

Schullenburg Memoirs

CC 2

WALTER SCHELLENBERG

THE
SCHELLENBERG
MEMOIRS

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ANDRE DEUTSCH

under the direction of Otto Ohlendorf, dealt with Germany and the occupied countries; its counter-VI which dealt with foreign intelligence. AMT IV, under the direction of Heinrich Mueller, was set up 'to on to the State'; AMT V, under the direction of the Criminal Police (Kripo) whose duty was

which Schellenberg was first assigned, had many Schellenberg, as head of AMT IV E, was entrusted with work for the Gestapo in Germany and the occupied 1941, at the time of the invasion of Russia, he took AMT VI, the Foreign Intelligence Service. Summer of 1944, on the liquidation of the Abwehr, the ce of the German High Command (which, under and General Oster, had been used as a cover for the position to Hitler), Schellenberg assumed the addi- tity for the German Military Intelligence and so tion of a unified Foreign Intelligence Service.

as never one of the Nazi leaders. His picture rarely apers, his name was unfamiliar. He belonged to the , the technicians of dictatorship, and he is the only ighly important group to have written his memoirs. Schellenberg was far more interested in describing what no than in constructing an apology. He had a gift for . Mueller, Ribbentrop, Kaltenbrunner, Canaris and are all brought to life and given that touch of t which the fantastic element in their actions and s unconvincing. None of them made so deep an Schellenberg as Heydrich and the pages in which he onship with Heydrich, 'the man with an iron heart', t in the book.

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of Nazi Germany (as of every dictatorship) were are and incessant struggle for power not only be-

/ A B was responsible for the rounding up, transporta- assing to death of at least three million Jews.' Edward Pummam, London, 1956.

between rival organizations—the Main Security Office, the Foreign Office, the Propaganda Ministry, the High Command and the Nazi Party—but also within each organization itself. Schellenberg was adept at both forms of intrigue, and needed to be if he were to survive. Since he was constantly in the company and in the confidence of Heydrich and Himmler, he provides valuable evidence on the steady engrossing of power by the SS leaders. His worst enemies were to be found in his own Main Security Office, Kaltenbrunner (Heydrich's successor) and 'Gestapo' Mueller. Only the continued favour of Himmler enabled Schellenberg to escape their attempts to destroy him.)

Schellenberg's responsibility was the organization of intelligence work abroad and this meant that he was also in a good position to follow the course and consequences of Hitler's policy towards the enemy, towards Germany's allies and the occupied countries. Two areas with which he was especially concerned were Occupied Russia and the Far East; in both cases his memoirs add considerably to our knowledge. He describes in some detail the steps taken to place German agents behind the Russian lines and to prevent the counter-penetration of Communist agents into Germany. He saw the opportunities which were being missed in Russia through Hitler's obstinate adherence to a policy of indiscriminate brutality, and he provides some interesting information on Japanese attempts to mediate between Germany and the Soviet Union. From these doubts sprang his own ambitious scheme (formed as early as 1942, according to his own account) to bring about a compromise peace through his influence over Himmler.

On certain subjects Schellenberg maintains a discreet silence. He barely mentions the concentration camps or the mass-murders of the Jews, although both were the responsibility of Himmler and the SS. Nor has he more than a sentence or two about the German opposition to Hitler and the plot of July 20, 1944, about which he must have known a good deal if only because of the part the liquidation of the plot played in his plans to secure control of the Abwehr.

The concluding episode, in which for the only time he tried directly to influence the course of major events by persuading Himmler to initiate independent negotiations for peace, is already well known.¹ But

¹ Cf. H. R. Trevor-Roper, *The Last Days of Hitler*, Macmillan, London, 1950; Count Bernadotte, *The Curtain Falls*, Cassell, London, 1945, and *The Kersten Memoirs*, Hutchinson, London, 1956.

His voice was soft but the negligence was not always convincing. He failed at winning his partner in a contest. You had the impression that his was not the Walter Schellenberg, the intelligence, and whether he was still the man he had in the past. If he encountered a situation he showed himself capable of suddenly changing while he started yielding to his opponent on terms which he tried to negotiate

iveness explains his unusual gift of doubt had been one of the secrets of his assimilation ultimately produced an almost feminine sensibility made her sure of success. continual pain and deeply worried his expenses, Herr Harpprecht knew the fact that no one any longer but the Italian police did not even particularly resented the fact that it was the former chief of the German High Command (East) and not he who was invited to intelligence service against the Russians. He created his own world of make-believe, of heads of states, financial aid and surveillance by English and French agents. Even a simple journey to the East was a mystery. It was natural that Schellenberg should have been of which he had already made use. In reliving the triumphs of his life, he shabby obscurity of the present. He drafted into order and help fill the gaps already been interrupted by a visit to his old enemy, the Spaniards (in Madrid) and it was now further Schellenberg's health.

For some time Schellenberg had been aware that another operation was essential if he was to secure any relief from the disease of the liver from which he was suffering. He put off this operation too long, was admitted to hospital too late for the doctors to save his life and died in the Clinica Fornaca, Turin, on the last day of March 1952. *— 41 years old*

In the early summer of the same year Frau Schellenberg returned from Pallanza to Düsseldorf, taking with her the MS. of the memoirs. In Düsseldorf she met Dr Werner Best, who had once been a collaborator of her husband's in the SS and later became the German governor of Occupied Denmark. At that time Best was working in the offices of Dr Achenbach, one of the foreign policy experts of the present Free Democratic Party and the Ruhr lawyer who acted as defence counsel for Werner Naumann, Goebbels' former lieutenant, when the latter was arrested by the British occupation authorities, in January 1953.

On Best's advice Frau Schellenberg gave up the idea of publication through a Swiss firm and decided to offer the memoirs to a German publisher. In fact, all that appeared was a brief sensationalized account in the Munich illustrated magazine *Quick* (*Die Grosse Moerder-GmbH*) based on incidents in the memoirs without revealing Schellenberg's identity. The articles, which bore every sign of having been written-up by a 'ghost', were described as the reminiscences of a high-ranking SS officer, the mysterious 'Colonel Z'.

The reasons for this anonymity are not clear. It is possible that the publishers of *Quick* believed that the Swiss firm of Alfred Scherz might still possess some claim to the copyright or that Frau Schellenberg was influenced by threats against herself and her children. In the end the full MS. of the still unpublished memoirs was bought by the present publisher, Mr André Deutsch, from *Quick* Verlag in Munich.

When it reached London, packed in a large suitcase, the manuscript was in complete disorder. Mr Deutsch was able to check parts of it with material left by Schellenberg with the Swedish firm of Norstedt Verlag and to show it to Dr Goverts—a partner of Scherz und Goverts Verlag—who had been in touch with Schellenberg and his wife as early as 1950. Finally he invited Herr Harpprecht to come over to England and inspect the manuscript. Herr Harpprecht spent a week examining the material in detail. He was able to point to numerous notes on the MS.

These were supposed to temper the young Nazi manhood for the great tasks that lay ahead.

However, I soon managed to secure a more suitable form of activity. It had been realized that the SS would have to offer more to the students of a university town than merely marching and drill and I was presently assigned to the task of conducting indoctrination talks and giving lectures, mostly of an historical nature, dealing with the development of Germanic law and at the same time directly attacking the Catholic Church. These lectures were for both students and workers and soon became quite popular. It was my first lecture, to which I gave an outspoken anti-Catholic bias, that first aroused the attention of the chief of the SD, Reinhard Heydrich.

One evening I noticed at the back of the audience two older men dressed in SS uniforms without any special insignia. At the end of the lecture they introduced themselves: both were professors at Bonn University, one a philologist, the other an educationalist. They said they had found my lecture very interesting and wanted to talk to me about other fields of activity in the SS.

It was from these two professors that I first heard about the existence of the SD. Within it, they explained, there was the Internal Security section which concerned itself with matters inside Germany, and the Foreign Security section which dealt with information from abroad. Both were highly secret institutions and their function was to gather information that could help the government to form policy or to evaluate the results of policy decisions already taken.

They asked me whether I would like to join one of these departments, I having told them of my keen interest in foreign affairs and foreign policy. They explained, however, that before I could get into foreign secret service work I would have to put in a spell at the Ministry of the Interior. They suggested that I should continue with my legal career, my status with the SD remaining a purely 'honorary' one without obligations on either side, and meanwhile, I would be freed from all other duties for the SS. I had no hesitation in agreeing to join the SD and enrolled immediately. But I still had to do one last spell of duty as an SS guard, and a fateful and unforgettable one it turned out to be.

The date was June 30, 1934. We were at the Hotel Dreesen at Bad Godesberg. Rumours had reached my ears of plots, divisions in the Party, and I whispered that the highest leaders of the hotel and I was posted outside the hotel from the terrace to the dining-room to look down over the valley of the Rhine. Inside the dining-room preparations were being made for the arrival of the 'they' were true. In the dining-room were a number of the Nazi movement, among them Goering and Goering. I could see their chattering movement of their lips, though I could not hear.

Meanwhile, black clouds had been gathering and now the storm broke. As the rain drove me back into the shelter of the hotel, I looked across the sky, illuminating the scene with a ghastly glow. From time to time Hitler would stand staring at the tempest with unlaboured under the burden of weight.

After dinner the meeting was resumed. With a brusque gesture Hitler brought the discussion to a close. At once the huge ballroom and Hitler and his companions got up. Guards and we clambered inside, the night towards the airport at Hagen. The waiting aircraft took off for Munich aboard.

The great purge of Roehm and his associates had begun.

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The date was June 30, 1934. We were sent to guard the fashion-able Hotel Dreesen at Bad Godesberg. All day strange and dis-quieting rumours had reached my unit. There were said to be plots, divisions in the Party, and impending disasters. It was whispered that the highest leaders of the Party were coming to the hotel and I was posted outside the French windows that led from the terrace to the dining-room, from which point I could look down over the valley of the Rhine to the mountains beyond. Inside the dining-room preparations had been made for a conference, and before long 'they' arrived: it seemed the rumours were true. In the dining-room were assembled the highest leaders of the Nazi movement, among them I recognized Hitler, Goeb-bels and Goering. I could see their changes of expressions and the movement of their lips, though I could not hear what they said.

Meanwhile, black clouds had been gathering over the valley and now the storm broke. As the rain poured down, I pressed myself back into the shelter of the building. Lightning forked across the sky, illuminating the scene with a weird and frightening glow. From time to time Hitler would come to the window and stand staring at the tempest with unseeing eyes. He was clearly labouring under the burden of weighty and difficult decisions.

After dinner the meeting was resumed, then finally with a brusque gesture Hitler brought the discussion to an end: a decision had been made. At once the huge black Mercedes cars drove up and Hitler and his companions got in. Trucks arrived for the guards and we clambered inside, then roared after the cars into the night towards the airport at Hangelar near Bonn, where waiting aircraft took off for Munich as soon as the leaders were aboard.

The great purge of Roehm and his followers in the SA had begun.

Roehm's activities in setting up a private militia may have constituted a threat to the state, but this was only the pretext for the monstrous blood-bath that Hitler's orders let loose among his own followers that night. The moving force behind the scenes was the General Staff of the Wehrmacht. They had manoeuvred Goering into forcing a showdown. Their purpose was the elimination of the more unreliable elements among the Nazis, in particu-

lar the radical wing led by Gregor Strasser, who took the socialist aspect of National Socialism too seriously. General Schleicher, however, who had preceded Hitler as Chancellor, was in no way connected with Roehm or Strasser, and really had nothing to do with the affair. He was shot on the express orders of Hitler himself because he knew too much of the shady financial transactions by means of which Hitler came to power.

In the ambitious Himmler, and the still more ambitious Reinhard Heydrich, Hitler found willing executioners, each of whom seized the opportunity to build up his own power. June 30 marked the ascendancy within the Nazi structure of the SS, whose black uniform with the death's-head insignia I now wore. It was also a crucial step upwards for Heydrich. The ruthless cruelty displayed by him that night filled even the most hardened of the Nazi veterans with fear.

I soon started my secret work for the SD. The information I had to obtain concerned academic matters and political and personal relationships at various universities. I was told to go to the lodgings of a Professor H—, a professor of surgery at the University, who would personally hand me my orders. They came in sealed green envelopes directly from the central office of the SD in Berlin. I never received any acknowledgements, however, of my written reports and was left with a feeling of working in the dark; the whole thing began to appear mysterious and unreal.

All the same, I much enjoyed the long conversations with Professor H—, whom I had to visit once or twice a week. Often we talked until late at night. He was an erudite man with a remarkable store of general knowledge and had collected a magnificent library, especially of literature dealing with secret service work.

Sometimes I received orders from a gentleman who looked like a commercial traveller and who always received me in a small hotel. I also established contact with a Mr K— S—. He was a highly gifted man who had formerly been a Jesuit Father, and impressed me as the most able and intelligent of these three men. He never asked me for written reports, but sought by questioning and conversing with me to form his own picture of the information I brought him.

After a while, Professor N—, the cruited me into the SD, called on me should move to Frankfurt to continue Law Examination at the Police Headquarters occurred in 1934, brought with it changes. At Frankfurt I always seemed interesting and important cases, and I movements were being plotted as they had to investigate the highest Party administrative misconduct. Twice I reported in person to the Minister of Justice, who supplied me with the necessary documents myself against the Gauleiters—the directors.

Violent quarrels were raging at Guertner, who was Minister of Justice, District Chief, of Nuremberg, Julius Streicher, each been sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. They had killed a Jew with a hammer. The other was innocent, as apparently he had been the first man without knowing for what he was doing. I therefore went into the prison one night to see the man's cell so that he could escape. This caused the Minister of Justice to reprimand Streicher.

Presently, without any warning I was promoted to a higher position. Within a few weeks, with orders to discover the political activities of a professor at the Sorbonne, whom I had known in Berlin, I had to write my reports. Shortly after my return from Berlin to continue my training in the SD, I reported to the Personnel Bureau of the SD to see Dr Schaefer, the Personnel Director, who handed me a meticulous printed schedule of my activities, including all the places I should visit for instruction and information.

It was an extremely interesting period. The levels were most friendly and courteous. It opened to me as though some unseen power had opened through the complex channels of this hierarchy.

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from a gentleman who looked like a man who always received me in a small room with a Mr K— S—. He was a man who had formerly been a Jesuit Father, and was very intelligent of these three men. I made reports, but sought by questioning him his own picture of the informa-

After a while, Professor N—, the educationalist who had recruited me into the SD, called on me again and suggested that I should move to Frankfurt to continue my training for the State Law Examination at the Police Headquarters. This move, which occurred in 1934, brought with it considerable financial advantages. At Frankfurt I always seemed to be assigned to the most interesting and important cases, and I got the impression that my movements were being plotted as though by an unseen hand. I had to investigate the highest Party functionaries suspected of administrative misconduct. Twice I went to Berlin to make reports in person to the Minister of the Interior, Dr Frick, who supplied me with the necessary documents to enable me to assert myself against the Gauleiters—the district bosses.

Violent quarrels were raging at this time between Frick, Guertner, who was Minister of Justice, and the Gauleiter, or District Chief, of Nuremberg, Julius Streicher. Two SS men had each been sentenced to ten years' imprisonment because one of them had killed a Jew with a hammer. I was convinced that the other was innocent, as apparently he had only lent the hammer to the first man without knowing for what purpose it was wanted. I therefore went into the prison one night and unlocked the door of the man's cell so that he could escape. This 'breach of the law' caused the Minister of Justice to remonstrate violently with Streicher.

Presently, without any warning I was sent to France for four weeks, with orders to discover the political views of a certain professor at the Sorbonne, whom I had once mentioned in one of my reports. Shortly after my return from France I was called to Berlin to continue my training in the Ministry of the Interior. I reported to the Personnel Bureau of the Ministry, and was directed to see Dr Schaefer, the Personnel Director of the Gestapo, who handed me a meticulous printed schedule of my future work and activities, including all the places I should have to visit for further instruction and information.

It was an extremely interesting period for me. Officials at all levels were most friendly and courteous and every door was opened to me as though some unseen power was working silently through the complex channels of this huge machine.

One day I was told to report to SS Oberfuehrer Dr Best, Chief of Departments I and III of the SD, and afterwards to go and see the Chief of Department II [Secret Political Police], SS Oberfuehrer Mueller.

Dr Best was an extremely able administrative official. As Chief of Department I, he was in charge of all personnel, administrative and legal work, and as Chief of Department III, in charge of counter-espionage abroad. We had a lively conversation about professional matters, especially administrative jurisprudence, and about the new police code and various problems of counter-espionage. Finally Dr Best said, 'I don't know what Heydrich has in mind for you, but one day he will probably tell you himself.'

Immediately after this first visit to Dr Best, I went to see SS Oberfuehrer Mueller, who was virtually chief of the Gestapo. The contrast between the personalities of Best and Mueller was most striking. Best was a cultivated man, tending almost too much towards the intellectual, while Mueller was dry and laconic. Short and broad, with the squarish skull of a peasant and a jutting forehead, he had tense, narrow lips and penetrating brown eyes, hooded by nervously twitching eyelids. His hands were wide and massive, with fingers as square as a matchbox.

This man, who had started his career as an ordinary detective in Munich, was to play a very important role in my life. Although he had worked his way up to the top, he could never forget his origin. He once said to me in his crude Bavarian accent, 'One really ought to drive all the intellectuals into a coal mine and then blow it up.' Any form of real conversation with him was almost impossible; it consisted on his part almost entirely of coldly-phrased questions and was largely an interrogation. Yet all the while he sought to establish an atmosphere of frankness, and by his broad Bavarian speech to suggest a natural geniality. Our first conversation ended by his saying, 'Heydrich likes your reports. You've only been sent to us as a matter of routine. Actually you'll work in the main office of the SD, which comes under the Party rather than the government. A pity—I could make better use of you in my department.' In spite of the friendly gesture with which he said goodbye, his eyes and expression remained quite cold. At

that time I did not know the extent of SD.

At last some light had been thrown on the matter. Both Best and Mueller had been interested in me. So the dreaded, the unseen force guiding me like a thread through all the channels of the Nazi system.

The next day I presented myself at the SD. An SS Oberfuehrer whom I had explained to me the mission of the SD, the chief organ of the information service to inform the top Party leaders of all movements at home and abroad. It covered Party, industry, the theatre, journalism, was no sphere that was not under the thumb of the SD. It did not seek out the first movements or individuals hostile to the Party.

This tremendous administrative problem was solved by Oberfuehrer Dr Mehlhorn, and in the chief of the SD. He came from a family which had been a lawyer in one of the large cities. Unimpressive in appearance, almost unimpressive in intelligence with a tremendous will. His main fault was a lack of decision: he was a man of people, his chief tactical mistake that he was the SS against Heydrich, who at once eliminated him and soon brought about his fall.

Mehlhorn was certainly not a Nazi absolute loyalty to the ideas of National Socialism by the Party. Later, when I knew him better, one of our long conversations: 'National Socialism is simply the form in which the eternal development of the world presses itself today. Whether this new world will be successful or not, no one can tell. How many thousand years' Reich' is simply absurd.' Mehlhorn dismissed one of Hitler's favourites.

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At last some light had been thrown on the mystery of my ad-
vancement. Both Best and Mueller had said it was Heydrich who
was interested in me. So the dreaded chief of the SD himself had
been the unseen force guiding me like a pawn on a chessboard
through all the channels of the Nazi secret police service.

The next day I presented myself at the Central Bureau of the
SD. An SS Oberfuehrer whom I had already met in Frankfurt
explained to me the mission of the SD and its aims. The SD was
the chief organ of the information service of the Party. Its task was
to inform the top Party leaders of all opposition movements and
forces at home and abroad. It covered the administration, the
Party, industry, the theatre, journalism, the police—in fact there
was no sphere that was not under the watchful eye of the SD, no
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Oberfuehrer Dr Mehlhorn, and in the ensuing period I worked
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Mehlhorn was certainly not a Nazi in the sense of professing
absolute loyalty to the ideas of National Socialism, as required
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ly situation report was prepared give the leaders of Germany a public opinion.

individual whose name appeared cross-indexed against their subject was constructed on which the files were driven and by pressing a controls could bring any one of Up to this time only the information had been organized so

Best and Mehlhorn during the time of Heydrich's power. It was one of Heydrich's character would have served their purpose. While until 1940, Heydrich instigated before a 'Court of Honour' in the service. However, he was not and given the task of reporting on. His reports on the Far Eastern had lasting value to the political situation and on trends in the United States that an entirely wrong picture had been given to Hitler.

II

UNDER HEYDRICH'S ORDERS

Impressions of Heydrich—The case against General von Fritsch—Himmler the mystic—Heydrich's position endangered—'Salon Kitty'—My relations with Frau Heydrich—Her husband's attempts to trap me—My marriage 'assisted'

NOT LONG after I had begun my work at Headquarters I was called to my first interview with Heydrich, the formidable chief of the SD. It was with considerable apprehension that I walked over to the Gestapo building where he had his office. Now perhaps I would find out what plans he had for me.

When I entered his office Heydrich was sitting behind his desk. He was a tall, impressive figure with a broad, unusually high forehead, small restless eyes as crafty as an animal's and of uncanny power, a long predatory nose, and a wide full-lipped mouth. His hands were slender and rather too long—they made one think of the legs of a spider. His splendid figure was marred by the breadth of his hips, a disturbingly feminine effect which made him appear even more sinister. His voice was much too high for so large a man and his speech was nervous and staccato and though he scarcely ever finished a sentence, he always managed to express his meaning quite clearly.

My first interview was fairly easy going. He began by speaking about my family and then about music—Heydrich himself was an accomplished violinist and often gave evenings of chamber music at his home. He asked me many questions about my legal training, and in particular whether I still intended to try to become an associate of X—, a noted barrister in Düsseldorf. He thought this a good idea and said it was important that trained lawyers, less 'fossilized' than those of the previous generation and with open minds towards the new state, should enter public life. But this was only a conventional introduction to our talk, and when he began to speak of the organization and extension of the counter-espionage system in Germany and the political secret service

ency came into his voice and his response in me. That he was talking to a sub- in aspects of my work, warn- legalistic formality. After an view to an end and I walked strength of his personality to ed before or since.

rich during the years that fol- ion of him. This man was the Nazi régime revolved. The guided indirectly by his force- all his political colleagues and vast intelligence machine of

whom I met when he was must recall something of his st World War he joined the e, then served in the cruiser al Canaris as his command- the rank of Lieutenant, but d especially his affairs with officers' Court of Honour and from the Service.

at succeeded in 1931, through an introduction to Himmler, to him the drafting of a plan come the Party's 'security

the perception of the moral, knesses of others and he also situation in its entirety. His e ever-watchful instincts of a ger and ready to act swiftly at pin-pointed as useful, he cessary, dropped with equal ant or to offer the slightest out,

He was inordinately ambitious. It seemed as if, in a pack of ferocious wolves, he must always prove himself the strongest and assume the leadership. He had to be the first, the best, in every- thing, regardless of the means, whether by deceit, treachery, or violence. Untouched by any pangs of conscience and assisted by an ice-cold intellect, he could carry injustice to the point of ex- treme cruelty.

Towards his assistants and colleagues and towards the higher Party leaders, such as Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy, Martin Bor- mann, Chief of the Reich Chancellery, and the Gauleiters, he operated on the principle of 'divide and rule', and even applied this to his relations with Hitler and Himmler. The decisive thing for him was always to know more than others, to know every- thing about everyone, whether it touched on the political, pro- fessional, or most intimate personal aspects of their lives, and to use this knowledge and the weaknesses of others to render them completely dependent on him, from the highest to the lowest. It was this that enabled him to hold and manipulate the balance of power in a milieu full of intrigue and cross-currents of personal ambition, rivalry and animosity, while he himself remained in the background. He was a master at playing antagonists off one against the other, feeding each one, under an oath of strict secrecy, with detrimental information about his rival, and getting still more damaging information in return. Heydrich was, in fact, the puppet master of the Third Reich. *Scene*

He made Hitler dependent on him by fulfilling all his most insane schemes, thus making himself indispensable. He supplied Himmler with brilliant ideas so that he could shine in conferences with Hitler, Hess, Bormann, and the General Staff, and yet would do this so tactfully that Himmler never suspected that these ideas were not his own. *He*

Heydrich's only weakness was his ungovernable sexual appetite. To this he would surrender himself without inhibition or caution, and the calculated control which characterized him in everything else he did left him completely. But in the end he always regained sufficient mastery over himself to prevent serious repercussions.

In February 1938, Heydrich found himself in conflict with the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, General von Fritsch.

One of the shadier characters in his service, Chief Inspector Meisinger, a former Munich police detective, brought Heydrich what he considered to be conclusive evidence that General von Fritsch had been guilty of serious moral offences. It was quite likely that Heydrich was delighted to accept at its face value incriminating evidence against the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army. Be that as it may, he passed the material on to Himmler and Hitler without checking its validity. By the time he realized that Meisinger had made a serious mistake it was too late, and he decided to maintain the accusation before his superiors. He was willing, in fact, that the General should be unjustly accused as long as his own mistake could be covered up.

But the Court of Honour summoned by the Reichswehr, over which Goering presided—one result of this affair was serious tension between Goering and Heydrich—brought the truth to light. The chief witness for the prosecution gave certain evidence about homosexual practices, but it was evidence that concerned not von Fritsch the General, but a cavalry officer called von Frisch—an incredible blunder to have made. The court established the innocence of General von Fritsch beyond any doubt. Yet in spite of this Hitler used the incident to force von Fritsch to resign 'for reasons of ill-health'. Von Brauchitsch, later promoted to Field-Marshal, replaced him as Commander-in-Chief of the army.

During the von Fritsch case I witnessed for the first time some of the rather strange practices resorted to by Himmler through his inclination towards mysticism. He assembled twelve of his most trusted SS leaders in a room next to the one in which von Fritsch was being questioned and ordered them all to concentrate their minds on exerting a suggestive influence over the General that would induce him to tell the truth. I happened to come into the room by accident, and to see these twelve SS leaders sitting in a circle, all sunk in deep and silent contemplation, was indeed a remarkable sight.

The SS organization had been built up by Himmler on the principles of the Order of the Jesuits. The service statutes and spiritual exercises prescribed by Ignatius Loyola formed a pattern which Himmler assiduously tried to copy. Absolute obedience

was the supreme rule; each and every without question.

The 'Reichsfuehrer SS'—Himmler's—the SS—was intended to be the counter of the Order, and the whole structure adopted from these studies of the hierarchy of the Church.

A medieval castle near Paderborn was constructed and adapted to serve as a kind called 'Webelsburg'. Here the secret assembled once a year. Each member had an engraved silver name-plate, and each a ritual of spiritual exercises aimed mainly at the Church.

Himmler was born in 1900, son of a greengrocer and a former tutor at the brought up in the strictest observance soon drifted away from the Church, a despotic father, though not until after dare to leave the Church. His father had a farmer, but having served as an ensign he joined the Hitler movement after G. In 1926 he was Reichsfuehrer der Schutz the Security Echelon—Hitler's bodyguard.

Before the sitting of the Court of I General von Fritsch, I was told to report myself with a service pistol and an ample When I arrived, Heydrich invited me to office. On the way to dinner he said, 'I cellent shot with a pistol.' I said that I was

We sat down, Heydrich, his Adjutant : Though I was mystified by the whole affair, questions, for Heydrich was obviously in sion. After dinner he took a large nun suddenly he said, without any preambles marching from Potsdam during the next greatest danger will have passed.'

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The 'Reichsfuehrer SS'—Himmler's title as the supreme head of
the SS—was intended to be the counterpart of the Jesuits' 'General
of the Order', and the whole structure of the leadership was
adopted from these studies of the hierarchic order of the Catholic
Church.

A medieval castle near Paderborn in Westphalia was recon-
structed and adapted to serve as a kind of SS monastery, the so-
called 'Wehelsburg'. Here the secret Chapter of the Order
assembled once a year. Each member had his own armchair with
an engraved silver name-plate, and each had to devote himself to
a ritual of spiritual exercises aimed mainly at mental concentration.

Himmler was born in 1900, son of a daughter of a Savoyard
greengrocer and a former tutor at the Bavarian Court. He was
brought up in the strictest observance of the Catholic faith but
soon drifted away from the Church, possibly out of hatred of his
despotic father, though not until after his father's death did he
dare to leave the Church. His father had intended him to become
a farmer, but having served as an ensign in the First World War,
he joined the Hitler movement after Germany's defeat. Already
in 1926 he was Reichsfuehrer der Schutzstaffel (SS) or Chief of
the Security Echelon—Hitler's bodyguard.

Before the sitting of the Court of Honour that was to try
General von Fritsch, I was told to report to Heydrich and to arm
myself with a service pistol and an ample supply of ammunition.
When I arrived, Heydrich invited me to dine with him in his
office. On the way to dinner he said, 'I've heard you're an ex-
cellent shot with a pistol.' I said that I was.

We sat down, Heydrich, his Adjutant and I, and ate in silence.
Though I was mystified by the whole affair I was careful not to ask
questions, for Heydrich was obviously in a state of extreme ten-
sion. After dinner he took a large number of aspirins. Then
suddenly he said, without any preamble, 'If they don't start
marching from Potsdam during the next hour and a half, the
greatest danger will have passed.'

Gradually he became more relaxed and then began to explain.
Through informants within the army, Heydrich had learned that

officers of the General Staff, outraged at the shameful proceedings against their popular Commander-in-Chief, were contemplating the strongest counter-measures, and that the officers in Potsdam had even discussed a resort to force against the régime. Heydrich knew that if they were going to strike they would do so that night. He had, of course, taken the fullest security precautions but remained so nervous, that, knowing of my prowess as a marksman, he wanted me near him that evening.

Some time after one o'clock in the morning I was allowed to go. Walking out of the building with me, the Adjutant said softly, 'There has been no evidence of great heroism tonight.' I shook my head.

This affair certainly damaged Heydrich's position for a time and it took all his skill and cunning to re-establish himself. He immediately replaced Meisinger, appointing Dr Best as Investigating Criminal Director of the Gestapo.

From the first Heydrich had been impressed by my work and my reports, and as our working relationship progressed and I grew to know him better I began to be aware of his intentions. Basically, his attitude towards me was the same as to all his subordinates. It was a sort of cat-and-mouse game, played in terms of trickery and deception, Heydrich always playing the part of the cat, never resting until he had got the mouse completely in his power, to be struck down at the slightest sign of escape.

In my case, he met with no success at first. Outside my work I came to be of some personal value to Heydrich as a means towards social contacts in spheres which he would not otherwise have got into—the intellectual and cultural circles of Berlin society. His wife, a cool Nordic beauty, not without pride and ambition of her own, yet completely enslaved by Heydrich, was glad to find in me someone who could satisfy her hunger for the better things of life—her longing for more intelligent and cultivated society in the world of literature and art.

When Heydrich first became aware of his wife's cultural aspirations, he was suspicious. But in spite of the subservience to which he had reduced her, Frau Heydrich retained a strong personality. Eventually Heydrich gave in with a good grace and took up riding, went to concerts and the theatre, which the three of us

enjoyed together, and began to frequent society.

Unknown to me, however, he was between his wife and me to set a trap. or evenings playing bridge, in what of the family circle', where he would husband, and the very next evening from him—his voice now assuming 'This evening we must go out toge dinner somewhere, and then "go play

During dinner his conversation would try to make me drunk as we p I always excused myself on the groun the mark, and he never succeeded.

One evening he conceived the id thing for the SD to set up an establish tors from other countries could be atmosphere and where they would b companionship. In such an atmospher might be induced to unbend and rev

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enjoyed together, and began to frequent the best circles in Berlin society.

Unknown to me, however, he was using this new relationship between his wife and me to set a trap. We would spend afternoons or evenings playing bridge, in what he called 'the dear intimacy of the family circle', where he would act the part of the devoted husband, and the very next evening I would get a telephone call from him—his voice now assuming a suggestive leer—saying, 'This evening we must go out together—in mufti. We'll have dinner somewhere, and then "go places".'

During dinner his conversation would become obscene. He would try to make me drunk as we prowled from bar to bar, but I always excused myself on the grounds of not feeling quite up to the mark, and he never succeeded.

One evening he conceived the idea that it might be a good thing for the SD to set up an establishment where important visitors from other countries could be 'entertained' in a discreet atmosphere and where they would be offered seductive feminine companionship. In such an atmosphere the most rigid diplomat might be induced to unbend and reveal useful information.

Not long afterwards I received orders from Heydrich to establish such an 'institution', as the increasing number of visiting foreign diplomats and their entourages made some such place almost a social necessity. The establishment was to be called 'Salon Kitty'.

Through an apparently innocuous businessman, a large house was rented in a fashionable district of Berlin. The furnishing and decoration were supervised by a leading architect, and then the technical specialists went to work. Double walls were built for the incorporation of microphones. These were connected by automatic transmission to tape recorders which would record every word spoken throughout the house. Three of our department's technical experts, bound by oath, were put in charge of this apparatus. The ostensible owner of the house was provided with the necessary domestic and catering staff for the establishment to be able to offer the best service, food and drink.

The next problem was to find hostesses. I refused to have anything to do with this. As I pointed out to Heydrich, my depart-

ment supplied only the most valuable of women agents and I could not afford to assign them to such work.

One of Heydrich's underlings, Arthur Nebe, Chief of the Criminal Police, who for many years had worked in the vice squad, agreed to take on the task. From all the great cities of Europe he recruited the most highly qualified and cultivated ladies of the *demi-monde*, and I regret to say that quite a few ladies from the upper crust of German society were only too willing to serve their country in this manner.

'Salon Kitty' certainly brought results—the most surprising information was yielded by some of the guests. They were mainly diplomatic secrets which Heydrich, with his usual astuteness, would use against Ribbentrop and his Foreign Ministry, for no one, not even Ribbentrop himself, knew to whom the 'Salon Kitty' really belonged. One of the biggest catches was the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, who went there with other important diplomats.

Heydrich, of course, missed no opportunity for what he described as a 'personal inspection' of the establishment, but on these occasions I was given special orders to turn off the listening and recording apparatus. Out of this came one of Heydrich's characteristic intrigues.

Having told Himmler about 'Salon Kitty' and of the importance of the information picked up there, he went on to complain that during one of his 'inspections' I had not turned off the recording apparatus, in spite of strict orders to do so. Afterwards he called me into his office and said, 'I don't know how Himmler has got hold of the information, but he says that in spite of my orders you had the listening apparatus on when I inspected "Salon Kitty".'

This plan misfired, however, as I immediately got sworn statements, which I put before Heydrich, from the entire technical staff, showing that I had carried out his orders.

His next plot against me was more dangerous. There was a conference of SS and police leaders on the island of Fehmarn in the Baltic Sea. Heydrich's wife came from the island, where they owned a lovely summer villa. After the conference Heydrich, who had been a fighter pilot, flew back to Berlin in his own

plane. I, still having one free day, remained. Frau Heydrich asked me to drive with her. It was a harmless excursion. We had coffee, literature and concerts—in fact, all those things which she had so much and which she had so little of at other times. Before it grew dark we drove home.

Four days later in Berlin I was told by Mueller, Chief of the Gestapo, that Heydrich was out with him 'in mufti'. I thought it was a usual escapade and accepted the invitation although at that time I was not exactly Mueller. As is often the case with people whose lives are in danger, I was supersensitively uncomfortable about the Heydrich at his most charming and this time he did not want to hear, as he usually does in espionage cases, but said that for once service matters at all.

After supper at a well-known restaurant near the Alexanderplatz. I noticed the most sinister individual. Mueller ordered me to leave. Our conversation was casual, in a private plane, until suddenly Mueller said it was at the Ploener Lake? Did you have a fight with Heydrich: his face was very pale. I quickly asked him if he wanted to know about his wife.

In a cold, sibilant voice he said, 'You are a poison. It could kill you within six hours. Complete and absolute truth, I'll give you an absolute truth.'

I did not believe a word of it—Heydrich was making just such a grisly joke with a perfect yet . . . I felt the tension within me explode though my heart was about to burst. But I was speaking as calmly as I could I told him the events of that afternoon.

Mueller listened to what I had to say and

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Four days later in Berlin I was told by SS Gruppenfuehrer
Mueller, Chief of the Gestapo, that Heydrich wanted us to go
out with him 'in mufti'. I thought it was going to be one of his
usual escapades and accepted the invitation without a thought,
although at that time I was not exactly on good terms with
Mueller. As is often the case with people who continually feel
their lives to be in danger, I was superstitious and had a rather
uncomfortable premonition about the evening. But I found
Heydrich at his most charming and this feeling was soon dissi-
pated. He did not want to hear, as he usually did, about the latest
espionage cases, but said that for once we would not speak of
service matters at all.

After supper at a well-known restaurant, we went to an obscure
bar near the Alexanderplatz. I noticed that the barman looked a
most sinister individual. Mueller ordered the drinks and handed
me mine. Our conversation was casual, mainly about Heydrich's
private plane, until suddenly Mueller said to me, 'Well, how was
it at the Ploener Lake? Did you have a good time?' I looked at
Heydrich: his face was very pale. I quickly pulled myself together
and asked him if he wanted to know about my excursion with his
wife.

In a cold, sibilant voice he said, 'You have just drunk some
poison. It could kill you within six hours. If you tell me the com-
plete and absolute truth, I'll give you an antidote—but I want the
truth.'

I did not believe a word of it—Heydrich was quite capable of
making just such a grisly joke with a perfectly straight face—and
yet . . . I felt the tension within me expanding till it seemed as
though my heart was about to burst. But I had nothing to hide,
and speaking as calmly as I could I told him truthfully about the
events of that afternoon.

Mueller listened to what I had to say very carefully. Once he

interrupted me: 'After you had coffee, you went for a walk with the Chief's wife. Why do you hide that? You must realize surely that you were being watched all the time?'

Again, as truthfully as I could I described our fifteen-minute walk, and the conversation that took place.

After I had finished, Heydrich sat motionless and withdrawn for several minutes. At last he looked at me with glittering eyes, and said, 'Well, I suppose I must believe you, but you will give me your word of honour that you won't attempt this sort of escape again.'

By this time I had managed to get hold of myself and I said, quite aggressively, 'A word of honour secured in this sort of way is just an extortion. First I must ask you to let me have the antidote'—it was always best to be on the safe side in dealings with Heydrich—'then I'll give you my word of honour. As a former Naval Officer would you consider it honourable to act in any other way?'

Heydrich eyed me narrowly. He hated an appeal to his honour, but he nodded, and I was given—somewhat to my surprise—a Dry Martini. Was it my imagination, or did it taste peculiar? Certainly it seemed to have an added dash of bitters. I gave Heydrich my word of honour, then in view of what had passed between us I begged to be excused. But he wouldn't hear of it, and we had to continue the evening's merrymaking. Once more he had failed to entrap me.

In the end it was entirely by my own doing that I put myself in his power. In 1940 I was engaged to be married for the second time, and as a member of the SS I had to submit *Ahnenpapiere* or racial heredity certificates. Then I discovered that my fiancée's mother was Polish. To get official approval for such a marriage was bound to be difficult, for I knew only too well how the Party leadership felt by now about Poland. So at the end of one of my routine reports to Heydrich I asked him for his help in a personal matter and told him of my difficulty. Rather to my surprise, he agreed to do all he could to persuade Himmler to give his official permission. He told me to send him all the heredity documents of my fiancée's family and to include two photographs of her.

Within four days I received a copy of an order from Himmler

to the *Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt* [the Office], giving me official permission to m me the order with his best wishes. (He also photographs, on which Himmler had col eyebrows with green pencil and added a n 'exaggerated'.) I wondered what had induc me this special dispensation so quickly.

I had been married about six months w tary handed me a folder marked 'Geheim Business of the Reich'. This was the high then in use, employed, mainly, for commu chiefs of departments. But as at least eigh through my hands every day, I opened t course. There lay a secret report from the addressed personally to Mueller, the Ges detailed surveillance report on my wife Among other things it contained a referer law's sister, who was married to a Jewish I had finally succeeded in gaining a hold ov strange twist of fate it was I who had given he was satisfied and stopped all other effor

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to the *Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt* [the Race and Settlement Office], giving me official permission to marry. Heydrich handed me the order with his best wishes. (He also returned my fiancée's photographs, on which Himmler had coloured her lipstick and eyebrows with green pencil and added a note describing them as 'exaggerated'.) I wondered what had induced them both to grant me this special dispensation so quickly.

I had been married about six months when one day my secretary handed me a folder marked '*Geheime Reichssache*' [Secret Business of the Reich]. This was the highest secret classification then in use, employed, mainly, for communications between the chiefs of departments. But as at least eighty such folders went through my hands every day, I opened this one as a matter of course. There lay a secret report from the State Police in Posen addressed personally to Mueller, the Gestapo Chief. It was a detailed surveillance report on my wife's family in Poland. Among other things it contained a reference to my mother-in-law's sister, who was married to a Jewish mill-owner. Heydrich had finally succeeded in gaining a hold over me, and through a strange twist of fate it was I who had given him the means. Now he was satisfied and stopped all other efforts to entrap me.

But in tracing the course of Heydrich's machinations against me I have gone ahead of my narrative, and must return to 1939.

D THE RED ARMY

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China. (Madame Chiang Kai-shek, for instance, is a member of this family.) Later he also developed valuable contacts with the Japanese Secret Service.

During the First World War Jahnke worked for the German Secret Service. The great strikes of the dock and transport workers in the east coast harbours of the United States resulted from his activities. When later he returned to Germany, he became Rudolf Hess's expert on intelligence and espionage. Politically he was interested only in questions of major importance. He was a big, heavy man with the thick skull of a Pomeranian peasant and when he sat opposite you, impassive, with his eyes half closed, he gave an impression of reticence and cunning. He liked to live in great style.

After I had assembled my material I made a verbal report to Heydrich at his hunting lodge—it was almost in the nature of an historical lecture. The subject was one that grew in importance in the later years of the Nazi régime: the basic conflict in German policy between an orientation towards western Europe, and towards Russia.

This was not a new problem. Indeed, the pro-Russian feeling in German Army circles, among the Staff Officers and the junker caste after the First World War, has often been called the 'Spirit of Tauroggen'—in reference to the alliance aimed at Napoleon that was concluded in 1812 at the East Prussian village of Tauroggen between the Prussian General, Yorck von Wartenburg, and the Russian Army, against the express command of the King of Prussia. It is interesting that the military build-up of Prussia against Napoleon had been prepared by Freiherr von Stein and Clausewitz from Russia, where they had found refuge under the protection of the Czar. The continuation of this policy of co-operation with Russia was vital to Bismarck's conduct of foreign affairs. After the First World War the Treaty of Rapallo in 1923 marked a return to this policy and ended Germany's isolation after her defeat.

This new co-operation between what was now Soviet Russia and Germany was not initiated, surprisingly enough, by the Social Democratic leaders of the Weimar Republic, Ebert and Noske, but by army officers of the General Staff.

The collaboration between the German Army and the Bolshevik leaders of the new Russia had a precedent before the latter came to power, with the famous incident of the 'sealed train' which enabled Lenin and his comrades to cross Germany from Switzerland on their way to Russia to assume leadership of the revolution there. The man who conceived this move was Colonel Nicolai, head of the Kaiser's Military Intelligence Service, who was to play an important role in the relations between the Reichswehr and the Red Army in subsequent years. Indeed, his may be considered one of the decisive influences in this direction. He was an officer of exceptional talents and great political ambitions, who, however, always remained in the background, preferring to operate behind the scenes. He had many connections with the Soviet Secret Service, and we came to recognize his small, inconspicuous office on the Potsdamerplatz as one of the most important and influential centres working for Soviet Intelligence.

In 1943 I finally succeeded in securing agreement from my superiors that Colonel Nicolai should be placed under observation. However, Mueller (whose job it was as head of the Gestapo) failed to organize this surveillance properly. Later, when I discovered Mueller's Russian sympathies I understood why he had failed to keep a check on Nicolai.

In 1923, the year of Rapallo, collaboration with the Red Army was begun under the Minister of War, Gessler, and General von Seeckt. Again the moving spirit was Colonel Nicolai. The first result was that German officers were trained in Russia in the use of weapons that had been prohibited by the Versailles Treaty, such as aircraft and tanks. In return, they passed on to the Red Army the technical and strategical experience and the great store of military knowledge of the German General Staff. In time, this co-operation was extended to the field of armaments. In return for the sharing of certain patents, Germany was allowed to build up her output of arms inside the Soviet Union, in particular by the production of aircraft and aluminium. Certain German war industries were more and more closely integrated with those of Russia; Junkers had aircraft factories operating in Samara and in Fili in south-central Siberia. These operated under the *Gesellschaft zur Foerderung gewerblicher Unternehmen*, the Company for the

Furthering industrial Enterprise - Undertakings

Promotion of Industrial Enterprise title masked a cartel whose branch production, heavily subsidized by a programme for the illegal rearmament for the World War, another phase of which was the 'Black Reichswehr'.

Though in the years after 1918 in their aim of achieving a Russo-German alliance in support of German nationalism.

Karl Radek—tried and sentenced of 1936-1937—was the director and propaganda along this line. His Comintern against the Versailles Treaty Offensive'.

From 1929 Stalin directed the regard not the National Socialist Democrats as their chief enemy, and accordingly. Whether under a Nazi leadership, Stalin's chief aim was to West. And when Schleicher, who secretly advanced Hitler forty-two decisive point in the rise of the Nazis is quite certain that he did this with Nicolai, who in this was surely acting for Stalin hoped that Hitler would Western bourgeoisie.

The chief centre of opposition to the German General Staff was among the chief supporters of Western orientation the years after the War was General the German delegation at Brest-Litovsk armistice of 1918 with the Bolsheviks.

General Hoffmann's political action one of the leading German industrial union of the civilized powers against. Only thus could Europe be saved France, Britain and Germany based

German Army and the Bolsheviks. A precedent before the latter incident of the 'sealed train' was to cross Germany from East to West to assume leadership of the movement. The man who received this move was Colonel Walter Intelligence Service, who had close relations between the Reichswehr and the Soviet years. Indeed, his may be seen in this direction. He was a man of great political ambitions, who, from a military background, preferring to have many connections with the Reichswehr to recognize his small, inner circle as one of the most important working for Soviet Intelligence. Securing agreement from my superiors would be placed under observation as it was as head of the Gestapo) properly. Later, when I discovered I understood why he had

collaboration with the Red Army in the War, Gessler, and General von Gessler was Colonel Nicolai. The first was trained in Russia in the use of the Versailles Treaty, and then, they passed on to the Red Army experience and the great storehouse of the German General Staff. In time, this was the field of armaments. In return for Germany was allowed to build up the Soviet Union, in particular by the armaments. Certain German war industries were integrated with those of the Soviet Union operating in Samara and in the Caucasus under the *Gesellschaft der Ingenieure*, the Company for the

Promotion of Industrial Enterprises. This rather comprehensive title masked a cartel whose branches were chiefly engaged in arms production, heavily subsidized by state funds. This was part of the programme for the illegal rearming of Germany after the First World War, another phase of which was the organization of the 'Black Reichswehr'.

Though in the years after 1918 the Soviet government failed in their aim of achieving a Russo-German alliance in Europe, and a similar Russo-Chinese alliance in Asia, they continued to support German nationalism.

Karl Radek—tried and sentenced during the Moscow purge of 1936–1937—was the director and chief exponent of Communist propaganda along this line. His theme was: 'The Struggle of the Comintern against the Versailles Treaty and against the Capitalist Offensive'.

From 1929 Stalin directed the German Communist Party to regard not the National Socialist Party of Hitler but the Social Democrats as their chief enemy, and Party strategy was conducted accordingly. Whether under a nationalist or under a socialist leadership, Stalin's chief aim was to mobilize Germany against the West. And when Schleicher, then Chancellor of Germany, secretly advanced Hitler forty-two million Reichsmarks, at a decisive point in the rise of the Nationalist Socialist movement, it is quite certain that he did this under the influence of Colonel Nicolai, who in this was surely acting again as Stalin's instrument, for Stalin hoped that Hitler would turn Germany against the Western *bourgeoisie*.

The chief centre of opposition to the pro-Russian party of the German General Staff was among the German industrialists. The chief supporter of Western orientation within the Reichswehr in the years after the War was General Hoffmann, who had headed the German delegation at Brest-Litovsk and had negotiated the armistice of 1918 with the Bolsheviks headed by Trotsky.

General Hoffmann's political adviser was Arnold Rechberg, one of the leading German industrialists. Rechberg's aim was a union of the civilized powers against the danger of Bolshevism. Only thus could Europe be saved. He sought a unification of France, Britain and Germany based on the fusion of their political,

*German
data*

industrial and military interests—this grand alliance to be supported by the financial power of the United States, which, incidentally, by helping the great powers of Europe to regain their prosperity, would be creating better markets for American products.

In the early 'twenties General Ludendorff, too, lent his support to the Rechberg plan. The three of them, Ludendorff, Hoffmann and Rechberg, established contact with several leading French and British politicians, among them General Malcolm, the British *chargé d'affaires* in Berlin, Haguenin and Hesnard on the French side, and later also General Noller, head of the French Control Commission. Though these men declared themselves ready to support the Hoffmann-Rechberg policy, their governments were not sufficiently aware of the Bolshevik danger, and in the end nothing came of their conversations.

Rechberg's plans for the fusion of European industry met with better success. Discussions were initiated among industrial leaders—M. Mayrisch, of the *Arbed* of Luxembourg, M. Duchemin, of the *Etablissement Kuhlmann*, Sir Alfred Mond and Sir Harry MacGowan (as they then were) of Imperial Chemical Industries, Sir Henri Deterding, and many others. At first the industrial leaders of France and England proved rather reluctant. Rechberg, Hoffmann and Ludendorff, realizing that international measures affecting such giant industries could not be undertaken without the approval of leading statesmen, began conversations with British and French politicians.

In 1926 the first agreement was signed between the German potash industry, in which Rechberg had a decisive influence, and the French potash industry. After this had proved highly advantageous to both parties, the heavy industries of Germany and France followed suit, and were soon joined by those of Belgium and Luxembourg, to be united under the *International Rohstahl Gemeinschaft*—the Raw Steel Union. Similar agreements were arranged between the chemical industries of France and Germany. After 1929, large British concerns also joined the Franco-German industrial alliances.

Such large-scale industrial collaboration could not remain without political and also military consequences. Through Poincaré, Rechberg was able to establish contact with Marshal Foch.

Rechberg himself declared: 'Marshal Foch, the outspoken enemy of Germany. But in 1923, the great French soldier showed insight into the Bolshevik danger. He had the old antagonisms of the European and that industrial co-operation between Germany and France guaranteed by military agreements.'

Between them Rechberg and Foch
proposal:

'A ratio of 5 to 3 be established between German and British Armies. A Supreme Command to be created, giving each army peace, to inspect both armies, and then in times of war. To every German divisional level up, a French staff. Once in force, Britain should be invulnerable with the strength of the British force British themselves.'

A naval agreement between the three

However, this policy met with strong opposition from the leadership of the Reichswehr. Both General Schleicher were against breaking the established with the Red Army. To carry these against the opposition of the German clearly impossible.

General Hoffmann had never sought was convinced that Russian Bolshevism by a German invasion, penetrating at . . . He was convinced, furthermore, that strong enough to undertake such an . . . assured of the full support of France, Britain.

In the midst of his efforts to bring about General Hoffmann died, somewhat mysterious. Ludendorff lost faith in the Western Alliance, the extreme wing of nationalism and to

Arnold Rechberg was arrested on Hitler's
the non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia

1939

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Rechberg himself declared: 'Marshal Foch has been the most
outspoken enemy of Germany. But when I talked with him, in
1923, the great French soldier showed an astonishing understand-
ing of the Bolshevik danger. He had come to the conclusion that
the old antagonisms of the European nations were now outdated,
and that industrial co-operation between our countries must be
guaranteed by military agreements.'

Between them Rechberg and Foch worked out the following
proposal:

'A ratio of 5 to 3 be established between the French and Ger-
man Armies. A Supreme Command of French and German
generals to be created, giving each party the right, in times of
peace, to inspect both armies, and this Joint Command to direct
them in times of war. To every German Headquarters, from
the divisional level up, a French staff officer should be attached.
Once in force, Britain should be invited to join this agreement,
with the strength of the British forces to be determined by the
British themselves.'

A naval agreement between the three powers was also envisaged.

However, this policy met with strong resistance from the
leadership of the Reichswehr. Both General von Seeckt and
General Schleicher were against breaking off the relations already
established with the Red Army. To carry through such plans as
these against the opposition of the German General Staff was
clearly impossible.

General Hoffmann had never sought to disguise his aims: he
was convinced that Russian Bolshevism could only be removed
by a German invasion, penetrating at least as far as the Urals.
He was convinced, furthermore, that Germany alone was not
strong enough to undertake such an invasion unless she were
assured of the full support of France, Britain and the United States.

In the midst of his efforts to bring about the Western Alliance,
General Hoffmann died, somewhat mysteriously, in 1927. Then
Ludendorff lost faith in the Western Allies, and turned towards
the extreme wing of nationalism and to Hitler.

Arnold Rechberg was arrested on Hitler's orders at the time of
the non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia, for through me he

1939

had sent a voluminous memorandum to Hitler, dealing with the effects upon German history of the alternating influences of East and West, and giving a warning against becoming in any way involved with Bolshevism. Hitler upon receiving it had one of his frequent outbursts of rage, and Heydrich was forced to place Rechberg under arrest. However, after a short time I managed to get him released.

At the time of the negotiations between Hitler and Pétain at Montoire in 1940, Rechberg submitted another memorandum on the treatment of France, urging a sincere policy of collaboration from which the seeds of a new Europe could spring. How much Hitler was influenced by it can be judged from the fact that he again had Rechberg arrested.

But once more I was able to secure his release, and I continued to maintain close contact with him, especially in 1943 and 1944. Later I was able to use various memoranda made by Rechberg in my efforts to influence the German leadership towards a peaceful solution of Europe's problems. He was ready at that time to forget the injustices that had been done to him, and contributed much to my attempts to achieve a compromise peace with the West.

My chief opponents, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, who since 1944 had been head of the SD, and Mueller, succeeded, however, in having Rechberg arrested once again after the plot against Hitler of July 20, 1944. He was then placed in 'honorary custody' in the Hotel Dreesen at Bad Godesberg, where he was interned until the end of the war with various French generals and political personalities, including the sister of General de Gaulle.

But to return to 1937, such was the background of the report I made to Heydrich, little realizing at that time the historic decisions which it foreshadowed.

Heydrich had received information from a White Russian emigré, General Skoblin, that Tukhachevsky, Marshal of the Soviet Union, was plotting with the German General Staff to overthrow the Stalin régime.

Heydrich at once grasped the tremendous importance of this piece of intelligence. If used correctly, a blow could be struck at the leadership of the Red Army from which it would not recover for many years.

*# It was better
his need.*
THE REICHSWEHR

Jahnke was of a different opinion. Skoblin might be playing a double game. He might have been concocted by Skoblin on Stalin's orders. Jahnke's purpose in this: he wanted to avoid by arousing Heydrich's suspicion. time, would be able to act against which Tukhachevsky was the leader of internal problems in the Reich. He wished to initiate proceedings against Skoblin, but preferred that the incriminating memorandum remain in the hands of Heydrich.

Heydrich remained unconvinced. Indeed, his suspicions were turned into a point, he felt, was motivated by Staff. Heydrich at once placed Jahnke under arrest for months.

Meanwhile Heydrich submitted a memorandum to Hitler. The memorandum contained no documentary proof. It was merely the German Army leaders in Tukhachevsky's report recognized this, and himself admitted that he was incriminating the German general staff. This if he could thereby weaken the German Army which was threatening the Reich.

+ It must be remembered that the authenticity of Skoblin's information subsequently happened I think he was therefore merely to strengthen to information that was in itself.

Hitler at this moment was faced with the question whether to align himself with Skoblin or with the German Army. He made up his mind how to use the information brought him. On the one hand, it might have meant the end of Russia as a world power. It would have involved Germany in a war which would unmask Tukhachevsky might be a disaster for the German forces, or might equally well put

** see Bullock*

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Jahnke was of a different opinion. He warned Heydrich that Skoblin might be playing a double game, and that the information might have been concocted by the Russians and passed on by Skoblin on Stalin's orders. Jahnke thought Stalin had a double purpose in this: he wanted to weaken the German General Staff by arousing Heydrich's suspicions against them, and, at the same time, would be able to act against the Soviet military clique, of which Tukhachevsky was the head. Jahnke thought that because of internal problems in the Soviet Government, Stalin did not wish to initiate proceedings against the generals himself and would prefer that the incriminating material should come from abroad.

Heydrich remained unconvinced by Jahnke's subtle reasoning. Indeed, his suspicions were turned against Jahnke, whose viewpoint, he felt, was motivated by loyalty towards the General Staff. Heydrich at once placed Jahnke under house arrest for three months

Meanwhile Heydrich submitted Skoblin's information on Tukhachevsky to Hitler. The material itself was not complete. It contained no documentary proof of active participation by the German Army leaders in Tukhachevsky's conspiracy. Heydrich recognized this, and himself added fictitious material aimed at incriminating the German generals. He felt himself justified in this if he could thereby weaken the growing strength of the Red Army which was threatening the superiority of the Reichswehr. It must be remembered that Heydrich was convinced of the authenticity of Skoblin's information, and in view of what subsequently happened I think he was proved right. His forgeries were therefore merely to strengthen and lend further conviction to information that was in itself valid.

Hitler at this moment was faced with the momentous decision whether to align himself with the Western powers or against them. And it was within this larger decision that he had also to make up his mind how to use the material that Heydrich had brought him. On the one hand, support for Tukhachevsky might have meant the end of Russia as a world power—but failure would have involved Germany in war; on the other hand, to unmask Tukhachevsky might be helping Stalin to strengthen his forces, or might equally well push him into destroying a large

** see Bullock's work on this*

part of his General Staff. Hitler finally decided against Tukhachevsky and intervened in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union on Stalin's side.

This decision to back Stalin instead of Tukhachevsky and the generals determined the whole course of German policy until 1941 and can be rightly regarded as one of the most fateful decisions of our time. It eventually brought Germany into a temporary alliance with the Soviet Union and encouraged Hitler to attack the West before turning against Russia. Once Hitler had made his decision, Heydrich, of course, supported him.

Hitler expressly ordered that the German Army Staff should be kept from knowing anything of the contemplated move against Tukhachevsky, fearing that the Soviet Marshal might be forewarned by them. So one night Heydrich dispatched two special squads to break into the secret archives of the General Staff and of the Abwehr, the Army Intelligence Service, run by Admiral Canaris. Burglary experts from the Headquarters of the Criminal Police accompanied the squads. In three places they found and removed material concerning the collaboration of the German General Staff and the Red Army. Important material was also found in Admiral Canaris's files. To conceal the break-in, fires were started which soon destroyed all evidence of it. In the resulting confusion the special squads escaped safely and unnoticed.

It has been claimed that the material assembled by Heydrich to implicate Tukhachevsky consisted largely of forgeries. Actually, very little of it was forged, indeed no more than was necessary to fill in certain gaps. This is corroborated by the fact that the entire and remarkably voluminous dossier was made ready and presented to Hitler within the brief space of four days.

After careful consideration it was decided to contact Stalin through the following channels: one of our diplomatic agents, who worked under SS Standartenfuhrer Boehme, was a German emigrant living in Prague. Through him, Boehme made contact with a trusted friend of Dr Beneš, then President of the Czechoslovak Republic. Dr Beneš at once wrote a personal letter to Stalin, whose reply came back to Heydrich through the same channels, asking him to establish contact with a certain member of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin. We did so, and the Russian at

once flew to Moscow and returned envoy of Stalin, who presented ~~sp~~ then Chief of the GPU.

Stalin asked what price we had Hitler nor Heydrich had considered financial prospects in the affair. However Heydrich asked for three million emissary, after no more than a cursory examination, paid at once.

The material against Tukhachevsky Russians in the middle of May 1937 Tukhachevsky was held in secret chiefly of Soviet Marshals and Red Army was prepared by a Military Comrade Andrei Vishinsky.

Tukhachevsky and his fellow-comrades evening of June 4, 1937. After his attempt at suicide, the trial began ended at nine o'clock the same evening dispatches of that day, all the details. Practically no other details of the case's summing up for the prosecution minutes. He demanded expulsion of Army and their death by shooting, hours later. On Stalin's orders, Marshal fell a victim to one of the later prosecution squad. Of the judges of the court, or survive today.

I personally had to destroy most paid to us by the Russians, for it was obvious, the numbers of which had changed GPU. Whenever one of our agents Soviet Union, he was arrested with

Thus the affair of Marshal Tukhachevsky step towards the rapprochement between the turning point that marked the Eastern front by an alliance with Russia the West.

*Scene
* @ Maurice Staline*

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once flew to Moscow and returned accompanied by a personal
envoy of Stalin, who presented special credentials from Jezhov,
then Chief of the GPU.

Stalin asked what price we had set on the material. Neither
Hitler nor Heydrich had considered that there would be any
financial prospects in the affair. However, to preserve appearances,
Heydrich asked for three million gold roubles—which Stalin's
emissary, after no more than a cursory examination of the docu-
ments, paid at once. *

The material against Tukhachevsky was handed over to the
Russians in the middle of May 1937. As is known, the trial of
Tukhachevsky was held in secret. The court was composed
chiefly of Soviet Marshals and Red Army leaders. The indictment
was prepared by a Military Council and the prosecutor was
Andrei Vishinsky.

Tukhachevsky and his fellow-conspirators were arrested on the
evening of June 4, 1937. After he had made an unsuccessful
attempt at suicide, the trial began at ten o'clock on June 11; it
ended at nine o'clock the same evening. According to the *Tass*
dispatches of that day, all the defendants confessed their guilt.
Practically no other details of the case were made public. Vishin-
sky's summing up for the prosecution took barely twenty
minutes. He demanded expulsion of the defendants from the Red
Army and their death by shooting. Sentence was executed four
hours later. On Stalin's orders, Marshal Bluecher (who himself
fell a victim to one of the later purges) commanded the firing
squad. Of the judges of the court, only Voroshilov and Budienny
survive today.

I personally had to destroy most of the three million roubles
paid to us by the Russians, for it was all in bills of high denomina-
tions, the numbers of which had obviously been listed by the
GPU. Whenever one of our agents tried to use them inside the
Soviet Union, he was arrested within a remarkably short time.

Thus the affair of Marshal Tukhachevsky was a preparatory
step towards the *rapprochement* between Hitler and Stalin. It was
the turning point that marked Hitler's decision to secure his
Eastern front by an alliance with Russia, while preparing to attack
the West.

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* @ Howie Stalin would not trust
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IV

THE OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Preparations for the Anschluss—Hitler's reception in Vienna—A bomb on the route—Hitler's visit to Mussolini—Security precautions in Italy—Attitude of the Sudeten Germans—Secret order for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia—Germany assumes 'protectorship' over the Czechs

AT THE beginning of 1938 I was instructed to assemble and edit all the reports that were to be submitted to Hitler on the attitude of Italy towards the contemplated annexation of Austria and its incorporation into the German Reich. Great importance was also attached, of course, to the attitude of the other Western Powers towards this matter. The decisive event was the resignation of Anthony Eden. We soon learned that his successor at the Foreign Office, Lord Halifax, did not view the Anschluss of Austria with hostility. This attitude must have influenced Hitler's decision considerably.

The intelligence material from Austria itself was so plentiful that the main problem was how to cope with it. The thousands of Nazis who had recently fled from Austria provided us with all the contacts we needed.

On February 12, 1938, Kurt von Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor, conferred with Hitler at Obersalzberg. He promised to limit and repress the activities of the anti-German 'Fatherland Front'. When it proved obvious, as it soon did, that he could not see his way to carrying out this promise, Hitler decided to force the pace. To forestall invasion by the German Army Schuschnigg resigned on March 11. Seyss-Inquart, the leader of the Austrian Nazis, at once took over the government. The order to march was given to the German Army by Hitler during the night of March 12.

The same night I was ordered to fly to Vienna with Himmler. We had with us a company of Waffen SS, the purely military

OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA

formation of the SS, and some m Legion' which had been formed. We took off from Berlin-Ten It was a rather unpleasant flight. loaded and weather conditions w lost sight of the ground and also

During the flight Himmler dis trative problems which had arise up of the new 'Ostmark'—as A then on. We had gone aft in the p engine noise and Himmler was noticed that the safety catch was i might have opened under the grasped him by his coat and jerked furiously, but when I showed b thanked me and said that if the o be happy to do as much for me.

We finally landed in Vienna. The administrative change-over at that very moment and the G was firmly established. The Bun Government of the Austrian Cc imendous activity. There was a and meetings. In the ante-rooms haggling for those government filled.

A huge crowd filled the square duties had already been taken ov wearing white arm-bands. Almo Miklas, the President of the Aus Minister of Police, left the buildi

Meanwhile, Heydrich had arr situation and he told me to secur the Chief of the Austrian Secret papers that I found were not ver some interesting material on dec himself expressed his willingness Secret Service.

and the adoring populace cheered themselves hoarse. The Via Triumphalis was floodlit as brightly as if it were midday, and the Colosseum had been turned into a sea of coloured flame. There was only one anxious moment in Rome: Hitler and Mussolini had left their car to admire the beauties of an ancient fountain and the crowd in a frenzy of adulation broke through the police cordon. My agents, whom I had placed as observers at this point, reported to me over the telephone that they had lost sight of Hitler in the confusion. I suffered several extremely anxious minutes till the *carabinieri* drove the crowd back and re-established control of the situation.

In Naples there was one rather embarrassing incident. Hitler was to accompany the King of Italy in inspecting a guard of honour. As the Fuehrer was to attend a gala performance at the San Carlo Opera immediately afterwards, he changed into evening clothes before the inspection and thus walked along the ranks of the guard in tails. The King, however, walked beside him in uniform. As a result of this, Hitler immediately dismissed the chief protocol officer, von Buelow Schwandt.

When Hitler left Italy on May 28 we were all convinced that the military alliance he desired was a foregone conclusion. On the day of his return he delivered an address lasting two hours to the highest leaders of the Party, the State and the army. He ordered the strengthening of the Luftwaffe, the formation of new army units, and the beginning of the construction of the new Western defence wall—the Siegfried Line, which was built under the direction of the engineer, Todt. Hitler spoke openly of the necessity of strengthening Germany's military preparedness to the point where, within two or three months, she would be ready to deal with any contingency of war. 'Then,' Hitler said, 'we will shatter Czechoslovakia!'

Secret Service work in Czechoslovakia was placed under the direction of the political branch of the SD. As in Austria, conditions were again favourable for the establishment of contacts. The Sudeten German Party of Konrad Henlein served us well, while the other minorities, the Poles, Hungarians, and Slovaks, also contributed valuable information. The intelligence material was so plentiful that in order to handle all the incoming messages

special telegraph lines running direct at two points on the German-Czech

Heydrich had a special department to maintain a continual check on the Sudeten German Party, for the Party was by no means time completely under Hitler's control. Party, led by Karl Hermann Frank, State of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, that aimed at the entire destruction of the Sudeten German while Henlein, at this point, only a three million Sudeten Germans. But from Heydrich and other German officials, completely to Hitler's demands at the time.

There was a serious divergence of the leaders of the Sudeten German Party. The British Secret Service was quite one of their agents, Colonel Christie, who several times with Henlein, met him in August 1938, in Zurich. I received a letter to investigate their conversations, an observation. This surveillance was to remind him of his promises to Hitler.

When Colonel Christie saw how Hitler had given way to Hitler's demands, meeting Henlein declared that to be possible, both for the Sudeten German Party. The problem would have to be solved at this time that Hitler made his threat, threatening the Czechoslovak Government based on the establishment of a new state.

There followed the historic visit to Berchtesgaden on September 15, 1938, the conference at Godesberg, and then—Munich.

The preparations for taking over the Sudeten territories were carried out

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special telegraph lines running direct to Berlin had to be installed
at two points on the German-Czech frontier.

Heydrich had a special department whose task it was to main-
tain a continual check on the Sudeten German Party and on Hen-
lein, for the Party was by no means united in its aims, nor at that
time completely under Hitler's control. The Nazi wing of the
Party, led by Karl Hermann Frank, who was later Minister of
State of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, pursued a policy
that aimed at the entire destruction of the Czechoslovak Republic,
while Henlein, at this point, only demanded autonomy for the
three million Sudeten Germans. But after considerable pressure
from Heydrich and other German quarters, Henlein capitulated
completely to Hitler's demands at the conference held in July 1938.

There was a serious divergence of opinion between Berlin and
the leaders of the Sudeten German Party regarding the much-
discussed fact-finding and mediation mission of Lord Runciman.
The British Secret Service was quite well informed about this and
one of their agents, Colonel Christie, who had already conferred
several times with Henlein, met him again at the beginning of
August 1938, in Zurich. I received a special order from Heydrich
to investigate their conversations, and to keep Henlein under close
observation. This surveillance was to be carried out in such a way
that Henlein should be aware of it—for the chief purpose was to
remind him of his promises to Hitler.

When Colonel Christie saw how completely the Sudeten leader
had given way to Hitler's demands, he was astonished. At their
meeting Henlein declared that to wait any longer would be im-
possible, both for the Sudeten German Party and for Hitler, and if
necessary the problem would have to be solved by force. It was at
this time that Hitler made his famous Nuremberg speech,
threatening the Czechoslovak Government and rejecting any
solution based on the establishment of an autonomous Sudeten
state.

There followed the historic visit of Neville Chamberlain to
Berchtesgaden on September 15, 1938, the British-German con-
ference at Godesberg, and then—Munich.

The preparations for taking over the administration of the
Sudeten territories were carried out mainly at the Hotel Dreesen

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I had one regret
it is that one—

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beyond a certain point.

V

ACTIVE ESPIONAGE

My first 'field trip'—An assessment of Dakar—Practical problems of espionage—Prelude to the sinking of the Royal Oak—The case of Lieutenant-Colonel Sosnovski—A Polish spy ring uncovered

DURING the summer of 1938, Hitler's thoughts were turning more and more to the approaching war with the West. He discussed the situation with Himmler, who in turn discussed it with Heydrich, and Heydrich with me. Hitler spoke contemptuously of President Roosevelt, and called America 'a Jewish rubbish heap'. He was sure that once the war had started Germany would overrun the West, but he did concede the possibility that Great Britain, together with the United States, might attempt a counter-attack against the European Continent from North Africa. But he concluded that the west coast of Africa hardly offered sufficient harbour facilities for such an action; nor did North Africa provide a suitable hinterland for the deployment of modern machines of war.

It was this last point of Hitler's rambling exposition that turned out to be of immediate consequence to me. Himmler, always eager to see directives for concrete action in Hitler's remarks, at once decided, in consultation with Heydrich, to survey the situation of the West African coastal region and its harbours. And so in the autumn of 1938, I was given my first job of active espionage. Heydrich wanted me to compile a full report on the harbour at Dakar, the chief French naval station in Africa. No one, he warned me, not even my immediate family, must know of my assignment. It would be officially camouflaged—ostensibly I would be going on a 'business trip' round Germany for about eighteen days. I promised Heydrich that no one should know the true nature of my job, and until this moment I have never revealed it.

Heydrich wanted me to find out about the condition and nature of the harbour installations and whether they could be extended

ACTIVE

and enlarged fairly easily. He had harbour authorities charts, maps, documents I could lay hands on specially designed for the job, identity of the son of a Dutchman wound up his business affairs in foreign currencies. Everything—my itinerary, the flight schedule, Madrid and Lisbon. Finally I had

During the long flight I was and tried to prepare myself in the beginning I had accepted the but now I began to have misgivings

At the airport I met my specially constructed Leica camera, customs officers and it required considerable financial outlay,

My contact in Lisbon was Japanese—and a close friend of mine which in later years proved to have caused the practical problems advised me not to take the Leica but instead to get another camera that on missions of this nature was possible and never to carry along my plans with him they had another. My first encounter with work made me realize that spot to what they had seemed

On arriving at Dakar I went to a Jewish family of Jewish descent, gold and diamond trade, and were working for us. He had through 'business correspondence' everything for my arrival.

After five days of hard work I secured valuable details of the authorities. These were posted

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films, which were hermetically wrapped, made quite a bump, so
that the whole thing looked like a swollen and infected wound
and aroused a good deal of sympathy among the customs officials
and border guards.

I made a verbal report on my trip to Heydrich which took
me fully two hours, and the next day submitted a detailed report
in writing together with the photographs. On the whole, every-
one was very satisfied.

This experience had given me much food for thought. I deter-
mined that in future, when ordering and preparing Secret Service
operations, I must never lose sight of the practical problems that
confront my agents in the field and I decided that the worst thing
was to try to prepare and carry out Secret Service work under
pressure. An intelligence network has to be built up step by step.
On foreign soil it must be nurtured like a plant and allowed to
take root. Only then will there be a healthy growth and a plenti-
ful harvest.

But the German leaders refused to proceed in this manner.
Hitler wanted to force everything, for he, and only he, 'had been
appointed by Providence to conduct this war'. The overwhelming
number of problems he tackled simultaneously resulted in a
forced, unorganic development in all phases of German life.
Looking back, one can only be amazed that the immense war
effort of the German people was possible at all.

This is what I wrote in my report after returning from Dakar:
'In Secret Service work one must never be rash. The careful selec-
tion and development of above-average collaborators is decisive.
In order to work in a foreign country they must be virtually
natives, and must acquire a "valid" profession unless there is some
other natural explanation for their presence in the country in
question. Only after one or two years should the first trial assign-
ments be given. Certain specialists should be used only in time of
great crisis or in war. Valuable intelligence contacts, especially in
political circles, should be patiently cultivated over periods of
years and should not be exploited until the decisive moment.
These channels can also be very useful for launching false reports
to mislead the enemy . . .'

For men like Jahnke such generalities about Secret Service work,

* D.T. For Hitler, "Providence was
not impersonal, but human the contrary.
a high intelligence. In that
sense I was his Providence.

back in the safe the next morning, he was still reluctant to face the full implications of his discovery. However, he decided that he must report her, and it was finally agreed that she should be put under strict surveillance.

By the end of the week fourteen of Fraulein von N—'s friends were under continual observation. Without their realizing it, the net was closing about them. Soon we had enough evidence to proceed against all the German nationals involved, and indeed it would have been quite simple to arrest them, but it was Lieutenant-Colonel Sosnovski in whom we were chiefly interested. To justify the arrest of a Polish national we had to catch him red-handed.

One of the things that our surveillance had disclosed was that Sosnovski had established contact with the French Secret Service. One of our agents got into touch with Sosnovski, pretending to be an agent of the *Deuxième Bureau*. Sosnovski took the bait, and expressed his willingness to sell him secret German military documents.

And so, the next day, in exchange for a sizeable sum he delivered this material to our man in the first class waiting room of a Berlin railway station. Within a few seconds of the exchange both Sosnovski and the agent were arrested—the arrest of our agent was necessary, of course, to preserve the pretence and enable us to use the 'confession' of the provocateur to break down the suspect.

All the other members of the ring were arrested in various parts of Berlin within the next ten minutes. Now began a round of interrogations and examinations which continued without interruption throughout several days and nights. And at length the full story emerged.

Sosnovski was a strikingly handsome man, tall, well-built and with great charm and good manners. After becoming an officer in the Polish Army, he had been assigned to Military Intelligence and had been sent to Germany to get information about German armaments, and especially to secure authentic plans of the German General Staff.

In Berlin he began to move in diplomatic circles and the higher strata of German society. He exercised a great influence over

women and sought to have as many with a view to gaining secret information.

Finally he found the instrument. Fraulein von B—, who was a secret Command of the German Army, impoverished Prussian nobility. Her officer in the Imperial German Army with her mother in very straitened circumstances met Sosnovski in an affair developed part was completely sincere.

Shortly afterwards Sosnovski met Fraulein von N—, and the three together in fashionable restaurants, Sosnovski entertained them lavishly with magnificent presents and was systematized to a much higher standard than he had been able to enjoy before.

Very soon he started an affair without Fraulein von B—'s knowledge. Fraulein von B— introduced him to her mother with chivalry and treated her household to its former splendour. They were at least able to maintain the position demanded. The old lady having been a rich and wealthy officer as her son-in-law, and her moral principles of her class, she died during the night at her house. The close daughter, the more certain the old lady's death.

Meanwhile jealousy had begun to develop among the women. This could have been easily managed to control the situation, but each was content with a share of his power, and never more strongly to him.

Sosnovski chose his moment and told them that he had described the difficulties of his situation to his superiors in Warsaw, and that they had decided to deal with his failure and their determination.

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 Fraulein von B—, who was a secretary at the OKH, the Supreme
 Command of the German Army. She belonged to the im-
 impoverished Prussian nobility. Her father, who had been a high
 officer in the Imperial German Army, was dead, and she lived
 with her mother in very straitened circumstances. Soon after she
 met Sosnovski an affair developed between them which on her
 part was completely sincere.

Shortly afterwards Sosnovski met a friend and colleague of hers,
 Fraulein von N—, and the three of them spent much time to-
 gether in fashionable restaurants, bars, and night clubs where
 Sosnovski entertained them lavishly. He gave them the most
 magnificent presents and was systematically getting them accus-
 tomed to a much higher standard of life than either of them had
 been able to enjoy before.

Very soon he started an affair with Fraulein von N—, though
 without Fraulein von B—'s knowledge.

Fraulein von B— introduced Sosnovski to her family. He
 treated her mother with chivalry and tact, and soon restored their
 household to its former splendour. Their debts were paid and
 they were at least able to maintain the sort of life that their social
 position demanded. The old lady hoped one day to see this dash-
 ing and wealthy officer as her son-in-law and in spite of the high
 moral principles of her class, she did not even object to his spend-
 ing the night at her house. The closer his emotional ties with her
 daughter, the more certain the old lady felt of the future.

Meanwhile jealousy had begun to arise between the two young
 women. This could have been dangerous. However, Sosnovski
 managed to control the situation with such skill that in the end
 each was content with a share of his love, jealousy binding them
 ever more strongly to him.

Sosnovski chose his moment and then revealed himself to the
 two women. He told them that he was a Polish Secret Agent. He
 described the difficulties of his situation and showed them mes-
 sages from his superiors in Warsaw, expressing their displeasure
 with his failure and their determination to recall him from Berlin

to return to active duty with the Polish Army. The two women could not bear the thought of losing him, and playing upon their fears, he told each of them separately that if he could bring his assignment to a successful conclusion, he would marry her and they would spend their lives together abroad with the money he would receive for his services.

Both the girls agreed to work for him Fraulein von B— also worked at the Headquarters of the General Staff, though not in such an important position as Fraulein von N— and during the nights of love-making he instructed them in their duties. They both began to bring home documents overnight for Sosnovski to photograph, and soon the home of Fraulein von N— became the favourite meeting place of several of the most charming women in Berlin society, with connections of a political, military, or economic sort. Among these ladies Sosnovski began a further series of liaisons.

At first Warsaw found the material he sent them excellent and the authorities were delighted. But as the information he delivered grew increasingly important and more and more startling, his superiors began to grow suspicious. The material seemed too good to be true, and they arrived at the conclusion that Sosnovski was being fed with false information by the German Secret Service. When he finally brought two trunks full of vitally important documents to Warsaw, his superiors would not accept their validity and told him that he had been duped by the Germans. They permitted him, however, to sell the material to other intelligence services and the *Deuxième Bureau*, recognizing its importance, bought part of it. British Intelligence also participated in the purchase. Large sums were offered to Sosnovski for further information, and only when he was arrested did Warsaw realize their mistake. But by then it was too late.

A trial followed the arrest of the spy ring. Fraulein von B— and Fraulein von N— were both condemned to death. A last appeal for clemency on their behalf was rejected by Hitler. They were executed and died with their devotion to Sosnovski still unbroken.

One of the circle of ladies with whom Sosnovski had also begun a liaison reacted quite differently. She was the owner of a small

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Sosnovski had also begun as the owner of a small

but elegant millinery shop in the West End of Berlin. As her complicity in this affair was slight, Counter-Espionage requested the Court to separate her case from that of the others and to stop all proceedings against her. We felt that we could use her. It was pointed out to the lady that proceedings against her could be reopened at any time if she should show herself to be unco-operative. But this precaution proved unnecessary. For when the truth was revealed to her and she learned, to her great surprise, of the trial and fate that had befallen her two friends, her former attachment turned into the fiercest hatred for Sosnovski, and she determined to take the most ruthless revenge on the Polish Secret Service. Under our instructions she continued to work for the Poles, who, after checking her carefully, took her back into their service. She became one of our most valuable and trusted collaborators and delivered at least ten Polish agents into our hands. Sosnovski himself was exchanged for several of our agents whom the Poles had arrested.

As a consequence of the affair, the German General Staff was forced to reshape its plans, and it took us a considerable time to recover from this setback.

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'There's going to be war. It can't be prevented any longer. Hitler made his decision long ago; you must have known it. Everything's ready. Even if the Western powers or Poland make a last-minute shot at conciliation—even if Italy intercedes, it won't change Hitler's basic plan. At the very most it might mean a slight delay, that's all.'

His voice grew more excited as he told me that Heydrich had asked him to come to his office, and, surprisingly, had confided to him one of Hitler's secret orders. Before September 1, if possible, an absolutely irreproachable cause for war had got to be created, one that would stand in history as a complete justification, and would brand Poland in the eyes of the world as the aggressor against Germany. It had therefore been planned to dress troops in Polish uniforms and attack the Gleiwitz radio transmitter. Hitler had assigned Heydrich and Admiral Canaris, Chief of Army Intelligence, to carry out this operation. However, Canaris was so repelled by the order that he had managed to withdraw and Heydrich alone was in charge of it. Heydrich had explained to Mehlhorn the details of the plan. The Polish uniforms were to be supplied at Keitel's command by the OKW—the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

I asked Mehlhorn where they would get the Poles who were to wear these uniforms. 'That's just it,' Mehlhorn replied. 'That's the devilish thing about this plan: the "Poles" will be convicts from the concentration camps. They're going to be armed with proper Polish weapons, but most of them will just be mown down, of course. They've been promised that any who get away with it will have their freedom immediately. But who's going to believe such a promise?'

Mehlhorn paused. Then he said, 'Heydrich has put me in command of the attack.' He gripped my arm hard: 'What am I to do?' he asked. 'Heydrich has given me this assignment to get rid of me. I know it. He wants my death! What can I do?'

Now it was my turn to be silent. What advice could I possibly give? Finally I said, 'The whole thing is insane. One can't make world history by tactics of that kind. The thing couldn't possibly be kept secret, not for long anyway. Somewhere, somehow, it'll all come out. You must keep clear of it though. Try to talk your

One day we returned so early that a lot of our food and drink had hardly been touched. The next day we were called out early and the thermos flasks were not ready. I only had time to take what was left over from the previous day—a bottle of cognac, half-full, and two packets of sandwiches, which I had placed near a window, hoping they would remain fresh overnight.

After driving for about two hours in the open car, Himmler asked for something to eat, so Gruppenfuehrer Wolff took a packet of sandwiches from me and they both began to eat. They had already got through the first packet when they happened to look at the second. The rest of the sandwiches were all covered with green mould. Himmler's face grew even greener as he tried desperately not to be sick. I quickly offered him some cognac—usually he did not drink; at the most two or three glasses of table wine—but he took a deep gulp and then, as he recovered, fixed me with a steely glance. I was prepared for the worst. 'I notice you ate none of the sandwiches yourself.' I hastened to explain, but there was a terrible look in his eyes as he thanked me for restoring his life with the cognac after having tried to poison him.

By this time the German armies were closing in on Warsaw and we went by plane to watch this last and most exciting phase of the campaign. We flew along the Vistula down to the Bug, over the so-called 'Land of the Four Rivers': Pissa, Narew, Vistula and San. Most of the countryside over which we flew appeared completely untouched by war.

After landing very near Warsaw, we inspected two heavily damaged Polish armoured trains which had been put out of action by Stukas. Hitler climbed about among the wreckage, inspecting everything very closely. Three or four bombs had landed near the trains and had torn huge craters in the earth. After estimating the number of hits and near hits, he ordered that the bombsight of the Stukas should be improved. He personally measured the thickness of the train's armour-plate with a ruler, and inspected the armament, the calibre of the guns, etc. He insisted on seeing everything for himself as he clambered about with Keitel running after him, puffing and sweating.

Dr Morell, Hitler's personal physician, had come along on this flight at Hitler's request. For some of the time we had flown

** all for effect. "He pays real attention"*

through very rough weather and always disliked him, but it was interesting there, a picture of woe, looking at his pills and injections.

Later we watched the artillery though the officers reporting on the defenders had great faith in the spearheads had penetrated. Artillery were firing one full salvo deafening. From time to time P but Hitler paid no attention. He thought he should leave the zone of view everything for himself.

After three or four hours we aircraft had already taken off which was not with us. Finally he arrived. He was dripping with sweat and him in a small wood—literally attempting to make a long detour and had lost his way.

Finally we took off. A great Warsaw as again and again fresh formation like swarms of hornets and destruction upon it.

On the way back Himmler asked me a lengthy discussion about his immediate and complete surprise me about our relations with the secret clauses of our agreement were to occupy their zone of Poland. I told me that we were turning on the Russians and said that I should beg for the new frontier. He would conduct them even more into opinion I should make a report,

I was astonished. 'That question I said. They will intensify their

At this meeting I explained to Best and Stevens that my trip to Berlin had taken longer than I had expected and that unfortunately the German opposition had been unable to reach a final decision. I then suggested that it might be best if I accompanied the General (the fictitious leader of the group) to London, where final discussions on the highest level could be held with the British Government. The British agents saw nothing against this and said they could have a courier plane ready the next day at the Dutch airport of Schiphol, to take us to London. In the end we agreed that I would try to bring the leader of the German opposition to a meeting next day at the same time and place.

I returned to Düsseldorf, but there was still no directive from Berlin and no permission to continue the conversations. I sent an urgent request to Berlin, warning them that without a decisive step of one sort or another my situation was becoming untenable. I received the reply that Hitler had not yet made a decision, but was inclined to break off the negotiations. He felt that they had gone far enough already. Apparently any discussion about his overthrow, even though it were bogus, made the Fuchrer uncomfortable.

So I sat in Düsseldorf, feeling impotent and frustrated, but the game intrigued me so much that I decided to go ahead. I got through to The Hague by wireless and confirmed the meeting for the next day. I must confess that at that moment I had no idea what sort of story I would tell my British friends. I realized that I was placing myself in a very ticklish position. If I aroused their suspicions in any way they could easily have me arrested again; the whole affair might come to a most unpleasant end. But I was determined to go on with the negotiations at all costs. I was angry with Berlin, although I knew that they had good reason for being hesitant: Hitler had tentatively set November 14 as the date for his attack on the West. The bad weather prevailing at that time may have been the main reason for abandoning this plan, but Himmler admitted later that my negotiations with the British agents might have been a contributing factor.

I spent a sleepless night, all sorts of plans whirling confusedly through my mind.

At breakfast I glanced at the morning papers. The headlines

proclaimed that the King of the Netherlands had made a joint declaration between the belligerents. I brought this solution to my immediate superiors. The British agents at today's meeting decided to wait and see how Hitler reacted to the Belgian proposal. I would add that the opposition from attendance would certainly be there tomorrow to go to London. That was my plan.

In the morning I had a talk with the role of the General, the leader of an industrialist, but held a high position as a leader of the SS—in fact, a part.

In the afternoon I crossed the border to wait for threequarters of an hour, as was being watched very closely by a number of harmless civilians: it was clear that they came suspicious.

Finally they arrived. It was a relief. I had no difficulty in presenting myself. I planned that morning, thus expected. They were entirely dissipated and when they met me with the warm cordiality of the peace was established.

Back in Düsseldorf that evening I was in charge of a special committee. He was in charge of a special committee in Berlin unobtrusively to safeguard the safety. He told me that in Berlin the committee had been ordered to cover all Dutch borders and cover all Dutch borders. The Dutch had tried to arrest me there, but it was very difficult, for his orders were to make me fall into the hands of the enemy. Therefore have resulted.

It gave me a rather strange feeling. I thought of my plans for the

at once. Hitler demanded that every evening the reports of the day's interrogation be shown to him personally. This meant that these reports had to be retyped on a special typewriter equipped with type three times the normal size, as Hitler's eyes were weak and he could only read very large print. He began to issue detailed directives on the handling of the case to Himmler, Heydrich, and me and gave releases to the press. To my dismay, he became increasingly convinced that the attempt on his life had been the work of the British Intelligence, and that Best and Stevens, working together with Otto Strasser, were the real organizers of this crime.

Meanwhile a carpenter by the name of Elser had been arrested while trying to escape over the Swiss border. The circumstantial evidence against him was very strong, and finally he confessed. He had built an explosive mechanism into one of the wooden pillars of the Beer Cellar. It consisted of an ingeniously worked alarm clock which could run for three days and set off the explosive charge at any given time during that period. Elser stated that he had first undertaken the scheme entirely on his own initiative, but that later on two other persons had helped him and had promised to provide him with a refuge abroad afterwards. He insisted, however, that the identity of neither of them was known to him.

I thought it possible that the 'Black Front' organization of Otto Strasser might have had something to do with the matter and that the British Secret Service might also be involved. But to connect Best and Stevens with the Beer Cellar attempt on Hitler's life seemed to me quite ridiculous. Nevertheless that was exactly what was in Hitler's mind. He announced to the press that Elser and the officers of the British Secret Service would be tried together. In high places there was talk of a great public trial, to be staged with the full orchestra of the propaganda machine, for the benefit of the German people. I tried to think of the best way to prevent this lunacy.

In the meantime new directives were continually being issued by Hitler. These made our work so much harder that often we were ready to tear our hair. For instance, within twenty-four hours he wanted a list of all the names of German emigrés in

Holland whom the Abwehr [¹] having relations with the Britis

Several days later at the Reich special detachment of the SS to operation. We marched into the and stood at attention while a drawn up in front of us. The welcome ceremony. We then marched first time I had been there; the diocese, but what I was most impressed—and were conducted to Hitler hung a large portrait of Bismarck in a firm, imperious stride, although he were about to give a but stared piercingly at each of us. He said he was grateful for our and as a group. He was especially initiative, and courage. The British tradition. Germany possessed no each success meant the building required even greater determination. Germany in the back during the ruthlessly destroyed. The German Secret Service was known to the little unless Germans themselves. In recognition of our achievement on the secret front was just as in the field of battle, he would now join the German Secret Service for the

Four of the men of the special Cross, First Class, the rest the made the presentation in person adding a few appreciative words of us again in military fashion; investiture was at an end.

We drove away in several cars bodyguard presented arms. I was most impressed by the whole of

ening the reports of the personally. This meant that a special typewriter equipped with Hitler's eyes were weak. He began to issue detailed orders. Himmler, Heydrich, and I, in dismay, he became in his life had been the best and Stevens, work- the real organizers of this

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Holland whom the Abwehr [Military Intelligence] suspected of having relations with the British Secret Service, and so on.

Several days later at the Reich Chancellery, Hitler received the special detachment of the SS that had taken part in the Venlo operation. We marched into the courtyard in military formation and stood at attention while a guard of honour of the SS was drawn up in front of us. The whole thing was made into a solemn ceremony. We then marched into the Chancellery—it was the first time I had been there; the furnishings were excessively grandiose, but what I was most impressed by was the size of the rooms—and were conducted to Hitler's study, above the door of which hung a large portrait of Bismarck. Presently Hitler entered, affecting a firm, imperious stride, and placed himself in front of us as though he were about to give a command. At first he said nothing, but stared piercingly at each one of us in turn. Then he spoke. He said he was grateful for our achievement, both as individuals and as a group. He was especially pleased by our resolution, initiative, and courage. The British Secret Service had a great tradition. Germany possessed nothing comparable to it. Therefore each success meant the building up of such a tradition and required even greater determination. The traitors who would stab Germany in the back during this most decisive struggle must be ruthlessly destroyed. The cunning and perfidy of the British Secret Service was known to the world, but it would avail them little unless Germans themselves were ready to betray Germany. In recognition of our achievement and of the fact that the conflict on the secret front was just as important as armed combat on the field of battle, he would now present decorations to members of the German Secret Service for the first time in its history.

Four of the men of the special detachment received the Iron Cross, First Class, the rest the Iron Cross, Second Class. Hitler made the presentation in person, shaking each man's hand and adding a few appreciative words. Then he posted himself in front of us again in military fashion, and raised his right arm. The investiture was at an end.

We drove away in several cars while a company of Hitler's bodyguard presented arms. I must confess that at the time I was most impressed by the whole ceremony.

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in this death struggle, while our real enemies in the East can sit back and wait until Europe is exhausted. That is why I do not wish to destroy Britain and never shall,'—here his voice became sharp and penetrating—'but they must be made to realize, and even Churchill must be made to realize, that Germany has the right to live too. And I will fight Britain until she has come down off her high horse. The time will come when they will be ready to reach an agreement with us. That is my real aim. You understand that?'

'Yes, my Fuehrer,' I replied, 'I understand the course of your thoughts. But one must not forget that the mentality of an island race is different to ours. Their history and their traditions are different. They are determined by the historical laws which their insular position has imposed upon them, and as a consequence of which they are a colonial power. Theirs is the insular way of life, ours the Continental, and as a consequence of that we are now a Continental power. It is very hard to reconcile the two and quite different national characters have resulted from these differences. The English are tenacious, unemotional and relentless: it is not for nothing that they bear the name "John Bull". A war like this, once it starts, is like an avalanche. And who would try to calculate the course of an avalanche?'

'My dear fellow,' replied Hitler, 'let that be my worry. One thing more,' he said after a pause: 'Have you been in touch with Ribbentrop about the Dutch note concerning the officer who died of wounds?' Then he turned to Heydrich and began to laugh. 'These Dutch really are too stupid. If I were in their place I would have kept quiet. Instead they play right into my hands with this note. And when the time comes, I'll pay them back. They admit the man was an officer of their General Staff, which proves that they and not we were the first to violate neutrality.'

I said that so far I had not spoken to Ribbentrop. Another pause followed. Then Hitler said to Himmler, 'There are still several things I have to discuss with you.' He rose abruptly, made a bow to the others at the table, and then turned to Heydrich and me. 'I would like you to stay too.'

We went into the next room where large easy chairs were arranged comfortably round the fireplace. On the way Himmler

said to me, 'You certainly are terribly pigheaded. But apparently the Fuehrer was amused.' And Heydrich added, 'My dear fellow, I had not realized you were such an Anglophile. Is that the result of your contact with Best and Stevens?' I realized that it would be wise to restrain myself and that I had gone about as far as I could.

For the next hour Hitler talked only to Himmler. He stood most of the time, rocking back and forth on his heels as he spoke, while Himmler close beside him inclined his face towards Hitler with an expression of rapt attention. I heard one of the SS adjutants whisper to another, 'Look at Heini—he'll crawl into the old man's ear in a minute.'

Hitler was drinking peppermint tea, but for his guests he had ordered champagne. After he had finished his conversation with Himmler, which had been carried on so softly that no one else could follow, Hitler turned again to the rest of the company. He spoke of the Luftwaffe, praising the work Goering was doing, and especially the fact that he availed himself of the experience of the veteran fighter pilots of the First World War. Then anti-aircraft defences, war production, and other questions of warfare were discussed. I reached home very late and completely exhausted.

The next day, at Hitler's orders, I attended a meeting between Heydrich and Mueller. The latter still looked very pale and overworked. He told us that during the night and morning three doctors, specialists in the psychiatric field, had worked on Elser and were still doing so. He had been given strong injections of pervitin, but had not changed his testimony under the drug's influence.

Mueller had also placed an entire carpenter's shop at Elser's disposal. There he had worked for the last few days and had almost completed a reconstruction of his bomb. He had also made a wooden pillar identical with the one in the Beer Cellar, and was demonstrating his method of concealing the bomb. Heydrich was extremely interested, so we went upstairs to the rooms where Elser was imprisoned.

It was the first time I had seen him. He was a small, pale man, with clear bright eyes and long black hair. He had a high fore-

head, and strong sensitive hand skilled artisan, and indeed the work was a masterpiece. At first he was very rather frightened. He answered nothing with a strong Swabian accent. It was only when we began to praise its ingenuity and precision that he really came to life and gave explanations of the problems involved in the bomb and how he had solved them. It was interesting that I completely forgot to mention that I had put all this ingenuity.

When he was asked about his past, he gave the same answers as before. He was a simple man and did not know now. His conversations about explosives and business were rather unemotionally, although certainly there was danger, but I was not aware of it. From the day on which he had been arrested, he had known that his own life was in danger, but he was certain he would succeed in the end. The preparations had taken a long time.

We looked at each other. My impression was that Heydrich had a small derisive smile.

The next day four of the best hypnotists came to hypnotize Elser. Only one of them succeeded. Heydrich gave exactly the same answers as before.

One of these hypnotists made a very good analysis of Elser's character. He was a typical warped fanatic. He had psychotic compulsions, which spring from an unbalanced mind. This was due to an unbalanced mind and acknowledgement which was a result of his brother. In killing the leader of the movement, he had all these compulsions because he

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IX

A PORTRAIT OF HITLER

Hitler's personality—His belief in his own 'mission'—His agnosticism—Causes of his breakdown in health—The basis of his anti-Semitism—Influence of Plaischinger and others on Hitler's racial theories—His concept of Western supremacy

I KNEW Hitler personally, I worked with him, and I am familiar with numerous details of his daily life, his methods, and his political and sociological conceptions. I ought, therefore, to be in a position to formulate a complete picture of his personality, but though I have often tried to do so, both in my own mind and in writing, I must confess that I have never really succeeded.

Hitler's knowledge was on the one hand sound and on the other completely superficial and dilettante. He had highly developed political instincts which were combined with a complete lack of moral scruples; he was governed by the most inexplicable hallucinatory conceptions and *petit-bourgeois* inhibitions. But his one dominant and dominating characteristic was that he felt himself appointed by providence to do great things for the German people. This was his historic 'mission', in which he believed completely.

It was his intense manner and the suggestive power of his personality that created the impression of an intellect and a range of knowledge far above the average. In addition, there was his extraordinary dialectical ability, which enabled him to out-argue even the most expert authorities in any field of discussion, often with most harmful results. He threw them so off-balance that they did not think of the appropriate replies until afterwards.

He had an insatiable craving for recognition and power, combined with a cultivated ruthlessness which reinforced his lightning reactions, his energy, and his determination. While fortune smiled on him these qualities enabled him to dominate Germany and to gain the startled attention of the whole world.

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an. Finally, after 1940, recog-
nition, he transformed this
the 'Eurasian Space'. Relying
to achieve the domination of
the conquered peoples in this
space as a new colonial space
German would be excluded.

X

OPERATION 'SEA-LION'

A setback for the Wehrmacht—Security arrangements for the invasion of Denmark and Norway—Reporting on the Venlo incident—Spies in France's heavy industries—Hitler's hesitation after Dunkirk—Preparations ordered for the invasion of England—These plans cancelled—Hitler's 'aquaphobia'—Differences between Goering and Himmler—Hitler decides to concentrate on the East

THE BEGINNING of the year 1940 found me overburdened with work. My chief task was the reorganization of the Counter-Espionage Department, which was to occupy me for the rest of that year. In addition, through continually receiving orders to carry out special assignments I sometimes found myself working for as long as seventeen hours a day. Even the early morning rides, which were my sole form of relaxation, were now combined with my work. Every day I went riding with Admiral Canaris, Chief of Military Intelligence, and as we rode we discussed problems of mutual interest with a view to co-ordinating the work of our respective agencies.

At the beginning of the year the German High Command met with a very embarrassing setback. Two Wehrmacht officers on their way to Cologne were invited to break their journey at Munster to visit an old friend. One of these officers was a special courier carrying highly important secret documents, namely the plans for the attack on Holland and Belgium.

At Munster the reunion proved so enjoyable that the two officers missed the train for Cologne. So their friend, who was a major in the Luftwaffe, offered to fly them there, and they agreed. But in poor visibility the major lost his way and they made a forced landing near Malines in Belgium. The officers at once decided to burn their documents, but found they had no matches, and before they could think of another method of destroying them, they were arrested by the Belgian authorities. At the police station while they were alone in a waiting-room they made

another attempt to destroy their papers by thrusting them into a stove, but the papers would not catch fire. They were only slightly singed, and the Belgians had no difficulty in saving them and then deciphering them.

When Hitler heard what had happened he raved. He at once suspected that premeditated treason was involved and wanted to have the two officers shot out of hand. Further investigations revealed, however, that at the very worst they were guilty only of criminal negligence.

The Western Powers were, of course, shocked and alarmed when at first they saw the plans for the attack. However, they finally decided that the documents had been placed in their hands by the Germans purposely in order to mislead them. They probably could not imagine that we had been guilty of such a crass blunder.

Shortly after this incident Himmler called me late at night. He told me that he had been unable to reach Heydrich and that I should prepare the draft of an order on secrecy regulations for the Wehrmacht. The order was also to apply to all other branches of the administration and Hitler wanted to issue it that very night.

Himmler was so excited and so confused that I found it impossible to understand just what Hitler did want. Each time I tried to get him to explain a little more clearly he became impatient and irritable and finally ordered me to have the draft ready within two hours.

I sat at my desk for at least half an hour just staring in front of me. Finally I managed to sketch out what seemed to be the main points, but when Himmler placed this draft before Hitler two hours later the Fuehrer was not satisfied with it. He therefore dictated the order himself, calling it: *Order No. 1 to all Wehrmacht and Civilian Authorities*.

The main point of Hitler's version was that all matters dealing with the conduct of the war should only be made known to and discussed with persons immediately concerned. This, of course, was nothing new as far as Himmler's and Heydrich's organizations were concerned, where the separation of planning and administration had been an established principle for a long time, and even went so far that the heads of departments hardly ever

informed each other of whatever, that excessive secrecy operation, but led to a desire for people to cover up their mistakes.

At the beginning of May 1940, the 'Weseruebung' to cover a possible occupation of Denmark. The following task was assigned: to establish contacts with Norway, via Hamburg; these were German-Norwegian shipping processing firms. (The Norwegian companies were staffed by our men, who were to provide weather information responsible for the great operations. The data, disguised as reports on fishing, was transmitted and proved satisfactory.

Hitler's decision to occupy Denmark from our Secret Service were concentrating their efforts now became my task to coordinate the operations—transport and concealment of the invasion.

But the rapidity with which the force had to be mobilized was extremely difficult. I concentrated on the ports of embarkation, roads, and passenger train stations for surveillance. In Stettin, however, the situation was extremely precarious. The tents are going up. The movement of large bodies of troops, and NCO's and officers carrying their forces prepared for the Alpine troops from Austria. The attitude that is char-

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German alliance against

England at the armistice negotiations with France is also attribut-
able to his personal views and prejudices.

Anti-British feeling was running high in France at the time, and
was intensified by the heroic struggle of the French Fleet against
the superior forces of the British. As far as the British were con-
cerned, the *Entente Cordiale* was dead, as it was of little use to them
in the life-and-death struggle for their own island home which
now ensued. Churchill admitted quite openly that he had refused
to expend the strength of the British Air Force in France.

German relations with France, however, could never grow into
an active collaboration because of Hitler’s underlying suspicion
and revulsion. He considered the French to be a dying nation,
biologically, economically, and morally. And in order to achieve
a compromise with England he would have sacrificed France
without a moment’s hesitation.

The failure to achieve a Franco-German alliance, the hesitation
that allowed the British Expeditionary Force to escape under the
very eyes of the Germans, and the subsequent failure to proceed
resolutely to the next step—obvious even to the lowliest private in
the German Army—the immediate invasion of the British Isles,
found its final explanation in Hitler’s blind and stubborn convic-
tion that the British were a Germanic brother-people worthy of
preservation. Great Britain would finally see reason and join
Germany. As he told me personally in 1939: ‘By no means do I
wish to destroy the British. I want them to be humbled, and to
learn to see things from a Continental-European viewpoint, as
we see them. They have to give up their policy of a balance of
power in Europe. They may keep their colonial empire and their
naval power. But on the Continent they have to grow close to us
and form a unity with us. Then we will rule Europe together and
the East will no longer be a danger.’

Until late in the year 1941 Hitler believed that he could achieve
an understanding with Great Britain. As Bismarck had forced
Austria into an alliance with Germany by inflicting military
defeat upon her, so Hitler wanted to win an alliance from Britain
by the same means.

But at the time of Operation ‘Sea-lion’, in the summer of 1940,
he had not yet recognized the impossibility of achieving an under-

Office and the various departments of the Secret Service, and Special Branch. This task occupied a great deal of my time, involving the collection and assembly of material from various sources by a selected staff of my own people. When it was finished an edition of 20,000 copies was printed, and stored in a room next to my office. They were burned in 1943 in a fire started in one of the air raids.

Hitler's failure to carry out the invasion of Britain may also have been influenced in a subsidiary way by his singular fear of water. I could not believe my ears when Himmler first mentioned this to me. 'It is really remarkable,' he said, 'but Hitler has a most peculiar fear of water. He believes that one day he will encounter some misfortune connected with this element.' Then Himmler told me how on several occasions such as at reviews of the fleet or on boat trips, he had noticed the Fuehrer in a state of considerable anxiety the moment the ship drew away from the shore. He would stride nervously up and down and try to distract himself by asking hasty, disjointed questions. It was a complex, and Himmler believed that this fear had made Hitler uneasy about any amphibious operations and conditioned his attitude towards operation 'Sea-lion' from the very beginning.

At this time a serious difference of opinion arose between Goering and Himmler. Goering seriously underestimated British aircraft production, especially of fighters. He based his strategy on an estimated monthly output of three hundred British planes, while Himmler's Intelligence information set the estimate at more than double that figure. Goering considered it would be possible to mount continual bomber attacks against Britain, and that the fighter defences would not be able to prevent the destruction of harbours and industrial centres. At the same time, material aid from America could be cut off almost completely by U-boats. Thus Britain would finally be forced to surrender. Of course, this line of thought was most welcome to Hitler, and reinforced his attitude towards the problem of Great Britain. He found further support—and therefore attached the highest value to them—in the reports of the German Military Attaché in Washington, General von Boetticher, who completely underestimated the productive capacity and the political developments in America. When in

* Dot. How I worked on his fears before Dunkirk. My instructions were simple "No invasion of Britain at this time."

Heydrich immediately and reported the conversation, his pathological jealousy. Heydrich said at once, 'I see; I no longer wish to consult me—old idiot! Well, and give him my best regards.' I promised Heydrich I would give him a detailed report of what Ribbentrop

Ribbentrop received me standing behind his desk with a serious expression on his face. He asked me to wait after a few polite remarks, came to the point. He said that I had various connections in Spain and Portugal and had achieved a measure of co-operation with the police in those countries. I did not know where these remarks were intended. I answered very cautiously. Dissatisfied with my answer, he shook his head. 'Mmm,' he said, then he was only he said, 'You remember the Duke of Windsor, were you introduced to him during his last visit?' I said I had not been. 'Have you any material on him?' Ribbentrop said I really cannot say at the moment, I replied. 'Well, do you think of him personally? How do you evaluate him as a figure, for instance?' I admitted honestly that these remarks had taken me by surprise and that at the moment my knowledge was not sufficient to give a proper answer. I had seen the Duke at the time of his last visit to Germany and, of course, it was generally known about the reasons for his abdication. I said that the English had handled the whole problem very badly; that in the end tradition and responsibility had had precedence over human feelings and personal emotions. It was difficult to decide whether the matter should be a sign of weakness or of strength in the English Royal Family. I said that it seemed that in the lengthy conferences on the subject the British government had shown understanding of the political problems involved. When I had finished I saw Ribbentrop's eyes would pop out of his head, so I said that as he was at the uninhibited manner in which I expressed my views. He lost no time in putting me right.

The Duke of Windsor was one of the most socially aware and charming Englishmen he had ever met. It was this which had made him a member of the governing clique; the marriage issue had been a

welcome pretext to remove this hon-ourable man from Germany. All the questions of tradition and protocol raised were completely secondary.

Here I tried to object, but was silenced. 'My dear Schellenberg, you have a complete knowledge of these things—also of the real reasons for the situation. The Fuehrer and I already recognized the matter in 1936. The crux of the matter is that the Duke has been under strict surveillance by the German Secret Service. We know what his feelings are towards his prisoner. Every attempt that he might make, however discreet he may have been, to escape from our reports that he still entertains feelings towards Germany, and that gives me the impression he wouldn't be averse to escaping from the whole thing's getting on his nerves. He has even spoken about living in Spain. I think he'd be ready to be friends with Germany. The Fuehrer thinks this attitude is extremely dangerous. I thought that you with your Western education were a suitable person to make some sort of excuse for the Duke—as the representative, of course, of the British State. The Fuehrer feels that if the atmosphere is not improved you might perhaps make the Duke see that we should be prepared to deposit in Spain a sum of fifty million Swiss francs—as some official gesture dissociating him from the British Royal Family. The Fuehrer wants him to live in Switzerland, though he would do so long as it's not outside the sphere of military influence of the German Reich.'

'If the British Secret Service should suggest some such arrangement, then the Fuehrer would be prepared to circumvent the British plans, even at the cost of need be, by the use of force. Whatever the Duke of Windsor must be brought safely to Germany. Hitler attaches the greatest importance to this. It has come to the conclusion after serious

I called Heydrich immediately and reported the conversation, for I knew his pathological jealousy. Heydrich said at once, 'I see; the gentleman no longer wishes to consult me—old idiot! Well, go over there and give him my best regards.' I promised Heydrich that I would give him a detailed report of what Ribbentrop wanted.

As usual Ribbentrop received me standing behind his desk with folded arms and a serious expression on his face. He asked me to be seated and after a few polite remarks, came to the point. He had heard that I had various connections in Spain and Portugal and had even achieved a measure of co-operation with the police of these countries. I did not know where these remarks were leading, and answered very cautiously. Dissatisfied with my evasive replies, he shook his head. 'Mmm,' he said, then he was silent. Suddenly he said, 'You remember the Duke of Windsor, of course? Were you introduced to him during his last visit?' I said that I had not been. 'Have you any material on him?' Ribbentrop asked. 'I really cannot say at the moment,' I replied. 'Well, what do you think of him personally? How do you evaluate him as a political figure, for instance?' I admitted honestly that these questions had taken me by surprise and that at the moment my knowledge was not sufficient to give a proper answer. I had seen the Duke at the time of his last visit to Germany and, of course, knew what was generally known about the reasons for his abdication. It seemed that the English had handled the whole problem very sensibly; that in the end tradition and responsibility had had to take precedence over human feelings and personal emotions. It seemed difficult to decide whether the matter should be adjudged a sign of weakness or of strength in the English Royal Family. It seemed that in the lengthy conferences on the subject the members of the government had shown understanding of the human and political problems involved. When I had finished I thought that Ribbentrop's eyes would pop out of his head, so astonished was he at the uninhibited manner in which I expressed these opinions. He lost no time in putting me right.

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and, it was astonishing how much ground Germany had recently. With this information, and by spending quite a little money, I was able to organize considerable undercover activity. Within two days I had drawn a close net of informants round the Duke's residence. I had even managed to replace the Portuguese police guard with my own people. I was also able to place agents among the servants, so that within five days I knew of every incident that took place in the house and every word that was said at the dinner-table. My Japanese friend was also working in a quiet but very effective manner to get me supplementary information. Portuguese society provided a third valuable source of news, and the witty remarks and gossip at the various *soirées* and parties were passed on to me.

Within six days I had a full picture: the Duke of Windsor no longer intended to accept the hunting invitation; he was most annoyed by the close surveillance of the British Secret Service; he did not like his appointment to Bermuda and would have preferred to remain in Europe. But he obviously had no intention of going to live either in a neutral or an enemy country. According to my reports the furthest he ever went in this direction was once to have said in his circle of Portuguese friends that he would rather live in any European country than go to Bermuda.

However, all my informants felt that it might be possible to influence the Duke, especially if one could increase his already existing aversion to his secret guards. I therefore arranged for a high-ranking Portuguese police official to tell the Duke that the Portuguese police would have to be strengthened because they had information that the Duke was being watched, whether by his own intelligence Service or that of the enemy, they could not tell, but it would be better to make certain. That same night I staged an attack in the garden of the Duke's villa; stones were thrown at the windows, and as a result an intensive search of the whole house was made by the Portuguese guard which caused a considerable commotion. I then started rumours among the servants at the Duke's house that the British Secret Service had been behind the incident. I gave orders to make the Duke's stay as uncomfortable as possible and thus make him readier to leave for Bermuda. Four

days later a bouquet was delivered to the Duke. I said: 'Beware of the machinations of a Portuguese friend who has your interests at heart.'

These things were, of course, discussed and created a certain feeling. In any case, I had to take into account that Berlin was continually demanding more moves, somewhat dramatized, so I even considered getting my finger in the Duke, but the possibility of this seemed so remote that I did not do it.

A week later my Japanese friend came to see me. He was convinced that the British were suspicious. Once, indeed, I suspected they were shadowing me. I tried everything to alter my route suddenly, changed my car again, but I could not get rid of them. In the end I managed to do so by driving through my house and leaving it by a side door. I was suggested by the British Secret Service that I should know nothing about my plans at that time that I was in Portugal.)

Replies from Berlin to my inquiries were cooler. Then suddenly after about a month from Ribbentrop: 'The Fuehrer is now completely organized at once.' This was an unusual statement, as there was so little in sympathy with our plans. But what could I do? Ribbentrop alone who was behind the completely wrong evaluation of the situation distorted my reports in order to make my ultimate folly.

The Ambassador was as worried as I was at once that I had no intention of carrying out the plan. In the evening I discussed the matter with him. He discerned mild contempt in his tone. Finally he said, 'An order must be given. After all, the thing should not be done.'

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I felt that it might be possible to increase his already high opinion of me. I therefore arranged for a high-ranking Duke that the Portuguese were being watched, whether by his own agents or by the enemy, they could not tell, but that was all. That same night I staged an attack on the Duke's villa; stones were thrown at the windows. A massive search of the whole house was made which caused a considerable commotion among the servants at the time. It had been behind the incident. The Duke's stay as uncomfortable as possible to leave for Bermuda. Four

days later a bouquet was delivered at the house with a note which said: 'Beware of the machinations of the British Secret Service—a Portuguese friend who has your interests at heart.'

These things were, of course, fairly unimportant, but they were discussed and created a certain amount of suspicion and ill-feeling. In any case, I had to take some form of action because Berlin was continually demanding reports of progress, and these moves, somewhat dramatized, served as material for my reports. I even considered getting my friends to arrange for me to meet the Duke, but the possibility of anything useful resulting from this seemed so remote that I did nothing.

A week later my Japanese friend warned me to be very careful. He was convinced that the British Secret Service had become suspicious. Once, indeed, I suspected that two British agents were shadowing me. I tried everything I knew to shake them off, altering my route suddenly, changing from bus to taxi and back again, but I could not get rid of them. Finally, after a two-hours' chase I managed to do so by driving to the Fatima Church near my house and leaving it by a side door. (When I was interrogated by the British Secret Service in 1945, I realized that they knew nothing about my plans at that time and did not even know that I was in Portugal.)

Replies from Berlin to my reports had grown cooler and cooler. Then suddenly after about a fortnight I received a telegram from Ribbentrop: 'The Fuehrer orders that an abduction is to be organized at once.' This was an unexpected blow. Since the Duke was so little in sympathy with our plans an abduction would be madness. But what could I do? I was quite certain that it was Ribbentrop alone who was behind this order. He had made a completely wrong evaluation of the situation, and had probably distorted my reports in order to persuade Hitler to sanction this ultimate folly.

The Ambassador was as worried as I was, though I assured him at once that I had no intention of carrying out my orders. In the evening I discussed the matter with my Japanese friend. I thought I discerned mild contempt in his eyes. He remained silent for a long time. Finally he said, 'An order is an order. It has to be carried out. After all, the thing should not be so difficult. You will have

On December 18, 1940 Hitler signed the order: '*Wehrmachtsbefehl Nr 21—Operation Barbarossa*'—the attack on the Soviet Union. It provided for an offensive by a strength of about one hundred infantry divisions, twenty-five armoured and thirty fully motorized divisions. On February 3, 1941, Hitler approved the strategic plan for the offensive which the Supreme Commander of the army, Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, placed before him.

After two months in Karlsbad I returned to Berlin. It was very hard to adjust myself again to the hectic atmosphere of the capital. The chief task now was counter-espionage work against the Soviet Union. The centres of interest here were the border countries, Rumania, Hungary, Poland and Finland. The Western sectors of our security network had to be weakened in order to strengthen the Eastern ones. A special problem was created by the thousands of Russian emigrés, White Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, etc., living in Germany. We knew that Russian Intelligence used a number of them as their agents, so I created a net of informants among them, using the Russian system of groups of three—each member of the group had to inform on the others without their being aware of it. At the moment, securing information about them seemed more important than the possibility of using them later on for occupation work in their own countries. We had sufficient Russian emigrés already actively working for our Secret Service.

The Russian Secret Service in Germany was becoming increasingly active and we were able to observe the growth of this extensive network. It was very difficult to decide how long to continue the surveillance and when to end it by making arrests. Merely to observe what objectives interested the enemy sometimes enabled us to draw valuable conclusions. But waiting too long could lead to very damaging results. Once, by delaying longer than I should have done, I spoiled a very important case. My assistants had warned me, but I had not listened to them.

The head of our Counter-Espionage in Breslau was a very able official, a specialist in Eastern European matters, with an excellent knowledge of Russian and Polish. He had been active in this area for many years, and his work showed quite good results. His opposite number in Military Intelligence had a similar background.

After I had been head of Counter-Espionage, I began to feel dissatisfied with the work. I suspected that in many instances the investigation was not thorough. I discussed this with the chief of the investigation. We found regularly in their homes and the unusually high standard of living accounts, and particularly of the showed that these could not be increased wealth. They received visitors in their homes, and we did people who did not live in Breslau.

Then one of them reported to me while it was parked in the important documents had been under surveillance and not make an arrest had vanished, having taken with them all documents from their offices.

The wife of the Military Intelligence officer was from an unknown cause. The wife was arrested and interrogated. She began to say that her husband had been in touch with Russian Intelligence, thinking to make a valuable coup for us. It was convincing. The house was thoroughly searched and some fragments of a suitcase were found some fragments able to put together well enough to say 'you will come and join me'. It was which her husband had written. I had seen it, and said that it was not his handwriting, though the writer's fluency of alcohol or drugs.

The case was never cleared up. A intensive and widespread search, no men was found. Nor could we determine whether they were traitors, or were perhaps killed. All the evidence

wife, pointed towards the conclusion that they were traitors. However, I did not take any action against the wife, and arranged to have a small grant paid for the support of the child which the man had left behind. As a result of the affair, we had completely to reorganize the security system of the Silesian war industries, for the material that disappeared with the two men contained a comprehensive account of its organization.

Heydrich was lenient about this error of mine. He even tried to console me, saying that this kind of affair was the sort of 'tuition fee' that everyone had to pay, and there was no reason why I should be spared such embarrassments.

The next day I was at his hunting lodge. During the course of our conversation, in which he stressed again the importance of strengthening the Counter-Espionage work against the Russians, and said that the Fuehrer was watching this work very closely, he finally began to talk about Admiral Canaris. He was very critical of Canaris's work as Head of Military Intelligence. He felt certain, in fact, that Canaris had betrayed the date of the attack in the West—May 10, 1940—to the Allies, but nevertheless he did not want to proceed against him just yet. He would wait and gather more evidence. The day would come, however, when Canaris would be punished for all the damage he had caused to the régime.

Heydrich then went on to speak of the problem of the whole Intelligence network. He was still very much preoccupied with certain setbacks he had had recently, and saw their cause in the organizational weakness of the various Intelligence Services, especially the SD Ausland, the Foreign Intelligence Branch of the Main Security Office, usually called AMT VI. Until now they had been allowed to function under the loosest control, but if anything went wrong, it was he, Heydrich, who would receive the blame. He realized the great difficulty of integrating a foreign intelligence service into an internal security organization, particularly in wartime, but the whole level of the work of this department was unsatisfactory, the training and experience of the younger people inadequate, and the direction they received from their superiors bad.

I had been aware of these problems for a long time and had come to very similar conclusions. I had therefore been expecting



(Top) Schellenberg before the

and Jutta in our service. He operated chiefly in Italy—he spoke Italian fluently—and did excellent work.

Later, to investigate the amount of loose talk which was going on in high military and social circles, I instructed the two society ladies and the official from the Air Ministry to chat with me and pass on what they had heard, just as if I were V—. The amount of highly secret and vitally important information that was bandied about in these circles was really incredible; and so, too, was the extensive harm such careless and stupid gossip could do. The guilty ones were all highly intelligent people, leading engineers, architects, officials and officers of the German Reich.

* A. H. has dreamed of a coup d'état
filling everything up to
his nostrils.

THE MYSTER,

Hitler's reactions to Hess's flight—Astrological influence towards astrology—Suspected: pondence with his wife

AFTER THE flight of R 1941, Hitler was morn that he was hardly cag Martin Bormann, until then the Party, made those advancement in the Fuehrer's confidence theory that Hess had 'become' clude this phrase in the first. From the point of view of power could never be remedied, for be kept in such an important time if it were known that I

Here, too, Hitler's 'execution' his element and without his powers, for which this occasion Hess's staff, from chauffeurs Mueller would probably his personnel too, as well as those who were responsible for the. Though only a narrow circle never would have imagined were affected by these 'executions' of the internal SD revealed that Rudolf Steiner and the anthologists of arrests were made in the accordance with astrological predictions and SD reports revealed

astrologers, seers, mediums, nature therapists, and so forth; consequently a series of collective arrests was also made among the ranks of these mystics. In point of fact, the great weakness he had displayed in this direction had been known for a long time.

From the day of his flight, so Himmler told me, the great interest Hitler had previously shown in astrology changed to an uncompromising antipathy. In my first conversations with Himmler about the Hess affair in May 1941, I said that I considered the German people much too intelligent for the story about his 'mental illness'. Himmler replied quickly, 'That was Bormann's influence.' After looking at me for a long time he added, 'It is too late to do anything about it now.'

Alan I can still remember how upset Himmler was by the measures taken against the astrologists. And it was with satanic glee that Heydrich, in Himmler's presence, explained to Mueller in detail Hitler's orders concerning them. Heydrich, of course, knew of this weakness of Himmler's, and would often say to me, complaining about Himmler's indecisiveness, that the Reichsfuehrer had been looking too deeply into his horoscope again. Once during a telephone conversation with Himmler I heard Heydrich say, '... one is worried about the stars on the epaulettes, the other about the stars in the heavens. It's a question of who is the more difficult to work with.' At the same time Heydrich made a gesture to me, as though to ask whether he had not gone too far. He had taken care to say it as though he were speaking only of Hess, but Himmler understood only too well that it applied to him too.

It was after this telephone conversation that I received the order to complete a report which I was preparing for Hitler. In it I said that our secret information showed that for some years Hess had been influenced by agents of the British Secret Service and their German collaborators, and that they had played a large part in bringing about his decision to fly to Scotland. This was true more particularly of the decisive influence of a Professor G—, a gland specialist in Upper Bavaria.

At one of the conferences at that time, at which both Himmler and Heydrich were present, there was a general discussion of the Hess case. When I was asked my opinion, I said that though pathological causes might offer an explanation, for psychiatrists had

described Hess's condition in circles which had been excluded from account, the explanation, and further in order to clarify the matter. In view of his fanatical devotion, Hess was capable of strategic planning to the position to do so. Nor was he incapable of giving a command with which he had prepared in which he had carried it out.

As far as the imminent was concerned, I thought that it might be in its context could act as seemed to me very doubtful, prepared to send a specific warning of the first interrogation conference.

For the rest, I believed that my intimate friend, was, perhaps under Hitler's suggestive original conceptions and had considered it his Messianic task to follow Hitler's command in 1939, and which he thought that the English were a burden to him, it obligatory to preserve German born abroad, Hess during his youth and education, especially when discussed along the lines conceived by von Seeckt.

While I was saying all this under the table and shook my frankness, and afterwards deal to learn. And I don't know what you really meant.' Bormann told me that my analysis was concerned, he took up

pure therapists, and so forth; consequently, a study was also made among the ranks of the SS. In fact, the great weakness he had displayed was known for a long time.

But, so Himmler told me, the great weakness shown in astrology changed to an advantage. In my first conversations with Himmler in May 1941, I said that I considered him too intelligent for the story he was telling. He replied quickly, 'That was all right, looking at me for a long time he was looking about it now.'

Now Himmler was by the measures of a prophet. And it was with satanic glee that he explained to Mueller in detail the plans of Heydrich, of course, knew of this, and would often say to me, complaining to me, that the Reichsfuehrer had been wrong in his horoscope again. Once during a telephone conversation I heard Heydrich say, '... one of the epaulettes, the other about the question of who is the more difficult to deal with.' Heydrich made a gesture to me, as if he had not gone too far. He had taken care to speak only of Hess, but Himmler told me that it applied to him too.

During this conversation that I received the order that I was preparing for Hitler. In it I said that I had shown that for some years Hess had been of the British Secret Service and their plan was that they had played a large part in his plan to fly to Scotland. This was true more than the influence of a Professor G—, a gland expert.

At that time, at which both Himmler and I were present, there was a general discussion of the matter. In my opinion, I said that though pathological, an explanation, for psychiatrists had

described Hess's condition as pathological, the influences of British circles which had been exerted over a number of years should also be taken into account, though neither gave a really satisfactory explanation, and further investigation would probably be needed to clarify the matter. I was convinced, I said, that because of his fanatical devotion, Hess would never betray the details of our strategic planning to the enemy, though certainly he was in a position to do so. Nor was his intellect so deranged that he would be incapable of giving a clear account of our plans. The precision with which he had prepared his flight, and the purposeful manner in which he had carried it through, was a clear indication of this.

As far as the imminent Russian campaign was concerned, I said I thought that it might be wiser to consider that the whole incident in its context could act as a warning to the Russians. However, it seemed to me very doubtful whether the English would be prepared to send a specific warning to the Russian leaders as a result of the first interrogation of Hess.

For the rest, I believed that Hess, having been the Fuehrer's most intimate friend, was, perhaps without even realizing it, strongly under Hitler's suggestive influence. Thus, following Hitler's original conceptions and his attitude towards England, he had considered it his Messianic task to reconcile the two peoples. This would follow Hitler's conceptions about Britain as expressed to me in 1939, and which Hess kept repeating in his intimate circle—that the English were a brother people and the bonds of race made it obligatory to preserve them. One must not forget that, as a German born abroad, Hess had been subjected to British influences during his youth and education, a fact he never sought to hide or deny, especially when discussing collaboration with the Russians along the lines conceived by the former Reichswehr chief, General von Seeckt.

While I was saying all this Heydrich kicked me several times under the table and shook his head disapprovingly. He did not like my frankness, and afterwards said to me, 'You still have a great deal to learn. And I don't believe the Reichsfuehrer understood what you really meant.' But Heydrich was honest enough to admit to me that my analysis had been correct. As far as my report was concerned, he took up the point about the influence of the

British Secret Service, and said several times that we had to try to go further in that direction for, if the information proved correct, these circles would be able to inflict additional damage on us. He felt that the British were capable of formulating and carrying out that sort of plan, and he would be surprised if we did not have some similar experiences in the future. Then he added an interesting remark: 'Well, the Russians are no less clever.'

In view of my knowledge of the Hess affair and of the investigations in the Abwehr, I can say definitely that it is quite impossible that Hitler ordered Hess to fly to Britain to make a last offer of peace. I only mention this because the lively fantasy of journalists raises it again and again. The only truth in this notion is that Hess, when he decided to take such action, felt that he was carrying out Hitler's original ideas as far as Britain was concerned, and the time selected for this attempt was determined by Hitler's decision to attack Russia. As I have already pointed out, his character, his mysticism, his racial ideas and Messianic complex, all played their part in his decision. Without being conscious of it, he was led to take this action through the influence of astrological circles and by intimate advisers, such as Professor G— and Haushofer. Our investigation has never made clear whether negotiations in Switzerland by Haushofer or by Hess himself preceded the flight. Haushofer has always denied it. However, even if this had been the case, the basic psychological motivation still remains, together with the fact that Hess received no express authorization from Hitler for his flight to England.

I was sincerely sorry about the fate of Hess's first adjutant, von L—, a man of honest and open character. He was the victim of Hitler's rage and of the continual intrigues of Bormann. In spite of Heydrich's skilful counter-moves, von L— was placed in a concentration camp, where he remained until the end of the war, and as if this were not enough, was afterwards treated as an antagonist by the Allies.

To a great extent this was Mueller's doing. While acting in an apparently friendly manner towards von L—, he was in fact carrying out Bormann's instructions. Mueller realized that Bormann would become Hess's successor, and that he was a personality of much greater dynamic force. Privately Mueller established good

relations with Bormann, while as far as Himmler and Heydrich were concerned, he was strange to me that Heydrich and Heydrich that Mueller was playing, a considerable importance.

Subsequently the great event faded into the background. But I ordered to gather further information about his mental state. I also had my wife to write to each other. I tried to correspond, within limits, with Cross in Switzerland, and it went on, since it was carried out by Himmler, however, was definitely clear enough not to offend before agreed with Himmler to

After that Hess's replies began to appear in the correspondence which dealt exclusively with his wife. The deepest love and attachment, difficult to understand, was clear from previous conversations with her. I wondered why the British perhaps, having already examined the mystical and maniac notions of Hess, had not been more than a political censor.

It was astonishing how He was a fanatic or a madman, believing in revelations. He would recite prophecies, such as Nostradamus's, and also referred to old horoscopes as well as that of his family and signs of uncertainty which had led him to a depressive state. All this he explained in an elaborate manner to his wife. She of his and expressed her agreement and actually represented her perspective of consideration for him, I can

ended within ten weeks. Heydrich's own and Hitler shared, was that military defeat of the Soviet system that a subsequent infiltration would completely shatter it. Both Canaris and I knew of the military leadership was ludicrous, considered Heydrich's political theories exaggerated, Canaris's estimate of the political situation was quite the opposite of what I told me, however, that he had been empowered, his superior officer, to take this point of view that the measures planned by Hitler were so successful that the Soviet system, no matter how weakened, would not be able to withstand them.

Canaris estimates that the western Allies had made of the outbreak of the war, I felt convinced that they were committing a similar error. I tried to point out that perhaps it would be wiser to base calculations on the probability that Stalin might be able to reinforce his party and his government, and that for Russia would become a source of strength. Heydrich stopped this line of discussion coolly, 'If Hitler orders this campaign, a war will arise.' Another time he said to me, 'I mentioned the same sort of idea to me just two weeks ago. It seems to be developing some remarkably good morning rides together.'

I attempted to discuss the matter in May, pointing out that even supposing him to be one hundred years old still be better, just as a precaution, to prepare for other eventualities. I put in my place. 'Stop your hypocritical, statist objections,' he said. 'You have no right to say that since whether the *a priori* rejection of all plans, or whether many of them did not get, while denying them in discussion, fear might endanger their positions. The fact that

so many of them made no provision at all for their personal security in case of a débâcle, suggests that the former was true, and that they had, in fact, a blind faith in Hitler's leadership. However, I am convinced now, as I was then, that Heydrich's intellect was too coldly calculating for him not to have thought out all the possibilities. Yet one never knew what was really in his mind. Thus, one day in the summer of 1941, when we were together at his hunting lodge, he remarked to me, apropos of the direction the war was taking: 'The way things are being handled by us, there must be a sticky end. Also it's sheer madness to have created this Jewish question.' The meaning of this reference to the problem of the Jews became clear to me only when Canaris told me after Heydrich's death that he possessed proof of Heydrich's Jewish ancestry.

Canaris's great nervousness at this time about a two-front war seemed to be an expression of his deep pessimism. In our conversations he jumped erratically from one subject to another—for instance, in the middle of a discussion on American bomber production, he would suddenly start talking about political problems in the Balkans. Sometimes his remarks were so elusive, so vaguely and obscurely couched, that only those who knew him well could understand what he was driving at. This was especially true of his telephone conversations. Once I jokingly remarked over the telephone that I thought I really ought to tell Heydrich and Mueller about this 'pessimistic' line of talk. 'Oh dear,' said Canaris, 'I forgot we were talking on the telephone.'

Towards the end of April 1941, Heydrich telephoned me at my office. He made several vague allusions to the approaching campaign against Russia, but noticing that I did not really understand what he was talking about, he said, 'Let's have lunch together, then we can talk this over quietly.'

We met at one-thirty in Himmler's dining-room. I had just come in when Himmler entered surrounded by a swarm of his personal staff. He greeted me benevolently, then took me on one side. 'You will have a great deal of work during the next few weeks,' he said. I answered, rather dryly, 'That would not be anything new, Herr Reichsfuehrer.' Himmler laughed. 'Well, Heydrich has a lot of things planned for you.'

At dinner Heydrich discussed various problems in the Balkans, among them the question of liaison with various army commands, and asked me to discuss the matter with the proper Wehrmacht authorities. Then he began to talk of the Russian campaign. As I recall it, what he said was something like this:

'You were right—the Fuehrer has not been able to deal satisfactorily with the military and political problem of Britain. He now believes, as our air offensive has been a more or less complete failure, that Britain, given America's aid, might be able to speed up her rearmament. Therefore he's accelerating the build-up of our U-boat fleet. He aims to make our under-sea arm so strong that the Americans will be discouraged from ever actively coming into the war, because he realizes the danger of the USA co-operating closely with Great Britain.

However, he calculates that although Franco has refused to support us actively, we completely dominate the Continent, and you can rule out for a year and a half at least any attempt by the Western Allies to bring about decisive military action by an invasion. It's of the greatest importance that we make use of this period, and it seems to the Fuehrer that we can now attack Russia without the risk of our getting involved in a two-front war. But if this time is not made good use of, then one has to count on the certainty of invasion from the West, and in the meantime Russia would have grown so strong that we wouldn't be able to defend ourselves if she attacked us. Russia's preparations are so tremendous that at any moment Stalin could exploit any commitment of our forces that we may make in Africa or in the West; which means he'd be able to forestall any future action we may be planning against him. So the time for taking decisive action is now.

The Fuehrer is convinced that the assembled power of the Wehrmacht is so enormous that the battle against Russia can be won and Russia conquered in the time we now have. But Germany will have to rely solely on her own resources, because the Fuehrer's convinced that the British, with their petty shopkeepers' souls, haven't a broad enough vision to recognize the Russian danger. Russia's demands on Finland and Bulgaria and Rumania, and their latest political intrigues in Yugoslavia, show that they'll

soon be ready to bring matters to a head. Stalin will soon be ready to join.

For anyone hoping to save the Soviet Union is in error. Therefore, it's better to stave off the inevitable. We can trust in our own strength and confidence. In their opinion we shall win. He's still getting ready for action so great that the campaign should be completed by the end of 1941 at the latest.

The Fuehrer is well aware of the situation, and it's because of the smallest element of our strength allowed, he has insisted that a Civil Police are to be used. The Fuehrer is the Commander of the army. The Wehrmacht is also in the front line as well as the Security Police and the Gestapo on protecting us against sabotage for guarding important persons and the general security of the rear areas, so-called "Rollbahnen". [These are the roads designed to carry the supply columns moving across the plains.] Operations are expected to be carried out because of the large number of fighting units of the Security Police so that they can be active in the fighting zone. All this has been decided by the Fuehrer, and he has given his orders. It's an unusual situation, and aspects must be discussed in detail. General. The Fuehrer has had this occurred to me: this is the first time we have been engaged at the front; even the opportunity to prove himself should finally dispel the false ideas of the executive departments are now

and no understanding of the way not make things easier.

Himmler made his first open move in the organization. He urged me, not to forgo a secret service but to concentrate instead on the framework of AMT.

He then reported to him. He repeated and added sarcastically, 'He is official, after all.' He begged me to be thorough, and then went on to his decision: after the Russian campaign, I appoint you Deputy Chief of the organization. I will make you the Chief. This is the most difficult one that I have for you. Give me time to consider the matter. If you've done so, we'll spend an hour and we can discuss the whole thing.

He gave me his hand. I left the next day. I was very happy to go, for which I had waited so long. I was oppressed that it had been so long. From the very beginning I had been placed upon me. I was, however, and it is understandable, overburdened with work, and my thoughts already beginning to work.

Heydrich, Mueller and me to the most fashionable Berlin club—he wanted to make a last stand against over-optimistic Canaris. It was typical of Canaris to take as an occasion for giving exceptional importance to support against the optimistic

attitude of the Wehrmacht High Command, for it would be extremely helpful for him to be able to say: 'Heydrich too is not so optimistic in his estimate of the situation.'

But Heydrich was not worried. He said, 'Yesterday at dinner Hitler was in a very serious mood. Bormann tried to relieve him. He said to him, "You are burdened with great worries just now—the successful conclusion of this great campaign depends on you alone. Providence has appointed you as her instrument for deciding the future of the whole world. No one knows better than I do that you have devoted the whole of yourself to this task, that you've studied every conceivable detail of the problem. I am convinced that you have planned everything thoroughly, and that your great mission will surely succeed." The Fuehrer listened to all this, and then said that one could only hope he would be proved right in everything, and that in such a great enterprise one could never know with certainty whether all eventualities had been foreseen. One could only hope so, and pray to providence that the German people would triumph. All this,' Heydrich went on, 'was reported to me by Himmler on the telephone this morning, and it proves that the Fuehrer is not so optimistic as his military advisers.'

At the end of Heydrich's remarks Canaris concluded the conversation by saying that Hitler's attitude was very noteworthy, and in a way revealing.

At dawn the next day, June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht began the offensive on all sectors of the front, from the Black Sea to the northern regions of Finland. In General Halder's diary is the following entry:

'I have just described the plan for the Russian Campaign to the Fuehrer; the Russian armies will be destroyed in six weeks. . . .'

That afternoon I received a telephone call from the Foreign Office. They wanted me to take part in the negotiations on the exchange of diplomatic personnel. At exactly the same time as the Russian Ambassador, Dekanozov, with his entire staff and consular personnel, left Berlin, the German Ambassador, Count Schulenburg, and his entire staff were to leave Moscow. The two special trains were to meet at Svielengrad on the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier, where the actual exchange was to take place. The

strongly centralized authority of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD in the Central Office in Berlin? Terboven considered himself complete master of Norway, with unlimited authority to rule as he saw fit. The German police forces were to carry out his orders only. Directives from the central authority in Berlin were ignored or scoffed at; he alone was responsible to the Fuehrer for Norway. Himmler and Heydrich were of interest to him only as personal acquaintances. He could afford to act in this vainglorious and autocratic manner, since he had a very close relationship with Goering which went back to the time when Terboven was Gauleiter in the Ruhr—they had both had a hand in certain questionable transactions in which shares in the German steel industry were confiscated, ostensibly in the national interest.

The discussion quickly reached a deadlock and I was then invited to give my views, which I did, in spite of Terboven's latent—and later open—hostility. However, some progress was made and the meeting ended with Terboven declaring that he thought we could reach a mutually satisfactory solution.

In the evening there was an official dinner. Terboven saw to it that nothing was lacking, for in all things he aped his great patron, Goering. As we had foreseen, the party degenerated into a drinking bout. Terboven drank an incredible amount and forced all those around to keep pace with him. This was a favourite pastime of his. I felt so much out of place that I twice attempted to withdraw quietly, but did not succeed. Finally Terboven forced his two secretaries to ride about the room on bicycles, which was greeted with yowls by the drunken group. I remarked rather loudly, 'Quite a circus!'

Terboven must have heard me and had obviously been waiting for an opportunity to make a scene. He suddenly rose, came towards me, and said, standing very stiffly in front of me, 'Here, take this glass of beer——'. He held out a two-pint mug. 'Drink that down at once—you are malingering.'

I said that I was sorry, but because of my health I must decline. I had not even finished the sentence before Terboven tried to pour the beer over my face. But Heydrich intervened quickly and held him back, for which I thanked him. I remained for another five minutes, then left without a word.

Early next morning one of Terboven's secretaries came on me and asked me to come over. He wanted us to have breakfast with the secretary, who gave me various curious life and customs at the time. I was quite sorry for her.

At first Terboven clumsily tried to make the party. 'It seems there was a night—but you see, Schellenberg is much too sober.'

After breakfast there was another party, including Mueller, who Terboven gave in all along the line sailing in Oslo Fjord.

The following day I was able to do what I had planned to do. I was very busy in the British Secret Service, which was one of the freedom-loving Norwegian resistance movement very much interested in military intelligence, as well as for the purpose of being possible to infiltrate double information was to be gained, to think of to stimulate and encourage of betrayal had cost us valuable shortwave sets, and so on.

At that time the navy and the I had been warned to take preventive action by the Norwegian resistance those Norwegians who had to make supply lines should be arrested as to Germany. This would be the best way to prevent the Norwegian resistance from becoming was thought to be over-cautious right. Two attempts to install the much valuable time was lost. Finally and the shortwave transmitter was

assignment for you must have his approval. I'd like to know, my dear Schellenberg, how you've managed it. Still, I wouldn't count on the situation if I were you.'

After I had told him briefly about my trip to Sweden, he took out a small notebook and jotted down several points arising out of other matters which we discussed. As far as I can remember them, they were as follows:

First he told me all about Rosenberg's job of building up a government ministry for the East—Ostministerium—the principles of which had been established at a conference on July 16, 1941, where the German occupation policy towards Russia was laid down. Present at the conference were Goering, Keitel, Rosenberg and Bormann. Hitler's plan was to divide and govern Russia as a colony, ignoring the desire for autonomy among the heterogeneous peoples of the Soviet Union. But, of course, the intelligent handling of this enormous human force was a prerequisite for the effective exploitation of this huge area.

Heydrich's remarks revealed the insanity of Hitler's policy of subjection of the 'subhuman Russians'. 'Hitler,' he said, 'wants all the formations of the RFSF¹ to be used ruthlessly. He wants a well planned information system built up as quickly as possible, a system that even the NKVD couldn't improve on—exact, relentless, and working all the time, so that nobody—no leader like Stalin—could ever emerge again under the cover of an underground movement—never again in any part of Russia. Such a character, if he ever did appear, would have to be recognized in time, and destroyed in time. The mass of the Russian people were never dangerous on their own account. They're dangerous only because of the power in them of creating and developing such personalities.'

I looked at Heydrich thoughtfully. He could read my opinion in my glance, and he gave a shrug. Did he believe this nonsense? At such times he was unfathomable. I said quietly, 'A people of two hundred millions is hardly likely to be inhibited by foreign police methods—especially if those nationalities who already hate the Soviet system, and would be favourably inclined towards us, are

¹ A Nazi-sponsored Russian anti-Communist liberation movement.

* Hitler's anxiety over a
slapdash night

denied any form of authoritarianism into some sort of own idea was that we ought states and encourage the n. Then we could play them Ukrainians, for instance, the sians, think of personalities.

Perplexed and annoyed said, 'You don't understand of these different races, if decades, will have exactly Fuehrer was right.'

I was doubtful. I pointed nights ago, he himself had Crinis had made; that the phers and scientists had been the most racial fusion. 'That fellow has thought u low, certainly, but not to b closed the discussion with the Secret Service against great concern to me over t Stalin's internal measures those dealing with guerill tween the Party and the an

Meanwhile the atmosph eastern offensive had come mer campaign had been s For this the responsibility Wehrmacht and on Hitle Utopia, and had refused r returning field officers w disaster.

Stalin's calculations, of a gun to justify themselves report of the transfer of acknowledged with interes greatly exaggerated and n

throp. I was there punctually and was admitted at once. At that time his office was in a wing of the former Presidential Palace, though the offices of his Ministry remained at the Wilhelmstrasse. The place was furnished in exact imitation of the style of Hitler's new Chancellery. The study, with its huge desk and large windows, was heavily over-furnished with thick carpets, valuable tapestries, and ornate chairs covered with silk. Ribbentrop stood as usual behind his desk with folded arms. He received me very formally and it was obvious that he was out to impress me. He spoke slowly and with emphasis, as though he were receiving me for the first time. After a few words, he came from behind his desk, solemnly gave me his hand, and begged me to be seated. Then he sat down opposite me and said, 'Please begin at once. I am already familiar with the subject that you have come to discuss.'

During the first half hour his face remained completely unmoved. He listened to me with concentration. But when I came to speak of the organization of various liaison offices with other Ministries, he interrupted me abruptly: 'You don't mean that you are going to build up Secret Services for the other departments too?' With this question he showed clearly that he simply had not understood what I had been talking about. I began again from the beginning and explained to him carefully and slowly that these liaison offices would be indispensable, and that if he thought the matter over, he would realize how much the Foreign Office, and he personally, would profit by them, because, apart from questions of control and authority, the contact of these offices, and of myself personally, with other government departments could be used to deal with all sorts of questions of paramount interest to the Foreign Office. And they would all be handled on neutral ground, so to speak, as matters of importance to the Secret Service alone, not to the conflicting interests of various departments. If the Secret Service could work in close collaboration with the Foreign Office, both would benefit, for the power of the Reichsfuehrer SS would be behind this arrangement, and so it would be unnecessary for me to consult him, Ribbentrop, about every detail. In order to remove Ribbentrop's suspicions that this represented a manoeuvre by the SS to penetrate the Foreign Office, I suggested

that whoever was the chief of the section on the staff of the Foreign Office

Ribbentrop looked at me completely to understand, and the further my estimate he grew. I therefore decided to be aggressive. I even went so far as to say when we had purposely supplied reminded him of his conversation said plainly that the Secret Service no longer in a position to attack it, conclude that he was against it.

At this he grew excited and, as being personally attacked, he said. reasonable working relationship, but that we refused to regard the Foreign government department. Thereupon said that I felt the turn the conversation misunderstandings, and if he attempted to place my plan before him in my contempt he said, 'Thank you, I can

I then tried to get him to talk, so very interesting to hear his ideas methods of a Secret Service. Immediately I leant back in his chair with an expression I had handled the interview in the begun with a dissertation of my own to explain his ideas first. Unconsciously

His ideas on the subject were clear. In his opinion, there should not be agents working abroad. They should have financial means and should collect according to their own judgement be regularly supplied with information. Matters of detail were of no importance of foreign policy; all that mattered and these one had to be able to follow

He had the greatest faith in me, putting off my chair at this—and as far as

to make my position secure. Indeed, he took me into the Foreign Service. There, myself with the study of general questions, organization of a small Secret Service such as led to him once again that personalities in this matter, which did not concern me, would not agree with his ideas. I felt that most decisive for a Secret Service, and the efficient and methodical evaluation of the net could the real bases for policy be done through accidentally acquired the minds of ten or twenty people, no more.

He suddenly began to look tired, and he noticed that one half of his face and one eye. Some days later I reported this to Dr. Ribbentrop. In his opinion there was something obviously been called in more than once for Ribbentrop. In his opinion there was something, probably connected with a disease of which he had already been removed and the probably disturbed.

Efficiently and formally. All my illusions had could not agree with this man, not in any way and never show any understanding of the nature of the Secret Service.

Ribbentrop was inexplicable to me. Probably everyone else around him, Ribbentrop's bureaucratic exactness and carried them out to be that the foreign policy conducted a sort of appendage to his own struggle seemed to be governed by an inner feeling—though how much this was a basic feeling it had developed in him—or why—I could explain a great deal about his attitudes and, for instance, could one explain his else explain his garrulous and overbearing-

ness of mind really shocked me. They

showed clearly the reasons for the limitations of our Foreign Policy, and also for its basic stupidity. Between them, he and Hitler were obviously prepared to go to any lengths, up to the ruthless sacrifice, if necessary, of the German people. At the time of this first long interview with Ribbentrop I did not understand this clearly, though the basis of this policy must already have existed. But I felt something of the sort instinctively, and both he and I knew that we were worlds apart.

On the other hand, he did not altogether dismiss me from his mind. I heard from members of his entourage that again and again he asked about details of my earlier career, and would sometimes say something to the effect that, 'The Fuehrer is right—Schellenberg is nothing but a decadent lawyer, and one day we shall have to deal with him'. He even gave Luther orders to report every detail of our collaboration, and to note especially whether I made any derogatory remarks about him or the conduct of Foreign Policy. One will never be able to understand how Hitler, in 1939, saw fit to proclaim that Ribbentrop was the greatest master of foreign policy Germany had had since Bismarck.

Possibly during the day the Foreign Office would ask me to prepare a brief on the administrative structure of the Roman Catholic Church and its policy in the South American Republics. Then perhaps Himmler would ask me to let him have a comprehensive report on the British Foreign Secretary's relationship with his Prime Minister.

Besides all this, a number of memoranda would regularly arrive from Hitler's Chancellery asking for reports on problems ranging over widely varied fields of interest. For instance: measures taken by the Russians to deal with the problems of the Kulak; the development of national aspirations in the Crimea; the raw materials of the Urals, and the extent of their exploitation; the social measures taken by Kemal Ataturk, and their effect on modern Turkey; the petroleum resources of South America, and the attempts by the United States war economy to control them.

These requests were elaborated into the form of questionnaires, and were then sent out post haste to the various Government departments, the Secret Service, certain offices of the Wehrmacht—who often had nothing at all to do with the questions involved—and even to the Waffen SS. Thus, ten or more offices might set to work separately and with the proverbial industry of ants, for this was an order of the Fuehrer! Because of secrecy regulations, none of the offices approached would know that others were also working on the same problem.

After a while the reports would begin to come in. To impress the Fuehrer, of course, everyone wrote as much as possible. As a result, there emerged whole volumes of scientific dissertation, seventy per cent of them pure theory, lofty structures of deduction based on a minimum of fact. Even if these reports had been of real value, Hitler could not possibly have read all this stuff, let alone understand and digest it.

There were about 380 research institutes, subsidized by the Government through special funds, which were occupied with problems of geography, ethnography, population, politics, psychology and so forth. Each of them had a selected staff of scientific workers and if they received no assignments, they set themselves their own tasks. Each institution considered itself of major impor-

* the toy store.



Be

about guerilla warfare which to Himmler: every guerilla resistance movement, must in fact which binds the guerillas together. This idea must be actually renew the energy and the highest qualities for systematic partisan warfare remains always the decisive problem during many a year, and also with our Russian units and become clear to me that were systematically developed partisan units which exploited the war being conducted on

which the Germans were the basis for their partisan *Befehl* (order to shoot all) about the 'sub-human' shootings carried out by the units operating with the small constituted arguments in arousing a ruthless spirit

in reality Stalin welcomed whose validity I was practicing of them stated that the warfare was ruthlessness in which would make the population committed must always that a hesitant population resistance. If, because of had to be punished, this punishment would seem to be the population would then the struggle.

to the NKVD on how it

was to support the partisan bands. The NKVD was to send some of its best and most reliable agents as advisers and informers into the German Army and administrative offices. Their task, apart from keeping in close touch with the partisan units, either by sending false or accurate information, was to use their wits in influencing and inciting the German occupation authorities to take harsh measures against certain sections of the population, such as Jews and Kulaks. Executions, liquidations and deportations were, of course, to be presented as brutalities consciously committed by the Germans against the Russian people. It was a truly devilish programme which the Russian leaders seemed to have evolved, and its effects were no less brutal than the measures taken by the Germans.

Himmler and Heydrich did not believe the Russian leaders had the time or ability to work out such complicated ideas. I told them that I had based my views on the reports which had come in, and on the professional views of my advisers. Furthermore, I added, the Russian leaders seemed to have a much sounder knowledge of their own people than we had, deceived as we were by our own propaganda creation, the 'sub-human' Russian. For making this point I got a serious dressing down, and for a while had to keep my mouth shut.

Later I took up the subject once more, but this time very cautiously. I suggested that it would be necessary to offer the Russian prisoners working for us an ideal worth risking their lives for. National Socialism was not suitable; its ideals were alien to them. The obvious thing would be to hold out the hope of eventual autonomy. But no one was interested. They went on with the old policy of putting Russians in uniforms and giving them better conditions. They gave them medals and lectured them on the high German standard of living and the efficient organization of the German State. With some of them this policy showed results, but the majority needed something better suited to the Russian character, something which would satisfy their eternal longing for independence.

In later conversations I was able to speak to Himmler more openly about these problems. Towards the end of 1942, he showed a much more receptive attitude, but because of his basic

prejudices towards all eastern questions, I could hardly hope to succeed in obtaining his final agreement. He was too much influenced by the ideas with which Hitler had imbued him during the last twenty years. I had given up discussing this question with Heydrich very early on. He had revealed to me quite openly the way his mind was working when he said, 'Be careful you don't get a medal from Stalin one day.' This was clearly a warning that he only wanted purely National Socialist conceptions used in propaganda work among the Russian prisoners.

I had some interesting discussions with two members of the Russian Army, one of them a General Staff officer, the other a corporal. Both of them were from Moscow, the one a professional officer, the other in civil life a hydraulic engineer. They had been taken prisoner at Bryansk in August 1941, and had gone through several phases of our training programme. Both had proved open-minded, intelligent and reliable, so they had been co-opted on to a special advisory board of Operation 'Zeppelin' in Berlin and sent to live in lodgings as ordinary civilians. Here I visited them with the chief of the section and a Baltic German, a well educated man who was an excellent interpreter and had already had many discussions with them. Through him, a lively and interesting conversation took place, stimulated by a supply of drink that we had brought with us.

There was a considerable contrast between these two Russians. The officer was a trained dialectician and a convinced Stalinist. The other man was only moderately influenced by the régime and admitted its shortcomings with a healthy realism. Both of them were firmly convinced that Russia would win the war. This conviction did not spring from the influence of the propaganda to which they had been subjected, but was a fundamental belief. Each of them based his conviction on different reasoning. The officer derived his from Stalin's superlative qualities as a leader and from the strength of the Russian Army. The other man, who thought in more primitive terms, said simply, 'You Germans will never be able to overcome the Russian people and the vastness of Russia. Even if you managed to give the various Soviet peoples their independence, this would only be a temporary step to the inevitable development of Communism.' He also said that a wave

of national feeling was sweeping as *Kutusov, A Life for the Czar* in Moscow with great success. In successes to begin with, is the courage of the Russian people itself.

The officer spoke of what he of the Red Army. According to him as many as twenty to thirty the enemy deeper into the core the force of the Germans' attacks battles would be fought in the under the iron severity of the would eat up a great deal of the would be highly vulnerable to the Russians would not let a petrol fall into the hands of the forces of nature, their own success the Russians, the Germans would new, well organized counter-

After this conversation I was impressed by the simple manner of their opinions, which I had to

I reported these talks to Heydrich, of course, it was not easy to follow successes had been so tremendous Russian State and people could organization as would be necessary course, whether Stalin possessed carry out such a plan, although the waffe had not yet struck at the west and east of the Urals.

Heydrich discussed the matter in his written report to show Hitler. He returned to me by Heydrich, who considered it to be complete nonsense not quite of the same opinion', should not risk burning our fun

brunner blamed Himmler for my favoured treatment and demanded that I should be subject to the same rules and discipline as the other heads of departments in the Reich Security Ministry.

My next interview with Himmler was a very rough one. He castigated all my experts, called the scientists of the Wannsee Institute, and especially their chief, Professor A—, agents of the NKVD. He attacked me too, and said the burdens of my post were obviously becoming too heavy for me and that I was beginning to fall under the defeatist influence of some of my assistants.

I could not suppress a smile at this, whatever it might have cost me. Himmler was so astonished by this reaction that he looked like a scared rabbit: he had never encountered insubordination of this sort before. But I could react in no other way. Psychologically it seemed to be the correct reaction, for it dissipated the dangerous tension. 'Enfant terrible!' Himmler said, with a shake of his head. And with that I knew I had won.

I then began quietly but forcibly to state my case. After two hours there was no longer any talk of arresting anyone. Instead, a thoughtful Himmler sat before me, chewing his thumbnail. 'Well,' he said, 'it would be terrible if you were right. Still, one cannot let intellectual considerations deflect one into showing weakness, there is too much at stake. If we don't manage to overcome the East this time, we shall disappear from history. I believe we should follow your conclusions only after we've won the war against Russia.'

'That's the decisive point,' I said, 'when to start on this new course. But I must repeat—if we don't start now we may never have a chance to start at all.'

In the end, I failed to convince Himmler. Still, I had succeeded in defending my assistants and the political line of my department. Today that may seem unimportant, even academic, especially for those who have never been embroiled in a war of nerves and cannot appreciate the inner excitement and disappointments one suffers. To decide to continue one's own line of policy in these circumstances required some courage, for Hitler's sensitivity and pathological suspicion rose in direct ratio to the deterioration of our general situation.

X
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*Combating Russian espionage
the Russian network—A spy
of a code—The Luftwaffe
Russian transmitter—The s
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DEBKANOZOV, Russia break of war in 19 Russian Secret Serv Vietinghoff brothers, and r both in Germany itself an aroused Hitler's intense inte information about our Cou Russian Secret Service to b much more successful than In this case his intuition was

Towards the end of 1941 be taken immediately to a espionage activities in Ge Himmler was asked to sup Foreign Secret Service Dep partment of the Gestapo, an tion, to which we gave th Chapel', was co-ordinated efforts we not only discover many and the occupied cour extent to break it up.

After Heydrich's assassina on the job of co-ordinating soon serious tension arose worsened to such an extent were reporting to him toge

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hed by Hitler himself.

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'Schellenberg has the most
us all. However, the man
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nal Socialist Party. I do not
your objections, and I wish
the decision in this matter is

mine, not yours. He is, so to speak, the Benjamin of our leader-
ship corps, and therefore I shall give him my special support. I
have said this openly and in his presence because it accords with
the intentions of your murdered chief, and I consider Schellenberg
too intelligent to grow conceited because of what I have said. On
the contrary, I hope it will be a further incentive to him to work
carefully and industriously at the tasks assigned to him. If anyone
wishes to say anything further on this matter, or on any other
raised on this solemn occasion, he now has opportunity to do
so...

There was an oppressive silence. I had felt relatively calm until
this moment, but now I began to blush—the more as Himmler
again took up his theme, saying that from now on he wanted me
to work closely with him, that he needed my abilities, and wished
me to report to him as frequently as possible. Then, rather
abruptly, he adjourned the meeting.

In the evening Himmler, accompanied by SS Obergruppen-
fuehrer Karl Wolff, again gathered all the leaders of the RSHA in
Heydrich's office. This time he made a speech in which he dealt
with the essential phases in Heydrich's personal development, and
pointed out to the SS leaders their obligations to the memory of
their dead chief. It should induce them to give the best of them-
selves in their conduct and their work. He ended with a reference
to the increasing importance of our work abroad, hoping that as
we developed our shortcomings and the gaps in our tradition
would be overcome, for our achievements in this special sector
still could not compare with those of the British Secret Service.
Therefore, our motto should be: 'My Fatherland, right or wrong'
—as well as the general motto of our order, the SS: 'My Honour
is Loyalty'.

At the memorial service in the Reich Chancellery which pre-
ceded the state funeral, orations were delivered by Hitler and
Himmler. It was a most impressive spectacle, which did full
justice to Himmler's gift for pageantry and drama. In their ora-
tions both Hitler and Himmler spoke of 'the man with the iron
heart'. I could not help thinking that with all the Ministers,
Secretaries of State, High Party officials, and family mourners,
the whole thing was like a Renaissance painting.

CE

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 even to consider their

My work had forced me to realize that our leaders had no real understanding of conditions abroad. Their actions were determined entirely by their own narrow political views. The Foreign Office did nothing to change this situation. There may have been people employed in that department who saw things just as I did, but they played no part in the formation of the political will. None of them was willing to advance from recognition of the facts to the inevitable conclusion—that the idea of final victory was impossible; still less would they stand up for their opinions in front of their superiors.

I began to think seriously about the problem and came to the conclusion that as long as the Reich had the power to fight, it would also have the power to bargain. There was, in fact, still time to achieve a compromise with our enemies, but one would have to calculate coolly like a broker: it is better to lose fifty per cent than risk complete bankruptcy and lose everything.

At this time, in August 1942, our evidence showed that Stalin was dissatisfied with the western Allies. That this seemed to offer a realistic basis for doing business was confirmed by the Japanese for, in spite of the passing setbacks we had suffered on the eastern front, they still considered that compromise negotiations with Russia were possible.

The situation in the year 1942 had developed into a race for time. Britain was too weak to act alone, and was waiting for the arrival of American strategic material. Stalin was waiting not only for the delivery of material, but for effective relief in the opening of a real second front. So long as the western Allies delayed their invasion, no matter from what motives, there was a good chance of conducting compromise negotiations. Germany's superiority of power at this time placed her in a good position to bargain with both sides. It was important therefore to establish contact with Russia at the same time as we initiated our negotiations with the West. An increasing rivalry between the Allied Powers would strengthen our position. Such a plan had to be launched very carefully, however, and with regard to Russia we were handicapped by previous Japanese attempts to act as mediators, for we could negotiate more freely if we did not have to consider Japanese interests.

the Sino-Japanese compromise negotiations. This took up the entire morning. I had almost finished my resumé when Himmler suddenly changed the subject and said he was happy that I had made good friends with Kersten, and begged me to improve my relationship with Langbehn as well.

It seemed to me the time had arrived for me to broach the subject that was most on my mind. Himmler must have noticed that I had something to think about, for he said to me suddenly, 'You look so serious—are you unwell?'

'On the contrary, Herr Reichsfuehrer,' I said, 'the treatment I had from Dr Kersten today has toned me up considerably. I know how great the demands on your time are, but the most important part of my report is not in my briefcase—that's almost empty now; it's in my head. But I don't want to begin until I can be sure that you really have got time to listen in peace.'

Himmler, suspicious as always, became a little nervous. 'Something unpleasant? Something personal?' he said.

'Nothing like that, Herr Reichsfuehrer. It is simply that I want to place before you a matter that involves a most important and difficult decision.'

At this point Brandt was called in and Himmler made certain decisions, dictated several directives, and postponed various appointments and conferences. Then he invited me to lunch with his adjutants and secretaries and asked me to be ready to report to him again at four o'clock. In order to keep this appointment he set back his trip to Vinnitza.

During the meal I consciously restrained myself, and noticed how Himmler's curiosity was increasing. Several higher Wehrmacht and SS Leaders were present and Himmler was especially gay and jovial. He had the ability to change his personality as easily as he changed his uniform, from being the cool executive to being an amusing and pleasant host.

After lunch Himmler excused himself and disappeared with his shadow, Brandt. About half an hour later I was called into his study. He came from behind his desk, a thing he very rarely did, and asked me whether I wanted anything to drink, then invited me to sit down with him and lit a cigar—which was also unusual for him. 'Well, please begin,' he said cheerfully.

I asked his permission to do so, but he was more than usual because of this to raise. He nodded.

'You know, Herr Reichsfuehrer, I had preparatory work for the Court there once asked me to do a tremendous amount of work until in the end I had to stop. Well, the next morning I went to the Court. The first thing he said to me was, 'This remark had an ironical double meaning: 'to receive my report' and 'to receive my report'.

At this Himmler smiled and told the orderly to bring me a glass of water. I said with a smile, 'Perhaps you would like to hear my report.'

I went on: 'The President has asked me to report on the things about my report. I thought that as I'd quit my job, I was writing about, he asked me for advice which he hoped I could give him. I said that going through the points which could have been dealt with, why I hadn't dealt with them, said, why did I not give a more rigidly to the same line of thought, often have to face very difficult decisions. I do well to think of his position. "Make those words your own," he said. Looking Himmler in the eye, he said, 'Herr Reichsfuehrer, I have given you this question: In view of the alternative solution, your alternative solution.'

The ensuing silence lasted for some time. I was quite aghast. He could not speak. His remarks and must have been very slow. Slowly he came to life. At last he grew louder until he was

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I asked his permission to start in a somewhat broader manner
than usual because of the extensive nature of the matter I wished
to raise. He nodded.

'You know, Herr Reichsfuehrer,' I began, 'that I did my final
preparatory work for the Bar in Düsseldorf. The President of the
Court there once asked me to prepare a draft judgement; it in-
volved a tremendous amount of work and I kept putting it off
until in the end I had to do the whole job in two or three days.
Well, the next morning I was told to report to the President.
The first thing he said to me was, "I'm sure you'd like a cigar."' This
remark had an ironical undertone, for in German it has a
double meaning: 'to receive a cigar' is to be given a rebuff.

At this Himmler smiled for the first time, pressed a bell, and
told the orderly to bring me a good cigar. When I protested, he
said with a smile, 'Perhaps you prefer the President's.'

I went on: 'The President told me that there were two good
things about my report. One, I had been punctual with it. The
other was that as I'd quite failed to get any grip on the matter that
I was writing about, he could take the occasion to give me some
advice which he hoped I'd remember for the rest of my life. He
said that going through the evidence he had noticed three or four
points which could have led to different conclusions, and asked
why I hadn't dealt with these alternatives in my draft. Also, he
said, why did I not give an alternative verdict instead of keeping
rigidly to the same line of argument? Later in life, he said, I would
often have to face very difficult problems indeed, and would then
do well to think of his words: never forget the alternative solu-
tion. "Make those words one of the basic principles in your life,"
he said.' Looking Himmler firmly in the eye I went on, 'Well, you
see, Herr Reichsfuehrer, I have never been able to forget this
advice given me by a very wise man. May I be so bold as to ask
you this question: In which drawer of your desk have you got
your alternative solution for ending this war?'

The ensuing silence lasted a full minute. Himmler sat before me
quite aghast. He could not have misunderstood my introductory
remarks and must have realized quite soon what I was driving at.
Slowly he came to life. At last he spoke, softly, then in a voice that
grew louder until he was almost shouting at me. 'Have you gone

mad? You've been working too hard. Shall I give you five weeks' leave right away? Are you losing your nerve? And anyhow, how dare you talk to me in this way?

I remained completely cool. I waited until his excitement had subsided, then assuming for the moment a detached tone, I said, 'Herr Reichsfuehrer, I knew you'd go on like this. In fact, I thought it might be even worse. But I should like you to consider that even such a great man as Bismarck at the height of his power always kept an alternative solution in mind; and such a solution is possible only as long as one can keep one's freedom of action. Today Germany still stands at the zenith of her power. Today we are still in a position to bargain—our strength makes it worthwhile for our opponents to seek a compromise with us.'

In broad strokes I outlined to him the relationship of forces in the world as it appeared to me. As I went on he became noticeably calmer. My own assurance had its effect upon him. During the course of my remarks he became more and more interested. Every now and again he nodded. By the time I had finished, after an hour and a half, he had interrupted me only a very few times, and I was able to repeat my question in a different form: 'You see, Herr Reichsfuehrer, that was my motive when I asked you at the beginning—in which drawer have you got an alternative solution for the war?'

He got up suddenly and now he was pacing up and down the room. Presently he stopped and said, 'As long as that idiot Ribbentrop advises the Fuehrer, this cannot possibly be done.'

I said immediately that of course Ribbentrop would have to go. 'He is always fighting with the Reichsmarschall' (meaning Goering) 'and as the one wants to be Duke of Burgundy, let us make Ribbentrop Duke of Brabant.' Himmler understood the jest, and also the serious purpose behind my words. He went to his desk and opened the large map of his Brockhaus atlas. For several minutes he studied it intently. I, too, had risen for the sake of courtesy and he called me over to his desk.

'How will your ideas work out in practice?' he said. 'I think you overestimate Russia's strength, but I am very worried about what's going to happen when American war production really gets going. How—how are we to go about it? In my present posi-

tion I might have some chance get him to drop Ribbentrop if port. But we could never let He'd wreck the whole scheme compromise with Stalin. And

He spoke almost as if to him thumbnail, then twisting his signs that he was really concentring, and said, 'Would you be ing right away—without our weakness on our part?'

I assured him that I could.

'Very well. But how do you won't act as a boomerang? western Powers' determination

I said, 'On the contrary, Herr are started in the right way, it

'All right,' Himmler said, 'd proceed?'

I explained that such operations through the official channels should go through the political in case of misfiring, the personally discredited and dropped. essential for the other side to know they would be dealing had real were prepared to appoint such would promise to get rid of Rib I would take up contact with the removal would prove to them and that our plan had power rumours of a new Foreign Ministry policy would strengthen me

Here Himmler interrupted me to dig up Fraenzchen again?—time our Ambassador to Turkey let's forget that for the moment more carefully. Do you really think

XXXII

MUELLER

*Himmler in financial difficulties—Bormann's influence on Hitler—
First suspicions of Mueller's loyalty—His criticism of Party leaders—
Report of his death in Russia*

DURING THE summer of 1942, a serious conflict arose between Himmler and Bormann in which Himmler continually made small tactical errors which Bormann always exploited to the full. Himmler's biggest mistake, about which he told me a year afterwards, was made during a sort of truce between them in 1943.

Himmler's first marriage had been unhappy, but for his daughter's sake he had not sought a divorce. He now lived with a woman who was not his wife, and they had two very nice children to whom he was completely devoted. He did what he could for these children within the limits of his own income, but although, after Hitler, Himmler had more real power than anyone else in the Third Reich, and through his control of the many economic organizations could have had millions at his disposal, he found it difficult to provide for their needs. He therefore asked Bormann, his greatest opponent within the Party, for a loan of 80,000 marks out of Party funds—a completely incomprehensible action.

When he told me about this he said that it was for a building loan, and asked whether I thought he had not been taken advantage of over the rate of interest. What could I say? I suggested he should repay the loan immediately and secure a mortgage on his house, which could easily be arranged. But he rejected this with an air of resignation. It was a completely private matter and he wanted to act with meticulous rectitude; under no circumstances did he want to discuss it with the Fuehrer. Obviously he could not afford to pay a high rate of interest, or for that matter make any other payment out of his official income.

At about this time I began to know Himmler. He was a short, stocky man with a very large head. His head was always pushed forward on one side, and he had the face of an opponent. His fingers were covered with black hair. This was really grotesque. If I thought of Bormann, Bormann seemed to me. Meetings with him I had an impression of his influence with Hitler.

In Hitler's entourage it was a constant presence, made him do anything which concerned him in all large and small decisions. Indeed, Bormann was Hitler's daily life. He had the right word with which to push new interests into the Fuehrer's worries. He also had a valuable to Hitler, particularly the régime became, the decisions of such a war matter. The greater the burden on Bormann's continual presence with his stalwart and unsimplified complicated matters. He did this that even his solution. I saw examples of this by his exemplary manner of reporting.

I once discussed Bormann's confirmed my supposition. I told Bormann that it was his influence. Again and again I thought really it's my duty to out-maneuvre him without being responsible for a lot of the F.

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At about this time I began seeing a good deal of Bormann. He was a short, stocky man with rounded shoulders and a bull neck. His head was always pushed forward a little and cocked slightly to one side, and he had the face and shifty eyes of a boxer advancing on his opponent. His fingers were short, thick and squarish and covered with black hair. The contrast between him and Himmler was really grotesque. If I thought of Himmler as a stork in a lily-pond, Bormann seemed to me like a pig in a potato field. At later meetings with him I had ample occasion to consider the source of his influence with Hitler.

In Hitler's entourage it was Bormann who, through his constant presence, made himself indispensable simply by habit. In anything which concerned Hitler, Bormann was there. He shared in all large and small decisions, in all the excitements, rages and fatigues. Indeed, Bormann governed the range of these events in Hitler's daily life. He had developed great skill in finding exactly the right word with which to change unpleasant subjects and to push new interests into the foreground—in short, to dispel the Fuehrer's worries. He also had a cast-iron memory, which was invaluable to Hitler, particularly in the last years, for the more absolute the régime became, the more difficult it was to reconcile the decisions of such a war machine with the Fuehrer's commands. The greater the burden on Hitler's nerves, the more soothing was Bormann's continual presence at all hours of the day and night with his stalwart and unflagging spirit. He had the ability to simplify complicated matters, to present them concisely and to summarize the essential points in a few clear sentences. So cleverly did he do this that even his briefest reports contained an implicit solution. I saw examples of this several times and was so impressed by his exemplary manner that I decided to adopt similar methods of reporting.

I once discussed Bormann's personality with Himmler, who confirmed my supposition. 'The Fuehrer has become so accustomed to Bormann that it's very difficult indeed to lessen his influence. Again and again I have had to come to terms with him, though really it's my duty to get him out. I hope I can succeed in out-manceuvring him without having to get rid of him. He's been responsible for a lot of the Fuehrer's misguided decisions; in fact,

XXXIII

MY HOPES FRUSTRATED

*The case of Horia Sima—Ribbentrop and Under-Secretary Luther—
An agreement broken—Luther's arrest—Himmler's attitude towards
peace proposals revised—Ribbentrop's ban on their further discussion—
Talks with the Swiss Secret Service—Ernst Kaltenbrunner—His
hatred of Heydrich—Our working relationship*

AT THE end of 1942 the leader of the abortive Iron Guard *putsch*, Horia Sima, managed to escape from the SD school at Bergenbrueck, near Bernau. Mueller had organized a big search, but had not reported Sima's escape to Himmler. Nine days later Himmler telephoned to me in a terrible state and told me to go to Mueller immediately and do all I possibly could to help recapture Sima. I realized at once how dangerous this situation was for Himmler, and put all the resources of my organization to work on the case. Within four days I had got Horia Sima back to Germany.

Meanwhile, Ribbentrop had heard of his flight, and had also found out that Hitler knew nothing about it. This brought the bitter struggle between Ribbentrop and Himmler to a climax. Ribbentrop went straight to Hitler and told him that Horia Sima was again attempting a *putsch* from Italy. Without even ascertaining the facts, Hitler flew into a terrible rage, for he had given Marshal Antonescu his word of honour not to release Horia Sima until they had mutually agreed that he should do so. Ribbentrop managed to phrase his report so cleverly that Hitler was firmly convinced that Himmler and I were again trying to launch a plot in Rumania. He became mad with rage and for three hours shouted that this was a scandal and—referring to the black uniform of the SS—that he would smoke out this 'Black Plague' with fire and sulphur.

For us the whole thing was an ill-starred business from the very beginning. And Hitler's attitude was, after all, quite understand-

able: he simply could not
Sima's flight.

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able: he simply could not believe that Himmler had not known of Sima's flight.

The atmosphere was extremely tense for about ten days, then very slowly Himmler began to re-establish his position. However, this ridiculous incident had decisive repercussions and enabled Ribbentrop to strengthen and re-establish his own position, while it took Himmler a considerable time to regain Hitler's confidence. Mueller, to justify himself, wrote long reports. I alone was left to hold the baby, for of course Ribbentrop could not now be removed, and my credit was damaged with the western Powers, to whom we had promised that Ribbentrop would be got rid of. They no longer believed in the seriousness of our intentions and regarded the whole thing as a desperate attempt to upset the unity of the Allies. It is even possible that news of our first abortive peace feelers reached Roosevelt and that this may have decided him to put the 'Unconditional Surrender' resolution before Churchill at Casablanca.

My discussions with Himmler at this time about his failure to keep his promise concerning Ribbentrop were stormy. He was deeply depressed and seemed completely to have lost his nerve, and it was only with the greatest effort that I could get him to give further authorization for my plans.

Here I should like to digress for a moment in order to refer to the important and tragic part played in the moves against Ribbentrop by Under-Secretary of State Luther, of whom I have already made some mention. In spite of an estrangement that had developed in his relationship with Ribbentrop, Luther, who supported our ideas, had managed to persuade him of the importance of the Secret Service in the conduct of the war. The feelings between the two of them were aggravated by difficulties in their private relationships, particularly those that existed between their wives. Luther no longer felt able to meet the Ribbentrops' continual and increasing demands on the large secret Foreign Office funds for which he was responsible. So far he had managed to manipulate them in order to meet his chief's extravagant way of life, but things had got to such a pitch that he began to doubt Ribbentrop's sanity. For instance, the tapestries in the Ribbentrops' house had to be changed four times because their colours

scene

TED

Secretary Luther —
Luther's attitude towards
further discussion —
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were not precisely to Frau Ribbentrop's liking. Luther felt that he could not go on working under such conditions, and though he did not wish to be disloyal to Ribbentrop, whose closest confidant he was, he did not hesitate to tell me how things stood.

In view of what had passed between Himmler and myself at our long conference at Zhitomir in August, I felt that the time was ripe to inform Luther, very judiciously, of my plan for peace negotiations. I also mentioned to him the unfortunate influence which Ribbentrop had on Hitler, and begged him to help me to get material which might enable me to bring about Ribbentrop's downfall. Luther was convinced by my arguments, and indeed was very pleased that Himmler was adopting such a reasonable policy. It would now be much easier for Luther to forget his earlier resentment against the 'black corps', as he called it. Mentioning the continual difficulties he had had with the SS leadership, he said, 'Some of these gentlemen are utterly unreasonable—they want the earth. They don't understand my difficulties at the Foreign Office, and especially with Ribbentrop. I know they're constantly slandering me to Himmler, so I'm very glad of this opportunity to improve relations with him. I'll certainly give you all the help I can to ensure the success of your efforts.'

Towards the end of the year at a reception given by the Italian Ambassador, Signor Attolico, Luther met Himmler again after a long estrangement. I had told Himmler all about Luther's attitude, so he was well-disposed towards him and received him in the most friendly and even jovial manner. Luther in return began to behave like an ill-bred upstart. In spite of the many foreigners present, he buttonholed Himmler as though they were bosom friends and began to talk shop. It was the worst mistake he could have made. Himmler was extremely sensitive about such things, especially when he felt himself in the public eye; but though he was irritated he remained polite and friendly. This only encouraged the unfortunate Luther to further unwelcome intimacies.

The next day they both telephoned me. 'You know,' said Himmler, 'that man Luther really is a common, unpleasant sort of fellow—slimy and uncouth.'

I tried to defend Luther as well as I could. I said that he had prob-

ably been over-flattered by Himmler, tempted to open his heart to him. I persuaded Himmler to forget the incident.

Then Luther's clipped speech, over the telephone: 'I must say, my respect—he's a man one can talk to. I got on well with him. My boss concerned.' He went on for some time, suggested that I should call on him to have a talk.

When we met I gave him a good impression. Himmler was a man of a capable disposition who needed time to decide also that he should make no more out of it, so that I should have with Himmler beforehand. Luther he would do this.

Then one day in January 1943, I was in a state of great excitement. He had piled a file against Ribbentrop's personal behaviour, raised serious doubts as to his loyalty, indicated that he was obviously not a Foreign Minister. Confident of Hitler, he had sent this report to various officials, with the hope of bringing about Ribbentrop's removal. Luther and I were waiting for Himmler to say action. Luther therefore wanted to launch his attack without delay, and asked Himmler immediately.

I had to think the situation over. He had acted in defiance of our agreement. I was to maintain whether Himmler had managed his position with Hitler sufficient to attack against Ribbentrop. On the other hand, Luther's move, though it would be premature. Consequently, I waited upon Himmler's approval, which came very day.

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tempted to open his heart to him. Eventually I succeeded in per-
suading Himmler to forget the incident.

Then Luther's clipped speech, full of Berlin slang, came over
the telephone: 'I must say, my dear chap, your chief is a real
sport—he's a man one can talk to. You know, last night I really
got on well with him. My boss can lump it now, as far as I am
concerned.' He went on for some time, until in the end I sug-
gested that I should call on him the next day so that we could
have a talk.

When we met I gave him a good dressing down and warned
him that Himmler was a man of the most complex and change-
able disposition who needed time to reach difficult decisions. I in-
sisted also that he should make no move against Ribbentrop with-
out telling me, so that I should have a chance to discuss them fully
with Himmler beforehand. Luther gave me a solemn promise that
he would do this.

Then one day in January 1943, one of his assistants came to me
in a state of great excitement. He told me that Luther had com-
piled a file against Ribbentrop which contained reports on his
personal behaviour, raised serious doubts about his sanity, and in-
dicated that he was obviously not fit to carry on his duties as
Foreign Minister. Confident of Himmler's support, and of mine,
he had sent this report to various government departments in the
hope of bringing about Ribbentrop's downfall. Those involved
were waiting for Himmler to say the word 'go' before taking any
action. Luther therefore wanted me to induce Himmler to begin
his attack without delay, and asked me to arrange for him to see
Himmler immediately.

I had to think the situation over quickly—Luther seemed to
have acted in defiance of our agreement. I was by no means cer-
tain whether Himmler had managed to re-establish and strengthen
his position with Hitler sufficiently to be able to launch an all-out
attack against Ribbentrop. On the whole, however, I welcomed
Luther's move, though it would have been foolish to commit my-
self prematurely. Consequently, I made everything conditional
upon Himmler's approval, which I said I would try to secure that
very day.

This conversation took place during the afternoon. It was not until the evening that I telephoned Himmler, who told me to go to him at once. Unfortunately, I had first of all to discuss some urgent Secret Service matters with him, which took a great deal of time because of his lack of decision. I did not know that he had to appear at an official gathering that evening; however, I did notice that while I was telling him what Luther had done, he became increasingly nervous and impatient, and presently SS Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff looked in to warn him to get ready.

I had to act swiftly, and as soon as Wolff had left the room I began to press Himmler to take immediate action in support of Luther. But he hesitated, twisting this way and that, then was just about to say 'yes', when Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff appeared again, carrying Himmler's coat. Himmler rose, and in a few words explained the situation to him, then said, more by the way of a question, 'That, I presume, will settle—'

At this dramatic moment Wolff, who had always held Luther in contempt, butted in. 'But, Herr Reichsfuehrer, you cannot let SS Obergruppenfuehrer Joachim von Ribbentrop, one of the highest ranking members of our order, be kicked out by this scoundrel Luther. It would be a grave infringement of the rules of the Order. I'm certain you would never get Hitler's approval.'

Suddenly all Himmler's old animosity against Luther was revived. I knew only too well that if Luther were dropped now, for reasons of SS etiquette, his fate would be sealed. It occurred to me therefore that it might be more prudent to give up for the moment and return to the matter when circumstances were more favourable. But it seemed as if Luther's destruction was pre-ordained. A nervous restlessness had seized Himmler, and he muttered repeatedly, 'Yes, yes, Woelffchen, you are right.' I interrupted him: 'Herr Reichsfuehrer—I must beg you not to reach a hasty decision in this matter. It is too complex and its effects are too far-reaching.'

It was impossible to guess what was going on inside Himmler's mind at this moment; I imagine he was trying to gauge his present position with Hitler and decide what risks he could take. I felt the decision was going against me, but he left without making up his mind.

I was disappointed and at a loss. I could have had another talk with him, but his fixed habits I realized it turned over a thousand possibilities. Then at midnight I was a telephone call.

It was Mueller, who told me to turn Luther's case over to him, to put myself at his disposal and told me to have Luther's assistant the morning and get a written statement with me. This Mueller part of his evidence. I hung up in a most unpleasant situation.

The next morning I telephoned more evasive and indefinite, but calm down. After all, no final decision reached yet. Whatever happens I over and I'll give you a chance to

Luther's colleague was cross-examined and then arrested. A succession of interrogations. Finally, Luther himself a non-stop interrogation. All of opinions. Ribbentrop was serious, monies, and if the country had that should have been enough. But the machinery of the Third Reich the protocol of the High Order of Specially incriminating facts were and disappeared into Himmler's. Himmler did this in order to material should a need arise for it protect the good name of the SS.

After eight days Ribbentrop and went at once to see Hitler. (one-sided version of the incident. was nothing but an unpleasant at the foreign policy which Hitler

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I was disappointed and at a loss what to do next. I wished that I could have had another talk with Himmler that night, but knowing his fixed habits I realized it would be unwise even to try. I turned over a thousand possibilities and still could find no way out. Then at midnight I was aroused from my brooding by a telephone call.

It was Mueller, who told me curtly that Himmler had decided to turn Luther's case over to him for investigation. He asked me to put myself at his disposal and give him information. He then told me to have Luther's assistant in my office the first thing in the morning and get a written statement from him about his conversation with me. This Mueller wanted to use as the principal part of his evidence. I hung up without saying good-bye. It was a most unpleasant situation.

The next morning I telephoned Himmler. He could not have been more evasive and indefinite, but eventually he said, 'Now, now, calm down. After all, no final decision against Luther has been reached yet. Whatever happens I will have time to think the matter over and I'll give you a chance to discuss it with me once more.'

Luther's colleague was cross-examined by Mueller the next day, and then arrested. A succession of Foreign Office officials was then interrogated. Finally, Luther himself was arrested and put through a non-stop interrogation. All of them stood resolutely by their opinions. Ribbentrop was seriously incriminated by their testimonies, and if the country had been run by responsible leaders, that should have been enough for his dishonourable dismissal. But the machinery of the Third Reich worked in a different way; the protocol of the High Order of the SS stood above everything. Specially incriminating facts were removed from the testimony and disappeared into Himmler's desk. I was never clear whether Himmler did this in order to have a reserve of incriminating material should a need arise for it later on, or whether he did it to protect the good name of the SS.

After eight days Ribbentrop received a summary of the files and went at once to see Hitler. Of course, his was an extremely one-sided version of the incident. This affair, he told the Fuehrer, was nothing but an unpleasant attack by a subordinate official on the foreign policy which Hitler himself ordered. Ribbentrop de-

mandated that Luther should be removed from office for insubordination and hanged for defeatism. But this was too much even for Hitler. He must have discussed the case with Himmler too; anyway, he finally ordered that Luther be dismissed and put in a concentration camp for the duration of the war.

When I discussed the matter with Himmler later on, I did not try to conceal my disappointment. I told him frankly that his handling of the affair had been most unfortunate. Himmler silently accepted this reproach. I demanded that he should not carry out the severe sentences which Ribbentrop wanted to impose upon Luther's colleagues. Himmler agreed, and no further punishments were dealt out, except to a few officials who were transferred to front line duty with the Waffen SS. Hitler had expressly forbidden that I should visit Luther, but I used my influence with Mueller to secure preferential treatment for him. Later I heard that at the end of the war Luther refused to help in building a bridge for the Russians in the eastern Sector of Berlin, claiming exemption as a concentration camp inmate, and that he had been shot on the spot by a Russian sergeant for refusing to obey orders.

* * *

While I should have liked to go ahead as quickly as possible with the plans laid down at Zhitomir, I realized that hasty action would be fatal. I could only employ such Secret Service contacts as I had built up over the past few years, and I did not wish to use the most important of these hastily, but to reserve them for the final negotiations. At the same time, I confess I was a little worried by the fact that I, the youngest member of Himmler's staff, had succeeded in securing such sweeping authority for myself. I had to overcome a feeling of insecurity. Was Himmler's promise honestly and seriously meant? I already suspected a strong element of indecision in his character, and I decided not to rush my fences.

I began by establishing contact with a British official who was at that time in Zurich. He expressed his readiness to begin preliminary conversations with an authorized German representative. Later he sent word that he had in fact received authorization

from Churchill to carry out negotiations, subject to certain conditions, to come to Germany to put the Service level. He was well

After these preparations on the first steps that I had to take was to secure his agreement. Here I experienced my first contact with me for hours, and the matter were becoming more and more. At first I did not understand, but then I realized he was not imagining my disgust and in his master's manner, he came to me. It would be best to discuss the

I pointed out that the general line of policy he was following would be catastrophic if Ribbentrop's thing depended on his execution. It was likely—then we should discuss plans. I was at a loss to understand how to bring him in.

He replied to my arguments against the Fuehrer—I was not making a decision, and you'll have to make it.

And so the whole matter was as I could gather, neither a courteous and meaningful discussion—closed—and neither of the

As I had feared, all this was to discuss the affair with Ribbentrop apathetically, showing nothing, while Ribbentrop

It was obvious that Hitler was not serious, and later I received a note from him stating that I have never for the Secret Service to continue this as defeatism, which, I

an office for insubordination was too much even with Himmler too; dismissed and put in a bar.

Later on, I did not tell him frankly that his fortune was unfortunate. Himmler thought that he should not let Ribbentrop wanted to interfere, and no further officials who were often SS. Hitler had said, but I used my influence for him. He refused to help in the Political Sector of Berlin, and that he was a prisoner, and that he was a prisoner for refusing to

quickly as possible. I decided that hasty action was not in the Secret Service contacts. I did not wish to use them for the reserve them for the future. I was a little member of Himmler's authority for my own. Was Himmler's authority suspected a strong decision not to rush

an official who was ready to begin German representation and authorized

from Churchill to carry on such unofficial exploratory conversations, subject to certain assurances. Finally, he was even ready to come to Germany to pursue these talks at the appropriate Secret Service level. He was well informed about me and my attitude.

After these preparations were completed I reported to Himmler on the first steps that I had taken under his authority. My object was to secure his agreement before venturing any further, but here I experienced my first disappointment. He discussed the affair with me for hours, and I soon began to notice that his views on the matter were becoming more and more involved and changeable. At first I did not understand why he was behaving in this manner, but then I realized he was scared by his own daring. It is easy to imagine my disgust and disappointment when, in his best schoolmaster's manner, he came out with the suggestion that perhaps it would be best to discuss the whole thing with Ribbentrop first of all.

I pointed out that fundamentally this would be against the general line of policy he had laid down and developed. It would be catastrophic if Ribbentrop agreed to the scheme, for the whole thing depended on his exclusion. Should he reject it—as was most likely—then we should merely have called his attention to our plans. I was at a loss to understand Himmler's motives in wanting to bring him in.

He replied to my argument impatiently: 'I am tired of working against the Fuehrer—I want to work with him. That's my final decision, and you'll have to put up with it.'

And so the whole matter was placed before Ribbentrop. As far as I could gather, neither of them in discussing it went beyond courteous and meaningless formalities—fencing with their visors closed—and neither of them divulged his real thoughts.

As I had feared, all this put Ribbentrop on his guard; he decided to discuss the affair with Hitler. Himmler watched this development apathetically, showing a cowardly lack of decision and doing nothing, while Ribbentrop, as they say, 'cleaned up'.

It was obvious that Hitler discussed this matter with Himmler, and later I received a note from Ribbentrop in which occurred a passage that I have never forgotten: 'I forbid the political sector of the Secret Service to contact enemy nationals in this way. I regard this as defeatism, which, from now on, will be severely punished.'

On the other hand, if any Englishman should wish to converse with us, he must first hand us a declaration of surrender—an echo of Hitler's own words on the subject.

When we next discussed the matter, Himmler was sullen and taciturn, possibly because of a guilty conscience. In an impassioned appeal I declared that things could not possibly go on like this: it indicated a complete misconception of the nature of a Secret Service. One expected such things from Ribbentrop, but I asked Himmler to show more understanding for my tasks, as well as for me personally, and for the scheme which he himself had approved.

He rambled on evasively, and finally said, 'Well, you know, perhaps you did make a mistake after all, but I won't hold it against you. Perhaps it was unwise to contact the British directly. Maybe you should have used a neutral as a buffer.'

Of course, this was only an attempt to save his face. But I grasped the opportunity at once and answered casually, 'Very well, in the future I shall see to it that these things are handled through neutral channels.' I wanted to try to save at least part of the foundations laid at Zhitomir.

Himmler agreed. His reaction was typical; he seemed relieved, freed from the trammels of his own conscience, and therefore generous. I exploited this at once, and said that in future I would continue to work along the lines which we had discussed, but would take all possible precautions. I was careful to add, however, that contact between members of my service and enemy nationals might still occur, since this could not possibly be avoided.

Again Himmler's reaction was true to form: 'Well, I don't wish to know all those details—that's your responsibility.'

It was then that I decided personally to take up certain secret and long-standing service connections with Switzerland, for no other purpose than to try to bring peace one step closer. I had a personal conversation with Brigadier Masson, then Chief of the Swiss Secret Service, and this led to further talks. But the failure to remove Ribbentrop, Himmler's wavering, and the unconditional surrender policy of Casablanca, frustrated any real progress in the matter, despite continual efforts to keep these tenuous contacts in being.

After a short time Himmler succeeded in re-establishing his former position of power and confidence with Hitler, who at

length believed his version of the whole thing to the fact because no chief of the pointed to replace Heydrich the appointment of the would have been almost finally selected, Obergruppenführer was convinced that Kaltenbrunner was an Austrian the job, of which undoubtedly the Fuehrer were not the

Incidentally, Himmler's foibles, had been able to higher SS and police leadership post. Thus, even Kaltenbrunner's impending appointment day. Afterwards Kersten, a callous ox to examine a wood would be more suitably only capable of the be the right man for Hitler but he still seems to think

Kaltenbrunner was a genuine a real lumberjack. It was the character of the man, with the back of his head, coarseness. His small, pe they looked at one fixed petrify its prey. When something, his angular, wooden table and begin to speaking at the hands of an old the fingers were brown smoked up to one hundred

My first proper contact from the first moment his bad teeth and some of the

* A + B - alp

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length believed his version of the Horia Sima affair. He attributed the whole thing to the fact that Himmler had been over-worked because no chief of the Reich Security Centre had yet been appointed to replace Heydrich. Thus the whole matter also affected the appointment of the new chief of the RSHA. My own choice would have been almost anyone except the man whom Hitler finally selected, 'Obergruppenfuehrer Ernst Kaltenbrunner. But Hitler was convinced that this countryman of his—for Kaltenbrunner was an Austrian—had all the necessary qualifications for the job, of which unconditional obedience and personal loyalty to the Fuehrer were not the least important.

Incidentally, Himmler, in accordance with one of his peculiar foibles, had been able to arrange for Dr Kersten to examine all the higher SS and police leaders who were being considered for the post. Thus, even Kaltenbrunner, having no idea as yet of his impending appointment, was examined by the 'fat fellow' one day. Afterwards Kersten said to me, 'I've seldom had such a tough, callous ox to examine as this fellow Kaltenbrunner. A block of wood would be more sensitive. He's coarse, hard-bitten, probably only capable of thinking when he's drunk. Naturally he'll be the right man for Hitler. I gave Himmler a report on all this, but he still seems to think he's the right man.'

Kaltenbrunner was a giant in stature, heavy in his movements—a real lumberjack. It was his square, heavy chin which expressed the character of the man. The thick neck, forming a straight line with the back of his head, increased the impression of rough-hewn coarseness. His small, penetrating, brown eyes were unpleasant; they looked at one fixedly, like the eyes of a viper seeking to petrify its prey. When one expected Kaltenbrunner to say something, his angular, wooden face would remain quite inexpressive; then, after several seconds of oppressive silence he would bang the table and begin to speak. I always had the feeling that I was looking at the hands of an old gorilla. They were much too small, and the fingers were brown and discoloured, for Kaltenbrunner smoked up to one hundred cigarettes a day.

My first proper contact with him was in January 1943, and from the first moment he made me feel quite sick. He had very bad teeth and some of them were missing, so that he spoke very

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Of particular importance to him was the fact that he knew of my aim to separate the Secret Service from the RSHA. The significance of this was reinforced by the fact that though he was Chief of the RSHA, I was the only one of the departmental chiefs under him who had the privilege of direct access to Himmler, who had quite clearly indicated to Kaltenbrunner the nature of my exceptional status. On the other hand, Himmler gave Kaltenbrunner the right to take a personal interest in the Secret Service abroad, and indeed encouraged him actively to occupy himself with the needs of my department. My having direct access to Himmler was the worst thorn in Kaltenbrunner's flesh. My limited interest in nicotine and alcohol was another thing which infuriated him. On several occasions he tried to force me to exceed my quota of one or two glasses of wine.

The more desperate the situation became towards the end of the war, the more Kaltenbrunner drank. I would find him in his office at eleven o'clock in the morning, having risen hardly more than half an hour earlier, his small eyes dull and empty. With the joviality of a drunkard he would reach under his desk, or bellow 'Orderly!' and pour out a glass of champagne or brandy for me. Then, when he became too obstreperous, I would take a nip or two to pacify him and pour the rest on to the carpet. Usually he did not notice this, but once when he did, the veins in his face became so swollen with rage that I thought he was about to have a stroke.

In the last years of the war I was forced to have lunch with the departmental heads of the RSHA, which we all had together on Himmler's orders. Kaltenbrunner presided, and availed himself of the opportunity to attack me in the most sadistic manner. To put up with this cost me dear. I complained to Himmler that this half hour took more out of me in nervous control than ten days' hard work. Himmler was much concerned and tried to calm me by telling me not to pay any attention, but because of Kaltenbrunner's relationship with Hitler, Himmler considered it important that I should not increase my reputation for unsociability. Among the top leaders I had few friends and many enemies, so there was nothing for me to do but to put up with it. I am not exaggerating when I say that because of such associations alone those terrible last years of the war seemed a real torture to me.

the German leaders not to consider the areas concerned as German colonial territories, but to grant them at least some form of autonomous administration.

I had informed Himmler of this situation in various detailed reports, which, if proper attention had been given to them, might possibly have prevented the worst stupidities of our political administration in the Russian areas—certainly in the Ukraine. Himmler agreed with several of the points that I raised, but lacked the moral courage to argue them with Hitler.

In spite of Ribbentrop's attitude, which by now amounted to almost continual sabotage, I was able to maintain my contacts with the Turkish police and the Turkish Secret Service. I was aware, of course, of the diplomatic manoeuvres of the Turks towards the western Powers, which was routine diplomacy. Ribbentrop, however, completely failed to understand the necessary give and take of diplomatic life. *

In order to counteract our political and military decline during 1943, I invited leading officials of the Turkish Government to Germany, having of course told Hitler and Himmler that I intended to do so. I thought it important to show my Turkish guests the positive side of National Socialism—the tremendous industry of the German people, and our great war effort; apart from official receptions and festivities, I also arranged sight-seeing tours.

After a visit to the eastern Front, my guests crossed Germany to inspect the Atlantic Wall and the bomb-proof U-boat harbours. I was given astonishing latitude in the matter of information: I was allowed, for instance, to give our guests arms production statistics, which until then had been a most closely guarded secret. In Berlin they were shown one of the anti-aircraft installations of the Waffen SS, and the newest machine-guns and automatic weapons were fired for them in one of the underground firing ranges in the centre of Berlin.

At an official reception at the Turkish Embassy I had an opportunity for a long conversation with the Ambassador which for once did not touch on politics at all. He had a deep knowledge of the Turkish language and all its dialects and told me that these dialects formed an unbroken chain from the shores of the Black

* D. T. The tennis player as autocrat. (But he understood Guélén in Hitler—always got back to the more extreme course.)

many and Russia were parachuting agents into each other's territory, but Turkish counter-espionage would make sure that in future no such operations were carried out from their territory.

We were able to read this exchange of notes, and it was apparent to us that the Turks were getting 'cold feet'. So I decided to take this matter up personally with the Chief of the Turkish Secret Service and try to find out whether co-operation between us was still possible. I also wanted to avail myself of this opportunity of seeing the German Ambassador, von Papen, in Ankara. I wondered whether he might not be the right man to suggest ways and means of negotiating a compromise peace.

Trade relations between Germany and Turkey had broken down over the delicate point of further Turkish deliveries of chromium ore to Germany, and I thought that a little pressure might easily put things right. I also intended to carry out an inspection of our Secret Service organization in Turkey.

When I presented the plans for my trip to Himmler, he not only agreed with them but told me that Hitler himself had been considering this kind of approach in the negotiations over chromium ore. I was rather surprised that all my suggestions, even the discussion with von Papen, were so readily agreed to. It seemed that Himmler was still willing to pursue the plans I had suggested to him at Zhitomir.

Before my departure I insisted on a consultation with Ribbentrop. He gave me a lengthy lecture about Germany's political position and asked me to emphasize in my conversations with Turkish officials Germany's enormous military strength, the united will of the German people, and their faith in final victory. I was to point out that there were set-backs in every campaign, but that the concentrated power of the German nation would make up for all this.

I asked Ribbentrop whether he wanted me to concentrate exclusively on this attempt to influence Turkey politically, or whether I should attempt a solution of the chromium ore problem. He looked at me like a frightened rabbit. He realized at once the trap that lay behind my question. Suddenly he was in a great hurry to conclude the conversation. He knew me well enough by now to realize that his empty chatter made no impression on me.

vasion of the Balkans. Obviously Roosevelt's military advisers played a decisive part in this question. The political situation in the Balkans may have seemed too complex and uncertain; also such strategy would favour British interests in South-eastern Europe, and Roosevelt was still continually afraid of a possible Russo-German understanding.

The documents photographed by 'Cicero' showed clearly that a special status was provided for Turkey. There were, unfortunately, no indications about Greece. However, it was quite evident that according to the agreement reached at Teheran, Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia would come under the 'protection' of the Soviet Armies. Stalin even demanded that Poland should become Russian territory as far as the Curzon Line and should receive parts of eastern Germany in compensation. With defeat growing ever more imminent, Germany's ultimate fate could clearly be foreseen.

The study of these documents was quite breath-taking. Our evaluating commentaries were simple and straightforward, and there was no mistaking their meaning. Only Ribbentrop tried to read between the lines, and saw there, as always, continuing tension between Russia and the western Allies—and, of course, found a ready audience in his supreme master.

Hitler reacted as I had expected. He declared that now more than ever before it was necessary to gather all our forces for total war, for total destruction of the enemy by means of a ruthless expenditure of all physical resources.

'Cicero's' reports obviously put Himmler into a state of uncertainty. Shortly before Christmas 1943, he asked me to go to see him. I was reporting on various matters when suddenly he interrupted me: 'Schellenberg, I realize now that something has to happen. Only everything is so terribly difficult——' I could hardly believe my ears when he went on to say, 'For God's sake don't let your contact with Hewitt¹ be broken off. Could you not let him be told that I am ready to have a conversation with him?' 1944

¹ Mr Abram Stevens Hewitt, President Roosevelt's special representative in Stockholm.

From that point on the blows fell in rapid succession. 'Cicero's' documents showed clearly that the continued neutrality of Turkey would be short-lived. Step by step the Turks were going over into the Allied camp. The Turkish diplomats proceeded carefully and according to plan—almost exactly as Knatchbull-Hughessen had described in his dispatches to the Foreign Office. First, there was the continuation of neutrality, but with the concentration of Turkish forces in Thrace to tie down German divisions in Bulgaria. Meanwhile, there were increasing shipments of Allied war material to Turkey, and finally, more and more consultations between the Turkish and Allied General Staffs. According to the documents, this process of wooing the Turks over was to be completed by May 15, 1944, and was in some way connected with Operation 'Overlord'. Therefore, from that date on we had to count on an all-out effort from the West.

Had Churchill been able to carry through his plan for an invasion of the Balkans at the end of 1943, then, according to my calculations at the time, the war would have been over in the spring of 1944. The Balkans were like an overripe plum, ready to fall at the slightest touch, and this would have torn open the German South-eastern flank. Instead, the western Allies inaugurated the bombing by their strategic air arm of important road and railway junctions and oil installations. The first victim, according to the schedule photographed by 'Cicero', was to be Sofia on January 15, 1944. The city was thus forewarned in ample time, though there was nothing much we could do to counter the attack.

About February or March 1944, 'Cicero' stopped his activities, and in April Turkey broke off relations with Germany and went over to the camp of the western Allies.

From the beginning I was convinced that 'Cicero' had worked with one or more accomplices. I never discovered his motives—whether greed, hatred, or just love of adventure—but often during my many journeys my thoughts would turn again to this strange case. Again and again I wondered whether perhaps there lay behind 'Cicero' the shadow of the Turkish Secret Service. The more I thought about this, the more likely it seemed to me that through his material Turkey had tried to warn Germany and prevent her from continuing on her path to total destruction. At the

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ference of her loyalty
thus be safeguarding
Russia.

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XXXVI

THE DOWNFALL OF ADMIRAL CANARIS

A blunder by the Abwehr—Heydrich orders a surveillance of some Abwehr personnel—I sound Canaris on a leakage of information—A Catholic intrigue—Friction between Canaris and Heydrich—Administrative defects in the Abwehr—Canaris's dossier goes to Himmler—His campaign against Canaris—The Admiral's arrest ordered—He declines an opportunity for suicide—Our last meeting

BY THE end of February 1942 the position of Admiral Canaris was no longer secure. His friends and subordinates may not have been aware of it, but I knew that Hitler was seriously considering getting rid of him. His downfall was precipitated by an incident that assumed considerable importance in the battle of wits between technicians that was joined throughout the war.

Since the middle of 1941 we had put into operation a new device for defence against enemy aircraft. It had been developed with great skill by the technical department of the Luftwaffe and was being employed so extensively that our anti-aircraft defences were able to determine exactly the position and distance of all approaching enemy aircraft. This device, together with our highly developed automatic aiming devices, enabled us to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy, as all the main airbases of northern and western Europe were covered by it.

One of the most important installations from which it was operated was at Cap d'Antifer, near Le Havre. At midnight on February 27, 1942 a British Commando unit made a surprise raid on the installation. They succeeded in removing important parts of it and took photographs of other parts that could not be removed. After massacring the German garrison, they were able to withdraw with their booty. It can well be imagined that this daring and successful stratagem aroused no great enthusiasm in Hitler's headquarters. He was in a blind fury, and this time his

anger was justified, for serious shortcomings especially in the camouflage installation.

After brooding over Himmler and demanding the western Powers be explained bitterly about information on this subject.

The technical research report based on their tortured equipment. However, he demanded that Canaris's organization be fore him. As usual, Canaris was sealed.

This was the opportunity for a decisive attack on Canaris. My AMT VI would have the Abwehr—the Admiral Canaris. I said that at that time any additional response to their decision not to act for the time being.

Later on, when I admitted that my reluctance made no difference: it was Canaris, but the Fuehrer and organization of a

The fact that I could not do more difficult for me. I was a man with many horses almost more than me, 'Schellenberg, all You see, my dachshund cannot say that of any

He was very good

gether, and his attitude towards me was always kind and paternal. Whether in Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Poland, Finland or Scandinavia, Canaris always had a fund of knowledge about the peculiarities of the countries, and especially about their cooking and their wines. In the South he always made sure—in spite of the great heat—that I wore a woollen stomacher! And he would ply me with all sorts of medicaments and with pills which he himself constantly took.

He often asked me to attend the various meetings of his organization, and I was thus able to acquaint myself with the weaknesses of the Military Intelligence Service. In this huge over-inflated organization, Canaris's methods were far too humane. His subordinates were able to twist him round their little fingers, and when he was eventually forced to take strong measures, he would always try to make up for his severity afterwards.

In many ways he was of an almost mystical turn of mind. Though he was a Protestant, he was a great admirer of the Roman Catholic Church, of its organization and of the strength of its faith. He was greatly influenced by Italy and the Vatican and many of his conspiratorial activities could be traced back to this influence.

His first attempts at peace negotiations dated back to 1939 and were centred on the Vatican. It was for this reason that Heydrich gave the 'file Canaris'—dealing with the circle round the Admiral and General Oster, of the Supreme Military Command—the code name *Schwarze Kapelle* (from the Black Chapel in Rome). Heydrich opened this file on Canaris to be able to bring about his downfall at any given moment.

During the last days of May 1940 I became deeply involved in these intrigues, in which, of course, Canaris featured prominently. I was working in my office one evening when Heydrich telephoned me and told me in his high, nasal voice to come to his office. Mueller had also been summoned, and when he and I entered the room, Heydrich motioned us to sit down without saying a word. For almost a minute we sat round the table in silence. Mueller watched the smoke of his cigar thoughtfully and drummed nervously with his fingers. I waited for what was coming.

Heydrich opened the conversation, 'What about the in Munich—Josef Mueller, very pretty clear that this is the ci the Vatican?' (Later it turned the Jesuit Father, Dr Leibniz tempted to sponsor a peace movement without Hitler. The D'Arcy Osborne, had assured Government would be in a change of régime in Germany launched in the West. He Sudeten territories could reach agreement of the French Government. Then Heydrich turned to remember that this Josef Mueller's service—I believe, in right?'

Not for the first time memory. Dr Knochen, and I told me that a man named Josef Mueller of the Papal hierarchy. Mueller was a very clever man. I trust him, his reports were this to Heydrich, who no Mueller, he said: 'See to watched.'

He then went on to say that the Reichsfuehrer had asked important cases of treason in time ago two wireless messages. Minister at the Vatican to him. In them he gave the exact thirty-six hours before it was this information was also. The Fuehrer's enraged about

¹ Hans von Dohnanyi, a judge, and was executed in April 1945.

his pre-ordained fate and let it run its course. Inflated with ideas and travelled restlessly from one sector of the front to another, he made real attempts at a far-reaching decision at the decisive moment. He was the outcome of the war and the

both from a human standpoint. I took no account of the fact that the two irreconcilable opinions were the apparent facts, and here he was over-inflating his organization with workers and dubious riff-raff and then allowed to peter out. A nightmarish oppression, for to develop if no efficient work was being done, was necessary intelligence? How were we to influence the leaders and, if necessary, policy?

For me the climax, as in the summer of 1943 was the penultimate of the tragic conclusion.) I explained to my colleagues in industry to drive them to the greatest extent possible, clearly that otherwise we could not do our work. Our information was well founded that we would have to face the necessity of an alternative

to directly suspect in a matter of fact at the time when General Canaris was with the western Allies with a view to a possible manoeuvre, together with the German High Command, our Military and Political Department, to the imminence of such a

change. Yet in spite of this, Canaris's reports to his immediate superior, Field-Marshal Keitel, were reassuring. Hitler's anxiety and suspicion had been aroused, however, by my reports. But as the only possible preventative measures would have to be of a military nature, the army had the last word. At Keitel's suggestion Canaris was sent to discuss the situation with General Amé—a suggestion which was probably Canaris's own in the first place. For he and Amé were both agreed that Italy's exit from the war should proceed undisturbed by any German measures. This agreement, of course, remained a secret between the two, while officially Amé's reassurances were brought back to Keitel: Long live the Axis—Italy is the most faithful of allies.

Six days later I was able to present Himmler with a dossier which included absolute proof of Canaris's treachery. Nevertheless, Himmler refrained from passing the dossier on to Hitler. The facts of the case came to light in the following manner. One of Canaris's assistants, Colonel Helfferich, was on the staff of the German Military Attaché in Rome, General von Rintelen. The Colonel employed two Italian chauffeurs who were both homosexuals and both in Amé's service. I pointed out the dangers of this arrangement to Canaris, but Helfferich was of such high standing that he pooh-poohed my warning. 'Ach, Schellenberg, after one's been in our profession a while one begins to see pink elephants everywhere.'

One of these chauffeurs was unwittingly the most valuable source of information for my political Secret Service, for he repeated all Amé's assignments and conversations to a friend who was in our pay. Thus we were able to piece together a very clear picture of the planned coup, and of how far Canaris was involved in the affair.

I remember adding the following sentence to the dossier which I gave to Himmler: 'It would have been better for Admiral Canaris to have concerned himself with his own tasks in Italy, rather than to carry on such sessions with Amé.'

During the years 1941-1942 the greater part of the work of my organization was concerned with silencing treacherous informers in Italy. Until the capitulation of the Afrika Corps in May 1943, there was not a single German tanker, troopship or aerial transport

whose position was not reported to the western Allies. This is an established fact. It certainly would have been more in the interests of the German soldiers if the Abwehr had honestly carried out their tasks of counter-espionage.

Active? Himmler always held Canaris up to me as a wise and experienced chief of Secret Intelligence from whom I could learn much. His faults and his opposition to the régime were another chapter, with which I need not concern myself. When I presented my reports about his various betrayals, Himmler would nervously tap his thumbnail against his teeth and say, 'Leave the dossier here with me. I will bring it to Hitler's attention when the right opportunity arises.' Again and again I raised these matters because of their importance to Germany's war effort, but Himmler obviously did not wish to be burdened with the responsibility. Like Heydrich, he seemed to have some inhibitions with regard to the Admiral. I am certain that at some time or other Canaris must have got to know something incriminating against Himmler, for otherwise there is no possible explanation of Himmler's reaction to the material which I placed before him.

During the following years Canaris's work grew continually worse. In spite of his intelligence, his behaviour aroused suspicion and many people became convinced that he was involved in treasonable activities. Himmler had decided to employ a sort of snowball tactic against him. He never spontaneously expressed his opinion on Canaris to Hitler, but always waited until the problem of Canaris was raised by Hitler himself. Meanwhile, he saw to it that other leaders, both political and of the Wehrmacht, who for one reason or another were opposed to the Admiral, continually kept the subject of Canaris in the limelight. Himmler regularly furnished this anti-Canaris clique with new material against him, and so added continually to the stiffening opposition.

In the middle of 1943 Canaris's staunch supporter, Keitel, tried to come to his aid by arranging a game of musical chairs in Canaris's departments. He told Hitler that he had taken these steps as Chief of the OKW. A fresh wind was to blow in Canaris's service and new heads were appointed to all departments. But this last attempt was in vain because by 1944 Canaris's personal and professional failings had so incriminated him in Hitler's eyes that

he had been relieved of it that the conduct of the war was in the hands of the German Intelligence: one of the main points of in 1941.)

The inevitable downfall at the beginning of August 1941, I was called to the Secret Service office with a phone call from SS Gruf Kaltenbrunner, had been into the plot of July 20. (me and tried to incriminate voice Mueller ordered me him that he was under : Kaltenbrunner. I was to take, and not to return was been cleared up.

I said that I was not an carrying out such an assignment. 'Furthermore,' I said, is an imposition.'

'You know,' said Mueller charge of the investigation refuse to comply with that will have to suffer the consequences.

I realized at once what that would have an excellent Mueller and Kaltenbrunner bore me, had already tried agent in connection with. Therefore I had to be on Mueller I hung up. After that to comply. I also thought able to be of some help to Baron von Voelkersam al accompany me. The Baro operations in Belgium in 1 had also served under Can-

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 of the Wehrmacht, who for
 to the Admiral, continually
 delight. Himmler regularly
 new material against him,
 ing opposition.

each supporter, Keitel, tried
 game of musical chairs in
 that he had taken these steps
 as to blow in Canaris's ser-
 to all departments. But this
 1944 Canaris's personal and
 and him in Hitler's eyes that

he had been relieved of his post. The official reason was simply
 that the conduct of the war now demanded the creation of a uni-
 fied German Intelligence Service. (It may be recalled that this was
 one of the main points of the programme which I had set myself
 in 1941.)

The inevitable downfall of Canaris came on a Sunday afternoon
 at the beginning of August 1944. I was working in a military
 Secret Service office with several others, when I received a tele-
 phone call from SS Gruppenfuehrer Mueller. He and his chief,
 Kaltenbrunner, had been assigned to carry out the investigation
 into the plot of July 20. (Both of them had their suspicions about
 me and tried to incriminate me with all their cunning.) In a sharp
 voice Mueller ordered me to drive to Canaris's home and inform
 him that he was under arrest—this was an official order from
 Kaltenbrunner. I was to take Canaris to Fuerstenberg in Mecklen-
 burg, and not to return with him to Berlin until everything had
 been cleared up.

I said that I was not an executive officer and would not dream of
 carrying out such an assignment, which was most unwelcome to
 me. 'Furthermore,' I said, 'I shall telephone Himmler at once. This
 is an imposition.'

'You know,' said Mueller, 'that Kaltenbrunner has been put in
 charge of the investigation of July 20—not Himmler! If you
 refuse to comply with the order, which I herewith repeat, you
 will have to suffer the consequences.'

I realized at once what their game was. If I refused to obey they
 would have an excellent excuse for proceeding against me.
 Mueller and Kaltenbrunner, in the abysmal hatred which they
 bore me, had already tried in 1943 to denounce me as a British
 agent in connection with the affair of the lawyer, Dr Langbehn.
 Therefore I had to be on my guard. Without another word to
 Mueller I hung up. After considering what to do, I finally decided
 to comply. I also thought that in this difficult situation I might be
 able to be of some help to Canaris. I told SS Hauptsturmfuehrer
 Baron von Voelkersam about the situation and ordered him to
 accompany me. The Baron had distinguished himself in airborne
 operations in Belgium in 1940 and in the Caucasus in 1943, and he
 had also served under Canaris.

Himmler. He had known nothing about Kaltenbrunner's move against me. He assured me that he would have an interview with Canaris, and this must have taken place, for there is no other explanation of the fact that Canaris was not sentenced to death until the very last days before the collapse of the Third Reich.

The evidence against him, was certainly sufficient to satisfy the People's Court, under its blood-thirsty President Freisler, of his guilt. In July 1944 two dispatch cases containing incriminating documents had been discovered in a safe in one of Canaris's offices outside Berlin. They supplied final proof of his and his collaborators' guilt. In 1944, however, Himmler was still powerful enough to protect Canaris from the death sentence, and instead he was sent to a concentration camp at Flossenberg in Bavaria.

From the middle of 1944 I took over Canaris's Military Intelligence Department, incorporating its various tasks in departments IV and VI of the Counter-Espionage organization.

In March 1945 Hitler and Kaltenbrunner jointly ordered the execution of Canaris.

OPERATION

Exchange of information material from abroad 'Tapping' Britain's secrets—Aktion Bernhardt—Roosevelt assassination—The

I ALWAYS considered the most important time Manpower the most brilliant experts, until its greatly helped in a rank of SS Brigades powers of a division the Waffen SS.

I spent a great deal of co-operation of the various services. Al Thiele, the heads of regularly exchange, so I gave a dinner for the three services, Stations discussed their problems. The single factor responsible technical side of me which these people most of my success

The problem of enemy countries is intelligence service

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ous tasks to work on

Goebbels, as Propaganda Minister, had established a compre-
hensive monitoring service which served mainly to supply his
Ministry with suitable material for propaganda to enemy coun-
tries. This service, with its host of foreigners working as monitors,
was of course a breeding ground for the enemy's intelligence ser-
vices, and was therefore under constant and thorough surveillance
by the Gestapo. My approach in this matter was cautious and in-
volved a great deal of patient and painstaking work, in which I
was given valuable assistance by Naumann, Under-Secretary of
State in the Propaganda Ministry, who also enjoyed the fullest
confidence of Himmler. Naumann, a dynamic personality, identi-
fied himself fully with the tasks of the Secret Service, and indeed
he was the only one who was able to match and counter the bril-
liant dialectics of his chief.¹ Time and again he managed to
neutralize violent attacks by Goebbels against me personally.

During 1943 Goebbels and I were at loggerheads over the ques-
tion of the treatment of the churches. I had warned Himmler not
to fall in blindly with Goebbels's and Bormann's anti-church
campaign, for as Hitler's heir presumptive he would lose any
potential confidence abroad once he allowed himself to be in-
volved in these matters. Under the influence of Goebbels a point
had been reached in the autumn of 1943 when Hitler was seriously
considering the deportation of the Pope into a kind of exile at
Avignon. In extensive reports I tried to point out the immense dis-
advantages that would result from such an action and how it
would discredit Germany in the eyes of the entire world. At last,
Himmler agreed with my views and took the matter up with
Hitler, who then gave him a comparatively reasonable answer: 'If
full churches contribute to the maintenance of unity amongst the
German people, then I cannot object to it, in view of the strains
imposed by such a war as this.'

The set-backs we had received in rapid succession in the years
1943 and 1944—the capitulation of our armies at Stalingrad, the
collapse of our African army in Tunis, the landing of the Allies in
Sicily, the fall and arrest of Mussolini, the capitulation of Italy, all

¹ Werner Naumann was arrested by the British authorities in January 1953,
together with six other Nazi leaders on the grounds that they were trying to
seize power in Germany. He was released in July of the same year.

in 1943, and finally the invasion of France in 1944—confirmed the analysis of the situation that I had given to Himmler at Zhitomir during August 1942.

In view of this meeting, I had taken up indirect contacts with the Russians through Switzerland and Sweden, and it seemed to me that they were genuinely interested in negotiations which might end the fighting with us. But all my efforts were wrecked by Ribbentrop's shortsighted clumsiness and his incredible conceit and optimism in spite of all reverses. Before agreeing, for instance, to meet the Russians, he demanded proof that their representatives were not of Jewish origin. Of course it may easily have been that the willingness of the Russians to negotiate was simply a manoeuvre to bring pressure on the Allies to open their Second Front. But whatever the reason, we were in no position to turn them down.

As soon as I heard from Dr Kersten that a Mr Hewitt, an American diplomat, was in Stockholm ready to talk about the possibility of peace negotiations, I took a special plane to Sweden. Mr Hewitt was Roosevelt's special representative for European affairs. Taking all possible precautions for secrecy, I met him in his suite at one of the largest hotels in Stockholm. Afterwards I asked some well-informed Swedish friends to tell me precisely the extent of Hewitt's influence. The references they gave him were excellent. Apparently he had a decisive influence on Roosevelt in all matters concerning Europe. Therefore, on my own responsibility and without reservations, I told him how essential a compromise peace was to Germany. He agreed to arrange official negotiations as soon as I gave my consent. When our talks ended, I flew back to Berlin and worked all night on a report to Himmler.

The next afternoon at three o'clock I saw him and informed him fully about my conversations with Hewitt. He was confused and quite aghast at my independent actions, and kept shaking his head and literally gasping for breath. Then he began to talk and gradually worked himself into a state of rage. Fortunately at its climax he had to take part in some ceremony, but later he called me to his office again to continue our talk. There followed a heated discussion between us. I was lucky not to be arrested, but all my plans were upset. My powers of persuasion, my efforts to present

my analysis of the situation of G comprehensible to Himmler, wex the spell which Hitler still ex

* 1

When in the summer of 1944 I see him at his summer residence apprehension. I had not heard for sure that he must have been bro which would solve all problems I combined the trip with an inter up his headquarters in a special mountain retreat. I was very over just when I was taking over Can Service.

Ribbentrop lived at Fuschl in magnificent park, which the state that he could receive important Hitler. Contrary to his usual cordiality, asked how my work important my department had to whether this was plain hypocrisy motive. Calmly I waited for his f

After declaring his wholehearted of the Secret Service, he said he v United States and especially on R He also wanted me to arrange t agents to work in America on t visualized a great radio campaign national minorities in the Unite Roosevelt's re-election. We discussed why these minorities should vent Roosevelt's re-election. He l "They don't have to have any important thing is for us to find a ties by broadcasts from Europe. Tl

I pointed out that there were among them the great burden be

fist and looked like a lump of mud. The idea was for it to be attached to Stalin's car. The charge contained a fuse which was controlled by short-wave and was so powerful that very little remained of the car on which we tried it out. The transmitter, which would automatically set off the explosives, was the size of a cigarette box and could send out an ultra-short-wave for a distance of about seven miles.

Two members of the Red Army who had previously been exiled for a long time to Siberia, and one of whom was acquainted with a mechanic in Stalin's garage, accepted the assassination assignment. They were flown in a large transport aircraft at night and dropped near the place where our agents had informed us by short-wave that Stalin had his headquarters. The two men jumped and, as far as we could ascertain, landed at the correct place; but that was the last we ever heard of them, although they both carried short-wave transmitters. I doubt very much whether they attempted to blow up Stalin. I feel it is more likely that they were either picked up soon after they landed, or that they reported their mission to the NKVD.

1944
 Meanwhile the threat of collapse was coming nearer. When Himmler took me with him to report to Hitler in the Fuehrer's headquarters, there was the usual atmosphere of intensive work and excitement. I had not seen Hitler for a long time and was really alarmed by his appearance. His eyes, which before had been so strong and dominating, were listless and tired. His left arm trembled so violently that he was forced to hold it, almost desperately, with his right hand. He tried to hide the ungainliness of his movements. His back was so bent that he appeared hunch-backed. His gait was clumsy and heavy. Only his voice was still as strong and clear as before, but more staccato, his sentences shorter.

He and Himmler were striding up and down the room. They broke off their conversation as soon as I entered, and Hitler sat down for a moment, then turned to Jodl and gave orders concerning the eastern front—the replacement of two divisions in the central sector, and other military matters. Turning to me, he discussed several of my recent intelligence reports: the problems in the Balkans, especially relations between General Mihailovitch and the British, and British relations with Tito. He also wanted to

know more about our intelligence. Then he asked about the eleventh, reported as briefly and concise

Suddenly he rose, looked at me with a voice which vibrated with anger. There was a long pause, and then he said accusingly in the air of that day: 'To show visible signs of uneasiness in two steps. But Hitler follows. Remember this one thing, I demand no compromise, there can be no compromise. The German people cannot be destroyed. I shall say: Yes, then they deserve to perish. Their hood will have fallen in battle and the German people will be destroyed.'

I felt that stark insanity stalked about and any ties which still bound him at that moment, for he was willing to sacrifice his own people. He would do it in the vengeful spite.

I recall another conversation in which I was present. Hitler discussed the infantry units would be employed. Armoured units composed of tanks, able to withstand all types of attack. Liquid fuel would no longer be used. It would have an operational radius of 100 metres without the need for refuelling. New types of incredibly destructive weapons.

Before the launching of the attack in 1944 Hitler summoned his staff. He dwelt at length on the 'fight for the East and West' and emphasized the struggle and death struggle. 'If Germany is biologically inferior and will perish. It is the West that forces us to fight. It is the winner who will

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know more about our intelligence activities in the Near East. Then he asked about the elections in the United States, and I reported as briefly and concisely as possible.

Suddenly he rose, looked at me piercingly, and said in a deep voice which vibrated angrily: 'I read your reports regularly.' There was a long pause, and the words seemed to stand, suspended accusingly in the air of that room. I noticed that Himmler began to show visible signs of uneasiness. Involuntarily I had retreated two steps. But Hitler followed me, and said in the same voice, 'Remember this one thing, Schellenberg: in this war there can be no compromise, there can only be victory or destruction. And if the German people cannot wrest victory from the enemy, then they shall be destroyed.' I shall never forget his concluding words: 'Yes, then they deserve to perish, for the best of Germany's manhood will have fallen in battle. Germany's end will be horrible, and the German people will have deserved it.'

I felt that stark insanity stood there in the middle of the room, and any ties which still bound me to the man fell away at that moment, for he was willing to condemn what was dearest to him, his own people. He willed the destruction of all this to satisfy his vengeful spite.

I recall another conversation between Hitler and Himmler at which I was present. Hitler claimed that by the year 2000, no more infantry units would be employed in warfare: there would be only armoured units composed of one-man tanks. These would be able to withstand all types of weapons, including chemical ones. Liquid fuel would no longer be needed, and the tanks, which would have an operational radius of more than two thousand kilometres without the need for servicing or supplies, would carry new types of incredibly destructive armament.

Before the launching of the great offensive in the Ardennes in 1944 Hitler summoned his army commanders to his headquarters. He dwelt at length on the 'fateful position of Germany as between East and West' and emphasized that this was for Germany a life and death struggle. 'If Germany loses, it will have proved itself biologically inferior and will have forfeited its future existence. It is the West that forces us to fight to the last. However, it will transpire that the winner will not be the West, but the East.'

** toward the end - his daydreams*

XXXVIII

PEACE FEELERS

Herr Musy's efforts to save Jewish internees—Discussions between Himmler and Herr Musy—Kaltenbrunner frustrates the efforts of the International Red Cross—A message from Count Bernadotte—Himmler consents to a meeting with the Count—Agreement reached on the transference of prisoners—The SS supervise the transfer

WHILE HITLER's fortunes declined rapidly, I had to make frequent and desperate use of my position with Himmler to ensure that at least Swiss neutrality was respected, and I honestly feel that it is largely due to my influence with and through Himmler, which I was never tired of exerting to the utmost, that a 'preventive' occupation of Switzerland did not take place. Needless to say, these purely negative interventions were inevitably linked with my ceaseless attempts to establish direct or indirect peace feelers. My efforts brought on me the wrath of Kaltenbrunner, Bormann and Mueller, who were waiting for just such an excuse to bring about my downfall. They almost succeeded.

A radio message about Dr Langbehn's negotiations with Allied representatives in Switzerland was intercepted, and the fact that Dr Langbehn had my blessing in this completely unofficial undertaking was mentioned, as well as Dr Kersten's part in furthering these negotiations. Kaltenbrunner and Mueller immediately arranged for a secret investigation, but Kersten's influence with Himmler saved me from disaster. Later I was able to repay Dr Kersten by warning him or taking counter-measures whenever Mueller's Gestapo had plans to liquidate him.

It was at this time that my contacts in Switzerland brought me into touch with Herr Musy, a former President of Switzerland. He was an utterly selfless man, highly intelligent and knowledgeable, who had one aim—the saving of as many as possible of the hundreds of thousands of concentration camp inmates. Towards the end of 1944, after weeks of persuasion, I managed to arrange a

secret meeting between Musy and I. He kept the conversation on general human personality and clever arguments managed to exert, made Himmler understood, however, that he was not in favour of Jewish concentration camps, cars, medicines and other things. Musy made a counter-suggestion himself with payments in foreign currency to the International Red Cross. Himmler's killing of thousands of Jews was impossible for Germany's foreign policy; he saw the effect such an action would have on Hitler. I realized during this talk that himself from his past record on this never work up enough courage to of the talk ended with a suggestion recognized by the United States that they would eventually emigrate there, the question with certain Jewish circles.

Just before Musy left for Switzerland, he proved his sincerity by conceding that a number of prominent Jewish names were released. Himmler reluctantly agreed to see that the arrangements were made. I asked him to keep in close contact with me during the meeting between them.

I immediately got in touch with him to take care of these prisoners, but possibly because I was not a member of the Gestapo, I could not reveal its internal affairs. I asked him to contact the officials in charge of the camps, and I was able to find out what they were and get them better food and receive food packages; in some cases civilian clothes and lodgings in the event of emigration. All this required the constant and constant liaison with the Gestapo.

-Discussions between
rates the efforts of the
Count Bernadotte —
Agreement reached on
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secret meeting between Musy and Himmler. At first Himmler kept the conversation on general lines, but at length Musy's forceful personality and clever arguments, together with the pressure I managed to exert, made Himmler come to a decision. He let it be understood, however, that he would only agree to a mass evacuation of Jewish concentration camp inmates in return for tractors, cars, medicines and other things of which we were badly in need. Musy made a counter-suggestion that Himmler should content himself with payments in foreign currency to be credited to the International Red Cross. Himmler could not realize that the freeing of thousands of Jews was important from the point of view of Germany's foreign policy; he seemed only to be concerned with the effect such an action would have on the Party clique and on Hitler. I realized during this talk that he genuinely wanted to free himself from his past record on the Jewish question, but he could never work up enough courage to take the decisive step. This part of the talk ended with a suggestion that Switzerland should be recognized by the United States as a place of transit for Jews who would eventually emigrate there, and Musy promised to discuss the question with certain Jewish organizations in Switzerland.

Just before Musy left for Switzerland I persuaded Himmler to prove his sincerity by conceding one of Musy's special requests: that a number of prominent Jews and Frenchmen should be released. Himmler reluctantly agreed, and asked me to be responsible for seeing that the arrangement was carried out. He also asked me to keep in close contact with Musy and arrange a further meeting between them.

I immediately got in touch with Mueller to get his permission to take care of these prisoners, but he rejected this request, ostensibly because I was not a member of the Gestapo, and therefore he could not reveal its internal affairs to me. However, he did allow me to contact the officials in charge of the various Gestapo establishments, and I was able to find out where the various prisoners were and get them better food and lodging and enable them to receive food packages; in some cases I was also able to get them civilian clothes and lodgings in hotels, and to arrange for their emigration. All this required the unravelling of endless red tape and constant liaison with the Gestapo offices.

Fall
1944

The second conference between Himmler and Musy was at Wildbad in the Black Forest on January 12, 1945. The following agreement was then reached through my active intervention:

- (1) every fourteen days a first class train would bring about 1,200 Jews to Switzerland;
- (2) the Jewish organizations with which Herr Musy was working would give active support in solving the Jewish problem according to Himmler's suggestions. At the same time, the beginning of a basic change in the world-wide propaganda against Germany was to be brought about;
- (3) according to my suggestion, it was agreed that the money should not be paid over directly to the International Red Cross, as had originally been decided, but should be handed to Musy as trustee.

The first transport went through at the beginning of February and everything functioned very well. Musy acknowledged the receipt of the five million Swiss francs, which were paid to him as trustee at the end of February 1945, and also saw to it that the fact was made known to the press, as had been agreed, while an article was published by President von Steiger of Berne, and another appeared in the *New York Times*.

Unfortunately a decoded message referring to these arrangements, which came from one of de Gaulle's centres in Spain, was brought to Hitler's notice. It was alleged in this message that Himmler had negotiated with Musy through his representative, Schellenberg, to secure asylum in Switzerland for 250 'Nazi leaders'. This obvious nonsense, cunningly circulated by Kaltenbrunner, had the most uncomfortable consequences for me. Hitler immediately issued two orders: that any German who helped a Jew, or a British, or an American prisoner to escape would be executed instantly: any such attempt was to be reported to him personally.

Musy was desperate and shed tears of rage and bitter disappointment. During his last visit to Berlin we both decided to make a final attempt to see if some sort of plan could be worked out. I suggested to Himmler that a four days' truce on land and in the

air be requested from the west to be used to bring all Jews and lines in an organized manner. I brought the chief of the Pr Gruppenfuhrer Berger, into to pass on many of Hitler's of hundreds of people.

Herr Musy and I felt that Allies through official and accepted. Further negotiation promise, which would benefit but indeed all men. However place this proposal before Himmler instead to the leader Kaltenbrunner, who himself gave your head?' This was on April

Musy and I agreed after that done. In view of the continued Himmler must be made to the evacuation of all concentration camps to the Allies. After a long discussion matter Dr Kersten, who was considerable influence on Himmler. I was able to tell Musy on April 15 that not to evacuate any concentration camps. His decision be conveyed to the Allies as possible. In spite of being ordered to leave in his car that same night that Washington had received favourably.

He then sent his son back to the Jews whose release from Buchenwald Himmler personally. The young man was very badly that preparations had been made and at once came to see me in Berlin.

I had been quite certain that the plan was carried out. However, after

and Musy was at 1945. The following intervention:

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Herr Musy was working the Jewish problems. At the same time in the world-wide was brought about; need that the money of the International Red should be handed

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air be requested from the western Allies and that this period should be used to bring all Jews and foreign internees through the front lines in an organized manner, and thus show Germany's goodwill. I brought the chief of the Prisoner of War Administration, Obergruppenfuhrer Berger, into this plan. He accepted my advice not to pass on many of Hitler's orders, and by doing so saved the lives of hundreds of people.

Herr Musy and I felt that if such a truce was brought to the Allies through official and responsible channels it would be accepted. Further negotiations might then lead to a general compromise, which would benefit not only those directly involved, but indeed all men. However, Himmler lacked the courage to place this proposal before Hitler. Favouring the plan himself, he turned instead to the leader of the circle around Hitler, to Kaltenbrunner, who himself gave me his answer: 'Have you gone off your head?' This was on April 3, 1945.

Musy and I agreed after this that there was only one thing to be done. In view of the continually worsening military situation, Himmler must be made to issue an order to prevent the evacuation of all concentration camps which might be overrun by the Allies. After a long discussion Himmler finally consented (in this matter Dr Kersten, who was then in Stockholm, exerted considerable influence on Himmler and was of great help to me) and I was able to tell Musy on April 7, 1945 that Himmler had agreed not to evacuate any concentration camp, and especially asked that his decision be conveyed to General Eisenhower as quickly as possible. In spite of being over seventy years of age, Herr Musy left in his car that same night, and three days later informed me that Washington had received the message and had reacted favourably.

He then sent his son back with the car in order to fetch several Jews whose release from Buchenwald had been promised him by Himmler personally. The younger Musy went to the camp commandant and was very badly received. He was horrified to notice that preparations had been made for the evacuation of the camp and at once came to see me in Berlin.

I had been quite certain that Himmler's original order would be carried out. However, after hearing Musy's story, I decided to

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Chancellery, and would often be alone with the Fuehrer for hours afterwards. However, in order not to risk a personal rejection, he also requested Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein (whose wife was Eva Braun's sister) to ask Hitler about the Count's visit. Fegelein reported Hitler's reaction the next day and repeated his comment: 'One cannot accomplish anything with this sort of nonsense in a total war.'

In the meantime, Count Bernadotte had already arrived in Berlin. I spoke to Himmler on the telephone and begged him earnestly not to miss this opportunity to receive the Count, and emphasized that various points of political interest would be bound to come up during their discussions. After talking back and forth for a long time, Himmler finally agreed to a suggestion that would still leave a line of retreat open to him: Kaltenbrunner should speak to Ribbentrop, while I at the same time should speak to Wagner. Both of us should try to persuade Ribbentrop to receive Bernadotte, but not to inform Hitler, and Ribbentrop should not be told that Hitler had already expressed objection to the visit. If Ribbentrop agreed, then Kaltenbrunner and I could receive the Count immediately afterwards. Himmler would thus have time to see how the affair was developing before committing himself officially. What actually happened, however, was that Count Bernadotte telephoned to me from the Swedish Embassy. First he was received by Kaltenbrunner and myself, and went to see Ribbentrop immediately afterwards.

Though I was reserved during this first conversation, I felt that I had established good relations with the Count. In this visit I saw the possibility of pursuing my original plan—to end the war for Germany. Contact with Sweden could be extremely important in this connection, for she would have a special interest in the pacification of northern Europe. Thus my original effort to do something for Denmark and Norway would be in line with the Count's aims. The next step would be to secure Sweden as a mediator for a compromise peace. At the close of our conversation the Count again told Kaltenbrunner that he wished to speak to Himmler, having something which he wanted to say to him personally and alone.

I decided to make a bold move to try to win Kaltenbrunner

over, in spite of his personal had left, I praised Kaltenbrunner in which he had responded to that he had handled this delicate the old Austrian school of diplomacy fully, and I continued by telling to Himmler that it was now and appoint him, Kaltenbrunner thinking Kaltenbrunner too hardly hold him. In the subsequent Himmler he became the most meeting between Himmler and orders forbidding it. Himmler the Count, on condition that I meeting. Disillusioned and Kaltenbrunner soon returned to his

The meeting between Count place at Hohenlychen two days to offer him some advice about prepare him for some of Hitler's original plan had been to turn prisoners to Sweden and international war. I knew that this would be a compromise proposal—that there a central camp in north-west fact, the basis of an agreement Himmler during their meeting

I had an opportunity of speaking after his conversation with me, and was deeply impressed by him, and with him. He wanted me to sign an agreement, which, as he very considerable difficulties from Kaltenbrunner from Ribbentrop too. I was tired of the conversation and he could present them to the

First, I informed Kaltenbrunner of my satisfaction. He began to reproach me

whom he brought into the...perable technical difficulties...Utopian; he was not in a...for all the widely dispersed...nor would the Camp...been suggested), since it was al...thing, he grumbled, when...themselves statesmen talked...their ideas...

and the petrol, I replied that...The quickness of my counter...guard and he agreed to it with...But the next day he raised...Germany were crowded with...on the German people to have...full of prisoners. To this I said...during the night, and I offered to...ment to this operation. Thus,...personnel saved many lives...with the Swedish Red Cross in...Polish and Jewish prisoners, and...uncertainty among the camp...orders which came in from...sight of in the general con-

XXXIX

HIMMLER SHIRKS THE ISSUE

The struggle for Himmler's soul—I try to persuade him to act—His fear of Hitler—His bodyguard degraded—Pressure on Himmler to end the war

AFTER THE meeting with Count Bernadotte I talked very seriously to Himmler, and told him clearly that the collapse of Germany was inevitable. I begged him to avail himself of the good offices of Sweden and attempt to steer the wrecked German ship of state into the harbour of peace before it capsized. I suggested that he should ask Count Bernadotte to fly to General Eisenhower and transmit to him his offer of capitulation.

I also tried to make it clear that his proper place as the Commander of an Army Group was in Berlin, and not in Prenzlau. He should have realized that it was Hitler's advisers who, for the second time, had succeeded in removing him from the Fuehrer's side. He ought to return to Berlin at once and arrange preparations for peace. If need be, he must use force. It was a very stormy conversation, but Himmler finally gave in and granted me the widest authority for negotiating with Count Bernadotte. But the next day he revoked everything. He would only permit me to retain superficial contact with the Count and perhaps influence him to fly to Eisenhower on his own initiative. From that day on—it was at the beginning of March 1945—there was an almost daily struggle between Himmler and me in which I wrestled for his soul.

I had already told Count Bernadotte about this struggle. In our talks we had agreed that I was to notify him as soon as Himmler finally made up his mind (I had planned to accompany the Count myself on his flight to General Eisenhower) and we also arranged that in case the Reich Capital itself was cut off by the enemy, I would fly with Himmler to South Germany and make contact with Bernadotte by way of the Swedish Ambassador in Switzerland.

Though in the first place Count Bernadotte had undertaken his mission on behalf of the Danes and the Norwegians, he also tried to intervene on behalf of the Jews, and through his intelligent handling of the situation he had already been able to save the Danish Jews. Of special importance were the conversations between Bernadotte and Himmler which started at the end of March, when Himmler had promised the Count not to evacuate the internment camps at the approach of the Allied armies, but to surrender them in good order—especially Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald and Theresienstadt, and the camps in southern Germany.

I kept on reminding Himmler how desperate the situation was, and warned him that one day history would hold him responsible for his lack of decision. He replied that the order of the SS had been built on the principle of loyalty and he could not violate this. If he did, he would threaten the very basis of his own position. I told him that compared to the existence of the whole nation the SS represented only a small minority, and after their long period of suffering the German people would expect a release from their ordeal. They looked to Himmler, for he was a man who had not sought to profit personally from the régime. To this kind of talk he would merely say, 'So you want to remove the Fuehrer?' And such was his changeable nature that there were days when it would have cost me my position to have answered, 'Yes.'

Hitler's appearance as seen in the newsreels confirmed my impression that he showed increasingly obvious symptoms of Parkinson's Disease, so I arranged a meeting between Himmler and Professor de Crinis, to which Himmler asked Reich Health Leader Conti, to discuss this. De Crinis told me later that Himmler had listened with great interest and understanding.

Several days later, on April 13, Himmler asked me to go and see him at Wustrow. He took me for a walk in the forest and during it he said, 'Schellenberg, I believe that nothing more can be done with Hitler. Do you think that de Crinis is right about him?' I said, 'Yes, though I haven't seen the Fuehrer for quite a while—but everything he has done lately seems to indicate that now is the time for you to act.'

On this occasion I pointed out proving the treatment of the Jews. Then we discussed Kersten the course of the next few days of the World Jewish Congress of about the Jewish problem with F. drew nearer, Himmler was still reply. I told him that for Kersten's the basic problem, arrangements for be put off.

Himmler was well aware that Storch while Hitler was still alive mental importance which would for his relations with his own association with the Jews. I too felt the symbolic importance, and for this strongly to agree to it. Himmler found out he would immediately as I pointed out, Kaltenbrunner would ing could take place at Kersten's Himmler finally agreed to this, but

He was very greatly troubled by Fuehrer, which by this time was all given orders that Himmler's (sp guard) were to have the stripes and mark of dishonour.

Himmler said to me that I was to whom he could trust completely. not shoot Hitler; he could not arrest him in the Reich Chancellery machine would come to a standstill matter; only two possibilities existed to Hitler and tell him frankly all last years and force him to resign; or force. Himmler objected that if Fuehrer would fall into a violent rage I said, 'That is just what you must still have enough higher SS leaders

Bernadotte had undertaken his mission to the Norwegians, he also tried to save them, and through his intelligent handling, he was already been able to save the lives of many. It was the conversations between him and the Count not to evacuate the Jews from the Allied armies, but to leave them in the camps, especially Bergen-Belsen, and the camps in southern

Germany. In a desperate situation was, Himmler would hold him responsible for the order of the SS had been violated, and he could not violate the very basis of his own position: the existence of the whole nation as a minority, and after their long imprisonment, they would expect a release from Himmler, for he was a man who had come from the régime. To this, he said, "No, you want to remove the people from their position to have answered,

the newsreels confirmed my impression of the obvious symptoms of a meeting between Himmler and Hitler. Himmler asked Reich Health Minister Goebbels to tell me later that Himmler understood.

Himmler asked me to go and for a walk in the forest and to believe that nothing more can be done. He said that de Crinis is right about the Fuehrer for quite a long time. It seems to indicate that

On this occasion I pointed once again to the necessity of improving the treatment of the Jews, and of his promise to Herr Musy. Then we discussed Kersten's plan to come to Germany in the course of the next few days with Hilel Storch, a representative of the World Jewish Congress of New York, who wanted to talk about the Jewish problem with Himmler personally. As this visit drew nearer, Himmler was still unable to decide on a definite reply. I told him that for Kersten's sake, and even more because of the basic problem, arrangements for this meeting could no longer be put off.

Himmler was well aware that to have a conversation with Herr Storch while Hitler was still alive would be an action of fundamental importance which would have the greatest consequences for his relations with his own associates in the Party and in connection with the Jews. I too felt that such a meeting would be of symbolic importance, and for that very reason urged him most strongly to agree to it. Himmler was afraid that if Kaltenbrunner found out he would immediately report the matter to Hitler, but as I pointed out, Kaltenbrunner was going to Austria, so the meeting could take place at Kersten's estate without his knowledge. Himmler finally agreed to this, but not without reluctance.

He was very greatly troubled about his rupture with the Fuehrer, which by this time was almost complete. Hitler had even given orders that Himmler's special SS Leibstandarte (Bodyguard) were to have the stripes removed from their sleeves as a mark of dishonour.

Himmler said to me that I was the only one, apart from Brandt, whom he could trust completely. What should he do? He could not shoot Hitler; he could not give him poison; he could not arrest him in the Reich Chancellery, for then the whole military machine would come to a standstill. I told him that all this did not matter; only two possibilities existed for him: either he should go to Hitler and tell him frankly all that had happened during the last years and force him to resign; or else he should remove him by force. Himmler objected that if he spoke to Hitler like that the Fuehrer would fall into a violent rage and shoot him out of hand. I said, 'That is just what you must protect yourself against—you still have enough higher SS leaders, and you are still in a strong

enough position to arrest him. If there is no other way, then the doctors will have to intervene.'

Our talk lasted about an hour and a half, but Himmler was still unable to arrive at a decision. Instead he wanted to confront Bormann with Professor de Crinis, Professor Morell, Hitler's personal physician, and Dr Stumpfegger, another of Hitler's doctors, who was also an SS Leader.

Two days later I asked Professor de Crinis what the decision had been. He was very disappointed. The doctors had refused to commit themselves, and nothing that they permitted themselves to say would have been of any help with Bormann. When I reported this to Himmler he begged me to maintain silence about the whole matter. I then pointed out to him the senselessness of the Wehrwolf organization, which was being formed to carry on the struggle after Germany's defeat. This plan, I said, would bring nothing but suffering to the German people. Opportunities would arise for every sort of crime to be committed, as each individual would take it upon himself to decide what he considered justified in the national interest. Yet these grave measures were being lightly and irresponsibly advocated by the German leaders. They were even announcing over the German radio that they would repudiate the Hague conventions. I ended with the words 'criminal and stupid', but Himmler was obviously too exhausted by this spiritual struggle with me. He merely said, 'I will try to think of some way to finish this business.'

During the first week of April I had established contact with the Reich Minister of Finance, Graf Schwerin von Krosigk. We had a long conversation and von Krosigk agreed with me that the war had to be ended quickly in order to save as much of Germany's resources as possible. I had been talking about this with Himmler too for quite a time. Himmler had gradually become estranged from von Krosigk, and therefore I brought the two of them together again for a discussion, which took place on the afternoon of April 19. Once again Himmler jibbed at the last moment, and it was touch and go whether the meeting would take place. However, when we finally arrived at von Krosigk's office, we found that the Minister of Labour, Seldte, was also there.

Von Krosigk and Himmler while I had a conversation should seize power himself to the German people, the formation of a second Courts. He elaborated this to me what my opinion was pine area (known as the F at all in any further military the political level could be

In the meantime, the Himmler had ended. Von knew that it was really success remained. He b Himmler so that he might Hitler.

After the meeting Himmler told him that I was convicted in Germany who could be

After we arrived in Holstern situation made a sad, politically not to drive into E. A message had come that come in Herr Storch's Jewish Congress, had arrived on to Kersten's estate at expected in Berlin at the these two meetings might cult military situation. Th Kersten that night and Masur, and also arrange a

I had dinner at Hohenberg send Berger to southern counterpoise to Kaltenberg much so indeed that I f Himmler defended Kaltenbergally intelligent and far-sighted perceived my opposition

midnight, just as Himmler, ordered another bottle of birthday at twelve o'clock. We were held up on our craft which were dropping Hartzwalde estate at two-asleep. In the morning. He was tion, and doubted whether Masur could still be brought Himmler should show his difficult my whole situation tried all possible means to

XL

NEGOTIATIONS WITH COUNT
BERNADOTTE

Himmler gives assurances concerning the Jews—An all-night discussion—Himmler confers with Count Bernadotte—A plan to contact President Roosevelt—The Count is asked to transmit a declaration of surrender—Himmler and the Count confer again—The Allies refuse to negotiate with Himmler—I renew discussions with the Count—Terms agreed for our evacuation of Scandinavia—Kaltenbrunner dismisses me from my posts—Admiral Doenitz nominated to succeed Hitler

ON THE morning of April 20 I was awakened at nine by the noise of planes overhead, and while I was shaving a bomb dropped about a mile away—an unpleasant surprise for Herr Masur. I breakfasted with him, and immediately afterwards we had our first discussion. He insisted that nothing could be accomplished without a meeting with Himmler, but he would have to leave Berlin by Monday at the latest. As I knew that Himmler intended once again to put off meeting him, I had got to get him to keep to the agreed date.

At this point a telephone call came through from Count Bernadotte, who was staying at the Swedish Embassy in Berlin. He told me that he would like to speak to Himmler once more before leaving for Sweden at six o'clock the next morning. Somehow or other I had to get Himmler to see Masur, and arrange for a meeting with Count Bernadotte, who was coming to Hohenlychen for this purpose that same night.

At about nine in the evening I went to Wustrow to wait for Himmler, who was delayed by heavy air attacks. When he eventually arrived, I managed to persuade him to drive with me to meet Herr Masur. Accompanied by a driver and Himmler's secretary, Brandt, we left for Hartzwalde at a quarter-past one. On the way Himmler told me what he intended to say to Masur. In essence it was a chronological summary of the past with a clever attempt at justification. I asked him not to speak of the past at all,

Gene
or to expound his astrological and philosophical theories, but to determine precisely what had to be done in the future. Now and then we had to take cover from low-flying aircraft, and we arrived at Hartzwalde around three in the morning.

Masur and Kersten were waiting for us and after a brief greeting their conversation began. It was conducted for the most part by Himmler who wanted to prove that he had tried to solve the Jewish problem in terms of expulsion, but that this could not be done because of the outside world's resistance on the one hand, and on the other, the opposition within the Nazi Party. Masur did not embark on any long discussion of the various points, but said after about three-quarters of an hour that although Himmler's account had been very interesting, it was not in any way conducive towards changing the situation. That, however, was his main purpose for coming here, and he wanted the following assurances: that no more Jews would be killed; that the remaining Jews—and their numbers were very uncertain—should remain in the camps and under no circumstances be evacuated. He asked for lists of all the camps in which Jews were still being held to be given to him.

On these points agreement was reached, Himmler repeating every time that he had already given such orders. He was, in fact, ready to free the Jewish women in Ravensbrueck camp and turn them over to Masur, for he had received permission from Hitler to free all the Polish women from that camp. Therefore, if there were any questions about it afterwards, he could say the Jewish women were Poles.

I then went into another room with Masur in order to decide on other points to be discussed, but when the conversation was resumed it tended to become more and more vague, dealing with completely unimportant side issues. I was anxious to bring it to a conclusion in order to be able to arrive at Hohenlychen with Himmler by six o'clock in the morning, so after briefly saying good-bye, we left Hartzwalde; it was now half-past four. I assured Masur once more as we left that I would do all in my power to arrange for his departure the next day.

We arrived at Hohenlychen punctually at six o'clock—this was on the morning of the 21st—and had breakfast with Count Berna-

dotte. I hoped that the frank conversation with the Count, which I had desired for so long, had been successful. Himmler told the Count of the fate of the Polish women in Ravensbrueck.

In fact, I had made all preparations for the transport of all the Poles in Ravensbrueck. If I had children or young girls, I was determined to save them. I impressed most strongly on Himmler the situation, and emphasized the high importance of the people by pointing to my own wife and children. Himmler was greatly moved and he seemed convinced that my question, for he constantly referred to it, was much later that he took any action.

Count Bernadotte asked whether we could transport the Danish and Norwegian women. Himmler was unable to grant this, but he agreed that should the Allied forces liberate a Neugamme camp there would be no problem.

The Count thanked him for his frankness and the confidence shown him in previous conversations. The meeting came to an end and they said good-bye. I was to accompany the Count part of the way, but he once more begged him to fly to Germany for him to have a conference.

However, at our parting on the morning of the 21st, Count Bernadotte said to me: 'I understand the realities of his own situation and he has no other hands after my first visit. I can help him. And you, my dear Schellenberg, do your best for yourself.'

I did not know what to reply to him, but I felt as though we would never fill with a deep sadness.

I drove back to Hohenlychen, showed the picture of misery, and said that there was nothing more I could do.

and philosophical theories, but to be done in the future. Now and then a low-flying aircraft, and we arrived in the morning.

For us and after a brief greeting was conducted for the most part by the fact that he had tried to solve the problem, but that this could not be because of the resistance on the one hand, and within the Nazi Party. Masur did not see of the various points, but said in an hour that although Himmler's intention, it was not in any way confirmation. That, however, was his intention, and he wanted the following would be killed; that the remaining were very uncertain—should remain in places be evacuated. He asked for those were still being held to be given

was reached, Himmler repeating given such orders. He was, in fact, in Ravensbrueck camp and turned received permission from Hitler to leave that camp. Therefore, if there were, he could say the Jewish

with Masur in order to decide on when the conversation was more and more vague, dealing with the subject. I was anxious to bring it to a close to arrive at Hohenlychen with in the morning, so after briefly saying goodbye, it was now half-past four. I left that I would do all in my power the next day.

Actually at six o'clock—this was when I had breakfast with Count Berna-

dotte. I hoped that the frank conversation between Himmler and the Count, which I had desired for so long, would now take place. Himmler told the Count of the possibility of transporting all the Polish women in Ravensbrueck to Sweden.

In fact, I had made all preparations for this and had drawn up a list of all the Poles in Ravensbrueck camp. As they were mostly children or young girls, I was determined to free them at all costs. I impressed most strongly on Himmler the shameful nature of this situation, and emphasized the high racial qualities of the Polish people by pointing to my own wife as an example. This impressed him greatly and he seemed considerably preoccupied with the question, for he constantly referred to it, although it was not until much later that he took any action.

Count Bernadotte asked whether it would not be possible to transport the Danish and Norwegian internees to Sweden, but Himmler was unable to grant permission for this, though he agreed that should the Allied armies threaten to overrun the Neugamme camp there would be no evacuation.

The Count thanked him for his willingness and for the confidence shown him in previous conversations. The discussion then came to an end and they said good-bye. Himmler, knowing I was to accompany the Count part of the way, hoped that I would once more beg him to fly to General Eisenhower and try to arrange for him to have a conference with the General.

However, at our parting on the road near Waren in Mecklenburg, Count Bernadotte said to me: 'The Reichsfuehrer no longer understands the realities of his own situation. I cannot help him any more. He should have taken Germany's affairs into his own hands after my first visit. I can hold out little chance for him now. And you, my dear Schellenberg, would be wiser to think of yourself.'

I did not know what to reply to this. When we said good-bye it was as though we would never see each other again. I was filled with a deep sadness.

I drove back to Hohenlychen, slept for two hours, and was then called to Himmler at about twelve-thirty. He was still in bed, the picture of misery, and said that he felt ill. All I could say was that there was nothing more I could do for him; it was up to him. He

had got to take some action. At lunch we discussed the military situation in Berlin, which was steadily growing worse.

At about four o'clock, having convinced him that it would be unwise to drive to Berlin, we drove towards Wustrow. In Locwenberg we were caught in a traffic jam, troops having become involved with the unending columns of fleeing civilians which blocked all the roads between Berlin and Mecklenburg.

As we drove on, Himmler said to me for the first time, 'Schellenberg, I dread what is to come.'

I said that this should give him the courage to take action. He did not answer. Just before we got to Wustrow we were attacked by low-flying planes. However, their main target was the column of refugees and troops through which we had passed.

After dinner, when we were alone again, we spoke of various problems, of food supplies, the danger of epidemics, reconstruction, prisoner of war administration, and so on. I told him of Kaltenbrunner's blind and unrealistic attitude in insisting on the evacuation at all costs of all the concentration camps. Himmler grew very nervous when I called this a crime, and said, brusquely: 'Schellenberg, don't you start too. Hitler has been raging for days because Buchenwald and Bergen-Belsen were not completely evacuated.'

At that moment Fegelein telephoned to say that Hitler and Goebbels were raging because Berger had not remained in Berlin—he had in fact just left Berlin to fly to southern Germany in Himmler's place. He was needed by Hitler to carry out the sentence passed on Dr Brandt, Hitler's former personal physician, who had just been condemned to death for smuggling his wife into the hands of the Americans in Thuringia. Apparently this was a complex intrigue among Hitler's entourage involving Hitler's 'friend' Eva Braun, and her sister, who was Fegelein's wife. Himmler did everything he could to prevent the doctor's execution and immediately gave instructions over the telephone to the Gestapo chief, Mueller. Dr Brandt was transferred to Schwerin, which was safer from air attacks, and Fegelein was told that Berger was on his way south by plane. For this reason sentence could not be executed at the moment, unless Bormann and Goebbels wanted to do the job themselves.

When Himmler returned he had complete power in Germany for the new alternative plan. I suggested National Unity Party though only in the vaguest terms missed me—it was now about five.

The next morning—it was five—the military situation had become four Waffen SS Divisions, which had been ordered by Hitler to Russians. Himmler was convinced though both his military adjutants mean unnecessary bloodshed.

After breakfast Obergruppenführer to drive back with us to Hohenzollern evacuated as it was threatened by the Russians.

We discussed the case of Van der Meer, a general who had formerly been a prisoner of war, and at the same time desire for peace with the western world, having in mind the freeing of their country and Germany. He had given strict orders against this.

I had had long conversations with him. As Himmler had reached an agreement. As Himmler had ranged with friends in Switzerland Military Attaché in Bern, Geneva, the border illegally. I did this arranged for a car to bring him to the frontier near Constance.

As I had had no news of the matter. By this time Himmler was

which we discussed the military situation growing worse.

I convinced him that it would be better to move towards Wustrow. In the traffic jam, troops having become columns of fleeing civilians in Berlin and Mecklenburg. For the first time, 'Schel-

lenger' had the courage to take action. He and Wustrow were attacked. The main target was the column in which we had passed.

Again, we spoke of various causes of epidemics, reconstruction, and so on. I told him of my attitude in insisting on the concentration camps. Himmler said, brusquely: 'The crime, and said, brusquely: Hitler has been raging for days when we were not completely

convinced to say that Hitler and his family had not remained in Berlin but had fled to southern Germany in order for Hitler to carry out the sentence. His former personal physician, Dr. Schmidt, for smuggling his wife into the camp. Apparently this was a crime involving Hitler's wife, who was Fegelein's wife. I tried to prevent the doctor's execution. I spoke over the telephone to the commandant who was transferred to Schwerin. Fegelein was told that Berger's sentence could not be commuted. Bormann and Goebbels

When Himmler returned he told me what he would do once he had complete power in Germany, and asked me to think about a name for the new alternative party which I had suggested to him. I suggested National Unity Party. After referring once more, though only in the vaguest terms, to Hitler's removal, he dismissed me—it was now about four-thirty—and went to bed.

The next morning—it was Sunday, April 22—it appeared that the military situation had become so much worse overnight that four Waffen SS Divisions, under Obergruppenfuhrer Steiner, had been ordered by Hitler to make a suicide attack on the Russians. Himmler was convinced that this order was necessary, though both his military adjutant and I agreed that it would only mean unnecessary bloodshed.

After breakfast Obergruppenfuhrer Berger came in. He was to drive back with us to Hohenlychen and Wustrow was to be evacuated as it was threatened by the enemy.

We discussed the case of Vanamann, an American Air Force general who had formerly been Military Attaché in Berlin, and was at this time a prisoner of war in Germany. Berger and I suggested that Vanamann, together with another United States Air Force colonel, should be got out of Germany and flown via Switzerland to the United States to contact Roosevelt. He was to try to get better supplies and conditions for the American prisoners of war, and at the same time tell Roosevelt of Himmler's desire for peace with the western Powers. I had planned this long ago, having in mind the freeing of influential British prisoners of war so that they might work towards an understanding between their country and Germany. Hitler and Himmler, however, had given strict orders against this.

I had had long conversations with Vanamann, and we were in full agreement. As Himmler had refused his permission, I arranged with friends in Switzerland and with the United States Military Attaché in Berne, General Legg, for Vanamann to cross the border illegally. I did this on my own responsibility and arranged for a car to bring him and the Air Force colonel to the frontier near Constance.

As I had had no news of them, I asked Berger to attend to the matter. By this time Himmler was in agreement with the plan.

which I had just emerged. However, I arrived at five o'clock in the afternoon, and reported to the Foreign Minister and

in view of the continuing deterioration of the Scandinavian area, through the help of the greatest importance. Then I spoke to him and told me that if I would stay with him, I was his assistant. On the other hand, he convinced me to go to Stockholm. We agreed on the importance, for a total capitulation of the only thing that was holding it up was the Moravian area the army groups of Generaloberst Rendulic, consisting of units supplied with munitions and provisions in contact. They were doing a more than in the eastern front.

In the evening I reported to Admiral Doenitz, who heard nothing about lifting the occupation of German troops in Sweden. He had pointed out to him the excellent General Boehme's army. Even after I stressed the importance of a peaceful solution, in Sweden, he still demanded to know what would bring for Germany. I explained to him the long-term political prospects, apart from the loss of a large number of German lives. It was my opinion towards us, and in the near future the importance for a defeated Germany to a neutral country like Sweden. In view of German fighting in Norway and Denmark, it was utterly futile.

The meeting was broken off, and I went to dinner with Jodl. At the table we continued the conversation and Jodl wanted me to remain with them, but I had to leave in matters of foreign policy. However, the importance of my mission to Stockholm, I seemed to understand.

Afterwards I spoke again to von Krosigk and advised him to induce Doenitz to follow my suggestions to dissolve the Party, the Gestapo and the SD as soon as possible. We then discussed in which capacity it would be best for me to go to Stockholm. Von Krosigk offered to make me Ambassador, Special Plenipotentiary, Representative, or whatever I preferred. I suggested that he should appoint me Envoy, for this corresponded accurately to the tasks upon which I was embarking. That night Secretaries of State Steengracht and Henke were called over by the Foreign Minister, and together they prepared the documents authorizing my appointment as Envoy. Doenitz signed these the next morning, May 5, and after reporting to Krosigk at ten o'clock, I bade farewell to Himmler and left for Copenhagen.

A few days later Himmler committed suicide.

Arriving at Copenhagen, I went to the Dagmarhus, for I wanted to inform Dr Best of my mission. While I was waiting for him, a huge crowd gathered in the town square in expectation of the impending surrender of Germany. Shots were fired and police vans and ambulances drove up, the crowd growing meanwhile until it must have reached tens of thousands. It was obvious that Dr Best would not be able to make his way through the tumult. I could not wait as it was imperative for me to get to the Swedish Embassy right away, for apparently they had not received my telephone message from the frontier.

After a long discussion with the SS guard at the Dagmarhus, an opening was made in the barbed wire barrier, and I was able to drive through in Count Bernadotte's car. Though the driver tried to avoid the crowded streets, we suddenly found ourselves surrounded by thousands of people. They recognized the Count's car and pressed round it until we could move neither forwards nor backwards. Fortunately I had locked the door from the inside and closed the windows, otherwise they would have pulled me out. I ordered the driver to push on, come what may, and slowly we inched our way through the solid mass of human beings. Those immediately next to the car began to cry out as those behind them kept on pushing forward, gesticulating with wild enthusiasm. By now there were about thirty people all over the car, on the running boards, on the roof, on the bonnet, and only the