor biographically valid. We must try to ascertain the relationship of cause and effect and see if a unique element may have given the common event a specific meaning." In Hitler's case, as in Luther's, the fact that the whippings were remembered and resented, and that he hated his father for giving them, indicates that they had an uncommon effect upon him.

The workings of hatred and love, of pleasure and pain, are complex. Hatred may be a distortion of love: pleasure may be sought through pain. Consciously, Adolf certainly resented the beatings and hated his father for hurting him; unconsciously, he may have desired the punishment as a way of winning his father's attention and love. We are suggesting the possibility that the sadomasochism we shall observe in the adult Hitler had its beginnings here. Clinical studies have shown that often, as children, people with masochistic tendencies baited their fathers into whipping them. "The desire to be punished or humiliated," a specialist in the pathology of masochism has written, is another way of "wanting to be loved . . . being beaten and being loved are fused into one single masochistic expression."³⁰

As with all little boys, Adolf's image of his father was heavily influenced by the picture he had of his father's sexual relations with his mother. For Hitler this memory was traumatic because, as we shall soon see, Adolf at the age of three had seen—or imagined that he had seen—his drunken father rape his beloved young mother.

(The stick in the pain & excitement of thinking of Alois or Klara.)

THE MOTHER: KLARA PÖLZL HITLER

IV-8

Unhappiness was the lot of Klara Pölzl, the woman who was to become Adolf Hitler's mother. All her life she was pained about to accommodate the wishes of others.

At the age of 16 she left the family farm to become a member of

The Child As Father to the Man

Alois's household. When the demand of her employer's son was stricken with tuberculosis: small children who belonged over. "Strangely enough," one does not seem to have aroused Fanni in Ranshofen and joined to nurse her back to health."

Rather than proving that saintly kindness, and endurance, strated her capacity to suppress refusal to help her rival and to have been the more direct as she had received. It is of course peasant culture dominated by natural behavior what a more tolerated. But there is no indication normal or dull. She was not a sensitivity, she was a woman control and subdue complex I not only resentment and rage by

Klara had been living with had become pregnant by him in before their marriage. She was carefully instructed in the catechisms of the little community of opportunity to forget her sins Klara, the devoted Catholic, felt her transgressions against both younger second wife Fanni. As women had been stuck down on living with their husband and the need for penance and atone docile acceptance of her lot: fit children and absolute obedience to ness to bear gossip and scandal tured into the streets of the town

Klara began her married life Fanni's children, Alois Jr., age 1, then added the care of her mother his birth, a second child, Otto, who died within a few days surviving children contracted di

The interpretation of Klara H Bronberg, M.D., "Hitler's Childhood. (1974). I have also profited from Hitler's childhood and family life.

In a certain real sense - that is, of psychological reality, AH does all official authority as being some

he sees his father as the agent of official authority. He will tremble inside on being presented at last to Himmler and the old goat, all but surely, nonetheless causes his fear. Adolf is in a sick rape, less in

to have pre-verse being weight of official authority

at 17 he says his mother was betrayed by him. This great love

the whole thing is a great love and a great love

138

1931

1932

[929-31]

activity. So he kept her and held her at arms' length, afraid to advance and afraid to retreat.

Geli Raubal was the only woman he had ever loved, and inevitably the one-sided love affair proceeded stormily. While she enjoyed the attention she received when in his company, she appears to have been less happy with his private attentions. According to Ernst Hanfstaengl, who knew Hitler well but was never among his intimates, the love affair took on pathological forms. As an artist, Hitler claimed the right to draw her in the nude and produced a number of obscene drawings, which were later stolen and bought back from a blackmailer, and it was said that he whipped her with his bull-hide whip. Hanfstaengl disliked Geli Raubal from the moment he set eyes on her, and the stories he tells about her are not entirely trustworthy. He reports at second or third hand that she once said: "My uncle is a monster. You would never believe the things he makes me do." It is possible that she once said these words: so might any ward bothered by her guardian's attentions. Whatever demands he made on her, she almost certainly accommodated herself to them, for she lived in his apartment for two years. What she seems to have feared most of all were not his sexual advances and bull-hide whip so much as his jealous rages, his screams and denunciations.

She had a soft, pleasant singing voice and a ringing laugh, and it was not long before she began to take singing lessons. Hitler approved, hoping that she would develop into a professional singer. She studied first under Adolf Vogel, an early party member who enjoyed much success as a teacher, and then under Hans Streck, who had once been Ludendorff's adjutant and was famous in Munich because at the time of the 1923 putsch he walked boldly toward the police with Ludendorff, while the others were running for cover. Neither Vogel nor Streck found any great talent in her. Streck, whose studio was in the nearby Gedonstrasse, gave her three lessons a week and was paid 100 marks a month. Hanfstaengl, whose wife also took lessons under Streck, reports that the teacher complained of her laziness. "Half the time she rings up to say that she can't come," he complained, "and when she does come, she learns very little."

The truth was that Geli Raubal was as self-indulgent as her famous uncle, but unlike him she was totally without ambition. She was also hot-headed, unpredictable, and jealous of the attentions he paid to other women. Inevitably there would come a time when she would have to choose between being a free agent and being a helpless prisoner. The storm had been brewing for two years. It ended on the evening of September 18, 1931.

There had been words between them during the afternoon, while

Hitler was preparing to take him to Hamburg. He had heard confused reports and give it to her. It was something more than to go to Vienna. They and jumpy. Their unusually prolonged the black Mercedes deliver that evening control of himself. down the stairs to overlooking the street. Then the aut

Although full of de after Hitler's departure. Winter she was quiet her bedroom and visiting her mother. reason for Annie Winter there had been would be many more.

Geli shut herself a girl friend, who consequence, and one of Hitler's was shot, and Hitler is that she had wrapped sound. She was dead.

The next morning received no answer. broke down the door. blue nightdress at had been dead for

Annie Winter was done. She telephoned order, and Hess, and in Hitler's good grace. A scandal was uncovered. police would soon find clues and collect many scores to settle only to discover that

The Life & Death of A.H. - Payne

Hitler was preparing to leave for an extended motor tour that would take him to Hamburg. Exactly what was said is unknown. The servants heard confused shouting. Geli wanted something, and he refused to give it to her. It might have been her freedom or it may have been something more concrete, like permission to see someone or permission to go to Vienna. The Föhn wind was blowing, making everyone nervous and jumpy. Their quarrels were usually soon over, but this one was unusually prolonged and exhausting. Hitler was on a tight schedule, the black Mercedes-Benz was waiting for him, and he had a speech to deliver that evening to party members in Nuremberg. At last he lost all control of himself and screamed at her in fury, and then abruptly ran down the stairs to his waiting automobile. Geli ran to the balcony overlooking the street and he shouted up at her: "For the last time, no!" Then the automobile vanished down the street. *married?*

Although full details of the quarrel are unknown, Geli's movements after Hitler's departure are reasonably certain. According to Annie Winter she was quite calm and composed. She said she was going to her bedroom and was not to be disturbed. She said something about visiting her mother at Obersalzberg the following day. There was no reason for Annie Winter to believe that Geli was in any serious trouble, for there had been many similar quarrels before and no doubt there would be many more in the future.

Geli shut herself up in her bedroom, wrote some letters, telephoned a girl friend, who said later that they had spoken about nothing of any consequence, and about midnight shot herself through the heart with one of Hitler's Walter 6.35 revolvers. None of the servants heard the shot, and Hitler is supposed to have told Eva Braun many years later that she had wrapped the revolver in a damp face towel to muffle the sound. She was dead at the age of twenty-three.

The next morning, when Annie Winter knocked on the door and received no answer, she summoned her husband and together they broke down the door. They found Geli Raubal lying on the floor in a blue nightdress at the foot of a sofa. The revolver lay on the sofa. She had been dead for many hours.

Annie Winter was devoted to Hitler and knew exactly what had to be done. She telephoned Rudolf Hess, a doctor, and the police in that order, and Hess, accompanied by Gregor Strasser, who was once again in Hitler's good graces, hurried to the scene before the doctor arrived. A scandal was unavoidable; there would be newspaper headlines; the police would soon be streaming through the apartment, looking for clues and collecting every stray document they could find, for they had many scores to settle with Hitler. Hess telephoned the Nuremberg hotel only to discover that Hitler had just left, and a messenger boy was sent

1934

off in a taxi to find him and give him the news. Hitler drove back to Munich at breakneck speed, and the tour to Hamburg was abandoned.

When Hitler returned to the apartment, he was in a state of collapse. Hess, Strasser, and Franz Xavier Schwarz, the party treasurer, had taken charge and were already in touch with Dr. Franz Guertner, the Bavarian Minister of Justice. At all costs the scandal had to be hushed up, and Guertner was in an excellent position to see that all the usual legal formalities were dispensed with. There was no formal police investigation and no inquest, for Guertner decided that it was a clear case of suicide. Hitler went to stay with friends in a villa overlooking the Tegern Lake, prostrate with grief. He was not examined by the police, and since he had a morbid fear of death it is unlikely that he saw Geli in her coffin.

He was not yet the dictator of Germany and could not order the press to be silent. The *Münchener Post*, a Socialist newspaper, came out with a long and circumstantial report of the suicide, saying that it resulted from a particularly violent argument between Hitler and his niece over her desire to leave his apartment and settle in Vienna, where she intended to marry a young Viennese. An unmailed letter to a girl friend in Vienna, which was found in the apartment, said she hoped to leave soon. The newspaper added that when the body was found the doctors observed extensive bruises, and the bridge of her nose was broken. Two days later the *Völkischer Beobachter* issued a categorical denial under Hitler's signature and threatened legal proceedings. The *Münchener Post* was not unduly disturbed by the threat and came out with another long and circumstantial article, adding a note of surprise that Hitler's own newspaper gave less coverage to the suicide of his niece than to the death of a street fighter. There were no more reports, perhaps because everything had already been said.

Rumor fastened on Geli Raubal's suicide, and even within the party there was the feeling that the true story had not been told. From time to time the Sunday supplements came up with lurid accounts of wild parties at the Prinzregentenplatz apartment. It was said that she was killed by Himmler at Hitler's orders because she had disgraced him by becoming pregnant by a Jewish boy friend, or because she was blackmailing Hitler, or for a number of other reasons. The truth was probably much simpler and, in human terms, more terrible. Hitler had driven her to her death by his vicious rages and by an infatuation which could not be resolved in any normal way. He had not intended to kill her, but he had killed her as surely as if he had held the gun to her heart.

Her death shattered him and brought him to the edge of suicide. For two weeks he lived in total seclusion in Gregor Strasser's house, so

withdrawn and slept badly, and Angela Raubal in Vienna, where C was conducted a under no illusion refuses to bury circumstances. The mental aberration for his acts. Such uncontrollable for the belief that involuntarily.

According to from committing to surrender the heroic measures regretted. Less th

Since the Aus if he ever set fo be granted to pu burial of Geli, I on Austrian soil spent two or thr night. Seven yea grave for a secon

For the remain woman he had d or rites; he dem. carried her photograph of h she killed hersel Annie Winter, w it. An obscure s sioned to paint h full length, occu salzberg, and th Hitler was so r Ziegler presiden complete authori Thorak, was con occupied a place remained with hi

withdrawn and silent that he resembled a ghost. He refused to eat, slept badly, and was incapable of conducting party affairs. Meanwhile Angela Raubal had arranged for the burial in the Central Cemetery in Vienna, where Geli had spent most of her youth, and the burial service was conducted according to the Christian rite by Father Pant, who was under no illusions about the cause of her death. The Catholic Church refuses to bury suicides in consecrated ground except in very rare circumstances. There must be evidence that the person was in a state of mental aberration and confusion, and therefore not wholly responsible for his acts. Such suicides are regarded as involuntary, brought about by uncontrollable forces. Father Pant conducted the funeral ceremony in the belief that she had been murdered or had committed suicide involuntarily.

According to Gregor Strasser, Hitler had to be physically prevented from committing suicide. He was watched continually, and he was made to surrender the revolver he always carried with him. Strasser took heroic measures to keep Hitler alive, a fact that he later bitterly regretted. Less than three years later Hitler ordered his execution.

Since the Austrian Government had given orders for Hitler's arrest if he ever set foot on Austrian territory, a special dispensation had to be granted to permit him to visit the grave. About a week after the burial of Geli, Hitler received permission to spend twenty-four hours on Austrian soil. He arrived in Vienna, went straight to the cemetery, spent two or three hours there, and was back in Obersalzberg the same night. Seven years later, entering Austria in triumph, he visited the grave for a second time.

For the remainder of his life Hitler observed a cult in honor of the woman he had driven to death. It was a strange cult without ceremonies or rites; he demanded of her only that she be present at all times. He carried her photograph wherever he traveled, just as he carried the photograph of his mother. The room in the Prinzregentenplatz where she killed herself was kept exactly as she left it, and only Hitler and Annie Winter, who brought flowers every day, were permitted to enter it. An obscure second-rate painter named Adolf Ziegler was commissioned to paint her portrait from a photograph, and this painting, nearly full length, occupied a place of honor in the reception room at Obersalzberg, and there was always a bowl of fresh flowers beneath it. Hitler was so moved by the painter's work that he later appointed Ziegler president of the Academy of German Art, thus giving him complete authority over all German artists. A sculptor, Professor Josef Thorak, was commissioned to make a bust of Geli, which eventually occupied a place of honor in the Chancellery in Berlin. The cult of Geli remained with him to the last days of his life.

drove back to
was abandoned.
state of collapse.
er, had taken
er, the Bavarian
hushed up, and
the usual legal
police investi-
as a clear case of
overlooking the
ed by the police,
that he saw Geli

uld not order the
newspaper, came
ide, saying that it
en Hitler and his
e in Vienna, where
led letter to a girl
said she hoped to
ody was found the
of her nose was
ssued a categorical
d proceedings. The
reat and came out
a note of surprise
the suicide of his
re no more reports,

en within the party
en told. From time
d accounts of wild
said that she was
d disgraced him by
use she was black-
he truth was prob-
terrible. Hitler had
n infatuation which
not intended to kill
eld the gun to her

edge of suicide. For
Strasser's house, so

* This traffic with the dead, this strange need for continual communion with the woman he had loved and killed, brought him dangerously close to insanity. In time he came to believe that her suicide was an act of extraordinary nobility and heroism to be remembered at moments of disaster and defeat; and he remembered vividly at the time of the crushing disaster at Stalingrad that she had acted more nobly than his generals.

She was of his blood and his flesh, almost a daughter and almost a wife, closer to him than anyone else in the world. To have caused her death was to have committed the ultimate crime; the guilt would remain, never to be washed away. Henceforth, he was free from all the conventional ties of morality and could be as hard and ruthless as he pleased. Murders, treacheries, the vilest abominations, the annihilation of nations meant nothing to him. He had gone beyond good and evil, and entered a strange landscape where nothing was what it seemed to be and all the ordinary human values were reversed. Like Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor, he succumbed to "the dread spirit of death and destruction," and was free to bring death and destruction to everyone and everything he encountered.

* Dr. Every people is a demon.

Lenin once spoke of the strange are the r

Hitler liked to power," as though to his will. But in backroom maneuvering, trialists and arm terrorized the people, resources of total war, a majority of voters still a rather shy from the wings back. His ferocity, his tiresomely regular figure. Actors in and reducing the dangerous he was.

In August, 1918, the Ministers, voting war for all the authority of a national confidence in Germany, economic recovery, rising from the fact for a man to live had lived in 1920 hard work, increasing

), the Chancellor
ult or conservative
s read accept one
rian of von Ben-
gover t, possibly
ent. F. er, nothing
his lib period Bis-
at he l to foresee
the co omise with
mesti onconciliation

stabil: ent of the
polit arties and
e, and arck's re-
pose to try and
The t oups were
cial I crats. One
parti the Reich.
re Re inde, ene-
n he eered them
s their rnational-
arty : German
Chu ndeniably
stitut ecause the
rient was called
booked yond the

er so sting and
ssing lines. All
part. ere class-
ere ti ty of the

nobility, the Liberals the party of the rising bourgeoisie, the Social Democrats initially purely a workers' party. The Center on the other hand was not tied to any particular interest group. It encompassed all classes. There was a Catholic nobility, even a Catholic high nobility, a large Catholic bourgeoisie, and, of course, many Catholic workers. The Center tried to integrate all these classes and to resolve their differences internally. This was something entirely new, a kind of party heretofore unknown in Germany or for that matter in Europe—a people's party. Today, of course, almost all governing parties are inclusive.

It was precisely this supraclass structure that Bismarck could not abide. He knew how to deal with class distinctions and was very conscious of his own class, the Prussian land-owning nobility. He was not averse to negotiation with other classes and class-based parties. But a party that represented no class was a state within a state, a Reichsfeind, and that is why in the 1870s he tried to smash them rather than deal with them as he had dealt with the Liberals in the 1860s, first opposing them and then pacifying them. In this he failed. The Center was a powerful party from the very beginning, and in the decade of the seventies, the time of the so-called *Kulturkampf*, Bismarck's war of annihilation against the Center, it continued to grow stronger.

The Social Democrats, on the other hand, were a class party, and Bismarck could understand

1911 31
136

31

Liberals from 1867 to 1879, the Iron Chancellor pursued a liberal course built on a conservative base. At the end he even was ready to accept one of the Liberals, the Hanoverian Rudolf von Bennigsen, into the Prussian government, possibly even as vice minister president. However, nothing came of that. Still, during his liberal period Bismarck stood by his word. What he failed to foresee was that after 1871, despite the compromise with the National Liberals, domestic reconciliation was no longer in the cards.

Concurrent with the establishment of the Reich two completely new political parties and forces appeared on the scene, and Bismarck's response to the challenge they posed was to try and stamp them out. He failed. The two groups were the Center party and the Social Democrats. One might say they were the real parties of the Reich. In Bismarck's eyes they were *Reichsfeinde*, enemies of the Reich. The reason he considered them as enemies of the Reich was their internationalism. The Center was the party of the German Catholics, and the Catholic Church undeniably was and is a supranational institution. Because the Center was strongly Rome-oriented, it was called "ultramontane"—since it looked "beyond the mountains" toward Rome.

But what made the Center so interesting and different was its success in crossing class lines. All the other German political parties were class-based. The Conservatives were the party of the

nobility, the Liberal bourgeoisie, the Social workers' party. It was not tied to an encompassed all class, even a Catholic bourgeoisie, or workers. The Center classes and to resolve. This was something heretofore unknown in Europe—a party almost all governing.

It was precisely Bismarck could not with class distinction his own class, the Prussian. He was not averse to classes and class-based represented no class *Reichsfeind*, and that to smash them rather had dealt with the imposing them and they failed. The Center was very beginning, and in the time of the so-called war of annihilation used to grow stronger.

The Social Democrats were a class party, an

AH 31
from
BG

1930, 1931, 1932

Hitler Comes to Power 11 B

It is equally true that Hindenburg was able to appoint Brüning and the other, later minority, chancellors only because by March 1930 the Reichstag itself was no longer able to form a majority government. Had a majority chancellor been proposed, Hindenburg would most likely have appointed him and let him govern. He never envisaged a coup d'état or wished Hitler to come to power. He only sought to profit from the given situation, from what we have described as a stalemate. Today we know that the Müller cabinet, had it not broken up, could have survived the worst part of the international economic crisis with a sound parliamentary majority, since its legislative term did not expire until May 1932. Instead, the Reichstag was prematurely dissolved and in the elections of September 1930 Hitler won his first major breakthrough.

This is worth repeating. The Müller cabinet was not overthrown in March 1930; it resigned. It is well known that the coalition partners could not agree on a question of unemployment benefits. But to see this as the reason for the resignation of the cabinet would be to confuse the long-term cause with the immediate trigger. The crucial factor was the structural stalemate of the Weimar Republic. Under the conditions of a stalemate Hindenburg was able to appoint his conservative minority chancellors. When they were no longer tolerated by the Reichstag, the state became ungovernable. In the course of the periodic elections held in hopes of providing these minority chancellors with a majority, the Nazi party became instead the strongest party. Still Hindenburg refused to appoint Hitler after these elections; he declined explicitly in August 1931 and again in November 1932.

We have to ask, therefore, why he changed his mind in January 1933. The answer is clear. The Conservative party in the meantime had been persuaded to form a coalition with the Nazi party and Hitler had reduced his demands. Apart

mis
1931

15

W

Hitler and Occult Sex

We are told Hitler indulged in occult initiation rites "derived from the horrible sexual magic of Aleister Crowley,"¹ one of the most infamous black magicians of the twentieth century and dubbed by the British Press—with its passion for superlatives—as the "world's wickedest man." However, the two most persistent claims regarding Hitler's sexuality are contradictory and irreconcilable: (1) Hitler had perverted sexual desires, most often involving sado-masochism; (2) Hitler was not interested in sex. The opposing characteristics came to be personified in Geli Raubal, the daughter of Hitler's half-sister, Angela. Angela moved in as housekeeper for him in 1928. Geli was then seventeen and Hitler quickly became fascinated with her² despite the fact that there was more than a twenty-year difference in their ages.

The affection Hitler felt for the pretty, superficial niece soon developed into a passionate relationship, "hopelessly burdened by his intolerance, his romantic ideal of womanhood, and avuncular scruples."³ However, both sides at first felt they benefited from the relationship. Geli enjoyed being with her uncle, especially as his political rise from 1929 to 1931 began to bring him fame.⁴ Hitler rather enjoyed the aura of bohemian freedom and the suggestion of a grand and fateful passion in the liaison between uncle and niece.⁵

All that was to change in an outburst of violence. It began

* D.T. what appealed to him most
was the incest ¹⁵⁹ — only the exceptional
exceptional could dip into such secrets.

1931 mis

160 W HITLER AND THE OCCULT

The War Path
p 109

one night when Hitler found out that Geli had made love to his chauffeur, Emil Maurice, the man who was her real love. Perhaps Geli had come to realize in that moment of anger that she could never have a life of her own. In any case, on 18 September 1931 she shot herself* through the heart using Hitler's own 6.35mm Walther pistol.⁷

Hitler was stunned and completely baffled. No other event in his personal life had affected him as strongly as this. For weeks he seemed close to a nervous breakdown. In his fits of gloom he even spoke of suicide.⁸ Hitler turned Geli's room in their Prinzregentstrasse apartment (in Munich) into a shrine and spent hours alone in it.⁹ The emotional damage he suffered was never repaired, claims Irving.¹⁰

Ravenscroft claims that apart from Rauschnig¹¹ the other leading biographers of Hitler fail altogether to understand that a "monstrous sexual perversion was the very core of his whole existence, the source of his mediumistic and clairvoyant powers and the motivation behind every act through which he reaped a sadistic vengeance on humanity."¹² He only knew sexual fulfillment through the extremes of sadism and masochism, sexual delight either through inflicting pain on others or from suffering pain himself. In his early days in Vienna Hitler would furtively retire to the red-light district to have himself tied and whipped by any prostitute¹³ who was willing to earn a few miserable *hellers*.†

There is some circumstantial evidence in support of these claims of perversion: Bromberg claims that the only way Hitler could get full sexual satisfaction was to watch a young woman as she

*Just over a year after Geli's death, on the evening of 8 November 1932, Stalin's wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva, argued with him at a Kremlin party and walked out. At thirty-one, Nadezhda was, like Geli with Hitler, twenty years younger than Stalin and attempting to make a life of her own. Much to her husband's displeasure, she had enrolled as a chemistry student at Moscow's Industrial Academy and travelled to and from the Kremlin by public transport. This assertion of her independence only added to the already longstanding yet strained personal relations between the two. That night she committed suicide, like Geli, by shooting herself.

†Old Austrian currency.

mis 1931
 D. T. Ali, the old ~~clucking~~ ^{clucking} that
 his father ~~grovelled~~ ^{grovelled} ~~in his heart and in his ass~~ ^{in his heart and in his ass} ~~of the power of the Arch. Brannen~~ ^{Hitler and Occult Sex 161}
 squatted over his head and urinated or defecated in his face. Brom-
 berg also writes of "an episode of erotogenic masochism involv-
 ing a young German actress at whose feet Hitler threw himself,
 asking her to kick him. When she demurred, he pleaded with
 her to comply with his wish, heaping accusations on himself and
 grovelling at her feet in such an agonizing manner, that she finally
 acceded. When she kicked him, he became excited, and as she
 continued to kick him at his urging, he became increasingly ex-
 cited." Bromberg adds that the difference in age between Hitler
 and the young women with whom he had any sexual involvement
 was usually close to the twenty-three year difference between his
 parents. ¹⁴ Alfred Hitler pp 194-5

Miller appears to accept without question the authenticity of
 this account, although similar lurid sex tales, often without the
 slightest foundation and with only small variations on the above,
 circulate widely, not only about other dictators, but many well-
 known persons.

According to Suster, Hitler had another fantasy that involved
 an image of himself as a Teutonic Knight of the Holy Grail, a
 man of pure and noble mien. However, there was too much hate
 in his heart for him to be content merely with the truly pure and
 noble. There were, for example, "those frightful sexual urges which
 completely overwhelmed him, and reduced the perfect knight to
 an abject object, half-crazed with lust, yet unable to summon the
 words that would bring him satisfaction from a pure Nordic
 maiden."¹⁵

Looking inside Hitler's head Suster writes:

There was a beautiful blonde German woman so superior to
 his own foul desires, chained to a pillar, completely helpless.
 Gloating over her was a fat, bald, hook-nosed, perspiring and
 lascivious Jewish butcher, a monstrous subhuman bent upon
 defiling the girl's purity. And there was her rescuer, Adolf Hitler,
 knight of the Grail to whom the woman looked for deliverance.
 But this hero was only a sham, a coward, a pathetic imitation
 of a warrior and he could only watch in hopeless despair, helpless
 and disgraced as the Jewish dragon pawed, clawed, and raped

It was there he believed he
 could merge with the Jew and acquire
 his secrets.

D. T.
 So
 over
 wrought
 no
 over-
 simple.
 He was
 close
 to what
 because
 D. T.

It could be himself as a Jew with
 god and a secret writing to his mother

* D.T. A meaningless discovery. It
 is ~~what does occasionally~~ *the fact that is still alive, which*
 162 HITLER AND THE OCCULT *proves significant*
 1931 U

the German maiden. He would wake up screaming, the Jews must be destroyed. It was no use Freud telling him that the Jew of his nightmare was but his own suppressed sexuality.¹⁶

As far as his niece's role in Hitler's sex life is concerned, some sources claim that the real reason for Geli's death was that she was driven to it as a result of Hitler demanding she commit abnormal sexual acts. While Irving says Hitler jealously guarded Geli, he insists that, contrary to the claims of abnormal sex between them made by Ravenscroft and others, she did not even have normal intimate relations with him.¹⁷ Hitler's sex life in general terms was "quite normal," although in the last ten years of his life his natural libido was somewhat diminished: his medical records show only half the usual secretion of testis hormone in his blood, comparable to that of a busy executive or a man serving a long prison sentence.¹⁸

Apart from not having a sexual relationship with his niece, clinical psychologist Edleff Schwaab doubts that Hitler had sexual contact with Eva Braun, his mistress in later life.¹⁹ This claim is contrary to Ravenscroft's view that it is "common knowledge" Hitler's whole relationship with Braun followed more or less the same sexual pattern as it had with his niece: She suffered his tyranny at all other times except in the bedroom where she became the all-powerful mistress and he the groveling slave.²⁰

Despite the conflicting claims of Ravenscroft and Irving, there is a strong presumption that Hitler was incapable of normal sexual relations, whether for physical or psychological reasons, or both.²¹ Bullock says Putzi Hanfstaengel, who was one of Hitler's closest companions up to the mid-1930s, maintained that Hitler was impotent and that his "abounding nervous energy" found no normal release. He lived in a sexual no man's land where he only once nearly found a woman who might have given him relief—Geli.²²

Schwaab concludes that Hitler was neither a sexual satyr nor impotent but a truly asexual male. Schwaab appears to blame this in great part on Hitler's lack of contact with women, which had made him an emotional cripple. As a youth in Vienna he had never experienced "the surprises and acute personal conflicts" of romantic entanglements. His identity as a man was never

Party Leader, 1889-1933

apt for law. Hitler had in his preoccupation with promise the revolutionary as to rob it of its attrac-

e S.A., which was to be Party's revolutionary pur- S.A. slogans was: 'Pos- key to power in the State,' 1930 the political struggle actions was supplemented street fights of the Party

ese gang feuds in Febru- S.A. leader, Horst Wessel, nists. Goebbels skilfully ype of the martyred Nazi s provided the S.A. with imous *Horst Wessel Lied*. 1930 the authorities issued against outdoor meetings, eck the growth of public s proved ineffective; for- wn shirts, the Nazis pa- ter night they and the ormation, broke up rival p opponents, and raided the unemployment rose, unted: the S.A. offered a unionship and excitement. npaign was incessant ac- of propaganda and agita- this the S.A. had an es- it was propaganda that S.A. were to be the shock t was never to be made. ep the spirit of the S.A. find an outlet in revolu-

The Years of Waiting, 1924-31

1930, 87C-
tionary action; to use them as a threat of civil war, yet never to let them get so far out of hand as to compromise his plan of coming to power without a head-on collision with the forces of the State, above all with the Army.

At the end of 1930 Hitler had considerable cause for satisfaction. Party membership was rising towards the four hundred thousand figure. In the Reichstag the Nazi—every man in brown uniform—had already shown their strength and their contempt for Parliament by creating such disorder that the sittings had to be frequently suspended. In the streets the S.A., by calculated hooliganism, had forced the Government to ban the anti-militarist film *All Quiet on the Western Front*.

Hitler was in no danger of underestimating the opposition to his leadership which still existed in the Party. Success alone would silence criticism, but now success no longer seemed impossible. He had reached the threshold of power.

At the beginning of January 1931, Ernst Röhm, already reinstated as a Party member, was requested by Hitler to take over new duties as Chief of Staff of the S.A. He immediately set to work to make the S.A. by far the most efficient of the Party armies. The organization was closely modelled on that of the Army, with its own headquarters and General Staff quite separate from the organization of the Party, and its own training college for S.A. and S.S. leaders, opened at Munich in June 1931. When Röhm took over, the S.A. numbered roughly a hundred thousand men; a year later Hitler could claim three hundred thousand.

The direction of the Party in the years 1931 and 1932 was for all practical purposes in the hands of six men—Hitler himself, Röhm, Gregor Strasser, Göring, Goebbels, and Frick. Röhm was important as

an organizer and for his contacts with the Army. Göring, with his wide range of acquaintances and his good-humoured charm, became Hitler's chief political 'contact-man' in the capital, with a general commission to negotiate with other parties and groups. The leader of the Nazi Party in the Reichstag was Dr. Wilhelm Frick. An early and convinced National Socialist, he was useful to Hitler as a good administrator and a man who knew thoroughly the machinery and the mentality of the German civil service. Both Gregor Strasser and Goebbels were able speakers. Strasser possessed the personality to be a leader in his own right if he bestirred himself; Goebbels, undersized, lame and much disliked for his malicious tongue, was useful for his abounding energy and fertility of ideas.

So highly organized a machine must have cost large sums of money to run. A good deal of money, of course, came from the Party itself—from membership dues, from the sale of Party newspapers and literature, from the admission charges and collections at the big meetings. There is no doubt that the Party made heavy demands on its members—even the unemployed S.A. men had to hand over their unemployment-benefit money in return for their food and shelter. Almost certainly the proportion of revenue which was raised by the Party itself has been underestimated. But there were also subsidies from interested supporters.

The main support for the Nazis came from a powerful group of coal and steel producers in the Rhineland and Westphalia, including Emil Kirdorf, the biggest figure in the Ruhr coal industry, and Fritz Thyssen and Albert Voegler of the United Steel Works. But however much Hitler received from industrialists and bankers, he was not a political puppet created by the capitalists. They were to discover, like the conservative politicians and the generals, that, contrary to the popular belief, bankers and business

men are too innocent for
played by a man like Hitler

In speaking of the Nazis there is a danger of mistaking the Nazi Party was no more democratic sense of that which the Party is today; it was against the State. The Party's important to win support, and for this reason, it had to be kept unaltered to become a subject for discussion. The real object was to get their hands on the gutter élite, avid for wealth; the sole object of their power by one means or another.

No State, if it was resolved to do so, could tolerate the kind of organization implied. If the people at this time had been really against the Nazi movement they would have stopped it. Why did they lack the will to do so? On this there are several answers.

First, Hitler's tactics of keeping the maximum advantage of the substitution of the Weimar Republic was enough to realize that he was the gainer, in any attempt to do so long as he kept within the limits which the authorities could fetter the authorities by using legal processes.

Second, the government 1932 had enough difficulties winter of 1930-1 the economy, bore down more heavily. Hitler found no difficulty in the economic distress of the government's policy, particularly saddled with reparation pay-

tacts with the Army. f acquaintances and his Hitler's chief political with a general commis- arties and groups. The the Reichstag was Dr. convinced National So- as a good administra- roughly the machinery man civil service. Both is were able speakers. ality to be a leader in himself; Goebbels, un- icked for his malicious abounding energy and

chine must have cost A good deal of money, / itself—from member- Party newspapers and n charges and collec- re is no doubt that the on its members—even to hand over their un- return for their food ly the proportion of the Party itself has re were also subsidies

azis came from a pow- roducers in the Rhine- ig Emil Kirdorf, the al industry, and Fritz of the United Steel tler received from in- s not a political puppet were to discover, like id the generals, that, bankers and business

men are too innocent for politics when the game is played by a man like Hitler.

In speaking of the Nazi movement as a 'party' there is a danger of mistaking its true character. For the Nazi Party was no more a party, in the normal democratic sense of that word, than the Communist Party is today; it was an organized conspiracy against the State. The Party's programme was important to win support, and, for psychological reasons, it had to be kept unalterable and never allowed to become a subject for discussion. But the leaders' real object was to get their hands on the State. They were the gutter élite, avid for power, position, and wealth; the sole object of the Party was to secure power by one means or another.

No State, if it was resolved to remain master in its own house, could tolerate the threat such an organization implied. If the people in authority in Germany at this time had been really determined to smash the Nazi movement they would have found the means. Why did they lack the will and the determination? To this there are several answers.

First, Hitler's tactics of legality enabled him to win the maximum advantage from the democratic constitution of the Weimar Republic. He was shrewd enough to realize that he would be the loser, not the gainer, in any attempt to resort to force, whereas so long as he kept within the letter of the law he could fetter the authorities with their own slow-moving legal processes.

Second, the government in Germany in 1931 and 1932 had enough difficulties already. Throughout the winter of 1930-1 the economic crisis, far from lifting, bore down more heavily on the German people. Hitler found no difficulty in laying the blame for all the economic distress of the country on the Government's policy, particularly as Germany was still saddled with reparation payments.

Finally, a stinging rebuff in foreign policy occurred when France, supported by Italy and Czechoslovakia, took the German Foreign Minister's proposal to form an Austro-German Customs Union as a move towards the political and territorial union of Austria with Germany which was expressly forbidden by the Treaties of Versailles and St Germain. The measures taken by the French helped to precipitate the German financial crisis of the summer and forced the German Foreign Minister to announce that the project was being abandoned. The result was a sharp humiliation on the Government of Chancellor Heinrich Brüning and the inflaming of national resentment in Germany.

Faced with such difficulties, both in domestic and foreign policy, any government was likely to hesitate before adding to its problems by the uproar which the suppression of the Nazi Party, the second largest in the Reichstag, would inevitably have entailed, so long as Hitler was clever enough to avoid any flagrant act of illegality. The refusal of the German parties to sink their differences and jointly assume responsibility for the unpopular measures which had to be taken drove Brüning into a dangerous dependence on support of the President and the Army. The attitude of both towards the Nazis was equivocal. Here was the third reason for the reluctance to take action against the Nazis.

From the beginning of 1930, General Wilhelm Groener, the Minister of Defence, a man of integrity and experience, had been uneasily conscious that a good many members of the Officer Corps were becoming sympathetic to the Nazis. The nationalist appeal of Nazi propaganda and its promise of a powerful Germany with an expanded Army were beginning to have their effect. The Army could still be relied on to support Brüning if Hitler attempted to make a putsch, but it was not at all certain that the Government would be able to count on the Army if it was

a question of suppressing the pretext of revolt.

In October 1931 the President Hindenburg, was eighty-four, ment as he had ever had was about most of all was the German had spent his life. Faithfully the Army, Hindenburg too was of force against the Nazis. He act if there was some unequivocal their part.

Even more important was General Kurt von Schleicher, virtually the authoritative in politics. Schleicher, a General charming, and ambitious—was politics and intrigue than in of a new department in his ministeramt, which handled all in the Army and Navy and acted armed services and other in this key position to make his powerful political figures in old friendship with Hindenburg entrée to the old man, who was pressed by what he said.

Schleicher's object was to ament which, in place of futile the economic and political need for the Army to intervene. In particular he feared the German Army should be a simultaneous Nazi and Communist

Schleicher, therefore, share responsible for—the reluctant Hindenburg to take any initiative. But he went further: impress at the elections and by their he began to play with the idea

verting the Nazi move-
into a prop of the exist-
battering ram directed

pan on the Army's em-
lists in arsenals and
ion of Nazi enlistment
er reaffirmed his ad-
ity by forbidding the
nting. During the suc-
ad several talks with
ays to work with the
31 he was ready to try
Hindenburg's re-elec-
the Nazis into support
ng their revolutionary

Hitler better. He had
zation, the strength of
question remained how
he had won into the
ne way of adding to the
n Hugenberg's German
31, Hitler and Hugen-
ed a statement to the
ard cooperate for the
stem'. But alliance with
rongly upper-class char-
much discontent in the
Although Hitler con-
use of the Nationalist
other course presented

policy of legality to suc-
one way, a possibility
n under which Germany
Chancellors were unable
majority or to win an
se the President's emer-

gency powers, thus transferring political power from
the nation to the little group of men round the
President. If Hitler could persuade these men to take
him into partnership and make him Chancellor, with
the right to use the President's emergency powers—
a presidential, as opposed to a parliamentary, gov-
ernment—then he could dispense with the clear elec-
toral majority which still eluded him and with the
risky experiment of a putsch.

Neither Schleicher nor the President was at all
satisfied with the existing situation. They did not be-
lieve that the President's emergency powers could
be made into a permanent basis for governing the
country. They were looking for a government which,
while prepared to take resolute action to deal with
the crisis, would also be able to win mass support in
the country, and, if possible, secure a majority in
the Reichstag. Brüning had failed to win such a
majority at the elections. Schleicher, therefore, be-
gan to look elsewhere for the mass support which he
felt to be necessary for the presidential government.

Hitler had two assets: the Nazi success at the elec-
tions was a promise of the support he would be able
to provide if he was brought in, and the organized
violence of the S.A. was a threat of the revolution
he might make if he were left out. Hitler's game,
therefore, from 1931 to 1933 was to use the revolu-
tion he was unwilling to make and the mass support
he was unable to turn into a majority, the first as a
threat, the second as a promise, to persuade the
President and his advisers to take him into partner-
ship and give him power.

This is the key to the complicated and tortuous
political moves of the period between the autumn of
1931 and 30 January 1933, when the game succeeded
and Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler as Chancel-
lor. During this period there were successive negotia-
tions between the Nazi leaders and the little group of
men who bore the responsibility for the experiment

er did not at the
by which he could
ed to speculate on
the Nationalists—
—or, better still, on
ht majority at the
iations broke down
es, but always with
ons.

ad admired the tac-
ned them up in two
s political activity,
ortance to winning
ed existence tended
their will to fight.
avan himself of all
his disposal, and to
ons over to his side,
ell-tried sources of
antage for his own
he way to 'winning
ce was threatened';
g the powerful exist-
above all the Army
waiting were at an

CHAPTER FOUR

1931

THE MONTHS OF OPPORTUNITY

9

October 1931-30 January 1933

The first contacts between Hitler and the men who disposed of power in Germany were scarcely auspicious. At the beginning of the autumn of 1931 Schleicher had a meeting with Hitler, arranged with Röhm's help, and subsequently persuaded the Chancellor, Brüning, and President Hindenburg to see him.

Brüning asked for Hitler's support until the reparations question was settled and Hindenburg re-elected as President. After this had been accomplished he was willing to retire and allow someone else more acceptable to the parties of the Right to take his place. Instead of giving a direct answer, Hitler launched into a monologue, the main point of which was that when he came to power he would not only get rid of Germany's debts but would re-arm and, with England and Italy as his allies, force France to her knees. He failed to impress the Chancellor, and the meeting ended inconclusively.

In his interview with President Hindenburg on 10 October, the first occasion on which the two men had met, Hitler was nervous and ill-at-ease. His niece, Geli Raubal, with whom he was in love, had committed suicide three weeks before, and he had wired to Göring, who was at the bedside of his dying wife in Sweden, to return and accompany him. Nazi accounts of the meeting are singularly reticent, but Hitler obviously made the mistake of talking too much and trying to impress the old man with his demagogic arts; instead he bored him. Hindenburg is said to have grumbled to Schleicher afterwards

that Hitler was an odd fellow who would never make a Chancellor, but, at most, a Minister of Posts.

Altogether it was a bad week for Hitler. The day after his interview with the President he took part in a great demonstration of the Right-wing 'National' opposition at Harzburg. Hugenberg, representing the Nationalists; Franz Seldte and Theodor Dürsterberg, the leaders of the Stahlhelm; Dr. Schacht and General von Seeckt; Graf Kalkreuth, the president of the Junkers' Land League, and half a score of figures from the Ruhr and Rhineland industries, all joined in passing a solemn resolution uniting the parties of the Right. They demanded the immediate resignation of Brüning's Government, followed by new elections. Hitler agreed to take part in the Rally with great reluctance, and Frick felt obliged to defend the decision to the Nazi contingent with a speech in which he said openly that they were only using the Nationalists as a convenient ladder to office. Hitler felt oppressed by his old lack of self-confidence in face of all these frock-coats, top-hats, Army uniforms, and formal titles. This was the Reaktion on parade, and the great radical Tribune was out of place. To add to his irritation, the Stahlhelm arrived in much greater numbers than the S.A., and Hugenberg and Seldte stole the limelight. Hitler declined to take part in the official procession, read his speech in a perfunctory fashion, and left before the Stahlhelm marched past. The united front of the National Opposition had virtually collapsed before it was established.

On 13 October, Brüning presented to the Reichstag a reconstituted government in which General Groener, the Minister of Defence—at Schleicher's suggestion—took over the Ministry of the Interior, and the Chancellor himself became Foreign Minister. In face of the Nationalists' and Nazis' demands for his resignation, Brüning appeared to be taking on a new

The Months of Opportunity

lease of political life, support of the Army and

Hitler expressed his course of events in an (published on 14 October) policy of the Government German interests.

Having delivered his 17 October to Brunswick thousand S.A. and S.S. ing base for six hours mollified his wounded trains and five thousand Shirts pouring into twenty-four new stand torchlight parade light was a show the like of the Stahlhelm nor the while they continued to support, Hitler already

Events continued to December 1931, the government passed the five-winter in Germany. B were poor comfort to primitive misery of his lack of hope, and Bri served manner, was no gramme of sacrifice and

The Nazis gained strength Following their success elections in May and a swept the board at the The threat and the pr

These facts were not who continued his task and December. Schleicher

allow who would never make a Minister of Posts.

week for Hitler. The day the President he took part of the Right-wing 'Nazis' Land League, and half the Ruhr and Rhineland

passing a solemn resolution of Right. They demanded the of Brüning's Government,

Hitler agreed to take part reluctantly, and Frick felt

sion to the Nazi contingent said openly that they were

as a convenient ladder to

by his old lack of self-con-

frock-coats, top-hats Army

s. This was the *Reaktion* on

ical Tribune was out of

tion, the Stahlhelm arrived

than the S.A., and Hugent-

imelight. Hitler declined to

cession, read his speech in

d left before the Stahlhelm

front of the National Op-

ollapsed before it was es-

presented to the Reichstag

nt in which General Groe-

ence—at Schleicher's sug-

nistry of the Interior, and

came Foreign Minister. In

nd Nazis' demands for his

ared to be taking on a new

lease of political life, with renewed proofs of the support of the Army and the President.

Hitler expressed his frustration and fury at the course of events in an open letter to the Chancellor (published on 14 October) in which he attacked the policy of the Government as a disastrous betrayal of German interests.

Having delivered his broadside, Hitler went off on 17 October to Brunswick, where more than a hundred thousand S.A. and S.S. men tramped past the saluting base for six hours, and the thundering cheers mollified his wounded vanity. Thirty-eight special trains and five thousand lorries brought the Brown Shirts pouring into Brunswick. Hitler presented twenty-four new standards, and at night a great torchlight parade lighted up the countryside. This was a show the like of which neither Hugenberg and the Stahlhelm nor the Government could put on: while they continued to talk of the need for popular support, Hitler already had it.

Events continued to flow in Hitler's favour. In December 1931, the figure of registered unemployment passed the five-million mark. It was a grim winter in Germany. Brüning's emergency measures were poor comfort to a people suffering from the primitive misery of hunger, cold, lack of work, and lack of hope, and Brüning, with his aloof and reserved manner, was not the man to put across a programme of sacrifice and austerity.

The Nazis gained steadily in strength. Their membership rose to more than 800,000 at the end of 1931. Following their success in the Oldenburg provincial elections in May and at Hamburg in September, they swept the board at the Hessian elections in November. The threat and the promise were gaining in weight.

These facts were not lost on General von Schleicher, who continued his talks with Hitler in November and December. Schleicher was more and more im-

pressed with the need to bring Hitler into the game and make use of him.

Hitler meanwhile kept up the attack on Brüning as the embodiment of all the evils of the 'System' by which Germany had been governed since 1918. An open letter he wrote to Brüning in December is interesting for a frank statement by Hitler of what he meant by legality: 'You refuse, as a "statesman", to admit that if we come to power legally we could then break through legality. Herr Chancellor, the fundamental thesis of democracy runs: "All power issues from the People." The constitution lays down the way by which a conception, an idea, and therefore an organization, must gain from the people the legitimation for the realization of its aims. But in the last resort it is the People itself which determines its Constitution.'

'Herr Chancellor, if the German nation once empowers the National Socialist Movement to introduce a Constitution other than that which we have today, then you cannot stop it. . . . When a Constitution proves itself to be useless for its life, the nation does not die—the Constitution is altered.'

Here was a plain enough warning of what Hitler meant to do when he got power, yet Schleicher, Papen, and the rest were so sure of their own ability to manage this ignorant agitator that they only smiled and took no notice.

Brüning had fewer illusions, but all his plans depended upon being able to hold out until economic conditions improved, or he could secure some success in foreign policy. His ability to do this depended in turn upon the re-election of Hindenburg as President. Brüning believed that he could rely on Hindenburg to support him and continue to sign the decrees he laid before him. The old man, failing in health, reluctantly agreed only when the Chancellor promised to try to secure an agreement with the Party leaders in the Reichstag to prolong the presidential term of

The Months of Opportun
office without re-election. total contest for the Pres something to be avoided. to further negotiations w him over to his plan.

Hitler was in Munich, *kischer Beobachter* when reported to have crashed gram in exultation: 'Now They have recognized me tiations.'

Brüning's proposal was in the previous autumn: l a prolongation of Hindenl or two, until the countr recovery and the issues o man claim to equality of been settled. In return, B resign as soon as he h: reparations.

Hitler asked for time to berg, who was also consi leader of the Nationalist prolonging Hindenburg's it could only strengthen B who took the same view, v only wants to stabilize hi . . . The contest for pow begun. . . . It will be a telligence and skill. The : fast, and waive all comp view was that Hindenbu any election the Nazis n ment, and that it was in cept a temporary truce. B: argued that it would be a to appear to avoid a cha pecially after the recent elections. Long and anx

ing Hitler into the game

the attack on Brüning
evils of the 'System' by
governed since 1918. An
ning in December is in-
ent by Hitler of what he
se, as a "statesman", to
ver legally we could then
r Chancellor, the funda-
runs: "All power issues
stitution lays down the
an idea, and therefore
rom the people the legit-
its aims. But in the last
lf which determines its

German nation once em-
t Movement to introduce
at which we have today,
. When a Constitution
its life, the nation does
altered.'

warning of what Hitler
power, yet Schleicher,
sure of their own ability
gitator that they only

ns, but all his plans de-
hold out until economic
ould secure some success
to do this depended in
Hindenburg as President.
uld rely on Hindenburg
to sign the decrees he
n, failing in health, re-
he Chancellor promised
t with the Party leaders
the presidential term of

office without re-election. In any case, a bitter elec-
toral contest for the Presidency at such a time was
something to be avoided. And so Brüning, too, agreed
to further negotiations with Hitler in order to win
him over to his plan.

Hitler was in Munich, in the offices of the *Völ-
kischer Beobachter* when the summons came. He is
reported to have crashed his fist down on the tele-
gram in exultation: 'Now I have them in my pocket.
They have recognized me as a partner in their nego-
tiations.'

Brüning's proposal was substantially the same as
in the previous autumn: Hitler was asked to agree to
a prolongation of Hindenburg's presidency for a year
or two, until the country had begun its economic
recovery and the issues of reparations and the Ger-
man claim to equality of rights in armaments had
been settled. In return, Brüning renewed his offer to
resign as soon as he had settled the question of
reparations.

Hitler asked for time to consider his reply. Hugen-
berg, who was also consulted by the Chancellor, as
leader of the Nationalists, was strongly opposed to
prolonging Hindenburg's term of office, arguing that
it could only strengthen Brüning's position. Goebbels,
who took the same view, wrote in his diary: 'Brüning
only wants to stabilize his own position indefinitely.
. . . The contest for power, the game of chess, has
begun. . . It will be a fast game, played with in-
telligence and skill. The main point is that we hold
fast, and waive all compromise.' Gregor Strasser's
view was that Hindenburg would be unbeatable in
any election the Nazis might force on the Govern-
ment, and that it was in the Party's interests to ac-
cept a temporary truce. But Röhm as well as Goebbels
argued that it would be a fatal mistake for the Party
to appear to avoid a chance to go to the nation, es-
pecially after the recent successes in the provincial
elections. Long and anxious debates followed among

Once again, however, the awkward question presented itself: how was electoral success, which, however remarkable, still fell far short of a clear majority, to be turned to political advantage? On 11 March Goebbels noted: 'Talked over instructions with the S.A. and S.S. commanders. Deep uneasiness is rife everywhere. The notion of an uprising haunts the air.' On the other side, Gregor Strasser, who had opposed fighting the presidential campaign from the beginning, now renewed his argument that the chances of success for the policy of legality were being thrown away by Hitler's 'all-or-nothing' attitude and his refusal to make a deal, except on his own exaggerated terms. What was the point of Hitler's virtuoso performance as an agitator, Strasser asked, if it led the Party, not to power, but into a political cul-de-sac?

For the moment Hitler had no answer to either side. It was the Government which took the initiative and used its advantage to move at last against the S.A.

At the end of November 1931 the State authorities of Hesse had secured certain documents drawn up by the legal adviser to the Nazi Party in Hesse, Dr. Werner Best, after secret discussions among a small group of local Nazi leaders. These papers contained a draft of the proclamation to be issued by the S.A. in the event of a Communist rising, and suggestions for emergency decrees to be issued by a provisional Nazi government after the Communists had been defeated, including the immediate execution of those who resisted the Nazi authorities, who refused to cooperate or who were found in possession of arms. Amongst the measures proposed was the abolition of the right to private property, of the obligation to pay debts of interest on savings, and of all private incomes. The S.A. was to be given the right to administer the property of the State and of all private citizens; all work was to be compulsory, without re-

The Months of Opposi-

ward, and people were cards and public kitchen the erection of courts-

The discovery of this and seriously embarrassed (probably with justice) of them and, had he them. Despite pressure ernment, however, the take action against the

Evidence of Nazi plans continued to accumulate. lined his insistence upon ter of the S.A. organization a putsch was bound to politics were conducted and semi-legality. On the election Prussian police found copies of Röhm which confirmed the preparations to carry out a majority. Near the Polish captured instructing them to take part in the defence of a surprise Polish attack

As a result of these movements, led by Prussia and (the Reich Minister) timatum. Either the against the S.A. or, the dependent action them act. On 10 April, the meeting presided over Groener's view, and promulgated dissolving the affiliated organizations

Röhm for a moment all, the S.A. now numbered men. But Hitler was in

Oct 1930 / Jan 1931

torium. Later that summer, the doctors let her go home, though with strict reservations (to which she paid little heed).

As the second-largest faction in the Reichstag now, in the autumn of 1930 the Nazi party was entitled to the office of deputy speaker (*Vizepräsident*). Hitler gave this plum job to Göring, which betokened his growing importance to the movement in Berlin. He appointed Göring his political trustee in the capital—which was, as Göring later pointed out, a very important post, enabling him to exploit his contacts there. "I was on the best of terms with Hindenburg, the armed forces, big industry, and the Catholic Church," he claimed; Hitler had authorized him to begin "wheeling and dealing," because the party now meant to win power by legitimate means: "Precisely how was irrelevant—whether with the help of the left or the right."

When the new Reichstag opened on October 13, 1930, he marched in at the head of the 107 Nazi deputies, all wearing brown shirts, and took his seat in the deputy speaker's chair. Afterward, the party's leadership and financial backers celebrated in the Göring apartment. "Reichstag opening," wrote airline-director Erhard Milch in his pocket diary. "Tumult. Evening at the Görings' with Hitler, Goebbels, August-Wilhelm of Prussia, Prince zu Wied and wife, the Niemanns, [chief photographer Heinrich] Hoffmann and daughter [Henrietta], the Hesses, Körner, Frick and Epp."

The only blight on Hermann's blossoming political career now was the failing health of Carin, the all-important hostess at these gatherings. On Christmas Eve she fainted as the presents were being unwrapped and rolled off the sofa onto the floor. For days after that she languished in bed with a fever, but she managed to struggle to her feet, waxy-featured and frail body trembling, for a dinner party on January 5, 1931, in honor of Hitler, Thyssen, and steel King Alfred Krupp, together with the country's leading men of finance. Banker Hjalmar Schacht, knowing nothing of her illness, was struck at the bareness of the repast—pea soup with pork, followed by Swedish apple pie. She retired to a sofa afterward, listening apathetically to their conversation.

Göring steeled himself against her physical decline. The political battle remained paramount to the Nazis, and they took support from whatever quarter they could get it. The harassed chancellor, Dr. Heinrich Brüning, later alleged (in a letter to Winston Churchill) that he found out that the Nazis were being financed by the Jewish general managers of two big Berlin banks, "one of them the leader of Zionism in Germany." On January 16, 1931, Göring joined Hitler's discussions with Brüning, who was vainly trying to hammer out a deal with the Nazis; then he and Carin left to visit the former kaiser at his place of exile, Doorn in Holland.

"Hermann and Mama have just left," wrote Thomas, who was visiting Germany again, in his green pocket diary. "It is eleven P.M. I went to the [Berlin] Zoo station with them and waved good-bye. We hope to profit by winning the kaiser over to the party, the kind of thing Hermann is adept at."

1930/31

The former empress was ho could hardly climb the stairs envelope for her to recuperate seventy-year-old kaiser spright Göring. "They flew at each other. Both are excitable and so I probably never heard anybody was a bit too much for him so kaiser toasted the "coming Re the "coming king," he was a several contenders.

A week later Carin seemed to neither pulse nor heartbeat. He stimulants. Lying at peace (she hear them announcing to her h prying open her eyelids. She was lustrous and beautiful. "My so one short instant of time." Ther Hermann's sorrowing gaze again

If Mama had died [com would have broken down c know how he would have dangerous given his smold stronger . . . and that we r leading a healthier, more r

Goebbels, Hitler's gauleiter (loc. at Göring's flamboyant method: February 18, 1931, Goebbels ma of an optimist—"He banks too get results by consistent hard w many levels in Berlin. Behind th with the Italian ambassador, Ba intercepted one telegram from the revealing that Göring had appare tag's foreign-affairs committee (o embassy.

Göring airily denied the allegati 1931—instructed by Hitler to assu pagan in intent—he had no diffict. It was all very different from his t years before.

Oct
1930Jan
1931

May 1931

Hermann had a wonderful time in Italy [wrote Carin on May 30]. For three weeks he was the guest of the king!!! He met Mussolini several times, and [air-force general Italo] Balbo too, and Sarfatti, Mussolini's "girl friend," who still has a great political influence.

He saw the pope and almost all the influential Vatican scoundrels as well. He had Mussolini's or the king's box every evening at the opera, a motor car was permanently at his disposal.

On this occasion he was not lying about seeing Mussolini, because he brought back a signed photograph for the Führer (which Mussolini only gave in person). But Göring had not seen the pope, or even Pacelli, the cardinal whom Hitler had specified. The Vatican had let him see only Giuseppe Pizzaro, a somewhat humbler functionary.

Göring had left Carin at the Altheide Sanatorium, and sometimes even put her out of his mind. For one last time she wrote to her mother in mid-July 1931, a long letter expressing cautious hope for her own eventual recovery:

But great news! Hitler has given us a wonderful car. Hermann only has to go and collect it himself. It will be a splendid specimen that was exhibited at the last Automobile Show in Berlin—a Mercedes, gray outside, red leather inside, long, elegant, and stylish! They made only one car of its kind. . . .

Hitler told us he always felt bad about the way the Bavarian authorities took away our car (you remember, 1923) and he has always wanted to give us a new one. He has done it from the royalties of his book, so it is an entirely personal gift!

Göring felt they both needed a vacation. He was drained. He spoke that month to an audience of thirty thousand farmers. "He was so moved to see all these people in need," wrote Carin. "There they all stood, singing 'Deutschland Deutschland über Alles,' most of them with tears streaming down their faces. . . . How his nerves stand it beats me."

Her life was coming prematurely to its end, while her husband's, as though he had been born again, was just beginning. Carin von Fock would love Hermann Göring to her dying day, which was not many months away, and he would never forget the debt that he still owed her: Thanks to her, he had beaten off the fateful addiction long enough to reach the very threshold of absolute power.

Knowing perhaps that she had not long to live, he packed her at the end of that August 1931 into the swanky new Mercedes, and they set off with swastikas fluttering from each fender to tour Germany and then Austria, where his sister, now Paula Hueber, was christening a daughter. He and Pili

1931

Körner took turns at the wheel, her face as pale as deerskin. She watched Hermann but she was so weak that she

Suddenly and unexpectedly, the warnings of her doctors, newly hired, beige-liveried, out in the Mercedes from Breslau, bleak churchyard at Lützow in the ground. It was the last night, at the Grand Foyer

Once more Hermann was willing to live on, now that he lingered, while Göring sat at his desk or crept away to shave or sleep. He whispered, "I did so hope I

Occasionally Hermann turned the corner of the room, and tears

And then the telegram came, now topping five million, that Brüning had become too loud to see the Nazi leadership and was required to return at once

For five more days he stood between duty and desire. Then later that his hands were soft, head bowed and long hair hanging. The couple barely spoke. One could look across the water to court in 1909 and had danced

"I am so tired," she whispered. "I want to follow Man" room. So long as Hermann is here,

Guilelessly Thomas told her on the fourth, and when Hermann close to her lips and whispered

Her sister Fanny came in.

"Hermann has been called home to pack."

Hitler and Göring were shown October 10, 1931. The ex-coordinator of Germany. This failed

Sept 1931

Italy [wrote Carin on May
guest of the king!!! He met
once general Italo] Balbo too,
and," who still has a great

the influential Vatican scoun-
in the king's box every evening
nantly at his disposal.

being Mussolini, because he brought
her (which Mussolini only gave in
pope, or even Pacelli, the cardinal
an had let him see only Giuseppe
ry, and
e Sanatorium, and sometimes even
time she wrote to her mother in
cautious hope for her own eventual

us a wonderful car. Hermann
It will be a splendid specimen
Automobile Show in Berlin—a
ter inside, long, elegant, and
of its kind. . . .

and about the way the Bavarian
remember, 1923) and he has
one. He has done it from the
entirely personal gift!

on. He was drained. He spoke that
to farmers. "He was so moved to see
on. "There they all stood, singing
most of them with tears streaming
stand it beats me."

end, while her husband's, as though
inning. Carin von Fock would love
ch was not many months away, and
still owed her: Thanks to her, he had
ough to reach the very threshold of

ing to live, he packed her at the end
new Mercedes, and they set off with
to tour Germany and then Austria,
in christening a daughter. He and Pili

Körner took turns at the wheel, while Carin sat in front wearing a light gray
coat, her face as pale as death but framed in a rakish motoring helmet of
leather. She watched Hermann triumphantly signing autographs everywhere,
but she was so weak that meals had to be carried out to her.

Suddenly and unexpectedly Carin's mother died on September 25. Ignoring
the warnings of her doctors, she returned to Stockholm for the funeral: with
newly hired, beige-liveried chauffeur Wilhelm Schulz driving, they all set
out in the Mercedes from Berlin, but by the time they arrived at the wind-
swept, bleak churchyard at Lövo near Drottningholm, the coffin was already
in the ground. It was the last time that Carin's embittered father, Baron Carl
von Fock, would ever see his five daughters together, because on the fol-
lowing night, at the Grand Hotel, Carin collapsed with a heart attack.

Once more Hermann was told that these were her last hours. She had no
will to live on, now that her mother had gone, but for several days she
lingered, while Göring sat at her bedside clad in a red silk dressing gown,
or crept away to shave or snatch a meal. Once her eyes fluttered and she
whispered, "I did so hope I was going to join Mama."

Occasionally Hermann turned to Thomas, sitting bleakly in a darkened
corner of the room, and tears were glistening in his eyes.

And then the telegram came recalling him to Berlin. With unemployment
now topping five million, the Nazi clamor to take over from the hapless
Brüning had become too loud for President Hindenburg to ignore. He wanted
to see the Nazi leadership about forming a new government. Herr Göring
was required to return at once.

For five more days he stayed at Carin's bedside, his conscience torn
between duty and desire. The nurse, Märta Magnuson, would recall years
later that his hands were soft and feminine—on first glimpsing him with his
head bowed and long hair hanging down she had thought it was a woman.
The couple barely spoke. Once Carin asked for the bed to be moved so she
could look across the water to the palace where she had been presented at
court in 1909 and had danced at the royal balls.

"I am so tired," she whispered to her son when Hermann was out of the
room. "I want to follow Mama. She keeps calling for me. But I cannot go.
So long as Hermann is here, I cannot go."

Guilelessly Thomas told her of the telegram that had come from Berlin
on the fourth, and when Hermann came back in she took the big man's head
close to her lips and whispered faintly but urgently to him.

Her sister Fanny came in.

"Hermann has been called back to Berlin," Carin said. "You must help
him to pack."

Hitler and Göring were shown into President Hindenburg's presence on
October 10, 1931. The ex-corporal subjected the great field marshal to a
lecture on Germany. This failed to impress, and nothing came of the inter-

1931 After the death of Socrates

barbet scenes
rary form is
uilleton.

science. The
stotle, whom
to disparage)
sseur" came
who with his
cret language
ces was then,
e established
ίος 'Ελλάδος)
olybius prag-
s, Apollonius
s. Euclid not
ok of geome-
of optics, the
hat of its re-
umference of
the lever (on
id discovered
enabled him
and anatomy
ceived scien-
ties, encyclo-
at mysterious
iasis, which it
arts, already
eclipses; and
turned on its
e cosmic cen-
es, who knew
was possible
eric pressure
ressed air out
a coin-in-slot
r-opener, and
-engines, and
moment men

stood at the threshold of the heliocentric system, the discovery of America, and the invention of the steam-engine.

Another thing, too, came into the world — the emancipation of women. Queens made history, women philosophers and novelists made literature, and poets began to write for a feminine public. The feminine soul was discovered, and with it sentimental love. The "lady" is a discovery of the time, and she begins to move freely and takes part in everything, even in sport. That age first knew the meaning of coquetry, gallantry, and fashion; men kissed the hand of women, and in all seriousness contemplated suicide for unhappiness in love. Yet another great power arose, that of paper; it became the custom to say everything in writing and at the greatest possible length. A rather feminine, over-civilized trait shows itself too in the beardlessness which was then universal; one of the Seleucids who did not follow the fashion became so conspicuous that he got the nickname of *πώγων*, the Man with the Beard.

The most exquisite delicacies, culinary and intellectual, were brought from every part of the world, and the excess and over-refinement of pleasure induced a *blasé* attitude of boredom and satiety. Over this fine-nerved, busy, and all-knowing world brooded a vast leaden nihilism. "When man feels no more joy and no more pain, the winter of the soul is thawed" — in these words of Epicurus the age discovered its formula. The three dominant philosophies, however much they disputed between one another, all came out at the same end even by different channels: the Epicurean worship of *ataraxia* (immovability), the Stoic ideal of *apathia* (lack of feeling), and the Sceptical demand for *ἐποχή* (the suspense of judgment) all have at bottom the same intent. Thus we get the grandiose spectacle of a universal world-nausea, which gripped Classical mankind like an epidemic until in a distant despised province a Hero of a new kind was born, the son, not of Jupiter nor of Jehovah, but of the true God; who understood more of philosophy than Plato and more of conquest than Alexander, and by whom this mankind was redeemed.

It is only because the Alexandrine age, in its immense expectation of a new God, forms a sort of ante-room to Christianity that our reason can comprehend it a little; and pre-Christian peoples — let us not harbour any delusions about that — are in the ultimate depths of their soul unintelligible to us. Herman Grimm says in

Hellenistic
Nihilism

P.T.
cannot
allow
A.H.
ever to
reach
this
point

Greek
musicalness

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

There is almost universal agreement about Geli's personal qualities. The leader of the Nazi Youth Movement and his wife, who knew her well, found her to be sweet, unaffected, "irresistibly charming." Hitler's chauffeur said she was "a princess . . . people in the street would turn around to take another look at her—though people don't do that in Munich." Hitler's close associate and official photographer remembered her as "an enchantress":

In her artless way and without the slightest suspicion of coquetry she succeeded by her mere presence in putting everybody in the best of good spirits. . . . Geli was deeply revered, indeed worshipped, by her uncle. . . . To him she was the personification of perfect young womanhood—beautiful, fresh and unspoiled, gay, intelligent, as clean and straight as God had made her. He watched and gloated over her like some servant with a rare and lovely bloom, and to cherish and protect her was his one and only concern.²⁵⁶

The one jarring note in this symphony of praise is struck by Hanfstaengl. For some reason he despised her:

She was an empty-headed little slut, with the coarse sort of bloom of a servant girl without either brains or character. She was perfectly content to preen herself in her fine clothes, and certainly never gave any impression of reciprocating Hitler's twisted tenderness.²⁵⁷

Everyone, including Hanfstaengl, agreed that Hitler was completely captivated by the girl. He became irrationally jealous and watched over her constantly, regulating her life, choosing her clothes and the company she could keep. He went everywhere with her, accompanying her on window-shopping trips, excursions, and picnics, and to movies and the opera. When he was with her, one observer noted, he became a different person, invariably happy, relaxed, gentle; another found that "she made him act like a seventeen year old." Geli became for him—as Stefanie had once been—"the complete embodiment of his ideal of womanhood."²⁵⁸

It seems clear, however, that Geli did not reciprocate her famous uncle's feelings. A close observer admitted that he was baffled by the relationship, but there was "something very unusual about it which made a life together unbearable for her." Another, who claimed to have been her confidant, testified that she was desperately unhappy because she could not bring herself to do "what he wants me to."²⁵⁹ That life with Hitler had become quite literally unbearable to her became apparent in late afternoon of 18 September 1931: Geli shot herself with Hitler's 6.35 Walther pistol. The wound was near her heart; she slowly bled to death.

226

1931

The Child As Father to the M

To all her friends, it was not a brooding, remorseful young woman who was, to all, Vienna where her uncle lived. The note she left of her death. It was addressed

When I come to Vienna to Semmering, an . . .

She never added the final

Geli's sudden and abrupt imagination of contemporary stop some of the ugly rum *Münchener Post* reported had received the following that I and my niece had a that I was violently opposed my niece was engaged to

Hanfstaengl claimed with Hitler after he discovered Jewish art teacher from Lent story. He testified that she had died a virgin.²⁶²

Others darkly suspect the most popular account, but reasons—saw Geli as a threat to others, including the re Nuremberg at the time—apartment to pull the trigger

All responsible evidence in own hand. While historians there can be no doubt what. As soon as he heard it, Nuremberg and spent two went to a Party member's as he would do in moment floor:

In my own room I heard the rhythmic sound of the ceaselessly and without could hear him, peacefully continued, hour after hour. He spent another

* could be seen of his blood + what he does

GOD: ADOLF HITLER

ut Geli's personal quali-
and his wife, who knew
"irresistibly charming."
people in the street would
h people don't do that in
photographer remembered

est suspicion of coquetry
putting everybody in the
ply revered, indeed wor-
was the personification of
sh and unspoiled, gay, in-
nd made her. He watched
h a rare and lovely bloom,
and only concern.²⁵⁰

y of praise is struck by

t the coarse sort of bloom
t character. She was per-
ne clothes, and certainly
ocating Hitler's twisted

nd that Hitler was com-
irrationally jealous and
life, choosing her clothes
rywhere with her, accom-
sions, and picnics, and to
r, one observer noted, he
, relaxed, gentle; another
year old." Geli became for
plete embodiment of his

ot reciprocate her famous
t he was baffled by the re-
usual about it which made
who claimed to have been
tely unhappy because she
me to."²⁵⁰ That life with
to her became apparent in
shot herself with Hitler's
r heart; she slowly bled to

The Child As Father to the Man

To all her friends, the suicide seemed incomprehensible. Geli was not a brooding, remorseful, or hysterical person. She was an attractive young woman who was, to all appearances, looking forward to a trip to Vienna where her uncle had finally allowed her to go to take mystery lessons. The note she left behind in her room only deepens the mystery of her death. It was addressed to a young friend in Vienna and ends:

When I come to Vienna—hopefully very soon—we'll drive together to Semmering, an . . .

She never added the final "d" to the *und*.²⁰⁰

Geli's sudden and apparently inexplicable death has challenged the imagination of contemporaries and later historians. Hitler attempted to stop some of the ugly rumors by making statements to newspapers. The *Münchener Post* reported in its edition of 22 September 1931 that it had received the following statement from Adolf Hitler: "It is untrue that I and my niece had a quarrel on Friday 18 September; it is untrue that I was violently opposed to my niece going to Vienna; it is untrue that my niece was engaged to someone in Vienna and I forbade it."²⁰¹

Hanfstaengl claimed that Geli killed herself after "a flaming row" with Hitler after he discovered that "she was pregnant by a young Jewish art teacher from Linz." But another intimate gave a very different story. He testified that the physician who examined Geli's body said she had died a virgin.²⁰²

Others darkly suspected not suicide but murder, committed, in the most popular account, by Heinrich Himmler who—for undisclosed reasons—saw Geli as a threat to his ascendancy within the Party. Still others, including the redoubtable Greiner, had Hitler—though in Nuremberg at the time—somehow spirit himself back to his Munich apartment to pull the trigger.²⁰³

All responsible evidence, however, indicates that Geli died by her own hand. While historians must guess at the reasons for her suicide, there can be no doubt whatever that Hitler was shattered by the news. As soon as he heard it, he hurried back from a political trip to Nuremberg and spent two days in isolation. He and a close associate went to a Party member's summer home on the Tegern Lake and there, as he would do in moments of turmoil throughout his life, he paced the floor:

In my own room I stood in the window, listening to the dull rhythmic sound of the pacing feet over my head. Hour after hour, ceaselessly and without pause, it continued. Night came, and I still could hear him, pacing up and down, up and down. . . . And so it continued, hour after endless hour, throughout the long night. . . .

He spent another day pacing and then drove all night until he

* And he a scene when he goes into
exaggerating length about the foulness
of his blood + she comes back with
what he does with her. ²²⁷

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

arrived at the Vienna Central Cemetery where he stayed thirty minutes alone by the grave.²⁰⁴

*seem
w
Hers*

For a week he seemed on the brink of total collapse. Over and over again he said that he must give up politics, that he would never look at another woman, that his career was ruined, that he must kill himself. Geli became for him a kind of personal cult. He locked the door to her room and would allow no one to enter except Frau Winter, the motherly servant who was instructed never to change anything in the room but daily to place a bunch of fresh chrysanthemums there. He commissioned a bust and portraits to be made from a variety of photographs. Along with portraits of his mother, he kept a portrait or a bust of Geli in every one of his bedrooms. In his entourage there was an unwritten rule that no one was ever to mention her name. And when Hitler himself spoke of her, tears would come to his eyes. Years later, during the Nuremberg trials, Hermann Göring told a defense attorney that Geli's death had had such a devastating effect on Hitler that it had changed his relationship to all other people.

One can only wonder at the reason for Hitler's extraordinarily intense reaction. With the single exception of his mother's death, no other event in his personal life had hit him so hard. One of Hitler's assistant valets, Willie Schneider, recalled that for many years after the death of Geli, Hitler spent Christmas Eve alone in the room where she had died.²⁰⁵ That is to say, he stayed in the death room in Munich just as in Linz, years earlier, he had spent Christmastime watching over the corpse of his mother. Thus, it seems likely that the loss of Geli was so overwhelming to Hitler because in her death he suffered anew the death of Klara.

Eva Braun

One day in 1930, Hitler wandered into the Schwabing photography studio of Heinrich Hoffmann, an avid Nazi who had joined the Party in 1929 and was rapidly becoming wealthy as a result of the monopoly he enjoyed on all official photography done for the movement. Hitler struck up a conversation with Hoffmann's new employee, Eva Braun, who served as a clerk and photographer's model. Thus began Hitler's most publicized love affair.

Eva had a kind of "impersonal chocolate-box type of prettiness" and an attractive, if slightly plump, figure which occupied her daily attention. She seemed to Hitler to be just the right age: at 18 she was 23 years younger than he. And her eyes were exactly the color he always found compelling. A friend called them "limpid, porcelain blue"—exactly the color of Klara Hitler's.

Not everyone was impressed with Eva. Her employer considered her "frivolous, vain, feather-brained, inconsequential . . . flattered and thrilled beyond words at the attention and compliments which this

1931

The Child As Father to the M

rising power in the land thought her "cheap, arrogant, sweet in Hitler's presence."

Hitler showed only no commitment to suicide. On 11 August Geli Raubal had almost as if Doctor Plate, assured him inch of her life, Hitler was deal of her.

Their relationship was tured. Eva attempted suicide tablets of Vanodorm. She a medical technician.²⁰⁷ ously. He set her up in a 1936 remodeling of his B directly with his own.

To Hitler she seemed ideal woman he had oft sweet, and stupid. He four ing companion on picnic norant of politics, she list them all. He saw to it that all public functions, but a Albert Speer told an interv doll's house. She was a the rubber tree . . . and the

Over the years Hitler addressing her, both in pr the Berghof, with tender A ous words to express his af The terms are asexual an latable. But to the Austrii flavor seems inappropriate descending tone, with a timacy and endearment, l baby. Patscherl, for examp the baby game "Pat-a-cake,

Why did the adult Hi to express affection to a w in his unconscious of the f to him as an infant? A r some support for that sug remembered vividly how o tive in urging her to eat food upon her sickly little Patscherl. . . . He always

political party that was supposed to provide some equilibrium, the Catholic Center Party, under Monsignor Kaas, was unwilling to fight Hitler, who was now voted full powers, by 441 to 94. He no longer needed President von Hindenburg's signature to enact laws.

The fake humility of Potsdam had been a solemn swindle.³¹ Almost instantly all unions were disbanded, the Socialists were outlawed, and, ironically, the right-wing Stahlhelm organization, which had backed Hitler since the Congress of Harzburg in 1931, was abolished. Three Nationalist Conservative cabinet members, Foreign Minister von Neurath, Minister of Finance Count Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk, and Vice Chancellor Franz von Papen, quickly abandoned fellow cabinet minister Alfred Hugenberg, head of the Stahlhelm. He was out.

Meanwhile, Hitler's round of domestic brutalities continued. Following on the heels of the anti-Jewish riots of April 1, instigated by the Nazis' vulgar anti-Semite, Julius Streicher, the legislators enacted severe anti-Jewish laws. Streicher, a former schoolteacher, was one of Hitler's old comrades. On July 14 came new laws for the sterilization of those with hereditary illnesses and incurable diseases. As François-Poncet wrote, "Nazism is debasing Germany and isolating her from civilized societies."³² At villages and small towns all over Germany the local SA commanders hoisted banners over the roads leading into each municipality: JEWS NOT DESIRED. Restaurants and hotels posted similar signs.

This was the Hitler the von Ribbentrops finally managed to entice back to Dahlem for dinner. They needed not have counted it a victory. Adolf Hitler always did exactly what was right for himself. He now faced decisions about foreign policy, and he refused to rely only on the guidance of von Neurath and his Foreign Ministry experts. As usual, Hitler wanted several sources and opinions, all from rivals for his favor, and it was von Ribbentrop's turn. Between bites of his specially prepared vegetarian meal, Hitler declared that he wanted peace, but Germany had to become "an equal among nations." He wanted revisions of the Versailles Treaty. Most urgently, he wished to establish connections with England. He declared his friendship for Italy and his disdain for France, and he was fanatical in his hatred of Soviet Russia. To Annelies, as an aside, he confessed he was sorry he had ever "signaled" any of these views on foreign policy in *Mein Kampf*. During that whole evening, he made no mention of the Jews, and von Ribbentrop did not bring up the subject for good reason. He was not willing to face another argument, another rebuff, another possible breach, as had occurred after the "Jewish lunch" in Berlin.

In the library of Great Britain. He leading circles view report much that for Britain" and became the basis (written shortly be

Hitler stated far possessed, a ma warm, but there troubled him at Army days or his one could sense t charming and su one. Many men totally convinced called me his "I defend my ideas incredibly loyal, could hurt people and Conquer" w conflict among h policy, everyone

Adolf Hitler berg [1938] he w Czechs mobilized at Hendaye with some clumsy th 1937-39] in the table. Every t said to me much

No one got c was in a meeting bit frightened of about giving up failed, Hitler said seen how angry C

Clearly, Joachim Germany's foreign travel, his knowled war, his inherited father had sacrifice

In the library after dinner, Hitler proclaimed his fascination with Great Britain. He asked von Ribbentrop to tell him how Britain's leading circles viewed National Socialism. Von Ribbentrop "could not report much that was favorable." Yet he "sensed Hitler's admiration for Britain" and felt that "our mutual feelings about the English became the basis for our mutual trust." Von Ribbentrop's memoirs (written shortly before his execution in Nürnberg) continued:

Hitler stated facts others simply had to accept. He was very self-possessed, a man without compromise. He could be courteous and warm, but there was a certain distance he could not help. I am sure it troubled him at times. He could speak freely and amusingly about his Army days or his own beginnings, and when he spoke of architecture, one could sense the artistic side of his nature. He could be enormously charming and supremely convincing when he tried to persuade someone. Many men went to "tell him the real truth" and reappeared totally convinced of *his* view. I also fell under his spell although he called me his "most difficult" subordinate because I would calmly defend my ideas after he thought he had convinced me. He could be incredibly loyal, but he could also be unreasonably suspicious. He could hurt people deeply. I never understood this split in him. "Divide and Conquer" was used by him so frequently that there was constant conflict among his collaborators. Particularly in the matter of foreign policy, everyone thought he could participate . . .

Adolf Hitler had a quick temper, often out of control. At Godesberg [1938] he wanted to break off the Chamberlain talks when the Czechs mobilized. He jumped up with his face telltale red. The same at Hendaye with Franco, when Suner [Franco's foreign minister] said some clumsy things. Same with Henderson [British ambassador, 1937-39] in the Poland crisis, when Henderson slammed his hand on the table. Every time it happened I managed to calm things down. He said to me much later, "You know I just can't control myself!". . .

No one got close to him except, possibly, Göring. When Göring was in a meeting, I barely seemed to exist . . . Perhaps he was even a bit frightened of Göring! When I once offered to speak to Göring about giving up command of the Luftwaffe in 1944, when it had failed, Hitler said, "God help us, no, Ribbentrop! You should have seen how angry Göring just got when I spoke to him!"³³

Clearly, Joachim von Ribbentrop wanted to be involved in forming Germany's foreign policy. He felt qualified by virtue of his years of travel, his knowledge of the international world, his service in the war, his inherited obligation of political participation. After all, his father had sacrificed his career for political principle. Why would the

Feb 4, 1931

obviously in need of, well, mothering. A few weeks later it struck Günther Quandt, who still frequently met her, that she talked of nothing but the Nazis. 'At first I thought it was just a passing fad for the oratorical gift of Dr Goebbels,' he wrote. Her law-student lover also noticed, and flared that she seemed to be losing her head to that clubfooted loudmouth.

'You're mad,' she snapped. 'I could never love Goebbels!'

GOEBBELS had other preoccupations right now. At the end of January 1931 an S.A. man had gunned down the Berlin communist Max Schirmer; four days later Nazis shot dead the communist Otto Grüneberg in a Charlottenburg street fight.²⁷ On February 4 police chief Grzesinski banned *Angriff* for two weeks. Goebbels was also down with 'flu. What sickened him even more than this was how close to the communists he found his position really was. After one Reichstag interruption on the fifth a Social Democrat rounded on him with the stinging rejoinder, 'That is from a gentleman . . . fully aware that Messrs Hitler, Frick, Jung, etc., have been to the Ruhr several times to explain their National Socialist program to the gentleman of heavy industry and to demonstrate that they have nothing to fear from the National Socialist brand of socialism.'

A few days later the government revoked the immunity of three hundred deputies, including all the Nazis. Goebbels alone had eight criminal cases pending. He recommended to his colleagues that rather than just becoming 'poorly paid extras' they should walk out *en masse*. Their salaries would stop, but the tactics were undeniably sound. The move would demonstrate to voters that the Nazis dissociated themselves from the government's rule by emergency decree.

On February 10 the Nazis marched in, remained standing while their bloc leader Franz Stöhr read out the tough declaration which Goebbels had formulated, then marched out again. After that, one hundred police officers raided Hedemann Strasse and searched the building. Goebbels' Lustgarten rally of the fifteenth was banned on the usual pretext ('danger to peace and quiet').

'Your peace and quiet,' swore Goebbels in his diary, 'will be endangered soon enough.'²⁸

IT has been a tense and angry week for Dr Goebbels in the Reichstag. At its end Magda Quandt comes round to see him in his new, luxurious Steglitz apartment. He finds himself captivated by this woman. Her dress is subtle, her whole posture is that of a person who now knows where she is going.²⁹ It is a Saturday—February 14, 1931—and Goebbels enters certain code phrases, circumlocutions, into his diary which show that this visit is not for mere archival gossip: 'And stays for a very long time,' he carefully records. And, 'How are you, my queen?' The answer follows: '(1)'. Magda has seduced him, after Olga only the second girl in his life to do so. Sunday finds him in a trance, or 'replete with satiated happiness,' as he writes. Magda writes him a fond note the next day.³⁰

Magda Quandt returns to her elegant leased apartment and servants,

March 15, 1931

MARIA MAGDALENA QUANDT 117

and Dr Goebbels goes over to Dortmund where twenty thousand people are waiting to hear him. In Hamburg he speaks to twelve thousand.³¹ His mind is on her. When he speaks at Weimar, Anka's Weimar, he takes Magda with him. He phones Anka, speaks tersely with her, and decides that he can't stand her whining and her 'lack of discipline' any longer. Now that he has Magda he can afford to be stand-offish.

He takes Magda to the automobile show in Berlin. She wants to buy a new car, but can't make up her mind. Does she buy him one? Suddenly he has a new Opel (it has been stolen already by March 9).³² They have the usual rows. Magda writes a farewell note. Goebbels has seen it all before—'the same old melody!' he writes, amused. He can handle it. She comes round for a 'very formal' talk and flounces out as though to leave. Goebbels holds the door open for her. 'You are so hard,' she murmurs, and relents.³³ She visits several times during March 1931, chats, laughs, makes music with him, meals for him, and—occasionally—love. On the ninth he adds '(2, 3)' to his score, and five days later '(4, 5)'.³⁴

But mysteries abound. She is often sick; she does not yet invite him back to her own fine apartment in Reichskanzler Platz. Sometimes she is inexplicably away, or does not answer her phone. Jealousy wells up within him. At this time the adventure probably means very little to her; but not to him.³⁵ Goebbels convinces himself that he has drawn a historic line under his philanderings. 'I'm going to stop the womanizing,' he writes secretly on March 15, 'and favor just the one.'

March 15
1931

IN Hamburg the gauleiter Karl Kaufmann had once remarked to Goebbels that Brüning for one considered Göring mad.³⁶ Göring had certainly been unbalanced by Carin's near fatal illness during January 1931. After visiting her sickbed Goebbels wrote that he revered her, a word he had used before only for his mother.³⁷ He was alarmed by Göring's character regression, probably a result of his addiction. 'We've got to get him into a mental clinic in time,' he wrote despairingly. 'He mustn't go to the dogs like this.'³⁸ Hitler promised to tackle Göring about the morphine. But the aviator's behavior worsened to outright megalomania. 'He alternates,' observed Goebbels in February 1931, 'between imagining he's Reich chancellor and imagining he's defense minister. ... Today he's just ludicrous.'³⁹

Febr.
1931

After both men spoke at Essen to an audience of sixteen thousand, including the industrialists Krupp and Thyssen, Göring accompanied him back to Berlin but refused to discuss his drug problem. The gauleiter's remarks about him took on a bitter edge. After they had both addressed some twenty-five thousand people in Frankfurt, Goebbels wrote that Göring had spoken the 'usual crap'.⁴⁰ One Sunday he again tackled Göring about the addiction; the aviator's spluttered denials were too thin to be plausible to Goebbels.⁴¹ They separated that evening 'half friends again,' as Goebbels noted, in which was implicit that they were now half enemies.⁴²

March 15
1931

1931

ON March 6, 1931 the gauleiter addressed another huge meeting at the Sport Palace. His audience greeted Grzesinski's two police observers with roars of 'Out!' lasting several minutes, and Goebbels heaped his own special kind of ridicule on them. On the following day *Angriff* repeated his words verbatim.⁴³ Seeking public sympathy, on the thirteenth he staged a stupid bomb plot: having ordered the S.A. man Eduard Weiss to open all mail addressed to him at HQ he arranged for a crude home-made device to be delivered to him there.⁴⁴ Although there is no doubt about Goebbels' authorship of the attack, he lied to his own diary about it.⁴⁵ More court actions crowded in on him—eight altogether during March.⁴⁶ On March 14 the Reichstag decided that he could be arrested after all. The courts declared Severing's ban on the Brownshirt uniform in Prussia unconstitutional.⁴⁷ On the fifteenth Grzesinski nevertheless repeated the ban, and he imposed a speaking prohibition on Goebbels in Berlin, in revenge for the Sport Palace episode. He instructed his police to prevent the gauleiter from speaking to transport workers in Hasenheide the next night.⁴⁸ Hitting back, *Angriff* instructed Berlin's Nazis to wear their uniforms and to sue Grzesinski if he ordered any arrests. The next day, two Nazis gunned down a communist deputy in Hamburg. The press called for a general ban on the party, and the speaking ban on Goebbels was extended to the whole of Prussia.⁴⁹

After that Brüning's emergency decrees could no longer contain the rising discontent. Goebbels arrived at one huge Königsberg rally to find that he had been banned from even entering the hall, where twelve thousand had gathered to hear him. Thousands of cheering East Prussians escorted him and Prince August-Wilhelm back to the railroad station, carrying the little Doctor shoulder-high up to the platform. As he climbed onto a bench, a police major ordered truncheons drawn and thirty of his officers waded in, laying out both Goebbels and the prince.⁵⁰ The incident was widely reported abroad.⁵¹ Magda Quandt visited the injured gauleiter upon his return to Berlin, and her accomplishments in bed that night ('6, 7') made up for his bruises. In his diary he passed over the irritable letters from Hella Koch, from Erika, and from Charlotte almost without comment. 'I now love just one,' he wrote.⁵²

Easter

When Hitler now invited him down to the Obersalzberg for Easter, Goebbels surprisingly turned him down.⁵³ His notes had recently contained several disparaging references to that 'damned party home,' the Brown House; to Hitler's coffeehouse mentality and milieu; and to the Führer's softness and 'fanatical compromising' nature.⁵⁴ He spent Easter with Magda instead, and added two more notches to the score, '(8, 9)': Nine times in six weeks.⁵⁵ It was not, perhaps, enough to justify the jack-rabbit reputation which posterity would endow him with, and which he had carefully encouraged.

ON March 26, the Reichstag adjourned for nearly seven months. Two days later Brüning issued an emergency decree allowing his government to ban any meetings, and to censor the leaflets and posters of any party.

1931

'And Brüning is Göring's friend!' commented Goebbels sarcastically. He did not mind the ban on speaking. At the big Sport Palace meeting on March 27 a recording of his latest speech was played. But he did fear a ban on his newspaper, which was now printing eighty thousand twelve-page copies a day.⁵⁶ The supreme court declared Grzesinski's latest ban illegal. Meanwhile Hitler appealed to all his followers to avoid being provoked into illegal actions.⁵⁷

This was particularly addressed to the S.A. The taut relationship between them and the party overhung Goebbels throughout that spring. He was torn between loyalty to Hitler, and his gratitude to these long-suffering streetfighters. In Munich Hitler had confided to him in October 1930 that he was gradually going to reconstruct the S.A. and recover total control of it.⁵⁸ But Goebbels found it hard not to sympathize with the criticisms of Munich voiced by his Berlin S.A. men. Their plight was unenviable: two-thirds of them were unemployed, including their Oberführer Bruno Wetzel.⁵⁹ While in Breslau one S.A. *Sturm* could not go on parade in the snow because they had no boots, they heard of the opulence of Hitler's new HQ in Munich and of elite new S.S. units being raised which were no longer subordinate to the S.A. as they should have been.⁶⁰

Both Walter Stennes, the supreme S.A. commander in eastern Germany including Berlin, and his subordinate commanders were already deeply concerned about Munich's 'wretched waffling about legality' and Hitler's persistent wooing of the bourgeois parties. When Hitler now demanded that the S.A. membership cough up another four thousand marks for a painting to go in his study, they were baffled.⁶¹

At the end of November 1930 Hitler had revealed to his party lieutenants his latest plans for the S.A. He was now their commander, with the pallid, flabby Ernst Röhm as his chief of staff. Goebbels had vaguely known Röhm since 1924 and had read his memoirs, *A Traitor's Story*.⁶² After Röhm's return from Bolivia he had entered in his diary, 'He's nice to me and I like him. An open, upright soldier type.' Two weeks later he added, 'He's a dear fellow, but no match for Stennes.'⁶³ Stennes however noticed only that Röhm was a blatant homosexual, who made few friends other than other notorious homosexuals like Karl Ernst and his lover Paul Röhrbein.⁶⁴ Stennes had nothing but contempt for Röhm and his unmanly ways.⁶⁵

Dr Goebbels deduced that Hitler intended to phase out the regional S.A. commanders like Stennes. He suspected that Stennes was plotting to set up a revolutionary Free Corps—'proof,' he felt, 'how naïve these fellows are about politics.'⁶⁶ But Goebbels was even more naïve. He solemnly tipped off Röhm in January 1931 that Röhrbein was a homosexual, and noted afterward that Röhm was 'very concerned.'⁶⁷ Only six weeks later did he learn the truth about Röhm from Stennes. 'Disgusting!' he expostulated in his diary—his own sexuality being at last a matter of record. 'Here too Hitler is paying too little attention. The party must not be allowed to become a paradise for poofers.'⁶⁸

Oct.
1930

1931

March 23, 1931

120 II: THE GAULEITER OF BERLIN

Fearing Stennes' growing influence meanwhile, Hitler removed several S.A. regions (North Saxony, East Prussia, Danzig, and Mecklenburg) from his control. Stennes sent a long letter of complaint to Röhm, causing Goebbels to wonder if Stennes was not biting off more than he could chew.⁶⁹ Röhm personally came to Berlin and there was a furious row with Stennes which ended with a categorical refusal by the S.A. commander to swear obedience to Röhm.⁷⁰

March 23
1931

This put Goebbels in a dilemma. Not only did he need the S.A. stormtroopers, they provided much of the staff of *Angriff* too. In Munich on March 23 Ernst Röhm told him he was going to get rid of critics like Captain Stennes.⁷¹ Goebbels was horrified and urged both Hitler and Röhm not to do it. But Hitler's loyalty was to Röhm, his old and intimate friend. In his diary, Goebbels began writing alibis: 'If there's got to be a clean break,' he recorded on March 25, 'then I'm with Hitler.' At the same time he told Stennes' men that he was with them.⁷² He had no choice but to equivocate. The Berlin S.A. was approaching flashpoint. All their hatreds were mirrored in the sarcastic samizdat newsletters which now began to circulate in Berlin. One dated March 20 referred mockingly to 'our own Aryan son Dr Goebbels, whom race-experts have branded an Israelite,' and described cruelly how he had left one meeting early via a back door 'on account of his aching paw.'⁷³

*

March 31,
1931

see
pp 1
p 21?

This S.A. crisis came to a head in the last week of March 1931. Karl Hanke, the young and virile commander of Goebbels' West End district, told him of rumors that Röhm was about to dismiss Stennes. Fearing this would bring his empire tumbling down, Goebbels said he would fight tooth and claw to prevent it. Stennes had gone to Pomerania that Tuesday, March 31, ostensibly to cool down S.A. hotheads.⁷⁴ In his absence, a telegram arrived in Berlin ordering all his senior officers to Weimar for a meeting with Hitler. It was clear that he was about to dismiss Stennes. According to police Intelligence, he also intended to relieve Goebbels as gauleiter.⁷⁵ Goebbels had already left to speak in Dresden; from there he drove straight on to Weimar, to see Hitler. This may be the occasion which Elsa Bruckmann later related, when Hitler had planned to sack Goebbels for disloyalty—whereupon the gauleiter threw himself whining at his feet in a most unworthy manner.⁷⁶ On balance Hitler decided to keep Goebbels, but nothing could save Stennes.

Wetzel, the Berlin S.A. commander, had already received a phone call at around 8:30 P.M. reporting that Röhm had ordered Stennes' dismissal.⁷⁷ Wetzel's men decided to defy Hitler's summons to Weimar. At four A.M. Kurt Daluge, the regional S.S. chief (S.S. Oberführer Ost) typed an urgent warning to Röhm, reporting that since midnight these local S.A. commanders had been meeting in secret cabal in Berlin, and that mutiny was once again in the air. Daluge in fact suspected that Stennes was acting in cahoots with the government, because the mutineers had learned—perhaps through government wiretaps—of Hitler's intentions. 'Jahn has told them,' reported Daluge to Röhm, referring to Stennes' chief of staff, 'that Stennes is to be dismissed by our Führer at

* There is a real feeling that the
devil put a finger on this fact

April 1, 1934

MARIA MAGDALENA QUANDT 121

a meeting in Weimar at midday today April 1.' The mutineers, he added, had decided to defy Hitler and send a delegation to Goebbels in Weimar to win him over for 'an independent freedom movement.'⁷⁸

Things were thus in an unholy mess. It was now April 1, 1931. At about four-thirty A.M. Stennes arrived back in Berlin from Pomerania. A few hours later he was awakened with news that the papers were reporting he had been dismissed. He discounted the story and went back to sleep. Meanwhile his commanders in Berlin went on the rampage, mutinied, and seized Goebbels' gau HQ and the *Angriff* editorial offices in the Hedemann Strasse building.

Thus the second 'Stennes putsch' began. Perhaps this is a misnomer. Stennes himself was still largely in the dark. At two-thirty P.M. he received, first a registered letter from Röhm dismissing him, then orders from Hitler to go to Weimar.⁷⁹ But the fat was already in the fire. This time the S.A.'s political actions met with active support from both Goebbels' staff and the *Angriff*'s employees. Dr Weissauer published a statement in the newspaper backing Stennes. Whatever Goebbels' private feelings, however, he knew which side his bread was buttered. He wrote unhesitatingly in his diary, 'I stand loyal to Hitler. . . The S.A. must come into line.' He applied for a court order to evict the S.A. trespassers from the building. Stennes was still floundering. He sent this telegram to Hitler in Weimar: 'IS RÖHM'S DISMISSAL ORDER VALID, I.E. BACKED BY YOU? SIGNED STENNES.' Hitler responded ambiguously: 'YOU ARE NOT TO ASK QUESTIONS BUT HAVING RECEIVED A PROPER ORDER ARE TO REPORT TO WEIMAR AT ONCE WITH THE COMMANDERS AS LISTED. SIGNED ADOLF HITLER.'

By now Daluge was also in Weimar. Hitler gave Goebbels sweeping powers to smash the putsch in Berlin, 'regardless of consequences,' and to dismiss the disruptive elements regardless of rank or office in the party. 'You have my backing,' he wrote in this document, 'whatever you do.'⁸⁰ At that evening's public meeting in Weimar both Goebbels and Daluge swore undying loyalty to Hitler.⁸¹ In Berlin meanwhile Stennes had printed thousands of handbills announcing that Goebbels was sacked as gauleiter for 'breach of faith' and replaced by Wetzel; the handbill once more rubbed in the Brown House scandal.⁸² Ignoring frantic appeals from his HQ to return to Berlin, Goebbels went south to Munich, sharing a railroad compartment with Hitler.

Hitler was undoubtedly shaken by these events. The next day's bourgeois press crowed over his embarrassment. In an article in the VB he vigorously attacked Stennes for his treachery.⁸³ Goebbels now wondered which dark powers might have bribed Stennes and Weissauer to act as they had. The party later obtained copies of urgent Berlin police instructions ordering police officers not to seize Stennes' handbills announcing his takeover.⁸⁴ Hitler signed an authorization for Goebbels to act 'ruthlessly' in purging his Berlin gau. 'Better no National Socialist movement at all,' this read, 'than a party in disarray, without discipline or obedience.'⁸⁵ It was time for backbiting all round. Hearing that Göring had pleaded with Hitler to give these powers to him, Goebbels noted: 'I'll never forgive

See 704

April 1
1931

April 1 -
8,
1931

April 8, 1931

122 II: THE GAULEITER OF BERLIN

Göring. . . He's a mound of frozen crap.'⁸⁶ Acting from Munich HQ, he issued appeals for loyalty and sacked the mutinous S.A. men. Stennes took perhaps two hundred others with him, and began a brief flirtation with Dr Otto Strasser.

WORRIED and ill Goebbels finally slunk back to Berlin on Wednesday April 8, 1931. Paul Schultz, who had replaced Stennes, assured him that the Berlin S.A. now stood behind him. Goebbels' five district commanders confirmed that evening that not one party official had defected, only S.A. men.⁸⁷ Addressing his officials on the tenth he explained why he had put so much distance between himself and Berlin during the crisis. During a battlefield crisis, he said, the generals did not go into the mutinous trenches either.⁸⁸ 'Of course the whole Jewish press is shrieking with glee,' he realized privately, and confined himself to bed with a thermometer for company.⁸⁹

Why is he so afraid this time?
Is he much impressed by Stennes?
Is he weakened by Magda?
that is, does he now wish to live?

April 10, 1931

16: The Stranger and the Shadow

?
7
THE thermometer's mercury thread has climbed to 40°C. Goebbels is ill, but Magda phones only once, saying she's at the Quandt estate in Mecklenburg.¹ He struggles out of bed on the Friday April 10, 1931, to speak to two thousand party officials. On Saturday he learns that she is back in Berlin; she does not contact him. Ilse and Olga fuss around the invalid. He is too weak to resist. On Sunday he phones Magda's home. She is not there; later however she phones him, and admits that she has been seeing off a young lover—but he has brought things to a head and fired a revolver at her. She tells Goebbels she is injured (in fact the Jewish law student's bullet has struck the door frame next to her. 'If you had really aimed at me and hit me,' she scoffs, 'I might have been impressed. I find your behavior ridiculous').²

Too late Goebbels realizes how much he loves her. Must he always be lonely? These and other thoughts lay siege to him. He spends Sunday pining for her and writing a gripping description of his jealous delirium. Perhaps thirty times he telephones her home, but nobody answers. He glares at the phone, willing it to ring. Staying home on Monday the thirteenth he at last reaches her by phone. They drive out to a remote forest house at Pichelsdorf. She pours out her heart about the grief her crazed ex-lover has caused her. She answers his reproaches with floods of tears, the last resort of feminine culpability; but she wishes to spend Saturday with the other man, to say farewell. She refuses Goebbels' ultimatum to spend that Saturday with him. 'Thus it is over,' writes Goebbels. Unconsciously scriptwriting again, he adds: 'She exits weeping.'³

ON the twelfth he had returned to gau HQ for the first time since the putsch. Everybody was very kind to him and the S.A. stood smartly to attention. But there were problems. The account books showed that *Angriff* was deep in debt.⁴ He instructed Hans Hinkel, Weissauer's successor, to cut back its size from twelve to eight pages.⁵ His deputy Mainhausen warned that Göring was double-crossing them. Goebbels needed few warnings on that score.⁶

The next morning he was back in court, charged with having said in a speech at the Veterans' Building in 1929, 'We don't speak of corruption in Berlin or bolshevism at City Hall. No! We just say Isidor Weiss, and

1931

that says it all.⁷ He was fined two hundred marks on one count, fifteen hundred marks for having picked on Weiss 'because of his Jewish origins,' still running a high fever, he limped out. He suspected traitors everywhere. 'Keep on marching' he penned into his diary. 'Don't look back!'⁸

17. There seemed no end to the court actions. On the seventeenth he was fined two thousand marks, then five hundred, and finally one hundred more for contempt of court. More summonses were heaped onto his desk.⁹ He resolved to take revenge on all the Isidors of this world when the time came.

A severe depression seized him, a mental crisis which he acknowledged only when he deemed that it had passed.¹⁰ Magda's shenanigans had triggered it. There was a 'shadow' still lurking around her apartment. Apparently she had had a stormier past than the comparatively innocent Dr Goebbels had suspected. Insane with jealousy, he trusted nobody. The word *spies* surfaced more often in his diary. He searched for them at his HQ, he even suspected Hinkel; his political life seemed more arduous than ever, a constant round of strange hotel beds briefly sighted at three A.M., of six A.M. railroad platforms for the return to Berlin, of persecution, court hearings, prohibitions, and the constant fear of violence or even assassination.¹¹

May
Grzesinski enforced a new three-month ban on Goebbels speaking—which sometimes meant listening to the pompous and vapid Hermann Göring standing in for him. Hitler now entrusted the aviator Göring with important missions abroad. In May 1931 he visited Rome and returned with a signed photograph of Mussolini for the Führer. 'Jack of all trades,' sniffed Goebbels, meaning master of none.¹²

April 25.
27.
Eight more court appearances faced him late that April. 'Maddening,' he recorded. 'But I'm not going to lose my nerve.'¹³ At Itzehoe near Hamburg he faced a four-month prison sentence but was acquitted.¹⁴

Squirming under Grzesinski's speaking ban, on April 25 he reluctantly signed an undertaking not to make fun of the police observers assigned to his meetings any more.¹⁵ Another hearing was scheduled at Moabit for April 27. He notified the court however that he could not miss an important Nazi meeting in Munich. But the Berlin courts had issued a bench warrant after his non-appearance. As he was eating at the Rose Garden hotel three detectives arrested him and escorted him to the night train to Berlin. 'So much for immunity!' he fumed. 'With a Barmat, a Sklarek and a Kutisker,' declared *Angriff* that morning, referring to the Jewish racketeers, 'they didn't go to such lengths. But then they weren't the elected representatives of sixty thousand Germans—just major embezzlers!'¹⁶ Press photographers crowded the platform as the train arrived back in Berlin. 'The *Judenpresse* is howling with joy,' Goebbels noted. In Room 664 at the Moabit courthouse (*Angriff* helpfully told its readers where the eight new cases were to be heard) the world's press awaited him.¹⁷ He told the judges what he thought of them, then sat down and refused to speak another word. He was given a month's suspended jail sentence, and heavy fines. Choking with rage he lodged an appeal.¹⁸ To

his lawyer he snarled, indicating the prosecutor Dr Stenig, 'Let's make a note of that man for later.'¹⁹

May brought still more cases.²⁰ But daylight was filtering into this long dark tunnel of police harassment. On June 12 he was again acquitted. 'The courts,' he gloated, 'are getting to whiff of things to come'—a reference to the growing likelihood that Brüning's days in office were numbered. 'Then it's our turn.'²¹

KEEPING a tryst with Magda at the five-star Kaiserhof hotel, he recognizes that the other man, the 'Shadow,' is still coming between them.²² Fretting, he spends his evenings alone at Steglitz fingering his piano keyboard, leafing idly through a book, or fitfully dozing. He phones countless times without reaching her. After one colossal Sport Palace gathering she invites him back to her own luxurious apartment for the first time. The Shadow has gone. Her elegant suite of seven rooms includes a music room, and quarters for her guests and servants. He decides that the worst is over between them. His diary soon finds him making plans for the future with her: and he is no longer keeping score.²³

scene?

Shadows flit in and out from his own past. Magda remains a vexatious enigma still, often inexplicably unpunctual for their dates. Once she tells him that 'a stranger' has warned her that Dr Goebbels is a Jew, and has shown her an original letter 'stolen from the gau HQ files' written a decade earlier by Goebbels to Director Cohnen, a family friend at Mönchen Gladbach. Cohnen was the gauleiter's real father, suggests the stranger, who also mentions Peter Simons, the husband of Goebbels' maternal aunt Anna. 'This is what I have to put up with,' winces Goebbels, puzzling over the stranger's identity.'²⁴ (The 'stolen' document is probably a product of Magda's own feline snooping around while working in his personal archives, but this evidently does not occur to him.)

The two spend Whitsun on her ex-husband's estate Severin in Mecklenburg. Günther Quandt's manager, a leading local Nazi, lets them in. Alone at last they iron out their remaining differences. Sometimes she still wounds him with an ill-considered word, but the wound soon heals.²⁵ He longs for a hearth and home. He begins talking about setting up a matrimonial home when victory is theirs; this is comfortingly vague, and she goes along with that.²⁶ After he returns to Berlin—alone, as she has asked to stay on for another day in this country idyll—he writes, 'When we have conquered the Reich we shall become man and wife.'²⁷ In fact Magda probably entertained little real ambition to harness her uxorial ambitions to such an uncertain chariot. He writes her a real love letter—the first such essay in ten years.²⁸ Visiting her to give her a clock a few days later, he is thunderstruck to find the Shadow still living there; Magda tells him that since the student will not budge, she is moving out and will have the police evict the trespasser.²⁹ As a sop to Goebbels, she agrees he shall have the right to walk young Harald to the Herder school across the square.

After speaking at Erfurt Goebbels meets Anka Stalherm and breaks

Dec 1931

u 22

HEINRICH HIMMLER

office was set up to determine the racial standards required of good German stock, to conduct research into the surviving ethnic groups in Europe that could be claimed as German, and to decide all matters connected with the descent of individuals at home and abroad about whom there were any racial doubts. Darré remained in charge of this office with its increasing powers until 1938, though he was also, from 1933, Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture. It was with his aid that searching tests were devised for the brides of S.S. men and made obligatory in the notorious Marriage Law of the S.S., dated 31 December 1931 and coming into force the following day.

In its opening paragraphs, Himmler's Marriage Law insisted on the importance of maintaining the high standard of blood in the S.S.² The principal clauses that followed filled many unmarried S.S. men with dismay:

'Every S.S. man who aims to get married must procure for this purpose the marriage certificate of the Reichsführer S.S.

'S.S. members who though denied marriage certificates marry in spite of it, will be stricken from the S.S.; they will be given the choice of withdrawing.

'The working-out of the details of marriage petitions is the task of the Race Office of the S.S.

'The Race Office of the S.S. directs the Clan Book of the S.S., in which the families of S.S. members will be entered after the marriage certificate is issued.

'The Reichsführer S.S., the manager of the Race Office, and the specialists of this office are duty bound on their word of honour to secrecy.'

Himmler ended his Marriage Code with a defiant flourish:

'It is clear to the S.S. that with this command it has taken a step of great significance. Derision, scorn, and failure to understand do not move us; the future belongs to us!

(Signed) Heinrich Himmler'

Himmler's Marriage Code for members of the S.S. required every man who wanted to marry to obtain a certificate of approval for his bride in order that the purity of the Nordic stock which he already represented should be maintained unimpaired in the blood of his descendants.

Th
with
right
child
that
was
to sa
bloo
infer
for e
La
whic
S.S.
princ
tradi
Th
Him
mere
to b
com
racia
Ti
in its
and
char
will
argu
to b
and
bred
qual
discr
but
few
the i
theo
into
hum
eithe
caug

mis. + June 1931

u 24

HEINRICH HIMMLER

oppressive decrees or find methods of evasion which soon became common practice not only in the S.S. but in the whole of Nazi society as the oppression spread.

Himmler's ideal man was a fair-haired, blue-eyed, superhuman athlete whose values were derived from a medieval concept of relationship with the cultivation of the earth, a man who despised most developments in modern culture because he had no judgment in such matters, though like Heydrich, he might well play accepted music on the violin or read accepted books. He was a man who left all political and social judgment to his leaders, and gave them his unquestioning obedience. Though he might well be in private a kindly husband and an indulgent father, he was essentially a destructive man, ready to act on the vilest or most stupid orders that only served to show the prejudice and cruelty of his commanders. This image of the ideal man, primitive in his outlook and brutal in his behaviour, was the result of the racial intolerance of Rosenberg, Darre and Himmler, whose collective vision was blinded by the same false idea of past glories which bore no relation whatever to historic truth, to the needs of modern society, or to any future social order which might be called civilized.

It was in June of the year when Darre and Himmler were concocting their marriage code that a man arrived to help them who had all the appearance of a young Messiah. Himmler was approached by one of his staff, the Freiherr von Eberstein, with a request that he interview a young man who had recently joined the S.S. in Hamburg. His name was Reinhard Heydrich; he was of good family and had until recently been a lieutenant in the Navy. Heydrich was a godson of Eberstein's mother. Himmler agreed, then fell ill and cancelled the appointment. Heydrich took no notice of the cancellation and travelled overnight south to Munich, relying on Eberstein to arrange for him to see Himmler, who had returned to his poultry farm to recover from his sickness. Himmler agreed over the telephone that, since Heydrich had come to Munich, he should visit him in Waldtrudering.

The first meeting between these two men, whose strange relationship was to constitute the direst threat to the well-being of Europe that resulted from conquest by Hitler, took place on 4 June 1931. Himmler understood that Heydrich had been a naval Intelligence officer, and he had a particular, important task in mind which he felt might be carried out by a man with this kind of background and

train
his
of
amt
the
T
pres
with
com
pecu
mist
navi
ing
Him
whe
In c
like
to h
invi
izing
Hey
limit
pape
entir
Secu
D
pow
ever
This
your
musi
Him
was
age
not j
at th
scho
an a
notal
son

June 1931

25 u

REICHSFÜHRER S.S.

training. He wanted to establish an Intelligence or security service of his own within the S.S. to conduct secret research into those members of the Party, particularly among the leaders of the S.A., whose ambitions seemed hostile to his own, or whose presence degraded the ideals of the Party as he conceived them.

The young man who came down to Waldtrudering was of impressive appearance. He was tall and blond, blue-eyed and Nordic, with a model physique that corresponded exactly to Himmler's conception of what an S.S. man should be. His eyes, in fact, were of a peculiar lightness, piercing and hypnotic. Although there was some mistake in his records (he had been a code and signals officer in naval Intelligence, not an Intelligence officer), his handsome bearing and assurance of manner made an immediate impression on Himmler, whose diffidence of nature always made him nervous when he had to deal with men of a capacity greater than his own. In order to assert himself, Himmler set Heydrich a written test, like a schoolmaster sizing up an over-bright pupil; first he described to him the kind of Intelligence service he had in mind, and then invited Heydrich to outline on paper how he would set about organizing it. He gave him twenty minutes to complete the project, and Heydrich seized this chance to impress still further a man whose limitation of character he could already sense. Himmler read the paper and offered him a post on his personal staff as head of an entirely new department in the S.S., the *Sicherheitsdienst* (S.D.) or Security Service. *see*

During the next ten years Heydrich was to create a network of power which was eventually to threaten not only his master but every other member of the Nazi leadership, including Hitler himself. This cold and brutally handsome man, three and a half years younger than Himmler, was the son of a distinguished teacher of music, who had once been a performer in opera and came, like Himmler's mother, from a musical family. Heydrich's second name was Tristan, and he had begun his own musical studies at an early age. He became an outstanding violinist, but his musical talents did not prevent him undergoing the strict training given to schoolboys at the school in Halle, where the family lived. He was brilliant at school, and it seemed that he could have succeeded equally well in an academic or musical career. He was also a skilled athlete and a notable fencer. His mother, who was a strict Catholic, brought her son up in the Catholic faith; scepticism, however, seems to have

developed fairly early in his cold and cruelly intelligent nature, and the traditional faith of his family in German nationalism led him at the age of sixteen to join the nationalist Free Corps movement that spread throughout Germany after the First World War. He decided to abandon a career in music and train to become an officer in the Navy.

His character was already well developed. He was alert, filled with a nervous energy, restless, hard-working, strong-willed and intolerant. His lean face was hard and ruthless, and he had grown over six feet tall. As a naval cadet he soon mastered the technicalities of navigation and he charmed the wife of Commander Canaris, the First Officer of the training cruiser on which he was stationed, by playing to her on the violin. He was invited by Frau Canaris to form a quartet for the performance of chamber music. Meanwhile, his energetic mind turned to the study of languages, and he rapidly gained a fair knowledge of English, French and Russian. He also began to develop his lifelong taste for philandering. In 1926 he was promoted lieutenant, and in 1928, at his own request, he was made a signals and radio officer stationed at Kiel. Here one night at a ball held just before Christmas in 1930 he met a beautiful girl of nineteen, Lina Mathilde von Osten, who was as blonde as himself. Within three days they had become engaged, in spite of the fact that a scandal arose because another blonde girl, the daughter of a prominent industrialist, claimed he was in love with her and she with him. The industrialist, who, unfortunately for Heydrich, was a friend of the Grand Admiral Raeder, used his influence to have Heydrich dismissed the service when he refused to break his official engagement and marry the other girl. He was required to resign his commission in April 1931, and his fiancée insisted on maintaining her engagement to him in spite of the opposition of her parents now that he was disgraced.⁴

Heydrich took his dismissal very badly. He wept, the only time he ever did so in Lina's presence. He could think of no future for himself outside the services. But Lina von Osten had other ideas. She was a passionate Nazi, whose conversion had started when at the age of sixteen she had first heard Hitler speak at a meeting in Kiel. She knew all about the S.S., and believed that in this movement there should be a place for so talented and handsome an officer as her unemployed lover. He responded to her enthusiasm and joined the Party, and it was her resolution that eventually

persu
visit 1

Hir
astute
surroi
sated
time e
their
whate
Since,
backg
when
he wa
he key
web, l
Heydr
S.S. a
in his
kind c
amour
same
not ha
were t
Heydr
when,
paring
during
by his
subord

In J
this mi
of offic
He toc
Christr
At the
Lina v
Heydri
start h
inform
it was

X H
in
ker
des

June 1931

REICHSFÜHRER S.S.

27 u

persuaded him to make the contact with Eberstein that led to his visit to Himmler in June.⁸

Himmler, though in many respects a weak man, was nevertheless astute and calculating. Throughout his career as head of the S.S. he surrounded himself with men who in one way or another compensated for whatever was lacking in his own nature, while at the same time ensuring that they remained his servants. He used their strength, their brutality, or their intelligence to fulfil his purpose for him in whatever portion of his total plan it suited him to place them. Since, unlike Göring or Goebbels, he preferred to hover in the background out of the public eye, except on those formal occasions when it was necessary for him to be seen alongside the other leaders, he was not averse to letting his subordinates act as his agents while he kept out of sight, the spider silently operating at the centre of his web. But in Heydrich Himmler met a man who became his match. Heydrich was quick to realize the intentions of the Reichsführer S.S. and to exploit them for his own purposes, while carefully posing in his presence and that of others as a dutiful subordinate. Yet a kind of dubious, mutual respect existed between the two men which amounted in Himmler's case to a form of affection; they shared the same negative ideals, though in nature and temperament they could not have been more diverse. For the next ten years, however, they were to be bound together, each man the other's evil genius, until Heydrich's assassination in 1942 suddenly removed him at a time when, in the estimation of many who knew him well, he was preparing to supersede Himmler and even outbid Hitler for power during this final period, for the Führer's leadership was undermined by his own obsessions and threatened by the intrigues of his subordinates.

In June 1931, at the age of twenty-seven, Heydrich gladly accepted this minor post in the S.S. in which an increasing number of men of officer rank and even of aristocratic background were enlisting. He took up his duties in Munich officially on 10 August, and by Christmas had been promoted to the rank of a major in the S.S. At the same time, on 26 December, he married his resolute fiancée Lina von Osten, who was then only twenty years old. Major Heydrich's salary was RM 180 a month, or about £15,⁹ and from the start he began the patient and methodical compilation of secret information on the private lives of men and women inside and, when it was likely to prove useful, outside the Party as well. By the end

* Heydrich in Czechoslovakia —
He took the chance he took
because of his belief that
destiny chose him or rejected him.

1931-32

Appendix A:

Adolf Eichmann's Account of Himmler

Prior to his trial in Israel, Adolf Eichmann voluntarily submitted to a very thorough examination, during the course of which hundreds of documents (most of them photostats of affidavits and of R.S.H.A. files) were sifted and discussed. The examination started on 29 May 1960 and continued in almost daily sessions to 15 January 1961; 76 tapes produced 3,564 pages of typescript, a verbatim account of the entire interrogation which, through the courtesy of the Israeli Embassy in London, we were given the opportunity to study.

Eichmann proved eager to co-operate with his interrogators; he became as obsequious as he must once have been to his former superiors. He was proud of his punctiliousness in obeying orders, and he delighted in describing filing systems and other office routine in considerable detail. He claimed he had originally joined the S.S. during 1931-2 (he was not sure of the exact date) through the influence of Kaltenbrunner, whom he had known well since childhood. Later, he had applied to join the S.D. and was appointed a clerk in the 'Freemason Museum'; subsequently, as we have seen, he became a specialist in Jewish affairs.

During the interrogation, Eichmann emphasized again and again that it was Hitler who ordered the physical destruction of the Jews, while Himmler was charged with issuing the necessary orders. Eichmann first describes Himmler (pp. 38-9) as 'always ready to oblige the Führer, liable to get bogged down in petty detail, but then again, quite impulsively, signing some far-reaching decree.' On p. 146 Eichmann reverts to Himmler's impulsiveness in giving these far-reaching orders whenever he was struck by some idea; as often as not such orders would be passed on to any officer who happened to be with him at the time and later held up by red tape as soon as they had reached the appropriate official channels.

handling
Heer

Eichmann mentions Himmler's aversion to seeing fingers stained with nicotine. Officers ordered into Himmler's presence were advised to use the lemon and pumice-stone available in the washroom of Himmler's special train. Anyone failing to do so risked getting a three or six months' *Rauchverbot*; this meant instant dismissal from the S.S. if he were caught smoking during that period.

In Minsk Eichmann witnessed the mass-shooting of Jews straight into the ditch, and a little later (p. 240) he claims that Heydrich out of sheer bravado gave orders to kill Jews who were already being killed by Globocnik's orders. Heydrich said, 'I herewith authorize you to submit a further 150,000 Jews to the final solution [*der Endlösung zuzuführen*].' Eichmann in fact seemed uncertain whether the figure might not have been 250,000 in this case. In the autumn of 1941 he was sent for by Himmler, along with Mueller, to report about these matters (p. 263). The interview took a mere five minutes.

Eichmann has much to say about the S.S. euphemisms, such as 'final solution' and 'special treatment'. Even at the notorious conference at Wannsee (see page 127) direct references to killing were avoided, Heydrich favouring the term *Arbeitseinsatz im Osten* (labour assignment in the East). Another point frequently mentioned by Eichmann (for example, on pages 135-6, 1020, 2028, 2167) is the fact that Himmler considered the camp at Theresienstadt very much his own domain, insisting on giving all the necessary orders for this place personally. As previously mentioned, he was very keen on maintaining the myth of Theresienstadt as the *Altersghetto*, suggesting it was a place where elderly Jews could live out their lives in peace and comfort, and was very angry whenever news leaked through of inmates from Theresienstadt being sent to the gas-ovens in Auschwitz and other extermination camps. Yet since the camp's maximum capacity was 10,000, he did nothing to stop hundreds of thousands of victims from Theresienstadt being 'evacuated'. He merely insisted on the strictest secrecy so as not to offend world opinion.

At all times Himmler was specially interested in 'prominent' prisoners; hence (p. 2608) we find him giving special orders for Fray Glück, the sister of La Guardia, the Mayor of New York, to be taken out of a mass transport and to be transferred to the camp where Léon Blum, Odette Churchill and other important prisoners were held.

On pp. 2456 et seq. Eichmann shows his surprise at documentary

A
evidenc
years o
Jews in
extermi
diamon
armam
Knight
Ther
1318) t
of Jews
refers t
frances).
of certi
they a
the inte
to the
'final se
and Jev
and sei
Eichma
French
tions (i
Reichst
that is,
Himml
French
The
1945, w
with Ei
hostage
and see
ated vil
order t
little in

lists gave him: 'office general.' To be sure, session, but he was a politician if there ever entered the Third Foot Guards as lieutenant, one of the most exclusive of the old Prussians, the comrade and friend of another von Hindenburg, son of the later marshal. One he became captain and entered the staff later, during the war, he became—still Hindenburg's close collaborators; and as friend of the old man's own younger friend. His friendship connected him with Groener, 'adopted son.' Through all these personal Schleicher's strongest talents—his ability. It almost seems as if the man's name (trigant) had shaped his personality and her was a timid or gentle nature; he loved it. But he pursued his lofty ambitions consciously adapted to his name, utilization of extreme suppleness and amiability in conversation. He was always ready with some to always to back up his words. His bearing never seemed unpleasant; he was so amiable, looked like a Caesar. But even his most concealing conceal his lack of scruples in the choice

Hindenburg's headquarters it had been to revise German politics and at the same time; to some extent he had been the political short-lived war dictatorship. The career of those living threads which connected the old imperial army with the fate of the years he had been the political brains of the so-called 'Chief of the Minister's Office'—which Schleicher in 1928 had secured for skillful deal with the unsuspecting Reichs in the overthrow of Seeckt; the former army ought to remain powerful and small.

1931
Röhm made a splendid impression on this powerful man, and won his confidence; to ingratiate himself, he even told Schleicher all sorts of amusing stories about Hitler's life and career; their general import was that Hitler, with all his eccentricities, was not really so bad. Schleicher, instructed by Röhm, was able to convince his chief Groener that Hitler was actually a rock amid the German chaos, a bulwark against the radical masses; even if, personally, he was perhaps unstable and none too strong, politically he was an anchor to the party of the Uprooted and Disinherited. The result of these conversations was a gentleman's agreement: on January, 1931, Röhm announced his inauguration as chief of the S.A. staff, and on January 2, Schleicher decreed that, since it was still by no means certain the National Socialists were really enemies of the constitution, National Socialist workers until further notice should no longer be dismissed from the arsenals and powder factories of the Reichswehr. In February, Hitler in turn issued a proclamation to the S.A. ordering them to refrain from street fights—'I understand your distress and your rage,' he said, 'but you must not bear arms.'

Mass discontent seethed among the extremists of Right and Left in the S.A. These men were by no means all noble warriors yearning to risk their necks; no, for them legality or revolution was a question of existence. Without street fights they would one day be superfluous, and they would probably be superfluous if their Führer was serious in using democracy as his chief weapon. They knew that Röhm had promised the Reichswehr Ministry to dismiss the most dangerous among them. It is possible that someone in the Reichswehr Ministry had passed this on to them in order to create unrest among the Brown bands; anyhow they knew that Röhm was selling them out. Hitler threw out these elements, after accusing them of planning an uprising. This was the Stennes crisis. 'I am your Führer, and not elected or hired by you, not sought out by you and appointed by majority vote,' cried Hitler to the discontented storm troopers. 'No, I am your Führer on the strength of my work! . . . And if all of you were to leave me, I should go on alone!'

Even before the court had sentenced Wilhelm Scheringer to im-

* Dr. T. Röhm was at his best. Schleicher was left as the opinion that if Hitler came to power, he would crack, and that would be all the spoils for R + S.

Dr. P.T. I was now ready to speak of vintage Hitler. Now that I have seen you and betrayed you, I am ready to say that you are for the Reichswehr. But the poor man was a good man who was all alone.

1931

and come to him. He had visited
sm Der Führer had dragged him
d subjected him to one of his art
se a to speak of politics, Hitler had
should believe and obey. Back in
P^a ed to Goebbels of his experience
N^a Berlin *gauleiter* whether the party
a^e down interest slavery? Goebbels
H^u d occur to him who had to read
rk^u eringer argued that all this stood
o^u int program, Goebbels cried in
d never heard of those miserable

h its most sacred principles! Even
loyal to principle, many of them
e young officers of 1923, who had
who marches; we'll march along!
we march with somebody else.)
nd believed in National Socialism?
s was perhaps the same. Schering
ght things over; the result of his
931, Hans Kippenberger, a Com-
Reichstag and read a letter from
d lieutenant renounced Hitler and
Only by smashing capitalism in
an we be freed,' he wrote. Goebbels
ad really made such a declaration.
r betrayed revolution declaration

alist, and warrior for freedom saw
a Communism; high S.A. leaders
inst Hitler — was that the picture
issues? Groener went around preach-
the hour demands we support Hit-
socialist leaders; he is a prudent man
he has every reason for doing so.
er that Hitler desired nothing but

freedom for propaganda; provided this were given him, he could easily be held in check, if for no other reason, because he lived in constant fear of being deported if he broke the laws. 'I have sworn legality,' Hitler often said, 'and Herr Stennes will not make a perjurer of me,' and the eternal fear of the Vienna vagabond trembled in his words.

And so the men in the government let Röhm persuade them that Hitler was more harmless than he looked, and not quite right in the head to boot. Brüning talked with Hitler, and afterward each had the feeling that he could swallow up the other. The gloomy, silent chancellor, a patriot as impassioned as Hitler, but shy and fearing his limitations, made a profound impression on the volatile Führer, and realized it; at times, perhaps, he thought he could lead Hitler. A formal understanding on the course to be taken was not possible, though Brüning himself had given Hitler the catchword that things could no longer go on as they were.

Thus Hitler wormed his way into the state system and the calculations and almost the confidence of those he intended to destroy — just by playing the good boy. Amazing how comparatively easy this was. He never won the confidence of the popular majority — never as long as there were free elections in Germany; but the men of the ruling caste, whether they secretly admired or only just tolerated or openly detested him, began to take him for granted as an indispensable and very big cog in the machine. It was not only cold reasoning that led Hitler on this promising and successful path; he followed some instinct of his nature that forbade him to take unnecessary risks. With this strategy he was already one step ahead of events. The world was in a state of revolutionary disintegration that had its repercussions from the vast spaces of the 'declining west' to the petty misery of bankrupt German communities. In the midst of this general decline there had to be the rainbow of a new order, based on force and firmness; a promise to the bewildered millions who did not — as Stennes imagined — long for more disorder, but for peace at home and abroad. To be sure, chaos was for Hitler a 'necessity of fate,' or there would be no general longing for what he wanted to stand for; but certainly in his own private desire for personal safety he was a genuine interpreter of this longing. It was a desire for greatness and safety at the same time.

K. C. L.

return

D. S. *

that was certain - too long

*D. S. What one does well to understand is the young lover in Hitler. How he loved Brüning for example — how he was taken to Brüning's patriotic intensity — 'You are as serious about these matters as I am. Ah, dear Chancellor Brüning, there are so few like you and me.'

Brüning's depression, as heavy as the horizontal door of a machine, deeply depressed just enough to take in Hitler's words, then closed again. Who could blame Hitler for this? He was

Oct 26, 1930

Oct 24 1930
Hervé asked whether, if France should cancel the German reparations in case the United States should cancel the French War debts; if France should give Germany's colonies back, permit German rearmament and *Anschluss* of Austria, favor the restoration of the Polish Corridor, etc., would Hitler then be ready to come to an understanding with France and conclude a military alliance?

Hitler made this surprising answer: 'I think I can assure you that there is no one in Germany who will not with all his heart approve any honest attempt at an improvement of relations between Germany and France. My own feelings force me to take the same attitude. . . . The German people has the solemn intention of living in peace and friendship with all civilized nations and powers. . . . And I regard the maintenance of peace in Europe as especially desirable and at the same time secured, if France and Germany, on the basis of an equal sharing of natural human rights, arrive at a real inner understanding. . . . The young Germany, that is led by me and that finds its expression in the National Socialist Movement, has only the most heartfelt desire for an understanding with other European nations.'

On October 26, 1930, the *Völkischer Beobachter* published this statement of its editor. The date is worth remembering. On this day Hitler began his peace propaganda which continued uninterrupted for almost ten years. Inexplicable and incredible, it moved men by this very fact, but also by an undeniable breath of passion. With the same passion Hitler had said the exact opposite; had for ten years attacked the German government for its willingness to conclude an understanding with France: 'The sword is our balance [he had cried] . . . the language of cannon is our language!' And now, when Hervé, in the style of the best *Realpolitik*, proposed that Germany should have equal military rights and as large an army as France, Hitler, the orator of blood and fire, crushed the Frenchman with the hyper-pacifistic answer: 'If this intention is really present in France, it strikes me as less important for Germany to arm than for France to disarm. France has it in her power to carry out at any time the disarmament that was solemnly promised Germany in the treaties, to free all Europe of a nightmare and set everyone's mind at rest.'

D.T. to A.H. — The masses
had no memory, and have no

Half a year before this discussion with the I had declared to the judge at a trial in Munich there are no principles of foreign policy. The principle of our party is its position on the racial and internationalism. Foreign policy is only a means. In matters of foreign policy I shall not permit myself — meaning, by programs, oaths, or treaties.

Hervé's somewhat irritated reply was to the effect: 'You are both a French army and a German army, at the same time, because they had to defend European states — how could just Hitler forget that? This is not that he was not debating with a Frenchman only of French National Socialist. He was speaking to anti-Semites of France; and so he told them that European states were not only a German movement, but a world well; he lured them with a world plan: 'In my European cabinets in their present make-up cannot think of a purely defensive war with Soviet Russia. European states have equipped their armies and their soldiers with every conceivable weapon — grenades, machine guns, tanks, airplanes, gas — and they are also famous weapons of defense against these arms. But only armed and immunized its people spiritually against Italy. The other European states possess neither arms nor political gas-masks against Soviet propagation of overcoming Bolshevism is a question of European states. The present European states contaminated cannot oppose any enduring resistance to the effects of this world plague.'

Fascization of the European states! That was just what Rothermere was aiming at when, in September, he prophesied that Germany 'would draw not only the Germans in Czechoslovakia along with the Czechs and Slovaks in Czechoslovakia and Rumania, but perhaps the Magyar people into its sphere of influence. As a result, the development, Czechoslovakia, which has so long been against the peace treaty (by the repression of nations

→ interest in what you said last year — only now

→ D.T. to A.H. This will increase the French desire to have your rearm in order that they can disarm. They expect to be able to deceive you. Keep preaching pacifism — the French will give you more. A.H. I know that already. You don't have to tell me what I already know. He thought he was speaking to himself. He took it for granted that there were two different voices in his head. Given

→ Now
human egoism
wasn't
longer
married
to
himself

Mac
1930

if France should cancel the German
ed States should cancel the French War
e Germany's colonies back, permit Ger-
chluss of Austria, favor the restoration
„ would Hitler then be ready to come
France and conclude a military alliance?
ing answer: 'I think I can assure you
many who will not with all his heart
at an improvement of relations between
own feelings force me to take the same
eople has the solemn intention of living
h all civilized nations and powers. . . .
nce of peace in Europe as especially de-
secured, if France and Germany, on the
f natural human rights, arrive at a real
he young Germany, that is led by me
n in the National Socialist Movement,
desire for an understanding with other

Völkischer Beobachter published this
e date is worth remembering. On this
propaganda which continued uninter-
Inexplicable and incredible, it moved
lso by an undeniable breath of passion.
er had said the exact opposite; had for
nan government for its willingness to
with France: 'The sword is our bal-
language of cannon is our language!' *the style of the best Realpolitik*, pro-
have equal military rights and as large
the orator of blood and fire, crushed
yper-pacifistic answer: 'If this inten-
nce, it strikes me as less important for
France to disarm. France has it in her
me the disarmament that was solemnly
aties, to free all Europe of a nightmare
rest.'

~~The masses
y, and have no~~

Half a year before this discussion with the Frenchman, Hitler had declared to the judge at a trial in Munich: 'In political life there are no principles of foreign policy. The programmatical principle of our party is its position on the racial problem, on pacifism and internationalism. Foreign policy is only a means to an end. In matters of foreign policy I shall not permit myself to be bound' — meaning, by programs, oaths, or treaties.

Hervé's somewhat irritated reply was to the effect that there must be both a French army and a German army, and an alliance between them, because they had to defend Europe against Bolshevism — how could just Hitler forget that? This reminded Hitler that he was not debating with a Frenchman only, but with a kind of French National Socialist. He was speaking to the 'Aryans and anti-Semites' of France; and so he told them that National Socialism was not only a German movement, but a world movement as well; he lured them with a world plan: 'In my opinion the European cabinets in their present make-up cannot think seriously even of a purely defensive war with Soviet Russia. The present-day states have equipped their armies and their soldiers for war with every conceivable weapon — grenades, machine guns, flame-throwers, tanks, airplanes, gas — and they are also familiar with all the weapons of defense against these arms. But only a single state has armed and immunized its people spiritually against Bolshevism: Italy. The other European states possess neither political offensive arms nor political gas-masks against Soviet propaganda! The question of overcoming Bolshevism is a question of fascizing the European states. The present European states contaminated with Marxism cannot oppose any enduring resistance to the disruptive work of this world plague.'

Fascization of the European states! That was just what his new friend Rothermere was aiming at when, in September, 1930, he prophesied that Germany 'would draw not only the three million Germans in Czechoslovakia along with the three million Hungarians in Czechoslovakia and Rumania, but perhaps also the Hungarian people into its sphere of influence. As a result of such a development, Czechoslovakia, which has so gravely offended against the peace treaty (by the repression of national minorities as

~~intend in what you said
last year — only now!~~

total rejection of disarmament), could be put out of sight. . . . This great national combination under which I see forming step by step as the new immediate future, would be a bulwark against Hitler concluded his correspondence with Hervé to my deepest regret, I must reject any offer of a German-French military alliance.' His the German-French alliance would prevent the for- most world front and lead to new wars. He, Hitler, peace among Fascists.

European bulwark which Rothermere foresaw was not. On March 19, 1931, Germany concluded a cus- tom the little republic of Austria, the 'brother land,' forbidden to join with Germany by the victors of country without any appreciable resources, a coun- the peasants starved on their stony mountainsides, deeply shaken by the crisis than Germany; the were even more radical, the contradictions more from its economic resources by the disintegration of monarchy in 1919, the country was living solely forces which were bleeding it to death; solidly Ger- lity and strongly conscious of it, it was torn into two main groups: the faithful Catholic population, the peasants and middle class, and the strongly anti- working class. The armed intellectuals and bo- so put in an appearance, and had mobilized many peasants; the workers had likewise mobilized. Austria, bristling with arms, was on the brink of civil war: union was an emergency act. An exhausted Austria economic union with an exhausted Germany. An im- mic area was created, an even larger one was the Danubian countries to the southeast of Austria (Slovakia, Rumania) lived in large part from the sale of products to Germany. Germany and Austria them into their new economic *grossraum*. It was attempt at a 'great policy of liberation.' undable that the leading men of Czechoslovakia be-

came agitated. Was this the beginning of Lord Rothermere's new *Mittel Europa*, built upon the ruins of the Czechoslovakian state? It is nevertheless tragic that in 1931 the small country could find no better answer to an act arising from the right of self-determination than a sharp protest. France, fearing everything that made Ger- many stronger, likewise protested. Italy wavered for a moment, but then decided against Germany. All three powers, France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy, issued their protest, for practical pur- poses a command: the customs union must be dissolved at once, for it was nothing other than a disguised *Anschluss* of Austria to Germany. The world was solemnly called to judge; the issue was put before the Hague World Court. Dino Grandi, Italian ambas- sador in London and the real director of Fascist diplomacy, said cynically to Doctor Julius Curtius, the German Foreign Minister, that, regardless of the World Court's decision, Italy would never permit the customs union.

Italy was right, said Hitler, and Brüning was wrong: for 'it is simply inconceivable to carry through a measure in foreign affairs if at home there are no forces to fight for it consistently and per- severingly or if they are left entirely unused. . . . Brüning's failure confirmed his oft-expressed theory 'that it is not foreign policy which decides the course of a nation; it is first and foremost the nation itself, in its organization and education that prescribes its own course within the surrounding world.' To the German pub- lic, smarting under this last of the great diplomatic humiliations at the hands of the victors of Versailles, Hitler said dryly: 'Not Ver- sailles is the cause of the catastrophe. Your parties are the cause.'

The hardest blow against the customs union was financial pres- sure brought by France; short-term loans to Austria were called off, and this helped to bring the little country to her knees. The slow economic decline turned into a crash. The Oesterreichische Creditanstalt, Austria's largest bank, controlled by the Viennese branch of the Rothschild family, collapsed in May, 1931, and this crash may be considered the beginning of the second period of the European economic crisis; in its darkness and despair comparable to the German inflation. Collapse of German banks was imminent, and collapse in other countries was bound to follow. Europe (with

D. T. There are no principles.
I am the principle.

Always to be remembered,
never to be said aloud,
except on the most
dramatic occasion

rate its attacks on the government; other-
 uined. Formally Göring may have given
 s ran their course. Catholic bishops had
 ists from worship because Rosenberg's
 a to regard the party as anti-Christian;
 'carried on an impassioned fight against
 'positive Christianity.' But the Catholic
 y reached an understanding with Italian
 : ignore the fact that National Socialism
 vism and actually embodied strong anti-
 ust, 1931, Göring went to Rome and was
 li, the Pope's secretary of state (the future
 pted to dispel the Vatican's poor opinion

and attempts at understanding were not
 ch as Papen demanded; the aim was the
 majority, and Hitler himself had pointed
 his oath to legality and the constitution,
 tween himself and the bourgeois-national
 onal Socialists and the German National-
 berg. Hugenberg, like Papen, desired the
 ass independent of the people, of a group
 a minority. However, it was a half-dicta-
 re based on a majority and confirmed by
 er great opportunist in this political game,
 esired. To this end he obtained for Hitler
 nburg.

ing one another for the first time. Hitler
 ssed and seems to have feared the meeting.
 He was afraid to go without someone who
 öhm would have been the right man; he,
 for the close connection with the Reichs-
 the invitation itself. But Hindenburg had
 ust the homosexual adventurer, and Göring
 that Hitler should appear before the field
 him. Göring was in Sweden at the death-
 ing illness was drawing to an end. Hitler

wired him impetuously; the meeting with Hindenburg seemed to
 both of them a turning-point in history. The dying woman herself
 is said to have urged her husband to go. Göring left her, met Hitler
 in Berlin, and went with him to Hindenburg.

What was said at the meeting is still unknown. Probably Hitler
 spent some time on his favorite theme, that only National Socialism
 could save the country—all Europe, in fact—from Bolshevism.
 It is certain that he complained of how patriots—that is, himself
 and his party—were being persecuted, and presumably in his agi-
 tation he threatened that under such circumstances no spirited
 resistance could be expected of the German people if tomorrow
 the Poles should overrun the eastern border. At all events, the meet-
 ing was a failure. Schleicher later related that the old gentleman
 had been disappointed and had said that he would not make this
 'Bohemian corporal' chancellor, but 'at most general postmaster.'
 Hindenburg seems to have had the impression that Hitler was not
 a real German. As for Göring, he never again saw his wife alive.

It was a dismal time in Hitler's personal life. Geli Raubal, his
 beloved niece, had died three weeks before. Hitler does not seem
 to have been in full possession of his faculties at this time; he drifted
 along and let himself be pushed into decisions which he himself
 held to be mistaken, such as a new alliance with Hugenberg and
 the Stahlhelm. On October 11, one day after the talk with Hinden-
 burg, a solemn foundation of a so-called 'national front' was laid in
 the little spa of Harzburg, with many brown and green uniforms.
 Hitler felt like a prisoner; he was so disgruntled and agitated that
 he could scarcely speak, and he refused to eat at the same table with
 Hugenberg and the Stahlhelm leaders, Franz Seldte and Theodor
 Duestenberg. In his speech he flung a few attacks at Brüning and
 demanded 'that the power and responsibility be put into the hands
 of the national opposition'; but went no further than to reject 'gov-
 ernments which are formed without us or against us.' On the other
 hand, he did not shrink from saying that as long as Brüning gov-
 erned against them, the National Socialists would not defend the
 national boundaries: 'From now on, a system which persecutes us
 cannot count on our help or protection in times of need, or even of
 mortal peril.'

Accept
 *
 10/10/
 31

Possible to
 win an
 argument

D.T. * Geli's death had wasted

the old
 German army was
 the final specimen
 of humanity God
 could create.
 On top of that,
 Hindenburg looked
 much too much like
 Adolf's father with
 whom it had never been

whole mental regions
 of spirit and emotion
 in him. He said his piece
 but he was shrill and
 weak as thin. The old man
 in this weakened condition
 he was the old man was too
 much for him, too old, too
 sure of his own opinion, too
 well born, too certain of his
 biography, too certain of his
 belief that a general from the

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

clauses" in their charters, as did the largest Catholic association of university students.²²¹

Martin Wanh, an American psychiatrist who has investigated the psychological origins of the genocide of the Jews, has found roots in the Nazi Youth Cohort's infantile experience during World War I. He believes that as young boys during the war, they discovered that their Oedipal longings increased during the father's long absence. Since strong incestuous desires for the mother could not be tolerated, they were projected and blamed on someone else. The psychological defense used was the same as the one employed by young Adolf Hitler: they, too, ascribed incest to the Jews, who sought the ruination of the German people. The Jews were the racial enemy who should be punished and removed as "incestuous criminals" and "defilers of the race." Thus, exactly as with Hitler, "self-contempt was displaced onto the Jews ... thereby assuaging feelings of unworthiness and masochistic fantasies of rejection." According to Dr. Wanh, such fantasies of self-destruction led to a more ominous displacement when feelings of suicidal depression were transformed into a program of mass murder.²²²

It is probably true that anti-Semitism was less important in Hitler's accession to power than the economic crisis of 1930-1933. Nevertheless, the economic and social distress of those years served to reinforce already existent anti-Semitism, particularly among the Youth Cohort. For hatred of the Jews was a very effective way of bringing together primitive urges to hate, attack, and destroy. Hitler's anti-Semitism also appealed to the Cohort because it provided a way to lessen guilt feelings for having abandoned traditional Christian teachings. As Erikson has reminded us, young people seek some sort of faith and commitment. In this era of national humiliation, resentment, and the *Versailles-Diktat*, thousands of young Germans found Christianity irrelevant to their needs. They wanted hatred and revenge, not love and reconciliation. But they still felt uneasy about rejecting the religion of their childhood. To such people, as Maurice Samuel has suggested in *The Great Hatred*, anti-Semitism was a kind of displaced hatred of Christianity, a way of decreasing guilt feelings by attacking the traditional enemy of Christianity, the Jew. Thus the emphasis of the Oberammergau passion plays of the period: hate the Jews, for the Jews killed Jesus. Hitler's anti-Semitism provided "the official rehabilitation of hatred."²²³

There was a need to hate, and Hitler supplied it. But it is a mistake to see his appeal solely in negative terms. Rather, he was effective because he spoke both to the basest and to the most lofty impulses of man; to hatred, cruelty, aggression, and terror, but also to faith, hope, love, and sacrifice. One of the reasons why Hitler was such an effective leader was that he thoroughly understood a profound psychological truth: neither a man nor a political party lives by bread alone. Both need sustaining ideals. Political programs are never successful if they cast their appeals solely in terms of materialism, self-interest, and cupidity. Hitler's Youth Cohort wanted very much to believe that their

The Past As Prologue: Hitler and

leader could inspire them patriotism.

Hitler, an opportunist but on the armor of righteousness, materialism, factionalism. The effectiveness of his propaganda that his party's nihilism was "ideology" altruism.²²⁴ And legion. Trevor-Roper is right Hitler were vicious anti-Sem "Many young people," he has their time, were inspired by clear, infectious insurance" the exercise of faith and will and independence.²²⁵

The memoirs of Hitler's movement speak eloquently of people who were particularly attracted where common good would brotherly concern and support problems of Germany and individual responsibility and the dishonor of Versailles national parties. But German National People's Party who believed that the consequence while seeking to restore wanted a united cooperative found what they sought in Hitler

How different from [the] proposition that sprang idea was not to use the and landowners, but to relieve the misery of millions

A young laborer was that Hitler shared his desire for "Faith was the one thing that faith in the purity of our nation of a young soldier strikes the superfluous to describe the spirit of *Gemeinschaft*."²

Hitler, it should never be forgotten. As early as 1923 he spoke service and sacrifice, the whole wholeness," the call to nation

1931
*
2. T 340
* The increasing One always had
the potential power of certification, and
wonder he had one looking in man

Cartoon of a
and young An
the first

ADOLF HITLER

... break out in
... ps, which thou-
... sive tendencies
... ts of the Great

... es mothers and
... ts made a criti-
... ficant effect on
... ood: first, they
... ntries of the
... ne at all, came
... the traditional
... abandoned his

... at seared their
... evolution. The
... Germans—in-
... sasters of the
... at fathers had
... and fears and
... ories of hunger
... and destructive

... nt that German
... ritarian figure
... drawn to Hitler
... cal leaders of
... felt psychologi-
... er-Führer they
... he was what
... unknown hero
... on Cross First
... ish a military
... and march in
... of total fidelity
... resurgent and
... so average and
... nal life helped
... r own fathers
... as to become

... Germans felt in
... in and follow.
... ary 1924 sent
... himself, in us,
... early as July
... ns) with long-

The Past As Prologue: Hitler and History

ing for a great Führer. . . .” The Protestant Association of University Students expressed the same hope: “A cry from the heart responds to an urgent, pent-up demand that lives within all of us . . . for the coming of the Führer of our people.”²¹⁸

Young women of the Cohort also found Adolf Hitler to be the father-image of their dreams. Two sisters born in 1913 and 1915 recalled that their earliest memory was of their mother wearing black and weeping over their missing father. They found it impossible to describe the excitement they felt on seeing Hitler in person in 1931. So emotionally stirred that they could not sleep, they stayed up all night talking about the wondrous Führer who was everything they had longed for. Together they prayed that nothing would harm him or remove him from them; together they asked forgiveness for ever doubting him as their Führer. They joined the Party and volunteered for service to help feed and care for Nazi Storm Troopers.²¹⁷

In reflecting on the amazing success of Adolf Hitler, an American psychiatrist wondered why Germans followed this particular leader who was essentially so *childish*; what was it in them, he asked, that responded to this immature person who was in so many ways ridiculous? ²¹⁸ It seems likely that the Youth Cohort felt drawn to Hitler precisely *because* he was childlike and exhibited traits so similar to their own. He too used the defense of regression; he too, they believed, had suffered hunger and deprivation; he too was filled with hatred and capable of furious temper tantrums. Like themselves, he was defensive and vulnerable, but he could also be brutal and dictatorial in his demands, a destroyer and creator who would repay the insult of Versailles and build a New Order. He, too, practiced “primitive idealization”: the world was divided into the All Good and the All Evil—the good, creative Aryans, the evil, destructive Jews.

Above all, the Youth Cohort came to Hitler because his movement institutionalized hatred and sanctified aggression. It was exactly what the Cohort needed to cope with the rage and frustration that had been experienced during their infancy and reinforced in late adolescence, during the Depression. The sheer violence of Hitler's movement served to redirect feelings of hostility. For the father-Führer was not merely a replacement for the distant and idealized father. He also served as a psychological defense against the destructive resentment they still felt toward their fathers who had deserted them.²¹⁹ In short, the psychological problems of the Youth Cohort gave Hitler a unique opportunity to project upon the German masses the same unconscious conflicts that had shaped his own infancy. In this instance, as in many others, “his own pathology harmonized with that of Germany.”²²⁰

Hitler's hatred of the Jews was another major attraction for the young people of Germany. For his racist ideology spoke directly to their own prejudices. Anti-Semitism was one of the striking features of the Weimar youth movement, as it was of the Free Corps and of university life. Almost all the dueling fraternities, for example, contained “Aryan

2

~~218~~

1929, 1933
1933

1931

*

1933

scarcely at all, economic. What came to the fore in 1930 and after was a tremendous surge of German nationalism*—among all classes, and significantly among those who were worst affected by unemployment and other economic woes. "The workingmen have no country," Marx wrote. He could not have been more wrong—something that was already evident in 1914, and even more in the 1930s. Haffner is especially commendable for having recognized this. German nationalism "now suddenly became part of everyday political discourse. Even the Communists began to speak in nationalistic tones. . . ."† And what happened in Germany in 1933 and after proves again the superior quality of Proudhon's insight

Gene
1929

"A very telling description of a significant episode in Heiden, HD, pp. 231-32. In April 1928 Stresemann spoke in the Bürgerbraukeller in Munich, a good speech. A group of young National Socialists entered, shouting, and then began to sing "Deutschland, Deutschland über alles!"—and the chairman of the meeting stood up and sang with them. Stresemann was white with fury at the cowardice of this man. That night he had a kidney attack; a year later he died. "The meeting was destroyed—thanks to the cowardice of its organizers. . . . When Stresemann confronted them later, one of them answered: 'Herr Minister, one had to show these boys that we are just as good Germans as they!' Instead of having shown them the door. Afraid not to look sufficiently 'national' to a ruffian, they abandoned their dignity. What more remains to be said? Thus would Hitler come to power."

†HF/AT, pp. 169-70. As late as 17 May 1933 there were still some Social Democratic deputies sitting in the Reichstag who applauded Hitler's foreign-policy speech, about greatness coming to Germany—probably sincerely, and not because of mere opportunism.

In a thoughtful article P. Stadler, in HZ, 1988, p. 25: Germany was different from other countries; Hitler rose to power by largely democratic means. "Historical research, in masterful analyses—as in Bracher's seminal work—worked out and reconstructed the events leading to January 1933, illuminating the responsibility of people [around Hindenburg] and thus contributing essentially to [the historical recognition] of important factors. . . . On the other hand it did not emphasize that the main responsibility is not to be found among the Papens, etc., but with the average German voter."

To this let me add: To what extent are people responsible for their regimes? In 1792-93, in France, the Jacobins were not a majority. In 1917, the Bolsheviks in Russia were not. In 1922, the Fascists in Italy were not. But Hitler had a large plurality, a near-majority, behind him in 1933—as a matter of fact, the July 1932 elections should have made him chancellor then, except for Hindenburg's temporary reluctance.

D.T.

* Again, the basis of his economics.

If people gain energy, then economics takes care of itself. But, again, for people to gain energy, it is necessary to find an outlet for their hatred. Only countries like the America with its great spaces can afford the luxury of emulating to do without a scapegoat. Of course, for too centuries they had their niggers—a wonderful outlet even for states.

* D.T. I did not have the moment Hitler and wanted

over that of Marx—that p to realities of power.*

Hitler understood that the four general plebiscites not follow a major foreign-powers had not merely mi expansion: they had to win [the Rhineland occupation should not, blame the Ge how foreign statesmen tre: the same time their mute Hitler's brutal mass executi As Haffner put it, "if one German people, then perha

"What kind of state was widely held beliefs, it was n Democratic Republic or th structured political party. T tral Committee, no Politbu committee meetings. . . . I state but Hitler who domin

Again Haffner, HF/AT, pp. 18: politically unified nation. It is a pi because people like to forget that thing like a national coming togeth the National Socialist Party, but b beginning to be called." Also M. B unserer Geschichte (M, 1986), p. 16 ism was more important than its id

"Or consider that Ferdinand I Bismarck in 1863: "a secret . . . d tion to accept dictatorship." In Re p. 120: "an insight of immense sig years. . . ." Or Julius Fröbel, a Ger enough of principles and doctrine theory. What it wants is power, I revered, more than it dreams of."

TKER, p. 105. This was already League of Nations, or the Saar plet

Hitler understood that the four general plebiscites not follow a major foreign-powers had not merely mi expansion: they had to win [the Rhineland occupation should not, blame the Ge how foreign statesmen tre: the same time their mute Hitler's brutal mass executi As Haffner put it, "if one German people, then perha

(2)

1923,

1930,

(1933)

ments.* (Also, belief in Hitler
not always the same thing.)
necessarily, true that a mass is
components. In many ways a
members are men and women,
former monarchists and
interesting question is *how*
alist voter became either a
Hitler. A further difficulty
"Volksgefühl," "Volksstim-
employed by Zitelmann),
into English ("popular" or
"), and are undefinable and
particular problem, which
of German rhetoric—
public statements and publi-
example, French or British
brutal as the German; but
was different. Here we must
speech is not only an ex-
patterns of speech have an
habits and patterns of

necessary recognition: that
out this: His book "is about the
outright opponents, whose atti-
ideological penetration and yet
The picture painted is not a
of German generals and other
of the gradual (though rapid)
Third Reich in 1933 is, as yet,
Tocqueville and Fontane gave
in Paris or in Berlin, but such
I attempted to express earlier,
large numbers of people were not

of the difference between mentality and ideology. For Hitler ex-
pected more of the mentality*—of the mental habits and the pre-
dictable mental reactions—of the German people than of their
wholesale acceptance of the National Socialist ideology. As he wrote
in *Mein Kampf*: "To lead means to be able to move the masses."

(actions not sublimations)

1913

BUT ENOUGH OF THESE methodological—or, more properly, epis-
temological—considerations. Our subject is Hitler's popularity, and
its variations.† To begin with, there are serious reasons to question
the widely accepted thesis, according to which the 1930–33 Depres-
sion not only contributed to but made it possible for Hitler to
acquire power. We know that a most important step—literally a
breakthrough—in his fortunes was the September 1930 Reichstag
election, when the National Socialists received nearly seven times
more votes than they did two years before—from less than 3 to
almost 19 percent of all votes cast. Yet historians have devoted rela-
tively little attention to the already rapid increase of National
Socialist votes in the summer of 1929 and in early 1930 in the
municipal and state elections (in Saxony, Mecklenburg, Baden,
for instance), rising at times to 13 or 14 percent. This happened
before the worldwide Depression and the tide of unemployment in
Weimar Germany. Some historians have remarked that during his
crucial ascent from 1930 to 1933, which coincided with the worst
years of the Depression, Hitler had no definite economic pro-
gram—in other words, his appeal was not primarily, and perhaps

WB

(*)

1931

"Mentality," here, is not altogether identical with the now fashionable use of
mentalités among historians. This is a greatly overdue recognition (especially among
French academics) of the fatal shortcomings of a materialist philosophy and recon-
struction of history. Admittedly a difficult task, calling for sensitive minds and per-
spectives, it must mean more than particular references to the "mental climate" of a
certain place and time.

†Steinert, in *ST/НК/Д*, p. 336, makes the convincing argument against those
who have claimed that Hitler's success was due to his radio speeches and that he
would have been greatly handicapped by his television image. As Goebbels proved,
pictorial materials were more easily manipulated and on occasion falsified than was
voice or text.

(*) This is also the Celi Raubal period and
A. H. identifies his success with
his presence.

2

216

1929, 1931

1931

*

1933

scarcely at all, economic. What came to the fore in 1930 and after was a tremendous surge of German nationalism*—among all classes, and significantly among those who were worst affected by unemployment and other economic woes. "The workingmen have no country," Marx wrote. He could not have been more wrong—something that was already evident in 1914, and even more in the 1930s. Haffner is especially commendable for having recognized this. German nationalism "now suddenly became part of everyday political discourse. Even the Communists began to speak in nationalistic tones. . . ."† And what happened in Germany in 1933 and after proves again the superior quality of Proudhon's insight

"A very telling description of a significant episode in Heiden, HD, pp. 231–32. In April 1928 Stresemann spoke in the Bürgerbraukeller in Munich, a good speech. A group of young National Socialists entered, shouting, and then began to sing "Deutschland, Deutschland über alles!"—and the chairman of the meeting stood up and sang with them. Stresemann was white with fury at the cowardice of this man. That night he had a kidney attack; a year later he died. "The meeting was destroyed—thanks to the cowardice of its organizers. . . . When Stresemann confronted them later, one of them answered: 'Herr Minister, one had to show these boys that we are just as good Germans as they!' Instead of having shown them the door. Afraid not to look sufficiently 'national' to a ruffian, they abandoned their dignity. What more remains to be said? Thus would Hitler come to power."

HF/11, pp. 169–70. As late as 17 May 1933 there were still some Social Democratic deputies sitting in the Reichstag who applauded Hitler's foreign-policy speech, about greatness coming to Germany—probably sincerely, and not because of mere opportunism.

In a thoughtful article P. Stadler, in HZ, 1988, p. 25: Germany was different from other countries; Hitler rose to power by largely democratic means. "Historical research, in masterful analyses—as in Bracher's seminal work—worked out and reconstructed the events leading to January 1933, illuminating the responsibility of people [around Hindenburg] and thus contributing essentially to [the historical recognition] of important factors. . . . On the other hand it did not emphasize that the main responsibility is not to be found among the Papens, etc., but with the average German voter."

To this let me add: To what extent are people responsible for their regimes? In 1792–93, in France, the Jacobins were not a majority. In 1917, the Bolsheviks in Russia were not. In 1922, the Fascists in Italy were not. But Hitler had a large plurality, a near-majority, behind him in 1933—as a matter of fact, the July 1932 elections should have made him chancellor then, except for Hindenburg's temporary reluctance.

over that of Marx—that p to realities of power."

Hitler understood that the four general plebiscites not follow a major foreign-powers had not merely military expansion: they had to win [the Rhineland occupation should not, blame the German how foreign statesmen treat the same time their mute Hitler's brutal mass execution As Haffner put it, "if one German people, then perhaps

"What kind of state was widely held beliefs, it was not Democratic Republic or the structured political party. The central Committee, no Political committee meetings. . . . In state but Hitler who domin

Again Haffner, HF/11, pp. 18: politically unified nation. It is a problem because people like to forget that thing like a national coming together the National Socialist Party, but beginning to be called." Also M. B unsener Geschichte (M, 1986), p. 16 ism was more important than its ide

"Or consider that Ferdinand I Bismarck in 1863: "a secret . . . tion to accept dictatorship." In Re p. 120: "an insight of immense significance. . . ." Or Julius Fröbel, a German enough of principles and doctrine theory. What it wants is power, revered, more than it dreams of."

TKER, p. 105. This was already League of Nations, or the Saar pleb

Hitler understood that they did not have to create a new German people, but to take over the existing one.

* Again, the basis of his economics.

If people gain energy, their economies take care of itself. But, again, for people to gain energy, it is necessary to find an outlet for their hatred. Only countries like the USA with its great spaces can afford the luxury of contemplating to do without a scapegoat. Of course, for two centuries they had their scapegoats—a wonderful source of energy for states.

* D.K. I did not think the moment Hitler and wanted

1932, 1933,

1933-4.

ON 30 JANUARY 1933, HITLER became the chancellor of a dark and depressed nation whose depression, however, was unusual, because it was not lethargic. On the contrary, millions of Germans felt themselves gripped by a strange kind of agitation, not knowing what to anticipate. Except for a minority who, with every reason, envisaged the worst, most Germans soon accustomed themselves to a new order that was both more and less radical than they had expected. There was a radical break with their immediate political past—this in spite of Hitler's proud insistence that a national revolution was being accomplished without turmoil and bloodshed. There was, however, a continuity—of sorts—in Germany's relations with the rest of the world.

It was not only that the immense importance of Hitler's assumption of power was inadequately understood by almost all foreign observers. (This is evident from the articles and commentaries of foreign newspapers during the week following 30 January 1933.) Despite the Depression, despite the very high rate of German unemployment, despite the recurrent electoral and political crises through which Germany passed in 1932, that year German foreign policy became more assertive than at any time since 1918. The Lausanne agreement in July 1932, which virtually put an end to all German "reparations," was acknowledged both by the Wilhelmstrasse and by German public opinion with a shrug of the shoulder; and at the more and more desultory disarmament conferences in Geneva the German delegation was increasingly stiff-necked and demanding. There is every reason to believe that the power and prestige of Germany would have risen in the 1930s even without Hitler; but a detailed exposition of this argument does not belong in this book. What does belong is a brief discussion of how Hitler, in the service of his statesmanship, made good use of the traditional and conservative personnel of the German Foreign Ministry during the first five years of his rule*—

*On one occasion, Goebbels criticized Hitler's foreign minister Neurath: Not a Nazi, "he belongs to an entirely different world." Hitler: No. "[Neurath] is seen in the Anglo-Saxon world as a [gentleman]." (SP, p. 162.) Also p. 217: "'Gentleman' was an unusual word for Hitler to use."

Dr. T. "He was more radical and certainly less radical than the German people expected."
"I know that already."

1931

perhaps, have made a normal man out of him. With her death the way was clear for his final development into a demon, with his sex life deteriorating again into a sort of bi-sexual narcissus-like vanity, with Eva Braun little more than a vague domestic adjunct.

He certainly had an eye for good-looking women and two or three more are sometimes named as having enjoyed his special favour. But in my experience none of them went beyond an expressive shrug and sigh and an upward hopeless lift of the eyes to describe how far the relationship had led. He would call them 'his princess' or 'his little countess' and was never chary of making passionate declarations of affection. He was perfectly prepared to indulge in the physical preliminaries, but when it came to carrying matters to a conclusion, or even worse, when he had succeeded in awakening the woman's interest and acquiescence in the idea of consummation, there was nothing he could do about it.

Psychologists could fill a whole text-book about Hitler, starting with his own description of himself in *Mein Kampf* as a *Mutter-söhnchen*—a mother's boy. Hitler claims that this was a stage he grew out of, but many of them do not and neither did he. Germany and the world were yet to suffer from the fact that he had all the psychological faults of the type magnified to a daemonic degree. His over-compensation for the inferiority complex of an impotent masturbator was the driving force of his lust for power. Uneasily aware that he was incapable of perpetuating himself as a father, he developed a substitute-obsession to make his name known—and feared—throughout the ages, whatever monstrous deeds such a mania involved. He became the modern counterpart of Herostratus, who, desirous of acquiring eternal fame, if only by a great crime, burnt down the Temple of Diana at Ephesus.

1931

was going to prevent him from reaching the top. If only the radicals like Strasser and Goebbels and the crackpots like Rosenberg and Hess could be off-set by people of more cosmopolitan views, in which I included myself, I believed the social revolution he preached would be orderly and beneficial. I was convinced, to use the old phrase, that there was every possibility of this poacher becoming a reliable gamekeeper.

Too many of us, the monarchists, industrial leaders, the Papens and Schachts and Neuraths, thought we could tame him. There never will be a limit to wishful thinking. We all hoped to be the sage advisers of an unruly but irreplaceable genius. Instead we had a tiger by the tail. I pulled it once too often, let go and paid the consequences with ten years of exile. I am not trying to make excuses, and do not need to rely on my own account for the evidence that I tried to fight the Nazis' excesses when they came to power. I criticized them to their faces, Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, all of them. For quite a time I got away with it, partly because I had been around a long time and still played the piano for Hitler and entertained him with my jokes, partly because I shared the Bavarian background of some of the leaders, was uninhibited, outspoken and emotional anyway, and partly, I suppose, because I controlled no faction, was no orator, and although a lot of people thought as I did, we could not combine and therefore represented no real threat.

I became a member of the inner circle again largely on personal grounds. After the crisis of Geli Raubal's suicide, Hitler seemed to suffer a temporary fit of nostalgia for the old days. His infatuation for my wife, which had never been entirely stilled, brought him increasingly into our lives again. Nor was he the only Party leader in the throes of a domestic loss. Goering's wife Karin died in the middle of October 1931. She and Helene had revived their friendship and Goering sought solace for his personal isolation with us. He was still not entirely accepted in the Party and our house continued to offer him a useful retreat. So it was that at the beginning of the fifteen months which were to bring them to power they both, if for dissimilar reasons, sought our company.

Hitler emerged from the shadow cast by his niece's death, to find a political situation tailored to his order. The Nazi's position as the

D.T. It was more than time to bring him forth again

1931

second largest party in the *Reichstag* had not, in spite of all their agitation and accretion of strength, brought them any nearer to power. But the defences of the established forces were breaking up. No stable coalition could be found to deal with the economic collapse and the four million and more unemployed, and neither Hindenburg nor General Schleicher, who had emerged as his and the Army's political adviser, was convinced that the emergency powers accorded Chancellor Brüning provided any long-term solution. Their increasing weakness coincided with the growing surge of political radicalism and the final hardening of Hitler's character into the savage urge to impose himself on all those with whom he came in contact, which was the only outlet to his repressions and superhuman energy.

He was still making a virtue of legality. That was one of his many postscripts to Machiavelli. He did not make a revolution to acquire power, but acquired power in order to make a revolution. It was a process which very few people foresaw. His great catch-phrase at the time concerned the necessity to *umorganisieren*—to reorganize the State—a seemingly acceptable necessity in view of the Weimar Republic's increasing decrepitude. But then he gave his own meaning to the words he used. Careful though he was to disguise his thoughts and intentions, I found it, in my renewed association with him, more and more difficult to penetrate his mind and put over my own ideas. His personal manner in a room had not noticeably changed. He could still relax and look back on earlier stages of his struggle and talk about them with charm and humour. But in his view of the future he had become more abrupt, the underlying extremism and radicalism had tightened up, the old Hess and Rosenberg prejudices had become sharpened. Here the new influence was Goebbels, and the nearer we got to Berlin and power, and Goebbels and his Sportpalast tirades, the more Hitler was lost to me.

The first personal recognition of Hitler's importance on the national front came towards the end of 1931, when, after preliminary talks between Schleicher and Roehm, who still eagerly fostered his Army contacts, Hitler was granted interviews with Hindenburg and Brüning. The only positive result was a violent outburst of jealousy on the part of Goering, who could not bear to think

that his Bavarian rival had provided as his exclusive right. Hitler made a worse one: "They are all bourgeois makers and disturbers of order, to be Communists," he told me. "They ha we are all equal before the law. If t munists are out to destroy the State e it a new content on a German patriot be done with them." "*Hanfstaengl*, S "*Hanfstaengl*, you ought to have b usually said when something had gone

My own position was somewhat an of the Party organization, but had foreign press chief directly under Hit hold my own, as not only did Hitler him have a total incomprehension of but everyone else in the Party within s of my job. Otto Dietrich wanted a s although he was small fry and easy thought it ought to be part of his pr of course was a very different proposi had ambitions, with a certain amoun Hitler, who used him as interpret This was typical of Hitler's divide with everyone. He would never delc all overlapped, so that he was able arbiter.

Schirach was a great trial to me. H conversations with visitors whenever and tone down some of Hitler's more: hope of avoiding too much china b tattle this to Hitler afterwards. There was talking about the Jews to a visiti forget, and I was being very careful to demanded the reduction of their repr the same proportion as their strength the accepted party *numerus clausus* p

ed not, in spite of all their
ought them any nearer to
d forces were breaking up.
deal with the economic col-
unemployed, and neither
to had emerged as his and
inced that the emergency
provided any long-term solu-
d with the growing surge of
ng of Hitler's character into
l those with whom he came
his repressions and super-

that his Bavarian rival had provided the sort of contact he regarded as his exclusive right. Hitler made a bad impression and received a worse one: "They are all bourgeois. They consider us as trouble-makers and disturbers of order, to be treated in the same way as the Communists," he told me. "They have got it into their heads that we are all equal before the law. If they cannot see that the Communists are out to destroy the State entirely and that we wish to give it a new content on a German patriotic basis then there is nothing to be done with them. *"Hanfstaengl, Sie hätten dabei sein sollen"* — "Hanfstaengl, you ought to have been there," which is what he usually said when something had gone badly wrong.

My own position was somewhat anomalous. I was never a member of the Party organization, but had a purely advisory capacity as foreign press chief directly under Hitler. I had a constant battle to hold my own, as not only did Hitler until the end of my days with him have a total incomprehension of the ways of the press abroad, but everyone else in the Party within striking distance wanted a piece of my job. Otto Dietrich wanted a share in it as home press chief, although he was small fry and easy to deal with, and Goebbels thought it ought to be part of his propaganda organization, and he of course was a very different proposition. Baldur von Schirach also had ambitions, with a certain amount of tacit encouragement from Hitler, who used him as interpreter at some of his interviews. This was typical of Hitler's divide and rule methods. He did it with everyone. He would never delegate clear functions and they all overlapped, so that he was able to maintain final control as arbiter.

Schirach was a great trial to me. He used to insinuate himself into conversations with visitors whenever he could. When I would try and tone down some of Hitler's more radical pronouncements, in the hope of avoiding too much china being broken, Schirach used to tattle this to Hitler afterwards. There was one occasion when Hitler was talking about the Jews to a visiting British M.P., whose name I forget, and I was being very careful to emphasize that the Nazis only demanded the reduction of their representation in the professions to the same proportion as their strength in the population — which was the accepted party *numerus clausus* policy — when Schirach broke in

Scam

y. That was one of his many
make a revolution to acquire
make a revolution. It was a
his great catch-phrase at the
organisieren — to reorganize the
y in view of the Weimar
then he gave his own mean-
ugh he was to disguise his
ny renewed association with
his mind and put over my
room had not noticeably
back on earlier stages of his
rm and humour. But in his
ore abrupt, the underlying
l up, the old Hess and Rosen-
Here the new influence was
lin and power, and Goebbels
Hitler was lost to me.

Hitler's importance on the
of 1931, when, after pre-
d Roehm, who still eagerly
as granted interviews with
sitive result was a violent out-
, who could not bear to think

1934

on his own account: "We students don't wish to have any Jewish professors at all."

Fortunately one of my early interventions stood me in good stead for a long time. In November 1931 the State authorities in Hesse seized a series of documents drawn up by the local Party headquarters which threatened an armed *coup d'état* by the S.A. They became known as the Boxheim Papers and caused a political scandal of the first magnitude. In view of Hitler's very clear instructions to the S.A. at the time to refrain from violence, this is one of the few instances when I think his disclaimer was probably genuine. The Party press was still insignificant and all the other papers were howling for the Nazis' blood. We were in Berlin at the time and I called the foreign press to the Kaiserhof Hotel, which Hitler was already starting to use as his headquarters, for a conference. He came in and talked brilliantly, lucidly, rationally and with complete conviction. Their stories went out with such effect that the German opposition papers were obliged to reproduce them on the rebound with banner headlines. It was a complete break through of their normal policy of either denigration or silence concerning Hitler and he was of course ecstatic at this success: *"Das war sehr gut, Hanfstaengl, das haben Sie wirklich fein gemacht."* The trouble was that that was the sort of effect he expected me to produce every time.

The next major interview set me right back on my heels. We were in Munich again and Hitler rang for me to come and interpret at an interview in his flat with a Japanese professor named Momo, whose visit had been sponsored by his embassy. "But I don't speak Japanese," I complained. — "He talks English and this is very important," Hitler countered, so I went along and this little character came in, hoicking and hissing like something out of the *Mikado*, and they started a dreadful mutual admiration session. "I have come to discuss your movement, the heroic spirit of which we Japanese admire so much," said Momo. So Hitler went into a brazen eulogy of Japanese culture and samurai swords, warrior codes and the Shinto religion, all the drivel he had picked up from Haushofer and Hess. Momo needed little encouragement. "We are both the victims of democracy, we both need living space and colonies, we must have raw materials to ensure our future. It is Japan's destiny to lead all

Asia. . . ." This was aw reticent, but he was in sphere in which we Ger we come to power we there." This of course w great report. He was, n guised as a newspaper. Pact in 1936 he turned Here were my worse fe Hitler I might just as expostulations that sucl sympathy fell on deaf staengl, today we have r

As an antidote I trie dents as I could. Ther *Times*, who came at t Knickerbocker, probabl expert journalist of his on the basis of a typewr very well. Knickerbock his lively way and red photographs. Knickerbo of the best photograph wanted to have someth things often taken by H a clenched fist and a di a madman.

I had told Hitler in o some pictures taken wh of man with whom fore in the end we got the taking the photographs but aimed most of the t were first class. He look happened? I was calle Hitler furious. "I don't "Of course you look lik

was to have any Jewish

ood me in good stead
authorities in Hesse
the local Party head-
that by the S.A. They
firsted a political scandal
clear instructions to
this is one of the few
probably genuine. The
er papers were howl-
the time and I called
h Hitler was already
nce. He came in and
complete conviction.
German opposition
pebound with banner
their normal policy of
and he was of course
Hfstaengl, das haben
at that was the sort
w
on my heels. We were
le and interpret at an
amed Momo, whose
But I don't speak
and this is very im-
l this little character
of the *Mikado*, and
on. "I have come to
which we Japanese
nto a brazen eulogy
rior codes and the
rom Haushofer and
are both the victims
onies, we must have
s destiny to lead all

Asia. . . ." This was awful and I tried to persuade Hitler to be more reticent, but he was in full flood: "Asia and the Pacific Ocean is a sphere in which we Germans have no demands," he ranted. "When we come to power we shall respect Japan's legitimate aspirations there." This of course was meat and drink to Momo, who fired off a great report. He was, needless to state, a Government emissary disguised as a newspaperman, and at the time of the anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 he turned up again. I had, of course, been appalled. Here were my worse fears taking shape, but in my protestations to Hitler I might just as well have been talking in Hindustani. My expostulations that such a policy would finally alienate American sympathy fell on deaf ears. Hitler brushed them all aside: "Hafstaengl, today we have made history," he said fatuously.

As an antidote I tried to farm in as many American correspondents as I could. There was Harold Callender of the *New York Times*, who came at the end of November 1931, and of course Knickerbocker, probably the best informed, most conscientious and expert journalist of his day. I got Hitler to see him for the first time on the basis of a typewritten list of questions and the interview went very well. Knickerbocker spoke excellent German, and Hitler liked his lively way and red hair. The only back-lash I had was over photographs. Knickerbocker had James Edward Abbé with him, one of the best photographers I have ever known. I had long since wanted to have something else available, other than the dreadful things often taken by Heinrich Hoffman, which showed Hitler with a clenched fist and a distorted mouth and flaming eyes, looking like a madman.

I had told Hitler in one of his quieter moments that he must have some pictures taken which made him look like a statesman, the sort of man with whom foreign diplomats felt they could do business, and in the end we got them by a trick. Abbé pretended that he was taking the photographs of Hitler talking quietly to Knickerbocker, but aimed most of the time at Hitler alone, and I thought the results were first class. He looked normal, intelligent and interesting. What happened? I was called round when the prints arrived and found Hitler furious. "I don't look like that," he shouted. "What is this?" — "Of course you look like that," I told him. "They are much better

in th'; it is an intrinsic part of the political was adone, trusting that they will take care he 've moment, however, to act ruthlessly— political determination is the gift—a rare th aig when the decisive moment has come; r disiders expected him to act like an armed o H;is is what made him their superior and first ned bohemian. The best of them were certajing for the party machine; he and his Hitl, determined if necessary to smash the befo n person: '... It would be better,' he be ebellious subordinates, 'that there should es apovement at all than a movement of in- puts.' For he is a politician to his last fiber— nd erything is a means to an end; and the occupi down to the cheese-mite, including all ' bearman and beast and the elements, is only u Mu his f did not fully realize that they had a e pre must incline to his political will. For w fo nyth was a lie, serviceable perhaps with-mer o chain masses with the power of the title ther disparaging admiration; he talked prave, never got around to action. Aware that ing S.A. must be subjected once and for all, wn c old-timer for whom he was still 'Ade,' yven öhm, lieutenant-colonel in the Bolivian He;olivia had been made difficult by a rev- l; 'Td involved himself; a telegram was sent and d by the end of 1930 the man who had halfist Party was back in Germany. Again cove man who knew him too well for any clic hm clearly understood that his task was 'führer.' To a collaborator endowed with ctivity tedness, and at the same time good-will, it a atest liberties, despite Röhm's faults and

his own misgivings. He was obliged to look on while Röhm with cold calculation built up in the eyes of the S.A. an idol of the Führer in which he himself obviously did not believe.

Many of the lower S.A. leaders, however, openly and disrespectfully opposed him. Röhm provided pretexts for opposition by filling the S.A. leadership with his homosexual creatures, Captains von Petersdorff and Röhrhein, Count Ernst Helldorf, an adventurer and military profiteer of the worst sort. The beloved Heines was given command of the S.A. in Silesia. Pfeffer's staff of leaders felt their position endangered and tried to make Hitler remove Röhm. Actually this was an insurrection against Hitler himself; the rebels admitted as much by attacking the 'legal' course of the party, demanding riots and civil war. It was all very well for his horse-dealers and butchers in Munich to gape at 'Ade,' to stretch out their arms and shout 'Heil, mein Führer!'; even to greet one another with the strange cry of 'Heil Hitler!' The Prussian officers in the North, though admitting that all this was adroit magic for the people, became contemptuous and rebellious when they themselves were expected to join in the magic with a straight face. At all times this has been the attitude of men who knew the magic at close quarters, or before it had become magic. Even historical figures, today universally regarded as 'great,' had the same difficulty in their day:

'... Ye gods! It doth amaze me
A man of such a feeble temper should
So get the start of the majestic world
And bear the palm alone . . .
Poor man! I know he would not be a wolf
But that he sees the Romans are but sheep:
He were no lion, were not Romans hind.'

Thus speaks Cassius in Shakespeare, and he is speaking of the 'greatest' of them all: of Caesar. For a time in 1931 Goebbels spoke thus of Hitler. Along with the Berlin S.A. leaders he grew embittered at Röhm's really repulsive 'men's harem,' and in secret conversations Hitler was not spared. In speaking publicly of Hitler, Goebbels laid on the flattery so thick that the suspicion arose that he was making fun of his Führer; in private conversations, he simply made fun, without flattery. In his diary he called him the 'great man

1931

?

Goebbels

above us all' and a 'star'; but in the Berlin squabbles of 1931 he cried out, with an irritation that was perhaps affected, that he too was sick of taking orders from the 'vain operetta queen' in Munich.

This he said to the former police captain Walter Stennes, who led the discontented S.A. in North and East Germany. For a time, perhaps, Goebbels meant this seriously. With him one could never be certain. In any case, he later disclosed these conversations and particularly Stennes's answers to Hitler, and it is possible that he only attacked the Führer in the first place to win the confidence of the guileless S.A. captain. It is certain that Stennes, no more than Otto Strasser, wanted to depose Hitler, but Hitler's principle was that criminals must be punished before they commit their crime. Again Goebbels had to carry out the expulsion, but this time the task put him in a cold sweat. Stennes and his followers did not give up as easily as Strasser. A sort of *putsch* developed, consisting of brawls between the 'politicians' and the military-minded rank-and-file; local headquarters were occupied by the 'rebels.' Stennes later boasted of having personally beaten Goebbels to a pulp. In any case the Berlin *gauleiter* fled to Munich and there sought protection. Always, when he betrayed his former friends, he attached himself with especial warmth to the previous common enemy; in this case to Röhm, with whom he now formed the closest bond. With Röhm and Heines, he helped to cement the rule of the homosexuals over the S.A. A month later, Hitler himself had to write a letter of praise and thanks to the depraved murderer Heines, because Röhm demanded it; the disciplining of the S.A., he wrote to the man whom he had formerly thrown out of the party, 'remains . . . above all, dear Heines, your achievement and that of your staff' — read: men's harem. He praised Heines 'for your services which have been above all praise.' And: 'Today I feel a special need to thank you most heartily for this and to express my full appreciation.' Thus did Hitler praise one half of his uprooted desperadoes, while, in an open statement, he covered the other, mutinous half with ignominy: 'Freebooters . . . clique of mutinous officers . . . traitors without honor . . . rabble . . . men without character. . . . From the very beginning of his activity in the N.S.D.A.P. Herr Stennes never moved a hand without a bill and a receipt. . . .'

This was what came out when he spoke of his embellishment. They had had the insolence not only; in bitter complaint, the Führer, who had been capable of debating with retired colonels in office technique, bellowed forth his sense of injury: 'I well-to-do parents. I was not educated at university drawn through the hardest school of life, through misery. The superficial world never asks what a man and least of all what his real abilities are; as a man it asks only for his diplomas. They never learned more than tens of thousands of our intellectuals saw that my diplomas were lacking. And I was a common soldier. . . .'

No school diplomas! That was his whole misfortune at least he told himself. In reality it was the qualitative lack of integrated personality, which made this historical phenomenon a lightweight in the human world; all the terrors of his career surrounded it with a Hitler was already the man of the hour in Germany; the man of tomorrow, and in the eyes of many the most able men of his *entourage* regarded him seriously — except as a demagogue. Could this be a phenomenon of mediocre talents unable to appreciate the people noticed about Hitler was not the madman; even the most hostile observer soon saw that behind the cloud of noise and excitement there was an intense and purposiveness in his movements. But what men who spoke with Hitler face to face was that his arguments and explanations, particularly in private where it was not brilliance or wit that mattered. When it was soberly explained to him that Germany's billion marks in annual reparations were assured but could hardly be responsible for the crisis, his seriousness that with the rapidity of currency circulation marks left in Germany would provide the country eight times as much in wages and salaries. Whether the second German inflation — which never

* D.T. is correct about

in the Berlin squabbles of 1931 he cried was perhaps affected, that he too was the 'vain opera queen' in Munich. police captain Walter Stennes, who led the East Germany. For a time, per-
tiously. With him one could never be disclosed these conversations and par-
o Hitler, and it is possible that he only first place to win the confidence of the
ertain that Stennes, no more than Otto Hitler, but Hitler's principle was that
before they commit their crime. Again
he expulsion, but this time the task put
es and his followers did not give up as
putsch developed, consisting of brawls
nd the military-minded rank-and-file;
ccupied by the 'rebels.' Stennes later
beaten Goebbels to a pulp. In any case
Munich and there sought protection.
his former friends, he attached himself
previous common enemy; in this case
w formed the closest bond. With Röhm
ement the rule of the homosexuals over
Hitler himself had to write a letter of
praved murderer Heines, because Röhm
ing of the S.A., he wrote to the man
wn out of the party, 'remains . . . above
evement and that of your staff' — read:
Heines 'for your services which have
!; 'Today I feel a special need to thank
and to express my full appreciation.'
half of his uprooted desperadoes, while,
covered the other, mutinous half with
clique of mutinous officers . . . traitors
. . . men without character. . . . From
activity in the N.S.D.A.P. Herr Stennes
at a bill and a receipt. . . .'

This was what came out when he spoke of his best men without embellishment. They had had the insolence not to take him seriously; in bitter complaint, the Führer, who had thought himself capable of debating with retired colonels in officers' clubs on tank technique, bellowed forth his sense of injury: 'I was not a child of well-to-do, parents. I was not educated at universities, but was drawn through the hardest school of life, through poverty and misery. The superficial world never asks what a man has learned, and least of all what his real abilities are; as a rule, unfortunately, it asks only for his diplomas. They never noticed that I had learned more than tens of thousands of our intellectuals; they only saw that my diplomas were lacking. And I was not an officer but a common soldier. . . .'

No school diplomas! That was his whole misfortune—or so at least he told himself. In reality it was the qualities of the man, the lack of integrated personality, which made this extraordinary historical phenomenon a lightweight in the human sense, and through all the terrors of his career surrounded it with an air of absurdity. Hitler was already the man of the hour in Germany, very probably the man of tomorrow, and in the eyes of many the man of destiny; and still the most able men of his *entourage* refused to take him seriously—except as a demagogue. Could this be merely the philistinism of mediocre talents unable to appreciate genius? What people noticed about Hitler was not the madness of his actions; even the most hostile observer soon saw that behind the first deceptive cloud of noise and excitement there was an amazing certainty and purposiveness in his movements. But what always surprised men who spoke with Hitler face to face was the poverty of his arguments and explanations, particularly in private conversations, where it was not brilliance or wit that mattered, but thinking. When it was soberly explained to him that Germany's one to two billion marks in annual reparations were assuredly a heavy burden, but could hardly be responsible for the crisis, he answered in all seriousness that with the rapidity of currency circulation one billion marks left in Germany would provide the country with seven or eight times as much in wages and salaries. Whether he was predicting the second German inflation—which never occurred—or the

1931

✱

✱ D.T. is concerned about this

lection. The deal was concluded, Hitler the collection for the party and employed curators. This was in April, 1929; the was still insignificant, it was sorely in need of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, begging for an article they had contributed, Rosen- of kicking them downstairs. While the still running about ragged and threadbare, ey, ostensibly for a collection of dusty old as to boast that National Socialism had d undertaking. His most devoted followers new whim; even the best-informed did not

wonderfully gifted for haggling and in- the letter from Rudolph—under exactly known. The sum of money does not seem 'presumably Schwarz advanced it from the to save Der Führer's reputation; in any case l the money. The letter probably did not go ; and in this he may have been fortunate. hwarz and he to Hitler. It is perhaps this Schwarz one of the most powerful, though es of the Third Reich.

Hitler and his niece became troubled as time t of the lost and recovered letter perhaps catastrophe. For a time, at least, the strange own rather repugnant to the young girl. But athological inconstancy had something to do ht himself entitled to extend his affections on ories which he assiduously spread about his fness had their basis in the fact that he knew ty in any human relationship. Nature gave instincts of a great egoist and devourer of m the hardness which might have enabled t without pain. His loveless core is covered a of sentimentality and self-pity; he demands

pity of his victims. He not only expected his women friends to tolerate competitors; he also claimed the right to have several families at once. His sister and nieces had to look on while he made himself at home in the family of Richard Wagner's son, Siegfried Wagner, in Bayreuth—after Siegfried's death, to be sure (1930). Here he spent most of his time, and rumors went about that he intended to marry Frau Winifred Wagner, Siegfried's widow; he regarded and treated the children of the family almost as his own. And this was by no means the only case of inconstancy of which Geli could complain. When she protested, her uncle lost all the devoted chivalry with which he treated the ladies in his good hours; he fumed and cursed like a truck-driver and locked the beloved child up in the house. She made other friendships, for example with Emil Maurice, the man to whom Hitler had dictated the beginning of *Mein Kampf*; by profession a clock-maker, by nature an armed bohemian of the lowest order. In the end, she made up her mind to end her whole life with Hitler, and go to Vienna.

Hitler resisted violently. During this quarrel Geli in her despair seems to have told outsiders about her relations with her uncle and about the dangerous letter. Hitler was beside himself; he felt he had been betrayed as a man. Geli was determined to leave for Vienna where a friend was awaiting her. Her uncle forbade her. One day he went to Hamburg; as he was setting out, she asked his permission for the last time to leave Munich. She called down to him from a window in the house on the Prinz Regenten Strasse, 'Then you won't let me go to Vienna?' And Hitler, from his car, called up, 'No!' According to the testimony of neighbors, she was not especially dejected. In a tone of indifference she announced that next day she was going to Berchtesgaden to see her mother, who was living in the mountain house on the Obersalzberg. She went about the apartment with a little box bearing a dead canary, bedded in cotton; she sang to herself and wept a little and said she meant to bury poor dead 'Hansi' near the house on the Obersalzberg. She began a letter to a friend in Linz—an everyday letter without special content. That was her last known act. Next morning she was found shot to death. It was September 18, 1931. Geli Raubal was twenty-three years of age.

1931

After a thorough investigation, the state's attorney declared her a suicide. The coroner's report said the bullet had entered the chest below the left shoulder and penetrated vertically to the heart, a probable direction in case of suicide. In Vienna where she had grown up, Geli Raubal was buried in the Central Cemetery. A Catholic priest who was a friend of the family blessed her remains. As a rule the Catholic Church does not do this in the case of suicides; but it admits of one exception—where there is a likelihood that the suicide occurred in a state of mental confusion. It was a terrible blow to Hitler. Gregor Strasser later claimed that for two days he didn't let him out of his sight, fearing that he might do himself harm. The Austrian government granted Hitler special permission for a trip to Vienna. A week after Geli's death, he spent an evening at her grave, shedding many tears.

How and why had Geli Raubal died? Was it suicide? Was it murder? In either case, what was the reason? To a close friend her mother later hinted at murder, or else suicide under compulsion or strong suggestion. She did not accuse Hitler; on the contrary, she said she was sure that Adolf was determined to marry Geli. She mentioned another name: Himmler.

Himmler's part in the matter can only be presumed. The mentality of this man and his entire circle justifies the most hideous speculations. Conceivably he thought it his duty to free his Führer from a dangerous woman. But the circumstances do not point very clearly in this direction. Corrupt as the Bavarian administration of justice may have been under the leadership of Franz Gürtner—it would at that time scarcely have hushed up a murder, even though it did its best to keep the matter quiet on the ground that suicide was a private affair.

Yet there is no satisfactory explanation for suicide. An outbreak of hysterical rage? Close friends insisted that the merry, robust girl had never shown any such propensities. If we are to believe the assertions and hints of her mother, we might piece together a gruesome scene, compatible with the spiritual twilight of this milieu. We can see Himmler, calling at a late hour; explaining to Geli that she had betrayed the man who was her guardian, her lover, and her Führer in one. According to National Socialist con-

ceptions, there was only one way of making it. To be sure, she was a woman, but at the same time, in an eminent way, she was a member of a kind of a strange concepts of honor. We may ask what gain by the inevitable scandal; but a worse scar if Geli went to Vienna and began to talk, ultimately. But again: these are pure conjectures, though they contain inner plausibility.

At all events, Geli Raubal died under strange circumstances for Adolf Hitler, life here played a cruel trick on her. The story as it is related here was told by a friend who had already learned a great deal about it. And probably Stempfle talked to other people, and so on, because Hitler ignored him after something is certain: on June 30, 1934, when Hitler was with hundreds of enemies and former friends, Pater Bernhard Stempfle was killed by three shots in the Forest of Harlaching near Munich, by a murderer named Maurice.

1931

The chief of these despised officers was Kurt von Schleicher, then a major general, a short time later a lieutenant general. Schleicher most certainly was an army man, but he deserved to some extent the

lists gave him: 'office general.' To be sure, expression, but he was a politician if there ever had entered the Third Foot Guards as lieutenant one of the most exclusive of the old Prussians the comrade and friend of another von Hindenburg, son of the later marshal by one he became captain and entered the staff later, during the war, he became—still Hindenburg's close collaborators; and as friend of the old man's own younger friend. His friendship connected him with Groener, his 'adopted son.' Through all these personal and Schleicher's strongest talents—his ability to please. It almost seems as if the man's name (at least) had shaped his personality and that he was a timid or gentle nature; he loved to win it. But he pursued his lofty ambitions unconsciously adapted to his name, utilization of extreme suppleness and amiability in conversation. He was always ready with some new way to back up his words. His bearing never seemed unpleasant; he was so amiable that he looked like a Caesar. But even his most conscious could not conceal his lack of scruples in the choice of his means.

Hindenburg's headquarters it had been to revise German politics and at the same time to lie; to some extent he had been the political brains of the short-lived war dictatorship. The career of those living threads which connected the old imperial army with the fate of the Reich he had been the political brains of the so-called 'Chief of the Minister's Office'—the man which Schleicher in 1928 had secured for the skillful deal with the unsuspecting Reichswehr in the overthrow of Seeckt; the former army ought to remain powerful and small.

Röhm made a splendid impression on this powerful man, and won his confidence; to ingratiate himself, he even told Schleicher all sorts of amusing stories about Hitler's life and career; their general import was that Hitler, with all his eccentricities, was not really so bad. Schleicher, instructed by Röhm, was able to convince his chief Groener that Hitler was actually a rock amid the German chaos, a bulwark against the radical masses; even if, personally, he was perhaps unstable and none too strong, politically he was an anchor to the party of the Uprooted and Disinherited. The result of these conversations was a gentleman's agreement: on January, 1931, Röhm announced his inauguration as chief of the S.A. staff, and on January 2, Schleicher decreed that, since it was still by no means certain the National Socialists were really enemies of the constitution, National Socialist workers until further notice should no longer be dismissed from the arsenals and powder factories of the Reichswehr. In February, Hitler in turn issued a proclamation to the S.A. ordering them to refrain from street fights—'I understand your distress and your rage,' he said, 'but you must not bear arms.'

Mass discontent seethed among the extremists of Right and Left in the S.A. These men were by no means all noble warriors yearning to risk their necks; no, for them legality or revolution was a question of existence. Without street fights they would one day be superfluous, and they would probably be superfluous if their Führer was serious in using democracy as his chief weapon. They knew that Röhm had promised the Reichswehr Ministry to dismiss the most dangerous among them. It is possible that someone in the Reichswehr Ministry had passed this on to them in order to create unrest among the Brown bands; anyhow they knew that Röhm was selling them out. Hitler threw out these elements, after accusing them of planning an uprising. This was the Stennes crisis. 'I am your Führer, and not elected or hired by you, not sought out by you and appointed by majority vote,' cried Hitler to the discontented storm troopers. 'No, I am your Führer on the strength of my work! . . . And if all of you were to leave me, I should go on alone!'

Even before the court had sentenced Wilhelm Scheringer to im-

1931
?

GOD: ADOLF HITLER

but Geli's personal quality and his wife, who knew "irresistibly charming." People in the street would say people don't do that in a photographer remembered

best suspicion of coquetry putting everybody in the city revered, indeed worships the personification of youth and unspoiled, gay, individual made her. He watched a rare and lovely bloom, and only concern.²⁵⁶

of praise is struck by

the coarse sort of bloom character. She was perine clothes, and certainly locating Hitler's twisted

and that Hitler was com- irrationally jealous and life, choosing her clothes everywhere with her, accom- nions, and picnics, and to r, one observer noted, he relaxed, gentle; another year old." Geli became for plete embodiment of his

ot reciprocate her famous it he was baffled by the re- usual about it which made who claimed to have been tely unhappy because she me to." ²⁵⁷ That life with to her became apparent in shot herself with Hitler's r heart; she slowly bled to

The Child As Father to the Man

To all her friends, the suicide seemed incomprehensible. Geli was not a brooding, remorseful, or hysterical person. She was an attractive young woman who was, to all appearances, looking forward to a trip to Vienna where her uncle had finally allowed her to go to take music lessons. The note she left behind in her room only deepens the mystery of her death. It was addressed to a young friend in Vienna and ends:

When I come to Vienna—hopefully very soon—we'll drive together to Semmering, an . . .

She never added the final "d" to the *und*.²⁶⁰

Geli's sudden and apparently inexplicable death has challenged the imagination of contemporaries and later historians. Hitler attempted to stop some of the ugly rumors by making statements to newspapers. The *Münchener Post* reported in its edition of 22 September 1931 that it had received the following statement from Adolf Hitler: "It is untrue that I and my niece had a quarrel on Friday 18 September; it is untrue that I was violently opposed to my niece going to Vienna; it is untrue that my niece was engaged to someone in Vienna and I forbade it." ²⁶¹

Hanfstaengl claimed that Geli killed herself after "a flaming row" with Hitler after he discovered that "she was pregnant by a young Jewish art teacher from Linz." But another intimate gave a very different story. He testified that the physician who examined Geli's body said she had died a virgin.²⁶²

Others darkly suspected not suicide but murder, committed, in the most popular account, by Heinrich Himmler who—for undisclosed reasons—saw Geli as a threat to his ascendancy within the Party. Still others, including the redoubtable Greiner, had Hitler—though in Nuremberg at the time—somehow spirit himself back to his Munich apartment to pull the trigger.²⁶³

All responsible evidence, however, indicates that Geli died by her own hand. While historians must guess at the reasons for her suicide, there can be no doubt whatever that Hitler was shattered by the news. As soon as he heard it, he hurried back from a political trip to Nuremberg and spent two days in isolation. He and a close associate went to a Party member's summer home on the Tegern Lake and there, as he would do in moments of turmoil throughout his life, he paced the floor:

In my own room I stood in the window, listening to the dull rhythmic sound of the pacing feet over my head. Hour after hour, ceaselessly and without pause, it continued. Night came, and I still could hear him, pacing up and down, up and down. . . . And so it continued, hour after endless hour, throughout the long night. . . .

He spent another day pacing and then drove all night until he

* And the scene when he goes into
of anguishing length along the foulness
of his blood + she comes back with
what he does with her. ²²⁷

1931

* scene

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

arrived at the Vienna Central Cemetery where he stayed thirty minutes alone by the grave.²⁰⁴

For a week he seemed on the brink of total collapse. Over and over again he said that he must give up politics, that he would never look at another woman, that his career was ruined, that he must kill himself. Geli became for him a kind of personal cult. He locked the door to her room and would allow no one to enter except Frau Winter, the motherly servant who was instructed never to change anything in the room but daily to place a bunch of fresh chrysanthemums there. He commissioned a bust and portraits to be made from a variety of photographs. Along with portraits of his mother, he kept a portrait or a bust of Geli in every one of his bedrooms. In his entourage there was an unwritten rule that no one was ever to mention her name. And when Hitler himself spoke of her, tears would come to his eyes. Years later, during the Nuremberg trials, Hermann Göring told a defense attorney that Geli's death had had such a devastating effect on Hitler that it had changed his relationship to all other people.

One can only wonder at the reason for Hitler's extraordinarily intense reaction. With the single exception of his mother's death, no other event in his personal life had hit him so hard. One of Hitler's assistant valets, Willie Schneider, recalled that for many years after the death of Geli, Hitler spent Christmas Eve alone in the room where she had died.²⁰⁵ That is to say, he stayed in the death room in Munich just as in Linz, years earlier, he had spent Christmastime watching over the corpse of his mother. Thus, it seems likely that the loss of Geli was so overwhelming to Hitler because in her death he suffered anew the death of Klara.

Eva Braun

One day in 1930, Hitler wandered into the Schwabing photography studio of Heinrich Hoffmann, an avid Nazi who had joined the Party in 1929 and was rapidly becoming wealthy as a result of the monopoly he enjoyed on all official photography done for the movement. Hitler struck up a conversation with Hoffmann's new employee, Eva Braun, who served as a clerk and photographer's model. Thus began Hitler's most publicized love affair.

Eva had a kind of "impersonal chocolate-box type of prettiness" and an attractive, if slightly plump, figure which occupied her daily attention. She seemed to Hitler to be just the right age: at 18 she was 23 years younger than he. And her eyes were exactly the color he always found compelling. A friend called them "limpid, porcelain blue"—exactly the color of Klara Hitler's.

Not everyone was impressed with Eva. Her employer considered her "frivolous, vain, feather-brained, inconsequential . . . flattered and thrilled beyond words at the attention and compliments which this

The Child As Father to the M

rising power in the land thought her "cheap, arrogant" in Hitler's presence.

Hitler showed only a faint interest in Geli's life. On 11 Au Geli Raubal had almost a was faking the act to go Doctor Plate, assured him inch of her life, Hitler was deal of her.

Their relationship was tured. Eva attempted suicide tablets of Vanodorm. She a medical technician.²⁰⁷ ously. He set her up in a 1936 remodeling of his B directly with his own.

To Hitler she seemed ideal woman he had oft sweet, and stupid. He fou ing companion on picnic norant of politics, she list them all. He saw to it that all public functions, but a Albert Speer told an interv doll's house. She was a p the rubber tree . . . and the

Over the years Hitler addressing her, both in pr the Berghof, with tender a ous words to express his af The terms are asexual an latable. But to the Austri: flavor seems inappropriate descending tone, with a timacy and endearment, l baby. Patscherl, for examp the baby game "Pat-a-cake,

Why did the adult Hi to express affection to a w in his unconscious of the f to him as an infant? A r some support for that sug remembered vividly how o tive in urging her to eat food upon her sickly little Patscherl.' . . . He always

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

him lightly and good-naturedly under the mistletoe during a Christmas celebration.

When he confessed to Kubizek that he could never have intimate relations with a woman because he did not want to become "infected," he seems to have had two kinds of infection in mind. Certainly he was terrified at the thought of syphilis—though he was also fascinated by it, as the many pages on the subject in his memoirs attest. But ever since his primal scene experience as an infant, he had felt that sexual intercourse was "moral infection"—something corrupting and evil. In particular, he associated copulation with capitulation. This may help explain why he had such an absolute horror of military capitulation, saying explicitly on many occasions, "There is one word I can never use and that is capitulation. . . . There is one word that does not exist in my vocabulary: capitulation. . . . I prefer to die in order to escape the shame of capitulation." ²⁸²

Over the years, Hitler thought of many reasons why he could not possibly get married: his offspring might be imbeciles; he had only one bride, his Motherland; the only person he could have married was Geli, and she was dead. He also noted that an earlier Messiah had never married. At times he urged the pragmatic political importance of preserving the image of the bachelor patriot: "If I married I'd lose five million votes of German women." A wife would interfere with his mission. Perhaps he could never find a woman worthy of his genius, or, conversely, insignificant enough to complement his stature; it was one of his aphorisms that "the greater the man, the smaller the wife should be." But whatever the reasons he gave, the thought of getting married and of having genital sexual relations with a wife did not appeal to him.

Homosexuality?

There is insufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that Hitler was an overt homosexual. But it seems clear that he had latent homosexual tendencies, and it is certain that he worried a great deal about them.

He was terribly concerned, for example, lest he give the impression of showing feminine traits—which, indeed, he did. The noted English diplomat and historian Sir Harold Nicolson, who was himself a practicing homosexual, was particularly interested in Hitler's femininity. He records in his diary a conversation with a colleague who told him that Hitler "is the most profoundly feminine man that he has ever met and there are moments when he becomes almost effeminate." ²⁸³ The American journalist, William L. Shirer, who watched Hitler closely one day in September 1938 as he came out of a hotel in Bad-Godesberg on the occasion of meeting Chamberlain, wrote in his diary: "It was a very curious walk indeed . . . very ladylike. Dainty little steps." But a German doctor who had very personal reasons for wondering about Hitler's sexual preferences reached a different conclusion:

The Child As Father to the Man

As a homosexual, I was walk. But I sensed imme-

Direct evidence from per a claim of overt homosexuality example, may be suggestive, that when he met his friend February night in 1908, Adolf lodging where we would see several occasions when adult but his friend "scrupulously men" and talked about homo he would solve when he estab

It is true that Hitler was Rudolf Hess, two practicing few people with whom he us clude that he therefore share the months he was with Hess become very close. When Hi friend who languished there, diminutives: "Ach mein Rudi that he's still there." ²⁸⁷ One plicit statement about the rel whenever Hitler got a present that particularly pleased him in homosexual circles as "Frä his mother to show his prize t the relationship with Hess w said about it. ²⁸⁸ Finally, there that one of Hitler's most prize which King Ludwig II had wr

A different kind of evid concerned about latent homos a remarkable similarity betw of homosexuality and his eff tainted by Jewish blood. In l denied that he was Jewish by was homosexual by attacking point of doing so.

After he came to pow against all types of sexual de rise in prosecutions was for h increased from 3,261 for the between 1936 and 1939. ²⁸⁹

* By 1941, Hitler had revise cially insane, damning him publi Hitler's behalf but without Hider's

234

* D.T. "Everything in my soul" he said "has gone out to the people. What can possibly be left in my soul?"

mistletoe during a Christmas

he could never have intimate
ut want to become "infected,"
tion in mind. Certainly he was
he was also fascinated by it,
memoirs attest. But ever since
he had felt that sexual inter-
corrupting and evil. In par-
ticipation. This may help ex-
plains the military capitulation,
here is one word I can never
one word that does not exist
er to die in order to escape the

my reasons why he could not
be imbeciles; he had only one
could have married was Geli,
an earlier Messiah had never
to political importance of pre-
it: "If I married, I'd lose five
would interfere with his mis-
man worthy of his genius, or,
element his stature; it was one
in, the smaller the wife should
He thought of getting married
a wife did not appeal to him.

grant the conclusion that Hitler
clear that he had latent homo-
he worried a great deal about

ample, lest he give the impres-
h, indeed, he did. The noted
d Nicolson, who was himself a
interested in Hitler's feminin-
a with a colleague who told him
nine man that he has ever met
nes almost effeminate." ²⁸³ The
who watched Hitler closely one
of a hotel in Bad-Godesberg on
rote in his diary: "It was a very
tiny little steps." But a German
for wondering about Hitler's
clusion:

As a homosexual, I was fascinated by Hitler's eyes, speech and
walk. But I sensed immediately that he is not one of us. ²⁸⁴

Direct evidence from people who knew him well does not support
a claim of overt homosexuality. The recollections of his roommate, for
example, may be suggestive, but they are only that. Kubizek recalled
that when he met his friend at a railway station in Vienna one foggy
February night in 1908, Adolf "greeted me with a kiss and led me to the
lodging where we would spend the night." ²⁸⁵ Kubizek also reported
several occasions when adult homosexuals attempted to seduce Adolf,
but his friend "scrupulously avoided all personal contact with such
men" and talked about homosexuality as one of the "social problems"
he would solve when he established his Reich. ²⁸⁶

It is true that Hitler was closely associated with Ernst Röhm and
Rudolf Hess, two practicing homosexuals who were among the very
few people with whom he used the familiar *du*. But one cannot con-
clude that he therefore shared his friends' sexual tastes. Still, during
the months he was with Hess in Landsberg, their relationship must have
become very close. When Hitler left the prison he fretted about his
friend who languished there, and spoke of him tenderly, using Austrian
diminutives: "*Ach mein Rudi, mein Hesserl*, isn't it appalling to think
that he's still there." ²⁸⁷ One of Hitler's valets, Schneider, made no ex-
plicit statement about the relationship, but he did find it strange that
whenever Hitler got a present he liked or drew an architectural sketch
that particularly pleased him, he would run to Hess—who was known
in homosexual circles as "*Fräulein Anna*"—as a little boy would run to
his mother to show his prize to her. Another valet, Krause, agreed that
the relationship with Hess was very close indeed—but that was all he
said about it. ²⁸⁸ Finally, there is the nonconclusive but interesting fact
that one of Hitler's most prized possessions was a handwritten love letter
which King Ludwig II had written to a manservant.

A different kind of evidence indicates that Hitler was personally
concerned about latent homosexuality and struggled against it. There is
a remarkable similarity between his attempts to deny any suggestion
of homosexuality and his efforts to prove that he could not possibly be
tainted by Jewish blood. In both cases he used the same defense: he
denied that he was Jewish by persecuting the Jews; he denied that he
was homosexual by attacking homosexuals. Indeed, he made a special
point of doing so.

After he came to power, his government moved immediately
against all types of sexual deviation and sex crimes. But the sharpest
rise in prosecutions was for homosexuality: the number of prosecutions
increased from 3,261 for the years 1931 through 1934 to almost 70,000
between 1936 and 1939. ²⁸⁹ It is also suggestive that Hitler grouped

* By 1941, Hitler had revised his high opinion of Hess and declared him offi-
cially insane, damning him publicly as a traitor for his mission to England on
Hitler's behalf but without Hitler's knowledge.

1931

?

.

17

Adolf "the second"
in which can possibly
my seed?

1932

1932

1932

Heiden
Waite
Lahees
Hauptstadt

Books in this file

The Flying Engine - Hattner

1st and 2nd of B.H. - Pogue

Q. MrD. Brees

or do they refuse to transfer their affection and attentions? Such fidelity is admirable, but does cast doubt on the good sense of bees; the inflexible course taken almost inevitably ends in death. Why does instinct, if not intelligence, not serve them better here?

Beekkeepers have devised many methods of dealing with laying workers, but most don't work, at least not in my experience. The conventional technique is to take the hive a couple of hundred yards from its stand, dump the entire colony on the ground, and then return the empty hive to its original place. Theoretically, the laying worker, heavy with eggs and unused to being outside, can't fly back with the others, cut down by her own pretensions. This solution is tempting in its comforting implications and easy application. The flaw is that the laying worker, despite her bulk, usually hustles back to the hive with the others within minutes to resume her labors as a single parent, while other may die from the rough handling.

I have read many techniques guaranteed to introduce a queen to a colony with a laying worker, but do not personally know anyone who succeeded in reforming such deviant behavior. Occasionally a colony will accept a new queen and reject the laying worker, but this is rare. Many authorities believe that the only real solution is to kill off the entire colony, or unite it with a stronger one that is queenright; members of the latter we assume, are outraged by such corrupt behavior and kill the bogus queen to protect their own legitimate sovereign and conventional way of life. This represents a moral or political solution, the underlying theology supporting the quixotic notion that, given a chance, the erring bees will return to the path of virtue. Virtue, however, is helped along if the strong normal, or square, colony first kills the laying worker or reeducates her to her proper role.

The remaining workers must recognize that there is no salvation for them, and yet, in a final act of despairing self-deception they may build a queen cell around one of the drone eggs,

suggesting that their need for normalcy has deprived them of their reason and they are trying to deny or wish away their troubles with a final heroic illusion, one last grand fatal fantasy.

The whole problem of the laying worker puzzles me. Usually bees are clever enough in resolving their difficulties, but here they seem fatalistic, stupid, or deprived of reason. I can find no excuse for them. Would it not be simple and sensible enough for a colony with no queen and no eggs to produce a queen simply by stealing a newly laid egg from another hive? Surely their scruples are not above it. They will steal honey from neighboring colonies quickly enough; they are not adverse to slaughtering their own kind, in robbing, to advance their personal fortunes. Why, then, this reluctance to take bold and imaginative action? Why this surrender to adversity and terminal virtue?

FIFTY-SEVEN



Despair is a quality usually associated only with man, and yet I have seen despair, or what passes for despair, in other creatures. Despair is not to be confused with sorrow, which is a sadness, usually over a loss—despair is an overwhelming black melancholy that comes with the certain knowledge or belief that all is lost, there is no hope, despair feeding upon despair. Because humans are volatile in their emotions, despair may be a temporary condition following a severe setback of some kind, and recovery will probably follow eventually with the healing balm of time.

In animals despair usually comes with a severe illness that precedes death. We have no way of knowing, of course, whether

1932+33

Lairis
Pouch

?

The
connection
to 1932-3
is not
yet
clear.

A-14

presents to his mistress, and surrounded himself with servants, whose trustworthiness was ensured because they were under the supervision of the SS. He had a fleet of automobiles, and airplanes were always at his disposal. Nearly every evening there were private showings of films. His table service was of the best Meissen china, each plate, saucer, and teacup engraved in gold with "A.H." and a swastika. All the luxuries of life were greedily and voraciously embraced by him. He accepted no salary from the state, but the state paid all his expenses, and his royalties and investments provided him with vast sums of money necessary for the pursuit of luxuries.

Just as he collected rare paintings, so he collected rare books, and his private library, housed in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, his apartment in Munich, and the Berghof, was among the most splendid in Germany. His books were leather bound, often by Ilse Hess, the wife of the Deputy Fuehrer. They bore his monogram "A.H." and a swastika encircled in oak leaves.

Many women before and after Geli Raubal were Hitler's occasional mistresses, but only one had the status of a permanent mistress. Eva Braun, the daughter of lower-middle-class parents, became his mistress during the early months of 1932. Her father, Fritz Braun, came originally from Württemberg, and her mother was Bavarian. Eva was born in Munich on February 7, 1912, the second of three daughters, and went to a convent school kept by the English Sisters, so named because English nuns had founded the convent in the eighteenth century. Here, at Simbach near the frontier, she grew into a vivacious and athletic young woman with a great deal of native intelligence and no intellectual attainments, so that she just barely acquired a diploma. The nuns thought her frivolous, and she thought they were charming and useless.

She left the convent at Simbach in the summer of 1929 and almost immediately got a job as a bookkeeper and "girl Friday" in the photographic studio of Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler's official photographer. One day in October, 1929, Hitler arrived in the shop, was introduced to her, and did not forget her. She had a chubby, round face, and her body was enclosed in a shapeless white dress, but there was an extraordinary gaiety in her. At the time he was conducting an ambiguous affair with Geli Raubal, which occupied most of his leisure hours. There was no time for an affair with Eva, although he saw her frequently. When Hitler received his weekly quota of photographs from Hoffmann, the messenger was likely to be Eva Braun. About five months after the suicide of Geli Raubal, she became his permanent mistress. She was the one woman he constantly returned to, and she remained his mistress for the rest of his life.

She brought to him her youth, her freshness, and a natural elegance.

Life & Death of A.H. - Pagan

Feb '32

ness, almost caress-
y, he was completely
m broadcast, but they
r reasonableness and
great ranting speeches
not to be taken alto-

le Hitler" was often
blouses and dark
Fuehrer, and as they
in that low, caressing
them with a proper
ous when he pleased.
nt, bare-headed, sun-
bowed from the waist
with the burning eyes
posters. They saw a
pleasantly even though
name they repeated
the man who some-
German of all time"

in the image he pro-
believed legend he
have anything to do
eer and diluted wine
sausages, and kept a
in the Berghof. There
peticism was a fiction
ation, his self-control,
by this outward show
to the service of his

possessed none of the
at man named Willy
as court jester. Al-
the form of sausages
mnoisseur of sweets,
turned in astonishing
ream and sugar. No

in the ample hobbies
ings, gave expensive

my
these levels
madden

1932, 1935
1938

Fair-haired, blue-eyed, with a rippling laugh and a quietly determined manner, she resembled even in her movements the dead Geli Raubal but was quieter and less moody. She had no ambition to be a singer, or indeed to be anything at all except his mistress. She was self-effacing and discreet, but she did not always obey Hitler's order that she divorce herself completely from politics, for she sometimes interceded with him on behalf of Jews she had known. Her difficult task was to be his mistress while remaining invisible, and she succeeded so well that very few people outside Hitler's immediate circle knew of her existence.

Twice at least she broke under the strain. In November, 1932, she attempted to shoot herself, and in May, 1935, she attempted suicide with an overdose of sleeping pills. Both attempts were due to her belief that Hitler was having affairs with other women. Later she accepted the fact that she could live with him only on his own terms. In March, 1936, he gave her a small villa at 12 Wasserburgerstrasse in Munich, where she installed herself with one of her sisters, and a Mercedes-Benz, which she never learned to drive. It was during this period that Hitler's house, the Berghof at Obersalzberg, was being rebuilt. Soon she had an apartment at the Reich Chancellery and another in the Berghof. She was an agreeable and expensive luxury.

Many of Eva Braun's letters, the diary she wrote before her second suicide attempt, and her home movies have survived. All together there are four and a half hours of her home movies in the possession of the Library of Congress. We see her swimming and exercising on the parallel bars, climbing mountains, playing with animals, or strolling along forest pathways. We see her standing with Hitler on the balcony of the Berghof, gazing at the distant mountains, or walking by his side. What is strange is that there is nothing strange in these movies. She might be any young woman endowed with an athletic body, quick to smile, and conscious that she is admired. In her presence Hitler completely loses his daimonic quality and might be taken for any small-business man taking a holiday in the Bavarian mountains. It was not that he had changed his character. It was simply that in her presence he no longer needed to wear the iron mask of authority.

In May, 1938, he wrote a will and placed her first in the list of beneficiaries after leaving the greater part of his estate to the party. He appointed Franz Xavier Schwarz, the party treasurer, as his executor. There seems to have been no particular reason why he should have written the will at this time. Such a will was long overdue, and he had long ago accepted the fact that he was living dangerously and might be assassinated. The will began in the customary way, with instructions for the disposal of his body. He asked that it should be brought to Munich, and the lying in state should be in the Feldherrn Hall, and that

he be laid to rest November, 1923. similar annuity w the same amount an outright bequ detested his half-long been forgott Hitler, who wroth he denounced his live in poverty. T beer hall and resi Hitler were recei nephew as being

The remaining mind working or attempting to ass loyal to him. He l ity of 1,800 mark 1,200 marks, wh Julius Schaub, hi the early party d of 6,000 marks. more distant rela Austria, and he paid out at the room in the Prin had killed hersel memory, were lef his art collection made an excepti should be examin were to be destro Angela and Paul. the will. Signifi Himmler, or any

The 1938 will an electrician wo fall of Berlin. Th reveal what he h therefore sewed wife that she wou

The will refle ing for his family

†
Geli's
Reminder

a mo
after
affair
Hagen
then
his
just
Lela

Life & Death of A. H. - Pagan

Haftener

At
Courtland
then
in 1932

At any rate, the objective was clear: the expansion of Prussia, and as much German unity as was compatible with that goal. And it was equally clear from the outset that this goal could be achieved only against Austria's will, and that to achieve it the most dangerous road, the road of war, would ultimately have to be taken. That is how the war of 1866 differed from Bismarck's two other wars, including the earlier one of 1864: that war, conducted in union with Austria against Denmark for Schleswig-Holstein, was only one of the milestones in the developing Prussian-Austrian hostility over Germany, and the initially joint

First, there was an entire kingdom of Schleswig-Holstein-Nassau, became a Free City of Frankfurt Confederation, became Prussia simultaneously, greatest expansion, history won a corner area. It would not be a lecture that for him was the most important

ass would want to organize, defend its interests. cordial terms with Fer- die fathers of Social De- ped some political plans g came of them. What e Social Democrats was but their international- ortantly, their then still

Social Democrats were party, "rabble-rousers" eir intention of chang- But that did not make . They wanted to carry n the framework of the however, had a deep- on, dating back to 1848. a society governed by nise with the liberal val of the state been at ive agreed to a compro- ass, but he feared and n.

Bismarck waged a re- Social Democrats. The ulgated called for the aders from their homes cratic clubs, meetings, . In the second half of Democrats were at best

semilegal, truly persecuted. True, they could campaign and run for office and sit in the Reichstag. Bismarck did not disturb these constitutional rights. But beyond that everything was forbidden. Yet in these years of persecution the Social Democrats, almost unstoppably, grew stronger with each election. That was one of the dark clouds that hovered over the Bismarck era. Bismarck could not bring the Social Democratic party to its knees, yet he never stopped fighting it, at the very end he even tried to outlaw the party and banish its leaders from the country. But nothing came of that any longer. He also tried to fight the Social Democrats with other means. The 1880s, the years of Bismarck's relentless anti-Socialist activity, were also the years in which he introduced the German social insurance programs: health insurance in 1883, accident insurance in 1884, disability insurance in 1889. Those were truly audacious programs for that time. Bismarck was hailed as the father of modern German social legislation, and in fact to this day Germany's social policies are considered exemplary. Bismarck saw these measures as part of his fight against Social Democracy. By improving the living conditions of the people, he hoped to counteract the influence of the Social Democrats. He failed. The workers liked his social programs but they would not let themselves be bribed. They remained Social Democrats.

In the second half of his tenure, after 1879,

AH
in
32

1932

R THE WORLD LOOKS AT HITLER / 111

PART TWO

vain, arrogant, and unqualified amateur, who filled a largely ceremonial post with little distinction. Indeed, his major distinction may well lie in the fact that he was the only one of Hitler's principal lieutenants to be hanged at Nuremberg.¹⁵ The following selection is taken from a memorandum written by Ribbentrop at the request of his defense attorney, Dr. Georg Froeschmann, who subsequently donated it to the Bavarian State Archives. It is a frankly sympathetic account by a man whose greatest virtue was his slavish and unshakable loyalty to his master. Even after allowances are made for the purpose for which it was written, Ribbentrop's memorandum demonstrates, once again, the extraordinary hold that Hitler exercised over those around him.

I saw Adolf Hitler for the first time in August 1932. . . . [His] entire personality impressed me strongly. . . . I was especially fascinated by his domineering blue eyes in his otherwise dark appearance. Even then I got the impression that this man, whose speeches I had read with so much interest, was quite an unusual phenomenon. What struck me most was his thoroughly self-contained, though not reserved, manner. Not only his thoughts and words but also the way in which he expressed them clearly distinguished him from other men; they seemed to come out of his innermost being; they were simple and clear, and therefore so convincing. Another thing that struck me was the finality with which he expressed his views. There was room for neither discussion nor contradiction. He simply stated facts that his listeners were expected to accept. He was clearly monomaniacal; a man hard to influence and not given to compromise. That was even then my impression. . . .

Although I spent much time with him, never during all those years did I get any closer to him than I did on the first day we met. He was indescribably aloof. Although millions adored him, Adolf Hitler was a lonely man. . . . He did not want to be unapproachable, but that was how nature had made him. I think he probably suffered as a result. Despite all this, however, he could be engagingly amiable, cordial, and gay. . . . When he was out to win someone over or to get something out of somebody he could be extraordinarily charming and persuasive. I have seen men with strong personalities go in to see Hitler, their hearts full, determined to tell him categorically that unless this or that were changed a catastrophe would occur, for which

¹⁵ Hermann Göring, at one time the Third Reich's number-two man, was also condemned to death by hanging, but managed to commit suicide just before his scheduled execution.

made illogical
use positions,

essed of the
Commander-
lettante with

peatedly ex-
able to hold
d necessarily
the Western
promise of
fight in the
Hitler during
tended that
your throat
stern Powers
forces in the

le from the
because of
surrender"
mentioned
paralleled"
had already
disinclined
ided of his
ld Marshal
ld Marshal.
he lost all
the bounds
vitably had
s.

tall of the
accounts a

ichkeit Adolf
ber die Per-
hte in Wis-
G. H. Stein.
eschichte in

1930, 1932

Hitler Comes to Power 5 B

them by a simple majority vote. If this happened, the government could no longer govern. Brüning's cabinet faced this challenge on July 18, 1930.

In this circumstance the president had still another weapon. According to Article 25 he could dissolve the Reichstag. Within sixty days of a dissolution a general election had to be held. Hindenburg dissolved the Reichstag on July 18, 1930, and made full use of the period of sixty days that followed. During this time his chancellor could continue to govern without fear of interference from the Reichstag. When the Reichstag reassembled after the election of September 14, however, the government found that its support in the parliament had decreased. Yet it was precisely because of the erosion of his support through the Nazi victory of September 14, 1930, that Brüning was able to remain in office for another eighteen months. In order to prevent Brüning's fall and Hitler's possible accession to the chancellorship, the majority of the Reichstag no longer used its right to put a vote of no confidence or to annul Brüning's numerous emergency decrees. The Reichstag was prepared to tolerate the chancellor. Brüning was finally dismissed by Hindenburg on May 30, 1932, and was succeeded by Papen. For the time being we shall not deal with the reasons for Brüning's dismissal or with the political and economic issues behind these developments, but shall continue merely to explain their constitutional implications.

Unlike Brüning's cabinet, Papen's ultraconservative cabinet could not expect to be tolerated by the Reichstag, and the Reichstag was again dissolved immediately after Papen was appointed. This gave him the chance of governing freely for fifty-seven days, until the election of July 31. He won another month's reprieve because the Reichstag was not bound to assemble until thirty days after the election, according to Article 23. When the Reichstag finally convened on August 30, it passed a vote of no confidence against Papen by the enormous majority of 512 voted against 42 with 5 abstentions.

9 This should have meant that the chancellor was deposed, but either immediately before or after this vote (a question that remained unresolved in the tumultuous session) the Reichstag was dissolved once more and Papen again gained fifty-five days, until the election of November 6. But this election also failed to produce a working majority; Papen had thus failed in his attempts to form a government with majority support. On December 6, thirty days after the election, the new Reichstag would reassemble and Papen could expect another vote of no confidence, after which not even Hindenburg could save him.

Hindenburg now had three options. He could immediately dissolve the Reichstag again. Papen would then have gained another three months in office—sixty days until the election and another thirty until the reassembly of the Reichstag. But this method was outworn and on the brink of illegality, and it did not promise a way out of the crisis.

Second, Hindenburg could accept Papen's suggestion to dissolve the Reichstag but delay the election beyond the prescribed day. This would have been a blatant breach of the constitution, and Hindenburg was not prepared to do this. He would have to break his oath to the constitution, which he took seriously, and he would have to answer to the supreme court, a circumstance that would have rendered the country altogether ungovernable. He could also have prompted a civil war, which the army declared itself incapable of winning for several reasons, including the possibility that other countries such as Poland might exploit the internal strife in Germany.

There remained only a third option: to appoint a new chancellor. Hence Papen was dismissed and on December 2, 1932, four days before the new Reichstag was to assemble, Schleicher was appointed. The Reichstag restrained itself from passing an immediate vote of no confidence against the new chancellor. It adjourned until after Christmas and Schleicher gained a brief respite to govern.

1932

1920

Hitler Comes to Power 9 B

were at least tolerated by the Reichstag. This had not been the case since the dismissal of Brüning.

By dismissing Brüning needlessly in May 1932, Hindenburg created the predicament that ultimately led him to appoint Hitler. Hindenburg dismissed Brüning because the president wanted to move away from the parliamentary regime and gradually introduce a more conservative and authoritarian system that might eventually lead to the restoration of the monarchy. We can go further and say that the same intentions guided him when he appointed Brüning. In itself this does not require much of an explanation. The old field marshal was, we repeat, not a democrat but a royalist. What requires an explanation is not his lifelong royalist convictions but the conditions under which he could implement them. This, in turn, raises questions about the basic structural problems of the Weimar Republic.

15
20 No political party in the Weimar Republic had ever had an absolute majority; hence all the governments were coalitions and most of them had only minority support in the Reichstag. The first duly constituted German government after the fall of the empire in November 1918 and the national elections of 1919 consisted of Social Democrats, left Liberals, and Catholic Centrists. This so-called Weimar coalition, which then drew up the Weimar constitution, lost its majority in the election of 1920 and never regained it. These three parties were basically the only ones firmly tied to the Weimar constitution, although there are some reservations in the case of the Center party. We can say, therefore, that the parliamentary, democratic, and republican form of government had had no support from the majority of the population since 1920.

Another group of parties, led by the Conservatives and the right Liberals, adhered to the idea of a constitutional monarchy, like the one that had ruled Germany until November 1918. But these parties also failed to win a majority. They

Needless to say, this explanation is not yet sufficient. It covers only a superficial series of events, and we need to know more, for example, about Hindenburg's motives. We can say at once that he was not pleased by his appointment of Hitler. Hitler was not his favorite candidate. Personally and politically Brüning and Papen had been to his liking; Hitler was not. Hindenburg despised this Bohemian corporal, as he called him, and recognized the potential dangers of his accession with remarkable insight. Moreover they had been opposing candidates in a bitter presidential election in the spring of 1932.

On November 24, 1932, Hindenburg had informed Hitler that he could not appoint him chancellor because he feared that "a presidential cabinet led by Hitler would necessarily develop into a party dictatorship with all its consequences for an extreme aggravation of the conflicts within the German people." As late as January 26, 1933, Hindenburg told his entourage: "Gentlemen, I hope you will not hold me capable of appointing this Austrian corporal to be Reich chancellor." And it was with an expression of resignation that on January 28 he asked his advisers who had opened the way to a Hitler government, "Does this mean that I have the unpleasant task of appointing this Hitler chancellor?"²

To understand how Hindenburg overcame his distaste for and doubts about Hitler, we must examine once more the conditions under which he acted at the end of 1932 and beginning of 1933. The president's freedom to act was considerable but not unlimited. The Reichstag could in principle at any time have proposed a candidate who commanded a majority and Hindenburg would in all likelihood have appointed him chancellor. He could appoint chancellors of his own choice only because the Reichstag itself no longer presented any majority candidate. On the other hand, Hindenburg's minority chancellors could govern only as long as they

1930, 1931, 1932

Hitler Comes to Power

11 B

It is equally true that Hindenburg was able to appoint Brüning and the other, later minority, chancellors only because by March 1930 the Reichstag itself was no longer able to form a majority government. Had a majority chancellor been proposed, Hindenburg would most likely have appointed him and let him govern. He never envisaged a coup d'état or wished Hitler to come to power. He only sought to profit from the given situation, from what we have described as a stalemate. Today we know that the Müller cabinet, had it not broken up, could have survived the worst part of the international economic crisis with a sound parliamentary majority, since its legislative term did not expire until May 1932. Instead, the Reichstag was prematurely dissolved and in the elections of September 1930 Hitler won his first major breakthrough.

This is worth repeating. The Müller cabinet was not overthrown in March 1930; it resigned. It is well known that the coalition partners could not agree on a question of unemployment benefits. But to see this as the reason for the resignation of the cabinet would be to confuse the long-term cause with the immediate trigger. The crucial factor was the structural stalemate of the Weimar Republic. Under the conditions of a stalemate Hindenburg was able to appoint his conservative minority chancellors. When they were no longer tolerated by the Reichstag, the state became ungovernable. In the course of the periodic elections held in hopes of providing these minority chancellors with a majority, the Nazi party became instead the strongest party. Still Hindenburg refused to appoint Hitler after these elections; he declined explicitly in August 1931 and again in November 1932.

We have to ask, therefore, why he changed his mind in January 1933. The answer is clear. The Conservative party in the meantime had been persuaded to form a coalition with the Nazi party and Hitler had reduced his demands. Apart

whether representatives of industry and finance persuaded Hindenburg to appoint Hitler. Such attempts were doubtless made. In November 1932 leading industrial representatives had asked Hindenburg in a letter to appoint Hitler head of a presidential cabinet. But it is most unlikely that such initiatives influenced Hindenburg's decision. Hindenburg despised industrialists and bankers and disliked following their advice. There were no industrialists in his political or personal entourage. Rather, his advisers were civil servants and army officers, his friends were landowners. The latter were especially influential at the end. The landowners opposed Schleicher because he wanted to cut the subvention of public money for the indebted landholders of East Elbia. There is plenty of evidence for this, and if Hindenburg was at all influenced in his decision making by the promptings of special interest groups, then it was by landed rather than by industrial interests. In saying this, we do not, however, intend to assign to landed interests the role that industry plays in various other explanations.

Another possibility in defining the role played by industry is that it paid Hitler and thus helped him to become a powerful political factor. We will postpone this question until we consider Hitler's electoral successes.

Let us return to the question how Papen came to conduct the negotiations for the formation of the government. The first factor was Hindenburg's confidence in him. Another precondition was the fact that the state apparatus had become largely autonomous. Here I shall follow Karl Marx in differentiating between state power and state apparatus. State power is the ability to pass laws and directives, which are then executed by the state apparatus. This state apparatus consists of the civil service, the judiciary, the army, and the police. All of them are subject to directives. Generally speaking, the state power is exercised by the ruling classes or, in a democracy, by those who are elected by the majority of the population. They

1933

1932

B 104

Hitler and the Germans

1932 14.3 percent; in November 1932 16.9 percent. Its electoral share, unlike that of the Nazi party, did not decrease, and it preached expropriation and promised sovietization.

Hitler, on the other hand, gave reassuring promises and openly courted the industrialists. Whatever else one might have thought of him, he was certainly a passionate anti-communist. Moreover, he had at his disposal millions of largely poverty-stricken (and therefore dangerous) followers and possessed such a charismatic appeal for them that he seemed in a position to make them serve the state. It was true that he spoke without much restraint and that he intended to abolish the constitution. But had not this very constitution, an exceedingly unpopular one at that, led to the present dilemma? And was it not possible to control the risk of transferring power to him by taking him in, binding him to a coalition, fencing him in, and taming him?

This was the train of thought of the political powers in the winter of 1932-1933. However briefly the process has been described here, it nevertheless offers an explanation for Hitler's rise to power. Unable to exercise power in their own right, the property holders of Germany, led by industrialists such as Keppler, bankers such as Schröder, and conservative politicians such as Papen, secured political power for a charismatic hero of the masses in the hope that he would at least protect their economic power and ward off a social revolution. To put it concisely, this constituted a pact with the devil: political power for economic stability. One was sacrificed to secure the other. And this plan did not, after all, fail completely, even though catastrophes of unimaginable extent followed and in the end buried the state.

Hitler could rule as he wanted so long as he did not seriously antagonize any of the differing and opposing factions that had helped him rise to power, neither his indigent followers nor his propertied stirrup holders, nor any of the other great social forces (such as the churches) whose institutions

* D. T. comments on the critics who say this is upon my word, they could not have been more accurate

many of the West German industrialists present had met Hitler, and their reception of him was cool and reserved. Yet Hitler, far from being nervous, spoke for two and a half hours without pause, and made one of the best speeches of his life. In it is to be found every one of the stock ideas out of which he built his propaganda, brilliantly dressed up for the audience of businessmen he was addressing.

Hitler began by attacking Brüning's view that the dominant consideration in German politics at this time ought to be the country's foreign relations. The determining factor in national life was the inner worth of a people and its spirit. In Germany, however, this inner worth had been undermined by setting up the false values of democracy and the supremacy of mere numbers in opposition to the creative principle of individual personality.

Hitler chose his illustrations with skill. Private property, he pointed out, could only be justified on the ground that men's achievements in the economic field were unequal. 'But it is absurd to build up economic life on the conceptions of achievement, of the value of personality and on the authority of personality, while in the political sphere you deny this authority and thrust in its place the law of the greatest number—democracy.' Not only was it inconsistent, it was dangerous, for the philosophy of egalitarianism would in time be extended from politics to economics, as it already had been in Bolshevik Russia: 'In the economic sphere Communism is analogous to democracy in the political sphere.'

Hitler dwelt at length on the threat of Communism, for it was something more, he said, than 'a mob storming about in some of our streets in Germany, it is a conception of the world which is in the act of subjecting to itself the entire Asiatic continent'. Unless it were halted it would 'gradually shatter the whole world . . . and transform it as completely as did Christianity'. Already, thanks to the economic

crisis, Communism had; Unemployment was dri- look on Communism as terpart of their actua was the heart of the Ge of foreign conditions, tion, our internal divisio this state of affairs wa nomic expedients embod by the exercise of poli nomics but politics that national life: 'There ca behind this economic lif political will of the natio and to strike hard.'

The same, Hitler wa policy. 'The Treaty of consequence of our ow aberration of mind.'

It was no good appe sacrifice for the State ' people are ready to fi while fifty per cent ha stands for a State whic the bounds of their own

'Unless Germany can in *Weltanschauungen* n can stop the decline of t

Recognizing this fac out to create a new ou re-vitalize the German tion which is filled wi spirit. . . . Today we Germany's destiny. . . working out a body-p conglomeration of par *Weltanschauungen*, fr madness of class, or e solidation, Germany w

uns sacrifice when today
ids of S.A. and S.S. men
iforms, their shirts, their
their own fares. But there
force of an ideal—a great
man nation today had the
as these hundred thou-
possessed this idealism,
the eyes of the world other-

the audience, whose reserve
e and cheered him wildly.
the resources of heavy in-
he Nazi treasury. As the
the man who promised to
y power, so the industri-
the man who would defend
threat of Communism and
nions, giving a free hand
economic exploitation in
of 'creative individuality'.

for the Presidency was
with which it was fought,
fusion of parties, and for
campaign, a masterpiece of
attempted to take Germany
ency down to the mest re-
sed, and the walls of the
n screaming Nazi posters;
els were made and shown
on in 1932); gramophone
sent through the post. But,
n the superiority of the
zi effort went into organiz-
ings at which the principal
oebbels, Gregor Strasser,
p to hysterical enthusiasm
st unrestrained kind.

The result was baffling. When the polls were closed on the evening of 13 March Hitler had nearly one-third of the total votes in Germany. But all the Nazi efforts left them more than seven million votes behind Hindenburg. This was outright defeat, and Goebbels was in despair.

By a quirk of chance, however, Hindenburg's vote was slightly short of the absolute majority required. A second election had therefore to be held. Before morning on 14 March special editions of the *Völkischer Beobachter* were on the streets carrying Hitler's new election manifesto: 'The first election campaign is over, the second has begun today. I shall lead it.'

It was an uphill fight, with Hitler driving a tired and dispirited Party, but the ingenious mind of Goebbels hit on a novel electioneering device. The leader should cover Germany by plane—'Hitler over Germany'. On 3 April the flight began with four mass meetings in Saxony, at which Hitler addressed a quarter of a million people. He visited twenty different towns in a week from East Prussia to Westphalia, from the Baltic to Bavaria. On 8 April, when a violent storm raged over Western Germany and all other air traffic was grounded, the leader flew to Düsseldorf and kept his engagement, with the whole Nazi Press blaring away that here at last was the man with the courage Germany needed.

Defeat was certain, but by his exacting performance Hitler pushed up his vote again on 10 April by more than two millions. The President was safely home with a comfortable 53 per cent yet by tenacity and boldness Hitler had avoided disaster, capturing votes not only from the Nationalists, but also from the Communists, whose vote fell by over a million. The day after the election Goebbels wrote in his diary: 'The campaign for the Prussian State elections is prepared. We go on without a breathing space.'

ward question pre-
success, which, how-
ort of a clear major-
ntage? On 11 March
structions with the
uneasiness is rife
prising haunts the
trasser, who had op-
campaign from the
argument that the
cy of legality were
'all-or-nothing' atti-
al, except on his own
he point of Hitler's
itor, Strasser asked,
, but into a political

to answer to either
h took the initiative
at last against the

he State authorities
ocuments drawn up
Party in Hesse, Dr.
sions among a small
se papers contained
e issued by the S.A.
ing, and suggestions
ed by a provisional
nunists had been de-
execution of those
ies, who refused to
possession of arms.
d was the abolition
of the obligation to
s, and of all private
ven the right to ad-
te and of all private
pulsory, without re-

ward, and people were to be fed by a system of food
cards and public kitchens. Provision was added for
the erection of courts-martial under Nazi presidents.

The discovery of these plans caused a sensation,
and seriously embarrassed Hitler, who declared
(probably with justice) that he had known nothing
of them and, had he known, would have disavowed
them. Despite pressure from the Prussian State Gov-
ernment, however, the Reich Government declined to
take action against the Nazis.

Evidence of Nazi plans for a seizure of power con-
tinued to accumulate. However much Hitler under-
lined his insistence upon legal methods, the charac-
ter of the S.A. organization was such that the idea of
a putsch was bound to come naturally to men whose
politics were conducted in an atmosphere of violence
and semi-legality. On the day of the first presidential
election Prussian police, raiding Nazi headquarters,
found copies of Röhm's orders and marked maps
which confirmed the report that the S.A. had been
prepared to carry out a *coup d'état* if Hitler secured a
majority. Near the Polish frontier other orders were
captured instructing the local S.A. in Pomerania not
to take part in the defence of Germany in the event
of a surprise Polish attack.

As a result of these discoveries the State govern-
ments, led by Prussia and Bavaria, presented Groener
(the Reich Minister of the Interior) with an ul-
timatum. Either the Reich Government must act
against the S.A. or, they hinted, they would take in-
dependent action themselves. Groener felt obliged to
act. On 10 April, the day of the second election, a
meeting presided over by the Chancellor confirmed
Groener's view, and on the 14th a decree was pro-
mulgated dissolving the S.A., the S.S., and all their
affiliated organizations.

Röhm for a moment thought of resistance; after
all, the S.A. now numbered four hundred thousand
men. But Hitler was insistent: the S.A. must obey.

Overnight the Brown Shirts disappeared from the streets. But the S.A. organization was left intact to appear as ordinary Party members. Brüning and Groener would get their answer, Hitler declared, at the Prussian elections.

Prussia was by far the largest of the German states, embracing nearly two-thirds of the whole territory of the Reich, with a population of forty out of a total of sixty-five millions. It had been the stronghold of German democracy, and the Prussian Ministry of the Interior had been more active than any other official agency in trying to check Nazi excesses. To capture a majority in Prussia, therefore, would be a political victory for the Nazis second only in importance to securing a majority in the Reichstag.

On 24 April at the Prussian elections and other State elections, some four-fifths of Germany went to the polls. In spite of the Nazi propaganda machine, Hitler's second series of highly publicized flights over Germany, and the support of the Nationalists, the Nazis fell short of the majority for which they had hoped. Three times the trumpet had sounded and still the walls refused to fall.

At this moment there appeared a *deus ex machina* in the shape of General von Schleicher, prepared to discuss once again the admission of the Nazis by the back door.

General Schleicher had resumed his relations with Röhm before the presidential elections. He appears at this time to have been playing with the idea of detaching the S.A. from Hitler, and bringing them under the jurisdiction of the State as the militia Röhm had always wanted to make them. Unknown to Hitler, it had already been agreed between Röhm and Schleicher that, in the event of a war-emergency, the S.A. would come under the command of the Army. Schleicher, however, was still attracted by the alternative idea of bringing Hitler himself into the

Government camp. In the S.A. was bound to

Schleicher went be-
sued Hindenburg to
plaining about the act
Reichsbanner, with th
tion of the S.A. had
been made public almo
malicious whispering
gan, and on 10 May G
on him in the Reichst
attempted to reply, he
Nazi benches. Scarcely
the effort, when he w
cher, the man he reg
that the Army no lon
that it would be bes
loyally defended Groe
of uproar in the Rei
to be cleared by the p
signed. The Nazis we

Groener's fall, treac
cher, was a grave bl
of the greatest weakn
was the equivocal atti
republican régime. Gro
the Army's leaders v
hearted loyalty, and th

But Groener's dep
Schleicher had now m
obstacle to the succes
the Nazis was Brüning
the 'System'. With th
which he had stabbed
now set about unseati

Brüning was not i
himself. He had failed
the Reichstag, and ha
perity to Germany. H

appeared from the
was left intact to
rs. Brüning and
Hitler declared, at

of the German
of the whole ter-
on of forty out of
been the strong-
ne Prussian Min-
e active than any
ck Nazi excesses.
therefore, would
second only in im-
the Reichstag.
actions and other
Germany went to
paganda machine,
icized flights over
Nationalists, the
r which they had
sounded and still

deus ex machina
cher, prepared to
the Nazis by the

his relations with
tions. He appears
ith the idea of de-
bringing them un-
the militia Röhm
Inknown to Hitler,
Röhm and Schle-
ur-emergency, the
and of the Army.
racted by the al-
himself into the

Government camp. In either case, the prohibition of the S.A. was bound to embarrass his plans.

Schleicher went behind Groener's back and persuaded Hindenburg to write an irritable letter complaining about the activities of the Social Democratic Reichsbanner, with the implication that the prohibition of the S.A. had been one-sided. The letter had been made public almost before Groener received it. A malicious whispering campaign against him now began, and on 10 May Göring delivered a violent attack on him in the Reichstag. When Groener, a sick man, attempted to reply, he met a storm of abuse from the Nazi benches. Scarcely had he sat down, exhausted by the effort, when he was blandly informed by Schleicher, the man he regarded almost as his own son, that the Army no longer had confidence in him, and that it would be best for him to resign. Brüning loyally defended Groener, but there were such scenes of uproar in the Reichstag that the Chamber had to be cleared by the police. The next day Groener resigned. The Nazis were jubilant.

Groener's fall, treacherously engineered by Schleicher, was a grave blow to German democracy. One of the greatest weaknesses of the Weimar Republic was the equivocal attitude of the Army towards the republican régime. Groener was the only man amongst the Army's leaders who had served it with wholehearted loyalty, and there was no one to replace him.

But Groener's departure was only a beginning. Schleicher had now made up his mind that the chief obstacle to the success of his plan for the deal with the Nazis was Brüning, the butt of Nazi attacks on the 'System'. With the same cynical disloyalty with which he had stabbed Groener in the back, Schleicher now set about unseating Brüning.

Brüning was not in a strong position to defend himself. He had failed to secure a stable majority in the Reichstag, and had so far failed to restore prosperity to Germany. His great hope—the cancellation

of reparations and the recognition of Germany's right to equality in armaments—had been frustrated by the postponement of the Reparations Conference at Lausanne until June 1932 and the opposition of the French. Ironically, his one great success, the re-election of the President, weakened rather than strengthened his position. For, with that safely accomplished, Brüning no longer appeared indispensable, and, under the careful coaching of Schleicher and other candid friends, the old man had come to feel resentment against the Chancellor as the man whose obstinacy had forced him to endure an election campaign, and to stand as the candidate of the Left against his own friends on the Right.

Moreover, Brüning, because of his economic and social policies, had made enemies who enjoyed great influence with the President, including industrialists and the powerful Junker class. Finally, Schleicher, claiming to speak with the legendary authority of the Army, announced that the Army no longer had confidence in the Chancellor. A stronger man was needed to deal with the situation, and he already had a suitable candidate ready in Franz von Papen. He added the all-important assurance that the Nazis had agreed to support the new Government.

Ostensibly Hitler played no part in the manoeuvres which led to Brüning's dismissal. Schleicher offered him the overthrow of the Brüning Cabinet, the removal of the ban on the S.A. and S.S., and new elections for the Reichstag in return for tacit support, the 'neutrality' of the Nazis towards the new presidential cabinet which Papen was to form. Such a promise cost Hitler nothing. Time would show who was to do the double-crossing, Schleicher or the Nazis. Meanwhile Hitler's agreement provided Schleicher with a winning argument for Hindenburg. Papen would be able to secure what Brüning had failed to get, Hitler's support, without taking him into the Cabinet.

Groener's fall on 13 May raised the hopes of the

The Months of Opp

Nazi leaders high. O diary: 'For Brüning arrived. He is being ready completely isolated collaborators—"My ter!" . . . Our mice through the last st 'Rat' would perhaps describe the part pl

At the end of M Chancellor's resignation fatal reliance on the forced to accept as t deadlock had produced could be made or withdrawal of tl bore the responsibility to arise will long be result was plain enough government in Germany of sixty-five m mitted to lie in the ha five and the little gro views.

On 29 May Hitler Hindenburg informed to appoint Papen as Hitler had agreed to Hitler answered: 'Ye

The new Chancellor fifties, came from a phallic nobility. He h regiment (he was a c now to the right clubs He had great charm social world, connexion French industry, and So far these ambitious

tion of Germany's had been frustrated. The Reparations Conference and the opposition of the great powers, the reason for the failure rather than the cause. With that safely accomplished, Schleicher had come to feel that as the man whose name was on the election campaign of the Left was right.

Of his economic and political views, who enjoyed great success in dealing with industrialists. Finally, Schleicher, the only authority of the kind no longer had confidence in any man was needed. He already had a plan for Franz von Papen. He felt that the Nazis had no chance.

But in the manoeuvres of the day, Schleicher offered to resign his Cabinet, the red S.S., and new elections for tacit support, the new presidential election. Such a promise would show who was to do the bidding of the Nazis. Meanwhile Schleicher with a few words to Papen would be able to get, Hitler's support for the Cabinet. He had the hopes of the

Nazi leaders high. On the 18th Goebbels wrote in his diary: 'For Brüning alone winter seems to have arrived. He is being secretly undermined and is already completely isolated. He is anxiously looking for collaborators—"My kingdom for a Cabinet Minister!" . . . Our mice are busily at work gnawing through the last supports of Brüning's position.' 'Rat' would perhaps have been a better word to describe the part played by General von Schleicher.

At the end of May Hindenburg requested the Chancellor's resignation, and Brüning resigned. That fatal reliance on the President which he had been forced to accept as the only way out of the political deadlock had produced a situation in which governments could be made and unmade by the simple grant or withdrawal of the President's confidence. Who bore the responsibility for allowing such a situation to arise will long be a matter of controversy, but the result was plain enough: it was the end of democratic government in Germany. The key to power over a nation of sixty-five million people was now openly admitted to lie in the hands of an aged soldier of eighty-five and the little group of men who determined his views.

On 29 May Hitler and Göring saw the President. Hindenburg informed them briefly that he intended to appoint Papen as Chancellor and understood that Hitler had agreed to support him. Was this correct? Hitler answered: 'Yes.'

The new Chancellor, Franz von Papen, a man in his fifties, came from a Catholic family of the Westphalian nobility. He had belonged to the light cavalry regiment (he was a celebrated gentleman-rider) and now to the right clubs, the Herrenklub and the Union. He had great charm, a wide acquaintance in the social world, connexions with both German and French industry, and considerable political ambitions. So far these ambitions had not been taken seriously

by anyone else. Schleicher was attracted to the improbable choice of Papen as Chancellor by the belief that he would prove a pliant instrument in his hands, but he seriously underestimated Papen's ambition, tenacity, and unscrupulousness. The choice startled everyone and pleased few, with the important exception of the President, who was delighted with the company of a Chancellor who knew how to charm and flatter so well that he soon established relations with him such as no other minister had ever had.

If Schleicher believed that Papen would be able to rally a coalition of the Centre and the Right he was soon disillusioned. Only with great difficulty was it possible to collect a Cabinet of men willing to serve under Papen. Of its ten members, none of whom was a political figure of the first rank, seven belonged to the nobility with known Right-wing views. From the beginning there was not the least chance of Papen avoiding an overwhelming defeat if he met parliament; the power of the 'Cabinet of Barons' was openly and unashamedly based upon the support of the President and the Army.

Of the four parties in Germany which commanded mass support, the Communists and the Social Democrats were bound to oppose Papen's government; his own party, the Centre, had excommunicated him, and only the Nazis remained as a possible ally, bought at the price of two concessions: the dissolution of the Reichstag and the lifting of the ban on the S.A. The question was whether this temporary arrangement could be turned into a permanent coalition.

Both sides were willing to consider such a proposal —Hitler because this was the only way in which he could come to power if he failed to win an outright majority; and the group around the President, Papen and Schleicher, because this offered the only prospect of recruiting popular support for their rule and the best chance, they believed, of taking the wind out of

the Nazi sails. The element all the time; the question Hitler's or Papen's? Whether support on his terms, heels, calculating that the continued frustration would demands. Hitler, on his without capitulating. This of events in the latter half on it is a second pattern crosses became divided on the one side this is represented Papen and Schleicher, a quarrel between Hitler and

Papen dissolved the Reichstag. The new elections for the Reichstag after a brief delay aroused Nazi hopes. The lifting of the S.A. ban was of the month, relations between the Government and the Nazis became strained. Papen wrote in his diary: 'We must at the earliest possible moment form a bourgeois Cabinet.' When on the 9th, he made no pretence of forming a new Cabinet, he told the Reichstag: 'I have no temporary solution and we must make my party the strongest. The Chancellorship will then be a matter of considerable grumbling in the future with Reaction'. Unhappily, the Nazis, tarred with the same brush as the Communists, independence.

When the ban on the S.A. was lifted, the Communist leadership provoked to murder. True, for, in the weeks which followed, violence became everyday in the big German cities.

peated Hindenburg's warning to him on the way to conduct opposition. Hitler's humiliation was complete.

If ever Hitler needed confidence in his own judgment, it was now. A false move could have destroyed his chances of success, and it was easy to make such a move. The policy of legality appeared discredited and bankrupt. Hitler had won such electoral support as no other party had had in Germany since the First World War, he had kept strictly to the letter of the Constitution and knocked on the door of the Chancellery, only to have the door publicly slammed in his face. The way in which his demands had been refused touched Hitler on a raw spot; once again he had been treated as not quite good enough, an uneducated, rough sort of fellow whom one could scarcely make Chancellor. His old hatred and contempt for the bourgeoisie and their respectable politicians flared up. He was angry and resentful, feeling he had walked into a trap and was being laughed at by the superior people who had made a fool of him. In such a mood there was a great temptation to show them he was not bluffing, to give the S.A. their head, and let the smug bourgeois politicians see whether he was just a 'revolutionary of the big mouth', as Goebbels had once called Strasser.

There was strong pressure from the Party in the same direction. The S.A. had always disliked the policy of legality, and had only been constrained to submit to it with difficulty. Now that legality had led to an open set-back and humiliation they were even more restive. The difficulties with which Hitler was confronted are vividly illustrated by the case of the Potempa murderers. The five S.A. members responsible for the murder of the Communist miner, Pietruch, were sentenced to death on 22 August. The S.A. were furious: this was to place the nationally minded Nazis and the anti-national Communists on the same footing. Hitler had therefore to choose between of-

The Months of C
fending public op
icy of legality if
murderers, or ris
the part of the S.
behalf. His answe
murderers: 'My
monstrous and b
to you in limitle:
liberation is a
against a govern
duty.' He followe
which he attacke
foot a persecutio
in Germany.

Although the l
an increasing ra
ond Reichstag el
Hitler came out
Papen's Governn
his tactics of leg
into the risk of
force.

Shortly after
Rauschnig, one
visited Hitler, w
pied. His silence
violent comment:
the next war. Mu
stress upon the p
tions for war—i
peace would be
'The place of ar
will in future be
to break down t
armies begin to
the moral break
has started—the
. . . We shall pr
tainly as we sh

o him on the way to
iliation was complete.

ice in his own judge-
could have destroyed
as easy to make such
appeared discredited
uch electoral support
many since the First
y to the letter of the
door of the Chancel-
blicly slammed in his
mands had been re-
spot; once again he
od enough, an unedu-
m one could scarcely
and contempt for the
ble politicians flared
tful, feeling he had
ng laughed at by the
a fool of him. In such
tation to show them

S.A. their head, and
is see whether he was
'mouth', as Goebbels

rom the Party in the
ways disliked the pol-
en constrained to sub-
at legality had led to
tion they were even
ith which Hitler was
ed by the case of the
A. members responsi-
munist miner, Pietr-
n 22 August. The S.A.
the nationally minded
nmunists on the same
o choose between of-

fending public opinion and travestying his own pol-
icy of legality if he came out on the side of the
murderers, or risking a serious loss of confidence on
the part of the S.A. if he failed to intervene on their
behalf. His answer was to send a telegram to the five
murderers: 'My comrades: in the face of this most
monstrous and bloody sentence I feel myself bound
to you in limitless loyalty. From this moment, your
liberation is a question of our honour. To fight
against a government which could allow this is our
duty.' He followed this with a violent manifesto in
which he attacked Papen for deliberately setting on
foot a persecution of the 'nationally minded' elements
in Germany.

Although the Nazi Press and Nazi speeches show
an increasing radicalism from August up to the sec-
ond Reichstag elections in November, and although
Hitler came out in uncompromising opposition to
Papen's Government, he still refused to depart from
his tactics of legality, or to let himself be provoked
into the risk of attempting a seizure of power by
force.

Shortly after the Potempa incident Hermann
Rauschning, one of the leaders of the Danzig Senate,
visited Hitler, whom he found moody and preoccu-
pied. His silence was interspersed with excited and
violent comments, many of them on the character of
the next war. Much of it was prophetic: he laid great
stress upon the psychological and subversive prepara-
tions for war—if these were carried out with care,
peace would be signed before the war had begun.
'The place of artillery preparation for frontal attack
will in future be taken by revolutionary propaganda,
to break down the enemy psychologically before the
armies begin to function at all. . . . How to achieve
the moral break-down of the enemy before the war
has started—that is the problem that interests me.
. . . We shall provoke a revolution in France as cer-
tainly as we shall not have one in Germany. The

who lived in S.A. messes and barracks, must have cost immense sums.

More serious was the sense of defeatism and demoralization in the Party. At the end of 1932, two and a half years after the first great election campaign, Goebbels wrote in his diary: 'This year has brought us eternal ill-luck. . . . The past was sad, and the future looks dark and gloomy; all chances and hopes have quite disappeared.'

Suddenly, at the turn of the year, Hitler's luck changed, and a chance offered itself. The varied antagonisms which Schleicher had aroused found a common broker in the unexpected figure of Franz von Papen, and on 4 January Papen and Hitler met quietly in the house of a Cologne banker, Kurt von Schröder. The meeting was arranged through Wilhelm Keppler, one of the Nazi 'contact-men' with the world of business and industry.

First, misunderstandings had to be removed. Papen slipped out of the responsibility for Hitler's humiliation by putting all the blame on Schleicher for Hindenburg's refusal to consider Hitler as Chancellor. But what Papen had really come to talk about was the prospect of replacing Schleicher's Government: he suggested the establishment of a Nationalist and Nazi coalition in which he and Hitler would be joint Chancellors. Hitler said he would have to be head of the Government, but Papen's supporters could be ministers if they agreed to go along with such changes as the elimination of the Social Democrats, Communists, and Jews from leading positions in Germany. Schröder reports that 'Papen and Hitler reached agreement in principle so that many of the points which had brought them in conflict could be eliminated and they could find a way to get together.'

Next day, to the embarrassment of both the participants, the meeting was headline news in the Berlin papers, and awkward explanations had to be given.

Papen denied the rected against S

It is certainly Papen Governme was agreed upon lay ahead, and 5 more thoroughly had been made; ground in their d to be revenged other's willingne: ceived the valuat not been given th the President. W help, arrangemen debts. Schröder w ists and bankers letter to Hindenl powers to form a

The Nazis cou trigue against 5 Papen—but it w sion of their decli ler decided to co on winning the 6 When the Nazis tory, so loud was ganda band that, ment, the group 1

The Nazis the: at Lippe by stag of the Communis stake everything of Berlin,' Goeb some hesitation, demonstration, a of armed police, the Bülowplatz a Hitler. Goebbels

l barracks, must have

of defeatism and de-
the end of 1932, two
st great election cam-
diary: 'This year has
. . . The past was sad,
d gloomy; all chances
red.'

he year, Hitler's luck
itself. The varied an-
l aroused found a com-
figure of Franz von
apen and Hitler met
gne banker, Kurt von
ranged through Wil-
'contact-men' with the

ad to be removed.
onsibility for Hitler's
blame on Schleicher
sider Hitler as Chan-
lly come to talk about
Schleicher's Govern-
ishment of a Nation-
he and Hitler would
id he would have to
t Papen's supporters
eed to go along with
of the Social Demo-
om leading positions
at 'Papen and Hitler
so that many of the
in conflict could be
way to get together.'
ent of both the par-
line news in the Ber-
tions had to be given.

Papen denied that the meeting was in any way di-
rected against Schleicher.

It is certainly wrong to suppose that the Hitler-
Papen Government, which was to replace Schleicher,
was agreed upon at Cologne; much hard bargaining
lay ahead, and Schleicher's position had still to be
more thoroughly undermined. But the first contact
had been made; the two men had found common
ground in their dislike of Schleicher and their desire
to be revenged on him, each had sounded out the
other's willingness for a deal. Hitler, moreover, re-
ceived the valuable information that Schleicher had
not been given the power to dissolve the Reichstag by
the President. With Papen's blessing and Schröder's
help, arrangements were now made to pay the Nazis'
debts. Schröder was also one of a group of industrial-
ists and bankers who, in November 1932, sent a joint
letter to Hindenburg urging him to give Hitler the
powers to form a presidential cabinet.

The Nazis could do little to help forward the in-
trigue against Schleicher—that had to be left to
Papen—but it was important to remove the impres-
sion of their declining strength. For this purpose Hit-
ler decided to concentrate all the Party's resources
on winning the elections in the tiny state of Lippe.
When the Nazis were rewarded by an electoral vic-
tory, so loud was the noise made by the Nazi propa-
ganda band that, even against their own better judge-
ment, the group round the President were impressed.

The Nazis then proceeded to follow their success
at Lippe by staging a mass demonstration in front
of the Communist headquarters in Berlin. 'We shall
stake everything on one throw to win back the streets
of Berlin,' Goebbels wrote. The Government, after
some hesitation, banned the Communists' counter-
demonstration, and on 22 January, with a full escort
of armed police, ten thousand S.A. men paraded on
the Bülowplatz and listened to a ranting speech by
Hitler. Goebbels exulted, 'The Communists have suf-

Dec 1932

Reichstag as he was no longer

Papen furiously wrote accusing
Hindenburg by preventing him from
the letter of that same day claimed.
Hindenburg, both of them actions that
Hindenburg's letter, Göring sued him
Hindenburg, and the episode left feathers

Göring's parliamentary prank. Over-
seen, by presidential decree, with

had mastered the intricacies of
for one instant," he bragged
fumbled. As it was, Papen was

reveling in both of them—the
society of 1932. He became a
for dinners and hunting parties.
invited him to hunt that autumn
noticed that the dichotomy in
the blustering and rowdy revo-
lution between the SA's brown shirt
jacket at night."

On June 6, 1932. A real electoral
Hitler lost two million voters,
Reichstag was trimmed accordingly
to see Mussolini, possibly to
Hindenburg; the Bavarian frontier police
mentioned casually at the currency
much cash, as they had been
included former Reichsbank
assured Hitler in a secret letter on
The news of Papen's resignation
when he was actually dining
the Führer's personal delegate
Hindenburg sent for both the
over the next few days. ("Herr
our ideas are!") The politicking
Göring backing Hitler all the way
office of chancellor, and Hin-
as the Nazis did not command
er, who had assured the aged

president that he could split the Nazis, offered Hitler the vice-chancellorship.
Again Hitler refused. The final lineup was that on December 1, 1932, Hin-
denburg appointed Schleicher as chancellor with Papen as vice-chancellor.
This regime would survive only two months. Göring called it the most
wretched that Germany had ever suffered. It was a testing time for the Nazi
rank and file: They were on the threshold of power, and many could not
understand why Hitler and Göring would not accept the half-loaf that Schleicher
had cunningly offered to them. Gregor Strasser, the leader of a rival leftist
faction within the Nazi party, had played an unfortunate and destabilizing
role in those weeks, and neither Hitler nor Göring could forgive him for that:
Strasser would eventually die on the same day as Schleicher, and in the same
way. "A movement like ours," wrote Göring that year, "can pardon many
things, but not disloyalty toward a leader."

Göring in these days was nagged by insomnia, and he found himself
occasionally yearning for more tranquil times. His soul was now torn between
two women—one cozy, warm-blooded, and alive, the other intellectually
vastly her superior, but dead. He spent that Christmas of 1932 with the
former, Emmy Sonnemann, then left to commune with the other, spending
the New Year with Carin's relatives at Rockelstad. The letter that he wrote
to Emmy from the Swedish castle, penned that New Year's Eve by the light
of candles and an oil lamp as he sat before an open fire, betrays a certain
fondness; but there was no trace of the intensity of the devotion he had felt
for Carin:

My darling!

I'm listening to songs on the Swedish radio. . . . What pleasure
the radio set you gave is giving me. I had a concert all the way
from Berlin to the Sassnitz ferry despite the rattling of the train.
I can pick up thirty or forty stations here. Yesterday I was able
to get Stuttgart for a while. . . .

For hours every day I go for long walks by myself in the most
beautiful forest you've ever seen. I'm sleeping eight or ten hours
a day; I just hope I can stay on a bit longer. They all speak so
charmingly of you here, they're all very nice to me.

My dear, I want to thank you from my heart for all your love
and unselfish sacrifice and for everything you've done for me.
Let's hope the New Year is just as kind to us.

A few hours later, the new year, 1933, began: Göring's year of destiny, and
Europe's too. He was obsessed with Gregor Strasser and his treachery. "At
midnight," wrote Goebbels, campaigning with Göring in an important elec-
tion at Lippe on January 13, "Göring came. Strasser is the eternal subject
of our discussions." But then, just when it seemed impossible that anything
productive would emerge from the weeks of grubby intrigue, the Nazis began

D.T.

1932, 1924

ADOLF HITLER

Image and the Man

speeches and pro-
repeated in speech

He played about
"defeating" time. Yet
constantly coming back
and over, "I have
made his own tie, so
my valet."³⁰

on his defeat. "The
mutilated." "I did not have
we never have
and we . . . lack

in all history wasted
in being driven about
Perhaps he felt
he was in some way
destroying it for other

there been any impor-
tance out.

CC

with death. Even in
the close of the tremen-
dous had billed as "The
triumph than to his
did not know, but the
he kept talking to

and death in
he wanted desperately
of Linz. When he
reports that he
hands as he exulted
and filmstrips made of
them die. He also tried
he had the power to
at war, I command
and the youth to their

to be dead. On a
he was a prisoner at
Rudolf Hess and

remarked: "You know, Rudi, it's only the moon I hate. For it is some-
thing dead, and terrible, and inhuman. And human beings are afraid of
it. It is as if in the moon a part of the terror still lives which the
moon once sent down over the earth. . . . I hate it! That pale and
ghostly fellow."⁴³

During the 1920s, Hitler was very much interested in a young
woman named Mimi Reiter—of whom more later. On his third date
with her, he took her to the graveyard where her mother was buried. He
stood staring down at the grave for some time and then muttered some-
thing that Miss Reiter never quite understood: "I'm not like that yet!"
[*Ich bin noch nicht so weit*]. Once, in a restaurant, Miss Reiter ordered
her favorite food, *Wienerschnitzel*. When Hitler looked disgusted, she
asked if she had done something wrong. Hitler replied: "No, go ahead
and have it, but I don't understand why you want it. I didn't think you
wanted to devour a corpse . . . the flesh of dead animals. Cadavers!"
Many years later, Hitler still made fun of people who ate meat. He called
their meat broth "corpse tea," and he told what he considered an amus-
ing story about crayfish: A deceased grandmother had relatives who
threw her body into a brook to lure the crayfish; the crayfish ate her
body, and the relatives then caught and ate the crayfish. On another oc-
casion, while a guest was dining on smoked eel, he remarked that eels
were best fattened when fed with dead cats.⁴⁴

All his life, Hitler showed unusual interest in crayfish, lobsters, and
crabs, partly because *Krebs* (crabs) is the German word for cancer. He
was particularly concerned about dying from cancer, the disease
which had killed his mother. He talked to intimates about his fear, and
was morbidly preoccupied with the disease and its cure. He was also
deathly afraid of water. During a boat ride on the Tegern Lake, for
example, he panicked and "seemed absolutely convinced that the boat
would capsize." Typically, he insisted it was not he but the ladies who
were so badly frightened they ought to return to shore.⁴⁵

Hitler's concern about death was manifested publicly during the
Third Reich. The Nazis were much more effective in staging death
celebrations than they were in feting life. Memorable ceremonies were
staged at the tombs of Prussian kings, at Hindenburg's monument at
Tannenberg, at memorial services for Horst Wessel, and at the annual
November commemoration of the martyrs of the Beer Hall Putsch. The
leitmotif of death sounded impressively at every Party rally.⁴⁶

Major political and military decisions were determined by the
Führer's fear of imminent death and concern over the passage of time.
He expressed his sense of urgency when giving his reasons for running
for president in 1932: "I don't have time to wait. . . . I can't lose a single
year. I've got to get to power shortly to solve the gigantic problems dur-
ing the time remaining for me. I have got to. I have got to." And on
another occasion: "I need ten years of lawmaking. The time is short. I
have not long enough to live. . . ." ⁴⁷

Hitler's decision to go to war in September 1939 was associated

D.T.

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

Only the Chancellor steadfast in fight
Watches o'er Germany by day and by night
Always caring for us.

Silent night! Holy night!
All is calm. All is bright.
Adolf Hitler is Germany's wealth,
Brings us greatness, favor and health.
Oh, give us Germans all power! ⁸⁰

In public speech and private soliloquy, and in ways in which he may not have been aware, Hitler himself spoke the very words of Christ and the scriptures. In talking to his Brown Shirts on 30 January 1936 he echoed the words of Jesus to his disciples as recorded in St. John's Gospel, saying, "I have come to know thee. Who thou art, thou art through me and all I am I am through thee." He reminded one of his disciples that "I have come to Germany not to bring peace but a sword." In a public speech in Graz in 1938 he used the words of Jesus as recorded by Matthew when he announced that Almighty God had created the Nation, "and what the Lord has joined together let not Man set asunder." ⁸¹

He was particularly prone to Biblical quotations when talking to his Hitler Youth. On 5 September 1934 he told them, "You are flesh of our flesh and blood of our blood." In 1932 he advised them either to be "hot or cold, but lukewarm should be damned and spewed from your mouth." ⁸² The phrasing is too close to the New Testament to be coincidental. The Book of Revelation (3:15-16) reads:

I know thy works. Thou art neither cold nor hot; I would thou wert cold or hot. So then because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spew thee out of my mouth.

He was fond of calling for a faith that could move mountains, saying on 31 January 1935, "If you had not had faith, who could have led thee? Faith can remove mountains, can free also nations." And in May of the same year, speaking about faith, he reminded the faithful, "It is the strength which in the end can remove the mountains of resistance!" *

During one of his last suppers with his followers when he invited them to partake of their Leader's body by eating blood sausage made from his own blood, was he not saying, "Take, eat: this is my body which is broken for you . . ."?

* He apparently had never learned the second part of the quotation from Paul's letter to the Christians at Corinth: "And though I have the gift of prophecy and understand all mysteries and all knowledge; and though I have all faith to remove mountains, and have not love, I am nothing" (1 Corinthians 13:2).

The Image and the Man

A MAN OF CONTRASTS

Hitler was a person of contrast spoke in disjunctives. Anybody acquitted or beheaded; "the only death, victory or destruction, conquering heroes or sacrificial he predicted, could end "either annihilation and victory of the mer or an anvil." A person either A leader could be either brutal as a woman. There was absolute

The urbane and perceptive Poncet was fascinated by the often: "The same man, good-n the beauties of nature, who, at opinions on European politics, the most savage exaltation and the n

Creation and Destruction

The constant battle within destruction and creativity was during a conversation prior to the League of Nations representative interview in an effort to achieve problem. At one moment Hitler against table and walls, and so "If the slightest incident occurs) so that not a trace of Poland w lightning with the full power of denly stopped, turned to look pe Alps, and observed quietly, "Ho have worked hard enough. No would I stay here and work as Years later, in the midst of war, remains is only the values besto music, and architecture—are th for future humanity?" ⁸¹

Albert Speer has described tion and creation, observing in Hitler's architecture "not only t believe at least one pregnant clu not his avocation; it was his obs that Hitler was not destroying t

Not even the triumphant smashing of Poland could quiet his fears. In a speech of 23 November 1939, thoughts of victory were again shrouded in concern about failure and capitulation. As his propaganda machine was thundering out proclamations of triumph, Joseph Goebbels was recording wistfully in his diary, "It is touching to hear the Führer express his wish that he may be privileged to live to see the day of victory."¹³⁰

Thus we deal with a man who was so deeply divided that he often appeared torn between opposing qualities: omnipotent and vulnerable, sophisticated and savage, creative and destructive, pragmatic and fanatical, brave and cowardly, lethargic and industrious, rigid and malleable, pathetic and masterful, cruel and kind.

In our attempt to understand Hitler, we shall return to the problem of his dualities.

HITLER AND WOMEN

Women of all ages were attracted to Adolf Hitler. Motherly types such as Frau Bruckmann, wife of the publisher, and Frau Bechstein, widow of the piano manufacturer, and another woman in her 60s, a retired schoolteacher named Carola Hoffmann, would feed him his favorite tortes, cluck approval, stroke his head, and call him "My little wolf" as he sat at their knee. Once, when Hitler found himself alone with Hélène Hanfstaengl, he ran to her, hid his head in her lap and murmured, "If only I had someone to take care of me!" When Hitler made an important speech in Düsseldorf in January 1932, the wives of industrialists paid a cloakroom attendant a mark each for the privilege of holding the bouquet that had been presented to him upon entering the hall—they were thrilled by the thought that they could actually smell the same flowers the Führer had sniffed.

The magnetism he exerted on women was also observable in his youth. As he walked the streets of Vienna in 1908, women stopped to look at him. One evening at the opera, as he and his friend took their places in the promenade, a liveried attendant handed Adolf a note. He was not at all surprised and simply said, "Another one." Years later, when he was chancellor, an American coed found him "quietly charming, tender in speech and glance, modest with this strange tenderness and appealing helplessness." And the Princess Olga, on a state visit to Berlin, reported that Hitler "has a remarkable charm despite all the reports of his ruthlessness. . . . He gives the impression of being softhearted, particularly when children are mentioned . . . tears would come to his eyes."¹⁴⁰

Hitler was aware of his capacity to attract women and enjoyed doing so. He was particularly anxious to convince women that he was a

man of overpowering virility. Or woman, Pauline Kohler, to the recalled that during the course losing interest, her host sough stretching out his hand in the and roared, "I can hold my arm feel tired when my storm troop I stand at this salute. I never unbending. But Göring can't stan an hour of this salute. He's flabb keep my arm stretched out in t as Göring. That means I'm fou amazing feat. I marvel at my ow

Hitler's dualities are partic women. He revered and idealiz contempt and sought to degrad notice, Hitler showed his ambi abstract forces that controlled hi tradictory female images who w also capriciously cruel and trea rounded by unpredictable supern the Goddess of Fate, Lady Care. opening sentence of *Mein Kampf* Braunau because a kindly Fate d his birth. But it was "an unmer: "born in a period of peace bet "inexorable hand of the Goddess nations. Here Hitler reveals his by changing the neuter German *die Göttin*. In a letter of 1914 h point in order to feminize a no "Friend Care and Want," he choo he had *keine andere Freundin als*

And in a speech of 13 Aug nich, he speaks of "the greatest : the most: the goddess called Mis in a May Day speech in Berlin in his mind:

In spite of all Party dogmas Misery will come and beat or and more the pain of want. is not satisfied.

And again—we are back to his n clasped me in *her* arms." When I my foster mother." To Hitler, mi

GOD: ADOLF HITLER

The Child As Father to the Man

ary where he stayed thirty

total collapse. Over and over that he would never look at her, that he must kill himself. He locked the door to her room. Frau Winter, the motherly nurse, was anything in the room but a nurse there. He commissioned a variety of photographs. A portrait or a bust of Geli in the room was an unwritten rule. And when Hitler himself died. Years later, during the defense attorney that Geli's defense attorney that Geli's Hitler that it had changed his

er Hitler's extraordinarily in his mother's death, no other so hard. One of Hitler's assistants for many years after the war in the room where she died. death room in Munich just at that time watching over the that the loss of Geli was so that he suffered anew the death

to the Schwabing photography studio who had joined the Party in 1931 as a result of the monopoly he had in the movement. Hitler struck an employee, Eva Braun, who el. Thus began Hitler's most

colate-box type of prettiness" which occupied her daily life at the right age: at 18 she was exactly the color he always liked, "porcelain blue"—exactly

va. Her employer considered the consequential . . . flattered and and compliments which this

rising power in the land was paying her." One of Hitler's physicians thought her "cheap, arrogant and selfish," but always compliant and sweet in Hitler's presence.²⁶⁰

Hitler showed only intermittent interest in Eva until she tried to commit suicide. On 11 August 1932 she shot herself over the heart, as Geli Raubal had almost a year earlier. Hitler at first suspected that she was faking the act to gain his attention, but when the surgeon, a Doctor Plate, assured him that she had come, quite literally, within an inch of her life, Hitler was favorably impressed; he began to see a good deal of her.

Their relationship was not so placid as has sometimes been pictured. Eva attempted suicide once more in May 1935, this time with 20 tablets of Vanodorm. She was saved at the last minute by her sister Ilse, a medical technician.²⁶⁷ After this second effort, Hitler took her seriously. He set her up in a house near his own apartment and, after the 1936 remodeling of his Berghof, provided her with rooms connecting directly with his own.

To Hitler she seemed to be a living doll, the embodiment of the ideal woman he had often described: cute, cuddly, naïve, tender, sweet, and stupid. He found her a relaxing and pleasantly undemanding companion on picnics and at motion picture shows. Totally ignorant of politics, she listened avidly to Hitler's ideas and agreed with them all. He saw to it that she was kept out of sight and excluded from all public functions, but at the Berghof she played a larger role. There, Albert Speer told an interviewer, "Hitler kept his Eva like a puppet in a doll's house. She was a part of the ambience, like the canary cage, the rubber tree . . . and the kitschy wooden clocks."²⁶⁸

Over the years Hitler really became very fond of Eva and took to addressing her, both in private letters and within the intimate circle at the Berghof, with tender Austrian diminutives. But he chose rather curious words to express his affection—*Tschapperl*, *Hascherl*, and *Patscherl*. The terms are asexual and neuter-gendered, as well as quite untranslatable. But to the Austrian or south German ear, their meaning and flavor seems inappropriate for adult lovers. The words have a condescending tone, with a slight echo of derogation. They express intimacy and endearment, but in the way a mother would talk to her baby. *Patscherl*, for example, is derived from the Austrian equivalent of the baby game "Pat-a-cake, pat-a-cake, baker's man. . . ."

Why did the adult Hitler consider these terms an appropriate way to express affection to a woman? Was it because they stirred memories in his unconscious of the first words his beloved mother had murmured to him as an infant? A remark made by one of his secretaries gives some support for that suggestion. In an interview after the war, she remembered vividly how often Hitler called Eva Braun by that diminutive in urging her to eat food—much as Adolf's mother had forced food upon her sickly little boy: "He patted her hand, calling her 'my Patscherl.' . . . He always urged her to eat this or that, saying, 'Now,

D: ADOLF HITLER

generalization about
th a grain of salt and
y was remarkably in
reputable social psy-

g forth the behavior
rately described the
ration for the strong
total and unquestion-
ively; glorification of
impotent, immoral,
with massive will-
hips "in the image of
ness, toughness, and
of masculinity and
site personality tend-
-ortant to them; they
project, that is, ex-
"a striving for com-
-tion of others, espe-
-develop, for there is
y as a target for

ned psychologists in-
om all walks of life,
es. The investigators
cularly among Nazi
tics. All of them are
the German POW's
-nce and impotence,
-will and fears that
-inexorable destiny."
-need for power and
-experienced as weak,
-the picture is one of
-ubmissive/dominant

studied the "German
-on: the people inter-
-emes—total victory
-archy. They did not
-scape from responsi-
-verb which suggests
-al hat/Hat die Qual
-e tendencies as com-
-arked among those
-and poisoning; they

The Past As Prologue: Hitler and History

tended to be obstinate and found it very difficult to depart from a set path once it was taken; they preferred the irrational and the abstract to the rational; they felt themselves to be unusually gifted and unique and had a belief in magic, myth, and destiny. They were particularly taken by the secret meanings of words. Finally, they thought in disjunctives, saying, for example, that the only alternative to total obedience was high treason.²⁰⁸ It is not surprising that Adolf Hitler was able to appeal so successfully to such people. He was indeed, as he said, "one of them."

Apart from psychological affinity, Hitler was also successful because of his uncanny ability to attract political opposites and, in so doing, to offer history an intriguing paradox: his movement was both conservative and revolutionary; he promised both preservation and radical change. Thus he won favor both with conservatives who believed he would strengthen old traditions and with radicals who were convinced they were participating in a sweeping revolution. Further, he promised to defeat the enemies of both and, at the same time, to reconcile all antagonisms in one patriotic, united *Volksgemeinschaft*. As a political tactician, Adolf Hitler should not be underestimated.

FATHERS AND CHILDREN: THE NAZI YOUTH COHORT

Members of Hitler's own generation, born in the 1890s, gave him broad support whether they were shopkeepers or journalists, soldiers or peasants, priests or professors. But those who turned to him with particular fervor were the sons and daughters of this generation—those, born during and shortly after the Great War, who would become the radical youth of 1930–1933. These young people were of the utmost importance to Hitler, and he responded to their needs so effectively that one historian of the Weimar youth movement concluded, "National Socialism came to power as the party of youth." Statistics bear him out: of all Germans in the 18–30 age group who were members of political parties, over 42 percent had joined the Nazis by 1932, compared with less than 20 percent in the Social Democratic Party. In Hamburg, 66 percent of the Party members were younger than 30; in Halle the percentage was 86 percent. In the Reichstag, 60 percent of the National Socialists were under 40; among the Social Democrats only 10 percent were of that age group.

It was symptomatic of a rising trend that even before Hitler achieved sweeping success at the polls, the official German Students' Association (*Bund Deutscher Studenten*) in 1931 elected a fanatic Nazi as its president. Hitler's drawing power for youth was remarkable. One Sunday in 1932 more than 100,000 young people came to hear him speak in Berlin and marched past him for seven-and-a-half hours.²⁰⁹

The sheer numbers of youth were impressive. So was their aggressiveness. As one writer concluded, "It was evidently the good luck of the Nazi movement to become the chief beneficiary of an enormous, destructive tidal wave in the ebb and flow of the generations."²¹⁰ Why

wave of the 1929 earthquake that began on Wall Street. Few men would have been equal to the task. Brüning was cool and judicious, unemotional and rational, eliciting neither popular support nor enthusiasm. To stem the economic downturn, he took all the right emergency steps, but the medicine tasted too bitter. To deflate the heated economy, he reduced wages and pensions, infuriating the workers and the fixed-income, lower-middle-class pensioners. Price control angered the farmers. Controls over banking upset the financial people. He wanted to break up the subsidized and debt-ridden Junker land holdings into smaller, individually farmed parcels, and angered the landed gentry who were part of von Hindenburg's own set. Brüning could not last, and he did not last.

For the 1932 presidential election Hitler, who had finally become a German citizen, on February 25, decided to challenge von Hindenburg for the presidency: the Austrian corporal against the Prussian field marshal.* Von Hindenburg was narrowly re-elected on March 13. The slim margin was a shock. Worse, Hitler was supported by many of the same right-wingers who had originally installed von Hindenburg. The marshal could not have won without cooperation between the liberals and the hated Communists. What uncomfortable allies these were for von Hindenburg! Nevertheless, Brüning, ever the unemotional intellectual, was pleased. He had preserved his patron. The Nazis won majorities in the next regional elections, and the president would no longer support Brüning. On May 30, 1932, Brüning resigned.

The great French statesman and wit André François-Poncet, who was then the French ambassador in Berlin, wrote:

Brüning's errors were typically German. He did not realize that the praise he got abroad rendered him suspect at home. He never realized to what pitch of blind fanaticism nationalist passion might rise, a frenzy too fierce to be assuaged by any victories he might have won. He tried the velvet glove. The Germans preferred the mailed fist. He was repelled by the drastic and brutal methods which would have saved him. He had two excellent opportunities to smash the Nazis: they were twice discovered planning treason and insurrection. Arms were found and plans for a coup d'état. Everything could be proved. But Brüning would not smash his opponents.²⁷

General Wilhelm Gröner, the minister of war, had no such scruples. He persuaded the president to let him ban the SA, the Storm

*The province of Brunswick appointed Hitler state counsellor, thereby granting him citizenship.

1932

Troopers, and he did so on April 13. His troops also raided their barracks. But Gröner found no support from his own colleagues, and von Hindenburg soon reversed himself. On June 14 the Storm Troopers were back on the streets in all their brown-uniformed strength. While Brüning had tried to govern Germany, the right-wingers had consolidated. On a raw autumn day in October 1931, in the old Harz Mountain spa of Bad Harzburg, a fierce assembly of nationalists came together for the first time. Leading the factions were Hitler and his SA. Then came the nationalist Stahlhelm (Steel Helmet) group and their chief, the fat Alfred Hugenberg. There was also flotsam: the Pan-German League with their boss, Heinrich Class, a lawyer, and the right-wing General Count Kolmar von der Goltz with the obscure Vaterländischer Bund patriotic party.

But there were also individuals of great prestige: the banker Hjalmar Schacht, the steel industrialist Ernst Poensgen, white-mustached General Hans von Seeckt, the founder of the Reichswehr, and a group of Nazi-prone royals: the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, Prince William of Lippe, and Prince Eitel Friedrich, a son of the Kaiser. This was the first time that men of such seeming substance had endorsed Adolf Hitler's plans for Germany by their presence.

The months between this Congress of Harzburg in 1931 and Brüning's resignation in 1932 had set the stage: Adolf Hitler's coming was now imminent. The end of democracy was at hand. In his Nürnberg memoirs von Ribbentrop wrote, "To my foreign friends I said: give Brüning a chance and he may succeed. Scuttle him and we will be Nazi or Communist."

Like millions of their countrymen, the von Ribbentrops were about to face drastic changes. Their pre-Hitler days were over.

mans, he knew a good
th the Austro-Bavarian
plastic solutions everyone
and lower middle class
munism, which seemed
in Moscow. Among the
ed the chills people feel
e appealed to the hidden
fences.

for Berchtesgaden with
former lance corporal he
more eager than most to
ing there to speak for a

the mountains to a chalet
ought with the help of his
merly a vacation villa in
with stunning views of
oon to become the center
ich can be seen in many

was to convince Hitler to
teller. This would block
Papen would have formed
ed von Hindenburg and
in close at hand.

one knows exactly what
seemingly assured as von
adian entrepreneurship,
hy Berlin internationalist,
care of his own fate and
convicted" by Hitler.

turn. Von Ribbentrop was
of a ideal with von Papen.
use "one can trust a Ger-
e threatening von Papen
the general? Any doubts
a classic Hitlerian tech-
and the energy to explain
his dreams, his argu-
of words. These "lec-
med, instinctively, at the

von von Ribbentrop
craft

vulnerable core of the audience, which might range in size from ten thousand to the one person sitting in front of him. No matter how often people have tried to describe their personal impressions of Hitler, they invariably speak of his powers to convince through this combination of seeming logic and brute force.

Von Ribbentrop had never dealt with anyone who so touched the best and the worst in him. Hitler must have reached the hidden fantasies, both brutal and vainglorious, that Joachim von Ribbentrop had harbored but was too embarrassed, too "mannerly," and too conservative to express. After two hours of Adolf Hitler's verbal pounding, he was convinced, converted, and devoted.

Hitler finally said he might be willing to join a coalition and become vice chancellor.

When von Ribbentrop brought this answer back to von Papen, the chancellor rushed to sell President von Hindenburg on the idea. He failed abysmally. The old man snorted, "That Bohemian corporal?" and refused even to consider it. Von Papen's cabinet soon fell, and on December 3, 1932, von Schleicher became chancellor. Despite von Ribbentrop's failure in Berchtesgaden, Hitler had convinced him he was the right man for the future of Germany.³

Von Ribbentrop, "drunk" with Hitler's ideas, donated six thousand marks to the NSDAP, which he had joined in May at the urging of his old regimental comrade Count von Helldorf.⁴ The handsome von Helldorf was a crook, one of several black-sheep aristocrats who had become part of the Nazi coterie following his service in the 12th Torgau Hussars, where he was one of the regiment's youngest officers. After the Armistice, like many other unemployed ex-officers, he joined one of the roving Freikorps, the semimilitary groups that attached themselves to right-wing political parties. Naturally, he took part in the Kapp putsch. When that failed, he joined the Storm Troopers, where he quickly reached high rank. The proletarian SA and its brawling captain, Ernst Röhm, always tried to recruit ex-officers and aristocrats, which helped to mask their reputation as thugs. After the Nazi takeover, von Helldorf blackmailed several Jews and then gambled away the money on horses at the Jockey Club in Berlin.⁵ Göring, who appreciated scoundrels, helped von Helldorf to become chief of the Berlin police in 1935. It is even possible that von Helldorf, at Göring's instructions, took part in the planning of the infamous 1933 Reichstag fire.⁶ In May of 1932 he was delighted to help the new Hitler convert, von Ribbentrop, become a party member. It was von Ribbentrop's first public commitment to the Nazi movement.

To von Ribbentrop's disappointment, his new hero, Hitler, now ignored him, despite their lengthy meeting in Berchtesgaden. After all, Joachim and Annelies von Ribbentrop were people to be reckoned with in better Berlin circles, and his having joined the Nazi Party constituted something of an endorsement. Nevertheless, there was nothing but silence from the man in Bavaria!

Annelies, who was pregnant, hated von Helldorf — he had often borrowed money from them — and she wished that they had better contacts with the party.⁷ The breakthrough came after a small stag dinner, a *Herrendiner* at the home of Prince Wied, where von Helldorf introduced von Ribbentrop to Count Vico von Bülow-Schwante, another titled reprobate and Hitler satellite.*

One day Hitler complained to von Bülow-Schwante that he wanted to read the London and Paris papers. If only someone could translate! Von Bülow-Schwante, probably with the hope of receiving the grateful thanks of the rich von Ribbentrops, suggested to Hitler that the right man was von Ribbentrop. Not only did Joachim speak foreign languages, but the von Ribbentrops were a wealthy, worldly couple with many connections abroad. They were part of Berlin's upper crust, to which they could introduce the party and its Führer. Even more important, they could make the Führer known to influential Londoners and Parisians. He showed Hitler some of the circular letters about the new Germany that von Ribbentrop had been distributing to his friends and acquaintances abroad. Hitler was impressed. In 1946, at the War Crimes Trials in Nürnberg, von Bülow-Schwante claimed that he introduced von Ribbentrop to Hitler at a Prince Wied dinner in 1930, two years earlier. He is said to have complained, "I introduced Joachim to the Führer, and now he's foreign minister, and I'm out of a job!"⁸ However, the 1932 date in Berchtesgaden seems more likely.

Von Bülow-Schwante's idea worked. Hitler finally showed some interest in von Ribbentrop. He accepted several of his invitations to small dinners *en famille* in Dahlem. While Joachim held forth on the ways of influential London and Paris, Annelies gently coached the gauche Austrian in the art of table manners. She usually avoided having other guests because Hitler "was not someone you could invite anyone with."⁹ For Hitler, it was a glimpse into a new world. He

* Von Bülow-Schwante was dismissed from the Foreign Ministry for being caught in *flagrante delicto* in a train compartment with a well-known lady. Prince Wied was head of a small principality and eager to gain influence. His family once held the Albanian crown for less than a year. He was one of Hitler's aristocrat followers.

relished the well-run household, trained servants and *kultivierte* atmosphere of von Ribbentrops' world.

Occasionally, Anne met Hitler: the von Bülow-Schwante, Colonel Richard Ribbentrop's composites. The Hen probably feared that turn the evening into couples they asked where she was a school friend. Dörnberg, known as to many royals, including name to Mountbatten. Ribbentrops for years in London.

Whenever he visited, he deserved better from old Nazi cronies. Beside Rollenhagen, the Fort arrangements Hitler had.

What Hitler "made" Some men never found an ambassador to the Reich. "Many Germans, with the radiance of his eyes, he never gave me any for his own people. I risen to what he was German people."¹¹

Others were completely secure, intelligent people. His closest associates. Some others, like Schindler and used him openly plain frightened. The Führer:

A pale face, globular, a gambler. At other times, a vision and violence. In

hero, Hitler, now
Berchtesgaden. After all,
people to be reckoned
with the Nazi Party
nevertheless, there was

He had often
that they had better
after a small stag
where von Helldorf
Bülow-Schwante, an-

von Schwante that he
only someone could
the hope of receiving
suggested to Hitler
did Joachim speak
a wealthy, worldly
were part of Berlin's
party and its Führer.
er known to influen-
some of the circular
rop had been distrib-
Hitler was impressed.
von Bülow-Schwante
Hitler at a Prince Wied
have complained, "I
foreign minister, and
Berchtesgaden seems

finally showed some
of his invitations to
him held forth on the
gently coached the
She usually avoided
one you could invite
to a new world. He

Ministry for being caught
known lady. Prince Wied
ce. His family once held
er's aristocrat followers.

relished the well-run household, the tasteful furnishings, the carefully trained servants and beautiful grounds. He was delighted with the *kultivierte* atmosphere. He agreed with von Bülow-Schwante that the von Ribbentrops would be important to the future of the movement.

Occasionally, Annelies did invite a few carefully selected guests to meet Hitler: the von Bülow-Schwantes came, as did Joachim's father, Colonel Richard Ribbentrop, who was not impressed with Hitler's pomposities. The Henkells were never invited.⁹ Joachim and Annelies probably feared that the imperious monocled Käthe Henkell would turn the evening into a shambles. One of the few genuine society couples they asked were Count and Countess Alexander Dörnberg. She was a school friend of Annelies's, and red-haired Alexander von Dörnberg, known as *der lange Sandro* or the Red Tower, was related to many royals, including the Battenbergs, who later changed the name to Mountbatten. The von Dörnbergs stayed close to the von Ribbentrops for years and became part of the embassy staff in London.

Whenever he visited Lentzeallee 7-9, Hitler probably felt that he deserved better from life than the crude, beer-brawling world of his old Nazi cronies. Besides, Annelies spoiled him with special fruit from Rollenhagen, the Fortnum & Mason of Berlin, and the kind of flower arrangements Hitler loved.¹⁰

What Hitler "magic" had bewitched Joachim von Ribbentrop? Some men never found it, among them Sir Nevile Henderson, Britain's ambassador to the Reich during the fateful late thirties. He wrote: "Many Germans, women in particular, used to descend to me upon the radiance of his expression and his remarkable eyes. I must confess he never gave me any impression of greatness. He was a spellbinder for his own people. To the last, I continued to ask myself how he had risen to what he was and how he maintained his ascendancy over the German people."¹¹

Others were completely enthralled, but in truth there was hardly a secure, intelligent person who fell completely under Adolf Hitler's spell. His closest associates, almost without exception, seemed flawed. Some others, like Schacht, the banker, stayed rational in his presence and used him opportunistically. Still others were less charmed than plain frightened. This is how André François-Poncet described the Führer:

A pale face, globular eyes, the faraway look of a medium or a somnambulist. At other times, animated, colorful, swept away with passion and violence. Impatient of control, bold, cynical, energetic. Some-

times a 'Storm and Assault' face, the face of lunatic! At other times naive, rustic, dull, vulgar, easily amused, a thigh-slapper, a face like a thousand other faces.

Sometimes he was all three in one conversation. He ranted on for ten minutes, a half hour, three quarters of an hour. Then he was exhausted. At that time one could speak, and he would even smile. He was no normal human being, a morbid, quasi-mad Dostoyevsky figure, a man possessed. He was an Austrian with a passionate love for Germany, wildly romantic, full of half-baked theories of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Nietzsche, Spengler. He wanted a new Germany to replace the Holy Roman Empire, a purified race, an elite. He lived Wagner!

A dreamer but a cold-blooded realist and schemer. He was *lazy* and hated regular work. He wanted oral information, not written reports. He allowed great freedom but knew every move his collaborators made. He willed or tolerated every excess, all crimes. He used intuition for the sudden power of decision. He was tied to the masses and had contempt for them. He lulled opponents by signing treaties while planning to wriggle out of them.¹²

François-Poncet believed Hitler eventually failed because of "pride, swollen out of proportion by success and flattery. His success, since the beginning convinced him that Providence protected him. He was antireligious but the elect of the Almighty. The stars had told him that he would have success and then suffer disaster. He counted on only ten years."

This was the man Joachim von Ribbentrop had first met in Berchtesgaden. Now, he thought, he and Annelies had "tamed" him. They were not the last people who mistakenly thought they had secured Adolf Hitler's admiration, his thanks, and good will. At the end, of all the dozens of these men who were closest to their Führer, only Goebbels would be there in the bunker under the Chancellery to share his fate. The others all made the error of thinking that Adolf Hitler cared for them, and they learned at last that he cared for no one, not even the German people. He wanted to consign them all to death for not choosing to follow him to a fiery, Wagnerian end. His last orders were to destroy everything and to flood the Berlin subways, where tens of thousands had taken shelter.

After Brüning's resignation in May 1932, it is unlikely that von Ribbentrop saw more than the surface ripples on the ocean of intrigue, politics, and short-lived alliances of the second half of the year. The choice of Franz von Papen, with his conservative views, his promise to control the Nazis and Communists, and his assurance that he

would deal with the protected the status of anti-Catholic confidence. The estimated once more. He negotiated with French reparations unending protests unnecessary, because 1932 elections. Von Hindenburg reluctantly signed, framed the words of the old *den*" (I once had:

His successor, Since 1920, when expert, he had died. After the Nazis lost of Hitler's more recent attempt to split of the labor union did not last. Hitler unions defected from republics, the Weicellors) who deplored for "no occasion. Early in 1933 yate life. Once morally, Adolf Hitler when Hitler was a people without ual freedom. They they probably go

During those without knowing commodities to relationship with von their villa all he uary 1933.

The sequence of by a speech give

order to await the outcome of the election." The previous November, after the election, Hitler now saw the situation as grotesque. "Twenty million Germans was to

win the voters of tiny Lippe, presented this election as a 19.5 percent of the vote after they trumpeted their "fantastic meeting of his party's leaders himself of his critics, including for his "treachery" with von

more confident Hitler to return von Papen, Hitler, Röhm, and convinced that there was no way to value of his victory in tiny enthusiasm. Von Papen would be could load the cabinet with her. The next meeting was scheduled on Papen invited specifically to see his son, Colonel Oskar von Papen, Otto Meissner. François-Poncet von Hindenburg's son was of his father's nobility." Meissner encased in his clothes, who

von Ribbentrop car, and an hour before Frick, Göring, and Oskar an early Hitler supporter, was a

under had begun the evening at the dark, and took a taxi to Dahlem, through the garden. When they paid no attention to Meissner but in the smoking room, where they spent hours. After they emerged, long and convinced. In a taxi back to had to be taken seriously as future

What was said during those two hours? Hitler obviously had made promises and used persuasion and charm, but it is also possible that there was a much harder edge. On two matters the von Hindenburg family was vulnerable: the tax status of their magnificent estate, Neudeck, in East Prussia, and the Osthilfe scandal. The von Hindenburgs were an old Prussian family, but they owned no land. To tie the old marshal to his fellow Junkers, a group of landowning aristocrats had persuaded some industrialists to underwrite the purchase of the vast Neudeck estate in West Prussia, which was presented to Paul von Hindenburg in 1927, on his eightieth birthday, "by a grateful nation." However, the estate was registered in the name of Oskar von Hindenburg, his son, in order to cheat the government out of eventual death taxes. The fact was of course not widely publicized.

The other matter, Osthilfe (Eastern Help), was potentially a much greater scandal. In 1930, Germany's heavy industry had approved subsidies to the agricultural east of Germany. The ostensible purpose was to strengthen this area as a consumer market. Billions of marks flowed into what soon turned into a bottomless pit. Much of the money went into the coffers of the richest landowners in Germany, who bought luxury cars, yachts, and horses, and gambled away fortunes in Monte Carlo. The figures speak for themselves: in 1932, 12,000 small farms received a total of sixty-nine million marks, and 722 large landowners received a total of sixty million marks. Hermine, the wife of the former Kaiser, one of the richest landowners, claimed and got Osthilfe while she was living in faraway Berchtesgaden. Von Oldenburg-Januschau, the man who had arranged the gift of the Neudeck estate to the von Hindenburgs, collected 621,000 marks, with which he added a fourth estate to the three he already owned.¹⁷ Heavy industry finally canceled Osthilfe and put the money into exports.

No matter what he mentioned in those two hours, Hitler must also have made some promises: Oskar von Hindenburg was promoted from colonel to general shortly after Hitler came to power, and thousands of acres were added to the Neudeck estate.

The day after this meeting brought more twists and turns in alliances and proposals. Von Schleicher realized his ruling days were over. He had received a flat no from von Hindenburg when he asked for emergency powers, and he knew that he was being undermined by von Papen and by his own chief, the old marshal. Von Hindenburg had no further trust in a Prussian general who wanted to reach out across all strata of German society even to the Socialists and who had

failed to favor his Junker brethren in the Osthilfe scandal. Suddenly von Schleicher saw everything clearly: General Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, the President and symbol of upright manliness, his idol, was faithless and disloyal. And this was not the first time. He had scuttled Brüning and von Papen, and now he was scuttling von Schleicher. Outraged, von Schleicher accused the old man to his face of disloyalty. Von Hindenburg made only a mild response: "My dear young friend, soon I shall be up there, looking down. Then I'll see whether I was right or wrong."¹⁸

His Nazi associates as well as von Papen tried to convince the insecure Hitler to accept a government of National Unity, a coalition cabinet incorporating Nazis and more moderate Nationalist Conservatives. Meanwhile, von Papen explored his own options, which included the possibility of an alliance with von Schleicher. Or could he form a cabinet with Alfred Hugenberg, the Nationalist Conservative Hitler hated? Hugenberg and his nationalist movement were not to be denied. They insisted on a place in the cabinet. Von Schleicher thought he might return to the cabinet as Reichswehr minister, but von Hindenburg had already selected a new man: General von Blomberg, a rival of von Schleicher's.

Von Schleicher called together the senior generals and convinced them to arrest von Hindenburg before the old man handed over absolute power to Hitler. On the afternoon of January 29 they sent out Werner von Alvensleben, one of the same von Alvenslebens who had once lured young von Ribbentrop to Canada, to issue a stern warning to Hitler that the Army was ready to launch a putsch from its lair in Potsdam to "clean out the whole mess in government." They wanted to scare Hitler into withdrawing, but they had miscalculated. Von Alvensleben found Hitler's group having afternoon coffee and cake at Joseph Goebbels's apartment on Reichskanzlerplatz (later Adolf Hitler Platz, now Theodor Heuss Platz). The alarmed Hitler ordered von Helldorf, now the head of the Berlin Storm Troops, to mobilize his thugs from every *Kneipe* (pub) and beerhall. Hitler warned Meissner, and an immediate date was set for the swearing-in of the coalition government Hitler had wanted to avoid. Hitler and two Nazis would join the cabinet. The others would be conservatives.¹⁹ The talk of a putsch also reached the President, and the wavering von Hindenburg finally made up his mind to accept Hitler.

The time for the swearing-in was fixed at 11 A.M. on January 30. Rumors of a military revolt multiplied: the presidential Reichswehr guards were alerted; escape plans were made; a plane was ordered to

stand by. Oskar v
to intercept the n
arriving from the
was told to avoid l
strasse lest he be a
dential Palace. Hi
Kaiserhof Hotel a
Hitler was driver
wanted to make a
for the time to be
haggled until Mei
kept the old Pres
A.M. they walked
tion hall.²⁰ Von H
brief. Hitler's anxio
serhof and search
cellery, he looked
tears in his eyes. F
The group of e
Heil Hitler!"
Only a half ho
wintry garden at
ceremony. She tur
voice said, "Oh, n
That night, the
Brandenburg Gate
Papen had rented
square in front of
there to view the
arches and in fro
indeed take place
underneath the v
ny's dashing blon
his balcony, flank
the chill. They w
crowd, and wavi
something to chee
cigarettes from a
sympathizer, and
and distracting th
The world ha

scandal. Suddenly Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, with his knightly manliness, his white hair, was not the first time. He was scuttling from the old man to his face with a response: "My dear Hindenburg: Then I'll see

convince the insecure army, a coalition cabinet of Nationalist Conservatives, which included the old man. Or could he form a Conservative Hitler cabinet? He was not to be deceived. Schleicher thought he was minister, but von Hindenburg, von Blomberg, a

generals and convinced old man handed over on January 29 they sent von Alvensleben's who came to issue a stern warning to launch a putsch from its government." They had miscalculated. Afternoon coffee and beer at the Chancellery (later Chancelleryplatz). The alarmed Hitler sent the Storm Troops, to the beerhall. Hitler set for the swearing-in to avoid. Hitler and his would be conservative president, and the wavering to accept Hitler.

At 11 A.M. on January 30. The presidential Reichswehr plane was ordered to

stand by. Oskar von Hindenburg himself went to the railroad station to intercept the new Reichswehr minister, von Blomberg, who was arriving from the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Von Blomberg was told to avoid his new offices at Army headquarters in the Bendlerstrasse lest he be arrested. Instead, von Blomberg walked to the Presidential Palace. Hitler, Göring, Goebbels, Ernst, and Röhm were at the Kaiserhof Hotel across the street from the Chancellery. Superstitious Hitler was driven the few yards in his large black Mercedes. He wanted to make an impressive entrance. Waiting in Meissner's office for the time to be sworn in, the other candidates for office argued and haggled until Meissner told them it was time. In fact, they had already kept the old President waiting fifteen minutes. Shortly after 11:15 A.M. they walked through a dusting of snow to the presidential reception hall.²⁰ Von Hindenburg was in a foul mood, so the ceremony was brief.

Hitler's anxious group peered through field glasses from the Kaiserhof and searched for Hitler's face. When he came out of the Chancellery, he looked somber. A few minutes later he was among them, tears in his eyes. He was chancellor!

The group of enthusiastic Nazis in front of the hotel yelled, "*Heil! Heil Hitler!*"

Only a half hour earlier, von Papen's wife had looked across her wintry garden at the line of men following one another toward the ceremony. She turned to young Alexander Stahlberg and in a shaking voice said, "Oh, my God! Oh, my God, I am afraid!"

That night, there was to be a huge torchlight parade through the Brandenburg Gate to celebrate the appointment of Adolf Hitler. Von Papen had rented a balcony suite at the Hotel Adlon, overlooking the square in front of the Brandenburg Gate. His family and friends were there to view the Storm Troopers parade through the gate's immense arches and in front of "jubilant crowds." The torchlight parade did indeed take place, but the crowd was slim and apathetic. The suite underneath the von Papen suite was rented by Hans Albers, Germany's dashing blond film hero, who appeared in full evening dress on his balcony, flanked by two beautiful girls in low-cut gowns despite the chill. They were all drinking champagne, toasting the sparse crowd, and waving. Now the people on the sidewalks below had something to cheer about. The Albers party tossed packs of expensive cigarettes from a silver tray to their "audience." Albers was no Nazi sympathizer, and this was probably his way of making fun of them and distracting them from the parade.

The world has often seen photos and films of that torchlight

parade, but the marchers they saw did not parade on the night of January 30, 1933. It was much too dark that night, the marchers were ragged, and no searchlights had been placed. The whole parade was restaged a day later by Hitler's propaganda genius, Goebbels, with floodlights and cameras in place and film directors to channel the brown-shirted, torch-carrying marchers. It was the first typical Third Reich fabrication.²¹

And what about the von Ribbentrops, now that Joachim's new idol and pupil would decide the future of Germany? Joachim had waited at the Kaiserhof Hotel with Göring, Röhm, and Goebbels, but no one had paid attention to him. Feeling snubbed, he returned home to Dahlem.

At first, Joachim and Annelies hoped that, once the first rush of events had died down, they would be asked into the new chancellor's circle to be thanked for their friendship and help and then given some tokens of respect and distinction. They waited in vain. Others had previous claims, mainly Hitler's "old fighters," who were sure they would now be rewarded with important posts. These old Nazis, the real revolutionaries, had their own vision of a Nazified Germany. The last thing they would permit was a bunch of arrogant aristocrats to continue to run the Army and the government. There were millions who wore SA and SS uniforms and who now considered themselves Germany's true soldiers. As the "Horst Wessel," the party's anthem, proclaimed: "Hold high the flag, close your ranks! SA is marching!" The second verse began, "Clear the street for the brown grenadiers!"*

The SA's chief, Ernst Röhm, would see that his men got their due.

The next claims were made to Hitler by the Military Ministry and the Foreign Ministry and heavy industry precisely because of these street brawlers. The General Staff of the Reichswehr wanted to be reassured, and the titled gentlemen of the Foreign Ministry wanted to be reassured, and the heads of heavy industry wanted to be reassured. Ambassadors had to report these German events to their governments. Some were openly cynical. Some were warily optimistic. The French, British, American, and Italian ambassadors, all signers of the Versailles Treaty, now had to deal with a man who had sworn to do away with the treaty and its reparations. Fascist Italy was still on reasonable terms with Great Britain. Benito Mussolini viewed Hitler with the tolerance of a master for the pupil, but he was soon taken

*Horst Wessel was a Berlin pimp who joined the SA, was killed in a brawl, and was raised to Nazi sainthood by party propagandists.

aback by the brutality that was waiting for me. The von Ribbentrops, they would have been unable to make contact. According to von Papen, he proposed for himself. He suggested that von Neurath, the Foreign Minister, had Bernhard von Bülow

If, indeed, von Bülow was an absurd not secretary had to possess skills. He had to be of bending the fact Joachim von Ribbentrop the temerity to con-

Baron Konstantin, well tailored, Brüning. He then became foreign minister. a full catalogue of people, dignified, political moral courage and and admired him. the old man's Junke

Prussians usually dependable. Vor from the very beginning and the ambitious Ministry was aware before his appointment during the private of one adviser against Herr von Ribbentrop professionals in the disdain for Joachim watched with alarm Lentzeallee. They felt revolutionary course at Champagne, tennis.

ade on the night of
nt, the marchers were
the whole parade was
mus, Goebbels, with
ctors to channel the
the first typical Third

that Joachim's new
many? Joachim had
on, and Goebbels, but
ed, he returned home

once the first rush of
to the new chancellor's
and then given some
in vain. Others had
who were sure they
These old Nazis, the
ified Germany. The
arrogant aristocrats
ent. There were mil-
now considered them-
Wessel," the party's
your ranks! SA is
street for the brown

men got their due.
Military Ministry and
ely because of these
wehr wanted to be
n Ministry wanted to
anted to be reassured.
ents to their govern-
warily optimistic. The
dors, all signers of the
who had sworn to do
ist Italy was still on
ussolini viewed Hitler
but he was soon taken

killed in a brawl, and

aback by the brutal anti-Semitism and fierce methods of the Nazis. He was waiting for moderation and hoping for the best.

The von Ribbentrops had only secondary claims for attention; they would have to wait their turn. Joachim von Ribbentrop was unable to make contact with his former dinner guest, and he pouted. According to von Papen, von Ribbentrop approached him, asking that he be proposed for the job of state secretary of the Foreign Ministry. He suggested that von Papen could discuss the matter with Konstantin von Neurath, the foreign minister. At von Hindenburg's insistence, von Neurath had remained in the cabinet, and his state secretary, Bernhard von Bülow, was a respected professional.

If, indeed, von Ribbentrop had proposed himself for this post, it was an absurd notion. In the structure of German ministries, a state secretary had to possess great administrative, legal, and diplomatic skills. He had to be a professional. However, von Papen had the habit of bending the facts, and his version is suspect. It is unlikely that Joachim von Ribbentrop, even if goaded by Annelies, would have had the temerity to confront the professionals of the Wilhelmstrasse.

Baron Konstantin von Neurath, the foreign minister, tall, corpulent, well tailored, was the former ambassador in London under Brüning. He then became a member of von Papen's "Barons' Cabinet" as foreign minister. His contemporary, André François-Poncet, offered a full catalogue of adjectives for von Neurath: "good-humored, simple, dignified, polite, south German." Also "not frank and a liar, no moral courage and . . . lazy." Nevertheless, von Hindenburg trusted and admired him. Von Neurath, a diplomat of the old school, cheered the old man's Junker heart even though "he was from the south."

Prussians usually considered south Germans jolly but slack and undependable. Von Neurath had met von Ribbentrop briefly, and from the very beginning no love was lost between the mature diplomat and the ambitious young wine merchant. The staff of the Foreign Ministry was aware that Adolf Hitler had been listening for months before his appointment to von Ribbentrop's notions of foreign policy during the private dinners in Dahlem. Hitler, never reluctant to play off one adviser against the other, probably quoted the opinions "of Herr von Ribbentrop" to von Neurath, raising his hackles. But the professionals in the Auswärtiges Amt were not the only ones to show disdain for Joachim von Ribbentrop. Old Nazi Party cronies had watched with alarm while "their" Adolf became a constant visitor at Lentzeallee. They feared that Hitler would be diverted from his revolutionary course and led into the ways of the *haute bourgeoisie*. Champagne, tennis courts, swimming pools, and butlers went counter

German diplomats, who
ques:

da, there actually was a
Ministry on December 21,
the eventual invasion of

Ribbentrop was a brief and
ong of the Anglo-German
and also by the unlikely Sir
tion was diverted by the
participants at the dinner, had
von Neurath in atten-
meeting's agenda, and it
was himself by requesting a
asked von Ribbentrop, his
meeting, nor had he re-
January. From Novem-
rop was clearly a man out
was eager to mollify von

arning about the Halifax-
Channon's diary re-

about Germany and his
nce, his khaki shirt, black
(sic). He told me he liked
was very much impressed,
the regime absolutely
taken seriously. But he is
come of it. I was rivetted

ate now seemed to be num-
er was not ready to discard.
ed by a series of events that
most aristocrats, particu-
ure the nobles had always
obewiks, and Masons, Die
ects of his most bitter ideo-
the Nazi Party's anthem,

"The Horst Wessel Song": "*Kameraden die Rotfront und Reaktion erschossen . . .*" (Comrades who were shot to death by the Reds and the reactionaries).

Meanwhile, though von Ribbentrop had to suffer his beloved Führer's rejections, he refused to blame Hitler, and he said to Spitzky, "The poor Führer has fallen into the hands of evil advisers and saboteurs."⁴

From the day he met Adolf Hitler to the day he died on the gallows, even at those times when he received shabby treatment, Joachim von Ribbentrop never showed a moment of disloyalty to Adolf Hitler. In his Nürnberg cell, after he was condemned to death, he proclaimed his eternal, personal devotion to Hitler. With the exception of Joseph Goebbels, he was the most steadfast of the top Nazis. It was this unwavering loyalty which Adolf Hitler sensed and used, and it would become von Ribbentrop's death sentence, passed on that day in 1932 when he first met Hitler in Berchtesgaden. Von Ribbentrop was indeed the son of an officer in the Kaiser's Army; blind loyalty was the German officer's religion. His father had ruined his own career out of loyalty to the great Bismarck. The son would lose his life for being unquestioningly faithful to an evil man.

Although von Ribbentrop believed that he had fallen from the Führer's grace and favor, he decided to perform one final task to demonstrate his undying loyalty to Führer, Reich, and party. He began a major evaluation of the Reich's future relations with Great Britain, a long and complicated document eventually labeled Ambassador's Report A 5522. It took him weeks to complete. Annelies helped him.

A 5522 was rambling and unfocused, but in the main it stated that Britain was trying to catch up by rearming as quickly as she could, that she thought time was on her side, and that the Halifax visit was only a smoke screen. Also, Britain did not trust Nazi Germany and would fight as a last resort, and Germany should continue an open show of conciliation while maintaining an Italian-Japanese coalition against Britain. He asked rhetorically, "Will France and Britain go to war if Germany goes to war in Central Europe?" He suggested that he preferred to make an oral report about the matter directly to the Führer. He was convinced Britain would fight if the British Isles were threatened. He reported that Edward VIII had had to leave the throne

⁴There are several accounts of the days when Joachim and Annelies von Ribbentrop scrambled on hands and knees on the floor of their bedroom, sorting the hundreds of drafted pages.

* 3 years of screaming over
how to put it together.

1927, 1928, 1932

1927

1927,
1928

1932

of expansion, then it must put all its vital energy into such a policy. And it may not be distracted by other problems. It must have a single goal. If it pursues other goals, then it lacks the strength to fight outwardly." The clarion call led up to a recall besides: "We [National Socialists] are convinced of the necessity for struggle. The peoples of this world have to struggle for their existence. If a people no longer does so, then history takes no further notice of it. History does not say: 'All right, if you won't have it that way, then have it some other way.' It says: 'Then you drop out.' Every creature that stops defending itself goes under." (Through all this, Hitler reminded his listeners only in passing that "the international Jew has become master.")¹⁰⁴ Never did Hitler invert his means and his end by promoting the foreign land grab in order to drain domestic tension. He came closest once in his fever year for theory, 1928, when, bypassing the Jews, he blamed Germany's civil strife on the shortage of land and soil: "Social diseases appear that then gradually assume an ideological character, until at length bloody civil strife erupts internally, a consequence of the disproportion between people and area."¹⁰⁵ But after September 1930 he evoked the end as a rule by citing the means only—intoning the first bars of his familiar refrain and leaving the rest to be hummed unthinkingly. That is, he sounded the aim of conquering feeding ground through the theme of terminating social and political divisions. And this pitch to heal the civil rifts and restore a "community of fate"¹⁰⁶ became his basic, constant pitch in the two years before he took office. As he put it on 31 July 1932, the issue was "whether Germany is to keep these twenty-five and thirty or forty parties, or whether Germany is to be pulled back together once and for all into a single formative will."¹⁰⁷ Or again on 23 January 1933: "If we succeed in turning proletarian and bourgeois back into Germans, the German future is ours."¹⁰⁸ This was his set piece in office too while public life was Nazified.¹⁰⁹ The sequence was the same in his politics as previously in his rhetoric: first came the Nazification, then—and all Germany felt it coming—the expansionist war. The Nazification began, moreover, with the exclusion of the Jews from public life and the

sup
racy
G
plai
pov
ene
was
—a:
Jew
192
tior
mic
atel
con
ele
san
wo
wh
mu
anc
wit
gio
wit
hel
tel
wa
for
pli
"W
un
an
ne
po
th:
Sc
wa
an

Nov 1932

D

or after he took power, but always called for sacrifices instead—"and," as his Minister of Finance remarked, "thereby proved himself a good connoisseur of the German psyche."¹²¹ He proposed no remedies for the Depression, but capitalized on it by representing it as merely the latest catastrophic consequence of the domestic and international order that had issued from the mistaken defeat of 1918.¹²² He stood for repudiating that order and with it that defeat. Otto Dietrich's later claim to have been won over to him in April 1929 by the "national community" he preached amid "economic duress" and "national depression"¹²³ is illustrative: April 1929 was long months before the duress and depression began. That spring and fall the Nazis' upswing to a mass party was clearly registered in provincial elections,¹²⁴ whereas in the thick of the duress and depression the Nazis suffered a severe temporary electoral setback (November 1932).¹²⁵ Besides, nothing like Hitlerism arose in other countries hard hit. Hitler's following did not batten in those lean years because his dictatorship beckoned as the only practical alternative to a regime that had proven ineffectual; rather, the regime proved ineffectual because his impractical alternative beckoned and his following battered.¹²⁶ His appeal was then as always to the pathology of nonacceptance of the 1918 defeat—a piece of traumatic unreason that surfaced the more readily in conditions of hunger and fear such as had attended the defeat itself. In June 1920 Hitler complained: "It is hard to bring a people that is sick onto the right track."¹²⁷ Right track or wrong, the Depression helped.

Hitler called the establishment of his dictatorship a "seizure of power" both before and after the event. That virile term first served to placate the revolutionaries in his ranks, particularly the paramilitary SA, while he steered his legal course after the Putsch. Then it stuck—right down to misguided, misleading post-Nazi studies of the techniques and stages of his takeover. In reality his takeover was a pushover. To quote one overview, "In whatever direction Hitler moved, nearly everything crumbled without significant resistance":¹²⁸ the "nearly" here is intriguing. Nervously anticipating resistance where none was forthcoming,

ing, he
proved
of how
cal can
too rec
nents c
ruary 1
Comm
meetin
ders fc
Decree
up at a
burg's
politic
tended
the ev
unlimi
sponse
put do
The pe
no mai
called
we coi
The fa
in the
cation
distinct
ever th
to him
compl
tion a
remov
surren
tion o
mar G
towar
dictate

1932

D

to the 1918 defeat produced an auxiliary shock effect of its own.¹³⁷ That reaction was the November revolution, in which all Germany was implicated inasmuch as no one lifted a finger to defend the old order.¹³⁸ As Hitler told a gathering of industrialists in 1932: "Believe me, our entire German people, all walks of life, bear a full measure of guilt for the collapse, some because they willed it and deliberately brought it about, the others because they looked on and were too weak to prevent it. In history, failure to oppose is weighed exactly as the intent or the deed itself."¹³⁹ (By so saying, he unweighted his own concept of "November criminals.") Hitler owned outright at his Putsch trial that he himself had not batted an eye when Red sailors poured into his ward at Pasewalk, as "I was loath to cry out at a time when one felt the collapse coming."¹⁴⁰ This completed his symbolic figure-cutting: disabled at the front¹⁴¹ and overwhelmed by the revolution, then resurrected. Authority impressing order from above was the second of the two organic principles of the Prussian-made Reich that collapsed in 1918;¹⁴² military supremacy was the first. Because the Reich had been forged by blood and iron under authoritarian Prussian leadership, the sequel to its military defeat was a ground swell against the Imperial social controls accompanied by strong regionalist, even separatist, impulses.¹⁴³ (The persistence of the regional identities overlaid by the Prussianized Reich after 1870 was, as much as the numbers of non-Germans included and of Germans excluded, what had lent that Reich its fatal proneness to annexations and Germanizations combined.¹⁴⁴) The shock of authority and order crumbling merged with the shock of defeat in the concept of a "Zusammenbruch" (collapse or breakdown) covering, *au choix*, the revolution as cause of the defeat or the defeat as cause of the revolution.¹⁴⁵ The revolution had come off unopposed only to generate bloody divisions afterward as long as the Weimar system lasted. Through these divisions the patriotic fever of August 1914—the jubilant battle cry in chorus, the thrill of Germandom outing—took on a mythic, magic lure. "In 1914, confronted with the hatred of 'a whole world of enemies,' we experienced an intoxicating intensification of our whole being," Ludwig Dehio remembered.¹⁴⁶ The Germans went out of battle array in 1918 as they

32 + 33

D

33

ing twice over, for it restricted the eradicating to Germany and presented the military-expansionist aim as the determinative one of the two. In a speech of January 1932 published as a pamphlet, Hitler set forth the three Aryan virtues as Nazi-held values confronting their opposites in a fight to the finish for control of Germany. For the Nazis' "inexorable resolve to exterminate Marxism in Germany down to the last root" he gave a single, insistent reason: "With today's body politic, no active foreign policy can be conducted any longer. . . . Forming the will of the nation as a whole is essential; it is the point of departure for political operations [abroad]." ³⁵ On 4 December 1932 ~~he~~ spelled out for a Reichswehr officer the first measures necessary to capacitate Germany for such political operations: "1. Repression of Marxism and its effects to complete extinction. Preparation of a new national unity of mind and will. 2. General spiritual and ethical rearmament of the nation on the basis of this new unity. 3. Technical rearmament. 4. Organization of national strength for national defense. 5. Attainment of formal recognition from the rest of the world for the new situation brought about." ³⁶ Four days after taking office he extended this short list in a talk to Germany's top brass (as noted by one of the generals present): "Over-all political goal solely the recovery of political power. . . . Internally: complete reversal of present domestic situation in Germany. No tolerance for any manifestation of sentiments (pacifism!) opposed to the goal. He who won't bow must be bent. Extermination of Marxism root and branch. Youth and entire nation must be attuned to the idea that only struggle can save us. Everything must yield to this idea (actualized in the Nazi movement's millions: it will grow). Toughening of youth and strengthening of will to defense by any and all means. Strictest authoritarian rule. Removal of the cancer of democracy! . . . Buildup of the armed forces most important requirement for reaching goal: winning back political power." Once this goal were reached, Hitler concluded, expansion would begin. ³⁷ The proposed exterminating, though displaced from the Jews to their institutional and intellectual mischief, was no less confined to Germany as a first step toward a new German power play. Hitler shortly pro-

c
s
w
t
ri
a
c
a
g
h
is
tu
1
h
d
ri
h
aj
k
tv
al
ta
g
p

ti
ra
ca
p
d
Je
la
is
on
th
ry
th

1932

1907
1932
1946
D

must have the courage to impose and enforce even decisions that themselves harbor dangers."¹¹⁶ In 1932 he declared in a similar context to the same effect: "Every plight has a root. So it is not enough . . . for me to doctor around its edges and try now and again to lop off the cancerous growth, but I must get down to its source."¹¹⁷

Iodoform absorbed into the system quickens the pulse and attacks the nerves and the brain, inducing restlessness, headaches, insomnia, fever, and—in severe cases—delirium with hallucinations.¹¹⁸ It also enters the saliva to bring on a burning thirst coupled with an inability to drink (things taste poisoned).¹¹⁹ Its sickening odor hangs heavy, and must have infested the tiny rooms in which Hitler nursed his mother during her protracted agony. Three close witnesses to that nursing gave congruent accounts of it in later years: Kubizek, Bloch, and Paula Hitler. "In these weeks it was as if my friend had all at once become an entirely different person," Kubizek related. "... He was exclusively his mother's loyal, helpful son." He took the housework upon himself, Kubizek specified, and rearranged the apartment "so that he would be close to his mother even at night. . . . Adolf read every least wish out of her eyes and fussed about her ever so tenderly. . . . In these weeks he forgot himself entirely and lived only in self-sacrificial concern for his mother."¹²⁰ As Bloch told it: "In most heartfelt love he clung to his mother, observing every one of her movements so as to be able to render her tiny services rapidly,"¹²¹ and again: "He slept in the tiny bedroom adjoining that of his mother so that he could be summoned at any time during the night. During the day he hovered about the large bed in which she lay."¹²² Paula for her part recollected in 1946 (in her interviewer's English): "... my brother Adolf spoiled my mother during this last time of her life with overflowing tenderness. He was indefatigable in his care for her, wanted to comply with any desire she could possibly have and did all to demonstrate his great love for her."¹²³ Klara Hitler died at 2 A.M. on 21 December 1907. "With his mother," as Kubizek remarked, "Adolf lost the one being on earth on whom his love was concentrated and who had returned it just as completely."¹²⁴ Bloch

Goebbels

1932

hearing—he had demanded that the police informant testify in open court—Weiss slapped a fresh three-week gag on the gauleiter.²⁵ Weiss also teleaxed to every provincial governor in Germany: 'National Socialist deputy Dr Göbbels [sic] forbidden to speak here. Meetings only under proviso that G is not speaker. POLICE PRESIDENT BERLIN.'²⁶

At the next few meetings organizers read out messages from Goebbels, until the police banned these too. The fight continued. On legal advice—and by now Goebbels was surrounded by eager lawyers willing to help—he deeded his personal library to a third person in case Weiss seized it on the pretext that it served the purposes of spreading revolution.

The tide of political violence was rising. Eighty-six Nazis were murdered during 1932; in twelve months Goebbels alone lost seven men, and the police seldom caught the murderers. The killing of fifteen-year-old Herbert Norkus was particularly nasty. He and five pals had been distributing leaflets early one Sunday morning when they were overwhelmed by communists. The body of Norkus, son of a working-class Nazi from Plötzensee, was found in the entrance hall of No. 4 Zwingli Strasse, where he had bled to death from six stab wounds. Goebbels personally inspected the scene with its twenty-yard trail of dried blood and the one bloody handprint on the whitewashed wall. After going on to the morgue he wrote these words in his newspaper: 'There in the bleak gray twilight a yellowing childish face stares with half-open, empty eyes. The delicate features have been trampled to a bloody pulp.'²⁷ The next day he buried the artist Professor Ernst Schwarz, an S.A. officer gunned down in a communist ambush a week before.²⁸

ONE evening Dr Goebbels returned home excited, limped up and down chain-smoking for a while, then told Magda he had had a splendid idea. 'Hitler himself must stand for president,' he said. Hitler however proved unexpectedly difficult to persuade: he wanted the opposition to come out with their candidates before making up his own mind. Still delaying his decision, on February 9 Hitler reviewed fifteen thousand of Röhm's stormtroopers in the Sport Palace. Goebbels enthused, 'Chief of Staff Röhm has pulled off a miracle.' This embarrassing laudatio appeared only in the first edition of *Kaiserhof*, and was struck out of all editions published after June 1934.²⁹

Police chief Grzesinski gagged at the prospect of Hitler, his arch enemy, becoming president. This centurion of social democracy made little pretense of impartiality: 'How shameful it is,' he declared in Leipzig, 'that millions of Germans are trotting along behind a foreigner. . . . How shameful that this foreigner, Hitler, not only conducts serious talks with the government on foreign affairs, but is able to speak to foreign press representatives about Germany's future and about Germany's foreign interests without somebody seeing him off with a dog-whip.'³⁰ Dr Goebbels made hay with that remark.³¹ In *Angriff* he pointed out how often Grzesinski had banned Nazis for precisely the same kind of incitement to violence.³² 'Let's see,' he crowed in *Kaiserhof*, published when he

Febr. 9,

Fahr. March 23, 1932

136 II: THE GAULEITER OF BERLIN

already knew the answer, 'which of us gets seen off with a dog-whip out of Germany.'³³

Hindenburg announced on February 15 that he intended to stand again. Taking Hitler's decision for granted, Goebbels began designing election posters with punchy slogans like *Schluss jetzt!*—'Time's up!'³⁴ Hitler was still undecided. Goebbels decided to present him with a *fait accompli*, subjecting him to the pressure of public acclaim. To a cheering Sport Palace audience on February 22, Goebbels simply announced that Hitler *would* stand for president.³⁵ Hitler's HQ in Munich was horrified and issued an immediate embargo to the Party newspaper, forbidding them to print Goebbels' announcement.³⁶ Hitler had no choice but to agree to stand. Writing in *Kaiserhof* two years later Goebbels claimed that Hitler had phoned him after the meeting to express his delight that the announcement had gone down so well.³⁷

Whatever the truth of this self-serving statement, on February 23, speaking in a Reichstag building surrounded by riot police, Goerner announced the election date as March 13. After that, speaking on behalf of the Nazis, Dr Goebbels launched into an hour-long assault on Dr Brüning, seated stony faced and with arms folded near him. In one year, he said, the police had banned *Angriff* twelve times; eight times the courts had ruled these bans illegal. 'The *Illustrierte Beobachter*,' he said, 'the picture magazine of the National Socialist movement, has today been banned until March 13—i.e. for the whole of the election period.' In the last three months twenty-four S.A. men had been murdered ('Probably by other Nazis,' yelled a Social Democrat) and now their police chief was talking of whipping Hitler out of Germany. No foreign power, he declared, was willing to sign treaties with Brüning—'Because they know, Mr Reich Chancellor, that you are the Man of Yesteryear, and that the Man of Tomorrow is coming.'

To a barrage of abuse from the left, Goebbels doggedly waded into Hindenburg's reputation. '*Lauded by the Berlin gutter press, fêted by the Party of Deserters*—' he declaimed, flinging out a demagogic arm toward the social democrat benches. The rest of his words were lost in the howl of outrage that his taunt provoked.³⁸

Furiously clanging his bell the Speaker called for silence. 'Dr Goebbels,' he charged, 'you have named one of the parties present in this House the "Party of Deserters" ...'

The Social Democrats screeched at Goebbels, 'Who deserted? Where were you!' One of them shouted, 'You weren't at the front for even one day!' Amid mounting hubbub the communist bloc leader Ernst Torgler mocked, 'Let war veteran Goebbels speak.' But the Social Democrats were now hysterical. 'We were at the front!' 'He was the dodger!' 'Withdraw!' 'Behold Goebbels, the political cripple!'

Barely pausing to draw breath Goebbels continued: 'The Jews of the Berlin gutter press have held the field marshal on high. These are the same Jews and Social Democrats [shouts of 'Sit down!' and 'Time's up!'] who dumped buckets of mockery and scorn on the field marshal in 1925.'

'Sit down
to be ins

The S
Gregor
not accu
Deserter

Return
illegal an
already.

slandere
astating
ing what
the Berli

field ma
brutal cl
System, c

in jail, b
by the h
now beg
up, Awa
represen
them: 'W

meet aga
Wagin
confiscat

inciting
Kampm:
Litfass
men sto

that gath
'A Man
such as t

a short s
was not
copies of

to mail t
film of M
ten-minu
squares

was alwa
he would
presiden

With
his post
broadcas
four days
ten park

March 13.
election
day

March 9, 1932

'Sit down! Sit down!' roared the Social Democrats. 'We're not going to be insulted by dodgers!'

The Speaker capitulated, and ordered Goebbels out of the chamber. Gregor Strasser leaped to his defense, pointing out that the gauleiter had not accused any particular party by name. 'When he said "Party of Deserters" only the Social Democrats felt the hat fitted!'³⁹

Returning to the attack the next day Goebbels complained that the illegal and unjust bans on *Angriff* had cost the newspaper 180,000 marks already. As for the opposition's specious allegations that he had just slandered Hindenburg as a 'deserter,' he retaliated by reading out devastating passages from press clippings in his confidential archives, reporting what the Social Democrat organ *Vorwärts*, the *Berliner Morgenzeitung*, the *Berliner Morgenpost*, and Carl Severing himself had written about the field marshal during the previous presidential election campaign. In a brutal closing tirade he offered a string of definitions for the Nazi word *System*, ending with this one: 'Where criticizing the Republic lands you in jail, but slandering and belittling the entire German people is rewarded by the highest distinctions!' He cried, 'That is why in the three weeks now beginning, one battle-cry will sound throughout Germany: Time's up, Away with the *System* . . . the *System* that Brüning and his Cabinet represent!' As screams of abuse erupted from the left, Goebbels taunted them: 'Well may you laugh and scoff. Events will prove us right. We shall meet again, on March the thirteenth, at Philippi.'⁴⁰

Waging an election campaign of dubious probity Brüning's officials confiscated the *Völkischer Beobachter* and banned *Angriff* yet again, for inciting contempt of the Republic. But the Nazis had poster power. Kampmann, now Goebbels' gau propaganda chief, plastered the circular Litfass advertisement pillars on street corners with huge placards: S.A. men stood guard on each site, and Nazi speakers harangued the crowds that gathered around them.⁴¹ Outsized pictorial posters like Schweitzer's 'A Man Breaks his Chains' adorned the façades of prominent buildings such as the Café Josty on Potsdamer Platz. Goebbels recorded on discs a short speech, cleverly structured so that its real propaganda message was not at first evident, and manufactured fifty thousand cardboard copies of this little recording costing only three pfennigs each for Nazis to mail to their marxist opponents.⁴² In 1930 he had seen an inspiring film of Mussolini speaking; the Herold film company now produced a ten-minute film of Goebbels speaking, to be shown each night in town squares throughout Germany.⁴³ Somebody—in the Reichstag the taunt was always 'Thyssen!'—must have topped up Goebbels' funds because he would spend two hundred thousand marks on propaganda for this presidential campaign.⁴⁴

With *Angriff* already banned, the government now banned the rest of his posters and leaflets.⁴⁵ Goebbels' demands that Hitler be allowed broadcasting time like Hindenburg were refused.⁴⁶ On March 9, with four days to go, he addressed eighty thousand people in Berlin's Lustgarten park. The press published doctored photographs to suggest only a

1932

sparse attendance.⁴⁷ Two days later Grzesinski sent police to raid his HQ again. The next day Goebbels addressed an election-eve rally at the Sport Palace.⁴⁸ After that he gathered his officials at his apartment to await the first results. By ten P.M. it was clear that, while eleven million votes had been cast for Hitler, Hindenburg was far ahead—indeed, only one hundred thousand votes short of an absolute majority.⁴⁹ Goebbels, overcoming his dejection, issued these guidelines to all gauleiters that same Sunday: 'The N.S.D.A.P. has won an unparalleled victory in the first election round. In one and a half years the Party has succeeded in almost doubling its vote.'

Their task now would be to win 2.5 million more voters for the runoff. Goebbels ordered the Nazi gauleiters to concentrate their scarce resources on the most promising sections of those who had not voted for them. Thus they must tell the bourgeois voters what to expect if Hindenburg was re-elected: The stopping of pensions, huge tax burdens, and renewed inflation, as well as further territorial encroachments by Poland and Lithuania, and civil war with the communists.⁵⁰

Refusing even to look at the gloating headlines of the 'Judenpresse' that Monday morning, Goebbels flew down to Munich with Kampmann for a campaign conference with Hitler. The second round would be held on April 10. Tossing more dirty-trick spanners into the Nazi works, Brüning ordered virtually simultaneous provincial elections for Prussia, Anhalt, Württemberg, and Bavaria. He also decreed an electioneering moratorium until after Easter. 'We're fighting a war,' snarled Goebbels, 'but there's to be no shooting for three weeks!' Carl Severing joined in the spanner-tossing, arresting scores of Goebbels' Berlin officials on mostly trumped-up charges, while Grzesinski and Weiss had their police search for evidence that would justify an outright ban on the S.A.⁵¹

Goebbels responded with innovative electioneering techniques as soon as the brief but unequal battle was rejoined. He had originally planned to issue four pictorial and sixteen text posters to be released day by day from March 22 onward.⁵² The moratorium knocked that plan on the head. Hitler again appealed to the radio stations to allow him air time; but again Brüning permitted only Hindenburg to get near the microphone.⁵³ The campaign got dirty on both sides. Hitler's opponents distributed leaflets in old people's homes warning that he would take away their pensions and insist on compulsory euthanasia at sixty; other election 'lies' against which Goebbels warned the other gauleiters in a circular were that the Nazis would bring war, inflation, expropriation, destruction of the unions, dissolution of the civil service, disemancipation of women, forced labour, civil war, and the renunciation of all claims to the South Tyrol, East Prussia, and Alsace-Lorraine.⁵⁴ (With the passage of time, about three quarters of these 'lies' would come true.)

In the same circular Goebbels suggested that Hindenburg was benefiting from the emotional female vote ('fear of war') and from civil servants' anxieties about their future. The gauleiters had to concentrate on this 'Hindenburg front'—they must ask the butchers, bakers, and

innkeepers why their own propaganda become a hallmar send groups of g and the bands of plan to triple the additional copies *Beobachter* alone :

As for Hitler, C in his own plans meetings a day in enemy 'lie' each the farming comr glossy photograph would round off t unlikely to attract learn about them.

Then the elect free-newspaper st Hitler's lavish Ka: He retaliated by 'womanizing,' but would not release to scold their opp.

The moratorium plane, Goebbels s; furt. On the fourth Lustgarten, then t police chief Grze Strasse padlocked designed for the u

VOTING was on A enburg, Hitler nov His vote increase votes). The Nazi attracting thirty-oi 36.8 percent natic this light, Goebbel apartment he mac mother, Magda cl pregnant. Any ela the defense minist and ordered their :

Polling in Pruss Goebbels now dir. Severing, and thei

1932

innkeepers *why* they had voted for the field marshal, and then tailor their own propaganda accordingly. (This field-operational analysis would become a hallmark of Goebbels' propaganda strategy.) He suggested they send groups of girl members into the old folks' homes to read to them, and the bands of the S.A. and S.S. to serenade them. He hatched a secret plan to triple the print-run of all Nazi newspapers for election week, the additional copies being sent free to all Hindenburg voters. The *Völkischer Beobachter* alone should send out 800,000 free copies each day.

As for Hitler, Goebbels brought in air power: Flying from city to city in his own plane D-1720 Hitler would address three or four huge meetings a day in twenty-one cities beginning on April 3, tackling a new enemy 'lie' each day. Goebbels printed four pictorial posters, targeting the farming community, city dwellers, women, and vested interests.⁵⁵ A glossy photogravure magazine illustrated with pictures of the Führer would round off his campaign package. True, its title, *Flamethrower*, was unlikely to attract the female fear-of-war vote—but he still had a lot to learn about them.

Then the election got dirtier. The government banned Goebbels' free-newspaper stunt. Infuriatingly, their opponents obtained details of Hitler's lavish Kaiserhof expenses.⁵⁶ Goebbels called the bill a forgery.⁵⁷ He retaliated by claiming to have annihilating material on Severing's 'womanizing,' but declared that, after consulting with the Führer, they would not release it. In fact neither he nor Hitler was in a strong position to scold their opponents on this score.

The moratorium ended on Sunday April 3. While Hitler set out by plane, Goebbels spoke three times that day at Wiesbaden, then at Frankfurt. On the fourth he and Hitler addressed 150,000 people in the Berlin Lustgarten, then fifty thousand more in Potsdam. In Goebbels' absence police chief Grzesinski suddenly ordered the gau HQ in Hedemann Strasse padlocked, and banned the election posters that Goebbels had designed for the upcoming Prussian campaign.⁵⁸

VOTING was on April 10, 1932. Though again failing to defeat Hindenburg, Hitler now clearly emerged as a statesman of equivalent stature. His vote increased to 13,418,547 (Hindenburg won with 19,359,983 votes). The Nazi vote in Berlin had grown by two hundred thousand, attracting thirty-one percent of the vote in the capital as compared with 36.8 percent nationwide. The communist won only 3,706,759. Seen in this light, Goebbels should have been delighted; but in the privacy of his apartment he made no secret of his disappointment. According to her mother, Magda chose this moment to reveal that she was four months pregnant. Any elation at this was tempered by the announcement that the defense minister Groener had banned the S.A. and S.S. nationwide and ordered their immediate dissolution.⁵⁹

Polling in Prussia, the next round of elections, would be on April 24. Goebbels now directed his propaganda venom at Otto Braun and Carl Severing, and their police minions Grzesinski and 'Isidor' Weiss.⁶⁰ He

devised more new techniques, including loudspeaker trucks illegally broadcasting the Horst Wessel anthem. One stunt tickled the fancy of the international press: His posters cheekily announced a public debate with Chancellor Brüning in the Sport Palace. In fact he had obtained recordings of a recent Brüning speech in Königsberg, from which he played extracts to his audience, together with his own devastating replies. Brüning's humorless response was to sue Goebbels for infringing the copyright in his intellectual property.⁶¹ After dropping dark hints in *Angriff* that he had some dirt on Severing, he detected a softening in *Vorwärts'* line. Struggling with 'flu and a 40°C fever he addressed a hundred thousand people in the Lustgarten. On election eve one of his S.A. men was shot dead with a bullet between the eyes. The next day saw every swastika flag in Prussia draped in mourning.

These were the Goebbels methods, and thanks to them the Nazi party increased its numbers in the Prussian parliament from six seats to 162; with 38.3 percent of the votes they were the strongest party. In Bavaria meanwhile the Nazis had swollen from nine seats to forty-three, in Württemberg from one to fifty-one, and in Anhalt from one to fifteen.

In Anhalt Germany's first Nazi prime minister was appointed. Elsewhere, Brüning's allies were still strong enough to form a coalition against the Nazis and stay in power.

'We've got to get into power sooner or later,' wrote Goebbels in understandable frustration at this outcome. 'Otherwise all these election victories will be the death of us.'⁶²

18: F

FOR T
than
a pe
Goebbels di
the aviator
married wo
Hitler spent
pathological
face when t
belses were
to wait outs
'Hitler rem:
with his fac

The Cent
only conditi
Gregor Stra:
than no bre
power. 'Eith

His publi:
Franz von P:
demise of t
caused wher
letters.⁴ Goe
of such perv

BY 1932 G.
The distingi
from Berlin f
master of pul
he wrote, wa
best journali
masterpieces
Goebbels
libeling Dr W
11; on the ra
could be enf
on April 25

1932

18: Follow that Man

FOR THE next few months Hitler would spend more time in Berlin than in Munich, wheeling and dealing in tandem with Göring in a persistent effort to cover the last hundred yards to power. Goebbels did what he could to undermine Hitler's trust in Göring. When the aviator started an affair with blonde actress Emmy Sonnemann, a married woman, he lost no time in telling Hitler.¹ In consequence, Hitler spent more time with the Goebbelses. In any case, he was almost pathological about being recognized in the capital. He would hide his face when the lights came on in movie theaters; one evening, the Goebbelses were out when Hitler returned to Reichskanzler Platz and he had to wait outside. He asked Darré to stand between him and the street. 'Hitler remained standing,' said Darré, 'in the corner of the doorway with his face turned toward the house until Dr Goebbels got back.'²

The Center party wooed Hitler the most persistently, stating as their only condition that he must accept a junior role. There were those, Gregor Strasser among them, who felt strongly that half a loaf was better than no bread. But Goebbels insisted that they hold out for absolute power. 'Either—or,' he wrote: 'Power, or opposition.'³

His published diary contains only hints at the part in fact played by Franz von Papen and General Kurt von Schleicher in bringing about the demise of the *System*. Missing from *Kaiserhof* too is the juicy scandal caused when a Munich newspaper published Röhm's homosexual love-letters.⁴ Goebbels was not alone in his perplexity at Hitler's indulgence of such perversions.⁵

BY 1932 Goebbels' fame was spreading beyond Germany's frontiers. The distinguished American journalist H. R. Knickerbocker, writing from Berlin for the New York *Evening Post*, singled him out as the 'greatest master of public management' that Europe had ever known. To Goebbels, he wrote, went all the credit for Hitler's election successes. 'He is the best journalist in the party, and the best orator.' His billboards were masterpieces of election psychology.⁶

Goebbels had lost his appeal against the two month sentence for libeling Dr Weiss, and a pro forma warrant had been issued on February 11; on the twentieth Dr Bernhard Weiss was informed that the sentence could be enforced as soon as Goebbels lost his immunity.⁷ Meanwhile, on April 25 supreme court officials from Leipzig served another forty-

Post-Cal
terror

May 1, 1932

142 II: THE GAULEITER OF BERLIN

page indictment on Goebbels, this time for high treason. This document too he shrugged off.⁸

The maneuvering between the Nazis and a camarilla of army officers, jointly and severally eager for power, had begun. Goebbels' diaries show that Hitler had entrusted the backstage negotiations to Röhm, Göring, and Frick, while General von Schleicher operated through his colleague Werner Count von Alvensleben, whom Goebbels identified only in the unpublished version of his diary.⁹ As the regime's position weakened in May 1932 Hitler and Goebbels, who had been conferring in Munich, hurried back to Berlin. A minister resigned and Hitler, living in the Kaiserhof or with the Goebbelses, again launched into negotiations with Schleicher's and Hindenburg's emissaries. Power seemed so near to the Nazi leaders, and yet so unattainable. When the Reichstag belatedly resumed, Göring and Strasser spearheaded the attack on Brüning's ruinous financial policies. Brüning survived the Nazi motion of no confidence, this time by 286 votes to 259. The gap was narrowing all the time.

12.

The next day, May 12, saw scandalous scenes in the Reichstag. After Nazi deputies roughed up an opponent, Dr Bernhard Weiss and his police officers stormed in and arrested several of them. Goebbels was thrilled at 'Isidor's' blunder in violating the sovereignty of their parliament. The entire press echoed him. Groener resigned as defense minister. The police arrested Strasser that night on his train heading back to Munich, and Weiss issued yet another libel writ against Goebbels for insulting him as a Jew.¹⁰ Clinging grimly to the tattered remnants of his office, Brüning still refused to resign, instead adjourning the Reichstag until June. Hitler was determined to force a new election, so that his party could bring its now massive voting strength to bear.

For all his public triumphs, Goebbels' finances at this time were on a knife-edge. *Angriff* was having to pay off his costs in one libel action by monthly installments of twenty marks. His lawyer tried to get the balance of 598 marks annulled.¹¹ His accountant declared a tax demand of 564 marks for 1931 to be totally beyond his means, and asked if he could pay one hundred marks a month; Goebbels indignantly penciled in the margin, 'Pay—from what?'¹² Magda's handsome alimony payments from Quandt had ended of course with her new marriage.

May 22.

Goebbels evidently refused however to touch the colossal funds that he raised for the election campaigns. After his private diary recorded on May 22 a visit from some gentlemen from Mercedes, the gau HQ was suddenly awash with funds. Magda, now in her fifth month of pregnancy, rented a little cottage in the middle of an orchard at Caputh, near Gatow, on Lake Schwielow. In this idyllic setting they spent their summer nights while frogs bleeped and swallows flitted through their open bedroom windows.¹³

30.

AFTER Dr Brüning resigned on May 30, 1932, the clever, foxy career politician Franz von Papen was appointed interim chancellor. The elec-

tion was
a coun

Once
paign,
tiniest
prison
royalty
he wro

He c
started
bumbli
easily p
and Gc
and We
the bar
under F
Weiss's

bel's yet
A mo
limited
'Nation
venom l
final list
the clai
office w
the rest
and bar
didates,
for Hitl

1. I sv
2. I sv

With the
the Bro
marched
in Hage
pistol, h
the mot
town. In
that he w
was in fu
Helmut
graveyar
Steinber
resulting
campaign

July 30, 1932

FOLLOW THAT MAN 143

tion was set down for the last day of July. Goebbels called his staff out to a council of war.¹⁴

Once again it was Goebbels who masterminded the nationwide campaign, from Hitler's fifty-city aerial tour of Germany right down to the tiniest personal details like obtaining the names of eight Berlin Nazis in prison and in hospital and dividing between them the latest meager royalty check from his book *The Unknown S.A. Man* 'as a small token,' he wrote them, 'of recognition.'¹⁵

He did not intend to allow 'Isidor' to disrupt this campaign and started a drive to get him and Grzesinski sacked. Papen had appointed a bumbling weakling, Baron von Gayl, as minister of the interior. Hitler easily persuaded him to lift the eight-week-old ban on the S.A. and S.S. and Goebbels publicly called on Gayl to 'get rid of Messrs Grzesinski and Weiss' as well.¹⁶ Under Nazi pressure Papen repealed virtually all the bans. A Nazi was appointed Speaker of the Prussian parliament: under his diktat, this body set up a formal commission of inquiry into Weiss's activities. 'Revenge is a repast best served up cold,' wrote Goebbels yet again. Weiss responded by banning *Angriff* for five days.¹⁷

A month remained before the election day. This time the Nazis enjoyed limited access to the air waves.¹⁸ Goebbels scripted a broadcast on 'National character as a basis for national culture.' It was stripped of its venom however by the radio censors before he could broadcast it.¹⁹ The final list of Nazi candidates for Berlin and Potsdam again poorly justified the claim to be a workers' party: Of the forty-one local names, six were office workers, five businessmen, two former police officers, and among the rest a civil servant, teacher, bookseller, pharmacist, tailor, librarian, and bank clerk; only five were truly working class.²⁰ All of these candidates, including Goebbels himself, had to sign a five-point declaration for Hitler's personal files, of which the first two points read as follows:

1. I swear that I have no links or relations with the Jews;
2. I swear that I hold no directorships in banks or other corporations.²¹

With the irksome ban on the S.A. lifted by the obliging Franz von Papen, the Brownshirt armies marched again. For two hours twenty thousand marched past Goebbels and Strasser in Dessau on July 3. As he arrived in Hagen on the twelfth the communists ambushed his car. Clutching a pistol, he signaled his chauffeur to put his foot down and plow through the mob. After that the left signaled his car's number ahead to every town. In Mönchen-Gladbach the communists passed out leaflets stating that he was not to escape alive; no idle threat, because the tide of violence was in full flood.²² Only a few days earlier he had buried S.A. Scharführer Helmut Köster of No. 24 Sturm; ten thousand people had packed the graveyard. In Wedding the communists gunned down S.A. man Hans Steinberg. In the fifty days up to July 20 Prussia saw 461 political clashes, resulting in eighty-two deaths on all sides; in the last two weeks of the campaign alone, thirty-two Nazis were killed. On July 17 communist

July 20, 1932

gunmen opened fire on a marching S.A. column in Altona, near Hamburg, leaving nineteen dead and sixty injured.²³

SUDDENLY everything tilted in the Nazis' favor. General von Schleicher agreed to back a putsch against Prussia. Meeting with Göring, Röhm, and Goebbels in Cottbus two days after the Altona blood bath Hitler announced to them that they were going to appoint a 'commissar for the interior' in Prussia; Carl Severing, the incumbent minister of the interior, huffed that he would yield only to *force majeure*. 'A touch on the wrist sufficed,' mocked Goebbels in *Kaiserhof*.²⁴ Severing's humiliation was followed by President von Hindenburg signing a decree appointing Papen himself as Reich commissar in Prussia, displacing the leftist prime minister Otto Braun. When Braun squealed, Hindenburg—on Schleicher's advice—called in the army. At 11:20 A.M. on July 20 General Gerd von Rundstedt, the garrison commander, phoned police chief Grzesinski with word that he was imposing a state of emergency: His orders were to replace Grzesinski with the police chief of Essen. Dr Bernhard Weiss was to be summarily dismissed as well. The army sent in its officers at five-thirty P.M. to arrest Grzesinski and Weiss.²⁵ As they were driven away from their police HQ at Alexander Platz in an army Mercedes, Weiss had no time even to gather up his bowler hat and pince-nez.²⁶

The sheer suddenness of it all took Goebbels' breath away. It was the end of an era. The Nazis had Papen eating out of their hand. He appointed 'reliable' police chiefs and civil governors (Regierungspräsidenten) throughout Prussia. He banned the newspapers that had been the bane of Goebbels' life such as the *Acht-Uhr Abendblatt*.

All the fetters thus came off in the last eleven days of Nazi campaigning. In the city's Grunewald stadium Karl Hanke organized the biggest open-air rally yet for Hitler. It was a boiling-hot day until evening when the heavens opened and the rains drenched the 120,000 people gathered to hear him. But nobody left—'A sign,' in Kampmann's view, 'of how the once Red Berlin had come around, thanks to Dr Goebbels' propaganda.' A mighty cheer went up as Goebbels remarked that even these rains had deterred nobody.²⁷

He was in Munich when the election results were announced. The Nazis had attracted nearly fourteen million votes, entitling them to 230 seats in the Reichstag. They were now far the largest single party, but once again the Center party, with seventy-six seats, held the balance. Again Goebbels advised Hitler to hold out for absolute power, and shun any compromise. 'Tolerance will be the death of us,' he argued. Vacationing briefly with him at Tegernsee, Hitler agonized over his next step—'balking,' jotted Goebbels in his diary, 'at the really big decisions.' In *Kaiserhof* he softened this criticism by applying it to the party as a whole, rather than its Führer.

Leaving Goebbels in Bavaria, Hitler set off for Berlin on August 4, 1932 to state his demands to Hindenburg: he wanted to be chancellor, with Frick as minister of the interior, Strasser as minister of labour,

Goebbels :
Göring as :
Obersalzbe
be taking o
minister of
acting as m
Reich. 'A C
up power.
total soluti

He staye
somebody :
the S.A. ur
jostling for
Ernst Röhm
and unsubt
about the o
discussing v
him he wou
ganda; as if
his position
of its nation
and nothing
manager.³⁰ c
even bigger
man Alvens
out for a h
compromise

Not all th
spread rum
even that G
published a
Here unsati
Hitler becoi
him round, v
summer hot
agreed that
offer, this w
blame for Pa
13 both Schl
Goebbels ha
see the presi
Nazi leaders
communicat
wanted actio
He departed

It was a to
They had fo

July, 1932

FOLLOW THAT MAN 145

Goebbels as minister of public education (meaning propaganda), and Göring as aviation minister.²⁸ He returned south on the sixth. Up at his Obersalzberg mountain home he predicted to Goebbels that they would be taking office in a week's time, with Hitler as both chancellor and prime minister of Prussia, Strasser as minister of the interior, and Goebbels acting as minister of culture in Prussia and minister of education in the Reich. 'A Cabinet of real men,' approved Goebbels. 'We shall never give up power. They'll have to carry us out feet first. This is going to be a total solution.'

He stayed for the next five days at Hitler's side, nervous in case somebody talked the Führer into making other dispositions. In Berlin the S.A. under their bullying commander Helldorff had already begun jostling for power. While Göring conducted the political negotiations, Ernst Röhm drew his S.A. army up around the capital to exert a visible and unsubtle pressure on the chancellor Papen. Goebbels was bullish about the outcome of the talks, and stayed up until four A.M. one night discussing with Hitler the structure of his new ministry. Hitler promised him he would be running education, films, radio, theater, and propaganda; as if these were not portfolios enough, Goebbels decided to retain his position as the party's gauleiter of Berlin and as Reichsleiter in charge of its national propaganda. (All of these ambitions remained pipedreams, and nothing about them appeared in *Kaiserhof*.)²⁹ Daimler-Benz's general manager³⁰ came to talk automobiles, and for a day visions of newer and even bigger cars danced in the Nazi leaders' heads. But then Schleicher's man Alvensleben phoned with news that the regime was still holding out for a horse-trade. Hitler told him that he was not interested in compromises—'A total solution,' as Goebbels put it, 'or no dice.'³¹

Not all the Nazis agreed with Hitler's unrelenting stance. The regime spread rumors that a split was beginning to show in their ranks, and even that Goebbels and Strasser were in favor of half-measures. Hitler published a communiqué denying it.³² He left for Berlin with Goebbels. Here unsatisfactory news waited for them: Papen was still flatly against Hitler becoming chancellor; Röhm and Schleicher were trying to talk him round, without much success. Pacing the verandah of the Goebbelsses summer house at Caputh, Hitler discussed this turn of events. They agreed that if the Führer accepted the vice-chancellorship that was on offer, this would saddle the Nazi party for all time with a share of the blame for Papen's failure. In the government quarter at midday on August 13 both Schleicher and Papen urged him to accept. Hitler refused, and Goebbels had to back him.³³ Later Hitler took Frick and Röhm over to see the president; he again left empty-handed. Frustrated and angry, the Nazi leaders gathered at Goebbels' apartment. Typewriters rattled out communiqués. The S.A. commanders were straining at the bit, they wanted action. Together with Röhm, Hitler briefed them to toe the line. He departed for Bavaria, leaving Goebbels in Berlin.

It was a totally unexpected impasse. The Nazis were the largest party: They had followed the path of legality until now, yet the *System* was

Aug 30, 1932

thwarting them once more. Goebbels consoled his embittered lieutenants and went on vacation to Heiligendamm. The millionaire banker Emil Georg von Stauss of the Deutsche Bank invited him over to his motor yacht.³⁴ But Goebbels' mind was in a turmoil. He feared that the Nazis' share of the vote had peaked, and might now rapidly decline.

The Reichstag resumed on August 30. Its members elected Hermann Göring as Speaker, a powerful position indeed. Göring invited Hitler, Röhm, and Goebbels up to his luxurious new apartment on Kaiserdamm to discuss tactics.³⁵ They agreed that at the very next Reichstag session on September 12 they must force an immediate dissolution. The new election would be held on November 6. The party was now in a precarious position, sliding in the polls and with its campaign coffers dangerously low. Goebbels ordered *Angriff* to appear twice daily instead of once. He organized a consumer boycott of opposition newspapers. He had no mercy on them. When a newspaper impugned Magda's honor he sent an S.S. officer to treat the journalist concerned with a riding whip; in best Prussian style, the S.S. man left his visiting card on the bleeding offender.

Magda had given birth to their first child on September 1, 1932. She had hoped for a boy to call Hellmut, to fill the hole left in her heart by her stepson's tragic death in Paris years before. But it was a girl, so 'Hellmut' became Helga. The infant's nocturnal wails kept the household awake. Goebbels, a novice in the art of parenthood, complained unfeelingly and left Magda in tears.³⁶

COUNT von Helldorff took the breakdown of negotiations particularly hard. 'He's only tough,' observed Goebbels shrewdly, 'when the going's good.'³⁷

He moved his gau HQ for one last time, to a building in Voss Strasse barely three hundred yards from the Reich chancellery. He had come a long way since the 'opium den' six years before. He began planning ahead, listing whom he would need to take over the radio system. Hitler again flew a whistlestop tour of fifty cities. Goebbels followed in an open plane, his face anesthetized with cold. When his graphic artist Schweitzer ('Mjölñir') showed him his latest poster designs, he felt that his old friend was running out of steam—but then so was everybody.

The Goebbels Diary for the last weeks before the November 1932 election lacked the sense of urgency and intrigue that had characterized it in July and August. Only rarely did anything of the old fun element surface in this campaign. He ordered the marxist districts plastered with stickers reading simply 'VOTE LIST 1 AGAIN' ('without stating which party that is'): The less sophisticated would assume that List 1 was the Reds.³⁸ He lured the German National party (D.N.V.P.) into accepting a public debate with him: In the hall the opponents provided him with only two hundred tickets, an inconvenience which Goebbels circumvented with the aid of *Angriff's* printers, who turned out two thousand more. When his opponents arrived, they found his men had taken over most of the hall.³⁹

Nov

On C
the fore
in poin
Hinden
relish fr
neither
the sam
to refra
civilian
the part

Towa
decided
port str
election
public t
grievan
Kampn
ally qui
away as
the picl
commu
and wr
express
right.⁴⁴

'invente
ledge o
Führer.
his clai
the stril
from the
the wor
control
expandi
their el
party, c
munists
(or 28-
bourgeo
ters the
ready to
on their
until the

Altho
single p
von Alw
Gregor
time on

Nov 9, 1932

FOLLOW THAT MAN 147

On October 20 he ordered the Jewish problem placed more firmly to the forefront—citing Papen's Jewish adviser Jakob Goldschmidt as a case in point.⁴⁰ He also ordered gau officials to start systematic rumors that Hindenburg had already written off Papen. After quoting with perverse relish from the D.N.V.P.'s organ ('Goebbels is a male Rosa Luxemburg—neither a pretty sight; both are of Jewish countenance. He is impelled by the same burning ambition to incite and to lie')⁴¹ he ordered his troops to refrain from similar personal insults. However, disguised as harmless civilians, his officials were to cluster around Nazi poster hoardings singing the party's praises.⁴²

Towards the campaign's end there was an odd episode: Goebbels decided that his Nazis were to back a communist-organized Berlin transport strike. It was as though he had lost sight of the Nazi party's larger election horizon. His men had heavily infiltrated the B.V.G., the capital's public transport authority. The transport workers probably had legitimate grievances, and Goebbels had remained at heart a socialist agitator. Kampmann, his propaganda chief, would claim that the strike was actually quite popular.⁴³ But the public's backing of the Nazi party melted away as all the usual brutish signs of union intimidation appeared, with the pickets this time wearing Nazi armbands. Together the Nazi and communist strikers terrorized strike breakers, ripped up streetcar lines, and wrecked buses. The liberal rightwing *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* expressed concern about the spread of class-warfare to the extreme right.⁴⁴ 'The bourgeois press,' Goebbels would write in *Kaiserhof*, 'invented the lie that I instigated this strike without the Führer's knowledge or consent . . . although I am in hourly phone contact with the Führer.' This self-defense is to be regarded with as much skepticism as his claim that the Berlin public displayed an 'admirable solidarity' with the strikers. Less hollow rings his excuse that to have withheld support from the strikers would have confounded all their recruiting efforts among the workers. Perhaps Goebbels had seen a chance for the Nazis to seize control of the strike and shortcut the tedious democratic process by expanding it into a full-blooded coup. But the strike backfired badly on their election campaign. Nationwide, two million voters deserted the party, costing them thirty-four of their 230 Reichstag seats. The communists gained strongly.⁴⁵ In Berlin, the Nazi vote slumped from 757,000 (or 28.6 percent) in July to 720,000 (or twenty-six percent) now. The bourgeois press gloated over this setback. At his Voss Strasse headquarters the next day he found his party and S.A. officers in ugly mood—'all ready to strike out again,' he wrote, a clear indication that a coup was still on their mind.⁴⁶ Hitler however ordained, 'There will be no negotiating until this regime and the parties backing it have been totally defeated.'⁴⁷

Although the German electorate had confirmed the Nazis as the largest single party, their opponents still clung on to the chancellorship. Count von Alvensleben reported that Papen hoped Hitler would come to terms; Gregor Strasser, it seemed, suddenly agreed with Papen, and for the first time on November 9 Goebbels recorded real venom about him. 'Let's

Oct 20

Nov 9

1932

148 II: THE GAULEITER OF BERLIN

hope that Fatso Gregor doesn't put his foot in it. He's so disloyal. . . I warn [Hitler] against Strasser.⁴⁸ Hitler however wrote to Papen, still refusing to do a deal.⁴⁹ Papen resigned on the sixteenth.⁵⁰

Nov 19

Now Hindenburg again summoned Hitler to Berlin. On the nineteenth, parting the cheering crowds outside the Kaiserhof, Hitler drove over to the presidential palace in a limousine. After a ninety-minute talk, in which he explained his party's program once more to Hindenburg, Hitler assured his henchmen that he still would not accept any compromise. Hindenburg however wanted to revert to parliamentary rule. Hitler wrote him on the twenty-first, then took Goebbels to the opera—Wagner's *Meistersinger* for the *n*th time.⁵¹

Nov 30

Hindenburg turned Hitler's proposals down. Some of Goebbels' faction urged that the time had come to seize power, at least in Prussia. For a few days Hitler remained at the Kaiserhof as a passive observer while Papen and Schleicher vied with each other for the coveted chancellorship prize. In Weimar on November 30 for the Thuringian election campaign, Goebbels heard from Hitler that Schleicher had made fresh overtures to him. Goebbels attended a three-hour council of war with Hitler, Frick, Göring, and Strasser. Again Strasser was the only one in favor of a compromise—joining a Cabinet under Schleicher, failing which the party seemed to be doomed to the political wilderness in perpetuity.⁵² Admanantly seconded by Goebbels, Hitler again refused to consider accepting the vice-chancellorship.⁵³

Dec 2

Terror
at the
Kaiserhof.
This could
bleed
them
badly

General von Schleicher sent a new intermediary, Lieutenant-Colonel Eugen Ott. The press ached and heaved with curiosity. Hitler stood firm. 'Follow that man!' marveled Goebbels. 'Then we shall triumph.' Unable to sway Hitler, on December 2 Hindenburg appointed Schleicher as chancellor.⁵⁴ Needing to neutralize the Nazi threat, Schleicher began to cultivate Gregor Strasser instead of Hitler. Goebbels learned that they had met on Sunday the fourth, and that Schleicher had offered Strasser the vice-chancellorship which Hitler had spurned, and had hinted at ministerial positions for any other renegade Nazis as well.

The new Reichstag would shortly meet. As Hitler warned the Nazi bloc in harsh terms about any tendency toward compromise, Goebbels saw Strasser's features harden. Two days later, hearing more specific rumors about Strasser's treachery, Hitler took him to task. Strasser picked up his hat and left: left the room, left politics, and ultimately (nineteen months later) this life. Julius Streicher called out, 'Exit the traitor!' Goebbels limped from group to group of the Nazi deputies, dispensing further details of Strasser's treachery.

Dec 8

At midday on the eighth Hitler received at the Kaiserhof a letter from Strasser resigning all his high party offices on account of the refusal to cut a deal with the new chancellor.⁵⁵ Simultaneously Strasser invited all the senior gauleiters—whom Hitler had just appointed as Landesinspektoren—to meet him (except Goebbels). Since August, he told them, Hitler had displayed no clear line except for his monotonous demand to be chancellor. 'He has got to realize that in the long run he

has no pros
ruined. Nor
entourage. 'I
and the rest:
egoist who c
and Röhm a
vidual partic
dered—like c
of Strasser's

At two A.M.
the *Täglicher*
party falls af
minutes!⁵⁸

The morn
sobered down
ishly echoed
adjoined un
his suite at th
and probably
said Hitler, h
movement a
portable bust
detain me on
before. Strass
von Reichena
would open fi
said, was bou
speech was 'f
for Strasser.
his hand. Stra
this.⁶²

Hitler was v
apprentice. T
correct: and th
had tortured h

Still relucta
that Strasser h
published a m
day.⁶⁴ He wou
Strasser, he h
afterward that
Austria and a c
Satan in a hur

1932

o disloyal. . . I
to Papen, still

Nov 19
the nineteenth,
drove over to
minute talk, in
Lenburg, Hitler
y compromise.
le. Hitler wrote
era—Wagner's

of Goebbels'
ast in Prussia.
observer while
chancellorship
tion campaign,
sh overtures to
Hitler, Frick,
in favor of a
which the party
betuity.⁵² Ada-
sider accepting

enant-Colonel
ler stood firm.
mph.' Unable
Schleicher as
cher began to
ned that they
fered Strasser
had hinted at

ned the Nazi
ise, Goebbels
more specific
trasser picked
tely (nineteen
t the traitor!'
as, dispensing

f a letter from
the refusal to
ser invited all
ted as Lan-
ugust, he told
monotonous
long run he

has no prospect of attaining this target.' He refused to see the party ruined. Nor would he put up any longer with the intriguing by Hitler's entourage. 'I have no desire to fall in behind Göring, Goebbels, Röhm, and the rest.' (According to Hans Frank he described Göring as a brutal egoist who cared nothing for Germany, Goebbels as 'a hobbling devil,' and Röhm as a 'swine'.)⁵⁶ One gauleiter later reported: 'After the individual participants had overcome their dismay, they went off bewildered—like children who have lost their father.' Gauleiter Rust took word of Strasser's mutinous remarks to Hitler at the Kaiserhof.⁵⁷

At two A.M. Goebbels found Hitler there studying the first edition of the *Täglicher Rundschau*. It headlined Strasser's bid for power. 'If the party falls apart now,' he told Goebbels, 'I'll finish myself off in three minutes!'⁵⁸

The morning's 'Judenpresse' fawned on Strasser, which probably sobered down some of his supporters.⁵⁹ Only Gottfried Feder had foolishly echoed his complaints.⁶⁰ After that day's Reichstag session—it adjourned until mid-January 1933—Hitler spoke to all the gauleiters in his suite at the Kaiserhof. His speech was a masterpiece of tragic oratory, and probably saved the party from oblivion.⁶¹ If they deserted him now, said Hitler, his life's work no longer had any purpose. 'Apart from this movement and my appointed mission,' he declared, glancing at the portable bust of Geli on the mantelpiece, 'I have nothing now that could detain me on this earth.' He tore apart Strasser's arguments of the day before. Strasser had hinted at the path of illegality. But General Walter von Reichenau, army chief of staff, had warned that the army and police would open fire. Reichenau himself had urged patience—the party, he said, was bound to achieve power legally sooner or later. The whole speech was 'fabulously sure-footed,' in Goebbels' words—'annihilating for Strasser. . . . Spontaneous ovation at the end, everybody gave Hitler his hand. Strasser is isolated. A dead man! I have fought for six years for this.'⁶²

Hitler was unquestionably the master, and Strasser only the sorcerer's apprentice. Two months later, events would prove Hitler's strategy correct: and this would temper the loyalty of every high party official who had tortured his conscience this day.

Still reluctant to make a final break, Hitler's press office announced that Strasser had only gone on three weeks' leave.⁶³ Goebbels' newspaper published a more malicious valedictory; he had to disown it the same day.⁶⁴ He would continue his feud with Strasser to the bitter end. As for Strasser, he had left for the sunnier climes of Italy; he told friends afterward that Germany was now at the mercy of a congenital liar from Austria and a clubfooted dwarf, of which the latter was the worst. 'He is Satan in a human's image.'⁶⁵

1932

19: 'It's All Fixed!'

WE have just completed,' reported Louis P. Lochner in December 1932 to his daughter, 'one of the hardest months of reporting in my career. . . . I tell you,' Lochner added, 'we had no end of excitement.'¹

Goebbels had inevitably neglected the provincial election in Thuringia and the party's vote there slumped by forty percent. Wakening to the realization that the Nazi party was in danger of electoral extinction, he took immediate action to revitalize the propaganda campaign: Blaming Dr Lippert for the tactless remarks about Strasser, he replaced him as editor of *Angriff* by Kampmann.² Hanke told him that the deputy chief of national propaganda, Heinz Franke, had allowed his Munich organization to go to seed. Goebbels replaced him with Wilhelm Haegert, a sound and popular attorney on his own legal staff.³

After consultation with Goebbels, on December 15 Hitler drafted a memorandum explaining how the party was to pack more punch into the election battle.⁴

In the first two weeks of Schleicher's chancellorship a quarter-million more Germans had been thrown out of work. On December 15 the general delivered an insipid broadcast on his economic program. Goebbels wrote a caustic commentary in *Angriff* entitled 'The Program without a Program.' The people were now too weak, he wrote there a few days later, even to clench their fists.⁵

As he toured the gau's Christmas parties at the historic Pharos Rooms and the Veterans' Building, he saw worse scenes of poverty than ever before.⁶

RETURNING home immediately after the Strasser brouhaha he has found Magda feeling ill. She is pregnant again. He is still madly in love with her—Magda tells Ello that their honeymoon is going to last ten more years yet. Her husband worries constantly about her as he mounts his new propaganda campaign. His hours grow longer and longer. Sometimes he creeps in at three A.M.; when Magda weakly scolds him he brings her roses. Her illness will not go away. When, at some of the Christmas parties, he glances at the beautiful society women, Providence immediately raps his knuckles. Magda collapses on Christmas Eve and is borne off in floods of tears with a miscarriage. 'Just perfect,' he curses in his diary. 'Now everybody else has their gifts and fare, let my own Christmas

begin!'⁸ He wheel the w

Then, th
for Magda
election ca
national pr
burning gla
voters.' He

Hitler inv
in the clinic
the news fr
unimaginat
seismic sou
Papen and
Year's Eve l
first hours
waits for th
'I am nothi
her fever is
begin? Horr
he arrives t
venous tub
Over the ne
to see her.

FOR an anal
written diar
pensable to
than their st
gynecologist
turned out.¹
Hugenberg,
second or th
He now dis
sometimes o
with snow.
Cologne hor
on this mee
denburg's e
return for th
on the Nazis

Goebbels
another you
Year's Day.
coffin for th
members an
The figur

1932-1933

'It's ALL FIXED!' 151

begin!⁸ He and Harald set up a Christmas tree outside her ward and wheel the whole glittering contraption in.

Then, thrusting aside all the trappings of Christmas, he sketches out for Magda on a white-lacquered clinic stool his plan for the upcoming election campaign in little Lippe. The Nazi party will focus its entire national propaganda machinery on the tiny rural constituency, like a burning glass. None of the other parties is bothering with Lippe's 150,000 voters.⁹ He has Hitler alone speak at sixteen meetings there.

Hitler invites the Goebbels family to the Obersalzberg. Leaving Magda in the clinic, Goebbels takes Harald down there on the twenty-eighth but the news from Berlin steadily worsens and he begins to brood upon the unimaginable, a future without Magda. He pays scant attention to the seismic sounds of fresh political upheaval—the renewed billets-doux from Papen and Alvensleben to Hitler. All joy has left the political fray. New Year's Eve brings word of a relapse and of Magda refusing to eat. The first hours of 1933 see him hurrying by sled and car to Munich; as he waits for the overnight train to Berlin the power of prayer returns to him. 'I am nothing without her,' he writes. The clinic tells him by phone that her fever is worsening. She is at death's door. 'Is this how 1933 is to begin? Horrifying! Even so, I shall stand and fight.' The next morning he arrives to find the crisis over. Magda lies there weeping, with intravenous tubes still connected to her arm, but the fever has passed on.¹⁰ Over the next weeks she makes a slow recovery, and Hitler often comes to see her.

FOR an analysis of the epoch-making events of January 1933 the handwritten diaries of Dr Goebbels, preserved in Moscow, are an indispensable tool.¹¹ For a biographer however their content is less revealing than their structure. True, he was preoccupied with Magda's illness; her gynecologist Professor Walter Stoeckel had already written her off, it turned out.¹² As Hitler's and Göring's meetings resumed with Schleicher, Hugenberg, and Papen, Goebbels dutifully recorded them—but only at second or third hand. On January 4 he launched the Lippe campaign: He now discovered rural Germany, speaking in tiny farming villages sometimes of only a few houses and barns surrounded by fields glistening with snow. Meanwhile Hitler and Himmler secretly met Papen at the Cologne home of a young banker friend of the party.¹³ Briefing Goebbels on this meeting, Hitler said that the ex-chancellor still claimed Hindenburg's ear and was now willing to offer Hitler the chancellorship in return for the vice-chancellor's office for himself.¹⁴ But much depended on the Nazis winning a convincing victory at Lippe.

Goebbels shuttled between Berlin and Lippe. Leftists had murdered another young Nazi, the tailor's apprentice Walter Wagnitz, on New Year's Day. Goebbels gave him a funeral fit for a prince, parading the coffin for three hours in drizzling rain past a hundred thousand party members and formations of the S.A., S.S., and Hitler Youth.

The figure of Gregor Strasser still haunted the pages of his diary.

Jan 4

1932

II

Reichsführer S.S.

u

Though the appointment of Himmler to the command of the S.S. was for Hitler a matter of expediency, for the man himself it was a moment of fulfilment. He was now Reichsführer S.S. This new, high-sounding title was in itself a challenge to his tenacity and an inspiration to the particular vision germinating in his brain, his own interpretation of what Hitler, with his aid, might make of the German people in the distant future.

Himmler was now twenty-eight, a young man with a pregnant wife older than himself, and a modest smallholding. To be Reichsführer S.S. based on Munich was to be in command of less than 300 men, and there were limits even to this very minor place of power. In Berlin, the centre of radical action stirred up by Goebbels's violent propaganda, Kurt Daluge was also appointed by Hitler to be head of the local S.S. and empowered to operate independently of Himmler, who was in any case regarded, along with his force, as subordinate not only to Hitler but to the general organization of the S.A., the brownshirt Party battalions on the streets. The S.S. was in fact a force within a force, its special task nominally the protection of Hitler and other Nazi leaders at meetings, rallies and parades. But, according to Gunther d'Alquen, who was later to become editor of *Das Schwarze Korps*, the special journal of the S.S., Hitler had instructed his Reichsführer S.S. to make the corps into an utterly dependable body of carefully selected men.

Himmler was therefore able to indulge his vision. In spite of his sloping shoulders, his close-cropped hair, his neatly trimmed moustache and rimless pince-nez with its ear-chains suitable for a respectable clerk, he saw his unit of Black Guards as an *élite* band of warriors whose unique character would elevate them far above the street-ruffians of the S.A. They were to be made into Hitler's knights-at-arms.

This elevation of his men became Himmler's great obsession. The fact that he played comparatively little part in the day-by-day strategy and intrigue with which Hitler, Göring and Goebbels worked their way to power between 1929 and 1933 did not at this stage trouble him. He had his own bright, particular star to follow. His immediate ambitions in the Party were fulfilled for a while by his command of the S.S. and by the seat in the Reichstag that was allocated to him after the 1930 elections. His domestic ambitions, such as they might be, were fulfilled when his wife had given birth to their child, Gudrun, in 1929. Marga Himmler was attended by a Dr Brack, whose son, Dr Viktor Brack, was some twelve years later to take charge of Himmler's euthanasia programme, after first serving him in the capacity of a chauffeur.

The S.S. did not expand suddenly under Himmler's leadership. The years 1929 and 1930 represent primarily a period of preparation; the final stage of expansion came later, as we shall see, during 1931, when many thousands of men were added to the force. Their initial duties, when the S.S. had been summoned to roll-calls and allocated in groups to accompany various Party speakers to their meetings, were by then superseded; by 1931 the S.S. had other work, at once more secret and more spectacular.

The first substantial stage in the establishment of a permanent, élite corps came when Himmler issued, in January 1932, the notorious marriage code for the members of the S.S. The code was based on the principles outlined by Walter Darré in his book *Um Blut und Boden* (*Blood and Soil*), which was published under the auspices of the Party in Munich in 1929.

Darré was Hitler's agricultural expert, and he had come to believe in selective breeding as a result of his studies. He was born in the Argentine in 1895, and had been educated in England at King's College School, Wimbledon. He had for a while been a civil servant in the Prussian Ministry of Agriculture, but had been dismissed in 1929 after a disagreement with his colleagues. In the same year he published a book on the peasantry as the life source of the Nordic race. His ambition was to become Reich Minister of Agriculture, and this indeed is what he became in 1933.

Darré is of importance only because of the hardening influence he had on certain of Himmler's prejudices, which were later to develop into dire obsessions. Darré was some five years older than Himmler, and in a movement that found it expedient to encourage

1931

Jan
1932

1933

unsci
gand:
close:
pouff
Gern
Ro
Baltic
escap
had t
In hi
he de
creed
abstr
and
more
and
Rose
domi
Gern
unde
hand
of so
a vic
In
ideal
and
Himl
In
was
essen
and t
futur
it wa
shini
Slavs
whos
Hi
said,
joine
Settl

1930 ; mls.

REICHSFÜHRER S.S.

21 u

unscientific theories if the results arrived at were useful as propaganda, Darré became an accepted 'thinker' on behalf of the Nazis, closely linked with Alfred Rosenberg, one of the principal propounders of the myth which convinced the Party that the true Germans possessed a unique racial superiority.

Rosenberg was of German stock, but he had been born in the Baltic town of Reval and had studied architecture in Moscow before escaping to Germany at the time of the Russian Revolution. He had become editor of Hitler's journal *Völkischer Beobachter* in 1923. In his book *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, published in 1924, he declared the humane ideals of Christian Europe to be a useless creed. What Europe needed, he said, was to be freed from the soft, abstract Christian principles derived from Asia Minor and the East, and to discover a new philosophy, which would be rooted once more in the entrails of the earth and recognize the racial superiority and cleanliness of Nordic man. 'A culture always decays', wrote Rosenberg, 'when humanitarian ideals . . . obstruct the right of the dominant race to rule those it has subjugated.' He saw in the German people the race endowed by nature with a true, mystic understanding, a 'religion of the blood'. Christianity, on the other hand, taught the decadent doctrine that all races shared an equality of soul, which the German race would soon show to be nothing but a vicious and insidious illusion.

In place of the meek and all-forgiving, Rosenberg created the ideal of the 'powerful, earth-bound figure', the 'strong peasant', and it was at this point that Darré, Rosenberg's disciple and Himmler's teacher, took over the spiritual education of his leader.

In *Blood and Soil*, Darré gave his reasons why the German race was so especially privileged. His assumptions were based on the essential nobility of the Nordic peasantry, whose blood was as rich and fruitful as the soil they tilled. So great was their virtue that the future strength of Europe depended on the survival of their stock; it was essential they should breed and multiply until their blond and shining youth outnumbered and outfaced the lurking, decadent Slavs and Jews, whose blood was poison to the human race and whose haunts were the healthless streets of towns and cities.¹

Himmler's energies during this initial period were, as we have said, devoted to the theory and practice of the S.S. In 1931 Darré joined his staff to organize the department known as the Race and Settlement Office, *Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt* (R.U.S.H.A.). This

April 1932
 of the year he had assembled a small staff of helpers, and in 1932 (during a period of which, April to July, the S.A. and S.S. organizations were, officially at least, disbanded by the German government), Himmler used Heydrich's skill and experience to help him reorganize the whole movement. In the summer Heydrich was promoted a colonel and given the title of Chief of the *Sicherheitsdienst*, but by then his influence was spread throughout the service, and he founded for Himmler an S.S. *Junkerschule*,⁷ an élite leadership school at Bad-Toelz in Upper Bavaria.

16 mmo
 By now the S.S. was a substantial force. Although the original 280 men whom Himmler found under him in January 1929 had increased by January 1931 to only 400 enlisted members, supplemented by some 1,500 part-time recruits, there were by the time the Brüning government disbanded the S.A. and the S.S. in April 1932 as many as 30,000 S.S. men. The organization, however, still remained nominally a part of the S.A.

With the rapid growth of the S.S., a more comprehensive form of para-military organization had to be devised. In this Himmler sought the advice of Heydrich who, in addition to his organization of the S.D., became in effect Himmler's Chief of Staff in the development of the S.S. as a whole, which was spread in units throughout Germany. Officers in certain centres such as Berlin, where Daluge controlled the S.S., acted with complete independence, and paid little or no attention to headquarters in Munich. The S.S. was now subjected to specialist departments for administration, training and discipline; among them was Heydrich's unit which, while claiming to be the intelligence section, was in fact a highly organized spy-ring with an increasing network of carefully graded agents and informers. A filing system was devised so that every useful detail about the public and private lives of every individual working for or against the Party, whether he was inside or outside it, was recorded, more especially if the information was of such a nature that it could at any time in the future be extracted and used as a weapon against him. The ultimate strength of Himmler and Heydrich came very much to depend on the fear the existence of these files generated once it became known that they were the closely-guarded possession of the S.D. Heydrich modelled his department on what he regarded as the British spy system, which he held to be the most efficient in the world.

The year 1932 was a period of difficulty and dissension for the

Part
 led l
 by c
 their
 to a
 enco
 the r
 form
 beca
 the 1
 100,
 givin
 the s
 Th
 disse
 whic
 S.A.
 an o)
 they
 He a
 from
 to pl
 Expl
 victo
 It wa
 Roeb
 to re
 appo
 work
 able:
 the S
 round
 and C
 homc
 mean
 and f
 clearl
 Hlr
 circle,
 each

sixth. Thereupon the Japanese landed in Shanghai at the end of January, 1932, drove out the Chinese army and destroyed the Chapei Quarter. On February 18, 1932, an 'independent' empire of Manchukuo, consisting of three raped Chinese provinces, was proclaimed in Manchuria. China protested to the League of Nations, of which Japan was still a member; the League sent a commission to Asia, led by an English statesman, the Earl of Lytton.

Was it for this that 'the war to end wars' had been fought? The Japanese assault on China profoundly stirred everyone who had previously believed in the peace of Geneva. At such a time, it attracted little attention when Brüning declared in an interview (January 9, 1932) that 'Germany's position makes the continuation of political payments impossible'; and that these payments would inevitably lead the rest of the world 'to catastrophe.' In Asia, a great nation had been cut to pieces because it was unarmed and torn by internal conflicts. This was exactly the situation in Germany, said Hitler, and he was not the only one to say so.

And let nobody believe, he went on, that this German weakness would be turned into strength by the Disarmament Conference, which, after endless preparations, finally was going to meet at Geneva, Switzerland, in February, 1932. No conference would make Germany strong again, but only the nation's own firm will. The official German line was that the aim of the Disarmament Conference must be to bring about the disarmament of the great nations, as it was promised in the Versailles Treaty, which explicitly had stated that Germany's disarmament should only be a first step toward general disarmament. Hitler asked mockingly if anybody was so naïve as to hope that this promise would be kept; the answer was that to insist on her right was Germany's biggest asset in international politics.

Groener handed the cabinet a memorandum stating that now, after thirteen years of unilateral disarmament, Germany must finally insist on equality of armaments. The world was spending seventy per cent more on armaments than in 1914; this at least was the estimate of President Hoover in a speech to the International Chamber of Commerce (May 4, 1931). Three days after Brüning had declared that he would pay no more reparations, Soviet Russia

issued a public statement, placing herself on the disarmament question: peace, she declared, disarmament, and disarmament 'requires the sion of the principle of complete equality of s pator in the conference [of disarmament], w small power.'

In all this clamoring for equality by disarmament was hidden. If Germany could not reach equality of armament, then there was only one way left: rearmament.

Amid the blackest domestic misery, Germany became a respected power in the crumbling Brüning accepted Hitler's line, that foreign su on unity and strength at home, and invited understanding with the government. Groener on Germany's equality of armaments January, shortly before Brüning announced t reparations. Germany took a deep breath, a strength. Hitler paced the floor of the edit *Völkischer Beobachter* in Munich; with him we and Wilhelm Weiss, one of the editors. A telegram Hitler. It was signed Groener and requested his ference in Berlin. Hitler hastily read the wire under the nose of all those present, and uttered like a contented beast of prey. By turns, he brc to Hess's, Rosenberg's, and Weiss's, stared in th cries of, 'Hey . . . hey . . . hey . . . '—as if he w see? You see? . . . Here we are, at last.' Then he fist on the telegram and cried: 'Now I have t' They have recognized me as a partner in their

EFEAT

R CONFERRED WITH GROENER, ining. Two years ago he had been an ow the future of the Reich was to be . The outward pretext for the meetings adenburg's seven-year term was due to 'president had to be elected. The most xt to Hindenburg was already Hitler, nd the person of Hitler was bound to ts, and inner conflicts could be fatal for hen she was fighting for recognition as ad Brüning had not been mistaken in understand the situation. As always in ot quite sure of his own position. Both doubtless come to power in the not too e would realize that until then Brüning an he himself those foreign concessions d not hope to govern. What Brüning pport in a kind of peaceful *coup d'état*. ould simply be suppressed. The Reichs- ong the present President's term as long is; it could suspend the entire constitu- irds of its members were present, and esent decided for the suspension. Hitler ajority, for the Chancellor thought he be other parties. Hitler made counter-

proposals: first elect a new Reichstag — for he calculated correctly that in the meantime the number of his followers had considerably increased; but then, why not simply re-elect Hindenburg by virtually unanimous popular vote, without an opponent except the inevitable Communist? 'Democracy,' as he later put it in an open letter to Brüning, 'espouses the view that all state power issues from the people and hence all the representatives of the state power are only mandatories of the popular will. No domestic and foreign arguments against new elections can ever be a license to infringe upon the constitution. . . .' Incited by Goebbels and Röhm he wrote, over Brüning's head, a letter to Hindenburg, telling him that Brüning was planning to make the President infringe on the constitution; against this Hitler felt obliged to warn him; but he was willing to work with Hindenburg in the coming elections if Hindenburg previously stated that he disapproved Brüning's unconstitutional proposal. 'Then Brüning is done for,' said Hitler to Goebbels; and to Hindenburg's secretary of state, Doctor Otto Meissner, he said: yes, he, Hitler, would agree to nothing, unless Brüning were dismissed first.

From this moment on, Hindenburg entered Hitler's life, and Hitler entered the life of the old man. It was an encounter between two men made great by history and created for one another, and the encounter was not only political but personal as well. When the two were face to face, the corners of their mouths seemed to show something like the grin of Titans who see through one another and contemptuously conceal the fact. Up to his last breath, Hindenburg treated the Bohemian corporal, the former Reichswehr spy, with ungrateful contempt; he gave him no credit for his really great achievements and regarded him neither as a personal nor political equal, but brushed him off like dust from his fingers. Hitler in turn saw through the foxlike, self-seeking old man behind the colossal legend, and in his intimate circle complained bitterly that Fate should have given him no more worthy adversary. The square head, the bushy mustache, the close-cropped hair, the lurking eyes — Hitler must have been terrified at the close resemblance between the old marshal and Alois Hitler, the customs official. From some of the Bohemian corporal's words and gestures, we almost

1932

1932

specimen

DER FUEHRER

And half a century later, Alfred Rosenberg Those are the words of a Herr.'

n were there actually? German statistics, and well able to compute the amount of edles produced in a year, never counted the is, the number of East German landowners ; property was never officially revealed. But hannes Conrad, an economist writing in the ted 11,015 large landowners; together they 113 of them owned from 12,000 to 25,000 res; the largest landowner was doubtless the with 415,000 acres.

red Hitler's life, and his struggle for powen no small measure a struggle with them m. At first the junkers were full of distrust. asses in the eastern plains often struggled owning aristocracy; for it was the Uprooted lay laborers and hired hands, who began to fill in the country. The National Socialists in-elf-confidence they had never before known sed the large landowners to protect property; é or Gregor Strasser spoke to the masses, they opposite. Gottfried Feder, the breaker of in-till regarded himself as the spiritual founder n, proclaimed that after its victory his party f small peasants in the East, 'with farm beside ds, that he would smash many of the large, l unprofitable estates.

ich had thrown large sums of money into the : of East Germany. Taxes had been remitted, gifts; but above all, the state intervened when erburdened his property with debt and could nterest—in other words, when he went bank- ing establishment set up by the state assumed reditors, and frequently became the creditor—ften meant that the money was lost for good, hundred and eighty million marks were given

* Separate note of P.T. — This is a note, to find the right kind of little that. DEFEAT 443

to Eastern agriculture and vanished like a drop of water in a giant sponge; in March, 1931, it was decided to pour in another nine hundred million marks in the course of the following years. And that was not all, for in the warehouses of the Reich there lay about a billion marks' worth of unsalable potato spirits, which the state had purchased from the big potato producers with the taxpayers' money.

This was the *Osthilfe* (Eastern aid). It cannot be said that the small group of junkers received most of this money; it is even true that per acre the small owners received higher sums than the big ones. It was the single cases of feudal favoritism that stirred up public opinion. Cases came to light such as that of Herr von Q., who had squandered his whole fortune in light company and then applied for *Osthilfe*; the official to whom he applied turned down his request, but his superior, himself a baron, decided that the debts which von Q. had incurred on gambling and women must be paid from the taxpayers' money in order to preserve his estate, 'since it has belonged to the family for several hundred years.' The family of the former Kaiser, one of the wealthiest men of Germany, took their share; old Oldenburg-Januschau used the sum, with which he was supposed to bolster up his three insolvent estates, in order to buy a fourth; when the scandal came to light, he wrote indignantly in the German press that everyone else had done the same, and his article began with the words:

"The aged pelican said: "Be fair,

You folks, now let me have my share."

But the problem of the German East and its junkers was something bigger and more serious than this scandal. That such a group with its petrified class consciousness should still exist, tearing and tugging at the political body: this was the real problem. For it was actually the last remaining group in Germany with an exclusive class consciousness. For years it had been steadily losing political power; its economic straits were growing worse and worse, and now it was struggling desperately against extinction. At first Britning had believed it unjust to let the big Eastern landowners suffer more than their share from the world crisis; for that reason

1932

had formed a new organization with an unprecedented propagandist appeal. The old 'Black, Red, and Gold Reichsbanner,' the fighting organization of the Social Democrats and the trade unions, had been reorganized under a new leadership. The new organization was called the 'Iron Front'; it tried to emulate the Communist principle of organizing the workers in the larger factories into self-contained combat groups; and it began to make preparations for a serious civil war. The idea was to win a firm grip on some of the big, strategically important factories, and by threatening nationwide sabotage to cut the nerves and sinews of any political coup before it started.

This front bore the actual burden of Hindenburg's election campaign. But even if the democratic masses rallied to Hindenburg, the candidate himself was no democrat—as has often been the case with the leading figures of democracy, and not only in Germany. Since labor leaders and capitalists were both for Hindenburg, Hitler might well have cried out: There you have it, Isaac and Moses Cohn, the capitalist and the labor leader arm in arm, a pair of brothers wanting the same thing. True, for some time he had been moderating this tone—association with big industrialists and bankers had doubtless taught him caution. But in the provinces his speakers made no bones about calling Hindenburg the candidate of the Jews. The Communists, in turn, required no great flight of the imagination to represent Social Democratic support of the Kaiser's field marshal as a 'betrayal of the workers.' As seven years before, they chose Ernst Thaelmann, their party chairman, as their candidate.

Hitler set himself up as the candidate of the workers and the masses in opposition to Hindenburg. He described conditions in a sentence that was effective and not untrue: 'Things have come to such a pass that two workingmen must feed one unemployed.' When asked by what right he set himself above all the authorities, specialists, ministers, and excellencies, Hitler declared: 'With the right of a man who comes of the nameless mass that is the people' and Groener may again have scented Bolshevism. In an open letter to Hindenburg, Hitler complained about persecution by the police: 'Even you, Herr Reichs President, cannot set aside the

article of the constitution which provides for freedom of speech. I am hard to uphold the strategic line that this was a venerable field marshal, but against Brüning a man,' said Hitler, embarrassed and not quite to you too much to suffer that those whom we want use you as a front. We are sorry, but you must want to fight, and so do we. . . . Most of the loss in this election fight, and many decided for Fritz Thyssen, the heavy industrialist, declared: Adolf Hitler, because I know him well and am that he is the only man who can and will rescue ruin and disintegration.'

And all blows were permitted! Röhm put in readiness; he ordered them to gather barracks; flying commandoes stood ready to of the Reichswehr. A ring of National Socialists thrown around Berlin; the families of the Socialists left the capital. Then Röhm called on good boy and informed him that he had taken a measures; nothing of importance. But Reichswel in different reports, and Groener began to quarrel saying that this was beginning to look dangerous. longer followed his adviser without question. Schleicher refused to recognize the danger of a the S.A., Groener wrote a letter to Carl Severing, Democratic Minister of the Interior, calling on him another open letter to Hitler, demanding that he live aims,' and 'thus destroy the grave anxiety of mans . . . over the dangers of a Bolshevik development police raided National Socialist headquarters, and of Röhm's order. Severing also found strategic revolutionary battle plans. And near the Polis strange thing was found: orders of local S.A. in case of a sudden Polish attack on Germany to take part in the defense. This was what Hitler threatened in his speeches and afterward represented it was high treason.

* D.H. This was my the center of my interest

1932

But the German voters showed with determination that they would not tolerate Hitler's *coup*. Hindenburg's campaign office had announced that he would receive 18,000,000 votes. Goebbels had retorted that on the day after elections the 'I' would have to be crossed off this figure. Hitler, more cautious and worried, admitted in a speech that regardless how the elections turned out, the fight would go on. As it happened, Hindenburg obtained 18,600,000 votes, Hitler only 11,300,000; the 2,500,000 of the upper class who supported the great-grandson of Abraham Selig Duesterberg found themselves hopelessly lost on the battlefield of democracy. The Communists garnered nearly five million votes for Thaelmann, two and a half times as many as seven years before.

March
1932

The victor's name was Hindenburg, but it was democracy that had really been victorious. Hindenburg's support consisted of the solid Social Democratic block of eight to nine million voters; some six million Catholic voters, who followed Brüning; and the greater part of the moderate liberal bourgeoisie. The figures clearly showed that only a small fraction of the conservative, reactionary, military-minded population had followed the old magnetism of Hindenburg's name. Goebbels was beside himself; he dashed to the telephone and asked Hitler in Munich whether the useless election battle should not be abandoned. It is possible, though not certain, that he asked whether the S.A. should not march and correct the election results by a *coup d'état*. Hitler rapidly countered the danger of unauthorized eruptions by the desperate announcement that he would continue the electoral struggle. This meant: I forbid violence; we remain legal.

For when all the figures were computed, it turned out that Hindenburg had not achieved an absolute majority. A second election was required by law, and in the very night of his defeat, Hitler dictated to Otto Dietrich, his press agent, a proclamation to show his disappointed and frightened followers that they had really won a great victory. 'From seven men we have grown to almost eleven and a half million,' he said. In difficult circumstances he always found consolation in recollecting the party's meager beginnings. Since 1930, he went on, they had gained five million votes. As Duesterberg's votes 'rightly' belonged to them, they really had

13,800,000, and needed only 'to snatch two and the enemy's front'—with such juggling he tried to make his followers that a hard task was really easy.

He changed his methods fundamentally. In he had attacked his enemies; in the second he the first he had painted the misery of Germany—up to the ears in debt, trembling from month checks will be protested, the municipalities facing collapse, the nation and the states with countries scoff at Germany and large ones destruction of Carthage no important people the German people'—now he described the future that would be embodied in himself. His apparition descending on Germany from Heaven. He hired a large Junkers plane and flew. Three, four, sometimes five times a day Hitler. ten thousand and over; millions saw him, and was so hoarse that he could scarcely emit a c to depict a picture of boundless future happiness Reich, every German girl will find a husband!

In this second campaign, Hitler was able to that really belonged to Hindenburg. The former Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, who his estates in Silesia, in the theaters, bars and sp capital, had quietly voted for Duesterberg in the second, in order to break publicly with Hitler. 'Since I regard it as absolutely necessary for to close its ranks, I shall vote for Adolf Hitler.'

One representative of this class, Hans Grimm, read novel about Germany's 'Lebensraum,' declared vote rather for Hitler's cause than for the 'cow' Hitler himself, because Hitler's 'new national come—and this is the greatest thing that can I more than he is'; therefore, and because there was his, Grimm's, vote for Hitler was meant, 'no Socialist Movement, not even for Hitler's pers Germany.'

St. D. T. I could not believe that he would be elected by him.

German voters showed with determination that they tolerate Hitler's *coup*. Hindenburg's campaign office need that he would receive 18,000,000 votes. Goebbels said that on the day after elections the 'I' would have to off this figure. Hitler, more cautious and worried, addressed speech that regardless how the elections turned out, the go on. As it happened, Hindenburg obtained 18,600,000 or only 11,300,000; the 2,500,000 of the upper class who he great-grandson of Abraham Selig Duesterberg found hopelessly lost on the battlefield of democracy. The s garnered nearly five million votes for Thaelmann, two times as many as seven years before.

or's name was Hindenburg, but it was democracy that been victorious. Hindenburg's support consisted of the Democratic block of eight to nine million voters; some Catholic voters, who followed Brüning; and the greater moderate liberal bourgeoisie. The figures clearly showed small fraction of the conservative, reactionary, military-pulation had followed the old magnetism of Hindene. Goebbels was beside himself; he dashed to the teleasked Hitler in Munich whether the useless election id not be abandoned. It is possible, though not certain, ed whether the S.A. should not march and correct the ults by a *coup d'état*. Hitler rapidly countered the danthorized eruptions by the desperate announcement that continue the electoral struggle. This meant: I forbid e remain legal.

1 all the figures were computed, it turned out that Hindid not achieved an absolute majority. A second election ed by law, and in the very night of his defeat, Hitler Otto Dietrich, his press agent, a proclamation to show his d and frightened followers that they had really won a y. 'From seven men we have grown to almost eleven million,' he said. In difficult circumstances he always solation in recollecting the party's meager beginnings. , he went on, they had gained five million votes. As g's votes 'rightly' belonged to them, they really had

13,800,000, and needed only 'to snatch two and a half millions from the enemy's front'—with such juggling he tried to persuade his followers that a hard task was really easy. *April 1932*

He changed his methods fundamentally. In the first campaign he had attacked his enemies; in the second he spoke of himself. In the first he had painted the misery of Germany—'the whole people up to the ears in debt, trembling from month to month that their checks will be protested, the municipalities ruined, whole cities facing collapse, the nation and the states without money. Small countries stoof at Germany and large ones despise us. Since the destruction of Carthage no important people has been treated like the German people'—now he described the brilliant, miraculous future that would be embodied in himself. He became the great apparition descending on Germany from Heaven—and that literally. He hired a large Junkers plane and flew from city to city. Three, four, sometimes five times a day Hitler spoke to crowds of ten thousand and over; millions saw him, and while sometimes he was so hoarse that he could scarcely emit a croak, he continued to depict a picture of boundless future happiness: 'In the Third Reich, every German girl will find a husband!'

In this second campaign, Hitler was able to win over the class that really belonged to Hindenburg. The Kaiser's eldest son, former Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, who led a merry life on his estates in Silesia, in the theaters, bars and sport stadiums of the capital, had quietly voted for Duesterberg in the first election. In the second, in order to break publicly with Hindenburg, he said: 'Since I regard it as absolutely necessary for the national front to close its ranks, I shall vote for Adolf Hitler.'

One representative of this class, Hans Grimm, author of a widely read novel about Germany's 'Lebensraum,' declared that he would vote rather for Hitler's cause than for the 'coarse and demagogic' Hitler himself, because Hitler's 'new national movement has become—and this is the greatest thing that can happen to a man—more than he is'; therefore, and because there was no other choice, his, Grimm's, vote for Hitler was meant, 'not for the National Socialist Movement, not even for Hitler's person, but for a new Germany.'

St. D. T. I could not believe how much he had by himself. I was

He knew that the more ordinary and mediocre the person, the larger were the dreams. To have reduced himself in many to the laughter of the faintest and withered Germany was no small feat. I could not even lay claim to have done most of it for him. In reality the goal, he had this strength & I will myself.

april '32

Poor fatherland. You must entrust yourself to the wolves unless you want to go to the dogs. And it did not even help. At the second election, Hitler, though increasing his vote to 13,400,000, was again defeated by Hindenburg with 19,300,000. In the decisive hour Thaelmann was abandoned by many; his vote fell to approximately 3,500,000.

One thing was clear after these elections: the large majority of Germans were opposed to National Socialism. But nothing else was clear. It was plain what the country was against, but not what it was for. Nevertheless, the elections surely gave the government a moral sanction to stamp out the smouldering flame of National Socialist civil war after so much hesitation. Groener was embittered; for many months he had believed firmly in Hitler's legality, he had even told him so publicly — and then suddenly the S.A. had drawn its ring around Berlin and armed for an attack on the arsenals of the Reichswehr.

But Schleicher had entirely different plans for the S.A. and not only for the S.A. In his conversations with Röhm a plan had matured by which both men had involved themselves in a treasonable plot, one against the state, the other against his party. The plan was to separate not only the S.A. but the other combat leagues from their parties by a sudden blow and put them under the jurisdiction of the state. At once Germany would have a 'militia' numbering millions, with Schleicher as their general. If the general suddenly felt that his chief, Groener, was in his way, Röhm had almost the same feeling toward Adolf Hitler. Röhm had become more and more open and confiding toward Schleicher; he had played Hitler into Schleicher's hands by telling him a number of unrepeatable stories about his Führer; in conversation with third parties, Schleicher boasted of knowing the most gruesome details.

Röhm was convinced that Germany was approaching a period of pure military rule; and not only Germany. In every country, he thought, there was a nucleus of soldierly men with an inner bond between them. It was immaterial under what party banners they had previously marched. For the parties were associations of shopkeepers; they had grown out of bourgeois interests and bourgeois experience; they pursued the aims of a peaceful world that seemed

to be doomed, and consequently they were equally true of the National Socialist Party. Hitler had firmly welded the S.A. Now the defeated in an election, and perhaps Hitler's to be wrong. Then it would be the hour of hanging over the country. If Röhm had known he might have recognized his own dream prophecy of rising European nihilism.

The unusual step which Röhm now took was the knowledge, even the wish, of Schleicher. At the same time, the S.A. was in contact with the 'Iron Front.' Among its leaders who had once worked closely with Röhm, might have called himself one of the inner circle. This was Karl Mayr, a former major in the Reichswehr, who had been a captain in that information section of the Reichswehr which had sent out Hitler as its liaison on the inner enemy, then to speak to the police squares. Mayr, a true genius in the department, euphemistically called 'information service,' had broken with the Reichswehr and all his political connections gone over to Social Democracy, had helped to create a people's army. When a new leader took over the Reichsbanner into the 'Iron Front,' Mayr remained in his own way. Röhm now turned to this old comrade. He asked, of bringing the S.A. and the Iron Front into the useless political windbags and 'make of Germany'?

Röhm was shrewd enough not to keep the secret from Hitler. The interview took place in Mayr's apartment, the trappings of a spy movie; behind a curtain, shorthand notes. Mayr asked Röhm what was going on that he could detach the S.A. from the Iron Front. He knew he had powerful and dangerous enemies. Mayr's comment on this was: Would you like to name of your future murderers? At that time

Pauli Raubal. + Eva Braun.

. You must entrust yourself to the wolves unless to the dogs. And it did not even help. At the Hitler, though increasing his vote to 13,400,000, was Hindenburg with 19,300,000. In the decisive hour abandoned by many; his vote fell to approximately

clear after these elections: the large majority of voted to National Socialism. But nothing else was what the country was against, but not what it less, the elections surely gave the government a stamp out the smouldering flame of National after so much hesitation. Groener was embittered months he had believed firmly in Hitler's legality, im so publicly—and then suddenly the S.A. had ound Berlin and armed for an attack on the ichswehr.

ad entirely different plans for the S.A. and not In his conversations with Röhm a plan had both men had involved themselves in a treason- inst the state, the other against his party. The e not only the S.A. but the other combat leagues y a sudden blow and put them under the juris- . At once Germany would have a 'militia' num- h Schleicher as their general. If the general sud- hief, Groener, was in his way, Röhm had almost ward Adolf Hitler. Röhm had become more and fiding toward Schleicher; he had played Hitler nds by telling him a number of unrepeatable threr; in conversation with third parties, Schlei- owing the most gruesome details.

iced that Germany was approaching a period of and not only Germany. In every country, he a nucleus of soldierly men with an inner bond was immaterial under what party banners they hed. For the parties were associations of shop- grown out of bourgeois interests and bourgeois sued the aims of a peaceful world that seemed

to be doomed, and consequently they were obsolete. This might be equally true of the National Socialist Party organization, to which Hitler had firmly welded the S.A. Now the party had again been defeated in an election, and perhaps Hitler's course would turn out to be wrong. Then it would be the hour of the S.A. Civil war was hanging over the country. If Röhm had known Nietzsche better, he might have recognized his own dreams in the philosopher's prophecy of rising European nihilism.

The unusual step which Röhm now took was probably taken with the knowledge, even the wish, of Schleicher. Röhm opened negotiations with the 'Iron Front.' Among its leaders there was a man who had once worked closely with Röhm, and who, like Röhm, might have called himself one of the inventors of Adolf Hitler. This was Karl Mayr, a former major in the Reichswehr. He had been a captain in that information section of the Munich Reichswehr which had sent out Hitler as its civilian employee, first to spy on the inner enemy, then to speak to the people in the streets and squares. Mayr, a true genius in the department that military men euphemistically call 'information service,' had a few years later broken with the Reichswehr and all his political friends. He had gone over to Social Democracy, had helped to build up the Reichsbanner, perhaps in the conviction that this was the right way to create a people's army. When a new leadership transformed the Reichsbanner into the 'Iron Front,' Mayr vanished from the central leadership, but continued in his own way to work in the ranks. Röhm now turned to this old comrade. Was there no way, he asked, of bringing the S.A. and the Iron Front together, of getting rid of the useless political windbags and 'making the soldier master of Germany'?

Röhm was shrewd enough not to keep the conversation secret from Hitler. The interview took place in Mayr's apartment, and with all the trappings of a spy movie; behind a curtain sat a lady taking shorthand notes. Mayr asked Röhm what grounds he had for thinking that he could detach the S.A. from the party. Röhm replied that he knew he had powerful and dangerous enemies in the party; Mayr's comment on this was: Would you like me to tell you the name of your future murderers? At that time Röhm's wild homo-

Acme

1932

sexual life had become fully public; there was great bitterness in the ranks against this leader who brought shame to the organization; Hitler had defiantly covered Röhm. 'Captain Röhm,' he said, 'remains my chief of staff, now and after the elections, despite all slanders.' The underground hostility to him was all the bitterer. A few months later, a Munich court actually did sentence two obscure National Socialists, Horn and Danzeisen, to short jail terms for having talked of murdering the chief of staff; but the court believed them when they said that it had been mere talk.

The conversation between Röhm and Mayr seems likewise to have gone no farther than talk, because Mayr had lost his influence on the Iron Front.

But the fact remains that Röhm was willing to subordinate the S.A. to the state. Groener, however, wanted no part of this and insisted that the army of civil war must be destroyed; Schleicher clung to his opinion that this was impossible, Groener threatened to resign, and put through a unanimous cabinet resolution; Hindenburg gave his consent. Three days after his re-election, the S.A. and S.S. and their subsidiary organizations were dissolved. For, said the government proclamation signed by Groener: 'No Reich government can tolerate an attempt by any party to form a state within the state and create for itself an armed force. . . .' Hindenburg was not fully convinced until Groener told him about the treasonable orders to the S.A. in Pomerania.

1932
Neither Hitler nor his followers dared to resist for so much as a moment. First they had been beaten by the voters, now they were crushed by the army. Was Adolphe Légalité on the right way? Would democracy really destroy itself? And if so, would National Socialism still live to see the day? The movement grew and grew, but it did not become more powerful, only more needful of power, 'You know, I am one of Germany's biggest business executives,' Hitler used to say humorously, when he met with industrialists. For the S.A. in the form of its 'ordnance department' had become a great department store with large stocks of clothing, uniforms, boots. The annual turnover in these goods was estimated at seventy million marks in 1932. In addition, the party had its own insurance against homicide and disability, which paid out a few hundred

marks to the survivors of S.A. men shot down. Hitler. The funds for all this had to be raised masses; no millionaire or any group of millionaire to do more than cover an occasional deficit for surprise. There was indeed a deficit which mounted source was the brown shirts and breeches which bought from the ordnance department and too paying for. The longer Hitler struggled for the burden of debt grew; he would not forever be money to feed his unemployed S.A. men. 'When wrote Goebbels-Machiavelli in his diary, 'you can get But then you no longer need it. If you haven' need money, but then you don't get it.' The fight became a fight for the state treasury.

me fully public; there was great bitterness in is leader who brought shame to the organization covered Röhm. 'Captain Röhm,' he said, f staff, now and after the elections, despite all rground hostility to him was all the bitterer. r, a Munich court actually did sentence two sialists, Horn and Danzeisen, to short jail terms murdering the chief of staff; but the court bey said that it had been mere talk.

between Röhm and Mayr seems likewise to r than talk, because Mayr had lost his influence

ins that Röhm was willing to subordinate the roener, however, wanted no part of this and ny of civil war must be destroyed; Schleicher that this was impossible, Groener threatened to ough a unanimous cabinet resolution; Hindent. Three days after his re-election, the S.A. subsidiary organizations were dissolved. For, t proclamation signed by Groener: 'No Reich state an attempt by any party to form a state l create for itself an armed force. . . .' Hinely convinced until Groener told him about the o the S.A. in Pomerania.

r his followers dared to resist for so much as a had been beaten by the voters, now they were y. Was Adolphe Légalité on the right way? cally destroy itself? And if so, would National o see the day? The movement grew and grew, ic more powerful, only more needful of power. me of Germany's biggest business executives,' humorously, when he met with industrialists. orm of its 'ordnance department' had become a re with large stocks of clothing, uniforms, boots. r in these goods was estimated at seventy mil-

In addition, the party had its own insurance id disability, which paid out a few hundred

marks to the survivors of S.A. men shot down in battle for Adolf Hitler. The funds for all this had to be raised among the party masses; no millionaire or any group of millionaires was rich enough to do more than cover an occasional deficit for such a giant enterprise. There was indeed a deficit which, mounted dangerously; its source was the brown shirts and breeches which the S.A. men bought from the ordnance department and took a long time in paying for. The longer Hitler struggled for power, the more the burden of debt grew; he would not forever be able to find the money to feed his unemployed S.A. men. 'When you have power,' wrote Goebbels-Machiavelli in his diary, 'you can get money enough. But then you no longer need it. If you haven't got power, you need money, but then you don't get it.' The fight for state power became a fight for the state treasury.

1932

For 1/2 get
Rerum Novarum

Chapter XIX

HINDENBURG'S STICK

THE SPIRITUAL FOUNDER OF THE MODERN CATHOLIC Church, Pope Leo XIII, said in his encyclical, *Libertas Humana* (1888): 'It is quite unlawful to demand, to defend, or to grant unconditional freedom of thought, of speech, of writing, of worship.' Some years earlier he had dealt with certain philosophers who 'say that all power comes from the people . . . but from these, Catholics dissent, affirming that the right to rule is from God.'

The Church was not, as many radicals believed, the defender of present-day society, for in his most famous encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, Leo XIII sharply attacked the economic age: 'A small number of very rich people are in a position to subject the mass of the poor to a yoke that is little better than slavery . . .' Altogether 'On the other hand, the socialists . . . are endeavoring to destroy private property. But private property is the natural right of every man.'

The spirit of the age is truly mirrored in these ecclesiastical documents. With the *Communist Manifesto* and, in their particular way, the *Protocols*, they are among the most potent documents of our times. What they reflected was not so much the imprint of existing things as the shadow of coming ones. Deeply human and Christian as they were, there was an overtone, inaudible at the time, which was to be re-echoed decades later, in many phrases of Hitler.

That successor of Leo who made peace with fascism in 1929, Pope Pius XI, published in 1931 another encyclical, *Quadragesimo*

HINDENBURG'S STICK

Anno (the title means that it came forty years after *varum*). Here the Church attacked sharply the capitalism, that 'immense concentration, not only of power and economic might in the hands of a few, but also the 'imperialism of international finance at home 'wherever there is booty to be had, just ordering of economic life cannot be entrusted to the state.' To be sure, communism was 'godless and unchristian,' but 'moderate 'socialism . . . remains incompatible with the Catholic Church.' Hitler would have said: 'Socialism and the international dictatorship of the state.'

Quadragesimo Anno went on to say that the economic order created by Mussolini in Italy was an economic effort of a different sort. It subordinated economics to politics, property by putting it in its place. 'A moment's reflection permits us to recognize the advantages of co-operation of the classes, repression of socialist efforts, regulatory influence of a special administration.' True, the Pope continued, some feared that the state was doing too much, that an excessive bureaucracy was creating these dangers, Pope Pius XI asked the 'co-operative' meaning people.

In the age of parliamentary democracy the state was more out of necessity than of desire, to exert a moderating influence on this system of power. Thus, the Center Party had grown up. The Center was a secular makeshift party of the era of parliaments; a democratic mobilization of millions against the hostile forces of a predatory world. When labor became a great movement, the distinct Catholic sector; but nevertheless, 'We are all workers are our comrades,' said Giesberts, one of the party leaders, as though he had never heard of *Rerum Novarum*. There were other forces too. All 'patriotic, Christian, truly social-thinking circles of all strata, especially the working class, should band together, said Heinrich Brüning, a young Catholic politician, in 1920. In this point

1931

1932

or less put the answer into their mouths: they thought that Groener had become 'unsuitable' as their minister.

On top of this, a political intrigue was heaped. The 'Iron Front' had elected Hindenburg. Material was collected to prove that the 'Iron Front' was arming for civil war just as much as the S.A., and this material was laid before Hindenburg with the implication that the prohibition of the S.A., upon which Groener had insisted so strongly, was at the very least one-sided and unjust. To top it all, the Chief Reich Attorney (*Oberreichsanwalt*) found that Hitler's orders to his Pomeranian S.A., juridically speaking, were not exactly high treason. Hindenburg had the feeling that Groener had deceived him, or at least advised him badly on this point; he wrote him a sharp, insulting letter and had it published.

Groener's distress affected him physically. When Göring reviled him in the Reichstag for his prohibition of the S.A., and Goebbels helped with poisonous cries, both intimating that they were well informed about certain confidential occurrences in the government, Groener's voice failed him. In the midst of his speech he stood for a time open-mouthed, unable to utter a word. When at last he sank back exhausted, Schleicher, his 'adopted son,' appeared beside him and said amiably that the army thought his resignation indicated. Groener still hoped that Hindenburg, whose legend he had in large part created and certainly done much to preserve, would keep him out of gratitude; but Groener's own prophecy was cruelly fulfilled: 'One thing you can rely on,' he had said, 'is the old gentleman's disloyalty.' Two days later, on May 12, he resigned.

Brüning, sensing that a heavy attack against himself was in progress, still believed that great political forces would carry him through these apparently petty intrigues. President Hoover in America, the MacDonald government in England, were pressing for an end to the German reparations that were disorganizing world economy. Brüning saw a great success close at hand. A day before Groener's resignation he cried out to the invisible intriguers in the Reichstag: 'Don't think you can stop me now, a hundred yards before the goal!' Then he went to Geneva to a meeting of the League of Nations Council, to obtain the consent of England and France for the end of reparations.

But Hitler was proved right: it was home at Domestic intrigue even managed to knife Brüning in the back. Schleicher was on terms of friendship with François-Poncet, the French ambassador in Berlin; that there was no sense in France continuing friendly to France. The consequence was that it was vain for French Premier Tardieu in Geneva; Hitler's illness, and the German Chancellor did not bring reparations, as he had hoped. This was a situation; but meanwhile the mass drama and intrigues.

The Prussian diet was preparing to overthrow the Braun government; the Communists gave the support. They entered a motion that the diet should give the government a vote of no-confidence. If the Communists put Hitler in power, they could have acted no differently than they did want to put Hitler in power. They thought that they were the born heirs of fascism; that they could overthrow fascism if it took power, but that it must not. Rosa Luxemburg had regarded military dictatorship as a preliminary to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Stalin had written in a letter to his comrades, in 1924: 'It is more advantageous for us that the Fascists should strike first: that will rally the whole world to the Communists!' For that reason, Stalin thought, the Communists must be 'restrained, not encouraged.' The victory of all Communist leaders, including Lenin, was as an exile on a Turkish island near Constantinople. The front of the working class would conquer Germany. Brüning demanded that the Communists create a unit with the Social Democrats, while the Social Democrats clung to the view that the Communists must be smashed before fascism could effectively rule. For that reason fascism must come to power.

In the Reichstag on October 13, 1931, Brüning told the capitalists of the menacing united front and urged them not to provoke the working class to

1932?

their mouths: they thought that Groener their minister.

intrigue was heaped. The 'Iron Front' material was collected to prove that the civil war just as much as the S.A., and Hindenburg with the implication that upon which Groener had insisted so one-sided and unjust. To top it all, *Oberreichsanwalt*) found that Hitler's S.A., juridically speaking, were not but Groener had the feeling that Groener had used him badly on this point; he wrote and had it published.

him physically. When Göring reviled prohibition of the S.A., and Goebbels, both intimating that they were well dental occurrences in the government, in the midst of his speech he stood for to utter a word. When at last he sank as 'adopted son,' appeared beside him, Groener thought his resignation indicated. Hindenburg, whose legend he had in only done much to preserve, would keep Groener's own prophecy was cruelly rely on,' he had said, 'is the old gentleman,' on May 12, he resigned.

heavy attack against himself was, in great political forces would carry him petty intrigues. President Hoover in government in England, were pressing variations that were disorganizing world at success close at hand. A day before d out to the invisible intriguers in the can stop me now, a hundred yards be- to Geneva to a meeting of the League n the consent of England and France

But Hitler was proved right: it was home affairs that decided. Domestic intrigue even managed to knife Brüning's foreign policy in the back. Schleicher was on terms of friendship with André François-Poncet, the French ambassador in Berlin. He told him that there was no sense in France continuing to negotiate with Brüning; for soon there would be another government, more friendly to France. The consequence was that Brüning waited in vain for French Premier Tardieu in Geneva; Tardieu pretended illness, and the German Chancellor did not bring back the end of reparations, as he had hoped: This was a situation that could not last; but meanwhile the mass drama and intrigues rolled on at home.

The Prussian diet was preparing to overthrow the democratic Braun government; the Communists gave the signal. On May 25, they entered a motion that the diet should give the Prussian government a vote of no-confidence. If the Communists had wanted to put Hitler in power, they could have acted no differently. Actually they did want to put Hitler in power. They staunchly believed that they were the born heirs of fascism; that they would speedily overthrow fascism if it took power, but that it must first take power. Rosa Luxemburg had regarded military dictatorship as the necessary preliminary to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in 1923 Stalin had written in a letter to his comrades, Zinoviev and Bukharin: 'It is more advantageous for us that the Fascists [in Germany] should strike first: that will rally the whole working class to the Communists!' For that reason, Stalin thought, the German Communists must be 'restrained, not encouraged.' It was the firm conviction of all Communist leaders, including Leon Trotsky living as an exile on a Turkish island near Constantinople, that the united front of the working class would conquer Germany. But Trotsky demanded that the Communists create a united front through a pact with the Social Democrats, while the Communists under Stalin's leadership clung to the view that the Social Democrats must be smashed before fascism could effectively be combated, and for that reason fascism must come to power.

In the Reichstag on October 13, 1931, Brüning warned the German capitalists of the menacing united front of the workers, and urged them not to provoke the working class too far. The worker,

* in passing - Goebbels & Hitler
a team? stat.

pp 461 & 462 to be summarized?

Oct 13
1931

he said, understood the need for sacrifices; but it was not possible to 'teach him this understanding if from the very start it is associated with conceptions and slogans which must inevitably drive the German working class into a united front.' Brüning had warned capital not to go too far; the Communists understood: not to establish open fascism, for, in Stalin's words, 'fascism is a fighting organization of the bourgeoisie.' The following day the Communist speaker, Remmele, stood up in the Reichstag and put the following interpretation on Brüning's remark: 'Herr Brüning has spoken very clearly: if once the Fascists are in power, the united front of anti-fascism will come into being and will sweep everything before it [stormy applause from the Communist benches]. . . . Who will strike whom? This question is already decided [applause from the Communists]. The only remaining question is: At what time shall we overthrow the bourgeoisie? . . . The Fascists do not frighten us. They will be finished even quicker than any other government [cries of 'Right!' from the Communists]. So thought the party which led the Uprooted and Disinherited of the Left. Their leaders and many of their followers were convinced (as Trotzky reproachfully said) '... that the task of struggle against fascism is a task of the second order; that it can wait; that it will solve itself; that fascism is essentially already in power; that Hitler will bring nothing new; that Hitler does not have to be feared; that Hitler will only break a path for the Communists.'

It did not disturb the Communists that this path was strewn with Communist corpses. When, in the Prussian diet, they entered the motion that was to overthrow the Prussian government, their deputy, Wilhelm Pieck, made a violent speech against the National Socialists, whom he called a party of murderers. The National Socialists jumped up, flung themselves on the numerically inferior Communists, thrashed them out of the hall, and sang the Horst Wessel song on the scene of their victory. There were pools of blood on the floor, and Hitler danced with joy when Goebbels told him the story on the telephone. Der Führer could not hear details enough of the smashed skulls and knocked-out teeth. When the two met three days later, 'I had to tell him the whole story in epic length, and he rubbed his hands with pleasure.' But incapable of

learning from blows, the Communists stuck to what was calculated only to bring their assailants to

This bloody scene in the Prussian diet took place on the twenty-sixth, Meißner called on Hindenburg to report to him that if he wished he could have the majority of the Reichstag would support; out any doubt or artifice. Yet no cabinet of persons of men whom he could trust and with some of personally acquainted.

On the twenty-eighth, Hindenburg was back on the twenty-ninth, a Sunday, Brüning was ordered to 'The Chancellor knew that an intrigue against him he did not know that it was already completely decided. He wanted to demand that Hindenburg to the intrigues until he, Brüning, had forced reparations. Instead, it was Hindenburg who the old man had written what he planned to letters on several slips of paper. He read them through his spectacles. 'I am informed,' he said, 'you have ministers with Bolshevik plans in which I cannot go on!' Brüning tried to discuss and explain but could not be distracted from his slips of paper he had to defend his name and his honor. An answer was: 'I request you to give me no more emergency'

In other words: If you can make laws with which you won't make any more in my name. This though the word was not uttered. But Brüning's statement. Next day he returned to see Hindenburg conversation was well started, a noise was heard from the palace, cries of command, clicking heels: everything changed. Impelled by curiosity, the old soldier turned his back on Brüning whom he had forgotten. After a while he remembered his change: whether Brüning might want to stay on as for the new government. Brüning replied that he too wanted honor to preserve, and left the room.

Meanwhile, Oskar von Hindenburg notified

A. H. "You saw the teeth on the floor."

J. G. "All over the floor. Only teeth, silver teeth, and teeth so rotten you didn't dare step on them for fear your shoes would stink."

A. H. "Yes, there was even some blood."

J. G. "Lots of blood. We're not picking. I should have heard the sound of a skull getting smashed. Ah - you should have been there. I heard that sound many times."

1932

d for sacrifices; but it was not possible
nding if from the very start it is asso-
d slogans which must inevitably drive
s into a united front.' Brüning had
o far; the Communists understood: not
r, in Stalin's words, 'fascism is a fighting
coisie.' The following day the Com-
stood up in the Reichstag and put the

Brüning's remark: 'Herr Brüning has
e the Fascists are in power, the united
ome into being and will sweep every-
plause from the Communist benches].
m? This question is already decided
inists]. The only remaining question is:
throw the bourgeoisie? ... The Fascists
will be finished even quicker than any
f 'Right!' from the Communists]. So
d the Uprooted and Disinherited of the
any of their followers were convinced
aid) '... that the task of struggle against
ond order; that it can wait; that it will
essentially already in power; that Hitler
hat Hitler does not have to be feared;
a path for the Communists.'

mmunists that this path was strewn with
a, in the Prussian diet, they entered the
throw the Prussian government, their
ide a violent speech against the National
l a party of murderers. The National
; themselves on the numerically inferior
m out of the hall, and sang the Horst
of their victory. There were pools of
der danced with joy when Goebbels told
bone. Der Führer could not hear details
ulls and knocked-out teeth. When the
I had to tell him the whole story in epic
hands with pleasure.' But incapable of

learning from blows, the Communists stuck to their motion which
was calculated only to bring their assailants to power.

This bloody scene in the Prussian diet took place on May 25. On
the twenty-sixth, Meissner called on Hindenburg in Neudeck and
reported to him that if he wished he could have a cabinet which
the majority of the Reichstag would support; constitutional with-
out any doubt or artifice. Yet no cabinet of party politicians, but
of men whom he could trust and with some of whom he was per-
sonally acquainted.

On the twenty-eighth, Hindenburg was back in Berlin; on the
twenty-ninth, a Sunday, Brüning was ordered to appear before him.
The Chancellor knew that an intrigue against him was in progress;
he did not know that it was already complete, that his fate had
been decided. He wanted to demand that Hindenburg put a stop
to the intrigues until he, Brüning, had forced the cancellation of
reparations. Instead, it was Hindenburg who did the demanding.
The old man had written what he planned to say in inch-high
letters on several slips of paper. He read them one after another
through his spectacles. 'I am informed,' he said to Brüning, 'that
you have ministers with Bolshevik plans in your cabinet. That
cannot go on!' Brüning tried to discuss and explain, but Hinden-
burg could not be distracted from his slips of paper. He said that
he had to defend his name and his honor. And his last sentence
was: 'I request you to give me no more emergency decrees to sign!'

In other words: If you can make laws with the Reichstag, good;
you won't make any more in my name. This meant dismissal,
though the word was not uttered. But Brüning wanted a clear
statement. Next day he returned to see Hindenburg. Before the
conversation was well started, a noise was heard in the courtyard
of the palace, cries of command, clicking heels: the guard was be-
ing changed. Impelled by curiosity, the old soldier stepped to the
window, turning his back on Brüning whom he had seemingly
forgotten. After a while he remembered his chancellor and asked
whether Brüning might want to stay on as foreign minister in a
new government. Brüning replied that he too had his name and
honor to preserve, and left the room.

Meanwhile, Oskar von Hindenburg notified Göring that his

1932

scare?

*

* while he looked out the
changing of the guard, Hindenburg
tried to remember the purpose
of this meeting. By this time
he turned around, he had
something to say.

1932

father was expecting the 'Bohemian corporal' at four in the afternoon. Hitler had remained hidden in the country, to avoid arousing Brüning's suspicions by his presence in Berlin. In the afternoon he called on the Reichs President with Göring. Hindenburg informed him that he had appointed von Papen as chancellor. Was it true that Hitler would support the Papen cabinet? Hitler said yes.

And now Papen attempted to form his democratic parliamentary government. It was the time to show whether he was able to bring his Catholic friends to join forces with the National Socialists. On the day after Brüning's fall, Hindenburg received Doctor Kaas, the leader of the Center. The ground of German politics indeed had shifted. Kaas said: Yes, the National Socialists must now enter the government; he demanded a 'total solution,' the 'entry of the opposition into the government, with full responsibility, and, in particular, the National Socialists must take their share of responsibility fully and openly.' In the government — this was the idea — the National Socialists would be tamed and exhausted; the dust of day-to-day work would settle on their glamour; it would be necessary to pass hard, exacting, unpopular laws, and the names of Hitler, Strasser, Goebbels, instead of Brüning and Stegerwald, would stand under these laws; Hitler had promised wonders; he should be forced to break his promises. These parliamentarians, in the past two years, had learned by hard blows what an ungrateful business power could be; they imagined that by power Hitler might, like Brüning, be broken.

But open power, connected with open responsibility, was not to be heaped on Hitler by the construction of the new Papen government; the National Socialists were to have influence and power secretly, and Papen was to help keep it secret, only exposing himself and possibly his friends. In the eyes of these friends — the men of the Center — Papen was an idiot and a betrayer at the same time. The next day, May 31, Papen debated and struggled all afternoon with Kaas, Brüning, and other leaders of his own party for their agreement and aid; it was refused with sharp words. Kaas intimidated Papen so much that he promised to abandon his attempt to constitute a government. He had failed to win his own party and hence had no majority in parliament; by the afternoon of May 31, Schleicher's master plan had failed.

But when the weak-kneed Papen appeared before the next day, he again let himself be intimidated by his own prestige, the old man could no longer command Papen as a soldier to form a cabinet. Ministers were sought out, some by telegram; officers whom the Field Marshal more or less ordered. Some, indeed, could not have been induced. There was Konstantin von Neurath, ambassador became Foreign Minister; Wilhelm Baron von economic leaders of the junkers in the province a frequent guest in the Hindenburg household. Reichswehr Minister; for finances there was a nationalist, Count von Schwerin-Krosigk, despite his but an official. But it was hard to overlook that men of the cabinet were all nobles. For justice, he had found a commoner from the Bavarian South: of Justice was the same Franz Gürtner, who had led the patriotic murderers; who had freed Hitler before the end of his term, who had made it possible to speak in public, and who finally had failed to prevent the death of Geli Raubal.

On June 2, Papen was Chancellor. On the instant of parliamentary democracy voluntarily allowed a new coup: the Prussian diet, with two hundred votes, the National Socialists in the lead, adopted a motion to give the Braun government a vote of confidence.

Now Papen and Schleicher attempted to force the National Socialists. The Reichstag was dissolved. Papen had had his way. But when he expected the proposal to be lifted, Papen demanded that Hitler first give his promise to support him even after elections. Hitler gave nothing in writing, but finally let himself be persuaded by the estate of Severin in Mecklenburg, belonging to his in-law, Walter Granzow, Hitler dictated a memorandum while, Schleicher was waiting for him on a near little city of Fürstenberg. Hitler dictated in haste whether what he had written was the right thing.

e 'Bohemian corporal' at four in the afternoon hidden in the country, to avoid arousing his presence in Berlin. In the afternoon s President with Göring. Hindenburg in- appointed von Papen as chancellor. Was it support the Papen cabinet? Hitler said yes. mpted to form his democratic parliamen- as the time to show whether he was able to ls to join forces with the National Socialists; g's fall, Hindenburg received Doctor Kaas, r. The ground of German politics indeed Yes, the National Socialists must now enter nanded a 'total solution,' the 'entry of the ernment, with full responsibility, and, in Socialists must take their share of respon- ' In the government — this was the idea — ould be tamed and exhausted; the dust of settle on their glamour; it would be neces- ting, unpopular laws, and the names of els, instead of Brüning and Stegerwald, e laws; Hitler had promised wonders; he k his promises. These parliamentarians, in learned by hard blows what an ungrateful e; they imagined that by power Hitler broken.

ected with open responsibility, was not to / the construction of the new Papen gov- icialists were to have influence and power to help keep it secret, only exposing himself

In the eyes of these friends — the men of ; an idiot and a betrayer at the same time. Papen debated and struggled all afternoon d other leaders of his own party for their as refused with sharp words. Kaas intimi- at he promised to abandon his attempt to . He had failed to win his own party and n parliament; by the afternoon of May 31, had failed.

But when the weak-kneed Papen appeared before Hindenburg the next day, he again let himself be intimidated. For the sake of his own prestige, the old man could no longer retreat. He roughly commanded Papen as a soldier to form a cabinet. In mad haste the ministers were sought out, some by telegram; all of them former officers whom the Field Marshal more or less ordered to their posts. Some, indeed, could not have been induced in any other way. There was Konstantin von Neurath, ambassador to London, who became Foreign Minister; Wilhelm Baron von Gayl, one of the economic leaders of the junkers in the province of East Prussia, a frequent guest in the Hindenburg household. Schleicher became Reichswehr Minister; for finances there was an outstanding specialist, Count von Schwerin-Krosigk, despite his name no junker but an official. But it was hard to overlook that the seven leading men of the cabinet were all nobles. For justice, however, Schleicher had found a commoner from the Bavarian South; this new Minister of Justice was the same Franz Gürtner, who had been unable to find the patriotic murderers; who had freed Hitler from prison long before the end of his term, who had made it possible for him to speak in public, and who finally had failed to throw full light on the death of Geli Raubal.

On June 2, Papen was Chancellor. On the third, the last remnant of parliamentary democracy voluntarily abdicated before the new coup: the Prussian diet, with two hundred and fifty-three votes, the National Socialists in the lead, adopted the Communist motion to give the Braun government a vote of no-confidence.

Now Papen and Schleicher attempted to forge and educate the National Socialists. The Reichstag was dissolved; thus far Hitler had had his way. But when he expected the prohibition of the S.A. to be lifted, Papen demanded that Hitler first give a clear, written promise to support him even after elections. Hitler wanted to put nothing in writing, but finally let himself be persuaded. On the estate of Severin in Mecklenburg, belonging to Goebbels's brother-in-law, Walter Granzow, Hitler dictated a memorandum. Meanwhile, Schleicher was waiting for him on a near-by estate near the little city of Fürstenberg. Hitler dictated in haste and was not sure whether what he had written was the right thing. He gave the

1932

1932
D.L.*

memorandum to Goebbels and Göring to look through and meanwhile went to see Schleicher. The memorandum, which apparently displeased Hitler's critical lieutenants, never reached Schleicher; but in the meantime Hitler had let himself be ensnared by the general, even without any exchange of documents. Schleicher promised that the S.A. would soon be permitted to function and that a National Socialist would become Premier of Prussia. According to the secret plan of the Papen government, this meant 'tying Hitler to responsibility,' without giving him any real power; Hitler did not notice the trap, but said, beaming, to Schleicher that a tablet should be erected on the wall of the house with the words: 'Here there took place that memorable conference between Adolf Hitler and General Kurt von Schleicher, by which . . .' When he returned and reported, Goebbels was beside himself, and no doubt thought: he must never be allowed to attend conferences alone; it was the same way before the presidential elections — this can be read quite clearly between the lines of his diary. The Prussian deputies, Kube and Kerll, were summoned, and Hitler was enlightened, no doubt as gently as possible; thereupon he hastily departed, and two days later his representatives, Göring and Kube, innocently told Papen and Schleicher that they could agree to nothing definite, for their Führer was absent and unfortunately ('Thank God,' wrote Goebbels in his diary) could not be reached.

Papen grew distrustful and hesitated to lift the prohibition of the S.A.; both sides began to accuse each other of broken promises. Hitler thundered at Göring, Goebbels, and Strasser over the telephone, ordered them to see Schleicher and Minister of the Interior von Gayl, but the longed-for three-line notice in the newspapers did not appear — and two weeks had passed since Hitler's handshake with Hindenburg. One night Goebbels assembled fifty S.A. men in his office. They put on their brown shirts, their brown breeches, their high boots, and then the fifty of them marched straight through the city, went into the cafés. Not a policeman ventured to arrest them, and the fifty felt like bold law-breakers, great revolutionaries. It did not occur to these warriors that with their millions they could seize the right of the streets without any question; that they could flood the whole country with their brown columns re-

ardless of prohibitions; no, first the President's mission.

It finally came on June 15. Now this new type-run its course unrestrained. On July 31, six weeks were to express their opinion at the polls. In giant appeared again in the streets, to hammer the them. Hitler was drunk with enthusiasm for people; the former despiser of parliament and recognizable. 'I do not know,' he said, 'whether elections will be the last. I hope not. I hope that come when our leaders say to themselves: now.'

On June 26, he gathered his S.A. leaders in the near Berchtesgaden, and gave them a severe lecture believe that they were at their goal. Power may day anew; that was what the National Socialist built for; and that was what made it stronger than of the barons,' which felt secure in the possession and lacked the intelligence to see that seven nobles insult to an impoverished people. Papen declared governed on the strength of authority and not people. 'A strong government,' he said, 'does not the convictions and inner life of the people'; at attention to these convictions.

Hitler told his S.A. leaders in Schoenau that masters would soon come into conflict with For the Reichswehr wanted the people, and the tary-minded German people. Conditions in Germany same as in Italy, said Hitler. A dualism, such as the Italian army and the Fascist militia, was impossible in Germany, for one thing because in its certain degree had to replace an obsolete officer Germany the army had a first-class officers' corps. S.A. would always lie in the field of domestic party matters; for this the Reichswehr was than and the S.A. should in turn be thankful to the Reiching it a free hand in the shaping of German conditions. Leaders listened to Hitler with consternation; with

* his weakness before powerful men was intolerable — and I could not

afford to live with it the time. Stalin pres

ls and Göring to look through and mean-ber. The memorandum, which apparently al lieutenants, never reached Schleicher; er had let himself be ensnared by the gen-ange of documents. Schleicher promised be permitted to function and that a Na-ome Premier of Prussia. According to the government, this meant 'tying Hitler to re-ing him any real power; Hitler did not eaming, to Schleicher that a tablet should f the house with the words: 'Here there le conference between Adolf Hitler and ichter, by which . . .' When he returned as beside himself, and no doubt thought: d to attend conferences alone; it was the idental elections — this can be read quite d of his diary. The Prussian deputies, Kube ed, and Hitler was enlightened, no doubt reupon he hastily departed, and two days Göring and Kube, innocently told Papen could agree to nothing definite, for their unfortunately ('Thank God,' wrote Goeb-not be reached.

l and hesitated to lift the prohibition of n to accuse each other of broken promises. ing, Goebbels, and Strasser over the tele-see Schleicher and Minister of the Interior -for three-line notice in the newspapers did eeks had passed since Hitler's handshake ight Goebbels assembled fifty S.A. men in their brown shirts, their brown breeches, hen the fifty of them marched straight nto the cafés. Not a policeman ventured fty felt like bold law-breakers, great revolu-ur to these warriors that with their millions t of the streets without any question; that ole country with their brown columns re-

before powerful man
and I could not

gardless of prohibitions; no, first the President had to give his per-mission.

It finally came on June 13. Now this new type of democracy could run its course unrestrained. On July 31, six weeks hence, the people were to express their opinion at the polls. In giant swarms, the S.A. appeared again in the streets, to hammer the right opinion into them. Hitler was drunk with enthusiasm for elections and the people; the former despiser of parliament and the masses was un-recognizable. 'I do not know,' he said, 'whether these Reichstag elections will be the last. I hope not. I hope that the time will never come when our leaders say to themselves: now we shall rest!'

On June 26, he gathered his S.A. leaders in the village of Schoenau, near Berchtesgaden, and gave them a severe lecture. They must not believe that they were at their goal. Power must be won every day anew; that was what the National Socialist Party had been built for; and that was what made it stronger than the 'government of the barons,' which felt secure in the possession of machine guns and lacked the intelligence to see that seven noble ministers are an insult to an impoverished people. Papen declared freely that he governed on the strength of authority and not by the will of the people. 'A strong government,' he said, 'does not need to prescribe the convictions and inner life of the people'; at any rate, it pays no attention to these convictions.

Hitler told his S.A. leaders in Schoenau that these unpopular masters would soon come into conflict with the Reichswehr. For the Reichswehr wanted the people, and the S.A. was the military-minded German people. Conditions in Germany were not the same as in Italy, said Hitler. A dualism, such as existed between the Italian army and the Fascist militia, was fundamentally impossible in Germany, for one thing because in Italy the militia to a certain degree had to replace an obsolete officers' corps, while in Germany the army had a first-class officers' corps. The tasks of the S.A. would always lie in the field of domestic politics, not in military matters; for this the Reichswehr was thankful to the S.A., and the S.A. should in turn be thankful to the Reichswehr for leaving it a free hand in the shaping of German conditions. The S.A. leaders listened to Hitler with consternation; without enthusiasm

afford to sit with him all
the time. Stalin presented many

difficulties as Hitler

for his explanation and assured him of
ter of course in view of the military

had long ceased to be the élite of which
und had become a loosely knit mass.
ut numerically inferior, the Stahlhelm
secret maneuvers. With these reserves
began to demand a stronger army at
conference which, since February, had
army still concealed its demand be-
'equal rights,' and cited the Versailles
ise of general disarmament. In Papen's
erman army had appeared as a western
alliance with the French army. Papen
tion with France, a total solution of all
once again home politics had spoken
—if they had ever been founded. In
Chamber in May, 1932, returned the
n Edouard Herriot, the democrat and
rriot, who for years had been cultivating
France and the Soviet government,
e to Germany's 'equal rights,' and also
ath the chapter of German reparations.
at Germany would pay no more repara-
32, the peace beside the Swiss lakes was
y. In the city of Lausanne, the victor
led an agreement with Germany which
an end to reparations. But Papen in
erriot, the man of the Left, had not
of barons' a full success; in this attitude,
been reinforced by one of his advisers,
rnational Marxism had showed its hand.
had not consented to revoke Article 231
placed the war guilt on Germany; that
d not been canceled in principle. Mean-
reduced to three billion marks, a sum
as, seemed insignificant beside the pro-

vious astronomic figure; and even this sum was not payable at
once, but only when circumstances should permit—and circum-
stances never did permit. This was Papen's 'failure of Lausanne,'
as Hitler called it, declaring the final payment of three billions to
be 'intolerable.' In near-by Geneva the Disarmament Conference
was dragging along almost without hope; there was no prospect
that France would consent to 'equal rights' for Germany.

And this was no wonder, Hitler carped, for France knew that
this government did not have the people behind it any more than
had previous governments. To Hitler, Papen's contempt of the
people was almost a personal insult; for the people, he felt, was him-
self. This was not even true. Certainly he was not the people of
the big coal and iron districts in the west of Germany. Here the
National Socialists encountered a passionate hostility and com-
forted themselves that this hostility was limited to the Communists.
Actually it was shared by workers of all tendencies, by Social Demo-
crats, and even the Center. Goebbels describes a trip through
these cities in July, 1932:

July 12. We force our way through the howling mob in Düs-
seldorf and Elberfeld. A wild trip. We had no idea that things
would get so serious. In all our innocence we drive into Hagen in
an open car and wearing our uniforms. The streets are black with
people. All of them mob and Communist rabble. They close off
the road, so that we can go neither forward nor back. . . . We cut
our way through the middle of the pack. Each of us has his pistol
in his hand and is determined, if the worst comes to the worst, to
sell his life as dearly as possible. . . . The meeting place is on a hill,
framed by a forest of beeches in the background. The Communists
have ingeniously set fire to this forest, so that it is almost impossible
to carry on the meeting. Nevertheless, we make our speeches. . . .
On our departure we are followed by a bombardment of stones.
We manage to leave the city by detours. . . .

July 13. . . . The experience in Hagen has made us more circum-
spect. Now we travel in disguise. Constantly we pass lurking
groups of Communists. We can hardly get into Dortmund. We
have to take a side-street to keep from falling into the hands of
the Communists who have occupied all the other entrances. . . .

July 14. . . . A trip to the Ruhr involves mortal peril. We take a

1932

own with its Berlin number is known and
s of it everywhere. La Elberfeld the Red
b into the streets. The approaches to the
completely. It is only because they take us
r car that we get through. . . . After a
new car. Again the mob has occupied the
nd so we get through.

leave my own native city like a criminal,
vilification, stoned, and spat upon. . . .

were a mighty mass, but a still mightier.
Actually this mass was itself disintegrated
itself when the Communists over-
ment.

e its downfall, was still governing, be-
ent could agree on no other cabinet; for
onal Socialists together could overthrow
ther they could not establish any state
nally did not have even a tenth of the
nd him, now declared himself unwilling
vernment which still commanded over
Braun, the Social Democratic Premier of
: and wanted to resign; and when his
des would not permit this, he took 'a
sulking, letting his colleagues govern by
ies, led by Carl Severing, the white-haired
r of the Interior, told themselves that,
minority, it was still the only minority
l so their right to power was not much
burg, who had been President for seven
y a minority.

ed out of his window, he saw the broad
ilding in which the overthrown Prussian
ly governing. Hostility now reigned be-
Half consciously, Hindenburg regarded
is 'most gracious Kaiser,' who had been
nd was now sitting in Holland; but the
ae been his 'most gracious king and lord'

— that is, King of Prussia — and this part of his heritage was now
administered by the enemy in the gray palace. The conflict between
Prussia and the Reich was intolerable to Hindenburg. In this he
was entirely at one with Papen, but Schleicher's mind was not made
up so quickly. What Papen wanted was to suspend the Prussian
government by force; and this was his first great disappointment
to Schleicher. For the Reichswehr Minister had invented Papen
in order to avoid the necessity of governing by force; his wish was
that in Prussia the National Socialists and the Center should form
a majority government in good democratic style. For the moment
this had failed, but after the Reichstag elections of July 31, it would
doubtless succeed; for the Center would not continue forever to
uphold the present Prussian government.

To be sure, this government would at once have ceased to be a
minority government if the Communists became reasonable;
if they gave up the idea that Hitler must come to power. Wilhelm
Abegg, the Prussian state secretary, attempted on his own responsi-
bility to bring the Communists to their senses. He invited two
Communist Reichstag deputies, Torgler and Kasper, to see him
and tried to persuade them to give up their sabotage in Prussia.
The Communists did not say yes and they did not say no.

But Abegg did not suspect how shaky the ground beneath his
feet had already become. Since the fall of Brüning, an intangible
but ubiquitous and corrosive conviction that Hitler would soon
come to power had penetrated every pore of the public conscious-
ness. The most convinced were to be found in the great silent
army of men who are seldom openly convinced of anything, but
who always adjust their business, their career, and, in this epoch of
race war, even their love, to the forthcoming political events. Busi-
ness connections were broken, friendships severed, men and women
broke off their engagements to Jews. Many found it timely to wear
the swastika in their buttonhole, for when the first booty was dis-
tributed, you had to be an 'old fighter'; long party membership
would be rewarded with employment, advancement, and loans from
public funds. And so now the opportunists stepped forward with
loud cries. But the party disapproved their sudden loudness and
preferred to use these shady characters in the shade. Occasionally

July
1932

such proclamations as this appeared in the National Socialist press:

Halt! Before you leave your present party, convinced of the truth of the National Socialist idea, reflect if you cannot be more useful to the National Socialist Movement by remaining a member where you are and informing us about all the occurrences and intentions of your present party comrades! . . . Your work will be valued as highly as the sacrifices of every party comrade and S.A. man who does his duty!

One of those who did their duty thus silently was sitting at the table as Abegg conferred with Torgler and Kasper. This was Councillor (*Regierungsrat*) Werner Diels; Abegg had unsuspectingly called him in as a witness, and he took down a protocol of the conversation. Treason could not have been performed more comfortably; Diels took his protocol to Papen and reported that the Prussian government was allying itself with Bolshevism!

This forced Schleicher's hand; reluctantly he permitted the Reichswehr to march. On the morning of July 20, 1932, Papen asked the Prussian cabinet ministers to call at the Chancellery. He told them that a state of military emergency had been proclaimed in Prussia; General von Rundstedt, commander of the Berlin division, had been given full power. The ministers, said Papen, should regard themselves as deposed. He, Papen, as 'Reich Commissioner,' would assume power in Prussia and set other commissioners over the ministries. It was a short conversation without much argument and counter-argument; on his way out, Severing said philosophically that in this hour world history was in the making. The ministers returned to their offices; when Severing was back at his desk, he received a telephone call from a certain Bracht, mayor of Essen; Bracht declared that he was Severing's successor and would present himself at twelve o'clock.

This was the gravest political upheaval that Germany had experienced in thirteen years; superficially, it occurred as a sequence of depressingly tragi-comic scenes without greatness. It was the leadership of the Social Democratic Party which determined the form and course of this upheaval. These men decided to accept the blow and offer no resistance.

The Communists thought differently. They called for a general strike to support a government which they had overthrown two weeks before. Nowhere did they call, and this historic fact contains the profoundest otherwise incomprehensible decision of the Social Democrats. The condition of the German working class in March, 1920, when in a similar situation they stood against the military *putsch*. Six to eight millions were waiting outside the factory gates; the workers' strike they could not expect a general stoppage, a solution of the factories that would crush all opposition.

Rundstedt had orders to arrest the Social Democrats as the first sign of resistance; later, the Reichswehr, which they would not have shrunk back from massing, it was improbable that the Reichswehr would have risen would have been the opposite of what they had done in 1919. If there had been an uprising, its leaders would have moved to the Rhineland, which, in accordance with the Versailles and Locarno, the Reichswehr could have possible that the South German states and their people have joined the Prussian government; for the largely Catholic population, were embittered by the Versailles, distrusted the Prussian junkers and militarily South and West of the Reich were beginning to challenge the hegemony of the North and East; again the frontier drawn by the river Main, which divides the North and South, and temperamentally, into North and South as the Mason-Dixon line divides the United States.

But resistance along these lines required preparation. The 'Iron Front' was not ready to strike. Side by side with the Reichswehr, the S.A. and the Stahlhelm would at once in great swarms and almost entirely dominated the northern and eastern Germany. Against them, the Social Democrats presented no reliable force, particularly in the struggle the Social Democratic leaders, their friends, the Communists, even more than their

** What Hitler understood so brilliantly was the advantage of giving a body for intelligent bodies to create human beings with a conscious double nature, not only physical but minor forms of life on such a double system, and it is expected.*

lers had openly assured the Brown of their seizure of power they would that they would 'reckon with their d a tooth for a tooth' (Röhm); a few eet their doom' (Frick). Many had lection victory, had expected election nife. In Königsberg the S.A. threw atic newspaper building on election ted band shot down two Communists in his diary: 'This is the only means on; nothing else impresses them any

nen to shoot down the 'red peril' was : him who sets out to become dictator parte, later Napoleon III, had shown coming President of the French Re eans' (as Scheubner Richter later put of the generals, telling them that they of menaced society'; he had placed his s of power; accused his opponents of and administration buildings. When he had proposed, he declared it dis— and this was exactly Hitler's plan: abling law demanded by Der Führer, Goebbels. In order that he might prove ry from a great danger, Louis Bona- nd soldiers through the capital, had id now local revolts did flare up in a ator proclaimed that this was 'Com- state of emergency, had some twenty- d, ten thousand deported to Africa, a nd had others interned or banished of 8.12 million voters, 7.48 confirmed -for ten years. The Wise Men of Zion they said that the people admires great to Berlin, talked with Schleicher, de-

manded to be made Chancellor and also Premier of Prussia. He boasted that he would be able to wrestle a majority from the Reichstag, 'like Mussolini in 1922.' This was exactly what Schleicher wanted, and he seems to have answered: If Hitler could gain a majority, nobody could and would prevent him from governing. Hitler, who, when excited, never was a good listener, believed that Schleicher had promised to 'make' him Chancellor; well satisfied, he returned to Munich, and Goebbels' diary, not for the first time, shows a suspicion that his Führer again might have been duped.

The party was in a fever of anticipation. Röhm ordered a state of alarm for the S.A., stationed strong troops in the headquarters so that hundreds of thousands could be mobilized within an hour. 'The whole party,' Goebbels reports, 'has prepared itself to take power. The S.A. men are leaving their places of work in order to make themselves ready.' And the other great and small functionaries of the party 'are preparing for the great hour'—the great hour of mass murder. 'If things go well,' sighed Goebbels in his diary, 'everything is in order. But if things go badly'—that is, if Hitler does not become Chancellor and there is no blood-bath— 'there will be a terrible setback.'

The smell of revolution was in the air. Almost hourly, news reached Berlin of new murders committed by National Socialists, particularly in the eastern parts of the Reich; and the opposing side, the 'Iron Front' and the Communists, also shed blood. The Reich government declared martial law; providing summary justice and the death penalty even for lesser acts of violence. That was at noon of August 9. In the night of the same day, in the village of Potempa in Upper Silesia, five National Socialists armed with revolvers entered the house of a Communist miner by the name of Konrad Pietrzuch; the whole family—Pietrzuch, his mother, and his brother—were in bed; the five pulled Pietrzuch out of bed, threw him to the floor, and, before the eyes of his mother and brother, beat him and trampled him for half an hour; the heel of a boot fractured his larynx, and he died.

Hitler was back in his house a few hundred yards above Berchtesgaden; he was in good spirits and thought himself near his goal. Then—on August 9—Strasser and Frick came for a visit and dis-

8/9/32

Read Goebbels' diary for 1931 + 1932

pelled his illusions. Schleicher had expected a parliamentary government of or with Hitler; now he found himself faced with the specter of a bloody *coup d'état*. Even good friends suddenly became wary. Industry did not want to put economic life at the mercy of such men as Gregor Strasser or Gottfried Feder, who, marching at the head of small property owners incited to revolution, wanted to hurl a bomb at large-scale wealth. Feder announced that the coming Hitler government would create a new form of treasury bills, to be given as credit to innumerable small business men, enabling them to re-employ hundreds of thousands and millions of workers. Would this be inflation? Yes! said Walter Funk, one of the many experts who for the past year or two had advised Hitler; an experienced and well-known finance writer, collaborator of Hjalmar Schacht, and, in Hitler's own eyes, a guaranty that big-business would treat him as an equal. Funk, too, arrived on the Obersalzberg with a message from Schacht: important people were so upset by Feder's plans that these threatened to become a serious obstacle on Hitler's road to power.

On August 11, Chaos, in the form of a long column of automobiles, again left Berchtesgaden for Berlin. On the shore of the Chiemsee, with a view of the Alps and a majestic castle that had belonged to the 'mad' King of Bavaria, the company paused at an inn for rest. Hitler sat with Strasser, Frick, Goebbels, and others, and for the last time they calculated the chances. Should they govern with the Center? This seemed a good threat against Hindenburg if he was not ready to appoint Hitler dictator with full powers. But the truth was that seriously they could have done nothing with the Center. This moderate party would not consent to the long adjournment of the Reichstag, and even less to the projected blood-bath. The blood-bath had gradually become the main point in Hitler's plans. Eating a big omelet, he declared to his henchmen: 'If we are not given an opportunity to settle accounts with Marxism, it is perfectly useless for us to take power.'

Most of the sub-leaders then went on to Berlin by train. Hitler followed slowly by car. Announcing his Führer, Röhm, on August 12, went to see Schleicher and Papen. He spoke calmly, as man to man, inquiring as to their intentions. Had Hitler misunderstood?

Who was going to be Chancellor? Perhaps Hitler stood; Röhm was reminded that his Führer had honor at least to 'tolerate' the Papen government.

Late at night Hitler arrived; he lodged at a villa near the village of Caputh, and conferred with Röhm, and Göring. A strategic plan followed, slipping through their fingers. They were now too but not strong enough for their own devious but aiming at dictatorship. Now the question was: the temptations of a brilliant defeat? Schleicher, a synthetic popularity for Papen, who cared little offered the National Socialists high offices, appar the vice-chancellorship, the premiership of Prussia; dependencies and mayoralties; this would take care careerists with the swastika over or under their party have the moral strength to continue an effort for full victory? Was it not better to accept the power, a share in the offices and state salaries, state treasury, some relief from the nightmare of running to twelve millions?

'All evening,' Goebbels relates, 'Der Führer has and down the room and the terrace outside. A going on inside him. The decision which must be has immense implications. It is being pondered on sides. . . . ' In situations of this sort, Hitler had the firmness of will—this should not be denied. He has taken in his appraisal of circumstances; he has various interpretations and the most frivolous prophecies; acted with astonishing lack of judgment; but in knew exactly how much he could risk—and yet The situation, he often repeated in those days, various blows and failures had not yet sufficiently taught him—the state power, the Reichswehr, the President—was bound to collapse without National Socialist before, Hitler had proclaimed that the decisive Swastika and Soviet Star would bring him to power his great hour. It almost literally cost him his blood.

unwilling to waste this hour in bargaining for fragments of power; but in the end the risk brought him his great triumph.

On the morning of August 13, Hitler, Röhm, and Frick went to see Schleicher. A wild argument broke out, and was continued in the presence of Papen; insulted and enraged, scarcely letting the others say a word or listening when they did speak, Hitler loudly explained why he insisted on full power and a free hand. He had given the same reasons, almost with the same words, to the Munich court in 1924: The great thing for him was not to become minister — so he said — but to break Marxism. In his long, deafening outburst he made ample use of such words as 'mow down,' 'Saint Bartholomew's Night'; for three days 'the S.A. must have freedom of the streets.' He is reported to have declared that he counted on five thousand dead.

8/12/32
Hitler's outburst seems to have made a terrible impression on Papen and Schleicher; Schleicher said later that he doubted Hitler's sanity. Perhaps Hitler expected to set the minds of Papen and Schleicher at rest when he said that what he was proposing was far from a National Socialist dictatorship. He desired neither the Reichswehr nor the foreign ministry; he desired 'only as much power as Mussolini took in his *coup d'état* of 1922.' Mussolini had had non-Fascists in his cabinet; but Papen and Schleicher, who had not studied the history of *coups d'état* as thoroughly as had Hitler, misunderstood; they believed that he wanted to govern alone and without them — and basically they were right.

It was the will of Hindenburg, and even more of Schleicher, to create a government which would at least be tolerated by the Reichstag. Since Hitler had made no attempt to 'bring' them the Reichstag, they could offer him no more than the post of Vice-Chancellor in the Papen cabinet, the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and similar posts; nothing was asked in return except that he keep his promise and help to give the Papen government a majority which would have to be completed with help from other sides.

Bursting with rage and disappointment, Hitler drove to Goebbels's Berlin home with Röhm and Frick, and there he gave his nerves free play. His failure to obtain power had not been a complete sur-

prise to him; but that they should have lure and humiliated him by such absurd offers. And the cruel events of that day were not less Hitler, six weeks before, had given to support Papen. Now the old man insisted before him. The telephone rang; Frick as State Secretary Erwin Planck, asked him to the President expected him at four in the afternoon, what would be the use of it? The accusing tone, had already been made — he Planck answered that no decision had been made ably that Hindenburg refused to accept or back on his promise as long as he had not himself, and in his own words. Hitler came, and Frick. Hindenburg had a horror of Röhm; Hitler; he received the three standing, leaning of eighty-five, he forced himself to undergo to make the quarter of an hour as painful as under the coldly staring eyes of the onlookers, burg, Meissner, Papen, and Schleicher.

Hindenburg began the conversation abruptly have only one question to address to you: offer me your collaboration in the Papen cabinet humiliated that he could scarcely speak; he already named his terms to Papen and Schleicher rather pleased that things were as he had in the whole power?" Hitler, almost in a whisper Mussolini . . . Hindenburg, too, misunderstood but was right, nevertheless: That, he said to the whole power. The official communiqué on that Hindenburg 'definitely rejected Herr Hitler that his conscience and his duties to the fatherland him to give the entire governing power to the National Socialist Movement, which wished of it.' If the fight must continue, Hindenburg request Herr Hitler at least to conduct it calmly, the sharp blame for not keeping it

Sup 483

if much is done so that

said the communiqué, 'regretted that Herr Hitler did not see himself in a position to support a national government appointed with the confidence of the Herr Reichs President, as he had agreed to do, before the Reichstag elections.' Large parts of the German public had felt for months that Hindenburg himself had broken faith with Brüning; the exiled Kaiser in his Dutch exile likewise felt deceived and forsaken by his field marshal. The marshal himself has been convinced since August 13, 1932, that Hitler was not a man of his word.

The whole interview had taken less than ten minutes.

Hitler's almost unerring feeling for the significance of great events in his life was expressed in the emotion with which he received Hindenburg's rebuff. The defeat in the presidential elections did not break him; the ten minutes' talk with Hindenburg did. Before the eyes of the German people, he had mounted the steps of the President's palace, the steps to power; before the eyes of the people, he had slunk down them. He had thirteen million votes behind him, and he was helpless against an old man who had to lean on a stick and was no longer able to concentrate his thoughts for more than a few minutes. But these few minutes had been enough to stop a so-called national revolution which by its own definition was impossible without 'the permission of the President.'

Chapter XX

THE RACE W

CATASTROPH

'GREAT HOPELESSNESS REIGNS AMONG comrades. The S.A. is desperate,' wrote Goebbels next day. Hitler's failure struck the Uprooted: personally, in their most private sensibilities. It was no state treasury, no state jobs. For the numerous party homes, the S.A. kitchens, the uniform factories in terror of losing their money, rude reminder for the party as a whole, with all its subsidies meant the menace of a bankruptcy to the millions; for thousands of employees it meant later.

For some it meant the executioner's axe. It sentenced the five murderers of Potempa to death with the law. Hitler sent the five who had traipsed before the eyes of his own mother a telegram with words: 'My comrades! In the face of this moment, I feel myself bound with you in unlimited five murderers, he said, had his picture hanging then could he forsake them? 'In our movement not cease when someone makes a mistake.' A derided man had been a Communist and a Pole in Germany, and 'anyone who struggles, lives, fi

figures, and through the meshes he world and of the whims and wishes whom, through many years, he had with seemingly unending success. ideas but fickle in his personal likes e annoyed with Schleicher and occa- that it would not do him any harm the command of a division in the t what a soldier had to look like.

between Germany's military men fate which in these days seemed to rhaps definitely. Outwitted by the industry, not supported even by the ment, Hitler had retained hope only t, was the most unreliable power of ; an editorial with sharp attacks on els on September 4 in his diary. 'If ct, we must again appeal to the prim- instincts of the 'stupid, lazy, cow- es during the next weeks and months as: 'Who is against us? Only a little 'We have long expected that when ie Jews, they would find a few run- .' But 'These old excellencies will not it Hindenburg. 'My great adversary, burg,' he said at a meeting, 'is eighty- ty-three and feel in the best of health. me, for I feel clearly what great tasks ie. By the time I am eighty-five years been dead a long while.' He meant said that the revolution of 1918 had 'at the head of the nation there were esmen, overweening leaders, raised in what most of his armed intellectuals unt Hindenburg when he wrote in the e system that was ingloriously over- 18, capitulated without manliness in a

decisive hour. The soldier who was fighting at the fronts will not forget that this system was not worthy of his sacrifices. With this world, with this society, with this mentality, nothing binds us any longer. It is the object of our hatred and contempt.' And Hitler added: 'I can only say that if in November, 1918, I had had only one army corps under me, the revolution would not have succeeded.'

If, in his few conferences with Hindenburg, he had been able to make this point clear to the old man, perhaps he would not be in the tight spot he was now. True, the field marshal might have understood that National Socialism had the one great aim of making a second November, 1918, impossible; but it was beyond the old man's understanding why mass meetings were necessary for this purpose. And the 'Bohemian corporal' and old Reichswehr spy just was not the type from which Hindenburg would take a lecture. Now Hitler had among his followers some other old generals and colonels who perhaps might be able to do what he was not. They were banded together in a committee for the sole purpose of influencing a dozen generals and colonels in the Reichswehr staff; their leader, Franz von Epp, the man who in bygone times had helped to 'invent' Hitler, was assigned to influence Hindenburg himself. This 'Military-Political Bureau' (*Wehrpolitisches Amt*) was going to make the old generals understand why there had to be a National Socialist Movement: to win 'spiritual domination over the people . . . ; to penetrate' as the program of the new bureau put it, 'the soul of the proletariat'; as a matter of fact, 'only the National Socialist S.A. has succeeded in drawing valuable fighter material from these circles.'

Meanwhile, let nobody fool himself that this new army would be had just for the asking. What was the use that Schleicher clamored in public: 'Germany will do what is necessary for her national defense, whatever happens'—and, 'We shall no longer stand for being treated as a second-class nation'? But it was, in Hitler's opinion, even worse that Papen still chased after his dream of a Franco-German occidental front, a Franco-German understanding that would give Germany her much-coveted army. No wonder that Mussolini became angry and shouted his anger in the face of

Hug

1932

* Hindenburg. "He is so awful,
He was a spy for us! Awful person."

Nov '32

fuse its participation. This seemed a great success, such as Papen had been unable to obtain. But the party of the junkers and heavy industrialists—for this is what the German Nationalists were at that time—consciously blocked the party of the Uprooted and Disinherited a step before their goal. Hugenberg declared that he would not participate in a government with the Center, that he would have no part whatsoever in this game of majorities—and without Hugenberg there could be no majority. These conservatives had a profound inner distrust of Hitler's method of combating masses with masses; it became one of their main tasks to prevent this newly rising mass from governing. Thus Hitler was unable to bring Hindenburg a majority; again, as in August, he demanded special powers; again, with an overtone of triumph, Hindenburg answered, through the voice of Meissner: This was party dictatorship; and Hindenburg did not feel he could 'answer for this to the German people.' But, at the end, a more conciliatory note: Hindenburg, Meissner wrote, repeats 'that his door stands open to you at any time'; he would always be ready to give Hitler a hearing, and he does not abandon the hope that in time it will be possible 'to win you and your movement for collaboration with all other constructive forces of the nation.' Meaning to say: you will grow smaller.

Angry and embittered, Hitler retorted—against his own better knowledge—that he would not grow smaller. He drove to Schleicher, shouted at him as if he were his subordinate. He would, he cried, prevent anyone else from governing; and since Schleicher was thinking of making Hitler's friend, Hjalmar Schacht, Chancellor, Hitler produced a written declaration by Schacht saying that only one man could become Chancellor today, and that was Hitler, and he should not be obstructed in his great task by conditions. 'If Hitler does not become Chancellor today,' wrote Schacht, 'he will in four months. He can wait.' And Schleicher, Hitler went on, should nourish no hopes of becoming Chancellor himself; for whoever became Chancellor would be overthrown by himself, Hitler, with the help—as he several times repeated—of the Communists.

Next day he had a calm and friendly conversation with Kaas, the leader of the Center. Both gentlemen agreed that the country

must be governed by a parliamentary majority—for a realistic basis for a possible majority government accord with my ideas,' said Hitler for the record that Hugenberg, as the spokesman of the junker try, made such a majority government impossible.

But confidence—the national catastrophe is the comfort Hitler gave his followers and even a few months the end [of the present government] than the beginning is today. Then they will time.'

Provided we are still in existence—Gregor S answered. He was now the loudest voice in that had seized upon the party, the proud prophet had been proved right. The majority of the opinion that in a few months, whatever happened, something worse would have happened.

In the course of 1932, Strasser's face had become the consciousness of the German masses. He put the socialist in the party, and no other party leader could make mass appeal. Within the party machine he had labor movement, known as the N.S.B.O. (Nationalization of Shop Cells). It was a part of the 'statue' which Strasser had made of the party apparatus. When the National Socialists seized power, they took the Wilhelmstrasse, not as a single minister or cabinet, but as a whole ready-made government; they would displace completely and set an entirely new one in its place. The party had cost him a hard fight with Hitler. Strasser's machine, which, to his mind, embodied planning and preparation; too little fighting and semi-socialist manifestoes and inflation plans of attracted many voters, but had aroused the business Hitler's friends; Schacht had warned Hitler to make promises. Hitler decided to dissolve the apparatus headed by Gottfried Feder. Now it was Hitler who was against socialism, but that Strasser was socialism of the party.

→ Do the with each other as a tool, there was no doubt on our side that our way would be as difficult as theirs. Just give us the power!

his seemed a great success, such as Papen in. But the party of the junkers and heavy is what the German Nationalists were at blocked the party of the Uprooted and Dis- their goal. Hugenberg declared that he a government with the Center, that he would r in this game of majorities — and without be no majority. These conservatives had a : of Hitler's method of combating masses : one of their main tasks to prevent this n governing. Thus Hitler was unable to ajority; again, as in August, he demanded with an overtone of triumph, Hindenburg voice of Meissner: This was party dictator- did not feel he could 'answer for this to it, at the end, a more conciliatory note: Hin- ze, repeats 'that his door stands open to you l always be ready to give Hitler a hearing, on the hope that in time it will be possible movement for collaboration with all other he nation.' Meaning to say: you will grow

ed, Hitler retorted — against his own better ould not grow smaller. He drove to Schlei- s if he were his subordinate. He would, he else from governing; and since Schleicher ag Hitler's friend, Hjalmar Schacht, Chan- a written declaration by Schacht saying that come Chancellor today, and that was Hitler, obstructed in his great task by conditions. come Chancellor today,' wrote Schacht, 'he le can wait.' And Schleicher, Hitler went on, es of becoming Chancellor himself; for who- r would be overthrown by himself, Hitler, several times repeated — of the Communists. calm and friendly conversation with Kaas, cr. Both gentlemen agreed that the country

must be governed by a parliamentary majority — 'the establishment of a realistic basis for a possible majority government is entirely in accord with my ideas,' said Hitler for the record; both men agreed that Hugenberg, as the spokesman of the junkers and heavy industry, made such a majority government impossible.

But confidence — the national catastrophe is with us! This was the comfort Hitler gave his followers and even more himself: 'In a few months the end [of the present government] will be worse than the beginning is today. Then they will turn to us a third time.'

Provided we are still in existence — Gregor Strasser might have answered. He was now the loudest voice in the whispered panic that had seized upon the party, the proud prophet of calamity who had been proved right. The majority of the party shared his opinion that in a few months, whatever happened to the government, something worse would have happened to the party.

In the course of 1932, Strasser's face had become imprinted on the consciousness of the German masses. He publicized himself as the socialist in the party, and no other party leaders equaled him in mass appeal. Within the party machine he had built up a sort of labor movement, known as the N.S.B.O. (National Socialist Organization of Shop Cells). It was a part of the 'state within the state,' which Strasser had made of the party apparatus. His idea was that when the National Socialists seized power, they would march into the Wilhelmstrasse, not as a single minister or chancellor, but with a whole ready-made government; they would discard the old state completely and set an entirely new one in its place. This type of party had cost him a hard fight with Hitler. Hitler had feared Strasser's machine, which, to his mind, embodied too much planning and preparation; too little fighting and propaganda. The semi-socialist manifestoes and inflation plans of this machine had attracted many voters, but had aroused the business men among Hitler's friends; Schacht had warned Hitler to stop making economic promises. Hitler decided to dissolve the economic planning apparatus headed by Gottfried Feder. Now it was said that the Leader was against socialism, but that Strasser wanted to save the socialism of the party.

He wanted to save the party itself. If it did not get its share of power at once, it was headed for ruin. Then the proudest dream of the armed intellectuals would be at an end, and a horde of bohemians, no longer armed, would wander through Germany, literally begging.

This had already begun. 'Financial worries make all well-directed work impossible,' wrote Goebbels. He reported that the party was cutting the wages of its employees; that the National Socialist deputies could give the Reichstag porters no tips for Christmas. He sent the S.A. out on the street to beg for money. In their thin shirts, shivering with the cold, the storm troopers stood on the corners by twos and threes, rattling their tin collection boxes and crying lamentably: 'Give something for the wicked Nazis!'

The party's trusted backers were dropping away; many belonged to that type of rich men who were always on the brink of financial difficulties themselves. In November, Fritz Thyssen had definitely declared that his strength was at an end; he would buy one more carload of political pamphlets from the *Völkischer Beobachter*, but after that they should cease to count on him. Even Adolf Müller, the printer of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, threatened several times in the course of November and December to stop printing unless he got some money. Hitler trembled and courted Adolf Müller's favor scarcely less than that of Hindenburg; he often yelled at him, to be sure, but Müller was half deaf and hard to perturb. He calmly replied that the *Völkischer Beobachter* was ruining him, but luckily he was doing a good business in Catholic church notices. This printing order he owed to Cardinal Michael Faulhaber, who more or less dominated Bavarian politics; Adolf Müller, who often held Hitler's financial fate in his hands, was no National Socialist, but a member of the Catholic Bavarian People's Party which ruled Bavaria.

Amid these dangers Strasser and Göring set out on their race to compromise. Schleicher reproached Papen for not seeing the most obvious thing of all: the venality of the National Socialists, their bankruptcy, the crumbling of their power under the pressure of financial stringency. He reproached him for setting too much

store on a minority group like the German, bornly overlooking the will of all big party understanding with the government. Papen, chairman of the Social Democratic Party, a tight-lipped, elderly man with a beard like many Socialist officials of the elder generation, came with Wilhelm Eggert, a younger colleague, into their grievances, and both spoiled the wage contracts, of the recently introduced stuffs. Schleicher replied that he, too, disapproved the rise in food prices as unfortunate. Much money had been given away to the unemployed. Rudolf Breitscheid, leader of the Social Democratic Reichstag, that he desired a functioning Reichstag were not capable of functioning; and if the Reich government should put off then, Schleicher inquired amiably: Would you mount the barricades? Breitscheid answered: I would not commit myself to the barricades, but I would act against such a breach of the constitution by legal means at their disposal. Schleicher said: I am ideal in legal means; from all these conversations I get the impression that with friendly treatment the situation will improve; even the Social Democrats, even the Communists. They would quietly permit individuals to enter the cabinet, and for the present would support the government.

But since Papen definitely was not willing to compromise but instead planned to force upon the constitution, Schleicher, using his authority as Chancellor, overthrew him by a palace revolution on the morning of December 2, approximately. Very reluctantly Hindenburg let his favorite Papen remain his private adviser; both agreed that Papen must take the responsibility of the chancellor. Papen's skeptically intended words, 'would

avoid a conflict with the Reichstag.' Schleicher would have preferred to govern by a straw man, but Hindenburg and Papen forced him into the open and explicitly commissioned him to form a government which would have the Reichstag's confidence. Schleicher was quite unaware of it, but by this act his fate was sealed.

Whom of the National Socialists would he ask to enter his cabinet? For the policy he had in mind it could only be Strasser. Schleicher made him, in a confidential talk on December 3, the best offer which the National Socialists in their situation could expect. Strasser was to enter the government as Vice-Chancellor. At the same time he was to become Premier of Prussia, not appointed from above by force, but regularly elected by the votes of the National Socialists and the Center in the Prussian diet. If Strasser wished, he could administer Schleicher's great re-employment project; the 'voluntary labor service' would be in his hands; he could put the S.A. in charge of the labor service and burden the state treasury with its expenses and debts. To be sure, he would have had to find a basis of understanding with the Social Democratic unions. Strasser thought well of Theodor Leipart, and the understanding was conceivable.

'We are agreed,' wrote Theodor Leipart at the end of 1932 in a message to the trade-union functionaries, 'that the ultimate aim of the working class is the realization of socialism. But you know that the trade unions were established in order to improve the situation of the working class in the framework of the present economic order.' He told a French press correspondent that Schleicher was really trying to relax the tension with the unions, in order to remove their resistance to his government; hence Schleicher should not be reproached for his past. If his rearmament speeches had inflamed public opinion in France, said Leipart, the only possible reply was that Schleicher's demand for equality had only expressed the view of all Germans.

'Betrayer of the workers!' the Communists shouted back. In a party proclamation of their own, the Communists, in an effort to take the wind out of the sails of the Nazis, had declared that the 'fetters of Versailles' must fall. The official Social Democrats, in turn, condemned Leipart and forced him to make retractions.

Schleicher's government, said a party proclama- tion was a 'one-sided government representing the system the failure of which has become more to day.' No statement could have been more on the basis of this line,' said Breitscheid, 'the hope of success to revive the democratic will that have succumbed to all the talk of dicta- Communists! But the unions, representing the real mass than the party, took no part in the years before, Ferdinand Lassalle, the founder of the movement, had explained in a correspondence that the working class is instinctively inclined to can only be convinced that it is exercised by nearly all the leaders of the trade unions be- openly, that Schleicher's 'dictatorship' would be in the interests of the workers. Schleicher 'has turned the people,' said Jakob Kaiser, one of the leaders of the workers in the Rhineland; 'the assault of the defeated,' and 'a wave of calm, conciliatory ex- working class.' An article in the Social Den- by the trade-union leadership, demanded: work! Even an adjournment of the Reichstag ens us.' And Leipart, despite all the anger of the leaders, stuck to his opinion: 'The one need now is a productive policy, resolute a situation of the German workers.' 'Schleicher ing to fulfill a part of our demands. This bring us socialism, we are well aware of that situation, reject the government's call to help- viding employment?'

Gregor Strasser believed that the hour for a contribution to Germany had come. In case H Schleicher said he would see to it that the b Hitler no more money. In those days Strasse the feeling that he had unexpectedly become many, for he seemed on the point of becoming a German working class.

On December 3, when Schleicher and Strasser agreed on their plan, new elections in Thuringia had taken place. The result had been a new National Socialist defeat. The party lost up to forty per cent of its votes; this was no longer a slip, it was a crash. To save the party, desperate measures were in order. Hitler sent Göring to Schleicher with instructions to discuss the possibilities of appointing a National Socialist premier in Prussia; but this premier, he insisted, must be Göring and not Strasser. Schleicher had an easy answer: the Center declared that it would approve and vote for Strasser as Prussian premier, but not Göring.

12/5/32
*
A sordid comedy—this mutual betrayal of the National Socialist leaders! Strasser conspired with Schleicher against Hitler, Hitler with Schleicher against Strasser. But more and more, the unexpressed sentiment in the party was gathering behind Strasser. In vain, Hitler attempted at a meeting on December 5 to inspire his Reichstag deputies with courage. It was not true, he told them, that the party had suffered a defeat in Thuringia—all of them knew that it was only too true. Never, he said, had a great movement achieved victory by taking the road of compromise. The closer the show-down approached, the greater the sacrifices; 'only one thing is decisive: who in this struggle is capable of the last effort, who can put the last battalion in the field.' For the deputies who knew that they themselves would be the sacrifice at the next elections, this was no consolation. 'God save us from having to go through with the next election campaign,' Goebbels had recently written in his diary. On December 6, he noted: 'The situation in the Reich is catastrophic.'

12/7/32
On December 7, Hitler and Strasser met in the Kaiserhof; their conversation ended with mutual threats, reproaches, and accusations of betrayal. Hitler accused Strasser of trying to cheat him out of the chancellorship, and even the party leadership—of trying to split the party. Strasser replied that he had wanted to save the party, but Hitler had disloyally stabbed him in the back. Perhaps he did not say everything he had in his heart; after the conference, he sat down in his room in the Hotel Excelsior across from the Anhalt Station, and wrote Hitler a letter overflowing with the anger that had been gathering within him for years. The letter took up differ-

* Due to the compromise of the principles becomes the corruption of the principles

THE RACE WITH CATAS

ences that went back to 1925, the beginning with Hitler; Goebbels was not spared, erred with vilification. Strange was the reproba to come to power, was consciously playing v trophe: for years Strasser had done nothing Strasser resigned from the party leadership Hitler the next day, December 8.

It was a 'bombshell' as Goebbels put it. It met with Frick, Göring, Goebbels, Hess, D. gauleiter of Cologne; Wilhelm Kube, deput For weeks they had felt their party tottering Many regarded Strasser as the man who might and thought Hitler had prevented him out of openly said as much. Though no great thin independent mind. Now he rebuked Hitler lieutenants. Strasser, he declared, might be rig and though his letter was a calamity, it was paired; Hitler must make his peace with Su and permitted Frick to drive about Berlin l

But that morning Strasser had left the He checked his suitcase at the Anhalt Station and a friend by the name of Moritz, he sat in a and cursing Hitler. In Italy the sun was s boisterously, and that was where he was g and children. In unprintable terms he pre month Hitler would come to him crawling.

Meanwhile, Hitler, Göring, and Goebbels Where and with whom was Strasser intriguing ing out plans with Schleicher? It seemed a ba Frick should be unable to find him. Restless went to Goebbels's home; here, as Goebbels 'very depressed, especially because there is no whole party will fall apart and all our work v

By this time Strasser had called for his suit for his home in Munich. But the bomb roll struck, it burst. While Hitler was sitting with (gloom, an energetic man made vain attempt

en Schleicher and Strasser agreed on their Thuringia had taken place. The result had Socialist defeat. The party lost up to forty is was no longer a slip, it was a crash. To late measures were in order. Hitler sent with instructions to discuss the possibilities onal Socialist premier in Prussia; but this must be Göring and not Strasser. Schleicher e Center declared that it would approve and ssian premier, but not Göring.

this mutual betrayal of the National Socialist sired with Schleicher against Hitler, Hitler st Strasser. But more and more, the unex- he party was gathering behind Strasser. In at a meeting on December 5 to inspire his h courage. It was not true, he told them, ffered a defeat in Thuringia—all of them too true. Never, he said, had a great move, by taking the road of compromise. The approached, the greater the sacrifices; 'only who in this struggle is capable of the last e last battalion in the field.' For the deputies themselves would be the sacrifice at the next consolation. 'God save us from having to go t election campaign,' Goebbels had recendy On December 6, he noted: 'The situation in ic.'

Hitler and Strasser met in the Kaiserhof; their with mutual threats, reproaches, and accusa- er accused Strasser of trying to cheat him out and even the party leadership—of trying to r replied that he had wanted to save the party, ully stabbed him in the back. Perhaps he did had in his heart; after the conference, he sat the Hotel Excelsior across from the Anhalt idler a letter overflowing with the anger that ithin him for years. The letter took up differ-

*promise of the principle
capture of the principle*

ences that went back to 1925, the beginning of Strasser's collabora- tion with Hitler; Goebbels was not spared, while Röhm was covered with vilification. Strange was the reproach that Hitler, in order to come to power, was consciously playing with the German catastrophes: for years Strasser had done nothing else. In conclusion, Strasser resigned from the party leadership. This letter reached Hitler the next day, December 8.

It was a 'bombshell' as Goebbels put it. In the Kaiserhof, Hitler met with Frick, Göring, Goebbels, Hess, Doctor Robert Ley, the *gauleiter* of Cologne; Wilhelm Kube, deputy in the Prussian diet. For weeks they had felt their party tottering; and now this blow! Many regarded Strasser as the man who might have saved the party and thought Hitler had prevented him out of injured vanity. Frick openly said as much. Though no great thinker, he was a man of independent mind. Now he rebuked Hitler in the presence of his lieutenants. Strasser, he declared, might be right about many things, and though his letter was a calamity, it was one that could be repaired; Hitler must make his peace with Strasser. Hitler gave in and permitted Frick to drive about Berlin looking for Strasser.

But that morning Strasser had left the Hotel Excelsior; he had checked his suitcase at the Anhalt Station and had vanished. With a friend by the name of Moritz, he sat in a wine room, drinking and cursing Hitler. In Italy the sun was shining, he cried out boisterously, and that was where he was going—with his wife and children. In unprintable terms he predicted that within a month Hitler would come to him crawling.

Meanwhile, Hitler, Göring, and Goebbels racked their brains. Where and with whom was Strasser intriguing now? Was he working out plans with Schleicher? It seemed a bad sign that his friend Frick should be unable to find him. Restless and unnerved, Hitler went to Goebbels's home; here, as Goebbels writes, everyone was 'very depressed, especially because there is now a danger that the whole party will fall apart and all our work will be in vain.'

By this time Strasser had called for his suitcase and had started for his home in Munich. But the bomb rolled on, and where it struck, it burst. While Hitler was sitting with Goebbels in irresolute gloom, an energetic man made vain attempt to save the party on

*Dre
1932*

** Could they trust Frick?*

his own responsibility. This was Doctor Robert Ley. He sat with other National Socialist deputies in the Kaiserhof and tried to convince them that Hitler was right while Strasser was in the wrong; he telephoned to the provinces and inquired about the mood. Finally he reached Hitler on the telephone and told him that 'the situation is becoming more acute from hour to hour.' He implored him to come out of his hiding-place since he alone could save something. Meanwhile, a letter arrived from Gottfried Feder resigning his offices and asking for a vacation; he boasted that by his propaganda he had won millions of supporters to the party, but that since Hitler obviously meant to break off this anti-capitalist propaganda and dissolve Feder's economic bureau, millions would drift away in addition to the millions who already had gone.

Hitler now awakened from his lethargy and decided to destroy the mutineers before they could strike. Late that night he went back to the Kaiserhof and dictated a decree, deposing the party leadership. Strasser's state within the state was smashed, the whole machine ready to take power was broken to pieces; it was of no use, anyway, said Hitler, for in the next months the party need concern itself only with one thing, with holding the vanishing voters; all the project-makers in the Brown House would do better to go out into the villages and speak to the people. Ley was set at the head of the organization; his title of 'staff leader' made it clear that he was merely supposed to be Hitler's helper. A 'Central Commission' was set over the party, with the function of supervising the policy of the movement in the provincial diets, to determine such matters as strike policy; the chairman of this mighty new party committee was a man almost unknown in the movement, the Leader's personal friend and private secretary, Rudolf Hess.

1932
But the question remained: Should the party, at the risk of cracking, continue in its struggle against the government? Should it continue to demand the chancellorship for Hitler? Did the mass of party functionaries possess the moral strength to persevere in desperate opposition, if going over to Strasser offered a prospect of becoming ministers, provincial presidents, mayors, superintendents of welfare offices, sergeants in the labor service, or nightwatchmen in some municipal gas works? Hitler knew that his loyal followers in

the brown uniform were running by the dozens to the offices and 'Jewish newspapers' to sell so-called newspapers for a few marks.

'The Leader,' writes Goebbels, 'is taking down the hotel room. You can see by his face is going on inside him. He is embittered and this disloyalty. Once he stops still and says on apart, I'll put an end to it all in three minutes.'

Finally Hitler reached a decision. By morning that he would fight, and 'throw the whole party before the opposing side could gather strength it would be crushed by a previous ultimatum drawn up, sharply condemning Strasser, full of omissions of loyalty to Hitler. On the following would have to sign this statement.

The great surprise of the next day, December 11, 1932, was the unexpected disappearance. Now it was the turn to be dismayed; they were abandoned and had no one to turn to. The statement condemning Strasser was submitted to them, nearly all of them signed it. Gottfried Feder, remaining intimate friends, refused: 'Either you kicked me out of the party,' cried Hitler. Feder's noon Hitler assembled his deputies and gathered them in the palace; he spoke with tears in his voice, and had always rebelled against him and for years had been his authority as Leader; but this last betrayal he believed that of Strasser! he cried, laid his head on his hands and sobbed. Many of those present began to weep, and ran down Göring's cheeks, and Goebbels brandished his handkerchief; from a modest place in the rear, Streicher, who for years had been humiliated by the fact that Strasser could do this to him on the evening after this success, Hitler 'looked quite again.' The demonstration of faith, as Goebbels encouraged and strengthened the indomitable mass. It was decided that Hitler should travel around and have confidential talks with the functionaries:

this was Doctor Robert Ley. He sat with deputies in the Kaiserhof and tried to console as right while Strasser was in the wrong; provinces and inquired about the mood. Then on the telephone and told him that 'the time is acute from hour to hour.' He implored a meeting-place since he alone could save something arrived from Gottfried Feder resigning on a vacation; he boasted that by his propaganda of supporters to the party, but that since he could break off this anti-capitalist propaganda bureau, millions would drift away in the end who already had gone.

From his lethargy and decided to destroy the party could strike. Late that night he went and dictated a decree, deposing the party within the state was smashed, the whole power was broken to pieces; it was of no use in the next months the party need nothing, with holding the vanishing voters; the Brown House would do better to go and speak to the people. Ley was set at the head of the 'staff leader' made it clear that he was Hitler's helper. A 'Central Commission' with the function of supervising the policy of provincial diets, to determine such matters as the chairman of this mighty new party committee was given in the movement, the Leader's personal secretary, Rudolf Hess.

Decided: Should the party, at the risk of crackling against the government? Should it continue its chancellorship for Hitler? Did the mass of the people have the moral strength to persevere in desisting over to Strasser offered a prospect of becoming provincial presidents, mayors, superintendents of the labor service, or nightwatchmen in the end? Hitler knew that his loyal followers in

the brown uniform were running by the dozen to government offices and 'Jewish newspapers' to sell so-called party secrets for a few marks.

'The Leader,' writes Goebbels, 'is taking long strides up and down the hotel room. You can see by his face that a great struggle is going on inside him. He is embittered and deeply wounded by this disloyalty. Once he stops still and says only: If the party falls apart, I'll put an end to it all in three minutes with a pistol.'

Finally Hitler reached a decision. By morning it was apparent that he would fight, and 'throw the whole party into the struggle.' Before the opposing side could gather strength for an ultimatum, it would be crushed by a previous ultimatum. A declaration was drawn up, sharply condemning Strasser, full of praise and declarations of loyalty to Hitler. On the following day the sub-leaders would have to sign this statement.

The great surprise of the next day, December 9, was Strasser's unexpected disappearance. Now it was the turn of Strasser's friends to be dismayed; they were abandoned and had no idea what to do. The statement condemning Strasser was submitted to them, and nearly all of them signed it. Gottfried Feder, one of Hitler's few remaining intimate friends, refused: 'Either you sign or you'll be kicked out of the party,' cried Hitler. Feder signed. In the afternoon Hitler assembled his deputies and *gauleiters* in Göring's palace; he spoke with tears in his voice, related how Strasser had always rebelled against him and for years had contested his authority as Leader; but this last betrayal! 'Never would I have believed that of Strasser!' he cried, laid his head on the table and sobbed. Many of those present began to weep with him. The tears ran down Göring's cheeks, and Goebbels brandished a big white handkerchief; from a modest place in the background Julius Streicher, who for years had been humiliated by Strasser, cried: 'Maddening that Strasser could do this to our Leader!' On the evening after this success, Hitler 'looked quite happy and exalted again.' The demonstration of faith, as Goebbels put it, had 'encouraged and strengthened the indomitable man.'

It was decided that Hitler should travel around the country and have confidential talks with the functionaries and S.A. men. Gö-

21
9/
32

would do the same. They set out; their friendly. 'A heavy depression prevails in Goebbels in his diary. 'The sentiment ship is still divided,' he finds on December of effort to keep the S.A. and the party course [December 15] . . . 'Occasionally a successful in 'lifting up' the mood of a always the case. On December 17, Hitler is in Halle. Only his will counted in the he bade each one of them give him his While those in the front rows were giving broke out in the back of the room; men illious S.A. and S.S. men shouted that the 1. In these speeches, Hitler did not strike Perhaps our enemies did give us a numer- reichstag elections, but next year we shall est and compound interest. . . . 'In three would be at hand: 'I think that in March gentry in open battle. By then we shall ry conditions and the guaranty that our

ous hope in the misfortune of the father- pointed. Hitler's prophecies, that without ent could accomplish anything in foreign to be false. After the MacDonald cabinet for Germany's right to equality in arma- w French Foreign Minister, made it plain with England under no circumstances and front must arise. The result was a great leicher government. On December 6, the e reconvened in Geneva. Again Germany- cember 11, Germany, Italy, France, Eng- ates agreed 'that one of the principles that ence on disarmament should be to grant powers, disarmed by treaty, equality of would provide security for all nations, and d itself be embodied in a convention con-

taining the conclusions of the Disarmament Conference.' True, this was only a declaration of principle; the statement also stipulated that France must receive some guaranties of security, to compensate her and relieve her fears. For Germany the declaration represented no material gain like the evacuation of the Rhineland in 1930, the cancellation of reparations in 1932; wherein the equality should consist, and how soon it should be realized, was not said. But for the world that takes principles seriously, this was the most brilliant satisfaction that Germany had received since 1919. The victors of Versailles had given the Reichswehr general what they had denied the democratic ministers of the German Republic.

At home, too, Schleicher began his government with an almost effortless success. Papen had been overthrown at once by his Reichstag; but no one dared or desired to overthrow Schleicher. The German Nationalists expected him to provide a powerful dictatorship; the Center hoped that he would restore parliamentarianism; the Social Democrats did not wish to do anything that might halt the disintegration of the National Socialists; hence none of them wanted to overthrow Schleicher. Not even the National Socialists.

'Whatever happens, no elections—we need a breathing spell!' wrote Goebbels in his diary. The Reichstag made an important decision: Papen's wage-cutting decree must be suspended. Schleicher was delighted, and of his own accord withdrew all Papen's other attacks on the wage laws. Then the Reichstag adjourned without demanding a program of the government, without any expression of confidence or no-confidence. The parliament voluntarily gave Schleicher a free hand. Meanwhile, with cautiously chosen words, the leading representative of German industry declared that the depression was slowly vanishing; Doctor Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, chairman of the Reich Association of German Industry, said on December 14 at a session of the leading committee of the organization: ' . . . The world economic situation, in the money market and above all the raw-material market, shows signs of an improvement; the low point seems definitely past.'

The chaos was lifting; slowly, but at many points. Desperately Hitler tried, in secret negotiations, to save what he could. Göring again and again had his talks with Schleicher about Prussia; no

Dec

1932

result. True, behind the curtain of these political conversations, the door to Hindenburg's private study had opened to Göring. The questions that the old marshal wished to discuss with the former air force captain were not strictly political. He was curious to know how much benefit could be expected of the S.A. in case Germany should build up a large army; or rather, as Schleicher planned it, a 'militia' around the nucleus of the professional Reichswehr. Werner von Blomberg, a general little known to the public, worked out plans for this militia; served as an expert adviser to the German delegation at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva; personally kept Hindenburg informed of developments. In Berlin, Göring, Blomberg, Franz von Epp, in the presence or at least with the knowledge of Hindenburg, discussed the dividing lines between army and S.A., and later events indicate that an understanding was achieved. Röhm had no share in these talks.

But this was far from an understanding concerning the political leadership of the Reich. The nation had a deep desire for peace at home — and Schleicher seemed to bring the peace. This was the darkest Christmas Hitler had had in years. In Italy, Roberto Farinacci, former general secretary of the Fascist Party, leader of the radical, anti-Semitic tendency in the Fascist Movement, wrote in his newspaper, *Regime Fascista*, that Hitler was on the down grade; that he had played his cards wrong, as was only understandable, for the National Socialists despite their claims were no revolutionaries, but peaceful citizens who had missed every favorable moment for striking.

The entries in Goebbels's diary at this time read like a confirmation of the Italian judgment. Goebbels, an outwardly excitable but inwardly cold temperament, dramatizes the feelings of the party masses at this period; he was doubtless a good observer and a good actor. From December 8 to December 23, he writes: 'All of us are in a very depressed mood. We are so sore inside that we desire nothing more fervently than to flee for a few weeks from the whole mess. . . . It is high time for us to come to power. If we succeed in keeping the movement together, we will also succeed in saving the situation. . . . We must muster all our strength to put the organization on its feet again. . . . There is a great deal of

wrangling and dissension in the party. . . . We in the *Gau*, or else we won't get by financially before Christmas: 'The most terrible loneliness me like dark hopelessness.'

ain of these political conversations, the study had opened to Göring. The al wished to discuss with the former tly political. He was curious to know expected of the S.A. in case Germany y; or rather, as Schleicher planned it, of the professional Reichswehr. Werner de known to the public, worked out l as an expert adviser to the German ent Conference in Geneva; personally of developments. In Berlin, Göring, in the presence or at least with the discussed the dividing lines between ents indicate that an understanding was are in these talks.

understanding concerning the political e nation had a deep desire for peace at ned to bring the peace. This was the ad had in years. In Italy, Roberto Fa tary of the Fascist Party, leader of the cy in the Fascist Movement, wrote in ista, that Hitler was on the down grade; ds wrong, as was only understandable, despite their claims were no revolution- who had missed every favorable moment

to diary at this time read like a confirma- t. Goebbels, an outwardly excitable but t, dramatizes the feelings of the party as doubtless a good observer and a good o December 23, he writes: 'All of us are o. We are so sore inside that we desire an to flee for a few weeks from the sime for us to come to power. If we suc- ment together, we will also succeed in We must muster all our strength to put et again. . . . There is a great deal of

wrangling and dissension in the party. . . . We must cut salaries in the *Gau*, or else we won't get by financially. . . . And one day before Christmas: 'The most terrible loneliness is descending on me like dark hopelessness.'

12/24/32

ter XXI

CHANCELLOR AT LAST

AY, HINDENBURG RECEIVED and expressed his pleasure that 'the time and the upward path is now open

rising; they will fall, said the economist. We must consider the politician. We must consider, said Schleicher: to combat their distress to economic life, even if they are not a friend with the laws of economic reason.' 'Beside that' over the radio on December 12 was that I am a supporter neither of the big landowners in the East; he, 'must proceed more rapidly than a hundred thousand acres of land he wanted small and medium farms, and these considerably.'

longer valid. Hindenburg's youthful 'commissar for re-employment,' started works with no less than one billion marks. That is inflation! 'No government acting moral responsibility if the present beginning should be destroyed by a wave of dis- ed Schleicher to abandon his program

for spending a billion, and for the present only half a billion was allotted for re-employment.

While the laws of economic reason were bringing about slow and hesitant upswinging, the elements played a strange trick on the German economy: a mild winter and an abundant harvest. The mild winter was a hard blow to coal-mining, a branch of industry which had long been struggling against a sick domestic market. Doctor Paul Silverberg, chairman of the Rhenish Board of Industry and Commerce, himself a coal man, spoke at the beginning of January with great confidence of the economic revival in the Rhineland: '... Indubitably a better mood and increased confidence have made their appearance. More and more voices in industry and economic life are speaking of increasing employment and a growing market. . . . The iron industry can register an improvement; the domestic market is reviving somewhat and the foreign market is also becoming steadier. The same is true of the machine and textile industries. . . .' There was only one dark spot in the picture: the coal business, said Silverberg, 'in consequence of the mild winter, has not kept step.'

At the same time German agriculture groaned beneath the weight of a mammoth harvest such as Germany had not witnessed for decades. A mockery of Fate in this winter of starvation! A surplus of grain, of potatoes, even of meat, milk and butter — and on the other side, unemployed people without money, insufficient demand, crashing prices. For half a century Germany's military leaders had been insisting that the country must be in a position to feed itself like a 'besieged fortress,' without imports. Now Germany's peasants and big landowners had achieved this historic feat for the first time, and they were pale with fear. 'After decades of bitter struggle,' said Baron von Braun, the Minister of Food Supply, 'German agriculture has succeeded in meeting its own breadstuff requirements, an idea which formerly would have been regarded as utterly Utopian. Likewise in meat production, increases have been achieved which would formerly have been considered impossible.' To a country with more than its share of starvation, the minister spoke of this blessing as of some devastating enemy army that must be defeated by all possible means: grain production, he said, must

Fall

32

be limited, in order to obtain 'healthy prices'; by the purchase of one hundred and ten thousand tons of potato flakes, by a law ordering the mixture of potato spirits with gasoline, and by similar measures, 'the assault of the record potato harvest may have been repelled at least in part.'

The coal miners complained because Germany was not freezing, and nearly the whole farming population felt embittered and hopeless because there was too much to eat. Schleicher does not seem to have fathomed the full seriousness of this discontent. It came as a great surprise to him when a spark from abroad caused the whole rebellious mixture to explode.

The decisions of Ottawa were beginning to inflame Europe. The new Empire tariffs forced Danish butter out of England; desperate Danish producers now threw their butter on the German market at dumping prices, and in December, 1932, German butter prices quickly fell to a new and unexpected low. In the last years German agriculture had stepped up its butter production; and so Germany now suffered from a surplus of butter in addition to grain and potatoes. This caused the profoundest hardship to German agriculture, for it largely affected small and medium farms. The Schleicher government was unwilling to bar Danish butter, for fear of driving the Danes to counter-measures against German industrial exports. Instead, it thought up a remarkable way of relieving the distress of the butter producers. It persuaded margarine producers to mix fifteen thousand tons of the finest Danish butter with their product each year. The butter producers were not at all pleased with this secret improvement of margarine, for they feared that margarine would become so good that consumers would cease to buy any butter at all. They loudly demanded that Schleicher should bar Danish butter from Germany as Papen had planned to do; and when Schleicher refused, the butter producers gave the danger signal to the whole of agriculture by declaring that Schleicher was hostile to farming interests. Toward the end of the year the League for the Defense of Peasant Interests (*Interessenverband der Bauern*) in Württemberg declared in 'boundless indignation' that agriculture, the most important occupational group, was being sacrificed to a 'more than senseless export fanaticism'; the league

threatened that 'despair and hopelessness w. measures of self-help which run counter to i state.' This incendiary cry did not come fr from small peasants, and similar voices, pr struggle against the Reich government,' wer farmers in West and North Germany.

For a moment it looked as if Schleicher w a result of the butter controversy, magnific National Socialists. With the support of co middle and small peasants, they had won a of the *Reichslandbund*, the leading Germ: Two of the four leading officers were Na President Werner Willikens and Director ve pressure, the *Reichslandbund* decided to pre licly with a demand for Schleicher's dismiss the president, Count Eberhard Kalckreuth, drawn up, stating that the misery of agricul field of peasant processing (butter, cheese), tion of the present government,' assumed dim not have been thought possible even under gime,' and that 'agriculture was being plunde the almighty moneybag interests of the intern: industry and its henchmen.' The memorandum trade war and measures to relieve agricultu debt payments. Foreclosures of bankrupt fa — this demand was raised especially by the larg owners. There already was an 'anti-foreclosur owners wanted it strengthened and extended.

With this paper in hand, the four leader Sybel and Willikens in the lead, called on Hi 11. Hindenburg was always accessible to comp agriculture. He sent for Schleicher and instru agricultural problem further study. Schleicher into the matter. Hindenburg left the room, S the paper with its violent attacks. Schleicher, not take strong words very seriously, said corn dren, you can't say such things'; then he pr

protection for the dairy farmers and stronger measures against foreclosures.

He apparently thought that he had talked the farmers out of their political attack. But they had previously given their statement to the press, and it was published. Now Schleicher answered sharply that the government would do what was necessary for the protection of agriculture, but it would have no further dealings with the leaders of the *Reichslandbund*. Hindenburg also declared that if he had known in advance of the *Landbund's* rude public attack, he would not have received its leaders. Schleicher informed the German public how the decisions of Ottawa had shaken the German butter market, and added that the small peasants were much harder hit than the big landowners. He satisfied Hindenburg by submitting to him an order for the strengthening of the anti-foreclosure laws; a few days later, Hindenburg wrote the *Landbund* that he hoped 'my order extending and broadening the anti-foreclosure laws will serve to pacify agricultural interests.'

While Schleicher with cautious steps had to find his way between these sometimes petty snares of world economics and domestic politics, his most dangerous enemy seemed in swift decay. The National Socialist movement, seen from outside and probably even more from inside, was evidently in full physical and moral disintegration. In the city of Kassel the S.A. had mutinied because it had come to light that their leaders had embezzled and sold food donated by peasants for starving storm troopers; the S.A. men did not mutiny against the embezzlement, however, but because the leadership had been forced to discipline the culprit; for leaders and rank-and-file were both involved in the embezzlement. The guilty leader issued an indignant statement to the effect that S.A. men had informed 'party officials (meaning the *gauleiter* of the Kassel district) outside the S.A.' of the events; they should take note 'that the affairs of the S.A. are absolutely no concern of outsiders,' and anyone who shot off his mouth again would be thrown out. They really did have something to keep secret, for the S.A. leader, in order to cover up the embezzlement, had arranged for subordinates to break into his office and stage a faked burglary.

In the Westphalian town of Volmarstein, the police discovered

that the S.A. Home was the headquarters of committed burglaries all over the region; and Hitler's storm troopers had arranged a hold-up. And in several other localities the police discovered barracks were positive robbers' dens, in which were stored. In Regensburg in Bavaria, Mairhofer, a *gauleiter*, was sentenced to a month in prison for unemployment relief office; Hitler publicly swindler 'for his self-sacrificing activity in the to depose him, but promised to 'appoint him which he could be useful to the movement.' Hentsch was murdered in the woods; a Nazi fled abroad; and it was whispered in the killings ascribed to the 'Marxists' could be a way. The top S.A. leadership maintained, December 8, that the troop was full of Communists who aimed to provoke the S.A. to perpetrate other words, whether provoked by Communists were in preparation. The German Nation more strongly than ever that this undiscipline was what they had always described as Bolshevism.

Were these the noblest and best of the nation's sacrifice and will-power? Challenged, Hitler said: 'With us the criminals are better cared for than the communists'; it was absurd, he said, to expect from the mission of National Socialism to transform the masses into strength for the nation. If the nation were destroyed, this force would not be turned against the nation in the form of Communists, which were the same thing. Meanwhile, Strasser had returned from Hitler through Mutschmann, *gauleiter* of the Reich government; that he entered into the Reich government; that he was a conciliator, but only on condition that he become the party with virtually unlimited powers. He summed his conversations with Schleicher; he received for the first time by Hindenburg

* D.T. Take the flea
bludgeon them

Dre
1932

farmers and stronger measures against

that he had talked the farmers out of it they had previously given their state- was published. Now Schleicher answered ent would do what was necessary for the but it would have no further dealings *Reichslandbund*. Hindenburg also declared advance of the *Landbund's* rude public at- received its leaders. Schleicher informed the decisions of Ottawa had shaken the and added that the small peasants were big landowners. He satisfied Hinden- an order for the strengthening of the w days later, Hindenburg wrote the *Land-* order extending and broadening the anti- e to pacify agricultural interests.

cautious steps had to find his way between res of world economics and domestic poli- acmy seemed in swift decay. The National from outside and probably even more y in full physical and moral disintegration. S.A. had mutinied because it had come had embezzled and sold food donated by m troopers; the S.A. men did not mutiny t, however, but because the leadership had the culprit; for leaders and rank-and-file e embezzlement. The guilty leader issued o the effect that S.A. men had informed the *gauleiter* of the Kassel district) ie events; they should take note 'that e absolutely no concern of outsiders,' and mouth again would be thrown out. They ig to keep secret, for the S.A. leader, in pezzlement, had arranged for subordinates d stage a faked burglary.

wn of Volmarstein, the police discovered

that the S.A. Home was the headquarters of a band of thieves who committed burglaries all over the region; on one occasion Adolf Hitler's storm troopers had arranged a hold-up with a store cashier. And in several other localities the police discovered that the S.A. barracks were positive robbers' dens, in which stolen goods were stored. In Regensburg in Bavaria, Mairhofer, the National Social- ist *gauleiter*, was sentenced to a month in prison for defrauding the unemployment relief office; Hitler publicly thanked the convicted swindler 'for his self-sacrificing activity in the party'; he was forced to depose him, but promised to 'appoint him to another post in which he could be useful to the movement.' In Dresden, S.A. man Hentsch was murdered in the woods; a National Socialist deputy fled abroad; and it was whispered in the party that other recent killings ascribed to the 'Marxists' could be explained in the same way. The top S.A. leadership maintained, in a secret order of December 8, that the troop was full of Communist stool-pigeons who aimed to provoke the S.A. to perpetrating blood-baths—in other words, whether provoked by Communists or not, blood-baths were in preparation. The German Nationalists were convinced more strongly than ever that this undisciplined, disintegrating troop was what they had always described as Bolshevism.

Were these the noblest and best of the nation, the cream of self-sacrifice and will-power? Challenged, Hitler sometimes answered: 'With us the criminals are better cared for than with the Communists'; it was absurd, he said, to expect force to be respectable; it was the mission of National Socialism to transform the dark pas- sions of the masses into strength for the nation; if National Social- ism were destroyed, this force would not be destroyed with it, but would turn against the nation in the form of sub-human criminals and Communists, which were the same thing.

Meanwhile, Strasser had returned from Italy. He sent word to Hitler through Mutschmann, *gauleiter* of Saxony, that he would enter into the Reich government; that he was ready for a reconcil- iation, but only on condition that he become general secretary of the party with virtually unlimited powers. On January 3, he re- sumed his conversations with Schleicher; on the fourth, he was received for the first time by Hindenburg, who listened to him

* Dr. T. Take the fear of me, and bludgeon them with it.

1932

patiently for several hours, though he himself did not say much and may not have been very convinced by the man and his plans.

'We shall not enter into any more negotiations until we have won,' wrote Goebbels about this time in his diary. In the tiny state of Lippe-Detmold in Northwest Germany, a new diet was to be elected on January 15. Hitler decided to fight for Lippe as though it were Germany, at any price to squeeze a success out of this little state. Baron von Oeynhausen, a supporter, granted him the use of an isolated castle in the midst of a lake as headquarters. Hitler traveled around the few square miles of Lippe for ten days, spoke in villages to audiences of a few hundred peasants at most—he who for years had been addressing tens of thousands. This condescension on the part of the famous figure of the time greatly flattered the peasants of Lippe, though, of course, it was a questionable expenditure of Hitler's popularity, like cutting down a forest for the sake of a bird's nest. In this election, the whole vanishing strength of the movement, its remnant of respect and terror, was staked on a fight for ninety thousand votes.

1932
The ultimate aim of all these struggles was only to seem strong for a moment, in order to obtain a better peace. There was one member of Hitler's political family, little noticed then, who never wearied of describing to anyone willing to listen the quietness, gentleness, moderation, legality of a future National Socialist government. The radicalism ascribed to the movement had long been discarded, he maintained; the movement did not give free rein to its radical elements, but held them in check; he pointed out that the Leader had virtually stopped mentioning the Jewish question in his speeches; for practical purposes, the movement had outgrown the anti-Semitism of its early days. And a number of Jewish businessmen were impressed to hear this from Hitler's associate and translator, Joachim Ribbentrop, by adoption von Ribbentrop.

Ribbentrop, former officer, since the war a good friend of Papen, since 1931 a supporter of Hitler, for whom he often translated English newspaper articles, was made by nature and conviction to be the messenger of peace between the two. Why Papen desired this peace is not the riddle which sensationalists have tried to solve by such explanations as envy of Schleicher, desire to avenge himself

on the man who had overthrown him, u power. By the dark winter of 1932, the prim of most German politicians had long since t is why the Social Democratic leaders, resign lowed themselves to be forced out of their Prussia with an indifference which would h five years before; Groener had abandoned h Brüning had tragically accepted the fact th have to cede his place to Hitler. The misery integration of society, destroyed the confidenc men; cynicism, herald of all world twilights in the political commissions and omissions of culation or lust for power.

Unofficially, Papen, the dismissed Chancell burg's adviser. The old man requested him and so Papen, though a private citizen, still official residence in the Chancellery. It so l winter of 1932-33 alterations were being m adjacent palace; and so the old man moved in a time. Hindenburg and Papen lived door by Hindenburg and Meissner they formed a sort chief topics of conversation must have been: V the National Socialists? After all, we wanted destroy them. Aren't we missing our opportu

Over and over again the idea that Nation in demonic force, but poor in brains, beguiled into the arrogant experiment of 'curbing' and tion was only what should be sifted out and merly Groener had argued with Abegg whet was better. Now that Schleicher wanted to dr National Socialists to his side, the question aro really the 'sensible' ones? It had not yet been could bring important parts of his party with he could, what kind of men were they? In t program it was stated that the trusts must be Feder wanted to abolish capital interest, or red to flood Germany with inflation money; and it

gh he himself did not say much and
 ced by the man and his plans.
 y more negotiations until we have
 s time in his diary. In the tiny state
 st Germany, a new diet was to be
 ecided to fight for Lippe as though
 to squeeze a success out of this little
 a supporter, granted him the use of
 t of a lake as headquarters. Hitler
 : miles of Lippe for ten days, spoke
 ew hundred peasants at most—he
 ssing tens of thousands. This con-
 sumous figure of the time greatly flat-
 ough, of course, it was a questionable
 ty, like cutting down a forest for the
 ection, the whole vanishing strength
 of respect and terror, was staked
 votes.

e struggles was only to seem strong
 ain a better peace. There was one
 family, little noticed then, who
 anyone willing to listen the quiet-
 gality of a future National Socialist
 scribed to the movement had long
 ; the movement did not give free
 held them in check; he pointed out
 topped mentioning the Jewish ques-
 al purposes, the movement had out-
 arly days. And a number of Jewish
 hear this from Hitler's associate and
 , by adoption von Ribbentrop.
 ace the war a good friend of Papen,
 ler, for whom he often translated
 s made by nature and conviction to
 ween the two. Why Papen desired
 ch sensationalists have tried to solve
 Schleicher, desire to avenge himself

on the man who had overthrown him, uncontrollable lust for
 power. By the dark winter of 1932, the primitive delight in power
 of most German politicians had long since turned to terror. That
 is why the Social Democratic leaders, resigned and weary, had al-
 lowed themselves to be forced out of their positions of power in
 Prussia with an indifference which would have been unthinkable
 five years before; Groener had abandoned his post full of disgust;
 Brüning had tragically accepted the fact that one day he would
 have to cede his place to Hitler. The misery of the nation, the dis-
 integration of society, destroyed the confidence and energy of most
 men; cynicism, herald of all world twilights, had a greater share
 in the political commissions and omissions of the day than any cal-
 culation or lust for power.

Unofficially, Papen, the dismissed Chancellor, remained Hinden-
 burg's adviser. The old man requested him to remain near him;
 and so Papen, though a private citizen, still retained his former
 official residence in the Chancellery. It so happened that in the
 winter of 1932-33 alterations were being made in Hindenburg's
 adjacent palace; and so the old man moved into the Chancellery for
 a time. Hindenburg and Papen lived door by door; with Oskar von
 Hindenburg and Meissner they formed a sort of family. One of their
 chief topics of conversation must have been: What shall we do with
 the National Socialists? After all, we wanted to educate them, not
 destroy them. Aren't we missing our opportunity?

Over and over again the idea that National Socialism was rich
 in demonic force, but poor in brains, beguiled this upper-class type
 into the arrogant experiment of 'curbing' and 'sifting.' The ques-
 tion was only what should be sifted out and what retained. For-
 merly Groener had argued with Abegg whether Hitler or Stennes
 was better. Now that Schleicher wanted to draw Strasser's 'sensible'
 National Socialists to his side, the question arose whether they were
 really the 'sensible' ones? It had not yet been proved that Strasser
 could bring important parts of his party with him; but supposing
 he could, what kind of men were they? In the National Socialist
 program it was stated that the trusts must be socialized; Gottfried
 Feder wanted to abolish capital interest, or reduce it to a minimum,
 to flood Germany with inflation money; and it was Strasser and his

1932-

3

Hans

following, his 'economic department' just dissolved by : had forced 'socialistic' economic projects on the party, these people came and offered Schleicher their collabora-

God, we're rid of the radicals . . . the party has become tic.' With these words the party's secret propaganda had ; for some weeks to make the best of the Strasser catastrophe was no more talk of revolution against the barons. rt time before, Hitler had rudely refused even to speak Now Ribbentrop was able to tell Papen that Hitler was eager for an exchange of opinions. False ideas about socialist aims must be dispelled. At this moment Papen have felt that he had succeeded, that his policy of education been effective; Hitler was about to let himself be dis-

uary 4, 1933, the two men met in Cologne at the house Kurt von Schroeder, a National Socialist financier; part a banking house with a large share of Jewish capital. was one of the bankers of West German heavy industry, powerful influence in the distribution of its political slush öring, who had been on the outs with Papen since the the Reichstag, was absent; tact forbade the presence of the mortal enemy of the barons. Ribbentrop did not seem : enough to attend. On such occasions Hitler chose his h extreme care, as though to say: These are the men with hall rule when the time comes. This time he chose Rudolf Heinrich Himmler, silent men endowed with impressive ol; but his most important companion was a man totally to the public, the manufacturer Wilhelm Keppler. For e Hitler had been consulting him in order to avoid the omic boners in his speeches. Keppler could explain with and suitable technical phraseology that it was a gross identify the party with every line in the program of the ve points. After all, it was now not Feder, the author of omic program, who advised the Leader, but he, Keppler, th Strasser's other planners, the breaker of interest slavery shelved. A year earlier, Hitler had spent two hours in

Düsseldorf vainly trying to convince the heavy industrialists of his harmlessness; now he found a simple formulation: as Chancellor he would take full charge of the political sphere, but as for economic affairs, gentlemen — with a glance at Schroeder — that is your province.

The conversation took place at a luncheon. No minutes were kept, and probably there will never be full agreement regarding its substance and results. Even when the talks ended, an hour and a half later, the conclusions were hardly clear, especially as Hitler seldom remembered after such exchanges exactly what he himself not to mention the others, had said. But one thing is certain: Papen did not — as has been claimed — promise that Hitler would now become Chancellor; he was in no position to do so, nor would he have wished to. The basis of the whole conversation was that Hitler was intensely eager for a compromise and was seeking a face-saving formula for the concessions he was willing to make. The pivotal question was whether Hitler, after all the bitter disappointments he had suffered, was now willing to support a cabinet other than his own. Even earlier, Hitler had been prepared to let Göring accept the premiership of Prussia or even the Reich vice-chancellorship. Though murders were still taking place in the party, Hitler had renounced the blood-bath which he had demanded in August. As late as November, he had been unwilling to let Hindenburg reserve all decisions in foreign and military affairs. Now, in case there should be a chance for him to become Chancellor, he conceded even this point. In any event, the government which he expected to support would probably carry through German rearmament, perhaps with that insane bluntness and lack of diplomacy which Hitler condemned. If this rearmament should bring about grave decisions regarding the fate of the private combat leagues, the supreme S.A. Leader would surely have his word. Therefore, let Hindenburg have his Reichswehr Minister, a general, a specialist, a good friend; if he were also a good friend of Hitler, all concerned could be satisfied. Hitler mentioned the dismissed general, Joachim von Stuelpnagel, until 1930 one of the Reichswehr's 'office generals,' and a bitter enemy of Schleicher. As part owner and editor of the *Berliner Börsenzeitung*, Stuelpnagel

1932

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

name preserved the words "Socialist" and "Workers;" he organized mass demonstrations, approved marching songs, and encouraged the raised-arm salute; May Day was converted into a National Socialist holiday.¹⁹⁰

One suspects that a key reason why Hitler was so successful with the lower middle class was that they recognized him as one of themselves. In the phrase of a German essayist, Hitler appealed because he was a "mirror of bourgeois boobyism" (*Spiesserspiegel*). He was *Kleinbürger* incarnate, whose manners were banal and whose speeches were larded with hackneyed nationalist clichés, but whose very stylistic mediocrity had its appeal. He was "a man of the masses" who did not so much conquer the common man as identify with him.²⁰⁰

He looked the part. And his very nullity was a source of his strength. The anxious and ineffective "little man" of Germany who longed for power and greatness could identify with Hitler, for he was a kindred soul; he was one of them. They could "see greatness emerging from a creature who was smaller than you or I—that is what made Hitler an experience for millions."²⁰¹

1932
Dorothy Thompson, one of the very few foreign correspondents who was permitted a personal interview with Hitler, was surprised and disappointed by the "startling insignificance" of this man who has set the world agog. . . . He is the very prototype of the "Little Man," she wrote in the spring of 1932. And when she thought of him sitting in a seat of power, "involuntarily I smiled: Oh, Adolf! Adolf! You will be out of luck!"²⁰² Miss Thompson was mistaken. Like so many others, she underestimated this nondescript politician and failed to recognize the paradox that part of his power lay in his "startling insignificance."

But only part of his power. For while he was one of the masses, he was set apart from them by the touch of political genius. It is only a half-truth that he was a product of his time and place. True, he profited enormously from the economic, psychological and political chaos of 1930-1933—but he had prepared for his moment and knew how to use it. The tide of history had lifted him up, but he could succeed only because he was "a superbly prepared swimmer."²⁰³

Consider how he cast his own speeches and the meticulous care with which he organized the demagogic assaults of other Party orators. He set up special Party Speakers' Schools to train hundreds of orators who toured the entire country. Their style and forensic ability may not have been sophisticated, but throughout Germany they convinced thousands that they had answers to all pressing problems, that this Party cared for and understood the needs of the masses and would act to fulfill them. Hitler's own speeches reflected with studied spontaneity the longings of the people. None of his competitors showed a remotely comparable ability to combine ideology and propaganda or anything like his capacity to sense the psychic needs of his audiences. Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler's adroit finance minister, was right in saying that he played on the *Kleinbürgertum* like a skilled harpsichordist plucking

The Past As Prologue: Hitler

the chords of middle-class speeches must suffice to masses. He too had been : too had known hunger and people:

When I speak to you workers, I have more grown out of you your among you in the war you to whom I belong today and for whom struggle. . . .

In my youth I went way up by industry, by

And again, his words flew li

We are so happy to be proud to be permitted imagine anything in the thousand times rather man] among you than through the streets just and millions of *Volks* from all enterprises at my heart beat faster at That is our people, our Reich.²⁰⁴ *

HITLER AND THE "GERM
Hitler's appeal went far millions of Germans in all mous popularity must cons character of the German Luther was at least as true should have evoked so great in expressing the underlying of people and providing the problem."²⁰⁵

Social psychologists, p have said that by 1933 the from psychological problem to some sort of authoritar "charisma hungry"; Eric F. Else Frenkel-Brunswick characterizes"; Kecskemeti and Lienes

* All those who all those who German blood

generalization about
with a grain of salt and
y was remarkably in
reputable social psy-

ing forth the behavior
urately described the
ration for the strong
total and unquestion-
ively; glorification of
impotent, immoral,
with massive will-
ships "in the image of
ness, toughness, and
of masculinity and
site personality tend-
ortant to them; they
project, that is, ex-
a striving for com-
ation of others, espe-
develop, for there is
y as a target for

ned psychologists in-
om all walks of life,
es. The investigators
cularly among Nazi
tics. All of them are
The German POW's
ence and impotence,
a will and fears that
inexorable destiny."
need for power and
experienced as weak
the picture is one of
submissive/dominant

studied the "German
on: the people inter-
emes—total victory
archy. They did not
scape from responsi-
verb which suggests
hat/hat die Qual
e tendencies as com-
arked among those
and poisoning; they

tended to be obstinate and found it very difficult to depart from a set path once it was taken; they preferred the irrational and the abstract to the rational; they felt themselves to be unusually gifted and unique and had a belief in magic, myth, and destiny. They were particularly taken by the secret meanings of words. Finally, they thought in disjunctives, saying, for example, that the only alternative to total obedience was high treason.²⁰⁸ It is not surprising that Adolf Hitler was able to appeal so successfully to such people. He was indeed, as he said, "one of them."

Apart from psychological affinity, Hitler was also successful because of his uncanny ability to attract political opposites and, in so doing, to offer history an intriguing paradox: his movement was both conservative and revolutionary; he promised both preservation and radical change. Thus he won favor both with conservatives who believed he would strengthen old traditions and with radicals who were convinced they were participating in a sweeping revolution. Further, he promised to defeat the enemies of both and, at the same time, to reconcile all antagonisms in one patriotic, united *Volksgemeinschaft*. As a political tactician, Adolf Hitler should not be underestimated.

FATHERS AND CHILDREN: THE NAZI YOUTH COHORT

Members of Hitler's own generation, born in the 1890s, gave him broad support whether they were shopkeepers or journalists, soldiers or peasants, priests or professors. But those who turned to him with particular fervor were the sons and daughters of this generation—those, born during and shortly after the Great War, who would become the radical youth of 1930–1933. These young people were of the utmost importance to Hitler, and he responded to their needs so effectively that one historian of the Weimar youth movement concluded, "National Socialism came to power as the party of youth." Statistics bear him out: of all Germans in the 18–30 age group who were members of political parties, over 42 percent had joined the Nazis by 1932, compared with less than 20 percent in the Social Democratic Party. In Hamburg, 66 percent of the Party members were younger than 30; in Halle the percentage was 86 percent. In the Reichstag, 60 percent of the National Socialists were under 40; among the Social Democrats only 10 percent were of that age group.

It was symptomatic of a rising trend that even before Hitler achieved sweeping success at the polls, the official German Students' Association (*Bund Deutscher Studenten*) in 1931 elected a fanatic Nazi as its president. Hitler's drawing power for youth was remarkable. One Sunday in 1932 more than 100,000 young people came to hear him speak in Berlin and marched past him for seven-and-a-half hours.²⁰⁹

The sheer numbers of youth were impressive. So was their aggressiveness. As one writer concluded, "It was evidently the good luck of the Nazi movement to become the chief beneficiary of an enormous, destructive tidal wave in the ebb and flow of the generations."²¹⁰ Why

1932

question is yes, he did. He stressed the dangers that he himself was attributed psychic reality to determine public

Over and over again, he stressed the dangers that he could not get of the blood destroys man, and never again mind." He felt the

himself to admit directly of universalizing the. Thus the poisoning, humanity. To an in- the ailment of mixed, and make statement?"

he suggested that the the Gospels the Jews sus: "His blood comes fulfill this curse." One saying children was his able-mindedness: "The life. Everyone expects omous parent. But that minded." 6

own blood sucked out suggests that he sus- blood. He wanted to rned about the precise about his own "Jewish in among Nazi racists Through meticulous en trying to prove to

story that his own servant, might have tant state papers, the called Blutschutzgesetz mented his concern. of these laws and gave d. Paragraph 3 is espe- ent of emphasizing the household servants of of age." Hitler's own

to him back
al. surface

grandmother had been no older than 41 when she became pregnant while working, according to Hitler's suspicions, in a Jewish household.⁷

He projected the fear that haunted him onto Matthias Erzberger, the deputy of the Center Party, whom he accused of betraying Germany by accepting the Versailles Treaty. In a revealing passage in his second book, written in 1928, Hitler wrote: "Fate had chosen a man who was one of those principally guilty for the collapse of our people. Matthias Erzberger, . . . the illegitimate son of a servant girl and a Jewish employer. . . ." As the editor of the book has pointed out, the rumor about Erzberger had no basis in fact. The psychologically interesting point, however, is that Hitler repeated the story in writing.⁸

The mere mention of a German girl working as a household servant or charwoman was deeply disturbing to Hitler. His press chief recorded a peculiar incident which he was unable to explain but which indicates that the very thought of a Catholic chambermaid was enough to trigger a violent emotional reaction in Hitler. On this occasion in the 1930s, Hitler was informed that the mother of the manager of the hotel he frequented in Nuremberg, the Deutscher Hof, had advertised for chambermaids in a Catholic magazine. "The Führer flew into a rage entirely disproportionate to the importance of the matter; the manager was dismissed out of hand and professionally blacklisted."⁹

In one of his nightly monologues, in February 1942, the thought was still on his mind. He told his entourage about "a country girl who had a place in Nuremberg in the household of Herr Hirsch" and had been raped by her employer.¹⁰

Hitler did not like to talk about his family. Nevertheless, he showed a remarkable interest in his genealogy. Indeed, he was so concerned about it that he sent his own Gestapo to investigate—presumably to prove that his grandfather could not possibly have been Jewish.* But the investigators could give him no such assurance. The

* In the so-called *Gestapo-Berichte* (Gestapo Reports) on Hitler, which are now in the main archives of the Nazi Party, there are records of repeated investigations into the Führer's family background. Data and documents were collected in 1932, 1935, 1938, and 1940. Two separate investigations were made in 1942 and another during the period December 1943–January 1944. Some of the documents, clearly, were collected by the party archivist with the marvelous Teutonic name, Attila Bleibtreu, who was simply gathering materials for the official archives. But the Gestapo also took a peculiar interest in Hitler's lineage. A letter of 14 October 1942, written by an SS *Obersturmbannführer* with an undecipherable name, was addressed to the *Reichsführer SS*, Prinz Albrechtstrasse, Berlin (which is to say, to Heinrich Himmler) and stamped "Secret." The letter was enclosed in the transmission of documents on the ancestors of the Führer which had been collected by the Linz branch of the Gestapo. Part of the Gestapo file, now in the Prints and Photographs Division of the Library of Congress, contains an original letter signed by Heinrich Himmler and addressed to "Martin Bormann, Secretary to the Führer." In the letter, Himmler notes formally that he is officially transmitting all his data on Hitler and requests a receipt for the file which he has sent by special courier and marked "Geheime Reichssache!" (Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs, Hitler materials). Himmler would not have sent the file to Bormann if he had been

1932

was served
GOD: ADOLF HITLER

The Image and the Man

loved to look at pictures and statues of stallions. He was afraid that his body odors were offensive and was so disturbed by his flatulence that he took huge quantities of "Dr. Koster's Anti-Gas Pills," which contained strychnine and atropin. He was convinced that microbes "pounced" on him personally.¹⁰⁹

Since his fears were so many, so great, and so unbearable, he felt a great need to consolidate them all into one single fear that he could recognize, one that would explain all others, and one upon which he could release all his pent-up anger and hatred. He found it, as we shall see, in the Jewish people.

Other Personal Dualities

Hitler could be a delightful and considerate dinner companion. He was also a boor, offensively gauche, insufferably rude. He did not like women guests to wear lipstick and often told them that lipstick was manufactured—variously—from sewage, human fat or kitchen garbage. Once, when ladies at the table were served suckling pig, Hitler announced loudly, "That looks exactly like a roast baby to me."¹¹⁰

At social gatherings he was often timid, vulnerable, ill-at-ease. He nervously checked and rechecked preparations for his teas and worried whether his guests would have a good time. He fretted over which tie he should wear. Anxiously he would seek reassurance that everything was fine. He would mutter while planning the event, "I'll show them that I know as much as they do about such matters."¹¹¹

Hitler was both frugal and profligate. His eating habits—with the exception of chocolates, cake, and other sweets—were austere. At one time he developed a liking for caviar but gave it up because it was "sinfully expensive." His spartan field headquarters during the war reminded his generals of a combination of "a monastery and a concentration camp."

Yet Hitler was a very rich man. The revenue he received from having his portrait on German stamps added to royalties from *Mein Kampf* came to over a million dollars. He had owed over half a million Reichsmarks in back taxes when he became chancellor, but he ordered these obligations canceled, and he paid no taxes after 1934. As his architect reminds us, he threw away billions of marks on unnecessary and unused buildings. "I have forgotten how many secret headquarters I ordered built for him—nine, I think, seven of which he seldom or never used."¹¹²

Hitler swung between the two poles of rigidity and movement. He wanted many things to remain the same—political ideas, personal habits, wearing apparel, members of his entourage, military strategy. And he prided himself on being a rigid person. Yet there was always a desire to change things and to move about a great deal—to redesign and rebuild, to take sudden trips and excursions. He did not like to

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

Not even the triumphant smashing of Poland could quiet his fears. In a speech of 23 November 1939, thoughts of victory were again shrouded in concern about failure and capitulation. As his propaganda machine was thundering out proclamations of triumph, Joseph Goebbels was recording wistfully in his diary, "It is touching to hear the Führer express his wish that he may be privileged to live to see the day of victory."¹³⁹

Thus we deal with a man who was so deeply divided that he often appeared torn between opposing qualities: omnipotent and vulnerable, sophisticated and savage, creative and destructive, pragmatic and fanatical, brave and cowardly, lethargic and industrious, rigid and malleable, pathetic and masterful, cruel and kind.

In our attempt to understand Hitler, we shall return to the problem of his dualities.

HITLER AND WOMEN

1932
Women of all ages were attracted to Adolf Hitler. Motherly types such as Frau Bruckmann, wife of the publisher, and Frau Bechstein, widow of the piano manufacturer, and another woman in her 60s, a retired schoolteacher named Carola Hoffmann, would feed him his favorite tortes, cluck approval, stroke his head, and call him "My little wolf" as he sat at their knee. Once, when Hitler found himself alone with Hélène Hanfstaengl, he ran to her, hid his head in her lap and murmured, "If only I had someone to take care of me!" When Hitler made an important speech in Düsseldorf in January 1932, the wives of industrialists paid a cloakroom attendant a mark each for the privilege of holding the bouquet that had been presented to him upon entering the hall—they were thrilled by the thought that they could actually smell the same flowers the Führer had sniffed.

The magnetism he exerted on women was also observable in his youth. As he walked the streets of Vienna in 1908, women stopped to look at him. One evening at the opera, as he and his friend took their places in the promenade, a liveried attendant handed Adolf a note. He was not at all surprised and simply said, "Another one." Years later, when he was chancellor, an American coed found him "quietly charming, tender in speech and glance, modest with this strange tenderness and appealing helplessness." And the Princess Olga, on a state visit to Berlin, reported that Hitler "has a remarkable charm despite all the reports of his ruthlessness. . . . He gives the impression of being softhearted, particularly when children are mentioned . . . tears would come to his eyes."¹⁴⁰

Hitler was aware of his capacity to attract women and enjoyed doing so. He was particularly anxious to convince women that he was a

The Image and the Man

man of overpowering virility. Or woman, Pauline Kohler, to the recalled that during the course losing interest, her host sough stretching out his hand in the and roared, "I can hold my arm feel tired when my storm troop I stand at this salute. I never unbending. But Göring can't stan an hour of this salute. He's flabb keep my arm stretched out in t as Göring. That means I'm fou amazing feat. I marvel at my owr

Hitler's dualities are partic women. He revered and idealiz contempt and sought to degrad notice, Hitler showed his ambi abstract forces that controlled hi tradictory female images who w also capriciously cruel and trea rounded by unpredictable superi the Goddess of Fate, Lady Care. opening sentence of *Mein Kampf* Braunau because a kindly Fate d his birth. But it was "an unmer: "born in a period of peace bet "inexorable hand of the Goddess nations. Here Hitler reveals his by changing the neuter German *die Göttin*. In a letter of 1914 h point in order to feminize a no "Friend Care and Want," he choo he had *keine andere Freundin als*

And in a speech of 13 Aug nich, he speaks of "the greatest: the most: the goddess called Mis in a May Day speech in Berlin in his mind:

In spite of all Party dogmas
Misery will come and beat or
and more the pain of want.
is not satisfied.

And again—we are back to his n clasped me in *her* arms." When l my foster mother." To Hitler, mi

THE PSYCHOPATHIC GOD: ADOLF HITLER

1932?

Since he held mankind in such contempt, it is small wonder that he considered duplicity and cunning high attributes of statescraft. Consider the political leaders he admired, those he ignored, and those he despised. He was an avid reader of history, yet in the records we have of thousands of hours of commentary and many pages of his writings on human history and the great political leaders of the past, there is no mention of Pericles or Justinian, of Henry II or Elizabeth I; none of Chatham or Gladstone or Disraeli; none of Washington, Jefferson, or Lincoln. He regarded Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt as fools and scoundrels: "Neither of the two Anglo-Saxons is any better than the other. . . . Churchill and Roosevelt, what impostors! . . . Roosevelt, who both in his handling of political issues and in his general attitudes, behaves like a tortuous petty-fogging Jew, himself boasted recently that he had 'noble' Jewish blood in his veins. The completely Negroid appearance of his wife is also a clear indication that she, too, is a half-caste." He saw Winston Churchill as "the undisciplined swine who is drunk eight hours of every twenty-four." Stafford Cripps, he said, was "a man without roots, a demagogue and a liar."⁵²

His favorite examples of statesmanship came from the East. He applauded the trickery, for example, of Kings Ferdinand and Boris of Bulgaria: "Under the rod of the old fox, son Boris himself became a young fox and was able to work his way out of the complicated tangle of Balkan affairs." As for the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, ah, there indeed was a "predominantly sly old fox . . . his quite exceptional wisdom puts him almost on equal terms with the Japanese. And what cunning diplomats the Japanese are!" To Rasputin he attributed a "power that could have contributed to the Slavic element a healthy life-affirmation." But his greatest praise was reserved for Joseph Stalin—a rival worthy of his steel. He spoke admiringly of "the cunning Caucasian" who commanded "unconditional respect," who was indeed, "in his own way, just one hell of a fellow! He knows his models Genghis Khan and the others very well." Stalin, he repeatedly said, was one of the "most extraordinary figures in world history." The reason for Hitler's feeling is revealing: "For him [Stalin], Bolshevism is only a means, a disguise designed to trick the Germanic and Latin people."⁵³

Struggle: "The Father of All Things"

The essence of Hitler's political thought was distilled in one speech delivered at Chemnitz on 2 April 1928. The thousands upon thousands of words that preceded and followed are merely an elaboration of these few sentences:

The first fundamental of any rational *Weltanschauung* is the fact that on earth and in the universe force alone is decisive. Whatever goal a man has reached is due to his originality plus his brutality.

The Intellectual World of Adolf

Whatever man possesses of the Aryan race. The whole world. The basis of the individual, not individual is decisive, n-up in three theses: struggles in blood, leadership

Struggle was indeed 'repeat the refrain: "He who he who does not want to be not deserve to be alive. Ever are . . . victory is forever cont

Public speeches of the gave the German people a they would get under Hitler office been so explicit in his an early and important speech said: "Force is the first law and the world become great. gruesome, then the only animosity as a whole, no. . . reemphasized the same point Munich on 21 November 19 than the struggle of a people eternal battle of a people, for this planet. . . . Man [is] there on earth. He knows nothing but world."

That the idea of "battle" on several occasions. From that did in Munich as early as between war and peace. . . final decision lies with the s of the foreign policy of a people

It is not accurate to say mere acts of aggression. As manifest, he wanted wars to was for Hitler the highest expression of life's purposes, the blood of another. The desire not dribble about humane feelings

Struggle and battle also Germany, as Hitler infused so He spoke of the "battle for . . . the battle for population of his Reich was a line from

1.932

sional intonation of the "conservative" side of his ideology. The most important—and effective—element here was his anticommunism; but there were, too, more than occasional presentations of himself and of National Socialism as being antirevolutionary, and even many positive declarations in favor of Christianity.

The psychology of anticommunism (more precisely, the history of its appeal) still awaits treatment by a master historian. Its appeal was not restricted to those who, no matter how briefly, experienced brutalities and misdeeds of a Soviet-like rule (as had the people of Munich in the spring of 1919). Nor was it restricted to the upper or to the property-owning classes, who had much to fear from the expropriations of a Marxist revolution. The main appeal of anti-communism has seldom been economic. There was the fear of revolution, yes; but even when and where the prospects of a Communist revolution were minimal, the stronger current was the respectability of nationalism, including the rejection of an internationalist doctrine, and of people who seemed to be among its proponents.*

Hitler was, of course, a *National* Socialist; of the two adjectives, the former was more important, and decisive, than the latter. But he was an opponent of *international* capitalism, as well as of *international* socialism. As a matter of fact, he had more of an appreciation of Communists and even of certain Socialists than of capitalists and reactionaries. There are many statements of his in that regard. Not many of them were made in public. He knew that in order to come to power, he had to appeal to the anticommunism of the German conservatives. In November 1932, he told Hindenburg: "The Bolshevikization of the masses proceeds rapidly." He knew that this was not true. He also knew that this kind of argument would impress Hindenburg and the conservatives. Unlike nine years before, when

his revolutionary attempt he would become the rule democratically, and not agreeable to respectable people in Germany. It is significant that even after he became chancellor that finally led to his death in 1933 (and in a speech at the League of Nations), he was across Germany like wildfire, been waging a heroic struggle for the people. . . ." (This at a time when they had been annihilated, their leadership in 1934 (three days before his death in the Long Knives"), he received declared: "The defense of Europe for the next two or three hundred years.")

He knew how to appeal to the masses. In *Kampf* he praised the Christians and how to use the existing structures of such older elements and institutions for the movement." We saw that he had active circles in Munich as early as 1919, won against the radical Gregor Strasser to vote in favor of a restitution of the old German princes that had been taken away from the older German conservatism. It is a wish to be torn away from this

*Hence, for example, the frequent anti-Marxism among the working classes in many parts of the world: a thorough refutation of Marx. It may also be of interest to notice that anticommunism was often most popular not when the power of the Soviet Union or when the local Communists or Marxists were strongest but when they were weakest: thus in many European countries in the 1930s and in the United States in the 1950s—for instance, during the McCarthy years.

*Cited by Klaus Scholder, *Die Kirche Christi*, would, of course, return to such arguments in June 1941, but at that time he would have been in politics but as an instrument of his private interests (privately), he often expressed his admiring hatred of the reactionary camp. For details about this, see chapter 5.

1331

often felt the need to speak.) That is, for example, why his table conversations show the "public" rather than the "private" Hitler. In their private table talk, Churchill, Napoleon, and even Stalin often appear to be more human and varied than in their public and recordable utterances. This was not so with Hitler, who, relatively late—at the age of thirty—suddenly discovered his ability to influence people through his speaking. The year 1919 was a decisive milestone, indeed a turning point in his life; but no human being changes entirely; with all his speaking talent, Hitler remained a secretive man in many ways, keeping many of his most important thoughts to himself.†

One of the problems of the historiography of Hitler is the scarcity of written documents he left behind—among them, the absence of any written instructions that connect him to the awful decision to carry out the mass liquidation of Jews—though the decision was made. (See chapter 6.) At the same time, there is more and more evidence that he read much (his retention capacity was phenomenal): books and all kinds of papers (including speeches by Goebbels); even during the war, he wrote in the margins and made corrections in these books.‡

*Before his crucial political campaigns in 1932, he took voice lessons from the tenor Paul Devrient in Munich.

†Bullock interview in the FAZ Magazin Woche, 6 December 1991: "Hitler was always quite open, by and large he said what he wanted to do." Not so. Speer, sp. p. 121: "Once in 1932 we sat in the Deutsches Hof in Munich. Hitler spoke of the duty to express only such things that are meant for the ears of the public." Fest cites Hitler in F, p. 710: For a Führer, "it is exceptionally important that nothing that one may discuss should be written down, never!" And: "Too much is being written down. . . some of that can always become troublesome." Fest's concluding remark: "He was constantly observing himself. . . never spoke an unconsidered word. . . the widespread image of the emotionally uncontrolled, wildly gesticulating Hitler [was seldom correct]; his was a most concentrated existence, self-disciplined to the extent of rigidity."

‡Schroeder (see above, p. 48), p. 225: "He himself corrected very often." sp. p. 179, quotes Hitler in the summer of 1939: ". . . the drafts of the Foreign Ministry are, again, useless. I better draft them myself." Many other instances in sp, e.g., p. 569: "I heard from Below that Hitler read this and also other memoranda of mine very carefully, even making marginal remarks and other corrections." Maser in M/HB, p. 153, noted this and claimed that after 1933 Hitler's style improved. In M/A, p. 178, Maser wrote that Schramm had underestimated the young Hitler's book-buying habit.

D.T. The need to read, the need to write, not to show.

D.T. I was able to instruct him in the art of reading—the ability to penetrate style and seekable to attribute different levels of writing, accuracy, hypocrisy, and outright lies.

between those that sought to be heard and those that were self-serving

king.* At the same time, Often he told his secret this habit in *The Duel* was much less secretive than a man of the written word (who once said that he, not read).‡ He was with hortatory and educational of his ability—and the necessity: for he

months of Hitler's life: The Dictation of his wife first to Italy, then to the Swiss François Genoud; 1932; and *The Testament of Adolf Hitler* of the original manuscript, a colloquium of the IFZ, also an introduction to HM shows p. 22: "[Heim's] transcripts are reservedness of Hitler." P. 22: "He failed to consider the psychopaths were aimed in the first place, all, these transcripts are not

very interesting analysis of Hitler's speaking style in *Sprach und Schrieb*, Frankfurt, with such matters as Hitler's pronunciation." The biography of his secretary Christa was more incisively about Hitler, where he relates the details of his character. Also see *Zeitenzeugen*, D., 1969. "superseded." Also Sereny, *The Fall of Hitler* (the son): (As Speer told me [Sereny])

close to his photographer, photographs, including his own, for propaganda purposes. On the subject of retouchings which Hitler had, as was previously noted, published during his lifetime.

1932-1938

0

Thereafter he could boast that his "Socialism of Action" was replacing his erstwhile opponents' "Socialism of Words." As Zitelmann wrote (about Hitler's decision to make May 1 a national holiday for German labor): "Not for the last time the National Socialists were [actually] realizing demands for which the workers' movement had fought for long and in vain." Also: "It is not debatable that in various social matters National Socialism made remarkable advances, for example in the improvement of the protection of the young, of others, and of social security."^{*}

The optimism and the confidence: For every two children born in Germany in 1932, three were born four years later. In 1938 and 1939, the highest marriage rates in all of Europe were registered in Germany, superseding even those among the prolific peoples of Eastern Europe. The phenomenal rise of the German birthrate in the thirties was even steeper than the rise of the marriage rate. It is unreasonable to slur over these figures by simply referring to Hitler's populationist policies. Of course he encouraged large families, and offered social and financial benefits to them. But no national leader

the Nazis on the political map." And: "... without the onset of the world economic crisis from 1929" the extreme Right "reduced to a tiny rump of electoral support ... might have remained so." Also: "Without the Depression [Hitler] would have continued to be an insignificant minority on the lunatic fringe." I do not believe this was so. But Kershaw is right in KER, pp. 46-47: "Hitler combined the fixity of basic points of dogma with maximum pragmatism in political maneuvering. . . ." And 112: "... far from revealing a naiveté and an incapacity which would have made him putty in the hands of the traditional power groups and would rapidly have rendered him dispensable, he showed a quick and sharp appreciation of the realities of governmental power."

^{*}ZIT/A, pp. 87, 122. What remains debatable: "Unfortunately the area of [Hitler's] social policy, unlike National Socialist foreign policy, has not yet been researched [studied] well enough." This, not unlike some other statements by Zitelmann, at least suggests some special pleading; though less so than Toland. For example, 70, p. 405: "Tuberculosis and other diseases have noticeably diminished. The criminal courts never had so little to do and the prisons have never had so few occupants. It is a pleasure to observe the physical aptitude of the German youth. Even the poorest persons are better clothed than was formerly the case, and their cheerful faces testify to the psychological improvement that has been wrought within them." Not entirely untrue—but note that this is a quote from a German propaganda book in 1938, used by "Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P." Toland failed to say that Wilson was a notorious British Naziphile.

pected and feared—
ermans of Austria and
astically willing, into a
ents of Bismarck, and
ut a war. He brought
the kind of prosperity
fter 1933, were sunny
ained in the memories
icentration camps, the
lgarity of Nazi propa-
nds of an embittered
st Hitler's creation of
shortly before he was
s memoir: "Über alles
bove everything there
sentimental exaggera-

h nor a biography of
d to the question of
to the character of his
ans. But ideas do not
man beings (contrary
but contrary, too, to
more important than
ist" may have assisted
reated his own Zeit-
dy true of his achieve-

cognize situations, to see
his tactical sense [was at
vince people. . . ." I find
Kershaw, KER, p. 37: [In
overshadowed by matters
2: "External events—the
reet crash, and Brüning's
ie summer of 1930—put

can force fathers to beget children (or mothers to bear them); and confidence in the future had much more to do with national perspectives than with economics. Social conditions are not material conditions, just as social history is not economic history.* From 1932 to 1939, the number of suicides committed by Germans under twenty dropped 80 percent during the first six years of the Hitler regime (from 1,212 in 1932 to 290 in 1939). Consider, too, not only Hitler's autobahns but his agricultural reforms, the extraordinary popular outpouring of support for the "Winterhilfe" ("No German must be hungry or cold"), Hitler's special interest in providing inexpensive vacations for German workers.† Hitler's National Socialist Germany demonstrated that it was possible to achieve a high standard of living under a rigid dictatorship.

It may be argued that many of these achievements were not "revolutionary"; but they were surely modern. Hitler's interest in and respect for technology were considerable. Schramm cited Hitler: "Just as the bird represents, in comparison to the flying fish, a higher stage of development, the ship is a preliminary stage of the airplane. The future belongs to the airplane." Hitler on 3 October 1941: "[He] thinks that the automobile is the most beautiful invention of man, as long as he really uses it for his pleasure. The automobile opened up the landscape for people. . . ." Of Hitler's city planning, Toland wrote: ". . . there would be automated underground parking, a traffic-free center, numerous parks and green areas, and strict pollution control."‡ Some of this is imprecise; it was developed in better detail by Zitelmann, with evidence culled from Hitler's written and spoken statements of the 1926-30 period. In the ZIT/PR volume of collected studies, Hans-Dietrich Schäfer

*LEW, pp. 175, 176, 177. Also 177, note 5: "It is perhaps significant, too, that in 1939 among German cities, Danzig and Gleiwitz, on the Polish border, registered phenomenally high birthrates, over 24 per thousand (the average of German cities of comparable size was 17.5 per thousand); even more phenomenal was the marriage rate in Linz, this then prototypically Nazi town, the cradle of Hitler as well as of Eichmann, with 25.8 marriages per 1,000 inhabitants, more than twice the national average."

†There's a good general summary in *HB*, pp. 96-97.

‡SCH, p. 86; TO, p. 405; also Koeppen notes, p. 41.

presented two interesting the historical continuity: "In harm achieved more than the social there was a levelling of classes society which earlier research 'economic Miracle' of the [Westmann's and Schäfer's present Zitelmann: "Hitler did not [that is, reactionary] visions ways his model was the Unitalist economics and the den theless admired its technology often saw as a model for German methods of advertisement. Sc lated the wishes and anxieties psyche of people without the attract and lead Germans free Some of this had been noted prior effects of Nazi marches : German Communists before the popular effect of the cult "he was certainly the most m his time."† Earlier the philo Socialist preference for the w [to organize], which appealed mechanization of the human guage."‡ It affected everyday for many young people.

Modernization does not ne

*ZIT/PR, p. 214 (Schäfer); p. 161 cited a book published about advertising to have a total effect . . . i in text). But already Viktor Klemperer (1960) noticed many of the Nazi Third Reich.

†F, pp. 399, 410.

‡Klemperer, pp. 126, 191.

1932

than those things that make you look like a fakir." The reason of course was that Heinrich Hoffmann had been enraged at this breaking of his monopoly and Hitler was taking it out on me. More to the point was the fact that Hitler apparently had an arrangement with Hoffmann to share in the proceeds of his work and this in due course was to provide a very handsome side income.

The tempo of the year 1932 was determined by its four national elections, two rounds for the Presidency, and two for the *Reichstag*, plus voting in the individual States. By train, by car and for the first time by plane, Hitler conducted a series of campaigns which rocked the rival Parties and exhausted companions and opponents alike. I accompanied him almost everywhere as a sort of right interference guard for the foreign press.

The first step he took was to make himself a German citizen. He disappeared from the Kaiserhof on February 22, 1932, and spent part of the afternoon at the representation in Berlin of the State of Brunswick, where the Nazis wielded sufficient power to have him appointed an *Oberregierungsrat* in the local civil service, an established post which carried with it the automatic grant of citizenship. The original plan had been to give him a nominal post as professor of arts in the Brunswick education service. However, when I threatened to greet him with 'Heil, Herr Professor', after all the years he had spent making fun of academicians, the idea was modified. He displayed his warrant when he returned in the evening, and from that time on I sometimes addressed him by his new title as a joke. I must have been the only person to get away with it. "Now at last you can stop singing the *Blue Danube* and learn the *Wacht am Rhein*," I told him, which put him such good humour that he signed a photograph for my son which I still have. It says: 'For my young friend Egon Hanfstaengl, with my best wishes.'

The boredom and confusion of the election tours was such that I can no longer sort them out in my mind. The team, with occasional additions and subtractions, was Brückner and Schaub, the adjutants, Sepp Dietrich, the later S.S. General, as bodyguard, Otto Dietrich, Heinrich Hoffmann, Bauer the pilot and myself. We must have visited every city in Germany several times, and it was always claimed afterwards that Hitler was the first politician to come to

power who knew the of the sort. — It might Sportpalast whereve the confines of four When he was not sp trying to iron out que

Like the leadershi socialist wings — it is the name of the pa quite separate and o of course was Hitler. and more than one Gauleiters are always biggest hall in town it to the roof for then their wits' end for m maniac to see that the

I think it was prob everywhere by plane. convoy of cars, which a pilot to take us thro nothing to chance ar for use. The precauti munists were always Breslau and Cologne streets which we got It should not be forgc years. In 'red' cities display Christmas tre

In Nuremberg a bc hit Streicher's car, w Bamberg late at night revolver shots. On tl Gauleiter at the top standing and I can re Emil Maurice was st began to yell impreca

1932, 1925

a fakir." The reason of
enraged at this break-
out on me. More to the
ad an arrangement with
rk and this in due course

ined by its four national
d two for the *Reichstag*,
t, by car and for the first
campaigns which rocked
s and opponents alike. I
ort of right interference

If a German citizen. He
ry 22, 1932, and spent
in Berlin of the State of
ent power to have him
d civil service, an estab-
atic grant of citizenship.
ominal post as professor
ice. However, when I
fessor', after all the years
ie idea was modified. He
the evening, and from
his new title as a joke.
ay with it. "Now at last
d learn the *Wacht am*
d humour that he signed

It says: 'For my young
s.'
on tours was such that I
ie team, with occasional
d Schaub, the adjutants,
dyguard, Otto Dietrich,
myself. We must have
ies, and it was always
st politician to come to

power who knew the country inside out. Of course he knew nothing
of the sort. - It might just as well have been the Bürgerbräu or the
Sportpalast wherever we went, whipping up mass hysteria within
the confines of four walls and travelling and sleeping in between.
When he was not speaking he was in the hotel behind closed doors,
trying to iron out quarrels in the local Party organizations.

Like the leadership itself they were all split into nationalist and
socialist wings - it is very necessary to bear in mind that hyphen in
the name of the party, because the two groups were intrinsically
quite separate and only combined out of self-interest. The hyphen
of course was Hitler. The regional leaders used to drive him mad,
and more than once he would say to me: "I know why these
Gauleiters are always harrying me to speak for them. They take the
biggest hall in town which they could never fill themselves. I cram
it to the roof for them and they pocket the proceeds. They are all at
their wits' end for money and I have to tear round Germany like a
maniac to see that they don't go bankrupt."

I think it was probably only in the later elections that we travelled
everywhere by plane. Often in the early stages we went in a great
convoy of cars, which was usually met at the outskirts of a town by
a pilot to take us through back streets to the meeting hall. Hitler left
nothing to chance and always had a street plan on his knee ready
for use. The precaution was probably not exaggerated as the Com-
munists were always waiting to attack us and on two occasions, in
Breslau and Cologne, wrong turnings took us into red beflagged
streets which we got through in the midst of fisticuffs and uproar.
It should not be forgotten how strong the Communists were in these
years. In 'red' cities like Chemnitz, people did not even dare to
display Christmas trees for fear of being attacked by fanatics.

In Nuremberg a bomb was thrown from the roof of a house and
hit Streicher's car, which only had the driver in it, and once in
Bamberg late at night we had a couple of windscreens shattered with
revolver shots. On these occasions Hitler would berate the local
Gauleiter at the top of his voice. His use of a map was of long
standing and I can remember when we arrived at Brunswick, while
Emil Maurice was still the driver and there was no map. Hitler
began to yell imprecations but Maurice, who was an old hand and

*

1932

1925

*almost like a bullfight in town

1932-1934

allowed himself a number of liberties, said: "Herr Hitler, what are you getting so excited about. Just remember Christopher Columbus." Hitler stopped in full spout. "What do you mean Columbus?" — "Well, Columbus had no map but that did not stop him discovering America."

Sometimes we would still stop *en route* for a picnic. There was one not far from a monastery or theological seminary, with a couple of teams of young clerics playing football in long habits. I think it was near Eichstätt. I pointed them out to Hitler but he refused to be entertained. "We'll teach them asceticism if we come to power," he said. "I am not going to have a lot of fat monks loafing around looking like characters out of a Grützner picture. They can keep up their social service if they like or work in the hospitals as practical Christians. But I am not going to have them holing themselves up in abbeys pretending they are superior to the rest of us, and they are going to be kept away from the new generation. We Nazis will see to their education. Of course the finest propaganda of all would be if the Pope were to excommunicate me." I looked at him astonished, but it was a phrase I was often to hear him use later. "If you feel like that why don't you announce officially that you have withdrawn from the Church?" I asked. "Why should I deprive him of the pleasure?" Hitler answered, "let him do it." What he meant was that if he proclaimed himself an atheist he would lose Catholic votes, but that as a mere heretic he might get away with it.

The plane journeys were misery. There were always protracted security precautions to ensure that the machine had not been tampered with. That was Bauer's responsibility and when he slept I do not know. Hitler used to sit in the left- or right-hand front seat and either doze or pretend to doze, look out of the window or back at his map and hardly talk at all. The others would sometimes try and attract his attention with a letter or a photograph to push their pet peeve, but then he would retire behind a newspaper or some document or other. The most extraordinary thing about him was that he never had a notebook. He never wrote a thing, never took notes, never had a pencil and only occasionally a fountain-pen to sign his autograph with. His notebook was Schaub—Schaub make a note of this or that—he never wrote it down himself. I got used to

the requirement and always in my pocket.

The atmosphere used to be a grade orderly-room, with We were in all these town house. I used to carry to workroom in Weimar and take them out and look at their mood of classical re plugged on. Of course it sprinkled Yardley's Lavelle smell of petrol, but even resorted to smelling-salts. bottle too, as it would of un-National-Socialistic to

One incident which I nearly crashed in the Balt had made a brief stop at Kiel. The weather was ve the clouds and we flew al taken into account was the came down again we could had the direction-finding Berlin station had failed a rupted and kept giving u run low and the atmosph by Hitler, and although he working. "That is the No the little folding table was then I remembered that pressed agony he must be by suggesting that we wor get a decent cup of tea, but

In the end he could stan at Bauer: "You must turn which of course was quite account and also thought

* Do to my advice, that way, he could sweep up all the anti Catholicism and —

only because then didn't then

1932

1: "Herr Hitler, what are
Christopher Columbus."
you mean Columbus?" -
not stop him discovering

for a picnic. There was one
primary, with a couple of
long habits. I think it was
tler but he refused to be
t if we come to power," he
onks loafing around look-
e. They can keep up their
he hospitals as practical
n holing themselves up in
e rest of us, and they are
tion. We Nazis will see to
ganda of all would be if
looked at him astonished,
use later. "If you feel like
at you have withdrawn
ld I deprive him of the
What he meant was that
lose Catholic votes, but
th it.

we were always protracted
machine had not been
ility and when he slept I
or right-hand front seat
it of the window or back
ers would sometimes try
photograph to push their
id a newspaper or some
ry thing about him was
rote a thing, never took
onally a fountain-pen to
Schaub-Schaub make a
vn himself. I got used to

the requirement and always had six or seven pens or pencils in my pocket.

The atmosphere used to get on my nerves. It smacked of a low-grade orderly-room, with this stupid, inartistic, inarticulate bunch. We were in all these towns and never went to a museum or historical house. I used to carry two picture postcards with me of Goethe's workroom in Weimar and when I could stand the boredom no longer take them out and look at them for minutes at a time to relax in their mood of classical repose, while this rattle-trap of an aircraft plugged on. Of course the others used to jeer at me. At first I sprinkled Yardley's Lavender on my handkerchief to keep out the smell of petrol, but even Hitler objected to this, so in the end I resorted to smelling-salts. The others were not above a sniff at the bottle too, as it would of course have been very *infra dig* and very un-National-Socialistic to be airsick.

One incident which I think has never been recorded is how we nearly crashed in the Baltic on the way back from Königsberg. We had made a brief stop at Danzig and were, as I recall, bound for Kiel. The weather was very bad and overcast, but Bauer got above the clouds and we flew along in bright sunshine. What had not been taken into account was the increasing headwind and when we finally came down again we could see nothing but rain-lashed water. Bauer had the direction-finding apparatus on, but for some reason the Berlin station had failed and Bremen and Lübeck were badly interrupted and kept giving us different readings. Fuel was starting to run low and the atmosphere got very tense. I was sitting up ahead by Hitler, and although he said very little I could see his jaw muscles working. "That is the North Sea," he exclaimed. His left hand on the little folding table was clenching and unclenching in spasm and then I remembered that he couldn't swim and realized the suppressed agony he must be going through. I tried to make a bad joke by suggesting that we would soon be in England and might at last get a decent cup of tea, but Hitler was in no way amused.

In the end he could stand it no longer, jumped forward and yelled at Bauer: "You must turn south, it is the only way to hit land," which of course was quite right. I had not taken the headwind into account and also thought we had crossed Schleswig-Holstein above

were all
did not

only the then Catholics who
didn't think the Pope was being
too severe

the clouds and were out over the North Sea. The situation was now really serious. The petrol tanks were as good as empty but at the last moment we hit the coast over a small medieval town which none of us could recognize. It was Heinrich Hoffmann who got our bearings. "It is Wismar," he suddenly shouted. He had remembered a photograph he had seen years before. Bauer, who had made us fasten our safety-belts and was about to bring the big plane down in a field in a forced landing, calculated quickly that he could just make the airfield at Travemünde, which he did literally with not more than a few pints of fuel to spare. Hitler was quite groggy, and it was one of the few occasions when I saw him in a physical fright.

These trips naturally attracted a lot of attention from the foreign press and from time to time one or other of the correspondents would accompany us part of the way. Sefton Delmer of the London *Daily Express* took a great interest in our campaign and became very much *persona grata* with the Nazi leadership. I was with him on one occasion when he went off to interview Dr. Georg Heim, the leader of the Bavarian Peasant Party, at Regensburg. Some of Heim's remarks harked back to Bavarian ideas of separatism, and as this seemed to me a valid point for the Nazis to refute, I persuaded Delmer to drive all the way down to Berchtesgaden and give Hitler a full résumé of his talk. Hitler, of course, was delighted: "That is worth two million votes to us," he shouted, slapping his thigh. He was really very partial to Delmer and, when he became Chancellor, willingly agreed that the *Express* man should be given the first exclusive interview.

It was towards midnight that I was usually called upon to play my rôle of court minstrel. Hitler would loll in the corner of his suite or the hotel lounge, exhausted with speeches and Gauleiters and say, "Hanfstaengl, play me something." It was not easy, as I never had any time to practise and had to cobble some of the passages, so I would start off with a little Bach or Chopin or some of the marches to get my fingers warm, but in the end it always had to be *Tristan* and *Meistersinger* and Hitler would sit there in a half doze and gurggle with delight. It would usually go on for an hour or more, often with repeats of his favourite pieces, but it gave him a respite, as the Chauffeureska did not dare to interrupt or talk to him and

just lumbered round the There were never any w there was a great hiatus.

People often ask me I this fateful year that br simple fact that he was r not concern himself with scene. He was not looki tactical advantage. He v was convinced that if he sufficiently he must, in his intention was brought local Gauleiters, to sp Although the general cor same, he would work in gave him the opportunit ment and rival parties.

Otherwise it was just concert tour. He would g and be off to the next t anything but recuperatio seconds, sponging him of and gathered his wits. I at any of the stops with won over or made use of alone or walk out in the ; safed an account of the he needed and that was : of a conference to plan c absolutely foreign to Hit then bounce these ideas their propositions had ca mind which line to adop compartments was one o he retained it to the end.

He even kept his senic warmth in his opinions o

tea. The situation was now
 as empty but at the last
 medieval town which none of
 Mann who got our bearings.
 had remembered a photo-
 had made us fasten our
 plane down in a field in a
 could just make the air-
 ally with not more than a
 groggy, and it was one of
 ical fright.

attention from the foreign
 the correspondents would
 lmer of the London *Daily*
 gn and became very much
 I was with him on one
 r. Georg Heim, the leader
 nsburg. Some of Heim's
 of separatism, and as this
 is to refute, I persuaded
 htesgaden and give Hitler
 , was delighted: "That is
 d, slapping his thigh. He
 en he became Chancellor,
 should be given the first

ually called upon to play
 l in the corner of his suite
 es and Gauleiters and say,
 not easy, as I never had
 some of the passages, so
 in or some of the marches
 always had to be *Tristan*
 here in a half doze and
 on for an hour or more,
 but it gave him a respite,
 rrupt or talk to him and

just lumbered round the other rooms drinking and smoking cigars.
There were never any women around. In that dark corner of his life
there was a great hiatus.

People often ask me how Hitler reacted to the political events of this fateful year that brought him to power. The question begs the simple fact that he was not a politician in the ordinary sense. He did not concern himself with the day-to-day kaleidoscope of the political scene. He was not looking for alliances or coalitions or temporary tactical advantage. He wanted power, supreme and complete, and was convinced that if he talked often enough and aroused the masses sufficiently he must, in due course, be swept into office. Of course his intention was brought, by the members of the entourage or the local Gauleiters, to specific developments and regional issues. Although the general content of all his speeches was more or less the same, he would work in such points as reinforced his arguments or gave him the opportunity for new attacks and abuse of the Government and rival parties.

Otherwise it was just like accompanying a musical artist on a concert tour. He would give his performance, have his bags packed, and be off to the next town. There was little time in between for anything but recuperation. We were reduced to the status of boxers' seconds, sponging him off between rounds, while he gasped for air and gathered his wits. If the necessity arose for an important talk at any of the stops with some prominent personality who might be won over or made use of, Hitler would shut himself up in his room alone or walk out in the garden with them. No one was ever vouchsafed an account of these interviews. He stored up the information he needed and that was that. Nor was there anything in the nature of a conference to plan campaign strategy. The committee idea was absolutely foreign to Hitler. He would pick one man's brains and then bounce these ideas off the head of someone else. By the time their propositions had cancelled each other out he had made up his mind which line to adopt. His habit of keeping people in separate compartments was one of the first quirks I had noticed in him and he retained it to the end.

He even kept his senior partners at arm's length. There was no warmth in his opinions of them. He regarded Goering as little more

than a useful muscle-man, wielding a great claymore at their opponents: "Give him a full belly and he really goes for them," Hitler once commented to me approvingly. This was the kind of man he could use. In picking his Gauleiters, he always looked for the bawling sergeant-major type, ready to use their fists if need be. The Gau-bulls, some of us used to call them. Hitler only really had time for people who could sway an audience. This reconciled him to Hermann Esser, although he was secretly jealous of him, as Esser was quite a ladies' man in a raffish sort of way. Esser had one extraordinary quality: he had joined the party so young and so early and had come under the influence of Hitler for so long that he could speak exactly like him. Every phrase, every nuance, plus more of a sense of humour and a quicker appeal for the women in the audience. He could always fill a hall anywhere, and with the Nazi oratorical strength spread thin, this made him extremely valuable.

There was another senior Nazi for whom Hitler's jealousy had deeper roots, and that was Gregor Strasser. He was the one potential, indeed actual rival within the party. He had made the Rhineland his fief. I remember during one tour through the Ruhr towns seeing Strasser's name plastered up against the wall of every railway underpass. He was obviously quite a figure in the land. Hitler looked away. There was no comment about 'Strasser seems to be doing well', or any approving sign. In Berlin, Strasser had been superseded by Goebbels, for whose golden voice Hitler had genuine admiration: "I have heard them all," Hitler said once, "but the only speaker I can listen to without going to sleep is Goebbels. He really can put it over."

Another, more ominous, characteristic was the distance he was starting to keep between himself and his immediate collaborators and entourage. He had always been a lone wolf all the years I had known him, and although he dominated most groups by the sheer force of his rhetoric, this was instinctive rather than deliberate behaviour. Now there was a new harshness in his tone, a conscious attitude of speaking from a higher level and keeping people in their place. He did not seem to mind what liberties he took. One day there was an article in the *Völkische Beobachter* to which he took exception, and he rang up Rosenberg to find out who had written it. It

was the work of son Rosenberg he turned diction over the paper a dog, overwhelming responsibility. "What afterwards. "For two But, of course, he did taken down a notch.

Hitler did it to all on Heinrich Hoffmann he drank and smoke continued that way, the room, he would us in our place. Hitler be sheer duplicity. Which I believe below The bailiff, Walter G and several of the far students who had fought They received no paper to keep Polish workers Their idealism impressed them. So they were half-hour's speech, recommending them for post Germany. What pleasure Third Reich of the attempt to infiltrate or be to repeat the fault I thought, then there but I underrated Hitler hear and still reserve I

At the first Presidential million votes to Hindenburg short of his necessary in eighteen months by at the result. They see

1932

R: YEARS

th great claymore at their
I e really goes for them,"
l cly. This was the kind of
ne, he always looked for the
t l their fists if need be. The
T tler only really had time
w This reconciled him to
jealous of him, as Esser
g way. Esser had one extra-
th o young and so early and
o long that he could speak
lk nce, plus more of a sense
s omen in the audience. He
h with the Nazi oratorical
b dly valuable.
o m Hitler's jealousy had
e. He was the one potential,
a i ad made the Rhineland
g h the Ruhr towns seeing
d ll of every railway under-
i land. Hitler looked away.
e ms to be doing well', or
t. i ad been superseded by
e i ad genuine admiration:
e i s, "but the only speaker
h bbbels. He really can put
n
e t was the distance he was
f i immediate collaborators
y : wolf all the years I had
n o st groups by the sheer
m : rather than deliberate
m s in his tone, a conscious
a i d keeping people in their
c s he took. One day there
e to which he took excep-
a i t who had written it. It

was the work of some other Baltic crony, but instead of berating Rosenberg he turned on poor little Otto Dietrich, who had no jurisdiction over the paper, and called him down in my presence like a dog, overwhelming all Dietrich's protestations that he had no responsibility. "What do you think of that?" the victim said to me afterwards. "For two pins I would have thrown my job in his face." But, of course, he did not do so, and there was another collaborator taken down a notch.

Hitler did it to all of them in turn. At table one day he rounded on Heinrich Hoffman, criticizing his photographs, telling him that he drank and smoked too much, that he would kill himself if he continued that way, and so on. Then, when the victim was out of the room, he would praise him behind his back to keep the rest of us in our place. Hitler would also say things which later proved to be sheer duplicity. We were staying in Mecklenburg on a big estate, which I believe belonged to Magda Goebbels' divorced husband. The bailiff, Walter Granzow, was a Party member. I found that his and several of the farms around were being worked by unemployed students who had founded what they called the Artamanen Society. They received no pay, just their keep, and their chief purpose was to keep Polish workers from coming over and settling on the land. Their idealism impressed me and I told Hitler he ought to address them. So they were called together and he made a very pleasant half-hour's speech, praising their efforts and particularly commending them for preventing foreign blood being introduced into Germany. What pleased me most was his statement that "in the Third Reich of the National-Socialists, we Germans will never attempt to infiltrate or subject other nations to our will. That would be to repeat the fault of Roman imperialism." If he believes that, I thought, then there will be no danger of war if he comes to power, but I underrated Hitler's ability to tell people what they wanted to hear and still reserve his own intentions.

At the first Presidential election on March 13, ¹⁹³² Hitler polled 11.4 million votes to Hindenburg's 18.6, leaving the old President just short of his necessary absolute majority. The Nazi vote had increased in eighteen months by 86 per cent, but many of them were in despair at the result. They seemed as far away from power as ever. Goebbels

1932

was literally weeping with defeatism, although Goering managed to keep a cooler head. At one moment there was a move to abandon the second round of voting four weeks later, but I felt there was no stopping now. Where the radicals only saw a solution in an armed uprising of the S.A., I argued with Hitler that he must stand again. A third of the population had shown themselves ready to accept him as presidential timber. "You must give the world time to adjust itself to the idea that Adolf Hitler can follow in the steps of Hindenburg. Up till now they have only known you as the Opposition leader," I told him. "To win you must attract the support of the smaller parties." I thought the necessity of reaching a compromise with other political leaders would help act as a brake on the wild men of the Party. Anyway, Hitler did stand again and got two million more votes. Hindenburg got another million, and that was more than enough.

The emergence of Hitler as a national, and indeed international, figure of the first rank nearly provided one of those confrontations which would have been the delight of historians—with Sir Winston Churchill. Sir Winston refers to the incident in his memoirs, but as he was not at the time in possession of all the facts, the story will bear retelling. I had seen quite a lot of his son Randolph during our election tours. I had even arranged for him to travel once or twice in the plane with us. He had indicated that his father was coming to Germany and that we should arrange a meeting. In April, either during or just after the second presidential campaign, I landed with Hitler at Munich airport to find a telephone message awaiting me from Randolph. His family were staying with a party at the Hotel Continental (not the Regina Palace, Sir Winston's memory plays him false), wanted me to join them for dinner, and hoped that I would be able to bring Hitler along to meet his father. I told him I would do what I could, but that we were tired, dirty and unshaven, and I would ring him back.

I caught up with Hitler at the Brown House and burst into his room. It looked, I might say, like an hotel lounge, early Adlon and late North German Lloyd, but that was his taste. He was trying to catch up on business and in his most unapproachable mood. "Herr Hitler," I said, "Mr. Churchill is in Munich and wants to meet you."

scene

This is a tremendous opportunity to dinner at the Hotel Continen

I could almost see the ashes *willen*, Hanfstaengl don't they earth would I talk to him about "this is the easiest man to talk to ture, anything you choose. This in England; you must meet him duced a thousand excuses, as h meeting someone. With a figur political ability, the uncertain b who would not go to a dancin; himself, the man who only acqu of a yelling audience. I tried or go to dinner and you arrive aft me, and stay to coffee." No, he day early—which was the first I had two or three days free: "Churchill is a rabid Francophile."

I rang Randolph back and pointed out that he had caught suggested, against my better kno for coffee. I turned up myself a Mrs. Churchill, serene, intelligen Professor Lindemann, one of the two other younger people whose n ten to dinner, with myself on M on the other side. We talked ab Churchill taxed me about Hitler's as mild an account of the subjec problem was the influx of eastern representation of their co-religion Churchill listened very carefully, c me that anti-Semitism may be a ge I had to get this bit of slang expla party laugh.

I had noticed that Lord Camro

although Goering managed to
I, there was a move to abandon
cas later, but I felt there was no
really saw a solution in an armed
Hitler that he must stand again.
themselves ready to accept him
we the world time to adjust itself
ow in the steps of Hindenburg.
g you as the Opposition leader,"
thact the support of the smaller
ou reaching a compromise with
lk t as a brake on the wild men
s and again and got two million
ha million, and that was more

ownal, and indeed international,
ed: one of those confrontations
anf historians—with Sir Winston
gc incident in his memoirs, but
d a of all the facts, the story will
viff his son Randolph during our
or him to travel once or twice
t. ed that his father was coming
relage a meeting. In April, either
e ntial campaign, I landed with
helephone message awaiting me
n sing with a party at the Hotel
eer Sir Winston's memory plays
fri for dinner, and hoped that
y i to meet his father. I told him
we were tired, dirty and un-
on'
mawn House and burst into his
arrhotel lounge, early Adlon and
ctias his taste. He was trying to
: unapproachable mood. "Herr
omunich and wants to meet you.

This is a tremendous opportunity. They want me to bring you along to dinner at the Hotel Continental tonight."

I could almost see the asbestos curtain drop down. "*Um Gotteswillen*, Hanfstaengl don't they realize how busy I am? What on earth would I talk to him about?" "But, Herr Hitler," I protested, "this is the easiest man to talk to in the world—art, politics, architecture, anything you choose. This is one of the most influential men in England; you must meet him." But my heart sank. Hitler produced a thousand excuses, as he always did when he was afraid of meeting someone. With a figure whom he knew to be his equal in political ability, the uncertain bourgeois re-emerged again, the man who would not go to a dancing-class for fear of making a fool of himself, the man who only acquired confidence in his manipulation of a yelling audience. I tried one last gambit. "Herr Hitler, I will go to dinner and you arrive afterwards, as if you were calling for me, and stay to coffee." No, he would see, we had to leave the next day early—which was the first I had heard of it, as I thought we had two or three days free: "In any case, they say your Mr. Churchill is a rabid Francophile."

I rang Randolph back and tried to hide my disappointment, pointed out that he had caught us at the worst possible time, but suggested, against my better knowledge, that Hitler might join us for coffee. I turned up myself at the appointed hour. There was Mrs. Churchill, serene, intelligent and enchanting, Lord Camrose, Professor Lindemann, one of the Churchill daughters, and one or two other younger people whose names I forget. We sat down about ten to dinner, with myself on Mrs. Churchill's right and my host on the other side. We talked about this and that, and then Mr. Churchill taxed me about Hitler's anti-Semitic views. I tried to give as mild an account of the subject as I could, saying that the real problem was the influx of eastern European Jews and the excessive representation of their co-religionaries in the professions, to which Churchill listened very carefully, commenting: "Tell your boss from me that anti-Semitism may be a good starter, but it is a bad sticker." I had to get this bit of slang explained, which made the rest of the party laugh.

I had noticed that Lord Camrose, on the other side of the table,

L932

was paying very close attention to everything that Churchill said, but over coffee, brandy and cigars, my host and I pushed our chairs back and he became confidential in his tone. I can remember the scene to this day. With his left hand, the one next to me, he held a brandy-glass almost touching his lips, so that his words reached my ears alone, and in the other a fat cigar. "Tell me," he asked, "how does your chief feel about an alliance between your country, France and England?"

I was transfixed. I could feel my toes growing through my shoes into the carpet. Damn Hitler, I thought, here is the one thing which would give him prestige and keep him within bounds and he does not even have the social guts to be here to talk about it. "What about Italy?" I asked in an attempt to assess the full range of Churchill's ideas. "No, no," he said, "we would have to leave them out for the time being. You cannot have everybody joining a club at once." I managed in my desperation to say how interested Hitler would be to discuss such a subject and expatiated excitedly on my own hopes. I must get hold of Hitler, I thought, and turning to Mrs. Churchill made a flimsy excuse about having forgotten to telephone my home to say how late I would be and would she please excuse me while I rang up. "But of course, ask your wife to join us," she said.

I got on to the Brown House. Hitler had left. I rang his apartment. Frau Winter had not seen him. Then I telephoned my wife to say I did not know what time she would see me. She was tired and preferred not to wait up or come out. I lurched out of the call-box into the hall and whom did I see nine or ten steps up the staircase—Hitler, in his dirty white overcoat and green hat, just saying good-bye to a Dutchman, whom I knew was a friend of Goering's and had, I think, channelled money to the Party in his time. I was beside myself.

"Herr Hitler, what are you doing here? Don't you realize the Churchills are sitting in the restaurant? They may well have seen you come in and out? They will certainly learn from the hotel servants that you have been here. They are expecting you for coffee and will think this is a deliberate insult." No, he was still unshaven, which was true. "Then for heaven's sake go home and shave and

come back," I said. "I will wait until you get back." "I have got up early in the morning. I put on the best face I could, I thought, perhaps for not having been more than a narrow little panelled hallway. I could not blurt this out. Hitler had been backing away from my football marches, and the party was in high fever.

Hitler never turned up. Early his car was waiting for him. He came up with his tame thugs and, please, he spent the whole day with Streicher. On the way there all about my talk. He did not feel that Hess and Rosenberg were outside contact at all cost. "Play?" Hitler complained. "Pay no attention to him." "Perhaps," I answered, nettled. But it was not to expose himself to a thunder. I did not even pass Semitism in case it provided Churchill's stayed in Munich but Hitler kept away until the

The *Reichstag* elections at yet further towards, but still out of 608 they became the first fortnight of August, the Hitler about his entering the the possibility of total power more chary than ever of con sort of a fellow is this Papen? him during the war in New York. "But politically he is a *Lufti*

hat Churchill said, I pushed our chairs can remember the ext to me, he held his words reached ell me," he asked, ween your country,

g through my shoes the one thing which ounds and he does lk about it. "What s the full range of have to leave them body joining a club ow interested Hitler ed excitedly on my and turning to Mrs. gotten to telephone d she please excuse wife to join us," she

t. I rang his apart- telephoned my wife : me. She was tired ched out of the call- n steps up the stair- een hat, just saying friend of Goering's y in his time. I was

on't you realize the may well have seen arn from the hotel cting you for coffee : was still unshaven, me and shave and

come back," I said. "I will play the piano for them or something until you get back." "I have too much to do, Hanfstaengl. I have to get up early in the morning," and he evaded me and walked out. I put on the best face I could and went back to the party. Who knows, I thought, perhaps after all he will turn up. I kicked myself for not having been more explicit to Hitler, but the Continental had a narrow little panelled hall, with porters and receptionists every yard. I could not blurt this thing out in front of the Dutchman, and Hitler had been backing away from me the whole time. So I played my football marches, and *Annie Laurie*, and the *Londonderry Air*, and the party was in high fettle. All except me, of course.

Hitler never turned up. He had funkcd it. The next morning early his car was waiting for me outside my house. We picked him up with his tame thugs and drove off to Nuremberg, where, if you please, he spent the whole morning talking shop with Julius Streicher. On the way there I leant forward in the car and told him all about my talk. He did not really believe it, or if he did I could feel that Hess and Rosenberg had been at him trying to prevent this outside contact at all cost. "In any case, what part does Churchill play?" Hitler complained. "He is in opposition and no one pays any attention to him." "People say the same thing about you," I answered, nettled. But it was no good. He had made up his mind not to expose himself to anyone with the capacity to steal his thunder. I did not even pass on Churchill's comment about his anti-Semitism in case it provided him with the excuse he needed. The Churchills stayed in Munich for two or three more days, I believe, but Hitler kept away until they had gone.

The *Reichstag* elections at the end of July had brought the Nazis yet further towards, but still so far from, their goal. With 230 seats out of 608 they became the strongest single party, and during the first fortnight of August, the new Chancellor, von Papen, talked to Hitler about his entering the Government as Vice-Chancellor. With the possibility of total power looming on the horizon he had become more chary than ever of compromising himself in coalition. "What sort of a fellow is this Papen?" he asked me. "You must have known him during the war in New York." "Socially he is a charmer," I said. "But politically he is a *Luftikus* [a light-weight]." This appealed to

*Dr. T. I was most unhelpful at this
from 20 was obvious that he could*

*develop good manners with other
powerful leaders only if he was in a
commanding position.*

him. "Ein Luftikus," he repeated, slapping his thigh, "that just describes him," but he did not entirely dismiss the idea of collaborating with him. "Mind you, if it amuses his vanity to go on living with his wife in the Chancellor's palace and they confide the real power to me, I would not mind," he added. But the time for that was not quite yet. It was late in the evening when we drove out of Berlin after the talks had failed, and quite dark. We all sat very silent in the car. Schreck was at the wheel, the inevitable Schaub, Brückner and Sepp Dietrich in attendance—"Wir werden schon sehen"—We shall see," muttered Hitler.

This, of course, was the worst possible time for me to press my American complex on Hitler. Their economy was nearly as shattered as ours, and the only other stories one heard were about gangsters in Chicago and the scandals surrounding Jimmy Walker, the mayor of New York. It all gave Hitler a perfect argument. "Any country which cannot even master its own internal police problems cannot hope to play a part in foreign affairs," he used to say. Schirach and company also never failed to bring to his attention the bad press he was getting, which he ascribed entirely to Jewish influence or to my ineffectiveness, if he was in a bad mood. I would have despaired if I had not received a private emissary from Franklin D. Roosevelt, my old Harvard Club friend, about to be swept into the Presidency. The message was to the effect that it looked as if Hitler would also soon achieve power and that Roosevelt hoped, in view of our long acquaintance, that I would do my best to prevent any rashness and hotheadedness. "Think of your piano-playing and try and use the soft pedal if things get too loud," my visitor quoted. "If things start getting awkward, please get in touch with our ambassador at once." The message heartened me enormously, and in due course I was to do just that.

November brought *Reichstag* elections again, but in spite of a frenzied campaign, the Nazis lost ground. Their representation was reduced to 196, and it was at this point that Schleicher became Chancellor, to exercise the power he had so long controlled from the wings. His plan was to split off the Strasser wing of the Nazi Party in a final effort to find a majority with the Weimar Socialists and Centre. The idea was by no means so ill-conceived and amidst

the momentary demoralization ranks, very nearly came of between Hitler and Strasser disloyalty with his head.

I always thought Strasser organizer, but another of it looked like a Levantine bus opinion of him; one of which bring Hitler and the great Olympian acidity would meet without my intervening the subject came up at a luncheon at Bayreuth. I could see Hitler's company, as he faked a success asserting that Spengler had his whole background was that he had no understanding should have been there."

I could hardly contain myself as a catalyst at the conversation. One day and he invited me round completely contemptuous. He talked heart with a demolition of it made the mistake of spouting Hanfstaengl," he complained. I tried to bring up the name mentioned as the possible Spengler, "he is a man without is just plain stupid. The only movement is Gregor Strasser's ground and a sense of reality.

That, I thought, was a failure when, back in Berlin, Knickerbocker with Strasser, I organized it. Knickerbocker had got hold of a Strasser's name, of which he came out with a whole list

lost 34 seats

lapping his thigh, "that just dismiss the idea of collaborating with his vanity to go on living with them. They confide the real power in him. But the time for that was not when we drove out of Berlin. We all sat very silent in the terrible Schaub, Brückner and *reden schon sehen*" - We shall

able time for me to press my theory was nearly as shattered. I heard were about gangsters in Jimmy Walker, the mayor of New York. "Any country with no police problems cannot be used to say. Schirach and his attention the bad press he put on Jewish influence or to my mind. I would have despaired if I had seen Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was swept into the Presidency. It looked as if Hitler would also be swept into it. I had hoped, in view of our long history, to prevent any rashness and to play and try and use the situation quoted. "If things start to change our ambassador at once." , and in due course I was to

ions again, but in spite of this. Their representation was so different that Schleicher became so long controlled from the Strasser wing of the Nazi Party with the Weimar Socialists so ill-conceived and amidst

the momentary demoralization and monetary confusion in the Nazi ranks, very nearly came off. With the failure came the final break between Hitler and Strasser, who, two years later, paid for this disloyalty with his head.

I always thought Strasser's reputation undeserved. He was a good organizer, but another of the un-Teutonic figures in the party. He looked like a Levantine business man. But several people had a high opinion of him; one of whom was Spengler. I had often tried to bring Hitler and the great historian together, in the hope that his Olympian acidity would deflate Hitler a little. They did, in fact, meet without my intervention and I learnt of it one Sunday when the subject came up at a luncheon given to Hitler by the Wagners at Bayreuth. I could see Hitler had a bad conscience about it in my company, as he faked a sort of sleepiness, scratching his ear and asserting that Spengler had only talked in terms of compromise, that his whole background was too monarchist and conservative, and that he had no understanding of racial problems. "Hanfstaengl, you should have been there."

I could hardly contain myself, as I had indeed wanted to act as catalyst at the conversation. I rang up Spengler in Munich the next day and he invited me round to coffee and cigars. I found him completely contemptuous. He thought Hitler a fantastic and won my heart with a demolition of the Rosenberg mythos, which Hitler had made the mistake of spouting. "There are no brains in the party, Hanfstaengl," he complained. "They are just a lot of pinheads." I tried to bring up the name of General von Epp, who was being mentioned as the possible next President. "Impossible," snorted Spengler, "he is a man without ideas, without powers of decision, he is just plain stupid. The only man who appeals to me in the whole movement is Gregor Strasser. At least he has a trade union background and a sense of realities."

That, I thought, was a powerful enough recommendation, and when, back in Berlin, Knickerbocker asked me to get an interview with Strasser, I organized it for him. It was a terrible flop. Knickerbocker had got hold of a book on economics published under Strasser's name, of which he had carefully read every word, and came out with a whole list of contradictions. After an hour of this

1932

cross-examination, Strasser had sweated through his second handkerchief and was reduced to retorting: "If you read the book again you will understand what I mean." As soon as Knickerbocker had gone he flew into a rage and said that if I ever brought anyone like that in again he would throw him out. It was only later that a member of his staff told me that the book had been written by a subordinate and that Strasser knew less about it than Knickerbocker.

My first indication of Strasser's threatened defection came from Sefton Delmer—we used to anglicize names when we talked over the telephone. "Hempstalk," said Delmer, "tell your boss that Mr. Streeter [Strasser] has been to see Mr. Creeper [Schleicher]." I went downstairs to Hitler's office in the Brown House with the news. He just grunted glumly, which was always the worst sign. Many years later I was to hear from a friend of ours, Dr. H. Martin, a private banker in Munich, Strasser's story of his final break with Hitler. The row took place on December 8, 1932, in the Kaiserhof in Berlin. Goebbels, needless to say, was there in support of Hitler.

For upwards of a year Strasser had espoused the opinion that the only solution to the chaotic situation in Germany was for the Nazis to enter the Government in a normal coalition. He knew of Hindenburg's and Schleicher's aversion to Hitler, particularly after the incident of the Potempa telegram, in which Hitler condoned the murder of a Communist miner by five Nazi toughs. As a result, Strasser was prepared to serve under Schleicher as Vice-Chancellor, leaving the leadership of the Party to Hitler. At the Kaiserhof meeting they could come to no agreement; in fact the split between them was widened. Hitler told Strasser he was a traitor to the Party and said his only recourse was to shoot himself. Strasser reciprocated the invitation.

The next day Dr. Martin happened to call on Strasser at his flat in the Tengstrasse and received a full account of what had happened. He found Strasser calm and resigned, in spite of his bitter words: "Dr. Martin, I am a man marked by death. We shall not be able to go on seeing each other for long and in your own interests I suggest you do not come here any more. Whatever happens, mark what I say: From now on Germany is in the hands of an Austrian,

who is a congenital li clubfoot. And I tell y Satan in human form."

It was also about th Ribbentrop, who was was a friend of Count he had ingratiated hin gaol when Helldorf wa he had some presence, above most of the me least he was, and cont field of foreign policy. palace of the *Reichst* since the July elections on the first floor tryir immediate effect, and and, as usual, said: "Hi into melodies out of T to start three times to f over, Ribbentrop cam staengl, you have broug

The top floor of the now been taken over m headquarters. I cannot Whenever the top ech a bunch of old busker recent meetings and brought him, or his su was frightful, like bein was also Goebbels' terr kanzlerplatz in the wes vinced that the Kaise Communists who were won his heart by prep were brought over to th

This was the period Hitler would often ride

ugh his second hand-
u read the book again
as Knickerbocker had
r brought anyone like
was only later that a
had been written by
bout it than Knicker-

l defection came from
when we talked over
ell your boss that Mr.
: [Schleicher]." I went
use with the news. He
orst sign. Many years
H. Martin, a private
reak with Hitler. The
e Kaiserhof in Berlin.
of Hitler.

d the opinion that the
any was for the Nazis
1. He knew of Hinden-
particularly after the
Hitler condoned the
i toughs. As a result,
er as Vice-Chancellor,
At the Kaiserhof meet-
the split between them
aitor to the Party and
rasser reciprocated the

l on Strasser at his flat
int of what had hap-
l, in spite of his bitter
y death. We shall not
d in your own interests
atever happens, mark
hands of an Austrian,

who is a congenital liar, a former officer, who is a pervert, and a clubfoot. And I tell you the last is the worst of them all. This is Satan in human form."

It was also about this time that I first made the acquaintance of Ribbentrop, who was a very late-comer in the Nazi hierarchy. He was a friend of Count Helldorf, the S.A. leader in Berlin, with whom he had ingratiated himself by sending crates of champagne into the gaol when Helldorf was temporarily detained. I took to him because he had some presence, spoke French and English and seemed a cut above most of the mental breast-stroke swimmers near Hitler. At least he was, and continued to be, an antidote to Rosenberg in the field of foreign policy. My first clear recollection of him was in the palace of the *Reichstag* President, which Goering had occupied since the July elections. Hitler was up with Hugenberg in the library on the first floor trying to get more money out of him, without immediate effect, and came down completely worn out. He saw me and, as usual, said: "Hanfstaengl, play me something," so I launched into melodies out of *Tosca* which I had in my head, although I had to start three times to find the right key. When the performance was over, Ribbentrop came over to me and said pompously: "Hanfstaengl, you have brought the Führer through a difficult hour."

The top floor of the Kaiserhof Hotel in the Wilhelmstrasse had by now been taken over more or less completely as the Nazi operational headquarters. I cannot say its atmosphere was thereby improved. Whenever the top echelon were there for meals they behaved like a bunch of old buskers. Each one would boast of his successes in recent meetings and how many bouquets of flowers had been brought him, or his success in dealing with Communist hecklers. It was frightful, like being in the green room of a music-hall. Berlin was also Goebbels' territory. They had a big flat out on the Reichskanzlerplatz in the west of the city, and once when Hitler was convinced that the Kaiserhof kitchen staff had been infiltrated by Communists who were putting poison into his food, Magda Goebbels won his heart by preparing delicate little vegetarian dishes which were brought over to the hotel for him in heatproof containers.

This was the period when Goebbels really began to gain ground. Hitler would often ride over and spend the rest of the evening with

(1932)

them and I was usually dragged along for my final piano act. My marches were high in favour and I had a relatively new one called *Deutscher Föhn*, which appealed to Hitler. "This is what we will have the band play when we march into Berlin," he used to proclaim, but the Goebbels were jealous. This ability gave me a special access to Hitler which they resented and they took to having all the radios on at full blast when we arrived, so that I could no longer compete. Goebbels soon found an even better answer. He had taken recordings of some of Hitler's more successful speeches and used to turn these on. Hitler would curl up in a big Morris arm-chair and semi-doze to the sound of this phonetic super-reflection of himself, drowning in his own narcissistic sound-image. They would follow this up with one of the Wagner recordings, just to outsmart me, because they knew that if he listened to my piano-playing it was sometimes a prelude to his listening to me, and that was something to be prevented at all costs.

About the only thing which reconciled me to the Goebbels was their unashamed enthusiasm for finding female companionship for Hitler. I was all in favour of this. I thought if he could find another woman it would be the best way of taming him and making him more human and approachable. One of their offerings was a vivacious blonde named Gretl Slezak, whose father, Leo, was the famous opera singer, and she herself had a very pleasant voice. She was not all that young, probably about 27 or 28 at the time, but she was a professional *ingénue* and asked the most delightfully asinine questions about the Nazis and what Hitler stood for and did he really mean to be beastly to the Jews, and so on. In fact she had a Jewish grandmother, so the question was not entirely without point. Hitler responded very well and tossed back her remarks by telling her not to bother about such matters and that the most important thing was to spend a pleasant evening. The Goebbels deliberately shut off their radio-sets and egged me on to go and strum at the piano. I felt rather like the man must feel who plays incidental music in a brothel. However, I thought this was all in a good cause and if only we could keep him interested, who knew what might come of it.

Hitler and Gretl had gone into the darkened drawing-room next

door, and I assumed they were foot off the loud pedal and he be the start of a beautiful friend or so we all took our leave. Brückner and company were : by which time it was about on this young lady home," said I sort of normalcy, I thought, the rest of us had a last drink in for leaving him unguarded, enough Hitler's jackboots were his door in the corridor—it thought, this is really an auspicious he returned quite late, but the behaviour next morning as it continued to be seen around : day she was in a confidential going on. She just looked up : I needed to know.

Leni Riefenstahl was another was in their apartment one might say, the acme of luxurious Pullman taste of all these to malicious, but, after all, these only spacious furnishings they stayed, so they came to accept sophistication, instead of the dull

Leni Riefenstahl was a very little difficulty in persuading the studio after dinner. I was can and trick interior decorator of bad. There was a piano the Goebbels, who wanted to leave This isolated Hitler, who got eye I could see him ostentatious cases. Riefenstahl was certainly straightened up or looked round

my final piano act. My relatively new one called "This is what we will Berlin," he used to probability gave me a special took to having all the that I could no longer answer. He had taken speeches and used to Morris arm-chair and reflection of himself, e. They would follow just to outsmart me, piano-playing it was and that was something

to the Goebbels was ale companionship for he could find another him and making him their offerings was a e father, Leo, was the ery pleasant voice. She 28 at the time, but she ost delightfully asinine stood for and did he so on. In fact she had not entirely without back her remarks by rs and that the most vening. The Goebbels ged me on to go and n must feel who plays ough this was all in interested, who knew

ed drawing-room next

door, and I assumed they were fondling each other, so I kept my foot off the loud pedal and hoped fervently that this would really be the start of a beautiful friendship. After three-quarters of an hour or so we all took our leave of the Goebbels—needless to state, Brückner and company were also along—and left for the Kaiserhof, by which time it was about one o'clock in the morning. "I must take this young lady home," said Hitler. If she brings you round to some sort of normalcy, I thought, she will be doing us all a service. The rest of us had a last drink in the hotel as a sop to our consciences for leaving him unguarded, and when I went to my room, sure enough Hitler's jackboots were the only ones missing from outside his door in the corridor—it was quite near mine. Well, well, I thought, this is really an auspicious beginning. I believe, in fact, that he returned quite late, but there was no clue to be obtained from his behaviour next morning as to what had happened. Gretl Slezak continued to be seen around and I got to know her very well. One day she was in a confidential mood and I asked her what had been going on. She just looked up at the ceiling and shrugged. It was all I needed to know.

Leni Riefenstahl was another of the Goebbels' introductions. She was in their apartment one night for dinner. It was considered, I might say, the acme of luxury, but in fact conformed to the early Pullman taste of all these top Nazis. I do not want to be too malicious, but, after all, these people came from nowhere and the only spacious furnishings they saw were in the hotels in which they stayed, so they came to accept the style as the height of breeding and sophistication, instead of the dreadful *kitsch* it was.

Leni Riefenstahl was a very vital and attractive woman and had little difficulty in persuading the Goebbels and Hitler to go on to her studio after dinner. I was carried along and found it full of mirrors and trick interior decorator effects, but what one would expect, not bad. There was a piano there, so that got rid of me, and the Goebbels, who wanted to leave the field free, leant on it, chatting. This isolated Hitler, who got into a panic. Out of the corner of my eye I could see him ostentatiously studying the titles in the book-cases. Riefenstahl was certainly giving him the works. Every time he straightened up or looked round, there she was dancing to my music

at his elbow, a real summer sale of feminine advance. I had to grin myself. I caught the Goebbels' eyes, as if to say, 'If the Riefenstahl can't manage this no one can and we might as well leave.' So we made our excuses, leaving them alone, which was all against his security regulations. But again it was an organized disappointment. The Riefenstahl and I travelled in a plane a day or two later and once more all I got was that hopeless shrug. However, she had made her mark and obtained quite a lot of privileges from Hitler for her film activities.

A third woman also appeared about this time. There is an entry in my guest-book dated January 1, 1933, signed in our Pienzenauerstrasse house by Schaub, Heinrich Hoffmann, his then sweetheart Erna Gröbke, whom he later married, Brückner and his girl friend Sophie Stork, Rudolf Hess and his wife Ilse, Ingeborg Groen, who presents no picture to my memory, Hitler—and Eva Braun. They had all come on for coffee after a performance of *Meistersinger* at the Hof Theatre. We may even have had dinner at the Four Seasons Hotel first. It was not my first sight of Eva Braun. She was a pleasing-looking blonde, the slightly helpless type who appears to need protection, well built, with blue eyes and a modest, diffident manner. I had seen her working behind the counter at Heinrich Hoffmann's shop some months earlier, and had certainly registered the fact. She was friendly and personable and eager to please. We had no sense that evening that she was there in any particular capacity, but rather as a friend of one of the other girls in order to make up the party.

Hitler was in his most benign mood. It took us right back to the 'twenties when we had first met him. The conductor that evening had been Hans Knappertsbusch and Hitler had not liked his *tempi* and interpretation and was expatiating on the subject. He could really do so with good sense and would hum or whistle many of the passages, the words of which he knew by heart, in order to show what he meant. We had refashioned the house by then and the studio he remembered from his early days had lost its height due to the necessity of putting in additional rooms. He thought it was a pity and said we should have built outwards and left it as a lofty room for receptions. I could not help thinking that if I had had my

thousand dollars back another thing and that reminisced charmingly pleasant party. I think this mood.

The conversation kept seen. It was probably H a completely Wagneria of the characters to mal its German connotatio Dutchman and a mixtu I could not help thin line about: '*ein Glühw Schaden angericht* [a was the cause of all th Eva Braun was no answ

Before they left, Hitl first day of the New Ye of suppressed excitemen you that in writing." O von Papen at the house the final step in his path

Three weeks later I v journalist friends throug in the Lustgarten. It wa the State of Lippe. The I am Dr. Hanfstaengl, and these gentlemen ha him in exasperation. "N said stubbornly. "But f In another week we sha not to be moved. "Con then," he said. By that ti

* D.T. The bear! The bear! Once or twice

I thought his least might stop when he was alone a woman

possessed. To the question: Who are you? — they had answered: We are nothing, but Hitler is everything! Now the best elements urged Hitler to break with these unsavory fellows; Pöhner, the former police commissioner and protector of the murderers, demanded that Hitler get rid of these two 'dunghills'; Ludendorff demanded the same; also Rosenberg and Anton Drexler, the founder of the party. Hitler, however, stubborn and insulted, clung faithfully to the two questionable characters, and on the telephone yelled at Drexler to go to the devil, at which the original founder left the National Socialist Party. But more obscure figures gathered around Hitler. For some time the photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann, belonged to the inner circle; a good bit of Hitler's popularity resulted from Hoffmann's photographs. Then there was the horse-dealer, Christian Weber, to whom Hitler owed a thousand dollars; and finally his publisher and business manager, Max Amann, in whose hands his own material existence rested. In order to assure the support of these men, who were useful and able in their way, he calmly threw overboard his most respected followers whose names would only have obscured his own.

Yet through it all, Alfred Rosenberg remained true to him. He was joined by Wilhelm Frick, Pöhner's former assistant, who had now gone into politics completely, and had become a deputy in the Reichstag. The most important of the new figures was Gregor Strasser, a druggist. He had not been prominent before 1923, but during Hitler's imprisonment he revealed himself to be a great organizer, an indefatigable speaker, a powerful personality, and Hitler's equal in self-reliance. It was a circle of unknown men. To the unswervingly loyal Rudolf Hess, Hitler said: 'I shall need seven years before the movement is on top again.'

It was not his task, he wrote in embarrassed apology, 'to attempt to improve or even unify the human material at my disposal.' His task was not to educate these men, for human nature could not be changed in the individual, only the type could be changed in the course of centuries; 'ideal universal men' were not to be found; consequently he did not look for men 'ideally suited to my idea.'

No, he purposely sought men of small stature with whom he

could easily deal; men whom he could im- in the humblest circumstances, who wou him; who were literally willing to be bea because they could not find easier or mor where else. He consciously gathered little : this quite literally; for it is noteworthy th: Hitler's old guard, the Streichers, Amann Berchtolds, were physically puny, some of

To his little men peering up at the summ that seemed so hopelessly distant, Hitler sa summit would some day come down of it me, this time will come. The illusory foun life will again vanish beneath our feet an will be able to understand our words bette:

This he said to four thousand people wha ary 27, 1925, inside and outside of the Bürge was past, the faithful were on the spot. Th Bavaria, and there were four thousand of th

Be simple, be primitive, be brutal! — th which in many different versions Hitler ke four thousand for two hours. Let them n rather trust in their emotion: 'Reason can t man, emotion is sure and never leaves h. present day has politics been conducted wit intelligence as by Hitler; but it was a cardii gence to bring the masses into a condition in scious of a goal, but uncritical. Go to the n discharged lieutenants, professors, and bank the masses will you find idealism and spirit c because they possess little material or spiritu sions, whether of a spiritual or a material na lyze the desire for struggle.' Therefore, go to do not beg from them, but beat your fanatic: ing to the methods which for five years y bohemians; do not forget: 'The key to the l not "if you please," but power.' In this the m 'It is not for nothing that you see so many wo

1932

ity] and how simple in his greatness. . . . In the fact of greatness he is above us all. . . . Der Führer is always like a star over us. . . . A star of the cabarets. For Hitler liked to move in the spots where life was amusing; preferably in places where he could eat a great deal of cake to the tune of waltzes and marches. Men who were present on many of these occasions later spoke of the 'impossible women' he usually took with him. In 1932, when a decision affecting the life and death of the party had to be made (whether or not Hitler should run for the Reich presidency), he hesitated for almost four weeks while Germany waited with bated breath. Unable to make up his mind, he sent for Goebbels to confer with him in Munich. Goebbels arrived, but Hitler spent his afternoons in the studio of his friend Troost, the architect, looking over plans for his future gigantic buildings. At night the program, according to Goebbels's notes, was as follows: First night, Gärtner-Theater, operetta, *The Fledermaus*; second night, movies, Greta Garbo; third night: another operetta, *The Merry Widow*. That was how he passed the momentous weeks; when the month had gone by and he had finally made his decision, Goebbels heaved a sigh: 'He is and remains our Führer after all' — for he had doubted it.

When the whole party apparatus was busy with preparations for one of the Party Days, the Führer vanished for a few days; in his seclusion he spent his time designing a plaque for the party comrades in Nuremberg to wear in their buttonholes. He himself designed the banners, standards, arm-bands, decorative buttons, newspaper layouts, and later the house façades, stadiums, posters for big meetings, usually aided by men like Troost and Speer. Rarely has anything uglier been conceived than the official party insignia designed in 1922, a lead disk about the size of a twenty-five-cent piece, ornamented with a red ring, a white field, and a black swastika. In these designs he attempted to realize the unfulfilled artist's dream of his youth. And all of them were lines in the giant figure which was his picture of himself. In choosing the title of Führer, he chose an image for himself, the image of Napoleon. The columns which adorn his blueprint palaces and monuments were designed for a new Napoleon. Napoleonic was the eagle between whose claws he placed the swastika; Napoleonic the Latin ornaments on the S.A.

standards, the antique inscriptions, and even of his personal uniform.

The image of the great man always hovered catchword before his inner eye. He always opinion the image would act. His action is his own; but it remains a histrionic gesture thought-out model, and this accounts for the ural quality of his most effective moments. When stooping figure draws itself to its full height spews flame like an archangel, it is as though had been bound with invisible cords to the model. To observers this bond with a hidden became almost palpable. Suddenly, in the midst Hitler's face grows tense as with an inner moment in which the humanly repulsive falls: the unfathomable is intensified until it becomes eyes peer into the distance, as though he were something which no one else sees; and if the direction of his gaze, sometimes, it has been told can be seen in the far corner, with his eyes apparently speaking to him with closed lips. strange atmosphere of such scenes confused to him see more than was there. But it is certain years of his career Hitler used his younger friend complement to his own personality; as a stage ballet master who helped him shape his own position and uncertain nature into whatever image he made.

When preparing a speech, he declaimed large friend Hess; he practiced gestures and facial mirror. He practiced other things too. There visitor to be received; the reception was previous Hess. Hess had to meet the stranger in advance at him and report. Then there would be an introduction:

Hitler: Fire away, Hess! Can he be used or can be used. But he's the silent type. — *Hitler:* Critical? — *Hess:* No, embarrassed. Would be

ness. . . . In the fact of greatness he
 s always like a star over us. . . . ' A
 liked to move in the spots where
 places where he could eat a great
 ltzes and marches. Men who were
 sions later spoke of the 'impossible
 im. In 1932, when a decision affect-
 rty had to be made (whether or not
 presidency), he hesitated for almost
 aited with bated breath. Unable to
 or Goebbels to confer with him in
 t Hitler spent his afternoons in the
 architect, looking over plans for his
 night the program, according to
 rs: First night, Gärtner-Theater, op-
 1 night, movies, Greta Garbo; third
Merry Widow. That was how he
 when the month had gone by and
 on, Goebbels heaved a sigh: 'He is
 ill'—for he had doubted it.
 ratus was busy with preparations for
 hrer vanished for a few days; in his
 signing a plaque for the party com-
 in their buttonholes. He himself de-
 arm-bands, decorative buttons, news-
 use façades, stadiums, posters for big
 n like Troost and Speer. Rarely has
 d than the official party insignia de-
 ut the size of a twenty-five-cent piece,
 a white field, and a black swastika.
 o realize the unfulfilled artist's dream
 were lines in the giant figure which
 In choosing the title of Führer, he
 he image of Napoleon. The columns
 es and monuments were designed for
 was the eagle between whose claws he
 nic the Latin ornaments on the S.A.

standards, the antique inscriptions, and even the studied simplicity
 of his personal uniform.

The image of the great man always hovers like a model and
 catchword before his inner eye. He always tries to act as in his
 opinion the image would act. His action is nevertheless basically
 his own; but it remains a histrionic gesture, an imitation of a
 thought-out model, and this accounts for the monumental, unnat-
 ural quality of his most effective moments. When the unimpressive,
 stooping figure draws itself to its full height and unexpectedly
 spews flame like an archangel, it is as though his hands and feet
 had been bound with invisible cords to the hands and feet of a
 model. To observers this bond with a hidden image sometimes
 became almost palpable. Suddenly, in the midst of a conversation,
 Hitler's face grows tense as with an inner vision; these are the
 moments in which the humanly repulsive falls away from him and
 the unfathomable is intensified until it becomes truly terrible. His
 eyes peer into the distance, as though he were reading or gazing at
 something which no one else sees; and if the observer follows the
 direction of his gaze, sometimes, it has been claimed, Rudolf Hess
 can be seen in the far corner, with his eyes glued to his Führer,
 apparently speaking to him with closed lips. It may be that the
 strange atmosphere of such scenes confused the observer, making
 him see more than was there. But it is certain that in the decisive
 years of his career Hitler used his younger friend as a necessary
 complement to his own personality; as a stage director or spiritual
 ballet master who helped him shape his own powerful but formless
 and uncertain nature into whatever image he momentarily wanted.

When preparing a speech, he declaimed large sections of it to his
 friend Hess; he practiced gestures and facial expressions at the
 mirror. He practiced other things too. There was an important
 visitor to be received; the reception was previously rehearsed with
 Hess. Hess had to meet the stranger in advance, take a good look
 at him and report. Then there would be an interview like the fol-
 lowing:

Hitler: Fire away, Hess! Can he be used or not? — *Hess:* He
 can be used. But he's the silent type. — *Hitler (suspiciously):*
 Critical? — *Hess:* No, embarrassed. Would be terribly glad to ad-

1932

?

mire, but he's embarrassed. — *Hitler*: They are all prepared. For ten years they have heard of me, for the last year they have heard of nothing else but me. What does he expect? — *Hess*: Authority, of course. You can speak at length. Your will is unshakable. You give laws to the age. — *Hitler*: Then I'll speak with the firm voice, without yelling? — *Hess*: Of course.

Hitler utters a few sentences. Hess, the human tuning-fork listens: '... No, not like that, quiet — no passion, commanding. You want nothing of him. It is Destiny that speaks. ...' At length the adviser falls silent. Hitler is in the swing and speaks evenly for several minutes, with the 'firm voice': '... It is indulging in a self-deception as harmful in the long run as it is catastrophic in its effects, to believe that a movement such as the one led by me can for all eternity be held down by the night-sticks of Messrs. Severing and Grzesinski. I warn you against regarding us as a movement comparable to the usual party formations. We are Germany's destiny and her future, regardless whether people think they have to question us on this point or that point in our program. We are restoring to the nation a faith and a will, and by concentrating all our strength on action, revolutionary action if you will, we are gathering in our ranks every member of the German people who still has energy and capacity for life. ...' And so on. After six or seven minutes he breaks off, already somewhat moved by his own words. 'Good, now I think we have it,' he concludes. Then the time and place of the reception are set.

He has conceived a picture of himself, and in all his philosophizing and politicizing he is constantly mixing colors for this picture. When he assured his bankrupts that their failure in civil life was really a proof that they were an élite — he meant himself, seen in the picture of the superman misunderstood by the people: 'There is nothing great in the world that does not owe its origin to the creative ability of an individual man.' The human mass, reflecting rank, exuberant, undirected life, must be shaped, it must be given meaning and purpose: 'Genius is not in the majority, but always in the single individual. The Napoleonic era did not give Napoleon his name, Napoleon imprinted it on the era. ... People talk of woods, meadows, fields, mines, buildings, and believe that these

are our national wealth. The national w great men.' He wants to become the Napoleon words, this era is his era, it belongs to him, he likes, '... and for this there is only one nothing else.'

Flight into the great image has from early answer to all life's enmity; that was why he artist when his father tried to break him it man; he wanted to shine and be admired-moved from one another, look up to the st this moment our thoughts meet — the gr are the uniting stars which hold men tog-prince and star in the realm of art; or ra would have become, if, as we know, he had and energy. But, as he will always feel, th have become if his alleged poverty, the soci: the resistance of a world hostile to him and not kept him down. Art is the struggle of the resistance of the dull world, the ultu ordinary to the creative spirit ... 'until th itself so brilliantly that all of them fall, knees.' In such phrases, he betrays what triumph. Art — that is the career of Rich: defeat of the Paris performance of *Tannha* the spiritual empire in Bayreuth; art is *Meistersingers*, when the man of the world his knees before the master.

On trips and walks he would suddenly ri companions to some church or cloister, wh them with a lecture: gaze and see how th made a room out of walls. There he stoo abrupt line, his gloves clasped in his uplifted he cried, that the old window-makers knew mined not only the façade but also the spa see how that accounts for the magnificent s It was not to be denied: when he asked if t everyone saw; at times he could really mak

Hitler: They are all prepared. For me, for the last year they have heard what does he expect? — Hess: Authority, enough. Your will is unshakable. You say: Then I'll speak with the firm voice, of course. Hess, the human tuning-fork, quiet — no passion, commanding. It is Destiny that speaks. . . . At Hitler is in the swing and speaks with the 'firm voice': ' . . . It is in as harmful in the long run as it is to believe that a movement such as the Party be held down by the night-sticks of the police. I warn you against regarding the Party as the usual party formations. We must see the future, regardless whether people are on this point or that point in our regard to the nation a faith and a will, and by means of action, revolutionary action if you wish, ranks every member of the German Party and capacity for life. . . . ' And so on. The speech breaks off, already somewhat moved. Now I think we have it,' he concludes. The reception are set. He speaks of himself, and in all his philosophizing constantly mixing colors for this picture. He speaks of their failure in civil life was not an elite — he meant himself, seen in the Party misunderstood by the people: 'There is no man that does not owe its origin to the Party.' The human mass, reflecting the Party life, must be shaped, it must be given form. The Party is not in the majority, but always the Party. The Napoleonic era did not give Napoleon the Party. It was not on the Party. . . . People talk of the Party, buildings, and believe that these

are our national wealth. The national wealth of a people is its great men.' He wants to become the Napoleon of this era; in other words, this era is his era, it belongs to him, he can do with it what he likes, ' . . . and for this there is only one justification: genius, and nothing else.'

Flight into the great image has from early youth been this man's answer to all life's enmity; that was why he wanted to become an artist when his father tried to break him into a normal respectable man; he wanted to shine and be admired — 'as two lovers, far removed from one another, look up to the stars with the feeling: in this moment our thoughts meet — the great spirits of a people are the uniting stars which hold men together.' That was he, a prince and star in the realm of art; or rather, that was what he would have become, if, as we know, he had not lacked both talent and energy. But, as he will always feel, that was what he would have become if his alleged poverty, the social arrogance of the age, the resistance of a world hostile to him and all its sentiments, had not kept him down. Art is the struggle of the great man against the resistance of the dull world, the ultimate subjection of the ordinary to the creative spirit . . . 'until the artistic genius reveals itself so brilliantly that all of them fall, overpowered, to their knees.' In such phrases, he betrays what he expects from art: triumph. Art — that is the career of Richard Wagner, from the defeat of the Paris performance of *Tannhäuser* to the erection of the spiritual empire in Bayreuth; art is the last word in the *Meistersingers*, when the man of the world and the patron falls to his knees before the master.

On trips and walks he would suddenly run ahead, dragging his companions to some church or cloister, where he would surprise them with a lecture: gaze and see how the old master builders made a room out of walls. There he stood, his whole form an abrupt line, his gloves clasped in his uplifted hand. Can't you see, he cried, that the old window-makers knew that a window determined not only the façade but also the space within? Can't you see how that accounts for the magnificent stained-glass windows? It was not to be denied: when he asked if they did not see, nearly everyone saw; at times he could really make people see what he

1932

?

1932
? .

wanted. From time to time he was possessed by a true passion for instructing the men of his *entourage*. It became an established practice that at least once a year he subjected his staff of leaders to a course in art; as a rule at the Party Days. From this developed the custom of his so-called 'art speeches'; infinitely long-winded lectures, which inspired secret jokes in men who otherwise admired him. In their content they are perhaps the most questionable, in form beyond a doubt the weakest of his speeches; and yet it is these speeches in which the orator expressed his profoundest, if most useless, thoughts. For here he speaks of himself, trying to attain clarity concerning his own nature. Here he speaks of his relation to art, his power and gifts in this field, in which, outwardly at least, he doubtless failed in his youth; and the sense of the whole speech is finally a stubborn, though inwardly uncertain: '*Anch' io son pittore.*' (I too am a painter.)

For it is art which distinguishes the noble men from the common herd; and his division, as Hitler learned from Houston S. Chamberlain, is no accident; it is here that the races divide. Therefore, in every people, including the Germans, there is the sub-human who merely eats and drinks, and the Aryan yearning for higher culture:

It is just as natural that a part of the human species should attain the fulfillment of their life tasks in the satisfaction of the lowest needs as it would be unnatural if the races chosen by Providence, for higher things should, contrary to the admonishing voice of their conscience, yes, the burning compulsion of their being, desire to retrogress to this most primitive life conception or even, which is the same thing, let themselves be coerced into it. . . . Discord entered among those nations in which two racial ingredients, different in nature, wanted to live and express themselves side by side. The man who requires nothing but eating and drinking for the satisfaction and fulfillment of his life, has never possessed understanding for the man who would rather stint on his daily bread in order to still the thirst of his soul and the hunger of his spirit. But the lack of inner understanding in those who have been born to this, the eternal incomprehension of their heart and soul, must at least be transformed into deferential respect by conscious education. . . .

THE UNHAPPIEST OF ALL

Here, after twenty-three years, the misund spits his contempt into the faces of his compa the Vienna lodging-house; of Hanisch, for exan cards and brought in sausages, while the young newspapers at once and pondered the deepes world. Hitler delivered this speech on the nece 'sub-human' in deferential respect in September, already dictator; and scarcely anything else ch and his cause as much as the intrusion of su discussion on art. Art must be brutal. The 'race things' must finally realize — this is the heartfel ognized artist-prince — that art is not a matter ternational humanitarianism,' but their own f fended against the 'sub-humans': 'Art cannot blood. It is the expression of the psychic sentim

Every race has its ideal of beauty, and we Ary by this ideal of beauty we recognize ourselves; of our invisible order, which has existed everyw 'The ideal of beauty of the ancient peoples will as men of the same nature, because of the same earth. . . . Every politically heroic people seeks i to a no less heroic past. The Greeks and Roma close to the Germans because they must all see and the same basic race, and hence the immort the old peoples exert again and again their attra racially related descendants.'

He was working on a manuscript, in which l the portrait of the artist genius who molds h cussed the work for whole nights with Alfred R studied to be an engineer and architect, and like done any creative work in the field. Some of rived at in these conversations were put down which Rosenberg was writing at the same time. his endless brooding, never finished his work, wrote 'Finis' to his own. He entitled the book w as he probably failed to suspect, was put into circ Soré, the French socialist, syndicalist, and fri

time he was possessed by a true passion for his *entourage*. It became an established rule at the Party Days. From this developed so-called 'art speeches'; infinitely long-aspired secret jokes in men who otherwise content they are perhaps the most questionable doubt the weakest of his speeches; and which the orator expressed his profound rights. For here he speaks of himself, trying his own nature. Here he speaks of his power and gifts in this field, in which, outless failed in his youth; and the sense of a stubborn, though inwardly uncertain: too am a painter.)

tinguishes the noble men from the common, as Hitler learned from Houston S. ent; it is here that the races divide. Therecluding the Germans, there is the suband drinks, and the Aryan yearning for

that a part of the human species should attain its life tasks in the satisfaction of the lowest unnatural if the races chosen by Providence. Indeed, contrary to the admonishing voice of their burning compulsion of their being, desire to a primitive life conception or even, which is themselves be coerced into it. . . . Discord ensues in which two racial ingredients, different live and express themselves side by side. The thing but eating and drinking for the satisfaction of his life, has never possessed understanding but rather stint on his daily bread in order to soul and the hunger of his spirit. But the lack of in those who have been born to this, the son of their heart and soul, must at least be essential respect by conscious education. . . .

Here, after twenty-three years, the misunderstood artist-prince spits his contempt into the faces of his companions in misery in the Vienna lodging-house; of Hanisch, for example, who sold post-cards and brought in sausages, while the young idealist read three newspapers at once and pondered the deepest questions in the world. Hitler delivered this speech on the necessity of keeping the 'sub-human' in deferential respect in September, 1933, when he was already dictator; and scarcely anything else characterizes the man and his cause as much as the intrusion of such brutality into a discussion on art. Art must be brutal. The 'races chosen for higher things' must finally realize — this is the heartfelt wish of the unrecognized artist-prince — that art is not a matter for any 'absurd international humanitarianism,' but their own privilege, to be defended against the 'sub-humans': 'Art cannot be divided from blood. It is the expression of the psychic sentiments of a people.'

Every race has its ideal of beauty, and we Aryans have ours; yes, by this ideal of beauty we recognize ourselves; it is the surest sign of our invisible order, which has existed everywhere, yet nowhere: 'The ideal of beauty of the ancient peoples will be eternal as long as men of the same nature, because of the same origin, inhabit the earth. . . . Every politically heroic people seeks in its art the bridge to a no less heroic past. The Greeks and Romans, then, become so close to the Germans because they must all seek their roots in one and the same basic race, and hence the immortal achievements of the old peoples exert again and again their attractive effect on their racially related descendants.'

He was working on a manuscript, in which he wanted to draw the portrait of the artist genius who molds his people. He discussed the work for whole nights with Alfred Rosenberg, who had studied to be an engineer and architect, and like himself had never done any creative work in the field. Some of the conclusions arrived at in these conversations were put down in another book which Rosenberg was writing at the same time. While Hitler, with his endless brooding, never finished his work, Rosenberg in 1928 wrote 'Finis' to his own. He entitled the book with a slogan which, as he probably failed to suspect, was put into circulation by Georges Sorel, the French socialist, syndicalist, and friend of Bolsheviks.

1932

?

term of 'myth' to the great conceptions which of political movements. Rosenberg called his *the Twentieth Century*. He gave Hitler the book; it contained some rather daring passages attacking of the party's reputation, did not want Hitler's approval. Hitler took the pages home and read them at his bed-table, where Rosenberg when he called on him. This went on for a year; then the book was sent back and asked to have his manuscript back. Rosenberg said: 'I feel sure that it's all right.' The book was put out in 1930, and it turned out to be a very strange way. To be sure, the book contained a lot of art and race no different from what Hitler thought. Rosenberg defended the theory—not original 'Nordic' race came from a vanished continent of Europe and consequently had taken important qualities from an Arctic or Asiatic element; it was a race of blue water and gleaming armor of the Wise Men of Zion, the Germanized Russian-German milieu, was wildly in elements which he viewed as non-German. To Hitler, in 'Tartardom' and, to an even greater extent, Gobineau and Wagner, he regarded the force of the older and more dangerous than its modern world. In this view the whole Mediterranean races are permeated with Semitism, and Rosenberg on the researches of an insane scholar named Rosenberg took special pains to demonstrate the Semitic Etruscans, who subsequently imbued all the Semitic essence.

The most widespread poison, the most dangerous Asiatic-Latin spirit, is Christianity, at least the Catholic Church. Rosenberg hinted that the book was in a spiritual sense a continuation of the old world concerning which he told the most hideous lies to the Roman medicine man, church history, swindles, and forgeries. Though all this came

from Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who had violently insisted that he was a Christian; though Rosenberg still approved a 'positive' Christianity—that is, a Christianity removed from all tradition—he brought the party a reputation for godlessness. The National Socialists were violently attacked, Catholic bishops forbade holy rites over the graves of party members, and all this might have been avoided if in the course of a year Hitler had taken a look into Rosenberg's manuscript. But he took the consequences on himself. Rosenberg wrote him a letter in which he offered to give up his position as editor-in-chief of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, even to resign from the party; Hitler wrote diagonally across the letter: 'Doesn't enter my head. You stay!' His own manuscript on the interrelations between art and race, however, did not see the light; he thought it better not to make enemies in this field too.

Hence we possess no written and developed definition of the beautiful by Hitler—since definition has never been his strong point, it is perhaps no great loss. In his speeches he occasionally attempted a clarification of beauty as 'functionalism fulfilled with crystal clarity.' The phrase has an empty sound; it is intended to convey, for example, that the form of the Greek roof, which he felt to be perfect, is explained by the vital needs of all Aryan or Nordic peoples, who in the rainy, snowy regions of the cold and temperate zones needed the slanting roof. This accounts for Hitler's furious fight against cube-shaped houses, or towers with flat roofs; the fight against the flat sun roof was conducted with almost religious ardor, for this roof was 'Oriental, Semitic,' and absolutely 'un-German.' Hitler declared everything which ran counter to his penchant for simplification and massiveness to be a product of foreign, hence hostile, race will; particularly the whole 'artistic and cultural stammering of the Cubists, Futurists, and Dadaists.' For him, all searching after new, unaccustomed forms is only a sign of the decay of the Aryan forces among modern peoples, who were no longer strong enough to feel the value of traditional classical forms.

'What we experience today,' he said in January, 1928, 'is the capitulation of the intellectual bourgeoisie to insolent Jewish composers, poetasters, painters, who set miserable trash in front of our people and have brought things to such a pass that for sheer cow-

1932

?

ardice the people no longer dare to say: that doesn't suit us, away with this garbage. No, against their better knowledge and conviction the so-called intellectuals in our nation accept as beautiful something set before them by those people, which they themselves must automatically feel to be ugly. That is a sign of our universal decay, a cowardice that can be thrown to the ground with one slogan: you are a philistine. . . . These are indications of the decay of taste and hence the racial decomposition of our people. . . . The good people of this nation, said Hitler, went timidly and sheepishly to operas and concerts, where 'there is an echo of dissonances. . . . The people do not want that in the least, but no one dares to stay away. The wretched sound is an insult to their ears; they look around: beside them sits a blasé young chap or an old bounder who begins to applaud and looks impudently around, and the others, instead of giving the young chap'—cry in the audience, 'a licking'—'. . . begin to wonder in all earnestness whether they haven't heard something profound after all, and finally they begin to clap, too, though they hadn't the slightest desire to clap. . . .'

1932
According to Hitler, we had adapted our daily lives to forms which were profoundly alien to us and which we also felt to be alien; but National Socialism would give the German people courage to repulse the alien: 'The things that we cannot understand because they are alien to us, we do not need to understand,' he cried loudly and with furious gestures: 'Nor do we want to understand them.' According to report, there was stormy applause at this spot. It is as though the politician in him were jealous of the artist—or perhaps the unsuccessful artist-prince was jealous of his more successful colleagues. Do we really need art? 'Minds who give birth to something new are infinitely rare,' he declares. 'It is only a very few great men on earth who really bless the nations by new achievements in the field of art. More than that is not necessary . . . for what an artist devises in a month, a people often needs thirty years to understand. . . . We need to produce no new art. If we accomplish nothing better, let us concentrate on what we already have, on what is immortal. . . .'

This he said in the year 1928, and to this renunciation of original creation, unlike his many other promises and assurances, he has remained faithful. When in 1933 he

commanded the German people to take the 'an of beauty' as a model, he justified this by saying to imitate something good than to produce something the predominantly intuitive creations of these fulfill their educational and leading mission as a doubt.'

Here art loses itself in politics, where, as a n everything serves as a means to an end. The end greatness: 'There is nothing in all the cultural Hitler, 'that does not owe its existence to a political and Hellas—no cultural state has arisen except hope and the will to obtain monuments in harm monuments to the unification of peoples, to celebrate might of the central political power. . . . I could victory of our philosophy of life, otherwise than elements which outlast the times.' And 'Art and together as nothing else on earth belongs together.

Hitler dreams of his own giant monument in t a people is extinguished and men are silent, the st of the great deceased, in whom his own people st values.' 'Everything that I say and do belongs to l a time when the great red posters with his name a thousand people to a beer hall. For basically e said or did was calculated only to imprint his i image on the present, to multiply himself in his disappear as a man behind his legend.

He made the masses see what they did not se what they did see. The masses, yes—but what i particularly those around him? They still had face that looked like an advertisement for a sh emptiness with the avid, frightened eyes; this so sometimes hopping, never naturally moving for row shoulders; this whole impersonal appearan want of other distinguishing features the ridicul most caught the eye. They were forced to hear equipped with all the semi-education of his age, t of things he did not understand; they had to swallow

re to say: that doesn't suit us, away their better knowledge and conviction in our nation accept as beautiful these people, which they themselves gly. That is a sign of our universal thrown to the ground with one. These are indications of the decay decomposition of our people. . . . 'on, said Hitler, went timidly and rts, where 'there is an echo of disnot want that in the least, but no vretched sound is an insult to their em sits a blasé young chap or an old and looks impudently around, and : young chap'—cry in the audience, der in all earnestness whether they and after all, and finally they begin the slightest desire to clap. . . . 'l adapted our daily lives to forms o us and which we also felt to be ould give the German people courings that we cannot understand be- lo not need to understand,' he cried s: 'Nor do we want to understand re was stormy applause at this spot. him were jealous of the artist—or prince was jealous of his more suc- y need art? 'Minds who give birth rare,' he declares. 'It is only a very lly bless the nations by new achieve- than that is not necessary . . . for h, a people often needs thirty years to produce no new art. If we ac- ; concentrate on what we already ' This he said in the year 1928, and l creation, unlike his many other remained faithful. When in 1933 he

commanded the German people to take the 'ancient peoples' ideal of beauty' as a model, he justified this by saying: 'Since it is better to imitate something good than to produce something new and bad, the predominantly intuitive creations of these peoples can today fulfill their educational and leading mission as a style raised above doubt.'

Here art loses itself in politics, where, as a matter of principle, everything serves as a means to an end. The end is permanence and greatness: 'There is nothing in all the cultural monuments,' says Hitler, 'that does not owe its existence to a political intention. Rome and Hellas—no cultural state has arisen except through political hope and the will to obtain monuments in harmony with it, monuments to the unification of peoples, to celebrate the outstanding might of the central political power. . . . I could not imagine the victory of our philosophy of life, otherwise than embodied in monuments which outlast the times.' And 'Art and politics belong together as nothing else on earth belongs together.'

Hitler dreams of his own giant monument in the future. 'When a people is extinguished and men are silent, the stones will speak'—of the great deceased, in whom his own people stamped its 'highest values.' 'Everything that I say and do belongs to history,' he said at a time when the great red posters with his name attracted at most a thousand people to a beer hall. For basically everything that he said or did was calculated only to imprint his infinitely enlarged image on the present, to multiply himself in his creation, and to disappear as a man behind his legend.

He made the masses see what they did not see, and not to see what they did see. The masses, yes—but what about individuals, particularly those around him? They still had before them this face that looked like an advertisement for a shaving lotion; this emptiness with the avid, frightened eyes; this sometimes slinking, sometimes hopping, never naturally moving form with its narrow shoulders; this whole impersonal appearance, in which for want of other distinguishing features the ridiculously correct suit most caught the eye. They were forced to hear this know-it-all, equipped with all the semi-education of his age, talking constantly of things he did not understand; they had to swallow the miserable

1932

?

2

German, the defective logic, the tasteless humor and false pathos which he brought forth at the dinner table as at the mass meeting; they had to suffer the bad manners; and some could not dispel the feeling that he was even physically unclean—this was not true, but water and soap avail nothing against a slovenly nature. How did the armed intellectuals come to submit to the leadership of this raving dervish? For when success brought masses to the party, men rose to the leadership who far excelled Hitler in practical ability, education, and character. It can be understood how the phenomenon subjected the masses; his hypnotic effect on certain individuals must be accepted as a fact; but by what human means did Hitler handle the men around him?

1932
7
The answer is that he did not handle them successfully. These men never ceased to laugh at him or to become enraged against him—and, in between, reluctantly to admire his amazing political success. He was not on terms of true friendship with any, not even with Hess who was seemingly so close to him. No one addressed him by his first name or by the intimate 'du'; those who had done so in earlier years had long since given up the practice. Companions in struggle for twenty years addressed him as 'Mein Führer,' to which he returned: 'Herr Reichsmarschall,' 'Herr Minister,' or 'Herr Reichsschatzmeister' (Reich Treasurer); at best, 'My dear party comrade.'

The phenomenon's name is 'Mein Führer'; whenever his men so address him, they presumably have the feeling of coming into contact with history. Among themselves, however, these subordinates were never so solemn. Then they were aware that above all they were participants in a wild venture, the maddest speculation in history, which was bound to pay off prodigiously if successful; and coldly businesslike, they called and still call the head of their firm the 'boss.' But they also had their disparaging nicknames. These realists, thugs and businessmen, had known their 'Manitou' intimately for years, and no one could pass off any forged gigantic portrait on them. They saw his weakness, nearly all of which could be reduced to a phenomenal untruthfulness, which all his collaborators complained of. For most of his faults, otherwise humanly understandable, became ugly only because he falsified them

into virtues. His big lies constitute the content of his life. He deceived his co-workers even in small person with tears in his eyes, he assured a journalist money that he had no funds at all, not even needs; the next day he started on a pleasure tri automobile. When the journalist complained, him: how could such an incompetent good-for-nothing to open his mouth? And a few days later, when he really was none too competent at his professional grave blunder—the stenographic copy of a Hitler was lost—the Manitou fell on his slave resounding slaps in the face. Later, more apart from the outside world it was staunchly maintained ways the best friend and comrade of his co-workers to him with all their troubles; that he had helped of the lies which Hitler's staff had come to take a remarkable part of it was the pathos with which ever possible, he attached an oath or at least a verbal lie. With trembling passion in his voice, he saw had never made an attempt to obtain money (February 5, 1930); the man who could have been in prison for perjury by producing a document, he spared the world its encounter with Hitler, silent.

What got on the nerves of his co-workers perhaps his alternate whining and brutality was his indifference in cheek, they systematically built up the myth of determination. True, to this lie there was an inner sense. The party calls itself a 'political army' and orders of a general; everywhere it must arouse military precision and rapidity. This is the discipline which it emanates. The truth, however, is that it is conducted with an uninterrupted series of light and deception. In this deceptive field, what really counts is one's gifts: the ability to wait, to keep an eye open on what events pass and patiently look on as, frequently, is canceled out by another. Politics is the oppos-

lower over the factories and those workers who were the Brown Storm battalions were able to gather in which was most usable, most supple, a type ready as the bohemian of the proletariat, the unemployed. These would have been chaff, living at the edge of that, if they were not the strongest, they were the most the of the nation. This tenth really had nothing to He even ideals. A part of these men believed neither in Fr: an human rights nor in the classless society, and almost semuler declared: 'If this process of moral disintegration in a ger, the nation will fall apart and only egoism will porat is why we have in our ranks hundreds of thou- ther life would have no sense and purpose if National. a. A: es. not given them a sense and purpose [several minutes defe... You are nothing, your nation is everything!'] lited purpose of life for tens if not hundreds of thou- sit day after day in the 'storm centers' which the r Hi lists had strewn all over the country. The storm his their headquarters, for the most part back rooms o h: Both proprietor and customers had sworn loyalty to at f: Both proprietor and customers had sworn loyalty to don: for beer-hall proprietors have at all times been the ide of the people. There sat the unemployed in their str: breeches and discolored yellow shirts for many hours tha their half-empty beer mugs; at mealtimes they were u he, pfennigs from a great iron kettle that simmered / room; their uniform, often the only suit they pos- sold to them by the 'field ordnance department' of redit. Every day — later twice a week — they spent o th: at their 'employment office' and with the money re- wh- state they paid the ordnance department for their a 1 meals. Thus, Hitler's private army maintained itself the em innumerable little groups defending themselves in el. 'not cold and hunger, financed by the state they were verthrow. olai the whistle blew in the back room of the beer hall, re ad leader cried, 'Attention!' then these men rotting in the e ing up, formed ranks, and stood at attention while a npic

man in high boots and armed with a horsewhip shouted: 'Everyone listen! ... In the name of the Führer, the chief of staff has ordered ...' And they marched off. For wherever they might be marching, it could only be better. Suddenly one of them had a pistol in his hand, he hardly knew how it had got there; rushing through a house door with a dozen others, he found himself in a strange room, he didn't know where; the pistol went off, a man lay groaning on the floor, he didn't know who. This is no fiction, but an account of the notorious murder in the village of Potempa in 1932. One December night in Berlin boxes in which something seemed to be moving were pressed into the hands of a few dozen of these men; they were led into a movie house in the center of the city; suddenly a whistle shrilled in the darkness, they stood up, shouted, opened their boxes, and hundreds of white mice ran through the theater. Women jumped up on chairs and railings, a snake wound its way through one of the aisles. Outside, uproarious shouts answered the noise within; thousands who had been standing there in silence suddenly began to yell. Joseph Goebbels stood in an automobile, saluting and shouting. With a thousand raised hands the crowd shouted its reply. This went on for several nights, then the government capitulated and did what Goebbels had been aiming at with his white mice and snakes: it distorted the laws to prohibit the picture that was running in the movie house. It was an American anti-war picture, written by a German and eagerly awaited by millions of other Germans, a picture revealing war in all its misery and horror: *All Quiet on the Western Front*, adapted from Remarque's best-selling novel.

Could these rowdies be expected to inspire the officers with confidence that the gray revolutionary horror of 1918 would not be repeated? On October 14, 1930, the hundred and seven National Socialists in parliament, at the behest of Strasser, Feder, and Frick, introduced a bill to limit the interest rates to four per cent; furthermore, 'the entire property of the bank and stock exchange princes ... must be expropriated without indemnification for the welfare of the German people as a whole'; the same should be done with the property of all eastern Jews, of all 'persons of foreign race' in general, and 'the large banks must be taken over by the state with-

* someone on the inside? let them in free

1932

*

where he stayed thirty

tal collapse. Over and over that he would never look at that he must kill himself. He locked the door to her t Frau Winter, the motherly e anything in the room but emums there. He commis- in a variety of photographs. portrait or a bust of Geli in there was an unwritten rule e. And when Hitler himself es. Years later, during the defense attorney that Geli's Hitler that it had changed his

r Hitler's extraordinarily in- his mother's death, no other o hard. One of Hitler's as- at for many years after the done in the room where she death room in Munich just timestime watching over the that the loss of Geli was so a he suffered anew the death

the Schwabing photography who had joined the Party in a result of the monopoly he the movement. Hitler struck employee, Eva Braun, who el. Thus began Hitler's most

olate-box type of prettiness" re which occupied her daily the right age: at 18 she was re exactly the color he always ipid, porcelain blue"—exactly

va. Her employer considered usequential . . . flattered and nd compliments which this

The Child As Father to the Man

rising power in the land was paying her." One of Hitler's physicians thought her "cheap, arrogant and selfish," but always compliant and sweet in Hitler's presence.²⁰⁰

Hitler showed only intermittent interest in Eva until she tried to commit suicide. On 11 August 1932 she shot herself over the heart, as Geli Raubal had almost a year earlier. Hitler at first suspected that she was faking the act to gain his attention, but when the surgeon, a Doctor Plate, assured him that she had come, quite literally, within an inch of her life, Hitler was favorably impressed; he began to see a good deal of her.

Their relationship was not so placid as has sometimes been pictured. Eva attempted suicide once more in May 1935, this time with 20 tablets of Vanodorm. She was saved at the last minute by her sister Ilse, a medical technician.²⁰⁷ After this second effort, Hitler took her seriously. He set her up in a house near his own apartment and, after the 1936 remodeling of his Berghof, provided her with rooms connecting directly with his own.

To Hitler she seemed to be a living doll, the embodiment of the ideal woman he had often described: cute, cuddly, naïve, tender, sweet, and stupid. He found her a relaxing and pleasantly undemanding companion on picnics and at motion picture shows. Totally ignorant of politics, she listened avidly to Hitler's ideas and agreed with them all. He saw to it that she was kept out of sight and excluded from all public functions, but at the Berghof she played a larger role. There, Albert Speer told an interviewer, "Hitler kept his Eva like a puppet in a doll's house. She was a part of the ambience, like the canary cage, the rubber tree . . . and the kitschy wooden clocks."²⁰⁸

Over the years Hitler really became very fond of Eva and took to addressing her, both in private letters and within the intimate circle at the Berghof, with tender Austrian diminutives. But he chose rather curious words to express his affection—*Tschapperl*, *Hascherl*, and *Patscherl*. The terms are asexual and neuter-gendered, as well as quite untranslatable. But to the Austrian or south German ear, their meaning and flavor seems inappropriate for adult lovers. The words have a condescending tone, with a slight echo of derogation. They express intimacy and endearment, but in the way a mother would talk to her baby. *Patscherl*, for example, is derived from the Austrian equivalent of the baby game "Pat-a-cake, pat-a-cake, baker's man. . . ."

Why did the adult Hitler consider these terms an appropriate way to express affection to a woman? Was it because they stirred memories in his unconscious of the first words his beloved mother had murmured to him as an infant? A remark made by one of his secretaries gives some support for that suggestion. In an interview after the war, she remembered vividly how often Hitler called Eva Braun by that diminutive in urging her to eat food—much as Adolf's mother had forced food upon her sickly little boy: "He patted her hand, calling her 'my *Patscherl*.' . . . He always urged her to eat this or that, saying, 'Now,