

2. copy

THE TESTAMENT OF ADOLF HITLER

The Hitler-Bormann Documents
February-April 1945
With an Introduction by L. Craig Fraser

I—4TH FEBRUARY 1945

playing the role which subsequently fell to its lot in the nineteenth century. It was a policy designed to preserve the existence of his country. Churchill, by refusing to come to terms with me, has condemned his country to a policy of suicide. He has made the same mistakes as those generals make who wage a war according to the principles of the preceding war. There are now elements which it is impossible to fit into such a scheme of things. The crucial new factor is the existence of those two giants, the United States and Russia. Pitt's England ensured the balance of world power by preventing the hegemony of Europe—by preventing Napoleon, that is, from attaining his goal. Churchill's England, on the other hand, should have allowed the unification of Europe, if it wished to preserve that same balance of power.

At the beginning of this war I did my utmost to act as though I believed Churchill to be capable of grasping the truth of this great policy; and in his lucid moments he was, indeed, capable of grasping it. But for a long time now he has been bound hand and foot to the Jewish chariot. My object in trying to come to terms with England was to avoid creating an irreparable situation in the West. Later, when I attacked eastwards and lanced the Communist abscess, I hoped thereby to rekindle a spark of common sense in the minds of the Western Powers. I gave them the chance, without lifting a finger, of making a contribution to an act of catharsis, in which they could have safely left the task of disinfecting the West in our hands

I—4TH FEBRUARY

alone. But the hatred felt by the man of good faith is stronger than preservation. I had underestimated Jewish domination over Churchill preferred, indeed, to perish by default admit National Socialism to the pressure, they might have tolerated semitism on our part. But our absence to eradicate Jewish power root and the world was far too strong men's stomachs to digest!

Pitt's genius lay in the implementation of policy, in harmony with the conditions which allowed his country to make ordinary recovery and which ensured supremacy in the nineteenth century imitation of this policy which pursuing—and with a complete disregard that conditions are not in the least sheer absurdity. The fact is that progress has been made since Pitt's day! For a while it is true, came slowly; but the first pace, and this war has led us to a bills and a final settlement!

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the point of power, Europe alone Asiatic empires had fallen into a state of the sleep of death. The New World more than an excrescence on the edge of no one could reasonably have fore-

ly fell to its lot in
policy designed to
ntry. Churchill, by
ne, has condemned
He has made the
make who wage a
the preceding war.

is impossible to fit
crucial new factor
the United States
ed the balance of
emony of Europe
from attaining his
other hand, should
urope, if it wished
wer.

ed my utmost to act
to be capable of
ey, and in his lucid
of grasping it. But
and hand and foot
trying to come to
creating an irrepar-
when I attacked
at abscess. I hoped

common sense in the
e them the chance,
a contribution to
could have safely
West in our hands

alone. But the hatred felt by these hypocrites for a man of good faith is stronger than their sense of self-preservation. I had underestimated the power of Jewish domination over Churchill's England. They preferred, indeed, to perish by default, rather than to admit National Socialism to their midst. Under pressure, they might have tolerated a façade of anti-semitism on our part. But our absolute determination to eradicate Jewish power root and branch throughout the world was far too strong meat for their delicate stomachs to digest!

Pitt's genius lay in the implementation of a realistic policy, in harmony with the conditions of the epoch, which allowed his country to make a truly extraordinary recovery and which ensured for it world supremacy in the nineteenth century. The servile imitation of this policy which Churchill is now pursuing—and with a complete disregard for the fact that conditions are not in the least the same—is a sheer absurdity. The fact is that the world has progressed since Pitt's day! For a whole century, changes, it is true, came slowly; but the first war increased the pace, and this war has led us to a presentation of the bills and a final settlement!

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, from the point of power, Europe alone counted. The great Asiatic empires had fallen into a sleep that resembled the sleep of death. The New World was still nothing more than an excrescence on the end of the old, and no one could reasonably have foreseen the prodigious

in British colonies
om. . . . Thirteen!
ory tempts me to
million inhabitants,
the course of a
g of the twentieth
orld Power . . . !
en 1930 and 1940,
from that which
Napoleon. Europe,
her pride of place,
ger recognized. It
tion on earth, but
importance in the
United States of
ossus and of the

ng and enfeebled
Jew-ridden, half-
ould at once have
policy of balance
lied on a different
scale. Instead of
fuel to European
most to encourage
rope. Allied to a
retain the chance
arbitrer in world

es one think that

Providence is now punishing Albion for her past crimes, the crimes which raised her to the power she was. The advent of Churchill, at a period that is decisive for both Britain and Europe, is the punishment chosen by Providence. For the degenerate *élite* of Britain, he's just the very man they want; and it is in the hands of this senile clown to decide the fate of a vast empire and, at the same time, of all Europe. It is, I think, an open question whether the British people, in spite of the degeneration of the aristocracy, has preserved those qualities which have hitherto justified British world domination. For my own part, I doubt it, because there does not seem to have been any popular reaction to the errors committed by the nation's leaders. And yet there have been many occasions when Britain could well have boldly set forth on a new and more fruitful course.

Had she so wished, Britain could have put an end to the war at the beginning of 1941. In the skies over London she had demonstrated to all the world her will to resist, and on her credit side she had the humiliating defeats which she had inflicted on the Italians in North Africa. The traditional Britain would have made peace. But the Jews would have none of it. And their lackeys, Churchill and Roosevelt, were there to prevent it.

Peace then, however, would have allowed us to prevent the Americans from meddling in European affairs. Under the guidance of the Reich, Europe would speedily have become unified. Once the Jewish

poison had been eradicated, unification would have been an easy matter. France and Italy, each defeated in turn at an interval of a few months by the two Germanic Powers, would have been well out of it. Both would have had to renounce their inappropriate aspirations to greatness. At the same time they would have had to renounce their pretensions in North Africa and the Near East; and that would have allowed Europe to pursue a bold policy of friendship towards Islam. As for Britain, relieved of all European cares, she could have devoted herself to the wellbeing of her Empire. And lastly, Germany, her rear secure, could have thrown herself heart and soul into her essential task, the ambition of my life and the *raison d'être* of National Socialism—the destruction of Bolshevism. This would have entailed the conquest of wide spaces in the East, and these in their turn would have ensured the future wellbeing of the German people.

The laws of nature follow a logic which does not necessarily always conform to our own ideas of logic. We ourselves were disposed to compromise. We were ready to throw our forces into the scales for the preservation of the British Empire; and all that, mark you, at a time when, to tell the truth, I feel much more sympathetically inclined to the lowliest Hindu than to any of these arrogant islanders. Later on, the Germans will be pleased that they did not make any contribution to the survival of an out-dated state of affairs for which the world of the future would have found it

hard to forgive them. V prophecy: whatever the British Empire is at as wounded. The future of of hunger and tubercule

British obstinacy and put up by the Reich have first place Britain had nothing forced her to go go to war, but she act hardly say that the Poles by the British and Fre themselves spurred on I not have felt themselves Even so, and even after Britain could have pulled either after the liquidation defeat of France. It was very honourable on her of this kind, the British particular. All she had for her defection squar ex-allies—just as she and 1940, and, furthermore helped her to save face.

At the beginning of North Africa had re-estab an even more favourable from the game and co with us. Why, you may

obey the orders of her Jewish and American allies, people, indeed, who were more voracious than even the worst of her enemies? I will tell you; Britain was not waging her own war, she was waging that which had been imposed on her by her implacable allies.

Germany, on the other hand, had no option. Once we had declared our desire of at last uniting all Germans in one great Reich and of ensuring for them a real independence—in other words, freedom to live their own lives—all our enemies at once rose against us. War became inevitable if for no other reason that in order to avoid it we should have been compelled to betray the fundamental interests of the German people. As far as our people were concerned we could not and would not be content with the mere semblance of independence. That sort of thing is all right for the Swedes and the Swiss, who are always prepared to subscribe to dubious and tortuous formulae, provided that they can at the same time line their pockets. Nor, for that matter could the Weimar Republic lay claim to any more worthy pretensions. That, however, is not an ambition worthy of the Third Reich.

We were, then, condemned to wage war—some time or other; and our sole preoccupation was to choose the least unfavourable moment. And once we were committed, of course, there could be no question of a withdrawal. It is not to the doctrines of National Socialism alone that our adversaries take exception. They hate National Socialism because through it the qualities of the German people have been exalted.

They therefore seek to people—of that there is once in a way, hatred and hypocrisy. We can only enemies for having turned to us.

To this all-embracing means of total war. Fighting are fighting desperately shall fight to the death to emerge from this war as Britain more enfeebled.

History shows that adversity often constitutes a great renaissance. To people—and in this war probably more than any other which, if Providence will to the heady influence Providence abandon us, our resolute steadfastness subjecting us to ever greater the chance to confirm.

always hope, and that, surely, should be enough to forbid us to think that all is already lost. No game is lost until the final whistle. And if, in spite of everything, the Fates have decreed that we should once more in the course of our history be crushed by forces superior to our own, then let us go down with our heads high and secure in the knowledge that the honour of the German people remains without blemish. A desperate fight remains for all time a shining example. Let us remember Leonidas and his three hundred Spartans! In any case, we are not of the stuff that goes tamely to the slaughter like sheep. They may well exterminate us. But they will never lead us to the slaughter house!

No! There is no such thing as a desperate situation! Think how many examples of a turn of fortune the history of the German people affords! During the Seven Years' War Frederick found himself reduced to desperate straits. During the winter of 1762 he had decided that if no change occurred by a certain date fixed by himself, he would end his life by taking poison. Then, a few days before the date he had chosen, behold, the Tsarina died unexpectedly, and the whole situation was miraculously reversed. Like the great Frederick, we, too, are combating a coalition, and a coalition, remember, is not a stable entity. It exists only by the will of a handful of men. If Churchill were suddenly to disappear, everything could change in a flash! The British aristocracy might perhaps become conscious of the abyss opening before

them—and might well ex-
These British, for whom,
fighting and who would
victory. . . .

We can still snatch victo-
we be granted the time to d-

All we must do is to r-
German people, the simp-
pendent life would be a
would be sufficient justifi-
would not have been in
unavoidable; the enemy
Socialism forced it upon r
1933.

III—7TH FEBRUARY 1945

This need to become properly enrooted applies to all continental peoples and particularly, in my opinion, to the German people. And that most probably explains why we have never really felt the urge to become colonizers. A glance at history, both ancient and modern, will show that overseas enterprises have always in the long run impoverished those who undertook them. They have all, in the end, been exhausted by their efforts; and, in the inevitable nature of things, they have all succumbed to forces to which either they have themselves given birth or which they have themselves re-awakened. What better example of this than the Greeks?

What was true for the ancient Greeks remains equally true for all Europeans in modern times. To prosper, a people must concentrate its efforts on its own country. A scrutiny of any reasonably long period of history will reveal facts which confirm the truth of this contention.

Spain, France and Britain have all enfeebled, devitalized and drained themselves in these vain colonial enterprises. The continents to which Spain and Britain gave birth, which they created piece by piece, have today acquired a completely independent way of life and a completely egoistical outlook. Even so, they are but artificial worlds, with neither a soul, a culture nor a civilization of their own; and, judged from that point of view, they are nothing more than excrescences.

It is, of course, possible to make out a case for the

* An ¹⁵justification for never having been out of German-~~stealing~~ ^{stealing} ~~country~~ ^{country}.

nation's strength—The
nces on the old—The
Materialism, alcoholism,
tural sons—Germany's
expansion eastwards—
he super-abundance of

7th February 1945

prosper should remain
should never lose con-
he had the honour of
way except for a short
tion of returning. The
of necessity, and who,
have generally obeyed

are concerned, I am
ey should expand only
ertain that the soil of
ontiguous.

success achieved in peopling continents which before had been empty. The United States and Australia afford good examples. Success, certainly—but only on the material side. They are artificial edifices, bodies without age, of which it is impossible to say whether they are still in a state of infancy or whether they have already been touched by senility. In those continents which were inhabited, failure has been even more marked. In them, the white races have imposed their will by force, and the influence they have had on the native inhabitants has been negligible; the Hindus have remained Hindus, the Chinese have remained Chinese, and the Moslems are still Moslems. There have been no profound transformations, and such changes as have occurred are less marked in the religious field, notwithstanding the tremendous efforts of the Christian missionaries, than in any other. There have been a few odd conversions the sincerity of which are open to considerable doubt—except, perhaps, in the case of a few simpletons and mentally deficient. The white races did, of course, give some things to the natives, and they were the worst gifts that they could possibly have made, those plagues of our own modern world—materialism, fanaticism, alcoholism and syphilis. For the rest, since these peoples possessed qualities of their own which were superior to anything we could offer them, they have remained essentially unchanged. Where imposition by force was attempted, the results were even more disastrous, and common sense, realizing the futility of

such measures, should introduction. One solitary to the colonizers: every arousing hatred, a hat awakened from their slus out. Indeed, it look awakened solely and si anyone assert that co number of Christians in conversions *en masse* Islam? Here and there Christians, Christians in conviction; and that is ti of this magnificent Chris supreme Truth!

Taking everything in policy of colonization has I have not forgotten the success, but a success that of that monster which c that I wish to talk. And name for it! At a time v their own mother—is fight the bolshevist peril, the I Jew-ridden Roosevelt, can do than to place their fal the disposal of these A determined to strangle her distressed at the thought o men of good faith, who en

and who are now the backbone of the country. For these men, mark you, are not merely good Germans, lost to their fatherland; rather, they have become enemies, more implacably hostile than any others. The German emigrant retains, it is true, his qualities of industry and hard work, but he very quickly loses his soul. There is nothing more unnatural than a German who has become an expatriate.

In the future we must guard against these haemorrhages of German blood. It is eastwards, only and always eastwards, that the veins of our race must expand. It is the direction which Nature herself has decreed for the expansion of the German peoples. The rigorous climate with which the East confronts them allows them to retain their qualities as hardy and virile men; and the vivid contrasts they find there help to keep fresh their love and their longing for their own country. Transplant a German to Kiev, and he remains a perfect German. But transplant him to Miami, and you make a degenerate of him—in other words, an American.

Since colonization is not an activity which Germans feel called upon to pursue, Germany should never make common cause with the colonizing nations and should always abstain from supporting them in their colonial aspirations. What we want is a Monroe doctrine in Europe. 'Europe for the Europeans!', a doctrine, the corollary of which should be that Europeans refrain from meddling in the affairs of other continents.

The descendants of the inspire in us nothing but indifference. If their vitality enable them to increase at size of the territories they look out, and it is no use help. For my own part, I seeing the surplus population drawn, as to a magnet, to all work out their own salvation—it is nothing to do with us

They react brutally and finally they revolt. It is an instinctive reaction, a reaction of repugnance against a stranger who refuses to adapt himself and become part of the whole, a parasite which clings to the host, imposes on it and exploits it to the utmost. By nature, the Jew is a parasite which cannot and will not be assimilated. A distinguishing feature of the Jew is that, unlike other foreigners, he everywhere claims all the rights of citizenship in the community that shelters him—and at the same time remains always a Jew. He regards it as his right to be allowed to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds; and he is the only man in the whole world to claim such an extravagant privilege.

National Socialism has tackled the Jewish problem by action and not by words. It has risen in opposition to the Jewish determination to dominate the world; it has attacked them everywhere and in every sphere of activity; it has flung them out of the positions they have usurped; it has pursued them in every direction, determined to purge the German world of the Jewish poison. For us, this has been an essential process of disinfection, which we have prosecuted to its ultimate limit and without which we should ourselves have been asphyxiated and destroyed.

With the success of the operation in Germany, there was a good chance of extending it further afield. This was, in fact, inevitable, for good health normally triumphs over disease. Quick to realize the danger, the Jews decided to stake their all in the life and death

struggle which they knew Socialism had to be defeated even if the whole world process. Never before has and at the same time :

I have at least com masks. And even if on failure, it will only be a opened the eyes of the w

One of the consequen cause the Jew to becom fact, he is less dangerou when he is sly and cu. avows his race is a hur shameful type which cla in the matter of religion. an end to Jewish world Jews a mortal blow from But if I lose the war, I mean that their triumph themselves will lose their arrogant that they will ev them. They will, of cour hare and hunt with the h of citizenship in every cot their pride, continue to re the Chosen Race. The shi disappear and will be rep and bombastic; and the l tionably as the former—

and finally they revolt. It is an a reaction of repugnance against ses to adapt himself and become parasite which clings to the host, ploits it to the utmost. By nature, te which cannot and will not be nguishing feature of the Jew is eigners, he everywhere claims all up in the community that shelters e time remains always a Jew. He at to be allowed to run with the the hounds; and he is the only rld to claim such an extravagant

has tackled the Jewish problem words. It has risen in opposition ination to dominate the world; it erywhere and in every sphere of them out of the positions they pursued them in every direction, the German world of the Jewish has been an essential process of have prosecuted to its ultimate hich we should ourselves have destroyed.

the operation in Germany, there extending it further afield. This ble, for good health normally Quick to realize the danger, the their all in the life and death

struggle which they launched against us. National Socialism had to be destroyed, whatever the cost and even if the whole world were destroyed in the process. Never before has there been a war so typically and at the same time so exclusively Jewish.

I have at least compelled them to discard their masks. And even if our endeavours should end in failure, it will only be a temporary failure. For I have opened the eyes of the whole world to the Jewish peril.

One of the consequences of our attitude has been to cause the Jew to become aggressive. As a matter of fact, he is less dangerous in that frame of mind than when he is sly and cunning. The Jew who openly avows his race is a hundred times preferable to the shameful type which claims to differ from you only in the matter of religion. If I win this war, I shall put an end to Jewish world power and I shall deal the Jews a mortal blow from which they will not recover. But if I lose the war, that does not by any means mean that their triumph is assured, for then they themselves will lose their heads. They will become so arrogant that they will evoke a violent reaction against them. They will, of course, continue to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, to claim the privileges of citizenship in every country and, without sacrificing their pride, continue to remain, above all, members of the Chosen Race. The shifty, the shamefaced Jew will disappear and will be replaced by a Jew vainglorious and bombastic; and the latter will stink just as objectionably as the former—and perhaps even more so.

There is, then, no danger in the circumstances that anti-semitism will disappear, for it is the Jews themselves who add fuel to its flames and see that it is kept well stoked. Before the opposition to it can disappear, the malady itself must disappear. And from that point of view, you can rely on the Jews: as long as they survive, anti-semitism will never fade.

In saying this, I promise you I am quite free of all racial hatred. It is, in any case, undesirable that one race should mix with other races. Except for a few gratuitous successes, which I am prepared to admit, systematic cross-breeding has never produced good results. Its desire to remain racially pure is a proof of the vitality and good health of a race. Pride in one's own race—and that does not imply contempt for other races—is also a normal and healthy sentiment. I have never regarded the Chinese or the Japanese as being inferior to ourselves. They belong to ancient civilizations, and I admit freely that their past history is superior to our own. They have the right to be proud of their past, just as we have the right to be proud of the civilization to which we belong. Indeed, I believe the more steadfast the Chinese and the Japanese remain in their pride of race, the easier I shall find it to get on with them.

This pride of race is a quality which the German, fundamentally, does not possess. The reason for this is that for these last three centuries the country has been torn by internal dissension and religious wars and has been subjected to a variety of foreign

influences; to the influence of Christianity as taught by in today's churches. It is itself in a German, as it is in an aggressive form, it is in a compensatory reaction for which so many Germans say, does not apply to of Frederick the Great and simple pride which are sure of themselves ostentation to bear with to those qualities which Prussians were able, as a united Germany. Nationalism to all Germans that possessed by the Prussians

The Austrians, too, have an akin to that of the Prussians; that for centuries they have any other race, but have very long time the ones obeyed. They possess the domination and power, a *panache* of Atticism which

In its crucible Nationalism all those qualities which

in the circumstances that
 ar, for it is the Jews them-
 flames and see that it is kept
 position to it can disappear,
 disappear. And from that
ly on the Jews: as long as
I will never fade

e you I am quite free of all
 / case, undesirable that one
 er races. Except for a few
 h I am prepared to admit,
 has never produced good
 1 racially pure is a proof of
 th of a race. Pride in one's
 ot imply contempt for other
 d healthy sentiment. I have
 e or the Japanese as being
 / belong to ancient civiliza-
 that their past history is
 have the right to be proud
 have the right to be proud
 ich we belong. Indeed, I
 ast the Chinese and the
 pride of race, the easier I
 hem.

quality which the German
ossess. The reason for this
 : centuries the country has
 sension and religious wars
 to a variety of foreign

influences; to the influence, for example, of false
 Christianity as taught by the many proselyte preachers
 in today's churches. When pride of race manifests
 itself in a German, as it sometimes does and in a most
 aggressive form, it is in reality nothing more than a
 compensatory reaction for that inferiority complex from
 which so many Germans suffer. This, I need hardly
say, does not apply to the Prussians. From the time
 of Frederick the Great they have possessed that quiet
 and simple pride which is the hall-mark of people who
 are sure of themselves and who have no need of
 ostentation to bear witness to what they are. Thanks
 to those qualities which are inherently theirs, the
 Prussians were able, as they well showed, to create
 a united Germany. National Socialism has tried to give
 to all Germans that pride which hitherto has been
 possessed by the Prussians alone among us.

The Austrians, too, have in their blood a pride very
 akin to that of the Prussians, a pride born of the fact
 that for centuries they have never been dominated by
 any other race, but have, on the contrary, been for a
 very long time the ones who gave orders and were
 obeyed. They possess the accumulated experience of
 domination and power, and to that is attributable that
panache of Atticism which no one can gainsay.

In its crucible National Socialism will melt and fuse
 all those qualities which are characteristic of the

a German soul; and from it will emerge the modern German—industrious, conscientious, sure of himself yet simple withal, proud not of himself or what he is, but of his membership of a great entity which will evoke the admiration of other peoples. This feeling of corporate superiority does not in any way imply the slightest desire to crush and overwhelm others. We have, I know, on occasions exaggerated our cult of this sentiment, but that was necessary at the outset and we were compelled to jostle the Germans pretty roughly in order to set their feet on the right road. In the nature of things, too violent a thrust in any direction invariably provokes an equally violent thrust in the opposite direction. All this, of course, cannot be accomplished in a day. It requires the slow-moving pressure of time. Frederick the Great is the real creator of the Prussian type. In actual fact, two or three generations elapsed before the type crystallized and before the Prussian type became a characteristic common to every Prussian.

Our racial pride is not aggressive except in so far as the Jewish race is concerned. We use the term Jewish race as a matter of convenience, for in reality and from the genetic point of view there is no such thing as the Jewish race. There does, however, exist a community, to which, in fact, the term can be applied and the existence of which is admitted by the Jews themselves. It is the spiritually homogeneous group, to membership of which all Jews throughout the world deliberately adhere, regardless of their whereabouts

*In A. H.'s H
a big position
Huntall Chaulali
V—13TH J*

and of their country of of human beings to wh race. It is not, mark you the Hebrew religion se present themselves as si collection of groups, unit religion.

The Jewish race is fir race of the mind. It has Hebrew religion, and th certain influence in mo teristics; for all that, how word a purely religious e terms both the most deter sincere, practising believe the bond that has been f cution—though the Jews they themselves who pr Nor does Jewry possess teristics which would star race. It cannot, however, the world has some drop him. Were this not so, explain the presence of cer which are permanently co ghetto of Warsaw to the offensive nose, the cruel v

A race of the mind is s durable than just a race, f a German to the United St

JARY 1945

will emerge the modern
entious, sure of himself
of himself or what he is,
great entity which will
r peoples. This feeling of
ot in any way imply the
l overwhelm others. We
exaggerated our cult of
necessary at the outset
ostle the Germans pretty
feet on the right road. In
violent a thrust in any
es an equally violent
ion. All this, of course,
day. It requires the slow-
ederick the Great is the
type. In actual fact, two
before the type crystal-
ussian type became a
ry Prussian.

gressive except in so far
rned. We use the term
onvenience, for in reality
of view there is no such
re does, however, exist a
the term can be applied
is admitted by the Jews
dly homogeneous group,
ews throughout the world
ss of their whereabouts

In A. H.'s speech, in regard
a big positive build-up of the
Hustar Chamberlain's observations

V—13TH FEBRUARY 1945

and of their country of domicile; and it is this group
of human beings to which we give the title Jewish
race. It is not, mark you, a religious entity, although
the Hebrew religion serves them as a pretext to
present themselves as such; nor indeed is it even a
collection of groups, united by the bonds of a common
religion.

The Jewish race is first and foremost an abstract
race of the mind. It has its origins, admittedly, in the
Hebrew religion, and that religion, too, has had a
certain influence in moulding its general charac-
teristics; for all that, however, it is in no sense of the
word a purely religious entity, for it accepts on equal
terms both the most determined atheists and the most
sincere, practising believers. To all this must be added
the bond that has been forged by centuries of perse-
cution—though the Jews conveniently forget that it is
they themselves who provoked these persecutions.
Nor does Jewry possess the anthropological charac-
teristics which would stamp them as a homogeneous
race. It cannot, however, be denied that every Jew in
the world has some drops of purely Jewish blood in
him. Were this not so, it would be impossible to
explain the presence of certain physical characteristics
which are permanently common to all Jews from the
ghetto of Warsaw to the bazaars of Morocco—the
offensive nose, the cruel vicious nostrils and so on.

A race of the mind is something more solid, more
durable than just a race, pure and simple. Transplant
a German to the United States and you turn him into

V—13TH FEBRUARY 1945

an American. But the Jew remains a Jew wherever he goes, a creature which no environment can assimilate.

* It is the characteristic mental make-up of his race which renders him impervious to the processes of assimilation. And there in a nutshell is the proof of the superiority of the mind over the flesh! . . .

The quite amazing ascendancy which they achieved during the course of the nineteenth century gave the Jews a sense of their own power and caused them to drop the mask; and it is just that that has given us the chance to oppose them as Jews, self-proclaimed and proud of the fact. And when you remember how credulous the Germans are, you will realize that we must be most grateful for this sudden excess of frankness on the part of our most mortal enemies.

|| I have always been absolutely fair in my dealings with the Jews. On the eve of war, I gave them one final warning. I told them that, if they precipitated another war, they would not be spared and that I would exterminate the vermin throughout Europe, and this time once and for all. To this warning they retorted with a declaration of war and affirmed that wherever in the world there was a Jew, there, too, was an implacable enemy of National Socialist Germany.

Well, we have lanced the Jewish abscess; and the world of the future will be eternally grateful to us.

* It is this mind, said H. H.
that must be excised
from civilization³⁰ before we are
polluted to the roots

Too soon and too late—
lack space—A revolution
bourgeois policy—Collapse
mistake—We should have
proletariat and liberated
right in *Mein Kampf*

The disastrous thing about
Germany it began both to
the purely military point of
us better if it had started
seized the initiative in 1933
to be forced into war in
case, unavoidable. However
if the British and the French
every demand I made of them

As things stand at the present
a little too late. But from
moral preparedness, it is

JANUARY 1945

remains a Jew wherever he
environment can assimilate.
tal make-up of his race
ous to the processes of
nutshell is the proof of
over the flesh! . . .
uncy which they achieved
eteenth century gave the
ower and caused them to
that that has given us the
ews, self-proclaimed and
en you remember how
you will realize that we
this sudden excess of
most mortal enemies.
tely fair in my dealings
f war, I gave them one
hat, if they precipitated
t be spared and that I
throughout Europe, and
To this warning they
f war and affirmed that
as a Jew, there, too, was
ional Socialist Germany.
Jewish abscess; and the
ernally grateful to us.

mid H. H.
ccied
before we are
root

VI

Too soon and too late—We lack time, because we lack space—A revolutionary State, pursuing a *petit bourgeois* policy—Collaboration with France was a mistake—We should have emancipated the French proletariat and liberated the French colonies—I was right in *Mein Kampf*

14th February 1945

The disastrous thing about this war is the fact that for Germany it began both too soon and too late. From the purely military point of view, it would have suited us better if it had started sooner. I ought to have seized the initiative in 1938 instead of allowing myself to be forced into war in 1939; for war was, in any case, unavoidable. However, you can hardly blame me if the British and the French accepted at Munich every demand I made of them!

As things stand at the moment, then, the war came a little too late. But from the point of view of our moral preparedness, it has come far too soon. My

disciples have not yet had time to attain their full manhood. I should really have had another twenty years in which to bring this new *élite* to maturity, an *élite* of youth, immersed from infancy in the philosophy of National Socialism. The tragedy for us Germans is that we never have enough time. Circumstances always conspire to force us to hurry. And if at this point time is lacking, it is primarily because we lack space. The Russians with their vast expansion can afford the luxury of refusing to be hurried. Time works in their favour, but against us. Even if Providence had allotted to me a span of life sufficiently long to allow me to lead my people to the complete degree of development that National Socialism desires, you may be quite sure that our enemies would never have permitted me to take advantage of it. They would have done their utmost to destroy us before they found themselves face to face with a Germany, cemented by a single faith and National Socialist in body and soul, which would have been invincible.

Since we lacked men moulded in the shape of our ideal, we had perforce to make what use we could of those whom we had. The result has been obvious. Thanks to this discrepancy between conception and realization, the war policy of a revolutionary state like the Third Reich has of necessity been the policy of petty bourgeois reactionaries. Our generals and diplomats, with a few, rare exceptions, are men of another age; and their methods of waging war and of conducting our foreign policy also belong to an age

that is passed. This is just as in all good faith as former serve us ill through enthusiasm, and the last malice aforethought.

Our greatest politicalament of the French collaborated with them. them in good stead a thought he was being ve champion of this idea a He thought he was t whereas in reality he wa to think that we were Napoleon, with a nation appreciating the import of a noble gesture. He fi fact, namely, that during has changed completely. and she is now a raddled ceased to swindle and to left us to foot the bill.

Our obvious course the working classes and to implement their own brushed aside, rudely at bourgeoisie, as devoid patriotism. Just look at t of the Wilhelmstrasse h: petty, calculating little

time to attain their full
ave had another twenty
new *élite* to maturity, an
from infancy in the
alism. The tragedy for us
ve enough time. Circum-
orce us to hurry. And if
it is primarily because we
ith their vast expansion
sing to be hurried. Time
gainst us. Even if Provi-
span of life sufficiently
people to the complete
ational Socialism desires,
our enemies would never
advantage of it. They
ost to destroy us before
to face with a Germany,
and National Socialist in
have been invincible.
added in the shape of our
ake what use we could of
result has been obvious.
between conception and
a revolutionary state like
essity been the policy of
. Our generals and diplo-
tions, are men of another
of waging war and of
cy also belong to an age

that is passed. This is just as true of those who serve
us in all good faith as it is of the rest of them. The
former serve us ill through lack either of aptitude or
enthusiasm, and the latter do so deliberately and of
malice aforethought.

Our greatest political blunder has been our treat-
ment of the French. We should never have
collaborated with them. It is a policy which has stood
them in good stead and has served us ill. Abetz
thought he was being very clever when he became the
champion of this idea and persuaded us to pursue it.
He thought he was two moves ahead of events,
whereas in reality he was well behind them. He seemed
to think that we were dealing with the France of
Napoleon, with a nation, that is, which was capable of
appreciating the importance and far-reaching effects
of a noble gesture. He failed to see what is an obvious
fact, namely, that during the last hundred years France
has changed completely. She has become a prostitute,
and she is now a raddled old strumpet, who has never
ceased to swindle and to confound us, and has always
left us to foot the bill.

Our obvious course should have been to liberate
the working classes and to help the workers of France
to implement their own revolution. We should have
brushed aside, rudely and without pity, the fossilized
bourgeoisie, as devoid of soul as it is denuded of
patriotism. Just look at the sort of friends our geniuses
of the Wilhelmstrasse have found for us in France—
petty, calculating little profiteers, who hastened to

make love to us as soon as they thought that we were occupying their country in order to safeguard their bank balances—but who were quite resolved to betray us at the first possible opportunity, provided always that no danger to themselves was involved!

We were equally stupid as regards the French colonies. That, too, was the work of our great minds in the Wilhelmstrasse! Diplomats of the old, classic mould, soldiers of a bygone régime, petty country squires—of such were those who were to help us to revolutionize all Europe! And they have led us into waging war as they would have waged it in the nineteenth century. Never, at any price, should we have put our money on France and against the peoples subjected to her yoke. On the contrary, we should have helped them to achieve their liberty and, if necessary, should have goaded them into doing so. There was nothing to stop us in 1940 from making a gesture of this sort in the Near East and in North Africa. In actual fact our diplomats instead set about the task of consolidating French power, not only in Syria, but in Tunis, in Algeria and Morocco as well. Our 'gentlemen' obviously preferred to maintain cordial relations with distinguished Frenchmen, rather than with a lot of hirsute revolutionaries, with a chorus of musical comedy officers, whose one idea was to cheat us, rather than with the Arabs, who would have been loyal partners for us. Oh! you needn't think I don't see through the calculations of these Machiavellian professionals! They know their job and they have

their traditions! All the trick they were playing still under the ban of and rivalry between B field. What I'm saying living in the reign of Queen Victoria and named Poincaré and rivalry has ceased to still seems to exist is some diplomats of the adversaries too. In r associates, each of w with considerable asp any appeal to friend again against a com deep-seated hatred of and different. Therein do well to ponder in th

As regards France, her. Either she could with Britain, in which interest to us as a po she would also aband or she could have pr partners, in which cas more dubious value t wishful thinking abou lous. In reality there adopt vis-à-vis France

* D.T. : This had been my opinion and he ignored it then and paraded it but now it is

✓ verities own

thought that we were
er to safeguard their
uite resolved to betray
nity, provided always
as involved!

regards the French
ck of our great minds
ats of the old, classic
égime, petty country
o were to help us to
they have led us into
waged it in the nine-
rice, should we have
against the peoples
contrary, we should
a liberty and, if neces-
into doing so. There
rom making a gesture
d in North Africa. In
d set about the task
not only in Syria, but
o as well. Our 'gentle-
tain cordial relations
rather than with a lot
a chorus of musical
ea was to cheat us,
ho would have been
needn't think I don't
these Machiavellian
job and they have

their traditions! All they thought about was the dirty
trick they were playing on the British, for they were
still under the ban of the famous alleged antagonism
and rivalry between Britain and France in the colonial
field. What I'm saying is perfectly true—they are still
living in the reign of Wilhelm II, in the world of
Queen Victoria and that of those artful sharpers
named Poincaré and Delcassé! In actual fact this
rivalry has ceased to be of any significance. That it
still seems to exist is due to the fact that there are still
some diplomats of the old school in the ranks of our
adversaries too. In reality, Britain and France are
associates, each of whom is playing his own game
with considerable asperity, neither of whom react to
any appeal to friendship, but both of whom unite
again against a common danger. The Frenchman's
deep-seated hatred of the German is something deeper
and different. Therein lies a lesson on which we should
do well to ponder in the future.

As regards France, there were two courses open to
her. Either she could have abandoned her alliance
with Britain, in which case she would have been of no
interest to us as a potential ally, since we knew that
she would also abandon us on the first opportunity;
or she could have pretended to make this change of
partners, in which case she would have been of even
more dubious value to us. On our side, some of the
wishful thinking about this country was quite ridicu-
lous. In reality there was only one possible policy to
adopt *vis-à-vis* France—a policy of rigorous and rigid

then I am
showing it

verdict is ours

ARY 1945

t about France. With
n accurate picture of
I know perfectly well
ntations that have been
reason at all to change
ars ago.*

suppress or to change the
of his book, *Mein Kampf*,
even after Munich. It is to

VII

The gravest decision of the war—Peace with Britain
not possible till the Red Army had been annihilated—
Time works against us—Stalin's blackmail—Settle-
ment with Russia as soon as the weather became fine

15th February 1945

No decision which I have had to make during the
course of this war was graver than that to attack
Russia. I had always maintained that we ought at all
costs to avoid waging war on two fronts, and you may
rest assured that I pondered long and anxiously over
Napoleon and his experiences in Russia. Why, then,
you may ask, this war against Russia, and why at the
time that I selected?

We had already given up hope of ending the war
by means of a successful invasion of Britain. Further-
more that country, under the guidance of its stupid
chiefs, would have refused to recognize the hegemony
we had set up in Europe as long as there remained on
the Continent a Great Power which was fundamentally

hostile to the Third Reich. The war, then, would have gone on and on, a war in which, behind the British, the Americans would have played an increasingly active role. The importance of the war potential of the United States, the progress made in armaments—both in our own camp and in that of our enemies, the proximity of the English coast—all these things combined to make it highly inadvisable for us to become bogged down in a war of long duration. For Time—and it's always Time, you notice—would have been increasingly against us. In order to persuade Britain to pack up, to compel her to make peace, it was essential to rob her of her hope of being able still to confront us, on the Continent itself, with an adversary of a stature equal to our own. We had no choice, we had at all costs to strike the Russian element out of the European balance sheet. We had another reason, equally valid, for our action—the mortal threat that a Russia in being constituted to our existence. For it was absolutely certain that one day or other she would attack us.

Our one and only chance of vanquishing Russia was to take the initiative, for to fight a defensive war against her was not practical. We dared not allow the Red Army the advantage of the terrain, place our *Autobahns* at the disposal of its swiftly on-rushing armour, and our railways at the disposal of its troops and its supplies. But if we took the offensive, we could, indeed, defeat the Red Army on its own ground, in the swamps and in the vast and muddy

expanses; but in a civilisation done so. We should sit with a spring-board with of Europe and destroy it

Why 1941? Because, ing power of our weste at all, we had to do so Nor, mind you, was S fronts, time was against therefore: 'Why 22 Jun 'Why not earlier still?' for us by the Italians : Greece, I should have earlier. For us, the ma Russians from moving f own personal nightmare take the initiative before

Another reason was the Russians were with In spite of their oblig decreased steadily, and they might suddenly ce prepared to give us of we had to have, then w and take them, *in situ* decision immediately a in November, for it t sooner or later Stalin v to the enemy. Ought order that our prepara

*A. D. T. He is
these negotiations
him by saying*

ie war, then, would have
 rich, behind the British,
 played an increasingly
 the war potential of the
 ade in armaments—both
 at of our enemies, the
 it—all these things com-
 isable for us to become
 g duration. For Time—
 otice—would have been
 der to persuade Britain
 to make peace, it was
 pe of being able still to
 itself, with an adversary
 We had no choice, we
 Russian element out of
 We had another reason,
 the mortal threat that a
 o our existence. For it
 day or other she would

of vanquishing Russia
 to fight a defensive war
 We dared not allow the
 the terrain, place our
 f its swiftly on-rushing
 he disposal of its troops
 took the offensive, we
 ed Army on its own
 in the vast and muddy

expanses; but in a civilized country we could not have
 done so. We should simply have been providing it
 with a spring-board with which to leap upon the whole
 of Europe and destroy it. ✱

Why 1941? Because, in view of the steadily increas-
 ing power of our western enemies, if we were to act
 at all, we had to do so with the least possible delay.
 Nor, mind you, was Stalin doing nothing. On two
 fronts, time was against us. The real question was not,
 therefore: 'Why 22 June 1941 already' but rather:
 'Why not earlier still?' But for the difficulties created
 for us by the Italians and their idiotic campaign in
 Greece, I should have attacked Russia a few weeks
 earlier. For us, the main problem was to keep the
 Russians from moving for as long as possible, and my
 own personal nightmare was the fear that Stalin might
 take the initiative before me.

Another reason was that the raw materials which
 the Russians were withholding were essential to us.
 In spite of their obligations their rate of delivery
 decreased steadily, and there was a real danger that
 they might suddenly cease altogether. If they were not
 prepared to give us of their own free will the things
 we had to have, then we had no alternative but to go
 and take them, *in situ* and by force. I came to my
 decision immediately after Molotov's visit to Berlin
 in November, for it then became clear to me that
 sooner or later Stalin would abandon us and go over
 to the enemy. Ought I to have played for time in
 order that our preparations could have become more

✱ P.T. He would wake up with
 these nightmares. I would soothe
 him by saying: "You attack first."

conflict. To ensure her abstention, no sacrifices, no presents on our part would have been too great. Had she steadfastly maintained her neutral role, we would have overwhelmed her with our favours. In victory we would have shared with her all the fruits and all the glory. We would have collaborated with all our hearts in the creation of the historic myth of the supremacy of the Italian people, the legitimate sons of the ancient Romans. Indeed, anything would have been preferable to having them as comrades in arms on the field of battle!

Italy's intervention in June 1940, with the sole purpose of aiming a donkey-kick at a French army that was already in process of disintegration, merely had the effect of tarnishing a victory which the vanquished were at the time prepared to accept in a sporting spirit. France recognized that she had been fairly defeated by the armies of the Reich, but she was unwilling to accept defeat at the hands of the Axis.

Our Italian ally has been a source of embarrassment to us everywhere. It was this alliance, for instance, which prevented us from pursuing a revolutionary policy in North Africa. In the nature of things, this territory was becoming an Italian preserve and it was as such that the Duce laid claim to it. Had we been on our own, we could have emancipated the Moslem countries dominated by France; and that would have had enormous repercussions in the Near East, dominated by Britain, and in Egypt. But with our fortunes linked to those of the Italians, the

pursuit of such a policy vibrated at the news of the Iraklis and the who ready to rise in revolt. J done to help them, even been both our duty and presence of the Italians created a feeling of *mala* who inevitably saw in unwilling, of their oppre parts of the world are r than either the British of the barbarous repris are still vivid. Then ag of the Duce to be rega evokes the same snee before the war. This Mahomed and a great c caused to be conferred brutes whom he had ei doing so. We had a splendid policy with req the bus, as we missed i thanks to our loyalty to t

In this theatre of ope vented us from playing c of the French subjects a of revolt in the countr Such a policy would ha the whole of Islam. It is

X-17TH FEBRUARY 1945

which was always possible, if not probable. From our point of view this means that there would have been a considerable number of British troops, immobile and acquiring neither the experience of battle nor the fillip derived from victory—in short, a sort of 'phoney war', and the longer it continued, the greater would be the advantage that we gained from it.

A war that is prolonged is of benefit to a belligerent in that it gives him the opportunities to learn to wage war. I had hoped to conduct this war without giving the enemy the chance of learning anything new in the art of battle. In Poland and Scandinavia, in Holland, Belgium and France I succeeded. Our victories were swift, were achieved with a minimum of casualties on both sides, but were yet sufficiently clear-cut and decisive to lead to the complete defeat of the enemy.

If the war had remained a war conducted by Germany, and not by the Axis, we should have been in a position to attack Russia by 15th May 1941. Doubly strengthened by the fact that our forces had known nothing but decisive and irrefutable victories, we should have been able to conclude the campaign before winter came. How differently everything has turned out!

Out of gratitude (for I shall never forget the attitude adopted by the Duce at the time of the Anschluss) I have always abstained from criticizing or passing judgment on Italy. I have on the contrary always been at great pains to treat her as an equal. Unfortunately, the laws of nature have shown that it is a mistake to

X-17TH FEB

treat as equals those who Duce himself is my equal, my superior from the point of view for his people. But it is not count.

We Germans do well in stances such as these it is in our hand. We have everything in our hand by binding ourselves closely and by choosing into the line of duty given all too frequent proof. I often said that wherever you find victory, there, you find victory, there, you find Italy!

Neither my personal and instinctive feelings of friendship have changed. But I do not listen to the voice of my ruthlessness in my friendship. I have done so, both to the people of Italy and to the advantage of Italy. of course, that such an action have offended him and I have given me. But as a result of what have happened which show which may well prove weakness.

* D.T.'s m

RY 1945

ot probable. From our
there would have been
ish troops, immobile
ence of battle nor the
hort, a sort of 'phoney
ed, the greater would
from it.

benefit to a belligerent
nities to learn to wage
is war without giving
g anything new in the
andinavia, in Holland,
d. Our victories were
imum of casualties on
iciently clear-cut and
defeat of the enemy.
a war conducted by
we should have been
by 15th May 1941.
t that our forces had
irrefutable victories,
onclude the campaign
rently everything has

ver forget the attitude
e of the Anschluss) I
riticizing or passing
contrary always been
equal. Unfortunately,
hat it is a mistake to

X—17TH FEBRUARY 1945

treat as equals those who are not your equals. The
Duce himself is my equal. He may perhaps even be
my superior from the point of view of his ambitions
for his people. But it is facts and not ambitions that
count.

We Germans do well to remember that in circum-
stances such as these it is better for us to play a lone
hand. We have everything to lose and nothing to gain
by binding ourselves closely with more feeble elements
and by choosing into the bargain partners who have
given all too frequent proof of their fickleness. I have
often said that wherever you find Italy, there you will
find victory. What I should have said is—wherever
you find victory, there, you may be sure, you will find
Italy!

Neither my personal affection for the Duce nor my
instinctive feelings of friendship for the Italian people
have changed. But I do blame myself for not having
listened to the voice of reason, which bade me to be
ruthless in my friendship for Italy. And I could have
done so, both to the personal advantage of the Duce
himself and to the advantage of his people. I realize,
of course, that such an attitude on my part would
have offended him and that he would never have for-
given me. But as a result of my forbearance things
have happened which should not have happened and
which may well prove fatal. Life does not forgive
weakness.

* D.T.'s will

opposition in his own country. He had done all in his power to provoke the Japanese. It was only a repetition, on a vaster scale, of the tactics employed with such success by Wilson at the time of the first war: the torpedoing of the *Lusitania*, provoked with diabolical skill, prepared the Americans psychologically for the entry of their country into the war against Germany. Since the intervention of the United States could not be prevented in 1917, it is obvious that their intervention now, twenty-five years later, was both a logical premise and unavoidable.

It was only in 1915 that World Jewry decided to place the whole of its resources at the disposal of the Allies. But in our case, Jewry decided as early as 1933, at the very birth of the Third Reich, tacitly to declare war on us. Furthermore the influence wielded by the Jews in the United States has consistently and steadily increased during the last quarter of a century. And since the entry of the United States into the war was quite inevitable, it was a slice of great good fortune for us to have at our side an ally of such great worth as Japan. But it was also a slice of great good fortune for the Jews. It gave them the chance they had so long been seeking to implicate the United States directly in the conflict, and it was a master stroke on their part to have succeeded in dragging the Americans unanimously and enthusiastically into their war. The Americans, mindful of their disillusionment in 1919, were by no means anxious once again to intervene in a European war. On the other hand

elt—Nothing could have
S.A. into the war—The
arity with the Japanese

18th February 1945

caused us no misgivings,
that the Japanese had
pretext to Roosevelt for
against us. But Roosevelt
already quite resolved to go
al Socialism, and he had
Such pretexts as were
stance of the isolationists
dicating for himself. One
thing to him.

Harbour disaster was,
It was exactly what he
to drag his countrymen
illate the last remnants of

they were more obsessed than ever with the idea of the Yellow Peril. Trying to teach the Jews a trick or two is like carrying coals to Newcastle, and you can be quite sure that all their plans are conceived with Machiavellian astuteness. I myself am quite convinced that in the case we are discussing they took a very long view which envisaged the overthrow by a white Power of the Empire of the Rising Sun, which had risen to the status of a world Power and which had always sternly resisted contamination by the race of Jewry.

For us, Japan will always remain an ally and a friend. This war will teach us to appreciate and respect her more than ever. It will encourage us to draw more tightly the bonds which unite our two countries. It is of course regrettable that the Japanese did not enter the war against Russia and at the same time as ourselves. Had they done so, Stalin's armies would not now be besieging Breslau or squatting in Budapest. We should have liquidated Bolshevism by the time winter came, and Roosevelt would have hesitated to take on adversaries as powerful as our two selves. In the same way I am sorry that Japan did not capture Singapore as early as 1940, immediately after the defeat of France. The United States was then on the eve of a presidential election and would have found it impossible to intervene. That, then, was one of the turning points of the war.

In spite of everything, we and the Japanese will

remain staunchly side by side together. Should we be the first to see the Russians continuing to 'Asiatic solidarity' for the sake

XII

We should have occupied Gibraltar in 1940—Congenital weakness of the Latin countries—The British duped by the French—Misunderstandings with the Duce—The disastrous campaign in Greece

20th February 1945

Taking advantage of the enthusiasm we had aroused in Spain and the shock to which we had subjected Britain, we ought to have attacked Gibraltar in the summer of 1940, immediately after the defeat of France.

At that time, however, the awkward thing was that it would have been difficult to prevent Spain entering into the war on our side—and particularly so as we had failed, a few weeks previously, from preventing Italy from flying to the rescue of our victory.

These Latin countries bring us no luck. Their overweening conceit is in direct proportion to their weakness, and that always confuses the issue. We failed entirely to curb the Italians' desire to shine on

XII—20TH FEBRUARY

the field of battle, even though they were themselves willing to confer upon them for heroism, to bestow upon them military glory and all the advantages of a war that has been won—provided they took no part in it at all.

The British, of course, were completely duped by their Latin ally rather than vice versa. Obviously, they would never have realized the full extent of French inadequacy. For the British in France to bear the whole brunt of the war on the Continent. For Chamberlain to have been easier than to shed a few tears for Poland and then to have taken the country up at our leisure.

To our material weakness the Latins added quite fantastic pretentiousness. In dealing with hostile France—it makes no odds which of them will have been equal to the task.

The only disagreements that arose between the Duce and myself arose from the pretensions which from time to time I had to take. In spite of the complete confidence in him personally, I felt compelled to point out his ignorance of my intentions in articulation might have prejudiced our relations. He had complete confidence in me and I had complete confidence in him—complete confidence in Ciano—an Italian who kept no secrets from the pretty ladies.

the field of battle, even though we had shown ourselves willing to confer upon them an honours degree for heroism, to bestow upon them all the fruits of military glory and all the advantages accruing from a war that has been won—provided always that they took no part in it at all.

Talk to Brown

The British, of course, were duped even more completely by their Latin ally than we were. Chamberlain, obviously, would never have declared war, had he realized the full extent of French demoralization and inadequacy. For the British undoubtedly expected France to bear the whole brunt of the land campaign on the Continent. For Chamberlain nothing would have been easier than to shed a few crocodile's tears for Poland and then to have left us to carve the country up at our leisure.

To material weakness the Latin countries add a quite fantastic pretentiousness. Friendly Italy or hostile France—it makes no odds. The weakness of both of them will have been equally fatal to us.

The only disagreements that have ever occurred between the Duce and myself arose from the precautions which from time to time I had felt constrained to take. In spite of the complete confidence I had in him personally, I felt compelled to keep him in ignorance of my intentions in any case where indiscretion might have prejudiced our interests. Just as I had complete confidence in Mussolini, he had complete confidence in Ciano—and he, of course, had no secrets from the pretty ladies who fluttered like

II

Gibraltar in 1940—Contin countries—The British misunderstandings with the paign in Greece

20th February 1945

thusiasm we had aroused which we had subjected attacked Gibraltar in the tely after the defeat of

e awkward thing was that to prevent Spain entering and particularly so as we eviously, from preventing ue of our victory.

g us no luck. Their over-ect proportion to their confuses the issue. We alians' desire to shine on

butterflies around him. That we know to our cost, and as the enemy were anxious for information regardless of costs, they learnt a goodly number of secrets through this channel. I had good reasons, therefore, for not telling the Duce everything. I am only sorry that he did not appreciate the fact, that he resented my attitude and paid me back in my own coin.

There's no doubt about it—we have no luck with the Latin races! While I was occupied, first in Montoire, buttoning up a futile policy of collaboration with France, and then in Hendaye, where I had to submit to receiving fulsome honours at the hands of a false friend, a third Latin—and one, this time, who really was a friend—took advantage of my preoccupation to set in motion his disastrous campaign against Greece.

XI

Third Reich's need of peace man and the Utopian doctrine, applicable war occurred in 1938, it was war—What would have happened for the West

We had need of peace in programme. I always desire have been jockeyed into war enemies. In practice, the three since January 1933, from power.

On the one hand, there are those who march in step with those who adopt a realistic affairs. And throughout history families of wholly irreconcilable

On the one hand, there are

FEBRUARY 1945

at we know to our cost,
anxious for information
want a goodly number of
el. I had good reasons,
a Duce everything. I am
appreciate the fact, that he
aid me back in my own

—we have no luck with
was occupied, first in
the policy of collaboration
enday, where I had to
honours at the hands of
—and one, this time, who
advantage of my preoccu-
sion disastrous campaign

XIII

Third Reich's need of peace to consolidate—Abstract
man and the Utopian doctrines—National Socialism
a realistic doctrine, applicable only to Germany—Had
war occurred in 1938, it would have been a local
war—What would have happened—a double coup
for the West

21st February 1945

We had need of peace in order to carry out our
programme. I always desired to maintain peace. We
have been jockeyed into war at the desire of our
enemies. In practice, the threat of war has existed ever
since January 1933, from the time that I came to
power.

On the one hand, there are the Jews and all those
who march in step with them. On the other, there are
those who adopt a realistic attitude towards world
affairs. And throughout history we have had these two
families of wholly irreconcilable outlook in the world.

On the one hand, there are those who strive for the

happiness of mankind in the abstract and who pursue the chimera of a formula applicable all the world over. On the other, there are the realists. National Socialism is interested only in the happiness of the German race and strives only to secure the wellbeing of the German man.

The universalists, the idealists, the Utopians all aim too high. They give promises of an unattainable paradise, and by doing so they deceive mankind. Whatever label they wear, whether they call themselves Christians, Communists, humanitarians, whether they are merely sincere but stupid or wire-pullers and cynics, they are all makers of slaves. I myself have always kept my eye fixed on a paradise which, in the nature of things, lies well within our reach. I mean an improvement in the lot of the German people.

I have restricted myself to making promises that I knew I could keep and that I had every intention of keeping. Hence the universal hatred which I have aroused. By refusing to make impossible promises, as do our enemies, I was not playing the game. I was holding myself aloof from the syndicate of the world's leaders, whose aim, unavowed but tacitly accepted, is the exploitation of human credulity.

The National Socialist doctrine, as I have always proclaimed, is not for export. It was conceived for the German people. All the objectives at which it aims are, of necessity, limited—but attainable. It follows, then, that I can put as little credence in the idea of universal peace as in that of universal war.

It was on the eve of Munich that the enemies of the Reich decided to have our hide at all costs. They saw no possibility of coming to that arch capitalist bourgeois and his deceptive umbrella in his hour of trouble of going all the way with matters with that upstart, Hitler, that he really intended to win. He was quite prepared to let them have their thought might serve to lure him and only object in undertaking the matter. What we ought then to have struck at once. We ought to have taken it. It was the last chance we had.

But they gave way all along. They gave way all along. They gave way all along. Under such conditions it was no initiative and commencement. He lost a unique opportunity of winning a war that was in any case inevitable.

Although we were ourselves neverthebetter prepared in September 1938 would have been the date. And what a chance we had.

We ought then and then to have disputed by force of arms and then to have won the opinion of our opponents to meet us. We solved the Sudeten question. We solved the Czechoslovakia at the same

* Wake up in the
* They tried to kill me, 1

JARY 1945

XIII—21ST FEBRUARY 1945

abstract and who pursue
cable all the world over.
lists. National Socialism
ness of the German race
wellbeing of the German

ts, the Utopians all aim
es of an unattainable
they deceive mankind.
hether they call them-
humanitarians, whether
ipid or wire-pullers and
slaves. I myself have
paradise which, in the
hin our reach. I mean
the German people.

making promises that I
had every intention of
hatred which I have
mpossible promises, as
aying the game. I was
ndicate of the world's
but tacitly accepted, is
lity.

ine, as I have always
t was conceived for the
tives at which it aims
attainable. It follows,
redence in the idea of
ersal war.

It was on the eve of Munich that I realized beyond doubt that the enemies of the Third Reich were determined to have our hide at all costs and that there was no possibility of coming to terms with them. When that arch capitalist bourgeois, Chamberlain, with his deceptive umbrella in his hand, put himself to the trouble of going all the way to the Berghof to discuss matters with that upstart, Hitler, he knew very well that he really intended to wage ruthless war against us. He was quite prepared to tell me anything which he thought might serve to lull my suspicions. His one and only object in undertaking this trip was to gain time. What we ought then to have done was to have struck at once. We ought to have gone to war in 1938. It was the last chance we had of localizing the war.

But they gave way all along the line and, like the poltroons that they are, ceded to all our demands. Under such conditions it was very difficult to seize the initiative and commence hostilities. At Munich we lost a unique opportunity of easily and swiftly winning a war that was in any case inevitable.

Although we were ourselves not fully prepared, we were nevertheless better prepared than the enemy. September 1938 would have been the most favourable date. And what a chance we had to limit the conflict.

We ought then and there to have settled our disputes by force of arms and disregarded the inclination of our opponents to meet all our demands. When we solved the Sudeten question by force we liquidated Czechoslovakia at the same time—and left all the

59
* Waken up in the middle of the night.
* They tricked me, they gyped me. "u

them, Germany, remember, has made a massive contribution to the peopling of America. It is we Germans who have made by far the greatest contribution of Nordic blood to the United States. And it is also a fact that Steuben played a part which decided the issue in the War of Independence.

The last great economic crisis struck Germany and the United States at more or less the same time and with the same force. Both countries rode the storm in much the same way. The operation, though extremely difficult, was crowned with success on our side. In America, where, after all, it presented no difficulty at all, the operation achieved only a very mediocre success under the guidance of Roosevelt and his Jewish advisers. The failure of the New Deal is responsible in no small measure for their war fever. The United States as a matter of fact could survive and prosper in a state of economic isolation; for us, that is a dream which we would love to see come true. They have at their disposal a vast territory, ample to absorb the energies of all their people. As far as Germany is concerned, my hope is one day to ensure for her complete economic independence inside a territory of a size compatible with her population. A great people has need of broad acres.

Germany expects nothing from the United States, and the latter have nothing to fear from Germany. Everything combines to ensure the possibility of peaceful co-existence, each in his own country and all in perfect harmony. Unfortunately, the whole business

ica—Contribution by
s—The failure of the
sibility of peaceful
/ and U.S.A.—The
/—Roosevelt, a false
a grand Continental

24th February 1945

ragedy. It is illogical
eality.

s of history that just
many, Roosevelt, the
nmand in the United
ithout this lackey of
te different. For from
nd the United States
nderstand each other
r, then at least to
e strain on either of

is ruined by the fact that world Jewry has chosen just that country in which to set up its most powerful bastion. That, and that alone, has altered the relations between us and has poisoned everything.

I am prepared to wager that well within twenty-five years the Americans themselves will have realized what a handicap has been imposed upon them by this parasitic Jewry, clamped fast to their flesh and nourishing itself on their life-blood. It is this Jewry that is dragging them into adventures which, when all is said and done, are no concern of theirs and in which the interests at stake are of no importance to them. What possible reason can the non-Jewish Americans have for sharing the hatreds of the Jews and following meekly in their footsteps? One thing is quite certain —within a quarter of a century the Americans will either have become violently anti-semitic or they will be devoured by Jewry.

If we should lose this war, it will mean that we have been defeated by the Jews. Their victory will then be complete. But let me hasten to add that it will only be very temporary. It will certainly not be Europe which takes up the struggle again against them, but it certainly will be the United States. The latter is a country still too young to have acquired the maturity conferred by age and exaggeratedly lacking in political sense. For the Americans, everything has so far been ridiculously easy. But experience and difficulties will perhaps cause them to mature. Just think for a moment what they were when their country was born

* *lost the
Daily Double here.*

—a group of individuals earth hastening forward finding at their disposal their hunger and all the conscience is a thing which especially in vast territory it be forgotten that these from a variety of races and the bonds of a national spirit the Jews!

The excesses in which country are as nothing in which they have indulged continue to indulge in their new hunting ground before the Americans realize they have adored is an idol this Jew-ridden man is in from the point of view of humanity as a whole. He path on which they had particular he has forced in a conflict that does not they possessed even a man they would have remained content in this conflict to they been a little more experienced, they would their best course in their have been to have entrenched

* *this is the mind
American violence
late 30's, and white*

world Jewry has chosen just
set up its most powerful
ie, has altered the relations
of everything.

That well within twenty-five
hundreds will have realized
imposed upon them by this
fast to their flesh and
life-blood. It is this Jewry
adventures which, when all
cern of theirs and in which
of no importance to them.
the non-Jewish Americans
of the Jews and following

One thing is quite certain
century the Americans will
ly anti-semitic or they will

r, it will mean that we have.
Their victory will then be
to add that it will only be
ainly not be Europe which
against them, but it cer-
l States. The latter is a
have acquired the maturity
erately lacking in political
everything has so far been
erience and difficulties will
nature. Just think for a
when their country was born

—a group of individuals come from all corners of the
earth hastening forward in pursuit of fortune and
finding at their disposal a vast continent to appease
their hunger and all theirs for the taking. National
conscience is a thing which develops very gradually,
especially in vast territories such as these. Nor must
it be forgotten that these individuals had been drawn
from a variety of races and had not yet been fused by
the bonds of a national spirit. What an easy prey for
the Jews!

The excesses in which the Jews indulged in our
country are as nothing in comparison with the excesses
in which they have indulged and in which they will
continue to indulge in ever increasing measure on
their new hunting grounds. It will not be very long
before the Americans realize that the Roosevelt whom
they have adored is an idol with feet of clay and that
this Jew-ridden man is in reality a malefactor—both
from the point of view of the United States and of
humanity as a whole. He has dragged them along a
path on which they had no business to be, and in
particular he has forced them to take an active part
in a conflict that does not concern them at all. Had
they possessed even a minimum of political instinct
they would have remained in their splendid isolation,
content in this conflict to play the role of arbiter. Had
they been a little more mature and a little more
experienced, they would doubtless have realized that
their best course in their own major interests would
have been to have entrenched themselves firmly with

* This is the underside of the
American isolationism in the
late 30's, and flavoured with the old
wisdom with the Jews as Jewish

XV

The Germans always, inevitably, in a hurry—Time fights on Russia's side—A people with a tragic past—Not the work of one man, or even of a generation—Germans have never ceased to fight for their existence

25th February 1945

It is a fact that we always bungle everything through being forced to act in a hurry. With us, to act swiftly is always to act with precipitation. To acquire the gift of patience, we should have both time and space, and at the moment we have neither. The Russians are lucky in possessing both, quite apart from that inclination towards placidity which is a characteristic trait of the Slav temperament.

Furthermore, thanks to the Marxist religion, they have everything required to make them patient. They have been promised happiness on earth (a feature which distinguishes Marxism from the Christian

religion)—but in the future Marx, like the good Jew I am coming of the Messiah. conception in a setting asserting that terrestrial almost endless process within your reach,' he says you must let evolution take its course. 'Mankind must not be tricked of that sort. . . . Lenin and Stalin will carry on the good work. . . . Marxism is a very practical religion. We assess Christianity, Judaised to the extent that it is Anti-Christ. Jew? Believe me, I am stronger!

I myself am fated to accomplish everything in my lifetime. To help me I have based on tangible facts, that can certainly be fulfilled. I promise the moon. When it is in their disposal, I have but to wait. Those others know that it is not they who will carry on the work, but others who will carry on the work with precision exactly the same plough stage where I wonder what their successors there will be:

* He had always been irreplaceable.

XV—25TH FEBRUARY 1945

religion)—but in the future. The Jew, Mardochée Marx, like the good Jew that he was, was awaiting the coming of the Messiah. He has placed the Messiah conception in a setting of historic materialism by asserting that terrestrial happiness is a factor in an almost endless process of evolution. 'Happiness is within your reach,' he says, 'that I promise you. But you must let evolution take its course and not try to hurry matters.' Mankind always falls for a specious trick of that sort. . . . Lenin did not have the time, but Stalin will carry on the good work, and so on and so on...Marxism is a very powerful force. But how shall we assess Christianity, that false leadership has Judaised to the extent that it will no longer fight the Anti-Christ Jew? Believe me, it is incomparably stronger!

I myself am fated to being compelled to try to accomplish everything in the short space of a human lifetime. To help me I have but a realistic idealism, based on tangible facts, from which flows promises that can certainly be fulfilled, but which forbids me to promise the moon. Where others have all eternity at their disposal, I have but a few short, miserable years. Those others know that they will be succeeded by yet others who will carry on where they left off, ploughing with precision exactly the same furrow with exactly the same plough. I have now reached the stage where I wonder whether among my immediate successors there will be found a man predestined to

* He had always ⁶⁹thought of himself as irreplaceable. I had confirmed it.

25th February 1945

to struggle everything through
v. With us, to act swiftly
tion. To acquire the gift
both time and space, and
ther. The Russians are
quite apart from that
which is a characteristic

• Marxist religion, they
take them patient. They
ss on earth (a feature
1 from the Christian

raise and carry on the torch, when it has slipped from my hand.

It has also been my fate to be the servant of a people with so tragic a past, a people so unstable, so versatile as the German people, and a people who go, according to circumstances, from one extreme to the other. From my own point of view, the ideal thing would have been, firstly, to ensure the future existence of the German people, then to form a youth imbued deeply with the National Socialist doctrine—and then to have left it to the generations of the future to wage the inevitable war, unless, of course, our enemies recoiled when they found themselves faced with the newly acquired might of the German people. In this way, Germany would have been well equipped both materially and morally. She would have at her disposal an administration, a foreign policy and an army all moulded from infancy in the principles of National Socialism. The task I have undertaken of raising the German people to the place in the world that is their due is unfortunately not a task that can be accomplished by a single man or in a single generation. But I have at least opened their eyes to their inherent greatness and I have inspired them to exaltation at the thought of the union of Germans in one great indestructible Reich. I have sown the good seed. I have made the German people realize the significance of the struggle they are waging for their very existence.

One day the harvest earth will be able to p
German people is a youn
with its future before it.

I had implemented without any trouble, would bring them inestimable advantages.

Even by the end of July, one month, that is, after the defeat of France, I realized that peace was once again eluding our grasp. A few weeks later I knew that we should not succeed in invading Britain before the advent of the autumnal gales because we had not succeeded in acquiring complete command of the air. In other words, I realized that we should never succeed in invading Britain.

The attitude of the Russians during the summer of 1940, the fact that they had absorbed the Baltic States and Bessarabia while we ourselves were busy in the west left me with no illusions regarding their intentions. And even if I had retained any, Molotov's visit in November would have been sufficient to dissipate them. The proposals which Stalin submitted to me after the return of his Minister did not deceive me. Stalin, that incomparable and imperturbable black-mailer, was trying to gain time in order to consolidate his advanced bases in Finland and the Balkans. He was trying to play cat and mouse with us.

The tragedy, from my point of view, was the fact that I could not attack before 15th May, and if I were to succeed in my first initial onslaught, it was essential that I should not attack later than that date. Stalin, however, could have launched his attack much earlier. Throughout the winter of 1940, and even more so in the spring of 1941, I was haunted by the obsession that the Russians might take the offensive. In the

tion—The irreparable
entiality of forestalling
the opening of the
strophic consequences
possible *entente* with

26th February 1945

settle the issue with
taken as soon as I
was determined to
quite unable to appre-
I had given proof by
irreparable breach
es. We did, indeed,
t Dunkirk. We ought
tem realize that the
ian hegemony estab-
s to the implementa-
n opposed, but which

1945

XVI—26TH FEBRUARY 1945

ia and in Cyrenaica
vult in the Balkans.
at the belief in our
nd and foe alike.

Yugoslavia's *volte-face*,
ag the Balkans into
which at all costs I
e we had become
ght well have been

I need hardly say
ould rapidly have
a small fraction of
to employ against
e necessary forces
ttle at that juncture
ct danger of giving
ould have done so
i the autumn, and
our point of view,
o win the day.

ies are concerned,
an elephant. They
ooner or later and
succeed in estab-
ks to the internal
ession of economic
to escape and the
they are particu-
w that in the case
ery different. They

know that in every field of endeavour, and more so in
peace than in war, we shall everywhere outclass them.

The explanation of this patience which the Russians
exhibit is to be found in their philosophy, which
allows them to avoid taking risks and to wait—a year,
a generation, a century, if necessary—until the time
is ripe for the implementation of their plans. Time
means nothing to them. Marxism, certainly, has
promised them a paradise on earth—but certainly not
today, not even tomorrow, but some time in the dim,
indefinite future.

Notwithstanding this patience which is the back-
bone of their power, the Russians could not stand idly
aside and watch the destruction of Great Britain, for
in that case, with the United States and Japan can-
celling each other out, as it were, the Russians would
find themselves face to face with us—and alone. And
that would mean without any doubt that, at a time
and a place of our choice, the long-outstanding issue
between us would be settled in our favour.

If I felt compelled to decide to settle my accounts
with Bolshevism by force of arms, and, indeed, arrived
at my decision on the very anniversary of the signing
of the Moscow pact, I have every right to believe that
Stalin had come to the same decision even before he
signed the pact.

For a whole year I adhered to the hope that an
entente, at least honestly sincere if not unreservedly
friendly, could be established between the Third Reich
and Stalin's Russia. I imagined that after fifteen years

of power Stalin, the realist, would have rid himself of the nebulous Marxist ideology and that he was preserving it merely as a poison reserved exclusively for external use. The brutal manner in which he decapitated the Jewish intelligentsia, who had rendered him such signal service in the destruction of Tsarist Russia, encouraged me in that belief. I presumed that he did not wish to give these same Jewish intellectuals the chance of bringing about the downfall of the totalitarian empire which he had built—that Stalinist empire which, in all its essentials, is only the spiritual successor to the empire of Peter the Great.

In a spirit of implacable realism on both sides we could have created a situation in which a durable entente would have been possible—by defining precisely the zones of influence to be attributed to each party, by rigorously restricting our collaboration to the field of economics and in such a manner that both parties would have derived benefits therefrom. An entente, in short, watched over by an eagle eye and with a finger on the trigger!

* Dr. K. D. matter how he hated, feared and detested Stalin, he always felt obliged to like him, to respect him, to value him as a man—Stalin knew how to deal with the Jews

XVII

Europe's last chance—Napoleonic peace—Napoleon's agony and bars our way—Those who thrive

I have been Europe's last hope of refashioning herself by means. She showed herself impervious to persuasion. To take her I had to use

Europe can be built only on ruins. Not material ruins, but on ruins of moral and economic coalitions, of mangled prejudice, of outmoded ideas. Europe must be fashioned in the interest of all and without regard to Napoleon understood that perfect

I, perhaps better than anyone else, knew the torments suffered by Napoleon

JANUARY 1945

could have rid himself of
y and that he was pre-
served exclusively for
er in which he decapi-
who had rendered him
uction of Tsarist Russia.
I presumed that he did
Jewish intellectuals the
downfall of the totali-
d built—that Stalinist
als, is only the spiritual
the Great.

alism on both sides we
n in which a durable
possible—by defining
to be attributed to each
g our collaboration to
ch a manner that both
enefits therefrom. An
by an eagle eye and

*then how he
d later that
felt himself
him, to
—Stalin
also the Jews*

XVII

Europe's last chance—Napoleon and winning the
peace—Napoleon's agony and mine—Britain always
bars our way—Those who thrive on discord in Europe

26th February 1945

I have been Europe's last hope. She proved incapable
of refashioning herself by means of voluntary reform.
She showed herself impervious to charm and per-
suasion. To take her I had to use violence.

Europe can be built only on a foundation of ruins.
Not material ruins, but on ruins of vested interests
and economic coalitions, of mental rigidity and per-
verse prejudice, of outmoded idiosyncrasy and narrow-
mindedness. Europe must be fashioned in the common
interest of all and without regard for individuals.
Napoleon understood that perfectly.

I, perhaps better than anyone else, can well imagine
the torments suffered by Napoleon, longing, as he was,

for the triumph of peace and yet compelled to continue waging war, without ceasing and without seeing any prospect of ceasing—and still persisting in the hope eternal of at last achieving peace. Since the summer of 1940 I have myself been suffering the same torments. And always it has been this Britain who barred Europe's way to prosperity. But now she is aged and enfeebled, though not less vicious and wicked. Finally, she is being supported in this negative and unnatural attitude by the United States, themselves inspired and urged on by the whole forces of international Jewry, which has flourished and hopes long to continue to flourish as the result of our dissensions.

A defeat which m
Reich hacked to
Germany in transit
Germany—Lines of
premier people on
if only . . .—A Fi
hostile—Waiting fo
Asiatic peoples—T
face—A Russia rid
American colossus—
The chances of surv

If we are destined to
will be utter and α
claimed their objecti
no illusions as to
Bolshevists and the
yelping at their ear
will lay aside their ar
annihilated National
it to a heap of rubb

et compelled to con-
g and without seeing
still persisting in the
ing peace. Since the
en suffering the same
een this Britain who
rity. But now she is
ot less vicious and
orted in this negative
United States, them-
the whole forces of
flourished and hopes
s the result of our

XVIII

A defeat which must inevitably be complete—The Reich hacked to pieces by the conquerors—A Germany in transition—The resurrection of eternal Germany—Lines of conduct for the faithful—The premier people on the Continent—Britain and Italy, if only . . .—A France degenerate and implacably hostile—Waiting for the rise of the African and Asiatic peoples—The U.S.A. and Russia face to face—A Russia rid of Marxism—The frailty of the American colossus—The rights of famished peoples—The chances of survival for a courageous people

2nd April 1945

If we are destined to be beaten in this war, our defeat will be utter and complete. Our enemies have proclaimed their objectives in a manner which leaves us no illusions as to their intentions. Jews, Russian Bolsheviks and the pack of jackals that follows, yelping at their heels—we know that none of them will lay aside their arms until they have destroyed and annihilated National Socialist Germany and reduced it to a heap of rubble. In a ghastly conflict like this,

ely irreconcilable
issue can inevit-
struction of one
must be waged,
hausted; and for
on until victory
blood has been

h horror to think
the victors, our
excesses of the
sters. Even this
y invincible faith
e. The more we
resurrection of
of the German
it seems certain
is at stake, will
But as far as I
bear to live in
iod that would
The ignominies
1918 will be as
may now expect.
ter twelve years
uld happen. My
Germany, hence-
her to the very
years and years

What advice can we give, then, what rules of conduct can we recommend to those who survive, with their souls untarnished and their hearts unshaken? Battered, left alone to work out its own salvation, existing solely as a custodian during the grim darkness of the night, the German people must strive its very utmost spontaneously to respect those racial laws which we laid down for it. In a world which is becoming more and more perverted through the Jewish virus, a people which has remained immune to the virus must in the long run emerge supreme. From this point of view, National Socialism can justly claim the eternal gratitude of the people for having eliminated the Jew from Germany and Central Europe.

Post-war Germany's second preoccupation should be to preserve indissoluble the union of all the German races. It is only when we are united that our qualities expand to their full stature; only when we cease to be Prussians, Bavarians, Austrians, Rhinelanders and become just Germans. The Prussians were the first to gather the Germans into one Reich under Bismarck, and by so doing gave the German people their opportunity to show that they were the premier people in Europe. I myself, by uniting them all in the Third Reich, set them on the path to become the architects of a new Europe. Whatever the future holds, the German peoples must remember that it is essential that they should cast out all elements that make for discord among them and should indefatigably pursue

every measure which contributes to the maintenance of their unity.

As far as foreign countries are concerned, it is not possible to lay down rigid rules, for the situation is in a constant state of change. Twenty years ago, I wrote that there were only two possible allies in Europe for Germany—Britain and Italy. The course of events during this period has not been such as to permit the implementation of a policy which would have been the logical sequence to my statement. The British, admittedly, still wielded imperial power, but they no longer possessed the moral qualities requisite for the preservation of their empire. They seemed to dominate the world; in reality they were themselves dominated by the Jews. Italy had tried to emulate ancient Rome. She had all the Roman ambitions, but she lacked the two essential adjuncts of a determined spirit and material power. The only trump card she had was the leadership of a true Roman. What a tragedy for that man! And what a tragedy for that country! For a people, as for an individual, it is tragic to have ambitions and to lack both the means essential to their fulfilment and any hope of acquiring those means.

There remains France. Twenty years ago I wrote what I thought of France. She was and is the mortal enemy of the German people. Her steady degeneration and her frequent *crises de nerfs* have sometimes led us to minimize the importance of her actions. Should she continue to become more feeble, as seems

probable, that will be no distrustful of her. The mind is nothing but a memory, and in view you may be quite sure to cause us a moment's anxiety on the issue of it, this war has been a category to which she belongs. Power. Even so, thanks to corruption and her inimical mail, she can still be a watchword therefore must be. Let the Germans take care not to be lulled by the voice of

While, therefore, it is a matter of principles in dealing with her, we must always be prepared for changing conditions, it is with confidence that Germany's staunchest friends from actively resistant to Jewish the Japanese, the Chinese will always be closer to us in spite of the fact that a tragedy that France has the course of centuries and has been perverted by the Jews to the pursuit of a Jewish

With the defeat of the emergence of the Asiatic the South American nation

the world only two Great Powers capable of confronting each other—the United States and Soviet Russia. The laws of both history and geography will compel these two Powers to a trial of strength, either military or in the fields of economics and ideology. These same laws make it inevitable that both Powers should become enemies of Europe. And it is equally certain that both these Powers will sooner or later find it desirable to seek the support of the sole surviving great nation in Europe, the German people. I say with all the emphasis at my command that the Germans must at all costs avoid playing the role of pawn in either camp.

At this juncture it is difficult to say which, from the ideological point of view, would prove to be the more injurious to us—Jew-ridden Americanism or Bolshevism. It is possible that under the pressure of events, the Russians will rid themselves completely of Jewish Marxism, only to re-incarnate pan-slavism in its most fierce and ferocious form. As for the Americans, if they do not swiftly succeed in casting off the yoke of New York Jewry (which has the same intelligence as a monkey that saws through the branch on which it is perching), well—it won't be long before they go under, before even having reached the age of maturity. The fact that they combine the possession of such vast material power with so vast a lack of intelligence evokes the image of some child stricken with elephantiasis. It may well be asked whether this

is not simply a destiny destined to vanish

If North American doctrine less pueril serves as a kind of based on lofty but Christian Science, it long remain a pre soon become appar clay has, after its strength left to bring what a fine chance the yellow races! justice and history arguments (or lack of invasion of the Europeans in the undernourished man right that history people to assuage their claim is well but

And so, in this wars have plunged white peoples who prosperity are those still retain the courage hopeless, to the death have the right to who have shown from their system

vers capable of con-
d States and Soviet
y and geography will
ial of strength, either
nomics and ideology.
ble that both Powers
pe. And it is equally
ll sooner or later find
of the sole surviving
an people. I say with
d that the Germans
the role of pawn in

say which, from the
d prove to be the
n Americanism or
der the pressure of
selves completely of
nate pan-slavism in
form. As for the
succeed in casting
which has the same
through the branch
on't be long before
reached the age of
vine the possession
so vast a lack of
ome child stricken
asked whether this

is not simply a case of a mushroom civilization,
destined to vanish as quickly as it sprang up.

If North America does not succeed in evolving a
doctrine less puerile than the one which at present
serves as a kind of moral *vade mecum* and which is
based on lofty but chimerical principles and so-called
Christian Science, it is questionable whether it will for
long remain a predominantly white continent. It will
soon become apparent that this giant with the feet of
clay has, after its spectacular rise, just sufficient
strength left to bring about its own downfall. And
what a fine chance this sudden collapse will offer to
the yellow races! From the point of view of both
justice and history they will have exactly the same
arguments (or lack of arguments) to support their
invasion of the American continent as had the
Europeans in the sixteenth century. Their vast and
undernourished masses will confer on them the sole
right that history recognizes—the right of starving
people to assuage their hunger—provided always that
their claim is well backed by force!

And so, in this cruel world into which two great
wars have plunged us again, it is obvious that the only
white peoples who have any chance of survival and
prosperity are those who know how to suffer and who
still retain the courage to fight, even when things are
hopeless, to the death. And the only peoples who will
have the right to claim these qualities will be those
who have shown themselves capable of eradicating
from their system the deadly poison of Jewry.