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COLLECTIVE STRESS IN NATURAL DISASTER :

THE FEDERAL RELIEF AND RECOVERY PERFORMANCE

BY

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A Senior Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Bachelor of Arts Degree.

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Our home would have been paid off in three months, free and clear, before the flood. At this time we are starting all over. Knee deep in debt; with the SBA loan around our necks, and we still haven't finished the repairs on our home.

My husband and I are in our fifties, and we are still struggling when we planned on taking life a little easier in our old age.

I'm sure we are not the only ones in the same situation.

With the help of God we will find a way to go on.

Letter from Anonymous
Victim of Tropical
Storm Agnes Flooding

PREFACE

This paper is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Bachelor of Arts degree from Princeton University. It is written under the supervision of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.

The philosophy of the Wilson School is that a merger of the academic and the practical is possible and desirable. This paper is written in conformity with that spirit.

The paper encompasses a basic tension. An academic audience requires theoretical relevance, methodological rigor, precission in the use of technical terms, observance of appropriate conventions for citation and acknowledgement. An audience of practitioners requires conciseness, clarity, a cogent demonstration of operational possibilities; in short, demonstrations of policy relevance. The occassional tension which occurs between these two divergent styles has been minimized as much as possible.

It is my belief that the audience of practitioners has kept this work honest, pragmatic, and thorough. The academics have kept it rigorous, comprehensive, and precise. It is my hope that the two influences and sets of expectations have been merged harmoniously.

As for the final value of this paper, I turn to Max Millikan for guidance:

> The purpose of social science research should be to deepen, broaden, and extend the policy-maker's capacity for judgement - not to provide him with answers. Thus, the test of effectiveness will lie not in whether the research leads to a new and unfamiliar conclusion but whether it clarifies and makes explicit the logical basis for a conclusion already perceived or suspected.
>
> The operator's normal impulse is to ask for the conclusion of a social science research project and to regard the argument as none of his concern. But the payoff for him will usually be precisely in the argument rather than in the conclusions. *

This seems an appropriate challenge; let us begin.

* Max Millikan, "Inquiry and Policy: The Relation of Knowledge to Action", in Daniel Lerner. The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1959. p. 176.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many cultures practice "coming of age" rites of one sort or another. The sub-culture of the academics is no exception. Among those assisting at my baptism were:

Professor Michael Kagay, my Godfather, whose cheerful and unflagging interest in this project accounts, in large measure, for whatever quality it may exhibit.

Professor Jameson Doig, who, in his kind and gentle manner, has enormously influenced the range and style of this manuscript.

Lloyd Romero, Joanne Bastian and Joan Paige of the Department of Labor, who have made my research in the mobius of bureaucracy an unexpectedly pleasant experience.

The administrators of the disaster relevant agencies, who have shown remarkable openness in discussing many sensitive aspects of their operations.

The wonderful people of Wilkes-Barre, Kingston, and Forty-Fort, Pennsylvania , who have shared their painfully gathered experience, that others might, perhaps, be helped.

The Woodrow Wilson School and the Region III Federal Regional Council. We rarely use our own paper and ink in a project of this sort, and both institutions have been quite generous.

The administrators of the Aaron Austin Godfrey Research Prize, who helped launch this project in the Spring of 1973.

My friends and associates at the University: Luke Roth '76 and Bill Lee '75 who gave generously of their time as I learned the secrets of the Computer Center.

Finally, the attendants at a baptism are held responsible for the sins of the participant until he has reached a point in his development where he alone is culpable for his sins. I acknowledge my attainment of that state and absolve all those who aided in this creation from whatever errors it may contain, they are solely my responsibility.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANRC	American National Red Cross
ARC	Atlantic Regional Commission
Cons Prot	Consumer Protection
C of E	Corps of Engineers
DOL	Department of Labor
DOT	Department of Transportation
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO	Federal Coordinating Officer
FDAA	Federal Disaster Assistance Agency (in HUD)
FRC	Federal Regional Council
HUD	Department of Housing and Urban Development
LEAA	Law Enforcement Assistance Agency
Nat Grd	National Guard
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OEO	Office of Economic Opportunity
OEP	Office of Emergency Preparedness
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
Pres. Envoy	Presidential Envoy Frank Carlucci
SBA	Small Business Administration
Tsk Fr Aging	President's Task Force on the Aging
UA	Unemployment Assistance, DOL Program
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Disaster is a fascinating and profound experience in the life of a community. It's havoc may be such that its impact lingers on as a collective memory for decades after the physical scars have healed.

In this country it is understood that a disastrous event is shared by the victims and the non-victims alike. "The spatially transcendent quality of kinship and friendship groups in American society is a fact of paramount importance for disaster management and control. Practically speaking, it means that the effective unit of disaster management is not confined to the disaster population, but extends to persons and groups throughout the nation and various parts of the world. In this sense, any large scale community disaster in the United States becomes a national or inter-national disaster - vitally affecting persons, organizations, and technical facilities located at points widely seperated from the disaster scene."[1] This shared transcendent quality implies shared action, which generates a nationally sensed responsibility for the alleviation of suffering and the initiation of recovery.

It is this recovery process which shall concern us for the balance of our study. Of specific interest shall be the role of the federal government in the process. The approach taken is two-fold. The first level is abstract,

insofar as it deals with political theory, sociology, collective and individual psychology, community decision-making models, bureaucratic theory, and so on. We shall find that, "conditions of collective stress bring out in bold relief aspects of social systems that are not so readily visible in the less stressful conditions of everyday life." [2]

The second level of approach is more concrete; it involves an attempt to indicate pragmatic application of abstract principles for the attainment of instrumental ends. It is my sense that any real distinction between the academic and the practitioner is a spurious one. This paper, then, serves as an attempt to integrate the two approaches in a productive and valuable manner.

The format of the paper is simple. In this section we shall lay the conceptual groundwork for the paper - what is disaster, what is the goal of recovery, what is the nature of the recovery process, what is the anticipated value of this study, and so on.

In the second section we examine the impacted community - what is the physical effect of disaster, how does the community respond, what variables determine this response.

In the third section we identify the process by which requirements for aid are converted into recovery outputs. This requires a thorough examination of bureaucratic

and organizational theory, impact of stress on organization, importance of environmental variables, and so on.

In the fourth section we look as the total system - emphasizing partisan/authority conflict, the importance of trust and expectation, and the uses of symbolic manipulation. We will pursue these themes by analyzing a systematic survey of the attitudes of victims of flooding induced in Wyoming Valley, Pennsylvania by Tropical Storm Agnes (1972).

The fifth section is a combination of the preceding into a full disaster operations model, which interrelates key disaster event variables and generates predictions on assessment of disaster recovery effectiveness. These predictions will then be tested for validity against findings from the Agnes survey.

In the sixth and final section we will examine the formal recommendations for change which have been made in federal post-operation reports. These recommendations will be evaluated in light of our earlier observations and discussion. Specific cases from the Agnes event will be cited to illustrate critical points.

What is Disaster

For the purpose of this study, a disaster may be considered a large, unfavorable change in the stability of a society, which is induced by a natural physical agent. Such agents include floods, tornadoes, windstorms, hurricanes, forest and grass fires, earthquakes, landslides, frosts, freezes, volcanoes and draughts.

Each of these agents, "upsets ongoing community relationships and threatens the performance of valued activities in two ways: 1) there is a drastic increase in the demand for certain services, and 2) there is a drastic reduction in the capability to perform some services."[3] In this vein, Fritz has suggested that disaster is "an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a relatively self-sufficient subdivision of a society, undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of the society is prevented".[4]

In this category, in the United States, we experienced 192 such disasters for the period 1960-71.[5] All are of interest to researchers and practitioners since they demonstrate points of collective stress; that is, a point when "many members of a social system fail to receive expected conditions of life from the system".[6]

For each disaster it was necessary to evolve a temporary system which would supply satisfaction for these demands. It is this system which is the focus of our attention. It must be realized that we will be isolating a range of situations in a continuum which also includes war, terrorism, assassination, economic depression, plagues, religious schism, etc. [7] In many ways all of these events are disastrous, and may be considered by extending the definition of some variables (e.g. broaden our concept of "disaster agent"). Unfortunately, the inclusion of such topics is far beyond the scope of this work, and their examination must remain an unrealized, if tantalizing, possibility.

What is the Recovery Goal

Following our definition, it is clear that the goal of recovery is to provide needed services until such time as the normal community processes again become operational. However, the means chosen to approach this end may vary. It is the consensus of virtually all concerned participants that the immediate needs for evacuation, food, shelter, clothing, and medical attention surely fall within the bounds of recovery aid. Similarly, such collective actions as consumer protection, legal aid, dissemination of information, technical advice, are considered proper. Further still, the provision of immediate post-impact aid in the form of clean-up assistance, rebuilding of roads, utilities,etc. is viewed as necessary and acceptable.

It is as expectations or demands extend beyond these limited goals that a fundamental philosophical question arises. What is the extent and nature of the federal responsibility for provision of recovery assistance? One's answer (or indecisiveness) affects the very essence of disaster operations and determines the manner in which we must pursue all questions about post-impact recovery.

Consider the following difficult questions:

1) Should aid be by determination of loss or by determination of need for each victim? In the first instance aid is graduated to reflect the amount of physical and personal

assets lost as a result of the disaster. In the second example, aid is granted uniformly to some arbitrary level, so that each is "equal", but some have lost more (in absolute and relative terms) than others.

Thus, the second approach is illustrated by the fact that SBA forgave the first $5,000 of a loan, whether the total loan was $6,000 or $60,000. Conversely, the first approach would be found in IRS laws about declared losses. The answer to this question goes to the heart of much long-range recovery conflict and should be kept in mind by the reader.

2) Should the government use its position as primary supplier of recovery aid to stipulate conditions for receipt of assistance which have long-range implications for much more than just disaster preventione/preparedness? It is argued by many federal agency officials that people should not be given aid to rebuild in disaster-prone areas (e.g. flood plain). Conversely, many victims feel that government has a committment to aid without the concomitant authority to make conditions.

Now, most federal officials see recovery aid as a tool for stimulating new communities, new political systems, "modern" social attitudes, etc. However, state and local officials, as well as victims, tend to view aid as a sort of national insurance program which solely compensates the victims for their losses. The middle ground observes that

the federal government has a responsibility to ensure that its aid is used wisely.

At any rate, one's response to this question has significant influence on how one views recovery "success", and how one would react to recovery period tensions in the disaster area.

3) To what extent is the government obligated to extend recovery aid? Loans? Full grants for sustained losses? Work programs? Accelerated urban development? Municipal aid to offset loss of tax base? Subsidation of utilities and mass transit?

Further, how consistent is the response to these questions from disaster to disaster (i.e. is it luckier to have a disaster in an election year?, is it good to have an influential Congressman?, or is the disaster aid program even-handed across the board?)

One's responses to these questions helps to set the stage for assessment of recovery operations. On the site, they have implications for victim/non-victim tensions, inter and intra-agency tensions, and community/state/national tensions. In a larger sense they shape our whole perception of disaster recovery as a process. They further reflect our cultural attitudes and value patterns as individuals and a nation. We shall return to these questions in our conclusion. However, keep them in mind as we consider the disaster process.

The Recovery System

The disaster site can be viewed as a system.[8] It contains a recovery process which operates within certain constraints - some indigenous to the area, others exogenous. An explication of the structure and dynamic function of this system should serve to order all of the observations which follow.

First, we identify the disaster environment, which consists of those physical, biological, social, and psychological variables which define and give meaning to life in the impacted communities. Within this environment we identify a conversion process - which is a mechanism for making authoritative decisions. In our case, this mechanism shall primarily consist of federal agencies with disaster-relevant roles.

We link the process with the environment on two points of exchange - input and output. On the input side we list community demands on and support for the mechanism, as well as contributions of resources. On the output side we list decisions which yield outcomes. There is a feedback loop which relates outcomes (T_1) to demands and support (T_2) so that the system is dynamic. This response system rests within a larger system of shared values, beliefs, attitudes, and resources which comprise the total culture of a larger society, in this case the United States.

The response system, during disaster, is subject to instability and change. The effectiveness of the system rests upon its success in coping, adapting, and persisting until stability may be restored. The appeal of disaster study rests not in a morbid fascination with suffering, but rather with the fact that it offers the opportunity of examining, on a small scale, the interplay of demand and outcome, environemtn and process, which leads a system under stress to persist. Once we recognize the fact that some systems do survive, "whatever the buffets received from their environment, it awakens us to the fact that they must have the capacity to respond to disturbance and thus to adapt to the conditions under which they find themselves."[9] Once we recognize this potential for adaptation, rather than passive reaction, we are able to envision, hopefully, key opportunities for improved response capability.

Naturally, our observations may have implications for systems beyond those involved in disaster. This is especially true when we recall those events which conform, with some modification, to our earlier definition of disaster. At any rate, since an understanding of the systems approach is important for grasping the rationale upon which this work is organized, let us pursue the systems approach a bit further.

Environment

We must know the physical constraints operating in the environment. Where is the site located -urban, suburban, rural?

What is the nature of the disaster agent? What is the nature and extent of the damage? Further, what are the relevant community attitudes operating in the disaster area? How does the victim group respond? Is there hostility, anxiety, depression, looting, scapegoating? Is there helping behavior, selfish behavior? Is the community close-knit? Waht of primary and secondary ties? In short, what are the critical features of the disaster impacted community which shall impinge on the disaster-relevant recovery roles of federal agencies.

Conversion Process

What are the internal constraints in terms of material, manpower, information, decision-making ability, intra-agency conflict, inter-agency competition, etc.

Inputs: What do the victims demand? How strongly? Why? How can this be adjusted? How can it be deflected? Coped with?

Outputs: What policies are pursued? why? With what result? Is the final result, and its ramifications, intended? If not, what adjustments are required?

In short, a systems approach allows us to consider the parts of a dynamic relationship in such a way that the dynamic element is not lost. Further, the system approach does not force us to a level of abstraction which clouds the issue. Rather, it allows us to order fact and observations, and theory and to relate them to policy and program possibilities. This, after all, is our primary goal.

Footnotes - Section I

1) Charles Loomis. Social Systems - Essays on Their Persistence and Change. Princeton: Van Nostrand Co., 1960. p. 162.

2) Allen H. Barton. Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969. p. XII

3) Barton, p. 66

4) Charles Fritz, "Disaster", in Contemporary Social Problems. edited by Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. 1961 p. 655. as cited in Russell R. Dynes. Organizational Behavior in Disaster: Analysis and Conceptualization. Ohio State University: Disaster Research Center, April, 1969. p. 61.

5) Office of Emergency Preparedness. Report to the Congress - Disaster Preparedness. Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, January, 1972. p. 175.

6) Barton, p. 38

7) Barton, p. 41 - 46

8) see, David Easton. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965. 300 pp.

9) David Easton. Varieties of Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1966. p. 144.

SECTION II

THE DISASTER IMPACTED COMMUNITY

THE DISASTER IMPACTED COMMUNITY

In this section we will learn how a community responds to the disaster event. The community, after all, is the locus of the relief and recovery effort. In our system, it provides the environment within which agencies operate and is the source of demands on and support for the agencies.

It is always important to understand the environment within which a program is designed and implemented. In the disaster context it is absolutely essential, simply because the nature of the disaster environment is markedly altered from that encountered during periods of "business as usual".

Collective Stress

A "collective stress" occurs when many members of the social system fail to receive expected conditions of life from the system.[1] The "social system" is a "collectivity of human beings whose interaction maintains itself in identifiable patterns over a relatively long time".[2] Its various parts are heavily inter-dependent and reasonably adaptable. When we refer to the "community" it is the social collectivity rather than merely a political boundary, which is meant. Essentially, this community provides for safety in the physical environment, food, shelter, income, social interaction, the guidance and information necessary for maintenance of normal life styles, and so on.

The stress event disorganizes this normal pattern and

frustrates the realization of familiar conditions of life. In a disaster, the stress lasts long after the termination of the disastrous event, per se, since its disordering consequences persist until the damage is reversed and the familiar stable patterns re-emerge.

In the interim, a new emergency social system must operate to approximate the functions of the normal system. The emergency system is not chaotic, but it is less organized and more uncertain than that which preceded it.

In this section we examine the emergency system, what values support it, what individual and collective attitudes and behaviors emerge from it, and what, eventually, transforms it into the more familiar patterns. And, of course, what role does ~~the~~ the federal presence play in the overall operation.

The Disaster Agent

The characteristics of the disaster agent are often relevant to the nature of the subsequent emergency system. The characteristics of the force which creates the disaster situation clearly influence the extent of damage, the type of damage, and the amount of damage. Further, it has implications for subsequent community attitudes, design of relief programs, needs for long-range recovery, and so on. In this section we shall examine the nature ~~fo~~ of the disaster agent. Then we shall view the larger disaster impact, of which the agent is a part.

Disaster Agent

Disasters differ in their frequency, predictability, controllability, cause, speed of onset, length of possible forewarning, duration, scope of impact, and destructive potential.[3] We shall consider each in turn.

Frequency is an important concept because it sheds light on the community's preparedness for and familiarity with a particular disaster situation. Floods are common along the Mississippi and coastal areas. Forest fires likewise are common in the West, and tornadoes in the Mid-West. It is clear that frequent disaster experiences lead to 1) real attempts at prevention, 2) realistic awareness of imminent impact, 3) familiarity with onset, 4) preparedness for relief and recovery. One expects lower damage and less

community stress in areas which are accustomed to frequent disaster threat and onset. In sum, "where external stress has been experienced in the past, society may learn how to deal with it and develop a high degree of social preparedness."[4]

Predictability is important because it implies possibility for forewarning. Some disaster events are reasonably predictable (e.g. flooding), others are nor (e.g. earthquakes, explosions).

Controllability is of interest because it is a weighty consideration in the selection of long-range recovery goals. Flooding, explosions, etc. require consideration, during even initial recovery, of alternative control and prevention policies. Earthquakes, on the other hand, are not amenable to such planning and present no such demands.

Cause is vital. First, the difference between man-made and natural disaster is critical, as we shall see in our section examining scapegoating. Further, various agents cause damage differently. Tornadoes damage above the ground structure almost exclusively. Floods tend to damage subterranean property and building interiors. Earthquakes do both. The implications of this for type and extent of property loss is clear. Further, recovery priorities will be significantly affected by the type of disaster-induced loss.

Speed of onset may be rapid, gradual, or repetitive. It is an important concept in that it indicates to what degree conserving action could be taken during the course of

the disaster event. It is also critical to the degree of individual disorientation that follows the disaster event.

An even more important concept, which follows these same lines, is forewarning. The length of forewarning is important because it determines the opportunity for preventive action and reduction of loss. It has even more important implications, however, for community attitudes. "One might suggest that the degree of community disorganization is inversely proportional to the length of the period of forewarning in disasters with rapid onset." [5] Fritz suggests that, an "instantaneous disaster (i.e. one in which there is no forewarning period) tends to produce a maximum in social and psychological disruption." This is because "changes coming without warning are likely to create greater loss and leave the system with less capacity to respond than changes that give warning and allow preparation."[6]

Scope of impact is also a critical consideration. The more diffuse the disaster impact the greater the community disorientation. In a disaster, the impacted area provides a focus for recovery activity. As the scope of the physical damage expands, the greater is the disruption of transportation, access, communication, provision of public services, and coordination of recovery efforts. This leads to difficulty in long-range recovery in that the dispersal of victims creates problems of access, communication, and damage evaluation.

Further, the greater the scope the more disorienting the disaster event becomes for both the individual and the community. We shall explore this fully when we discuss the "therapeutic" and the "altruistic" community.

Finally, it must be realized that disaster agents differ in their destructive potential. "In general, the greater the destruction, either of persons or property, the more organizationally relevant problems will be. The degree of damage is inversely[e/] proportional to the speed with which restoration of community equilibrium may be accomplished. When the impact is great there tends to be a lack of consensus pertaining to just what action should be taken in the impact area. This leads to greater community stress, since it is difficult to maintain the highly integrated level of activity necessary to cope with the impact." [7]

Social Time and Social Space[8]

Beyond the characteristics inherent in the disaster agent, there exist other variables critical to an understanding of the disaster event. Of these, the two most interesting for our purposes are "social time" and "social space".

Social Time: The disaster event happens within a unique community time context. The month of the year, the day of the week, the hour of the day, may be critical to the eventual extent of the disorienting impact of the disaster agent. Each community has its own pattern. Understanding that pattern and locating the disaster event within that pattern

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pattern can yield beneficial insights to aid the recovery efforts. Consider the following implications:

(1) Warning: If the disaster can be predicted and a warning issued, preventive action to minimize loss of life or property may be taken. However, warnings' effectiveness vary during the day. Public broadcasting is useless if the warning is issued late in the night. Even during the day audience size varies considerably. Further, many local organizations which might replace broadcasting (e.g. police) are undermanned during night shift. Other groups (e.g. Civil Defense) consist of skeleton crews whose volunteer strength varies due to work schedules, availability on weekends, etc. In short, "the determining factor is what types of activities the community members are engaged in at the particular time. At certain time more people can be warned than at others."[9]

(2) Preventive Action: Warning is important because it leads to preventive action, which minimizes property damage, loss of life, and shock and disorientation. It, too, is affected by timing. During the workday preventive action will be centered on places of business. During off-hours it will predominate in residential areas.

In this vein, consider evacuation. During the workday families are seperated. Evacuation at this time is severely disorienting because it not only involves departure from the disaster area, but also seperates primary groups, which means subsequent loss of contact with family and neighbors.

It is apparent that decisions on post-disaster actions are family and even neighborhood decisions. Thus, the existence of whole neighborhoods in single shelters is a stabilizing and orienting influence of considerable significance for post-disaster community attitudes. Further, separation of family and friends leads to overload of valuable communication channels and the wasting of valuable effort as victims strive to relieve justifiable anxiety over the safety of loved ones.

(3) Significant Damage: The timing of the event is critical to the degree of loss of life and personal injury. Areas of concentration of individuals during the day (children in school, shoppers in a business mall, workers in a skyscraper, people in a movie house) and the timing of the disaster event, determine the subsequent damage and injury.

(4) Unique Circumstances: In addition to the above there are unique fortuitous circumstances which have ramifications for the post-disaster period. The time of year is absolutely critical for problems of housing, reconstruction, health, and son on. Special events may correspond to the disaster period - such as National Guard training season, national election year, flu season, vacation season, and so on. All of these considerations are important variables affecting extent of damage, post-disaster planning and operations, people victimized, type of response required, and so on.

Social Space

Here we regard the particular spatial distribution of the disaster event. Is the disaster area long and narrow (such as a tornado path)? If so, access is easier, victims are usually near undamaged shelter, reconstruction is speedier, chances are that no single section of the community has been totally destroyed. If the area is wide (say flooding) it means that many victims may be miles from undamaged areas. Thus makes relief difficult; it slows down reconstruction and recovery; it lends itself to exaggeration (since extent of damage is not easily surveyed).

Further, there is a good chance that entire neighborhoods and sections of a community are damaged. Depending on the nature of the section, this could mean that certain groups (either by income class, etnnic identification, and so on) become almost systematically victimized. This is especially true in areas which suffer repeated damage at the hands of the same type of disaster agent. In this case, higher income groups usually relocate leaving behind poorer families. These families become victims repeatedly since they are unable to relocate.

This same concern may be expressed more broadly. If the affected section is the business district then suppliers of needed goods may be hard to locate. At any rate, financial problems will be different from those in a residential disaster. Were essential public services victimized? Are the

police and fire departments operational? Are phones in order? Have gas, electricity, and so on been interrupted? How will the disaster impact affect traffic patterns? Are some impacted areas inaccessible?

From all of these questions it is clear that the disaster event may have varying social consequences, or varying organizational consequences, or varying recovery consequences depending on the temporal and spatial variables. All of these affect the community's ability to cope and the community's recovery requirements.

Disaster Phases

We will do well to identify the "phases" of disaster, since many elements of both social and organizational responses follow reasonably identifiable sequential patterns. However, it must be perfectly clear at the outset that the listing of phases is merely a conceptual tool, a device for broadly indicating what actions or attitudes may be present or imminent. The phases overlap; the pattern may be slower or faster in different parts of the community; the points of transition may not be detectable. We shall realize later that reliance on the appearance of new phases as a device for triggering action is a sadly insufficient approach to disaster operation.

Nevertheless, with this caveat firmly in mind, a look at disaster phases now will help to introduce us to the total disaster picture to be developed later. We may distinguish six phases,[10] which follow:

1) the pre-disaster period: From this period we may gather information about the individual and collective characteristics of the community, including absolute characteristics of individuals (raw background information), relational characteristics of individuals (e.g. friendly, involved, strong ethnic identification), contextual characteristics of individuals (memberships in various organizations), additive characteristics of communities

(aggregates of individual absolute characteristics), distributional characteristics (range of incomes and education, etc). [11]

Further, from this period we may gather information about the norms, culture and values of the community. It will be realized that this basic information is critical to a full understanding of the community's response to the disaster event and to outside relief agencies.

2) _detection_and_warning_: This is the phase in which preparation, timing, speed of onset, and so on are important. From an understanding of this period we may form initial estimates of community disorientation, type of loss, individual social and psychological disruption, results of evacuation, etc.

3) _the_disaster event: Much of the consequences of this phase have been sketched in the section on disaster agents. Suffice to emphasize that this event sets the entire disaster system into motion. Appropriate subsequent action often depends upon a full grasp of the implications of the onsets characteristics.

4) _immediate, unorganized response_: This period marks the appearance of "spontaneous enactment of emergency roles on the part of individuals".[12] It appears, superficially, as a period marked by either depression or random hyper-activity. Such is not the case. Rather, it is a period of re-orientation, from which purposeful (if occasionally inappropriate) activities

are generated. It also provides the ground from which the "emergency community" grows.

5) organized social response: This is the phase in which the new emergency consensus takes hold, operates, and, eventually, declines. It comprises the periods of short-term and long-range releif and recovery and may vary enormously in length (even within the same disaster site). It is the period which shall monopolize most of our attention. It is characterized by the mobilization of local and community agencies, the appearance of agencies and resources external to the community, and the development of intra-community social and psychological support mechanisms.

6) long-run post-disaster equilibrium : At this point the community life has begun to approach the pace and the security of the pre-disaster period, although the intervention of the disaster may have left "permanent effects" which prevent full return to the "status quo ante". [13]

Community Response - The First Cut

We seem to have set the stage fully. Now we must consider in detail the dynamics of the emergency social system which develops from the ruin of disaster.

The first responses are individual, not collective. Essentially, the members of the community must orient their cognitive processes to the new situation in which they find themselves. Thus, the initial shock, or "freezing", is a period of adjustment, in which the victims re-establish or replace reference points and try to "structure" their new surroundings.[14]

This restructuring activity quickly leads to the formation of small groups. LaPierre has noted:

> No aggregate of reacting individuals can long refrain from interaction with one another, if for no other reason than that they are likely to come into physical contact with one another. Inevitably, therefore, the period during which the members of a group react as individuals is brief and is followed by some sort of collective behavior.[15]

Collective Behavior

There are four empirical variables which clearly affect the formation of community-wide emergency response. These are: 1) degree of familialism, 2) degree of integration, 3) degree of organizational complexity, 4) degree of organizational adequacy.[16] We may take a first look at the community response by examining each of these. We shall find that they

will provide us with clues on what to expect from whatever social system eventually emerges from the initial chaos.

Familialism: Familialism describes the degree to which the residents of a community rely upon the extended family unit for aid and support. In communities expressing high degrees of familial reliance the support for and encouragement of organizational, political , or economic alternatives is relatively lower than that expressed by less familial communities. A consequence of high familialism is reliance on informal, personalized efforts rather than professional or routine organizational alternatives. The clear implication is that, "in a community structure dominated by familialistic and personalistic relationships,...the effectiveness of extra-community agencies is reduced, and their efforts are frustrated." [17]

Integration: This variable indicates the amount of cohesion, or interaction, which is exhibited within the community. We may consider two dimensions - differentiation and homogeneity.[18] Differentiation describes how various, divergent, or conflicting are the interests and the loyalties of the members of the impacted community. The higher the differentiation, the greater the opportunity for conflict, the more difficult the task of coordination on a local level, and the more complicated the job of communicating with victims.

Homogeneity describes the range of characteristics of individuals within the community, and has a clear effect on

the degree of differentiation. Thus, we would want to know if there are evident class distinctions, cultural conflicts, racial conflicts, implicit cognitive boundaries within the community, and other similar manifestations of divisive community-wide attitudes. Again, these considerations impinge on later disaster operations insofar as they affect the larger community system and contribute to competition, conflict, and tension.

Organizational Complexity: This variable measures the array of potentially disaster-relevant organizations within the community. Some communities are typified by "organizational poverty",[19] others by an impressive variety of appropriate formal and informal groups.

These groups function to provide an early structure for the re-orientation of the community. They speed development of adaptive actions and attitudes, provide early support and assistance, and present meaningful outlets for the need to "be active", which is a common phenomenon in disaster impacted areas. All of this contributes to the early appearance of a healthy and positive emergency consensus.

Adequacy of Key Organizations:

This variable relates the scope of the post-disaster requirements to the community's pre-disaster capabilities for organized self-help. Naturally, it is this variable which finally determines the extent of extra-community, hence

federal, presence. It is suggested that the greater the adequacy of local organizational resources, the more quickly the community restructures its interaction patterns. This is strongly affected by the familiarity with and confidence in local organizations which is expressed by most victim communities, as well as by the actual available resources of the local groups.

Having noting these variables we are prepared to take a second look at the disaster-impacted community. This time we shall focus on one overriding characteristic of the community response, namely:

Absence of Community Conflict in the Early Phases - The Second Cut

One might assume that competition for scarce resources, searches for blame, relative differences in extent of loss, and so on would lead to a great deal of post-disaster conflict within the victim community. It is clear that such is not generally the case. "Community conflict is usually absent in the emergency period following natural disaster, nor are there indications that cleavages which existed prior to the event are amplified during the time period."[20]

We may adduce six arguments to explain this initially puzzling observation:[21]

1) An essential feature of disaster is that threats and dangers come from outside the system and their causes can be clearly perceived and specified. Thus, because the agent is external, the event cannot be used by one group against any other in the same community. The disaster event is not the result of any existing schisms or controversies.[22]

2) A hierarchy of values is generated within the community; it forms an "emergency consensus". This "consensus places the total community's welfare above that of any individual or group. Accordingly, primary attention is devoted toward activities which enhance the total community." We might say that system questions take precedence over normal allocation questions.

3) Disaster-relevant questions are immediate and clearly

defined. There can be quick decisions made on immediate rescue and relief operations. Values, goals, attitudes, which may be critical in other community crisis, are not activated in the post-disaster situation since needs are obvious and solutions evident.

4) Disasters are present-oriented. This orientation minimizes both memories of and potential for conflict and disagreement. Essentially, the disaster situation, initially, liberates people from worries about past and future. Victims become present-oriented and acquire satisfaction from perception of immediately realized benefits, which serves to further encourage cooperative behavior.

5) Disaster reduces status differences. "A general de-categorization of social life is created by the fact that danger, loss, and suffering become a "public phenomenon". This tends to reduce class and status , as well as ethnic, religious, political, distinctions.[23] "The net result of most disasters is a dramatic increase in social solidarity among the affected populace during the emergency and post-emergency period and a breakdown of pre-existing social patterns and distinctions and a great outpouring of love, generosity, and altruism.[24]

6) Disasters strengthen community identification. This is due to the interaction of at least three factors - "a) a dramatic event in the life history of the community, b)support to primary groups, c) wide opportunity for participation in

community relevant activities."[25]

a) The event - The disaster event makes a significant collective experience for all members of the community. They share in the immediate event and continue to relate to each other through the common bond of disaster experience through the post-disaster period. Even years later the disaster is a common event, or folk memory, serving as a comparison point for much later experience.

b) Primary groups - The disaster event strengthens rather than weakens primary group (family, friends, neighbors) life. Such disorganization as does occur, exists as a disruption of secondary group (work, government) life. It is, of course, from primary groups that the initial basic patterns of community interaction will be re-established. Further, lacking smoothly functioning secondary group identification, we find that the key elements of primary attachment - intimacy, sympathy, directness, informality, spontaneity, and sentiment - become more widely shared throughout the community. Essentially, disaster victims do not withdraw into pre-existing primary groups; rather, they extend their sense of primary identification to include those normally beyond such attachments. Fritz attributes this to the fact that the victims, shocked free from normal patterns and attitudes, begin to perceive that others are basically like themselves: "That people respond in like manner to the fears, dangers, deprivations, and anxieties

posed by the disaster, largely regardless of previous station in life, is greatly reassuring - especially for those who have previously felt marginal, detached, isolated, or uncomfortably different from others. The "outside" becomes an "insider"; the "marginal man" a "central man". People are able to perceive, with a clarity never before possible, a set of underlying basic values to which all people subscribe. They come to see that collective action is necessary for these values to be maintained. Individual and group goals become merged inextricably. This merging of individual societal needs provides a feeling of belongingness and a sense of unity rarely achieved under normal circumstances."[26] Further, this unity and belongingness "provides a channel for intimate communication and expression and becomes a major source of physical and emotional support and reassurance."[27]

c) Participation - The victim operates in a post-disaster situation which is fluid. He has great freedom of choice in determining what to do and how to act. Further, he can clearly identify the quality of his contribution to the community "good". This lends a sense of mission and responsibility. Community identification is enhanced by this sense of mission because the victim realizes that most community members share the same goals. There is a decided absence of the controversy, opposition, and public and private hostility which often accompagny community-wide issues (busging, tax policy, redevelopment, etc). The premium, in the post-

disaster situation, is placed on cooperation in approaching the realization of the common good. Each individual may perceive himself and others as actively contributing to this shared perception of the common good.

It is interesting to note that illness, as reflected in health insurance disbursement figures, is markedly reduced in the post-disaster period. This is widely attributed to victims' belief that they are "too busy to get sick". Of course, this reflects the singlemindedness with which many victims bear their sense of community mission and responsibility.[28]

Negative Implications

To this point the analysis has dealt with the absence of conflict within the community. It is clear that this enhancement of community identification and solidarity may bear counterproductive results in the community's relations with the "outside". "The increase in solidarity within the community is accompagnied by an increase in hostility toward outsiders. This is true even when they come to bring aid."[29]

Two critical observations must be made - 1) "inside" and "outside" are not merely geographical terms, since some non-local groups share "insider" status with the disaster victims; 2) the determination of "outsider" does not necessarily reflect whether an individual (or group) is performing a useful function. In effect, the determination

of who is an outsider seems to be based primarily upon the appearance that they share the sentiments of the victim insiders."[30] We shall explore this more closely when we view the community/agency conflict

Therapeutic Community - The Third Cut

All of the characteristics identified earlier - existence of external threat, generation of an emergency consensus, immediate problem solving, present time orientation, reduction of status differences, enhanced community solidarity through shared experience, expanded identification and joint participation, and extra-community hostility, can be referred to as the "therapeutic community" which exists after the disaster event.[31] The ideal type of this reaction is described by Wolfenstein as "the rise and fall of the post-disaster Utopia" and by Fritz as "the community of sufferers".[32]

We may consider the community response to be therapeutic in the following sense:[33]

1) It tends to assure the continuity of social life by minimizing non-relevant tensions or personal/social conflicts.

2) It tends to guide and channel individual or social responses which could be disorganizing or irresponsible.

3) It tends to reduce anti-social, aggressive, self-aggrandizing, or neurotic actions stemming from disaster loss and subsequent recovery.

4) It tends to remotivate individuals to renew efforts for constructive and regenerative tasks.

5) It tends to temporarily offset physical property loss with social and emotional attachments, delaying full impact of the final realization of the victims' loss and extent of deprivation.

6) It tends to generate the stability and consensus which is necessary for the initial planning and implementation of immediate and longer-range recovery.

7) It tends to guarantee performance of vital functions. Pre-disaster tasks which were highly structured (provision of food, availability of health care) must be performed in an unstructured manner. The therapeutic community tends to identify and support needs which are no longer being systematically fulfilled.

Limitation

Although we have discussed the existence of community solidarity, we must indicate some limitations of the concept which 1) minimize the depth of the community identification, and 2) militate against the maintenance of the community harmony for any appreciable period of time.

We have used"community" loosely in this section, we must now become more rigorous. Community does not translate into disaster area. The sense of victimization is,almost by definition, shared with the entire disaster area. However, assessments of "relative deprivation" and , concurrently, "relative value of outside aid" become operative as soon as the post-impact assessment period ends. Different neighborhoods suffer different levels of destruction, different boroughs,townships,etc. maintain different levels of preparedness, command different degrees of recovery strength, and thus, suffer different degrees of post-impact

hardship. Further, any geographical boundaries (o
traditional boundaries, like railroad tracks) which
communities or neighborhoods may serve to inhibit t
generation of solidarity. In short, "delineation of
boundaries in a disaster may be facilitated by an ap
of an idea taken from Homans that sub-groups may unde
different circumstances maintain different boundaries
seperate from one another but all confined within one
common boundary. What constitutes the one common bound
is dependent, among other factors, on the enormity of t
disaster" [34].

Essentially, then, one disaster area may contain several therapeutic communities. Within these communitie solidarity reigns. Between these communities conflict is probably minimized (for the shared qualities of the disaster still obtain.) However, traditional barriers betw the communities, couples with different levels of damage, prepare the way for possible conflict.

The presence of outsiders can serve as the spark which ignites this conflict. In this vein, we may consider the effect of varying quality or degree of aid. Has one communit (variously defined) received more aid? Has one class (say, politicians or businessmen) received more aid? Even, has one area received more media attention? All of these factors tend to exacerbate tension. Further, the perception of preferential treatment is what counts, not the actual objective

amount of aid.

The implication of the preceding for the presence of federal agencies is clear. On one hand, they are often the focus of the general, free-floating hostility afforded outsiders. On the other hand, they can usually not avoid exacerbating tensions between therapeutic communities. By doing this they again focus hostility upon themselves - this time from those specific communities which feel particularly deprived.

Therapeutic Community Over Time

The preceding discussion on the evolution and nature of the therapeutic community leads to several interesting questions: What finally brings about its termination; how is the spirit of altruism maintained; does the period of altruism and harmony leave any permanent record? Let us consider each question in turn.

Termination of the Altruistic Community: The sites of past disasters do not remain isolated Utopias for any appreciable period of time. It is unfortunate, but:

> The norms of altruistic sharing, mutual identification, and social closeness, which so frequently appear in the disaster-struck community, invariably disappear.[35]

We may adduce several arguments which tend to account for the decline and eventual termination of the therapeutic social system which has been described above.

First, it is quite probable that the success of recovery

and rehabilitation, which tends to reduce perceptions of deprivation, convinces people that supportive behavior, with all of its therapeutic trappings, is no longer necessary.

Second, for those not immediately and constantly in contact with the disaster-induced loss, the memory of the event and its consequential agony probably begins to fade. To this end, the concomittant motivation to participate in the therapeutic system also fades.

Third, this refocusing of attention is supported by the resurgence of personal self-interest. As urgency for action decreases, one's sense of neglected self-interest becomes more pressing. Indeed, these private losses accumulate while victim losses and total community losses are gradually reimbursed. Eventually, the balance reverts back to one of self-interest, as allocative questions re-emerge, again competing with system questions.[36]

Fourth, there may be a general disaffection with the victims growing from stories and rumors about ingratitude, unworthiness, etc. However, it has been suggested that this may merely serve to rationalize feelings growing from the factors discussed above.[37]

Finally, it is suggested that all of the above perceptions are supported by the gradual return of a division of labor, which tends to differentiate experience and obstruct informal information channels. Further, the return of division of labor clearly transfers the burden of maintaining the altruistic

ethos onto those agencies playing a long-term recovery role. Eventually, they become "defenders of the faith" in the wake of the gradual dissolution of the altruistic environment. Consider, then, the problems of extended maintenance of a therapeutic community.

Maintaining Altruism: As the informal support in the community begins to fade, more and more responsibility is turned over to professional, permanent agencies. This phenomenon has been identified as the "bureaucratization of altruism". It subsumes numerous ironies.[38]

First, the very professionalism and formality which tends to frustrate members of the community at the height of the emotional altruistic outpourings serves to maintain the norms of aid and recovery after the community's attention reverts to self-interest. It is suggested that the formal organization, through formal rules and impersonality of employees, is not strongly influenced by the fluctuations in perception of worthiness or need exhibited by the community during the various periods of the therapeutic adjustment. Thus, agencies tend to respond to objective need even when mass sentiment has subsided.

Second, mass altruism operates only to aid those visibly in need. As more and more victims reach old levels of well-being the subjective visibility of remaining victims decreases. Thus, the community may sense that need for aid has terminated before it actually has. Such is not the case,

ideally, for a permanent agency operating with objective criteria for need and qualification.

Third, termination of the altruistic community involves readjustment of victim/non-victim roles and relations toward a more normal pattern of non-altruism. Continuing agencies face no such readjustment since a victim remains, objectively, a victim and his status in the agency's procedures, and treatment through those procedures, remains regardless of changes in the community attitude.

In short, then, we discover that the basis of the therapeutic is emotional and subjective (as well as transcient), while the ethos of the professional agency stresses objectivity. Even as the community's subjective evaluations begin to change in the direction of normalization, the objective orientation of the professionals remains. It is this objective bias which maintains required therapy in light of the dissolution of the more emotional, popular outpuring of concern.

In closing, it is important to realize that the preceding implies that post-therapeutic success becomes increasingly dependent upon the agencies' success in internalizing the therapeutic norms in its standard operating procedures. That is, if the agency is improperly oriented for providing service to victims and remains unaffected by its disaster experience, its success in maintaing the altruistic ethos is, at best, problemmattic.

The Permanent Record: The disaster experience is likely to have long term effects on the disaster-impacted community. These are clearly visible in vacant buildings, some geographical changes, new buildings, and so on. But further, there may be fundamental changes in the political, economic, and social positions of people and groups. The memory of disaster is long, the stories can be retold for generations. One need only consider the San Francisco Earthquake or the Chicago Fire to recognize the collective force of some disaster memories.

Further, and more concretely, the disaster event may bring new people or classes into prominence; its afterglow may lead to positive or negative sanctions which reward competence or punish intransigence.

It is even possible that media attention, the influx of capital, a heightened sense of self-reliance, the identification of singularly competent individuals within the area, etc. will lead to a net improvement, "an amplified rebound" from the original loss.[38a]

We begin to get ahead of our story, however, let us now turn to maladaptive behavior in the impacted community.

Maladaptive Community Responses - The Fourth Cut

In this chapter we will examine various maladaptive or counterproductive behavioral patterns which may be exhibited within a disaster-impacted area. Some, such as hostility, are common elements of the therapeutic community. Others, such as looting, violate the basic principles of the altruistic spirit and are extremely rare. At any rate, an understanding of this section will both acquaint the reader with the dynamics of the occasional maladaptive response and, also, impart an even greater appreciation for the pervasive and orienting influence of altruistic norms.

Hostility

Earlier we saw that an agency's status as "outsider" tended to make it a focus for the expression of hostility by members of the victim community. At this point it will be instructive to identify more clearly those special characteristics of the relationship between outside agencies and victims which tend to trigger hostile sentiments, regardless of any objective efficiency demonstrated by the agency.

We have already realized that outside agencies must fit themselves into the operational patterns located in the community. Further, the agency and its personnel must conform to a set of local rank, value, and sentiment patterns. Later, we shall see the constraints which operate in a

bureaucratic organization to prevent such adaptation, but for now let us view some of the more critical elements of community hostility.

1) If the personnel of the agencies represent social ranks appreciably higher than that of the victims, and if uniforms and equipment are ostentatious, then sympathetic linkage between victims and officials will be hindered.[39]

2) If the agency interacts in an impersonal, rational, structured manner, it obviously cannot express the affective, emotional, personal attitude which is expected within the disaster-impacted community.

3) "The arduous and less dramatic task of providing a basis for a lasting rehabilitation is often a subject of severe criticism...because there are many alternatives and many and conflicting evaluations of the possible choices."[40] Thus, agency decision-making on long-range questions may be seen as a cause of the reintroduction of self-interest into disaster operations, which may spark hostilities rendered latent by the disaster consensus.

4) If the agency personnel are professional, disaster-hardened veterans they may have developed personal defense mechanisms in order to avoid affective attachment to the never-ending procession of disaster victims. While this is understandable,in retrospect, it may not be so to the individual victim. This is especially true if the workers find relief inappropriately (such as joking on the job,etc.).[41]

5) Since the agencies' personnel are probably non-local and heterogenous the possibility that some of their attitudes or behaviors may be viewed as inappropriate by local residents is high.[42]

In short, there are numerous subjective considerations which will tend to create tension and conflict regardless of the agencies' objective performance. This will become abundantly evident in later sections, when we examine the nature of bureaucracies and their interaction with the disaster system.

Scapegoating

Scapegoating usually occurs in man-made disasters (plane crashes, bottled gas explosions, train wrecks, etc) where it is conceivable that a human agent is involved. It is normally held that scapegoating is not evident to an appreciable degree in natural disaster. In a formal sense, this is true; disaster scapegoating is usually limited to doubts about those in charge of warning (e.g. river watcher) or those vaguely related to the event (people upriver from a flooded community, for example).

However, many of the same forces which lead to scapegoating operate in the natural disaster context, and they usually create difficulties for efficient relief and recovery. Let us examine further the dynamics of scapegoating and then relate them to Federal disaster response.

Two important elements of scapegoating immediately

present themselves. First, "it is basically irrational, a form in which people can work off their frustration and anxieties, as well as the feelings of guilt, anger, shock, and horror brought on by the disaster."[43] Second, the victims require a "satisfying" target, which implies a prominent official or group of officials.

In a natural disaster this leads to a free-floating frustration and hostility in search of an outlet. If we realize that "among certain elements of the public there is a deep-rooted, perhaps unrecognized, latent hostility toward political authority, toward those higher up",[44] we can sense how large, powerful, professional federal agencies, entering the area from outside, can serve as the focus for the expression of hostility. In this way. elements of the public may find an opportunity to enhance their own self-image, relieve their tension and, even if momentarily, feel superior to so-called "higher-ups".

It is clear that recovery agencies will not be blamed for the disaster, per se. However, it is interesting to note that these agencies were often accused of creating a "second man-made disaster".[45] The reference is revealing for it demonstrates that the same dynamics which generate scapegoating in man-made calamities can generate scapegoating behavior in natural disaster.

Looting

The problem (or more correctly, absence of a problem)

with looting during natural disaster may appear, at first glance, to be peripheral to any consideration of disaster recovery focused on a period of time any more than a few days after the disaster impact. Such, however, is not the case since an examination of the looting literature offers significant clues to the redefinition of "property" which occurs during a disaster event and which may prevail for a considerable period of time. Further, it has implications for future victim/recovery agency relationships.

First, let us consider looting, per se. "The word, 'looting' has military roots. It implies that invading armies take property by force, generally when the rightful owner canot protect it."[46] By extension, in disaster, looting is seen as the misappropriation of the property of victims, who have been driven from the area, and thus, cannot exercise control or ownership.

Now, is there much looting in disaster.? The answer is clearly, "no". There are many reports of looting, but actual occurrence is very rare. This contradiction occurs for several reasons.[47] First, there are misinterpretations of observed behavior. People sifting through the debris of their homes; relatives and friends aiding a victim, can easily be mistaken for looters. Second, there may be misunderstanding over ownership. Frequently goods are given away during disaster. Occassionally, misunderstandings, easily resolved, occur over what is being given away and what

is being retained. Third, reports of looting become inflated as they travel through communication channels. This is seen as a function of the expectation that looting will occur. Fourth, sensational coverage, which by its nature highlights the unique, atypical, and dramatic, often rounds out the picture by reporting alleged incidents of looting. The upshot of all this is that looting is a rare post-disaster phenomenon. "Still, the fact remains that certain'illegal' appropriations of property do occur in disaster situations".[48] Often, people break into abandoned stores to obtain shovels, medical supplies, cots, etc. Is this looting? Why not? Here we approach the issue of true significance, redefinition of property norms.

"The nature of 'property' involves a shared understanding about who can do what with the valued resources within a community".[49] Now, during normal periods, property refers to material goods in reference to "ownership". "A community in its day-to-day operations, can be seen as a multi-purpose system. The allocation of resources for this multi-purpose system is accomplished by what has been called a pluralistic decision-making process."[50] The actual allocations may change, but in the short or middle range they are relatively fixed. Property is one of the key institutionalized elements of the relationship.

However, the system becomes suspended during disaster. During this period, all resources are seen as being at the

disposal of the community. "Anyone who might openly object to such a redefinition of private resources is likely to be subject to considerable social pressure to adhere to the new priorities."[51]

Thus, it becomes clear, the disaster event leads to an attitude which regards property as shared - insofar as the property is used in a legitimate manner (i.e. relief, recovery, aid and comfort, etc.). Now, what is the implication for all of this for recovery agencies which enter the disaster area? Simply stated, the recovery agencies hold the normal "property" conception and must relate to victims whose attitudes are influenced by the disaster redefinitions of property.

The results of this fundamental conflict are quite interesting. We find that SBA officials are often annoyed at how honest the victims' loan requests are.[52] Indeed, they are often considered too low and may be revised upwards. This is not really surprising, however, when one realizes that victims are not seeking self-aggrandizement. Rather, they are taking a share of the "community property" which is required to meet their disaster needs, rigorously defined.[53]

Second, there is a great deal of impatience among victims when confronted with excessive paperwork, bookkeeping, and so on. This type of red tape is normally essential as a precaution against purposeful attempts at misrepresentation and cheating. In a disaster situation, such precautions are

perceived as irrelevant and an affront. Further, the victims have usually become used to the informal methods of agencies which offer immediate relief in the form of food and clothing. These materials are usually simply distributed to whomever shows interest.

The distinction between that informal aid and recovery aid, while clear to the responsible agencies, is not clear to the disaster victims. Of course, the agency is caught between the rock and the hard place, since its procedures reflect legislative mandates and internalized norms which are influenced by non-disaster conceptions of property. The agency cannot adjust, yet it will not succeed.

The balance drawn is that of trying to expedite processing as much as possible to minimize friction and hostility. Needless to say, this is yet another area in which the agency is doomed from the start, and again, it's the basic conflict, not objective efficiency, which will make the agency the focus of attack.

Social Conflict Over Recovery Aid

In the early phases of disaster the norm "need and not loss", which is the basis of most initial aid, is not questioned.[54] However, as the strength of the altruistic consensus begins to wane it becomes increasingly clear that this disaster norm quickly loses support. Difficulties emerge as many victims seem increasingly disturbed over the manner in which aid is distributed. "The difficulties seem to

involve a feeling of relative deprivation especially among members of the upper groups at seeing goods distributed on an equalitarian basis, and seeing income differentials reduced by the disaster work pay rates."[55]

Further, the procedures used in assessing need, when the system finally switches to assistance by amount of loss, also cause conflict. This is because, "when lengthy case work interviews are used to establish need, resentlement is frequently aroused, especially among lower-middle and upper-lower class people whose sense of dignity may be assailed by procedures they consider appropriate for welfare patients but not for their class."[56]

Now, this may be overstated, but it is apparent that early hostility is generated as altruism wanes and the "shiftless" begin to collect "more than their due". Further hostility then may emerge as agencies rely upon impersonal and formal procedures . On this note, then, let us turn to an examination of those agencies and explore the nature of their functions and their operational "style".

Footnotes - Section II

1) Allen H. Barton. Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969. p. 38.

2) Barton, p. 38

3) Russell R. Dynes. Organizational Behavior in Disaster: Analysis and Conceptualization. Ohio State University: Disaster Research Center, April, 1969. p. 62-66.

4) Barton, p. 40

5) Dynes, p. 64

6) Charles Fritz, "Disaster", as quoted in Dynes, p. 64.

7) William H. Form and Sigmund Nosow. Community in Disaster. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers. 1958. p. 111.

8) Dynes, p. 74-80

9) Dynes, p. 75

10) This description is a combination of several different approaches to differentiating the disaster experience. Some are very detailed (as in Dynes, p. 67) or reasonably brief (Barton, p. 49). For our purposes these six will be sufficient.

11) Barton, p. 211 - 214

12) Charles Loomis. Social Systems - Essays on Their Persistence and Change. Princeton: Van Nostrand Co., 1960. p. 132.

13) Barton, p. 49

14) Loomis, p. 137

15) Leonard Logan, A Study of the Effects of Catastrophe on Social Disorganization. Johns Hopkins University: Operations Research Office, 1952. p. 107.

16) Dynes, p. 115-116

17) Dynes, p. 117

18) Dynes, p. 118

19) Dynes, p. 119

20) Enrico Quarantelli, and Russell R. Dynes. The Absence of Community Conflict in the Early Phases of Natural Disaster. Ohio State University: Disaster Research Center, 1969. p. 1.

21) Quarantelli, p. 2-5.

22) Barton, p. 206

23) Quarantelli, p. 3

24) Loomis, p. 138

25) Quarantelli, p. 4

26) Charles Fritz as cited in Quarantelli, p. 5

27) Barton, p. 206

28) Attorney Frank Townend. (Director of Luzerne County, Pa. Civil Defense and Treasurer of Wyoming Valley Blue Cross/ Blue Shield. Interview June, 1973.

29) Quarantelli, p. 6

30) Quarantelli, p. 6

31) Quarantelli, p. 7 (quoting Fritz)

32) Barton, p. 206

33) The first four of these are noted by Quarantelli at page 7.

34) Loomis, p. 159

35) Barton, p. 301

36) Barton, p. 302

37) Barton, p. 302

38) Barton, p. 305

38A) Barton, p. 279

39) Loomis, p. 161

40) Loomis, p. 144

41) Loomis, p. 139

42) Form and Nosow, p. 20

43) Thomas E. Drabek. Scapegoats, Villains, and Disaster. Ohio State University: Disaster Research Center. 1967. p. 12.

44) Drabek, p. 13

45) This opinion appeared frequently in the comments attached to the opinion survey forms used in the Wilkes-Barre research.

46) Russell R. Dynes and E. L. Quarantelli. Looting in Civil Disorders: An Index of Social Change. Ohio State University: Disaster Research Center, 1968. p.9

47) Dynes ("Looting"), p. 10-11
Attorney Frank Townend of the Luzerne County Civil Defense noted in testimony before the House Committee on Government Operations and in an interview (June, 1973) that he did not know of any appreciable rise in taking of property. Indeed, he suggested that the crime rate for the Summer of '72 was probably at a record low, from his experience.

48) Dynes, "Looting", p. 11

49) Russell R. Dynes and E. L. Quarantelli. Redefinitions of Property Norms in Community Emergencies. Ohio State University: Disaster Research Center, 1968. p. 4.

50) Dynes, "Property Norms", p.5

51) Dynes, "Property Norms", p.6

52) Comment from interview of October, 1973.

53) "I personally feel that the Government should have paid for all the damages, because they own the waterways and they are responsible for them."
"You have to set up a system where people can keep their pride and not be made to feel like they are bandits".
"The Red Cross and Salvation Army people were so nice, I don't know why the HUD people had to fill out forms, forms, forms..."
Comments from Wilkes-Barre questionnaires.

54) Loomis, p. 145

55) Barton, p. 310

56) Loomis, p. 146

SECTION III

THE CONVERSION PROCESS

THE CONVERSION PROCESS

Having described the environment within which the recovery process occurs, we can now turn our attention to the understanding of those institutions which must generate desired outcomes in response to the demands and needs of the impacted community. We have spoken of this element of the recovery system as the "conversion process".

It is clear that myriad organizations, agencies, clubs, ad hoc committees, and so on, are involved in recovery operations. The spectrum runs from neighbors making sandwiches to massive agencies responsible for housing thousands (e.g. HUD). For our purposes, it is necessary to limit consideration to the upper end of the scale - namely, to those federal agencies which are involved in disaster recovery.

In any large scale disaster, the vast proportion of the recovery operations are administered by federal agencies. The characteristics which these share tend to be those which are shared by "bureaucracies" generally. Thus, it will be instructive to begin our examination of the conversion process by focusing on the nature of bureaucratic organizations.

I prefer to take an organizational structural approach rather than an approach which emphasizes only personnel and certain officials. We do find that "visible organizational problems generally are exemplified by the people in the

organizations and their relationships with one another. But this does not necessarily mean that in order to change these problems you have to change the people."[1] Rather, the problems are deeper, inherent in the very fibre of the organizations' existence and its interaction with its environment. It is this perspective we shall now assume. It is hoped that an understanding of these bureaucratic dynamics will move us closer to an understanding of selected elements of the disaster recovery system.

This section is organized in the following manner. First, we shall define our terms a bit more precisely and offer some introductory comments on bureaucracy as an organizational phenomenon; second, we will identify how public and private bureaucracies differ; third, we will discuss some common elements of bureaucratic structure which will have consequences for disaster (or really, any stress) operations; finally, and most importantly, we shall identify several common characteristics of bureaucratic functioning, all of which are particularly significant as one interprets organizational behavior in disaster recovery situations.

What is Bureaucracy ?

In response to this question we turn to Max Weber, who created the "classic model" of bureaucracy. In Weber's terms, and as commonly used, bureaucracy is comprised of those organizations which reflect the following critical traits:[2]

1) Precise rules and regulations fix the jurisdiction and operation of the bureaucratic agency.
2) The bureaucratic organization is hierarchically structured, i.e. there are clear sets of superior-subordinate relationships.
3) The internal mangement and direction of the bureau is carried out through the use of formal, written communications, directive and decision channels, etc.
4) Bureaucratic officials reflect a high degree of specialization and expertise in substantive functional areas.
5) Official activity requires the full working capacity of the executive - it is a primary, and not a secondary, responsibility.
6) Officials become specialists in bureaucracy, per se.

These may be considered the six "primary" traits of bureaucracies. By extending them we may understand the dynamics behind the appearance of various "secondary" traits which usually, but not necessarily, correspond to the

bureaucratic style.

Before pursuing these traits, however, it is necessary to remind the reader that "bureaucracy" is a value-free word. It merely describes a style of organization which has advantages and disadvantages, depending upon one's perceptions and expectations. Weber has stressed the purely "technical superiority of bureaucracies over any other form of organization...precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personnel costs - these are stressed to the optimum point..."[3] Others have stressed inefficiency, incompetence, lack of flexibility, impersonality, agency self-aggrandizement, and so on, as counter-productive and unanticipated side effects of the bureaucratic style. I suggest we conform to the spirit of our system approach and follow the advice of Anthony Downs, which follows:

> The merits and efficiency of bureaucratic organizations can be considered only in relation to specific social functions and specific alternative forms of organization suitable for carrying out those functions. Hence neither praise of the technical superiority of bureaus nor condemnation of their inefficiency makes sense unless the exact context of their operation is specified.[4]

Public and Private Organizations

Although all bureaucracies reflect Weber's six primary criteria, there are several other dimensions which tend to sub-divide the set of bureaucracies into different categories. One of the most critical of these dimensions is that of the public versus the private agency.

Non-Market Orientation

Markets (a selling place for goods and services) are based upon voluntary transactions. A private organization performs profitable functions and ignores unprofitable ones. Thus the income of the private organization is directly related to its success in receiving compensation for its labors in the competitive market place.

Conversely, the public agency is not market-oriented. "Unlike most other large organizations, bureaus are economically one-faced rather than two-faced. They face input markets where they buy the scarce resources to produce their outputs. But they face no economic markets whatever on the output side."[5]

This non-market orientation complicates the public agencies' operation a great deal. First, "bureaus specialize in the supply of those services the value of which cannot be exchanged for money at a per-unit rate. As a consequence of the above, bureaus cannot be managed by profit goals and the 'economic calculus'."[6] Thus, "in the

absence of profit goals, bureaus must be centrally managed by the pervasive regulation and monitoring of the activities of subordinates."[7]

Second, non-market orientation cannot aid the bureau in computing allocation of its controled resources, or in assessing personnel performance, or, eve, in quantifying the actual intensity or breadth (elasticity) of demand for what it can supply and what it produces.

A third implication to be drawn from non-market orientation is that since the agency is freed from the constraints of "profitability tests" it is allowed to meet non-economic needs (e.g. food assistance; flood recovery,etc.). Further, the agency is free to allocate resources to collective goals (such as education, law and order, national defense) which involve some indivisible benefits[8] (i.e. everyone benefits, yet it is virtually impossible to exact compensation for the value received).

This freedom, however, has a price - namely, that of demonstrating some value in the service performed. "One of the implicit tasks of an organization, then, is to establish the legitimacy of its output (and , we might add, the legitimacy of its method of operation). In the economic sector it is generally thought that this end is achieved through the market mechanism...Legitimacy for non-profit organizations is sometimes an even greater problem."[9]

In short, non-market orientation creates a vacuum,

since something must replace the "invisible hand" of the market place. Into this vacuum flow many of the secondary traits (such as uncertainty, formal rules, inertia) which we shall view in a later section.

Allocational Uncertainty

Clearly related to non-market orientation is allocational uncertainty. Since the public agency does not derive income from its outputs, and indeed does not intend to, it must be funded in some other manner. These funds are usually allocated from a central pool of resources. The allocation criteria are usually vague and not primarily economic in their orientation. This means that the agency cannot expect income in any definite relation to its output.

Further, it means that the agency must maintain awareness of those political, inter-organizational, and structural tensions which will influence its income. This significantly complicates the operation of the public agency relative to that of the private agency.

Powersetting[10]

We may consider attention to an agency's "power setting" as a clear result of the agencies' response to allocational uncertainty. By powersetting, we mean the constellation of actors which provides the direction, competition, and cues which would normally be provided by a relevant market.

All organizations,"whether industrial or not, have an environment comprised, at the minimum, of suppliers,

customers or clients, potential or actual unions...new technologies, and, of course, the complex social and political milieu of the communities in which they exist."[11] The following actors are critical members of the power-settings of federal agencies.

The Sovereign: Public agencies have at least one organization or person with authority over them. Usually, this sovereign is the Chief Executive or Congress. The degree, or scope, of authority varies, but is usually appreciable. The sovereign is a source of uncertainty; his reactions must be anticipated since his role is important in granting benefits (higher budget, prestige, access) or sanctions (impoundment, dissolution, curtailment of some activities).

Allies: Since agencies are financed from the same purse, functionally overlap, and occasionally become involved in conflict, it is necessary that the agency cultivate allies. Allies may be other agencies, suppliers, beneficiaries, favor seekers, or any group which is willing to support the agency in times of need. Again, the agency must be on guard ~~the~~ to retain or recruit allies.

Rivals: Any agency which competes with an agency for funds or functional responsibility is a rival. Insofar as good public relations are considered a valuable resource by agencies, then agencies which wish to share the limelight are rivals. It is clear that agency rivalry tends to approximate the competitiveness of the open market. Indeed,

"the competition for resources is a serious and deadly game among all types of organizations, and survival is vital and not to be taken ~~fro~~ for granted."[12]

Beneficiaries and Sufferers: These are the actors who are affected by the agencies' decisions, whether favorably or adversely. Direct beneficiaries and sufferers are continually aware of their position; those affected indirectly are not. Thus, there is a set of beneficiaries and sufferers who have a stake in influencing the agency and there is a set which is unaware or unmotivated to exercise influence. Because of this, the public agency tends, eventually, to favor those directly affected by its operations and to exercise less interest in indirectly affected actors.

Emphasis on Immediate Results

Public bureaucracies are under strong pressure to "have operating performance coincide with promised expectations as soon as possible. To paraphrase Banfield slightly, the extent to which federal executives may discount the present for future gains is extremely limited."[13]

This tends to be the result of the influence of the agencies clients (beneficiaries and sufferers) and of the nature of the political/allocational process, which must emphasize immediate political capital. This political advantage is generated more by present action than by planned future action.

Common Structural Elements

In spite of all of the preceding discussion of the differences between public and private agencies, we may identify still more relevant characteristics which are shared by all bureaucracies. We may consider these elements which are inherent in any bureaucracy, and which contribute to numerous agency behavioral traits.

Size

It is impossible to determine precisely when an organization becomes bureaucratic. However, it seems clear that size is an important factor. Most tasks undertaken by the government are large and the mere sizes of the tasks alone work in the direction of large organizations.[16] Now, a task may be reduced to numerous sub-tasks, but some larger body must integrate and coordinate those sub-tasks into a single coherent direction.

When the size of the agency is such that informal communication (i.e. face-to-face verbal exchanges) is no longer an efficient control or direction method, the organization must begin to conform to Weber's characteristics. Eventually, the top administrators will become separated physically and psychologically from imlementation of their decisions. When this occurs problems of authority, responsibility and accountability arise.[17] This further moves the agency into the bureaucratic mold as control and oversight

mechanisms develop.

Thus, "every organization of any significant size is bureaucratic to some degree, or, to put it differently, exhibits some more or less stable patterns of behavior based upon a structure of roles and specialized tasks."[18]

Decision Making [19]

There are inherent limitations on officials in all aspects of decision making. Thus, the approach differs from the economists' "perfectly informed" world. The most significant limits are decision-making capacity are:

1) There is a limited amount of time allocated for making any given decisions.

2) Any official can only grasp a limited amount of all relevant information.

3) Most officials must perform their decision-making on a prioritized schedule, focusing on only the most critical problems.

4) The amount of information available for any decision is appreciably smaller than the amount which could possibly be gathered.

5) The cost of added information increases at an increasing rate.

6) Some information is patently unavailable at any price (such as information about future events).

Of course, much of the above holds true generally. However, it is particularly relevant when we consider that

"the more an organization is in conflict with its social environment or depends upon it for the achievement of its central goals, the more resources it will allocate to the intelligence function..."[20] In spite of this we find:

Uncertainty

"As the number of variables increase, the number of possible alternative solutions will also increase, and, at the same time, the ability of the decision maker to estimate the consequences of each possible alternative will become increasingly uncertain. Under these circumstances, the utilization of subjective preferences, approved by the organization, is frequently not only the necessary but the only means that can be employed to introduce a degree of confidence into the complexities of the decision making process." [21]

This leads to an interesting difficulty insofar as the existence of uncertainty allows for the existence of varying policy views within an agency, since none are refutable from the available information. Thus, even an agency in which goals, experience, perceptions and information are shared, there is considerable room for disagreement as uncertainty increases.

Intra-Agency Behavior

At this point we are prepared to examine those agency behavioral traits which are of particular relevance to disaster recovery operations. In this chapter, we shall examine intra-organizational traits, including impersonality, formal rules, inertia, routinization, performance gaps. In the next chapter, we will examine traits which are basically the manifestations of inter-organizational contact, including expansion, competition, imperialism. This concluded we will turn, in the folowing section, to a view of the impact of disaster-induced stress on the nature of intra and inter-organizational traits.

Impersonality

At the outset we may recall that Weber's model of bureaucracy was developed in opposition to those organizations which operated informally on the basis of wealth, status, kinship, social rank, and so on. To minimize the influence of such subjective criteria, the bureaucratic organization has required emphasis of impersonal elements of administration, such as routine and formal rules. "This relates directly to Weber's 'dehumanizing' tendency of bureaucracy. In practical terms, the goal of any complex organization should be to minimize - indeed, eliminate - individual behavior that is contrary to the responses desired by the organization."[22]

To this end, we identify a critical element of this

limitation of accepted ranges of behavior - impersonality. We observe two levels on which this operates: within the bureau, and between the bureau and its clients.

Impersonality is valued within the organization. "The more bureaucracy is 'dehumanized' the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation."[23] This is deemed desirable because the "peculiarity of modern culture...demands.. 'calculability' of results."[24] Because of this inclination, role performance is a major factor in agency personnel policies. Hiring and promotion must be based upon ability, knowledge, technical skill, past and potential performance.

This emphasis is due to the fact that agencies must perform their functions with reasonable dispatch and competence in order to persist. Not only does impersonality enhance objective personnel standards; it also serves to 1) increase agency control over desired responses from agency members, and 2) maintains internal hierarchical division of authority and responsibility. The point here is that emphasis in impersonality must lead to increased reliance on the formal administrative network.

Impersonal client-agency relations are also necessary. This is due to the fact that "impersonality means similar treatment of all persons whose situations involve objectively similar conditions, regardless of their personal characteristics."[25]

This state of affairs arises for two reasons: 1) all citizens must normally receive equal treatment before the law, hence the agency has no real choice, 2) more importantly, impersonal treatment and reliance on formal rules are incompatible. "A truly personal relationship implies a unique and spontaneous emotional response by the official to the personality or problems of his client, not to a rule book."[26]

This formal impersonality is also deemed desirable because it serves to "prevent favoritism and improper discrimination, and to protect individuals from the agonies resulting from intimate knowledge and friendship when a situation demands an impersonal decision."[27] Now, since formal rules seem so critical to internal function we shall condier them next.

Formal Rules

Let us examine several basic reasons why formal rules must be relied upon by agency personnel in the performance of their duties.

1) Since the agency is non-market oriented, it must supply some decision guide to replace the direct guide available in "quid pro quo" transactions. It is suggested that "the more obscure the relationship between a bureau's activities and their ultimate objective, the more likely those activites are to be governed by formal rules."[28]

2) Freedom of response to problems significantly

complicates the task of coordinating agency activities into consistent and coherent sets of policies. Reliance on formal rules simplifies this task by specifying, in advance, the limited range of consistent responses.

3) An agency must be consistent in its dealings with its clients - either with one client over time, or many clients simultaneously. Formal rules guarantee that consistent interpretation of objective standards is introduced.

4) All agencies operate in the face of uncertainty and of scarcity of time, personnel, attention, and money. Formal rules guarantee that control over the allocation of these resources within the agency may be exercised by the rule makers. Thus, approval is required to expend more time, effort, or personnel, on any given issue.

5) Uncertainty and ambiguity may plague an agency during certain periods. Formal rules guide subordinates even in the face of massive change within the agency, when effective administrative oversight may be interrupted.

6) Formal rules serve to identify changing conditions. Unanticipated demands often go beyond existing formal rules, which signals that reevaluation, or at least, accomodation of agency rules is required.

In essence, we may suggest that formal rules serve to maintain the integrity of the agency by intimidating the individual to give priority to the demands of the organization[29] (even in the face of conflicting external or internal demands.),

while simultaneously imposing some predictability upon the environment.

From the preceding, we may derive three ranges of importance for rule making. First, there are decisions which offer no threat to agency integrity and are, therefore, too trivial to be covered by formal rules. Second, there are those decisions which are so fundamental and momentous that they require prior review by administration, and are, as such, too important to be covered by formal rules. Third, there is a vast range of "middle-level" decisions which do not require review, but which are not insignificant. These issues are covered by formal rules.

Often, these decisions are encountered over and over again. If such is the case, the third element we discussed, routine, comes into play. Let us shift our attention to this element of intra-organizational behavior.

Routine

"As methods of handling recurring questions become matters of organizational practice routine ... they cease to be objects of reconsideration when these questions arise."[30] Under the circumstances of limited time, attention, and so on there must be an efficient means of improving work capacity. Extending this, we may observe that, 1) the larger an organization, the more routine it becomes, 2) the longer an organization has been carrying out a function, the more routine it becomes.

Routinization, per se, is a legitimate response to pressing objectively similar, demands. A difficulty emerges, however, when an agency is faced with changing or subjectively loaded demands. While, "the thrust is to routinize, limit uncertainty, increase predictability, and centralize functions and controls ...Rules and regulations cannot possibly meet every contingency and cannot possibly avoid conflicting with one another."[31] This difficulty is exacerbated by impersonality and organizational size.

Now, we may join all of these considerations in our next sub-section, as we discuss organizational inertia.

Inertia

All of the preceding lends itself to efficiency, dispatch, consistency, and thoroughness in the daily operations of an agency, assuming the demands upon the agency and the agency's environment remain reasonably stable. It must be realized, however, that these elements (we'll refer to them together as "organizational habit") do not reflect purely passive behavior, "for once a habit has been established the mere presence of the stimulus tends to release the habitual behavior without further conscious thought."[32] Indeed, it may take a great deal of exertion to prevent habitual responses when they begin to become counterproductive.

This inertial tendency exists for several reasons. First, agencies' established processes reflect an enormous "sunk cost"[33], which was the investment of time, effort,

training, and supervision which was required to initiate and pattern the process to begin with. Thuse, there is a dynamic operating to continue rather than lose the initial investment. Second, an agency faces equally enormous "make ready" costs if it wishes to establish a whole new set of responses. This certainly operates to discourage intra-agency policy or procedure shifts.

Third, apart from these considerations, we must realize that agency habits develop an internal logic and fascination which tend to minimize the impact of external stimuli conveying messages contrary to the established pattern. Assuming all of this, we must ask about the possibility for incremental change within the larger patterned operation of the agency. Even here, serious obstacles are present.

Essentially, the problem is a result of reliance on formal rules, impersonality (i.e. the necessity of following formal channels to bring change to the attention of decision makers), and the size of the organization (which we have observed is normally large).

We may examine the difficulty from two perspectives. First, within the organization any proposed action must follow a regular decision path. This involves expenditure of a great deal of effort over long periods if the proposal for change is to be successful. Success, however, remains problemmatic since it requires multiple approvals along the

way, and may be rejected at any point. Second, really novel proposals often fall outside the pale of both formal rules and control processes.[34] Hence, the opportunities for losing or delaying the proposal increase even more.

In sum, we find that the agency may indeed exhibit great dispatch and high productivity at the expense of flexibility. Unfortunately, the relevance of the final product may be in doubt during periods of change.

It seems clear, though, that if agencies persist in times of change, they must be able to adapt somehow in spite of inertial forces. To explain the dynamics of adaptation we turn to an interesting and stimulating concept - performance gaps.

Performance Gaps

Previously, we discussed only "formal" decision/function roles. Now we begin to introduce the "informal" structure which operates to fill in performance gaps created by highly uncertain or rapidly-changing environments.[35] Essentially, we may define a performance gap as the discrepancy between what an agency is doing and what it "ought"to be doing.

"The fact that organizations have built in protective devices to maintain stability and that they are notoriously difficult to change... should not obscure the realities of the dynamic interrelationships of any social structure and its social and natural environment."[36] It is this set of

interrelationships which leads to the appearance of a performance gap.

We may make several observations about the nature of performance gaps and their implications for agency operations. Later, in the discussion of disaster induced stress, we will consider alternative responses to the existence of performance gaps. Consider, therefor, the characteristics of gaps:

1) Performance gaps will appear more frequently in those agencies undergoing rapid external change. The importance of the gap is increased since a discrepancy caused by environmental changes is more visible than that induced by internal stimuli (such as turnover, technical change, personnel difficulties, etc.). [37]

2) High turnover within an agency tends to increase the reguency of performance gaps;[38] this is especially true when one realizes that agencies with high turnover tend to rely more heavily than others on formal rules and impersonality.

3) The more visible and immediate the fruits of the agencies' labors, the greater the strength and breadth of feedback - hence the more likely the possibility that performance gaps will be detected.[39]

4) Very extreme environmental instability will greatly detract from the objective value of feedback. Such feedback might be intense, but substantive quality would conceivably

be limited. This tends to create a general sense of agency "failure" without accurately and specifically focusing on discrete performance deficiencies.

With these observations, we are prepared to consider the impact of a high stress environment on the internal behavior of the agency. Before doing so, however, it will be instructive to consider one final feature of organizational behavior - relations with other agencies (either functional rivals, allocational rivals, or allies) in the shared power-setting.

Inter-Organizational Traits

Some traits of organizations which develop from internal dynamics eventually involve the organizations in various types of conflict with other organized groups. In this section we will trace a few such traits in order to arrive at an understanding of "bureaucratic imperialism".

Expansion

It seems clear that most agencies have inherent tendencies to expand. The dynamics behind this tendency are several. Firts, a rapidly expanding agency can attract more capable personnel and retain those capable people it already has. This is because it has greater resources - either monetary or psychic - with which to reward those persons. Further, those attracted to expanding agencies, often typified as "climbers", tend to be oriented toward expansion generally, which serves to maintain the momentum of growth.[40]

The second dynamic favoring expansion is that growth tendsto provide an outlet for internal tensions, since factions within the agency may be temporarily mollified by receipt of a larger absolute share of the agencies' business. Further, this need not be at the expense of any other agency members.

Finally, expansion tends to reward top members with increased prestige, income, and power. This benefits both the administrator personally, and the agency for which he speaks.

Competition [41]

In a world of finite resources (in any period of time) competition is inevitable. Of course, expansion thus tends to produce competition, since expansion is often at the expence of some other agency or agencies. However, even in a functionally static situation, competition will occur over budget (recall, public agencies are non-market oriented).

We recognize two types of rivalries: 1) functional rivalry, wherein agencies battle over who will administer overlapping functional responsibilities; and 2) allocational rivalry, wherein agencies compete for scarce resources from some central pool, regardless of functional relationships. Thus, along two dimensions we realize that public agencies "must impress those politicians who control the budget that their functions generate political support or meet vital social needs."[42]

Imperialism

All of this leads us to an examination of agency territoriality, and from there to imperialism. First, we shall explore Downs' idea of "territoriality".[43] This behavior is analagous to that found in nature, wherein animals stake out and defend areas which surround their homes and hunting grounds. Similarly, the agency stakes out, conceptually, the boundaries which define its "policy space".

Essentially, the "territory" represents a gradient of

sensitivity, where agency sensitivty to encroachment increases as one moves closer to the "heartland" in which the agency and its members are dominant. This is similar to the approach which describes each agency as having a "mission" which it jealously guards. These concepts will all prove helpful as we consider agency competition, the ramifications of expansion, and the impact of stress.

We must realize that although agencies become increasingly sensitive as interlopers near the interior of the policy space, the actual boundaries of the territory are ambiguous. This vagueness is to be expected if one considers the incredible variety of policy overlaps which occur in public activity. However, some agreement (domain consensus) does emerge. We may consider this to be a "set of expectations both for members of an organization and for others with whom they interact, about what the organization will and will not do...it provides an image of the organization's role in a larger system which in turn serves as a guide for the ordering of action in certain directions and not in others."[44]

Now, in our preceding analysis we have come to recognize that growth, expansion, and encroachment occurs constantly. What does this mean in territorial terms?[45]

1) Some jockeying always occurs as a means of testing and defining boundaries.

2) These tests are of interest because they signal possible trouble points if resistance is not strong.

3) Thus, agencies tend to spend a good deal of time and effort in boundary defense, which is not socially productive in any immediate (or even, perhaps, long-range) sense.

4) Each test sets off a new round of adjustments since any behavior change ripples through the policy system.

5) Any new, unstaked, space is quickly divided up between agencies since, to paraphrase the physicist, bureaucracy abhors a vacuum.

To refocus, by bureaucratic imperialism we mean the inter-agency conflict associated with assertion of pre-eminence by two or more agencies in a single jurisdiction.[46] The battle is joined for functional and allocational reasons. It is functionally relevant since it involves extension, acquisition, or defense of activities relevant to an agencies' "central mission".[47] It is allocationally relevant insofar as increased jurisdiction means increased funding, with possibilities for even further future increases.

Two prerequisites exist: 1) the agency must be inclined to do battle (some may prefer to conserve while others will tilt with any opponent), 2) there must be some occassion for jurisdiction to open up[48] (such as in nascent policy areas (NASA) or newly created areas).

This final line is a clear cue that we would do well to turn to disaster recovery and bring into immediate focus all of the preceding.

Footnotes - Section III

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4) Anthony Downs. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967. p.

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7) Niskanen, p. 7.

8) Downs, p. 33.

9) Perrow, p. 98-99.

10) Downs, p. 46. The Powersetting concept is borrowed as a handy way to order our sense of the agency environment.

11) Perrow, p. 55.

12) Perrow, p. 128.

13) Louis C. Gawthrop. Bureaucratic Behavior in the Executive Branch. An Analysis of Organizational Change. New York: The Free Press, 1969. p. 256.

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15) Gawthrop, p. 251.

16) Downs, p. 37.

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19) Downs, p. 75.

20) Harold L. Wilensky. Organizational Intelligence - Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry. New York: Basic Books Inc., 1967. p. 10.

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24) Gerth and Mills, p. 13.

25) Downs, p. 69.

26) Downs, p. 69.

27) Perrow, p. 58.

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31) Perrow, p. 67, 56.

32) Simon, p. 89.

33) Simon, p. 95. This is Simon's discussion of both "sunk" and "makeready" costs.

34) Downs, p. 160.

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36) Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, "Organizations and the System Concept," in Brinkerhoff and Kunz. p. 45.

37) Downs, p. 208.

38) Downs, p. 208.

39) Downs, p. 208.

40) Downs, p. 11.

41) James D. Thompson and William McEwan, "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interaction Process," in Brinkerhoff and Kunz. p. 261.

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SECTION IV

THE SYSTEM AT WORK

THE SYSTEM AT WORK

In this section we examine the interaction of victims and relief agencies, demands and output. In the first chapter we will consider at length the response of federal agencies to disaster induced stress. This may be seen as an extension and application of the basic principles elucidated in Section III. In our second chapter, we will see how victims and agencies interact, by viewing partisan/authority relationships, symbolic action, and so on. In the third chapter we will turn to a rigorous view of that interaction by analyzing the results of a systematic survey of victims of flooding induced by Tropical Storm Agnes in 1972.

We may rightly view this Section as the culmination of the three preceding Sections. It should serve to clarify the dynamics of the post-disaster system. Further, it is hoped that this material will provide a solid introduction to the model building, performance predicting, and policy analysis which shall follow in later Sections.

Response to Disaster Stress

In this chapter we must examine the manner in which the disaster stress situation modifies, minimizes, exacerbates, or otherwise affects the normal behavior of the federal agency. In order to do so we must begin with the effect of of stress on the internal organization and structure and operation of the agency. First, however, we may view the the nature of the public/private dichotomy from an economic perspective.

Public Agencies v. Private Organizations

To this point we have touched only lightly on hard economic questions within the community. Since this is an integral part of the response environment and the focus of a good deal of the later disaster operations we shall rectify the omission by sketching several critical economic overviews.

We must note, at the outset, that economic considerations have become increasingly important, both as policy-making inputs and as underlying shapers of community attitudes. This is due to two considerations - first, in highly developed parts of the world "the character of the threat has changed within the past century from one in which an expectation of significant loss of life has given way to an expectation of significant loss of property.[1] This may be

seen as an advance in warning and evacuation technique and also as a result of our second observation, which is that the move toward urbanization and agglomeration of building has provided larger targets for natural disaster. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that disaster prevention programs have encouraged development in disaster-prone areas (e.g. flood plains), and thus increased the likelihood of high property loss disasters. Consider, now, short-term economic recuperation.

Short-Term: We realize that supply/demand problems which do occur in the disaster area usually surface during the short-term, immediate post-impact period. However, it is clear that the spontaneous generosity of non-victims serves to decrease the high prices and scarcities which would be evident in a more normal, impersonal market.[2]

Thus, housing demand is decreased because relatives and friends take in victims; food supply is increased because non-victims do not hoard and even dip into their own emergency supplies. Businessmen often make selective price reductions as a gesture of good-will for victims. We have earlier considered this type of activity to reflect a redefinition of property norms. An economic approach suggests this is a result of changes in the utility functions of non-victims.[3]

Federal Agencies: Now, how does the federal agency fit into this picture? It will be recalled that public agencies

typically face only one market, in which they are consumers. The implicit assumption, made explicit by economists like Milton Friedman,[4] has been that the function of many agencies can be performed by a market-oriented organization. Examples would be education, pollution control, etc. However, a unique result of the impact of the disaster event on this state of affairs is that the disaster context involves the virtual dissolution of the traditional marketplace. It must be realized that both consumption and production are totally disorganized in the short run and significantly chaotic for appreciably longer periods.

Consumer Disorganization: Consumption implies voluntary transactions, which usually require capital. The disaster victim is seen as being completely without liquid assets in the short run. He is not, in point of fact, in a position to enter into market transactions (including barter). Only as aid flows into the disaster area does the victim reacquire physical property of any immediate value. Even this aid is primarily in-kind (food, clothing) rather than cash.

It is only in the long run that the victim begins to build a capital stock - in the form of gifts, unemployment compensation, SBA loans, etc. Thus, it is clear that a market orientation during the early to middle phases of disaster recovery is inappropriate. However, even if the consumer were somehow to retain his assets, or to be quickly

compensated for his losses (under, say, disaster insurance) he would still face a second problem.

Producer Disorganization: In the post-disaster situation it is clear that the production function is not being fully performed. This may be because of 1) damage to the production facilities, 2) diversion of manpower away from production of durable goods and to services like clean-up, 3) lack of resources for production (factor inputs).

In the short-run the market mechanism is suspended because severe restrictions of supply (this may be food, electricity, clothing, plywood, anything) obtain. More importantly, even if production were restored to normal very quickly the availability of supply to meet demand at reasonable prices would not be assured. This is because the disaster site typically reflects demands that are enormously greater than those prevailing in more normal times. It is clear that the vast increase in effective demand, coupled with a probable decrease in supply, will require very high prices to clear the market.

This is in spite of the generosity of non-victims, since the goods they donate are drawn from inventories and are not being replaced (because of producer disorganization). Further, we are talking here about necessities - food, clothing, shelter; for which reliance on the allocational power of the market place is not appropriate. Some commitment to provision of these products or services at a reasonable

cost does seem appropriate.

It would appear that because of 1) high demand, 2) low supply, 3) consumer and producer disorganization, and 4) immediate and significant needs, the market solution to disaster recovery is not advisable.

It seems clear that agencies which operate in any useful manner will have to be non-market oriented.(Indeed, even those businesses which do function in a disaster area tend to take on "public" or "charitable" non-profit roles.)[5] This brings us clearly to face the difficulties of the non-market disaster agency.

First, since profit measures are lacking, the organization must, in some way, gauge its effectiveness. This has been called the "search for legitimacy".[6] Second, the relief and recovery agency must accept the burden of ambiguous central management (with the concommittant control and operation problems). Third, the agency is freed from profitability constraints. It, (the agency), is usually the recipient of a good deal of unexpected income. Let us consider this more closely.

Allocational Uncertainty

This concept takes on new meaning in the disaster situation. Rather than a long-term budgeting orientation, the agency must begin to weigh 1) the availability of short-term disaster funds, and 2) the possibility for long-term allocational increases.

Usually, special disaster money is made avilable in a single appropriation. It is then divided among agencies, and finally, within agencies. Since this allocation helps to define "functions" and certainly augments power, prestige and position within the disaster operation, there is a great premium placed on the receipt of large initial disaster grants. Further, insofar as initial grants can be used, justifiably, to develop new programs, and insofar as grants imply some commitment to future funding, there is a long-range incentive which sensitizes the agency to the perception of possible future gains as a result of present windfalls.

Naturally, allocational competition for immediate and long-range "money from Heaven" places a high value on victory in any allocational conflicts. Thus, competition is encouraged.

Power-Setting

This brings us to the consideration of "powersetting", which becomes critical to the agency in the disaster situation. The requirements of the disaster situation virtually guarantee functional overlap, so the influence of rivals and allies is of great importance. Similarly, the proximity, density, and numbers of victims highlight the role of beneficiaries in the setting. Finally, it is reasonable that the agencies' sovereigns, operating with a mix of political and humanitarian motives, will be quite interested in the agency's performance.

It is a function of the disaster situation - its stress, its immediacy, its challenge, its promise for rapid increases in agency prestige and power, that perceptions of the power-setting become both more sensitive and more critical. We may realize that, "disaster is a very visible phenomenon; for its duration and for some time thereafter it tends to dominate the news of the immediate and adjacent environs, and even is news to far-removed sections of the world. To be prominent in a disaster is for a brief time to be somebody. To have even a small part in goal fulfillment is to "be in the know" and to have a large part is to be central in a very central situation. "[7]

Immediate Results

We earlier indicated that an agency head is normally oriented toward the present, rather than the future, performance of organization functions. This inclination is encouraged in the disaster site. However, such a tendency is rife with danger, insofar as decisions made in haste, or with consideration of only short range data, may commit an entire disaster operation to a patently unproductive or counterproductive strategy. (e.g. HUD tried to grapple with the long-run implications of housing options it might pursue, but finally had to drop such considerations and purchase thousands of trailers as a short-term, stop gap measure. This decision had wide-ranging impact on the number of victims who returned home, the speed with which homes were rebuilt, the

morale of victims, the problems of the agency as a trailer park landlord, etc.)[8]

The upshot of this is that the mix of assistance, the type of aid, the initial recovery plans of the disaster relevant agencies must ~~are~~ be formulated in the face of high public demand, pressing political considerations, and the glare of national, perhaps international, media. The immediacy of all needs and problems is clearly apparent and quite influential.

Size

There are two separate size considerations here. The first involves the parent organization. (i.e. the whole agency, rather than that sub-section which is actually mobilized for disaster action). It seems clear that the tendency in government is to give the most critical and pressing assignments to relatively large agencies (HUD, Corps of Engineers) rather than smaller agencies (OEO, VISTA). This seems a reasonable attitude in situations which require speedy mobilization of manpower, resources, expertise, etc. It must be realized, however, that with size also come the behavioral traits which we examined in our earlier Section.

On a second level, we must realize that the section of the agency which operates in the disaster may be small, even tiny, relative to its parent, but it is usually massive in relation to those recovery agencies which are indigenous to

the community. This has two sets of implications for recovery operations. On the one hand, the very size of the agency (coupled with the vague realization that it is a part of an even larger organization) fosters a sense of safety and security within the ranks of the distraught victims. On the other hand, the size of the agency makes the organization very visible to the victims. Recall the community potential for exhibiting hostility toward outsiders and we will recognize how objective size may prove to be a liability.

It is interesting to note that an agency's position on the size continuum tends to clearly determine victim perceptions of its effectiveness. In small disasters, Red Cross is often roundly criticized for being too "professional" and aggressive[9]. Typically, Red Cross is the largest single organizational presence in such disasters.

Conversely, in large scale disasters, in which Red Cross is at the lower end of the size scale, it is almost unanimously approved. This does not vary by the objective amount of aid (per capita) but rather by the relative size of the agency in the overall disaster picture. Recll, then, that size has both organizational and attitudinal implications.

Decision Making

Earlier, we noted the limitations inherent in the decision making process. The dynamics of the disaster situation operate in numerous ways to exacerbate the problem.

Recall, first, that we had noted the requirements for intelligence go up as the agency reliance on environmental cues goes up. Clearly, the disaster site is one of escalating requirements for intelligence.

Second, the availability of intelligence is probably inversely related to disaster extent. Much data may be destroyed, much may be only potentially available, much patently unavailable. Thus increased demand for data is coupled with disorganization in the information gathering processes.

The whole problem is exacerbated by the fact that need is immediate, not long range. When information gathering is delayed, as it invariably is, one of two choices presents itself - 1) decisions may be delayed, or 2) decisions are made on whatever data is available. The first choice paves the way for 1) increasing dissatisfaction and potential hostility, 2) missed opportunities if some decision opportunities are non-recurring, 3) actual physical and mental harms created by the delay of provision of some essential service. The second choice is difficult since it implies 1) possibility for error leading to premature commitment to a poor policy, 2) strong negative post-mortem evaluation, since decisions which appeared good and went bad are very hard to defend when situations normalize.

Uncertainty

Uncertainty, as we have learned, is the constant

companion of the administrator. In the disaster situation it has a pervasive influence throughout the decision-making process.

What are the effects of massive uncertainty? Recall, first, that an increase in uncertainty generally leads to an increase in the number of policy variables to be considered and, hence, an increase in the number of alternatives which may be proposed for the solution of any given problem. Recall further, that this increase in the the number of alternative strategies is in conjunction with reduced decision making capability. This tends to force the decision-maker into the increased reliance on subjective evaluation and decision criteria. Further, the existence of uncertainty increases the possibility for conflict within the decision-making body,as well as the probability of error.

It is clear that the disaster situation offers high stakes challenges with absolutely minimal opportunity for confidence in decision making. It must be recalled that confidence is a subjective evaluation which is a function of both uncertainty and risk. The two variables are multiplicative and directly affect whether an official will "optimize" or "satisfice"[10]. Essentially, "optimization" involves the choice of the best possible alternative, while "satisficing" involves the choice of the first alternative which minimizes the problem to a satisfactory level. It is clear that satisficing is the normal decision process in

the disaster situation. The implications are clear, since the result is often long-range committment on the basis of normally insufficient deliberation.

Finally, an examination of the influence of uncertainty must include its effect in making the actual mission and goals of the agency highly ambiguous. In so doing, the opportunity for conflict or oversight is greatly increased.

Impersonality

Impersonality becomes a fundamental obstacle in disaster recovery operations. While efficient for normal bureaucratic operations, it is in total opposition to the basic "ethos" of the disaster community, with its emotional, therapeutic, and altruistic overtones. The attitude of the the agency personnel, in dealings with clients, is, as we demonstrated earlier, critical in defining the agency as "insider"or "outsider". The impersonal nature of the bureau guarantees its "outsider" status.

> This hostility has been observed in almost all disasters systematically studied in this country. One can go back to the Halifax explosion of 1917 and find the same complaints being made there about the work of the Citizens' Relief Committee:
>
> It is regrettable, however, to have to say that the cause of social service did not receive in the community the much larger repute which its magnificent work justified, chiefly because the innumerable 'typewriters, card catalogues, involved indexes, and multifarious office equipment' were

not made less obtrusive. The merest touch of 'cold professionalism' soon became fuel for the burning disapproval which spread through the city regarding methods of relief. 11

The conflict is, of course, heightened by the fact that agencies are not only impersonal, but also rational, professional, transient, and, as we shall see, formal and routinized.

Formal Rules

No set of formal rules anticipates everything during periods of business as usual. In the disaster context the number of unanticipated demands is much higher than those experienced during normal operations; hence the failure of formal rules and the concommittant appearance of significant "performance gaps" is appreciably higher than usual.

There are two types of formal rules - those that are amenable to change and those that are fixed in the short, middle, or even long run. The first rule is that which involves administrative rather than legislative authority. In this case, the locus of decision making authority is critical. On site authority is vital if formal rules which can be changed are to be adjusted with a degree of success.

The second type of rule is that which is set by statute. Timely adjustment, in this instance, is problemmatic. This is especially true if a disaster is sufficiently limited in scope that effective public pressure cannot be sustained .

Routine

Similarly, routine is roundly shaken in the disaster situation. Some routines persist, depending on the organization's mission, but most must be restructured from scratch. This is a valuable insight when we understand that the point of routine is to free the decision-maker from the demands of middle-range concerns. Failing adequate routinization, the administrator is forced to divert the lion's share of his attention to matters of pressing (if, eventually, inconsequential) import.

Further, it will be recalled that a significant amount of the agency's resources must be devoted to tooling up until a steady routine is established. This diversion of scarce resources is of critical importance insofar as it represents a very large opportunity cost.

We may view the net impact of all of these concerns when we consider the interplay of disaster and inertia, which follows:

Inertia

Several agency difficulties are suggested by our earlier analysis of inertia. First, it was observed that inertia represents habit, which is a virtually automatic response to conditioned stimuli. The response requires constant attention if one attempts to eliminate it after it has been firmly established. Thus, the agency does not enter a disaster site with a clean slate; it goes in with a

set of organizational repertoires which may be wholly dysfunctional, but which are nonetheless activated. Commenting on this, " the psychologist, F.P. Kilpatrick, states that 'under stress there is a tendency to isolate oneself from immediate on-going events, and to hold to a familiar stable perceptual organization.' Whether or not this is always true, he makes an important sociological observation when discussing it. He says, 'these findings suggest, among other things, that if people are to be drilled in actions to be taken during an emergency, the actions should be ones which will in no case be inappropriate."[12] We may suggest much the same for agency operations.

Second, recall that we suggested agency habits develop an internal logic which often makes them impervious to normal external stimuli. The clear implication is that massive, prolonged, and highly visible stimuli may be required to break through a given agency's inertial conceptual barrier. Such being the case, the inertia and concommitant attempts at influence become widely recognized in the victim community, and may directly contribute to unfavorable sentiment oriented toward the agency.

Third, change, as we indicated, must be routed through identifiable operational channels. In normal times this is an irritating, but not necessarily crippling, requirement. However, in the uncertain disaster system the very existence of appeal channels is doubtful. The efficiency,

quality, or accessibility of those channels which do exist is dubious.

Further still, the channels which continue to function probably tend to overload the top agency officials. In the normal system hierarchies are designed to provide responsible decision making at the lowest practical levels, so that top management's attention is free. In the disaster context we find that overconformity, reticence, or actual disorganization of channels all tend to direct decision opportunities to the top of the organization. Given previously indicated limitations on authoritative decision making, the results of such a process may be truly dysfunctional.

Inter-Organizational Stress

The inter-organizational problems presented by the disaster situation are absolutely staggering. Competition is fierce, boundary warfare is constant, and opportunity for expansion fuels the entire clattering juggernaut. Couple with deficient coordination and lack of final authority, the post-disaster situation is grim.

Expansion: The agency operating in the disaster context has several dynamics working to encourage expansion and, simultaneously, has fewer constraints operating to limit its growth.

First, of course, the agency has extra resources to support expansion. Further, plans for expansion have a much better chance of being funded than is usually the case.

Second, the opportunities for prestige and power operate to reward expansion. This tendency is supported by the inclinations of climbers, who are attracted to a rapidly growing, visible agency. Third, the evident need for action tends to justify and rationalize expansion. Indeed, we cannot perjoratively label expansion since the hard facts are that someone must, indeed, expand to meet real needs.

The ambiguity of the situation aid expansion because agencies and allocators are willing, in uncertain, high demand situations, to err in favor of redundancy in provision of services. Fourth, expansion is not necessarily at the expense of other agencies. The phenomenon doesn't approximate encroachment so much as it does a "land rush". Competition: Inevitably, however, this expansion is going to lead to competition. Such is especially the case if no strong "lead" agency is present to authoritatively allocate functional responsibilities.

It is instructive to realize that just as an agency makes binding decisions regarding victim demands, so there is an analogous need for such a mediating function in the case of agency functional and allocational demands. The presence of an appropriate authority is critical, but as we shall see, not guaranteed.

The agency competition occurs at two levels. The first level, as we saw earlier , is allocational. The agencies are competing for present and future conditional money - where

the size of one's turf significantly determines one's share of the disaster fund pie. We recall that,"a critical characteristic of organization is the basis on which it obtains resources and authority from the community... both voluntarily supported and tax-supported agencies dealing with disaster are in a special position requiring them to secure public recognition of their services, if they are to be supported." [13]

There is also a functional rivalry. This results from the ambiguity of the disaster responsibilities, the tendency to expand, and the inclination to err in favor of redundancy. Of course, functional rivalry leads to a familiar concept - territoriality.

Territory: Territorial battles are particularly heated in the disaster context. This is because stakes are high, rules are ambiguous, risk is great but potential returns are even greater.

One of our key observations is that the disaster situation is not one of incremental shifts. Normally, there is a reasonably stable territorial pattern, with competition constrained to raids on marginal elements of an agency's mission. In the disaster context, there is no modus vivendi governing who controls what. Raids extend beyond the periphery into the very heartland of other agencies. Further, we may recall the superman/ shrinking violet dichotomy,[14] and suggest that the battle is quickly reduced to one between organizational

giants with superman tendencies.

A further wrinkle is added when we realize that territorial disputes are not only on the federal level, but also between government levels. Thus, subtle power struggles between federal, regional, state, sub-state, and local bodies (all with essentially similar missions) are evident in the large-scale disaster context.

Now, how are these problems mitigated and battles refereed? First, we'll consider internal problems, then we'll examine the inter-organizational ramifications of persistence.

Internal Adaptation

We suggest, first of all, that the counterproductive nature of the agency's internal array of coping devices initially becomes apparent in the form of performance gaps. How does an agency respond to a perceived performance gap? Well,[15]

1) The bureau can make no attempt to reduce the gap. This is likely to occur only when changing its behavior would greatly inconvenience the bureau's leaders, and when the bureau has its own resources, thereby being relatively immune to external pressures.

2) The bureau can conform to the opinions of external agents about how it "ought" to behave. This will usually occur whenever there is strong consensus among these agents, and the bureau is heavily dependent upon them for support.

3) The bureau can exert pressure upon the external agents to alter their picture of its "desired" behavior. This response implies that the bureau is very powerful relative to other agents in society.

4) The bureau can redefine its social functions so that they no longer include the particular actions the agents in its powersetting believe it should carry out.

5) The bureau can assert that the "desired" behavior really coincides with what it is already doing. This tactic is possible only when the bureau is very powerful relative to the other agents in its powersetting, or those agents have arrived at only a weak consensus regarding the desired changes.

It seems reasonable that in the disaster environment the second, fourth, and fifth alternatives will be the only real options. This being the case, how does the agency move to be more responsive to demans for change? Consider the second alternative, which involves the agency in internal structural and policy change.

Consolidation: Essentially, we identify two types of change - responsive and anticipatory. "Responsive change means a stimulus for change is received from either an internal or external source, and the organization responds accordingly."[16] Anticipatory change means that the agency perceives potential sources of stimulus for change before that stimulus impinges upon it. In brief, "it is the ability to act before the force becomes overt."[17]

Now, these two types of change are significant insofar as they determine different patterns of response. It is suggested that responsive changes are essentially consolidative, while anticipatory changes are innovative. "The essential difference between consolidative and

innovative behavior is that within the former setting, organization officials are almost exclusively preoccupied with finding solutions to manifest problems, whereas the latter pattern places a much greater emphasis on the active search and identification of the problems themselves, before they become overt expressions of internal or external demands."[18]

Given our preceding analysis, it seems reasonable to suggest that disaster-site change is probably consolidative, while post-disaster operations change, enlightened by assessment of past performance and oriented toward future contingencies, could be seen as anticipatory. We shall confine ourselves to a discussion of consolidation.

Consolidation may be expressed as an attempt to satisfy external or internal demand through either 1) re-ordering or revising existing, routinized programs and modes of operation, or 2) devising new programs or performance standards which clearly exist within the framework of existing organizational values, norms, and attitudes.[19]

In this vein, the essential expressions of consolidation are moderation, compromise, accomodation, and, possibly, reluctance. The intention is clearly to maintain, preserve, or reproduce the organization's basic patterns of behavior (pattern maintenance).

It seems that the strength of agency behavioral patterns will significantly affect the nature of the response. We must understand that choice of consolidative or anticipatory

modes is not conscious or planned; it is a function of the nature of the agency and its interaction with its environment. Thus, if we assume an agency response has, of necessity, elements of both modes in its response package, we may suggest that the degree of consolidative behavior exhibited in that mix may serve as a guide to the result of interaction between external demand and internal behavioral orientation. This reference should be kept in mind for later sections when we attempt to characterize agency disaster behaviors within a typological framework.

Responses to Inter-Organizational Stress

Not only does an agency face severe internal stress requiring integration and persistence; it also encounters uncertainty in its inter-organizational relations. As earlier noted, territoriality in the disaster site serves as an introduction to the exploration of the phenomena associated with inter-organizational instability.

Conflict; Our analysis of conflict is a subtle one. To this point we have considered each agency as a discrete organizational entity. In terms of client/agency behavior this is a fair approximation. However, in a larger perspective we may view all agencies as partners in a similar project - certainly partners at some abstract level.

Thus, while inter-organizational theory aids by contributing insights into competition, expansion, and territoriality; intra-organizational theory may help us to

consider discrete agencies as sub-sets of a larger total organization. This larger organization is not strictly bureaucratic, it is more a cooperative, consensual arrangment. Nevertheless, it is beset by many problems common to the single bureaucratic agency - i.e. lack of coordination, effective communication, goal consensus, etc. Let us pursue the question of conflict. Later we shall discuss the difficulties of coordination and the role of authority.

When dealing with large-scale, complex organizations, operating under stress in high demand disaster areas, we suggest that organizational conflict is virtually inevitable. This observation stem from the following observations:

1) There are conflicts based upon technical limitations, which may not involve disagreement, but merely the inability of any official to know what every other official is doing in relevant areas.[20]

2) Specialization leads to technical limitations of this sort. This is especially true in inter-organizational arrangments since appropriate information and communication channels across agency boundaries are probably non-existent or static-filled.

3) Information and decision making limitations tend to foster conflict. Administrators may have identical value and attitudinal patterns, but are exposed to different pieces of information.

4) Even if attitudes and information are similar, the ambiguity of the disaster situation is such that conflicting decisions may be made in spite of such basic similarities.

5) It is quite possible that the assumption of similarity in administrators' attitudes is not valid. Officials may differ in their perception of reality, their ability to accept risk, and so on. This may lead to conflict. It also means that more than technical limitations operate to foster conflict.

6) Different agencies are governed by different administrative and legislative guidelines. Insofar as these directives conflict, and depending upon how amenable they are to prompt readjustment, the possibility of unavoidable and "programmed" conflict is real.

7) It is possible that administrators will differ in their perceptions of the explicit or implicit goals of the recovery operation. We indicated a very real lack of goal consensus in our introduction. Insofar as the recovery philosophies of agency administrators vary, overt and covert conflict may appear.

8) Since each administrator is trained for and socialized in a different agency, the opportunity for and possibility of, divergence in their attitudes is quite high.

Coordination: It is problematical whether the power mandate for overall, coordinating activities will be respected if those agencies whose activities are being

> coordinated are unconvinced of the responsibility of the empowered coordinating agency.
>
> This quite naturally results in attempts on the part of each separate organization to magnify its own role and to scramble for superiority of position. The poorly defined power component in the disaster and post-disaster period has led to the facetious query "Who owns the disaster?" [21]

Coordination arises as an attempt to reduce levels of conflict and increase efficiency. Note that coordination is a minimizing alternative; some conflict is inevitable. At the outset, we may identify two broad approaches to coordination. The first involves granting authority to a single person or group; that authority empowered to make binding decisions. The second approach is to develop a council of equal members who decide by consensus (or majority rule, or chance). We shall examine this "committee coordination" and the hierarchical authority process in the following sub-section.

Harold Seidman has observed that "interagency committees are the crab grass in the garden of bureaucratic institutions... the quest for coordination is in many respects the twentieth century equivalent of the medieval search for the philosopher's stone." [22] Why is "rule by equals" so difficult to achieve?

There are conflicts within the body resulting from personal loyalty to the agency one represents. It is clear that the agencies, both formally and informally, attempt to

mold their members so that they adopt the agencies' perspectives as their own primary frame of reference. In times of conflict or uncertainty the agency identification serves to orient and support the individual. Along with this subtle dynamic is a second factor, identified by Downs as "self-serving loyalty", which states, "all officials exhibit relatively strong loyalty to the organization controlling their job security and promotion."[23]

Now, all of this indicates the basic failure of the coordinating group, which requires that all members adopt a supra-agency perspective. It seems clear that there is little incentive for an administrator to do so, when agency loyalty is more comfortable and gratifying.

The goal of coordination in a disaster site is mostly subjective - because of information deficiency, ambiguity, etc. Given the difficulty of reaching agreement in such a setting, since overwhelming argument for any alternative is difficult to develop, the challenge of coordination under stress conditions is much greater than ~~than~~ that evident during periods of business as usual.

Further, "the settling of conflicts by voting or council negotiation requires a great deal of time prior negotiation, prpearation, etc. , particularly if the organization is large and its members are physically scattered in the process of performing their tasks."[24] In a disaster site the availability of time is doubtful.

Finally, authority requires that decisions are binding. For decisions to be binding the participants in the council must accept the legitimacy of the council as a decision-making body. This implies that organizations will be inclined to modify their performance in line with the results of council deliberations. We have indicated numerous reasons why such modification may operate to the disadvantage of any given agency and why the members of the council are, in the final analysis, reluctant to place themselves in the hands of any inter-organizational group.

"It is not difficult for an administrator to conclude that cooperation with another agency, unless it is on his own terms, will threaten his autonomy and threaten the wisdom of his approach or program. We might even say that where the technology is not well developed... the basis for cooperation among agencies is most precarious. For each agency becomes wedded to its imperfect techniques, is the more defensive the more they are not demonstrably effective."[25]

The upshot of all this is that the dynamics of disaster operations tend to require a final decision-making authority with the ability to impose or require adherence to its rulings, if agency cooperation is to be maximized.

Authority in the Disaster Site

We may identify several ways in which conflict resolving authority is established. First, some agency may be designated as a "lead" agency with responsibility for

coordination and the authority to exact compliance. Note that responsibility alone is insufficent, since a "lead" agency must have a lever to enforce its rulings. This lever may be supplied if 1) the lead agency can develop contractual obligations with other agencies (such as OEP which farms out responsibilities, but retains final financial control and oversight); 2) if the agency is vastly more prestigious than those it is coordinating;[26] 3) if the lead agency is infused with legitimacy by being associated with a widely perceived authority figure (e.g. a "Presidential Envoy"); 4) if the lead agency is not one of the key actors in the daily operations and the competition. This is because the "greater the degree of similar goals and functions between the organization set and the focal lead organization, the greater the amount of competition between them, and hence the lower the degree of decision making autonomy of the focal lead organization";[27] 5) if the agency has been formally designated as the "lead" agency by Congress, which implies disapproval from the controllers of the purse strings if the wishes of the lead agency are ignored.

However, it must be noted that the further the authority figures are from the disaster site, the more diffuse the holders of final authority (Congress), and the more those authority holders are accessible to all agencies, the less compelling is the control exhibited by agencies which gain legitimacy from their sponsorship.

Victim/Agency Interaction - First Cut

At this point, we should have a sense of the nature of the disaster-impacted community. Similarly, we have realized the operational difficulties faced by any large recovery agency. The time has come to examine the dynamic relationship between the two as we turn to a view of the recovery process as a whole.

We may recall that several critical elements of our preceding analysis are important here. First, the disaster community generates demands and support for recovery aid. Second, the recovery agency makes final determinations on those measures to be taken to meet those demands and cultivate that support. Third, these relationships are looped; the actors influence each other.

Partisans and Authorities

In order to explicate the process we shall rely upon a concept of conversion postulated by William Gamson; that is, the interplay between "partisans" and "authorities". Some initial definitions are in order. First, "for any decision, there exists some group or individual whose acceptance or rejection of an alternative is binding. The authorities are those who, for any given social system, make binding decisions in that system."[28] Of course, these authorities are our familiar recovery agencies.

Second, we have "potential partisans", which may be

defined as "that set of actors who, for any given decision, are affected by the outcome in some 'significant' way."[29] For the moment, we may identify disaster victims, and the members of the whole community, as partisans.

Usually, potential partisans become active in attempting to influence authorities when they are organized as a "solidary" group. A solidary group is one in which all of the members are united in pursuit of a goal which satisfies a common demand held by all group members. " They are a collection of individuals who think in terms of the effect of political decisions on the aggregate and feel that they are in some way personally affected by what happens to the aggregate."[30] (e.g. Wyoming Valley had a Flood Victims Action Council, which appeared spontaneously and claimed to speak for all flood victims.) We shall find that the characteristics of the therapeutic community correspond almost exactly with the requirements for group solidarity, which is what gives the partisan/authority model its analytic power for our purposes.

What factors promote solidary groups?

1) "Symbolic expression of the group as a collectivity.

The existence of a name or slogan as a focus for loyalty and identification will enhance solidarity."[31] In this vein we note that the slogan "Valley With a Heart, Coming Back Better Than Ever" was prominently displayed throughout the Agnes disaster area within a matter of days after the

cessation of flooding. The slogan was omnipresent (although the originator is unknown)and served as a strong reminder of the group nature of the disaster experience.

2) "Treatment as a group by others. When members are treated by others as part of the same group and when others view them as being affected in a common way by political decisions, then solidarity will be promoted."[32] Two dynamics operate to maintain this sense of commonality. The first is that examined earlier as the "therapeutic community" and is socio-cultural. The second is a function of the impersonal, formal and routine behavior of recovery agencies which, again, serve to impress the victims with their commonality and group membership. It is ironic that the very agency behaviors which partisans protest are responsible, in part, for the solidarity of the group.

3) "A common style of life, norms, and values. When members-share a common sub-culture, solidarity will be enhanced."[33] This is intriguing, since it invests with new meaning our analysis of the disaster agent and the physical pattern of damage. We might suggest that there is more commonality within rather than between neighborhoods, within rather than between larger communities, etc. Thus a localized disaster event, such as a flood which affects entire neighborhoods, invokes more sense of commonality than, say, a tirnado which may cut through different geographical and social/cultural sections of a single city.

A further observation is that the more isolated or homogenous the community the more solidarity is exhibited by the emrging partisan groups. We might note that "in an isolated community where all workers share the same culture and interact primarily with one another, discontent is likely to become defined in a common fashion."[34]

4) "A high rate of interaction ... When they have a significantly greater amount of social interaction with each other than with non-members, solidarity will be enhanced."[35] Again, the nature of the disaster event will determine the spatial distribution of the victims, which determines interaction ratios between victims and non-victims. Further, the population density of the site helps determine the victim/non-victim interaction. We have already seen that the nature of the disaster experience encourages high interaction rates, even beyond such physical/geographical considerations.

In short, the disaster event provides fertile ground for the formation of solidary groups. "Anthony Wallace has likened this swelling solidarity feeling to the revitalization movements 'which as it institutionalizes, frequently effects massive reforms...Charismatic leaders may function in such movements!"[36] An interplay of these factors leads to the development of attempts at victim influence which may be exhibited in any given disaster situation.

Trust

The partisan group is political, with a small "p". It

is primarily oriented toward the outputs of the authority system, and tailors its demands and support according to its evaluation of the fairness and effectiveness of the allocation of those outputs. Note, that the partisan evaluation is subjective - it is a shared perception of effectiveness, not a comparison to any objective standard, which determines the degree of success the group recognizes.

This evaluation of success leads to the development of trust, or opposite feelings. Further, since victim partisans are already inclined toward hostility, the generation of trust is particularly difficult in the disaster situation. Further still, we must realize that such subjective issues as fairness and efficiency are "difficult to disentangle since most groups have a very strong tendency to rationalize their own interests as public interests."[37]

Given all of the above, how does the recovery agency handle "lack of trust" which may be translated into discontent, distrust, dissatisfaction, disaffection, and alienation?[38]

Management of Disafection

We may posit a basic distinction in the nature of authority response to overt dissatisfaction; either the agency may modify its outputs in some way or it may exert influence to control or manage the potential partisans themselves. It is interesting to note that this dichotomy is very similar to the range of options which an agency

can exercise if faced with performance gaps. When we noted that range we spent a good deal of effort examining the dynamics behind attempting to change output. It is now appropriate to consider the second alternative, management of the attitudes and expectations of partisans. We may consider this topic as embracing persuasion and symbolic action. Several techniques are evident.

First, an agency may attempt to manage partisans by withholding information which would tend to elicit strong negative reactions from the victim group. In a similar vein much news is managed so that it creates as favorable an impression as possible, occasionally through the withholding of qualifications or doubts attached to that infomation. (To this end we observe that agencies sometimes took money which was already committed to the area, labeled it disaster aid, and publicized it, with no small amount of hoopla, as proof of agency concern and success.)

Second, authorities may be surrounded with the trappings of omniscience.[39] If the authority is, or appears to be, prepared, informed, prestigious, and privy to even higher authorities, partisan groups may hesitate to challenge him. (One Wyoming Valley resident spoke of the victims worshipping at the "Carlucci Shrine". She did not rate the agencies highly.)

Third, an opposite technique is found in the attempt to humanize authorities, leading the victims to identify and cooperate with them. Thus, minimization of social

distance enhances feelings of trust, which reduces the motivation to exert influence.

Fourth, the authority may pursue a program of incremental conciliation, in which partisan group demands are diffused just before they reach critical proportions. The group leaders may be offered concessions; some changes may be made. The point is that crisis will be avoided.

Fifth, the authorities may be transferred quickly so that personal contacts and familiarity between partisans and authority figures must constantly be reestablished, wasting the valuable (because limited) resources of the partisan group. This minimizes focused attempts at influence, but may generate even more "free-floating" hostility.

Sixth, some authorities may act as "lightning rods", diverting attempts at influence and hostility toward themselves. The actual effectiveness of such an official at converting diverted demands into outputs is problemmatic, but the very existence of himself as a target tends to reduce the group frustration. (One official spoke of HUD Secretary George Romney's visit to Wyoming Valley as being akin to a sheep walking through a shearing pen.)

Most of the preceding have dealt with responses to active attempts at influence, or at least imminent attempts. However, a good deal of importance should be attached to the attitudes of the whole community - regardless of degree of activism. Thus, we turn to the use of symbolic acts, which

are performed for all elements of the disaster community.

Symbolic Action

We recall that the primary job of the recovery agency is the conversion of needs into outputs. We recall further that recovery agencies face stress, inevitably. Now, how can the agency best minimize the incidence of discontent and disatisfaction? Several overviews follow: 1) we have already discussed active control, we are now concerned with a more subtle, yet more pervasive phenomena; 2) we shall see that the relationship between objective performance and subjective evaluation is weak, hence discontent exists regardless of actual productivity; 3) no value judgement is being made at this point. We must understand the method of control before we judge its specific applications.

At the outset we agree that the substance of public attitudes is a critical element in recovery processes. Further, we must observe that such attitudes are unstable and uncertain. Edelman has noted that, "We have compelling evidence from a variety of kinds of observations that political beliefs, demands, and attitudes, far from being fixed and stable, are frequently sporadic in appearance, fluctuating in intensity, ambivalent in composition, and therefore, logically inconsistent in pattern and structure."[40]

What we must know is - 1) what is the role of government activity in forming such attitudes; 2) what prescriptive suggestions can be made to improve government

performance; 3) what are the implications to be drawn from our disaster discussion for the preceding?

Government as Symbolic Actor : We may observe that: "Governments affects behavior chiefly by shaping the cognitions of large numbers of people in ambiguous situations. It helps create their beliefs about what is proper; their perceptions of what is fact; and their expectations of what is to come. In the shaping of expectations of the future the cues from government often encounter few qualifying or competing cues from other sources; and this function of political activity is therefore an especially potent influence upon behavior."[41]

Further, we must realize that not only can the government shape behavior, it is also the only political body which can evoke a fairly confident sense of trust and expectation. Further still, it is virtually impossible for the government to avoid the behavior-shaping ramifications of the exercise of authority.

Now, how does the government generate such popular perceptions and attitudes? That is, which political cues convey or re-enforce which meanings in mass publics?[42] We may identify two broad areas in which government influence is important - 1) the perception of popular participation and influence in policy decisions, 2) the perception, by the public, of the officials' ability to cope. Consider each in turn.

Popular Influence : The following governmental actions or

rhetoric help assure public that there is popular participation in decision making:[43]

1) Voting - while most attention is centered on the outcome, the act of voting, per se, helps to shape and stregthen one's belief in participation.

2) Hortatory Language - urging people to take positions and become involved implies that some influence will naturally follow.

3) Publicized Consultation - In a fluid system in which voting, structured argument, etc. are inappropriate, the highly publicized ritual of consultation with representatives of partisan and special interest groups serves a useful function.

4) Public admission of incorrectness, deficiency, etc. in an area which was the focus of discontent, regardless of substantive nature, fortifies the sense that public attention is influential.

5) Change associated with the above, such as replacement of personnel, institution of new procedures, etc.(again regardless of substantive nature) serves the goal of increasing public confidence that its voice will be heard.

6) Change not the result of mass influence (such as the sudden availability of extra resources for reasons unrelated to the disaster event), which corresponds to public requests, increases public confidence in its exercise of influence.

Ability to Cope:[44] If the political leader can attack a personified enemy he can rally people who are anxious and uncertain. Lacking a person (as in natural disaster) he can try to attack vague, abstract, but commonly understood forces - such as politics, incompetence, etc. Naturally, this is a delicate job since the official is essentially attacking himself or an associate, and the official may himself be the target of similar attacks (which negates the value of his attack as a management technique).
Essentially this strategy would be pursued by an official whose agency's success is unquestionable , or who is in an official ombudsman role (where he is within, but not a part of, the government system).

Rhetorical skill, style, and proficiency , regardless of content, may be quite effective in comforting publics. This is especially true if the content of the communication is sufficiently bland that alarming implications cannot be drawn from its message.

Well-publicized acts of decisiveness, effectiveness, honesty, compassion, may be effective. This is especially true if the content of the act is limited, since the substance will not cause disagreement and the act, as such, will be highlighted.

While considering the acts cited above, it will be helpful to contemplate the conditions which provide the most fertile ground for the successful manipulation of

expectations by the political actor.[45] Briefly, these are:

1) If there is difficulty or inability to empirically examine a source of anxiety, mostly because the situation is unclear or the anxiety is oriented toward the future, them manipulation may be successful.

2) If there is an avid search for information to resolve uncertainty, coupled with rumor and high interaction rates within the victim public, symbolic action will offer potential for success.

3) If there is "conspicuous, publicized, government action which either explicitly asserts or clearly implies a factual state of affairs that does resolve the uncertainty"[46] it may bear symbolic advantages. Size and evidence of massive presence may contribute to this condition.

Since these factors are all common to the disaster situation, we would do well to consider:

Disaster Implications : We may recall that the disaster context is typified by ambiguity. Recall further, that it is ambiguity and fear of uncertainty which elicits strong attitude-modifying authoritarian cues.

Thus, "political activity and formally proclaimed policy...amount to authoritative signals and assurances, in amgiguous and anxiety-producing situations, that particular group interests victims will be taken into account; or, alternatively, that they will be ignored or suppressed."[47]

Further, we must realize that disatisfaction is not necessarily related to loss. Indeed, "...deprivation alone is inadequate to account for most motivated behavior...much greater weight must be given to anticipations of the goal than merely to the duration or magnitude of deprivation, per se."[48] Still further, we must realize that not only may need be of minimal impact, but also the quality or quantity of what is received. It is suggested that government activity not only allocates resources, but also subtly influences the feelings of satisfaction or disatisfaction, regardless of the objective value of the aid. The upshot is that oversell is a very basic error. Consider Red Cross:

> It is probably very difficult to achieve a rational allocation of limited resources for long-term rehabilitation and at the same time use the symbolic language of uninhibited generosity demanded by the suffering community. Moore suggests that unrealistic expectations of abundance play a part:
>
> > Perhaps the Red Cross has oversold itself as a disaster relief agency...Through this effort to imprint on the public mind that 'when disaster strikes, Red Cross is there,' the idea is perhaps created that Red Cross will repair all damage and heal all wounds, no matter how great the disaster. Such expectations can lead only to frustration.[49]

Policy Implications: Several implications from the preceding may be drawn, which are of specific interest to the disaster operations practitioner.

1) "Political arousal and violence among populations perceiving themselves as deprived or threatened are inevitable

unless public policy or unambiguous events cue people either (a) to see their deprived status as inevitable or desirable; or (b) to perceive a closing of the gap between expectations and actual conditions."[50] Insofar as government actions help to create the gap between expectation and actual status by fostering excessive hope, the first priority of an agency should be to maximize confidence and legitimacy and to minimize expectation.

2) The tension of the mass group may be discharged by catharsis. Lasswell has noted (in a pseudo-Machiavellian tone): "The ruler (President Nixon at this writing) is wise to attend to the disasters of the community, and to signify his prompt and earnest sympathy to the survivors. Whether quake, flood, hurricane, drought, or pestilence, the resulting insecurities are potentially dangerous to the social order. Hence, the canker of resentment must not be permitted to thrive in lonely sadness. Gestures of condolence plus bread are far more potent than bread alone."[51]

3) The encouragement of organization within the community may structure disatisfaction and tends to facilitate cooptation rather than violent conflict. However, continued attack, symbolic and real, offers genuine possibilities for escalation.

Second Thoughts: While the first option, above, seems reasonable, it is necessary to qualify the last two. The expression of concern is important, but it is not sufficient.

Similarly, cooptation is sadly dysfunctional in the long run, since it deprives the recovery agencies of the valuable input which the community alone may make to recovery planning. The wisest course, therefore, would be intended to capitalize on real initiatives rather than to produce bogus public relations gestures. There is a not very subtle distinction between the two approaches.

Victim/Agency Interaction - Second Cut

At this point it seems reasonable to substantiate our analysis of the community/agency interaction by referring to the results of the survey of Agnes flood victims (which is described in detail in the appendix, pp. A-1). Some truly fascinating insights may be gained from this approach.

Community Attitudes

We may divide the attitudinal questions into three groups - 1) articulation of feelings about recovery goals (how extensive, in concrete and abstract ~~a~~ terms, is the federal responsibility), 2) perception of agency program administration (what problems did the victims sense as pertinent to the provision of recovery services), 3) what general attitudes do the victims hold toward the agencies (i.e. their sincerity, competence, trustworthiness,etc). The sections become progressively more complex and interesting, so we'll start with the easiest of the three.

Recovery Philosophy: In response to the comment "Flood victims have a right to free emergency housing", 92.7% agreed, 3.6% were uncertain, and 3.6% disagreed. This response suggests an overwhelming sense in the victim community that federal initiative in this area is necessary. However, in response to the comment "The federal government should have forgiven all of the SBA loans (that is, the full amount)", only 53.7% agreed, 12.2% were uncertain, and 34.2% disagreed. This suggests that within the victim group there

is a range of sentiment about the optimal extent of federal assistance, with members setting ceilings to mark appropriate limits on government involvement. Indeed, of those indicating "strong agreement" with the "housing" question, 70% favored full forgiveness. Of those who "agreed" only 32% favored forgiveness. Since this means that most people in favor of full forgiveness were the most extremely positive on free housing, the remaining variable range of sentiment about federal involvement is further demonstrated.

Further, this suggests that as one moves from immediate shared concerns (housing) to long-range, more private, concerns (refinancing) the expectations for federal activity drop off sharply.

There are some other interesting features to these responses. First, the actual amount of damage suffered, the respondent's income, the respondent's occupation, his area of residence - none of these "objective" variables correllated to his response on the broader philosophical questions. Rather, it seemed most related to the depression felt at the time.

This indicates that expectation of full federal support is <u>not</u> related to objective financial considerations, but rather to a subjective response to the event, per se. This seems to bear out ~~out~~ the intuition that the "altruism" generated by the community tends to override more objective considerations, such as loss and financial condition prior to the impact.

Agency Administration : All of the following comments bear on assessments of agency administrative performance:

	strongly agree	agree	uncertain	disagree	strongly disagree
9) Many officials acted in an insensitive or high-handed manner.	12.7	27.7	16.9	36.1	6.6
13) The people I talked to at Federal agencies really wanted to help me.	19.5	57.8	11.0	7.8	3.9
14) Federal officials had their hands tied by higher-up officials in the government.	12.2	36.6	32.3	14.6	4.3
7) People who claimed about being mistreated were really in the minority.	13.8	45.5	13.8	19.8	7.2
18) Instead of pulling together as a team, many officials caused confusion and delay by political bickering among themselves.	22.3	42.2	15.7	15.7	4.2

What do we see here?

1) The federal agencies got the best score (77.3% favorable) on the question about "really wanting to help). This seems to discount surliness or lack of consideration as a significant cause of bad feeling within the victim community.

2) Next, the feds do reasonably well on "mistreated were in the minority", which, again, seems to indicate that victims didn't feel that overt mistreatment was rampant.

3) On the comment, "officials acted in an insensitive

or high-handed manner" the sentiment is evenly split - 40.4% agree and 42.7% disagree. Now consider the importance of this. In question 13 the victims agreed that personnel were trying to help them; in question 7 they acknowledged that mistreatment was not widespread. Yet here they evenly split on the question of insensitivity. This would seem thoroughly inconsistent if we not already aware of the vague, but real, hostility which was predicted. Although mistreatment was rare, in spite of a feeling of "good faith" on the part of individual workers, the poor assessment of federal concern persists.

4) The next two questions may help to clarify the matter. On comment 14, "hands tied by higher-ups), 48.8% of the respondents agreed and only 18.4% disagreed. This seems to be a reaction against legislated inflexibility, formal rules, routine, etc. I suggest that these factors weigh heavily against the federal operation in spite of positive victim feelings about the personnel's concern for them. This sense is heightened when we realize that 64.5% of the victims sampled felt that that confusion and delay were caused by political bickering among officials (comment 18). I suggest that this is a clear reflection of the victim perception of both Political and political (inter-agency) conflicts.

On balance, we see that a generally unfavorable position in relation to agencies and agency officials was maintained by

a sizeable share of the victims. This seems to fit nicely with our previous discussions of "bureaucracy meets therapeutic community".

Now, are there any significant relations between these variables. When we lok at the matrix below we find something very interesting. There are strong correllations between comments 9, 13, 14, and 18 - which, of course, are the four questions identifying general agency failure due to bickering or inflexibility.

	9	13	14	18
9	1	.24	.38	.34
13	.24	1		.13
14	.38		1	.20
18	.34	.13	.20	1

Matrix of tau* values. 1.0 is perfect.

In short, these views seem to come as a package which comprises the general attitude "set" which was predicted earlier in this section.

The final comment, "mistreated were minority" varies inversely with "insensitivity" (tau is -.33). This demonstrates that the more one perceived mistreated people, the more one felt that agencies were insensitive. This is probably the way client/employee conflict affected overall perception, but it must be realized that so few people actually agreed that there was mistreatment , that the

* Tau values measure the strength of variable correlations. They run from 0 to 1.0 . The closer the tau value is to 1, the stronger is the correlation. In the above survey, .3 is good and .5 is exceptional.

significance of the variable in strongly affecting perception of agency performance is doubtful. What the correllation does demonstrate is that a ~~high~~ high interaction rate and personal contact with dissidents leads to a sharing of the dissidents' point of view. This was predicted, and is an important insight.

General Attitudes: This section contains the really fascinating comments - on trust, satisfaction, agency competence, and expectations. It will be seen that these attitudes were most significant in relating to all other responses. Further, these questions go to the heart of our earlier discussion of discontent, partisans and authorities, and symbolic manipulation.

Trust: Comment 12 stated, "You really can't trust the government to do what's best". Of the respondents, 29.3% agreed, 25.0% were unsure, and 45.7% disagreed. That means that over half the sampled victims were unable to answer that they trusted the government, and almost 1/3 stated definitely that they did not trust the government. Now, what kind of relation is there between trust and other attitudes?

There are two ranges - strong correllation, and weak correllation. Let's consider each in turn.

Trust and strong correllates: The strongest correllation is between trust and "hands tied" (14). This is followed by "level of satisfaction" (8), "botched job" (15), "political bickering" (18), "politics not important" (16), "promised more than they gave" (6), and "insensitivity" (9).

Of course, 14 and 18 are part of the"bureaucracy package" we identified earlier. (The tau significance measures appear below).

14	8	15	18	16	6	9	
.35	-.41	.43	.35	-.28	.43	.39	12 (trust)

The response to#6 seems to reflect a reaction to a sense of "broken" promises. This clearly shows that failure to deliver on the original "hype" comes home to roost as distrust.

The response to#8 indicates a strong relation between "satisfaction" and "trust". It will be recalled that these concepts were synonymous in our partisan v. authority discussion. The correllation supports that argument.

The response to#15 shows that there is a clear relationship between assessments of "competence" and sense of "trust". Of course, this fuels our argument that victim attitudes on agency performance are not the functions of the objective efficiency or productivity of the agency. Rather, the evaluations are subjective - strongly influenced by the sense of trust.

The response to #16 indicates that the sense that "politics" is involved seriously undermines the community trust. This seems a reasonable finding when we recognize that the therapeutic community is "apolitical" compared to the normally functioning pluralist community. Thus, evident political considerations violate the consensus and detract

from trusting feelings.

Now, the strongest of the factors discussed are, in order, a) bickering (18), b) botched job (15), c) hands tied (14), d) expectation (6), e) insensitivity (9), and f) politics (16). The unfavorable responses on these, respectively, were 64.5%, 61,0%, 48.8%, 42.4%, 40.4%, and 38.8%. It seems abundantly clear that a great deal of the sampled victims' disenchantment can be traced back to the interplay of these factors.

Trust and Weak Correllates: The following six variables correllated most weakly with the trust dimension. In order, they are a) mistreated a minority (7), b) SBA forgiveness (11), c) HUD politics (5), d) depression (10), e) wanted to help (13), f) local officials (17). This is really interesting for several reasons. (See tau listing below).

7	11	5	10	13	17	
-.28	.28	.25	.23	-.20	-.15	12(trust)

Comment #10 clearly indicates that depression, with little variance, is not a primary cause of distrust. That is, the agencies aren't lambasted just because people are generally out of sorts. This observation supports our argument that subtler dynamics are at work.

Comment #17 seems to indicate that in a large disaster local officials aren't even really considered "government", but become more a part of the broadly construed insider community.

Numbers 5 and 11 are interesting because they seem to indicate that the sense of distrust is not a function of the actions of any particular agency. 53.7% of the people thought SBA should do more, and 36% thought politics influenced HUD policy (another 28.7% were uncertain). It seems off, then, that these two unfavorable views of high profile organizations were the least strongly correllated variables. This would seem to support our argument that trust and victims' perceptions are pervasive, but general, and are not focused on or caused by any one agency. One will recall that we earlier indicated that,when agency met victim community, objective performance was not relevant to the creation of victim attitudes. It would seem that this has been born out.

Competence: Again we will define three broad ranges - very strong, strong, and weak. We shall find more evidence to support our earlier comments. All of the following variables were related to #15 (agencies botched up job) to see which attitudes most closely related to attitudes about competence.

Competence and Strong Correllates: You may recall that earlier in this chapter we discovered a "bureaucracy package" of #'s 14, 18, and 9 - which were all inter-related. These three variables are at the top of the list when we consider competence. With them in the strong correllation category are trust (#12), satisfaction (#8), and expectation (#6). (tau's on next page)

14	18	9	12	8	6	
.43	.41	.43	.43	-.43	.43	15 (competence)

It is increasingly clear that the levels of trust, satisfaction, expectation, and competence are the four most critical variables for determining all other responses. When we consider that expectation creates demand; trust creates a sense that demand will be met; competence measures the output; and satisfaction reflects how closely output comes to demand, we can understand why these four variables essentially summarize any individual's set of agency-oriented attitudes.

Strong Correllates: In this category we find politics (#16), and HUD politics (#5). This certainly makes sense since "politics" is often short-hand for rivalry, inertia, conflict, etc. - all of which decrease the subjective evaluation of competence. Of course, it is interesting to

16	5	
.36	.36	15(competence)

note that comment on HUD politics relates to competence, where it didn't relate to trust. This leads one to suspect that perception of competence in the federal agencies is more agency-specific than perception of trustworthiness. We will see if this bears out in a later sub-chapter which will relate attitudes and the ranking of agency performance.

Competence and Weak Correllation: In this category we find the remaining comments. It is interesting to note that, once again, depression has little relation to evaluation of competence. Similarly, the individual employees (#13), and local officials (#17) are not critical in determining the victims' attitudes about agency competence.

10	13	17	
.29	-.18	-.10	15 (competence)

Expectation: We have suggested that expectation is a major force behind discontent and the key variable in symbolic manipulation. Let's see how it affects other attitudes. (This will be #6 versus all others.) This time we have four ranges - our former three, plus one truly exceptionally high correllation.

Exceptional Correllation: Expectation (#6) relates to satisfaction (#8) with the strongest correllation to emerge from all of the findings (tau = -.47) and clearly indicates that expectation is the prime force behind satisfaction. Consider the meaning of this finding. We learned that expectation is the key element of partisan/ authority hostility and the critical element of symbolic manipulation. We also showed earlier that subjective factors (like relative deprivation) and not objective facotrs (like amount of loss, or annual income) were the primary force supporting the sentiments and attitudes of the therapeutic community. This finding brings all of those observations home

with a vengeance. In a later section, we shall find expectation identified as one of the four critical variables in a typological model of agency performances.

Very Strong Correllation: Once again the "bureaucratic package" (#9, #14, #7) strongly correllates with expectation.

9	14	7	12	15	
.42	.47	-.34	.43	.43	6 (expectation)

This would seem to demonstrate the subjective bias that we stated plays such an important role in the evaluation of agency performance. The other two strong correllates are, predictably at this point, trust (#12) and competence (#15).

Strong Correllation: Following closely behind the preceding are politics (#16), wanting to help (#13), bickering (#18), and HUD politics (#5). This seems reasonable when we consider that #13 helpedto raise expectations,

16	13	18	5	
-.30	-.28	.24	.28	6 (expectation)

#16 and #5 simultaneously raised and frustrated expectation, and #18 clearly could be viewed as an obstacle to the attainment of promised ends.

Weak Correllates: Once again, we find philosophical questions (#11 - SBA, and #4 - housing) having little

11	4	17	10	
.23	.24	-.05	.25	6 (expectation)

impact on expectation, although this is the one major attitude in which some influence is detected. Further, the impact of local officials (#17) and depression (#10) is absolutely[e/] minimal.

We may summarize the key findings in the matrix below. #6,12 and 15 define three critical attitudes - trust, expectation and confidence. You see their correllation in the upper left. #9,14, and 18 define the bureaucratic "set" - insensitivity, hands tied, bickering. They are correllated in the lower right. The attitudes and the "set" are correllated in the upper right. In the middle is #8, satisfaction, which is correllated with attitudes. If you peruse the larger matrix on the next page you will see that all of the most significant correllations in it are accounted for by the interaction of the seven variables listed here.

	6	12	15	8	9	14	18
6	1	.43	.43	-.47	.42	.47	.24
12		1	.43	-.41	.39	.35	.35
15			1	-.43	.43	.43	.41
9				1	.38	.34	
14					1	.20	
18						1	

Tau Values for Attitude Questions (#4 to #18)

	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
4	1		.24		-.20			.40	.20			.12			
5		1	.28						.25			.36	-.36		
6	.24	.28	1	-.34	-.47	.42	.25	.28	.43	-.28	.47	.43	-.30	-.05	.24
7			-.34	1		-.33			-.28			-.20			
8	-.20		-.47		1		-.12		-.41			-.43			
9			.42	-.33		1			.39	-.24	.38	.43			
10			.25		-.12		1	.34	.23			.29			
11	.40		.28				.34	1	.28			.18			
12	.20	.25	.43	-.28	-.41	.39	.23	.28	1	-.20	.35	.43	-.28	-.15	.35
13			-.28			-.24			-.20	1		-.18			-.13
14			.47			.38			.35		1	.43			.20
15	.12	.36	.43	-.20	-.43	.43	.29	.18	.43	-.18	.43	1	-.36	-.10	.41
16		.36	-.30						-.28			-.36	1		-.27
17			-.05						-.15			-.10		1	
18			.24			.34			.35	-.13	.20	.41	-.27		1

This sums up our findings on the interrelationships between attitudes. The key variables are expectation, trust, satisfaction, and judgement as to agency competence. Several other elegant findings follow:

Therapeutic Community: Variable #66 reflects whether the respondent lived in Wilkes-Barre (home of most federal agencies, by far the largest urban area), Kingston (which as a totally demolished affluent suburb on the other side of the river), or Forty-Fort (middle range income area a few miles upriver from Kingston). It was thought that expectations, trust, satisfaction, or competence might vary by political and geographical boundary. Such was not the case. A glance

6	12	8	15	
.04	.02	.02	.11	66 (residence)

at the correllations will show that no relation exists between residence and attitudes. This clearly demonstrates that the areas were bound together, subject to the same influences, and exhibited the same attitudes. This may serve to demonstrate the strength and breadth of the influence of the therapeutic community.

To double-check this I related place of residence to loss. The range of loss for each commuity was the same as the range of value of pre-disaster housing located in each community, so the sample seems valid in this use.

Loss	Area (Sections of Disaster Site) Forty-Fort	Wilkes-Barre	Kingston
0 - 10,500	25%	25.2%	20.4%
10,500 - 21,000	50%	27.8%	26.5%
21,000 - up	25%	47.0%	53.1%

A random survey of pre-flood property value would yield substantially similar figures, which tends to validate the randomness of the survey sample responding.

Indeed, to pursue this, we find that years as resident, age, marital status, occupation, had no relation to one's attitudinal set. This again demonstrates how total the "therapeutic" experience is.

Even further, the attitudes of victims and non-victims (who were located at the edge of the disaster site) were virtually the same, with no significant or patterned variation between the two. This clearly shows the totality of the encompassing nature of the "altruistic" and subjective dynamic, and well as the efficacy of victim/non-victim interaction as a source of attitudes.

Objective versus Subjective

There was no relation between amount of loss (#48), aid received (#51), or annual income (#67). This seems

48	51	67	
.01	.06	.03	6 (expectation)
-.03	.04	.01	12 (trust)
.05	-.009	.007	15 (competence

clearly to indicate that objective facts are of minimal importance in the formation of attitudes in the disaster site. From our earlier discussion we suggest this is as expected.

Federal versus Local: It is clear that the victims thought "federal" when they read "government" of "official". The relationship between evaluation of local officials and genral attitudes is virtually nil.

6	12	15	
-.05	-.15	-.10	17(local officials)

This set up a curious inside/outside distinction which was to be expected.

Victims Rate Specific Agencies

Thus far we have dealt with the forces which shape generalized community attitudes. Now we turn to how these attitudes focus on and affect individual agencies. In a later Section we shall do this systematically and rigorously as a set of testable predictions. Right now we can take one agency, HUD, and show the interplay of these factors in more detail. After that, I wish to introduce another view of the objective/subjective dichotomy.

HUD : We have chosen HUD because it was the federal agency with the highest profile in the disaster area. It was subject to urgent and strong demands, and demonstrated

both flexibility (e.g. set an all-time record by housing 25,000 displaced families in a few weeks) and rigidity (e.g. problems with paperwork, distribution,political bickering, etc.) Now, what we have is:

1) The following flood victim sample responses:

	HUD	Average (all agencies)
very disappointing :	14.4%	7.67%
disappointing :	17.5%	10.38%
uncertain :	13.1%	28.38%
impressive :	41.3%	29.43%
very impressive :	13.8%	24.42%

2) A clearly strong record of objective performance on the part of HUD officials.

3) The victim responses on general attitude questions.

Let's see how these attitudes (trust, expectation, incompetence) affected victim perception of HUD's record.

Trust: We find that 77% of those who strongly felt the government was untrustworthy were very disappointed with HUD's performance. Of those who only agreed that one couldn't trust the government, over half were impressed by HUD and only 35.5% were disappointed. Similarly, of all those who were very disappointed by HUD, 78.2% did not indicate trust in government.

It seems clear that those who very strongly disliked HUD were the same people who felt no sense of trust in "government", per se. We have already learned that the trust

function goes way beyond any single agency's performance. Perhaps now we realize why HUD could be maligned in spite of an exceptional objective performance. (It is worth adding that the correllation also works in the other direction; that is, 78.2% of those impressed by HUD indicated trust in the government.)

Expectation: Our results are almost identical for this variable. 82.6% of those very disappointed by HUD felt the government had reneged on its promises, in spite of the performance of HUD in housing every victim. We are confounded when we realize there is no patterned relation between committment to free housing (#4) and assessment of HUD(#19). Indeed, the breakdown is:

Of those very disappointed by HUD	78.3%	strongly agree with free housing.
Of those disappointed by HUD	55.2%	strongly agree with free housing.
Of those uncertain about HUD	55.0%	strongly agree with free housing.
Of those impressed by HUD	57.6%	strongly agree with free housing.
Of those very impressed by HUD	52.2%	strongly agree with free housing.

Thus it appears that one's feelings about housing are not reflected in one's assessment of HUD. But, this is HUD's mission. It is apparent that trust, expectation, etc. are more important in determining attitudes.

Bureaucracy: We find that 83.3% of those very disappointed in HUD felt it didn't really want to help them. Indeed, this variable correllates more strongly than othersto performance assessment (tau = .32). Further, even of those very impressed by HUD, only 23.8% strongly agree that personnel wanted to help them. Recall our earlier discussion of formality, professionalism, etc. This seems to bear out our prediction.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that people didn't really see this non-cooperativeness as a result of restrictive rules. Only 30.4% of those very disappointed strongly agreed that officials hands were tied. Even further, the people do blame HUD for being too political; of those strongly disappointed, only 17.4% felt politics did not figure in trailer distribution.

Finally, one must realize that even those impressed by HUD were willing to indict the federal effort. Of those impressed by HUD, only 26.2% disagreed that the recovery effort had been "botched up". This certainly leads one to suspect that forces other than objective performance shape people's attitudes.

Inter-Agency Dependency: The discussion which follows is very important because it demonstrates the compelling strength of peoples' tendency to generalize their perceptions. The second strongest correllation in the entire survey (tau = .53) was between attitudes toward HUD

and attitudes toward SBA; this in spite of the fact that their functions were different and the agencies were often in disagreement. However, since these two agencies operated in very similar styles (they are in the same cell in our typology, next Section) this might be expected. Thus we turn to HUD v. DOT, two agencies that had virtually nothing in common, programatically.

What we find is a reasonably strong correllation (tau = .23) in peoples' attitudes toward these agencies. I submit that the fact they are both Cabinet level agencies is the deciding factor.

To test this, relate HUD to the Red Cross. Red Cross was as visible as HUD, but non-governmental and exhibiting a different operational style. One would expect a negative correllation (i.e. if you liked one you wouldn't like the other) or a strong positive correllation (i.e. you like them all or you don't like any of them). Neither is the case; although complicated by the lack of variance in the Red Cross item, we find there is no discernable pattern in how the two agencies were judged (tau = .026). This leads on to suspect that the criteria for judging performance are different for government and non-government agencies. This strongly hints at the insider/outsider dichotomy to which we have referred so often.

Objective v. Subjective: A particularly fascinating insight was gained when the agencies were ranked two different ways and then compared. There were two ranking questions in the

survey. One question specifically said, "For each agency below, give it a ranking on how important you thought it was to the recovery effort (give the most important agency a "1", the second most important a "2", etc.)" The other question asked the repondent to "rate each agency on a scale of 1 to 5 (very disappointing to very impressive) on its effectiveness."

Now by ranking the agencies according to mean ratings one can derive a ranked list from the second question. The first question generates a ranked list (either list agencies by the percentage of "1's" received out of all ranks given it, or by percentage of "1's" received out of all "1's" given to all agencies - it comes out the same.)

One would expect the two questions to generate very similar sets of ordered agencies. However, a wrinkle appears when we compare the two. Here they are:

		RANKING	
Agency	difference(+ or -)	Importance (1 to 14)	Effectiveness (mean on scale of 1 to 5)
Red Cross	0	1	1 (4.4)
Salv. Army	2	4	2 (4.4)
Nat. Guard	2	5	3 (4.26)
SBA	2	2	4 (3.66)
Carlucci	3	8	5 (3.64)
Civ. Defns.	0	6	6 (3.50)
C. of Eng.	0	7	7 (3.50)
HEW	2	10	8 (3.30)
DOT	0	9	9 (3.29)

(continued)

Agency	difference(+ or -)	Importance(1 to 14)	Effectiveness (mean on scale of 1 to 5)
HUD	7	3	10 (3.05)*
Dept. Comm. Afrs.	2	13	11 (3.05)
FRC	2	14	12 (3.03)
DOL	1	12	13 (2.95)
OEP	3	11	14 (2.94)

It seems reasonable to suggest that one or two spots off isn't a bad correllation. Look at the two most surprising discrepancies - HUD and Presidential Envoy Carlucci.

HUD: HUD is ranked very near the top in "importance (#3), yet it is only ranked very impressive by 1/5 of the number who placed Red Cross at the top of "effectiveness".

I suggest the following. Importance implies large resources, extensive activity, massive presence - in short, it is comprised of a number of undeniable and obvious objective factors. Conversely, effectiveness rates an evaluation of what was done with all of the resources. It seems reasonable to suggest that the first ranking touched upon objective considerations, while the second response was much more a function of subjective evaluations. This seems to clearly demonstrate that people singled out HUD from all of the other agencies (for their displeasure) in spite of their recognition that the quantifiable presence was massive.

Carlucci: The Carlucci ranking sustains this analysis, but in the other direction. Here the victims realized that Carlucci's actual resources and importance were relatively limited. Nevertheless, they rank him as the second most effective federal representative. This is particularly important when one realizes that Carlucci performed a mostly symbolic role as an expediter - he brought no real tangible resources into the area. Thus, he took no applications, observed no formal rules, was not impersonal or bound by routine. He was the federal version of a troubleshooter (exhibiting many of the symbolic techniques discussed earlier), and the people responded appropriately.

All of the preceding, once again, demonstrates the subjective loading of victim evaluations and perception of effectiveness.

Red Cross: The admirable showing of Red Cross brings up an interesting point about size. In most other disasters which have been studied the Red Cross performance has been roundly scored by victims (see example below).

TABLE 6-1: Ranking by Informants of Adequacy of Performance of Participating Institutions

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Institution*	Rank Waco	Rank San Angelo
United States Army	1	6
United States Air Force	2	1
National Guard	3	3
State and city police	4	1
LOCAL CHURCHES	5	5
SALVATION ARMY	6	4
Municipal government	7	7
State government	8	9
LOCAL RELIEF-FUND	9	8
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT	10	12
Local agencies not named her	11	10
AMERICAN RED CROSS	12	11

* Agencies involved mainly in relief indicated in small capitals. Two agencies tied for rank 1 in San Angelo.

Source: Adapted from Moore, 1958, Table 17, p. 101.

TABLE 6-2: Evaluations of Selected Organizations by Beecher Residents

Organization	Per Cent			
	Positive	Negative	Non-evaluative	Total
Fire departments	41	0	59	100
SALVATION ARMY	41	2	57	100
National Guard	23	4	73	100
Police departments	19	9	72	100
RED CROSS	18	27	55	100
Other organizations	40	5	55	100

Source: Adapted from Form and Nosow, 1958, Table 17, p. 119.

However, in the Agnes flooding recovery, Red Cross ranked number 1 on both scales. Why is there such a difference? There are two critical reasons, both of which illustrate points made earlier in the text.

Size: In the disasters in which Red Cross was criticized you will see that Red Cross was always the largest coherent high profile outside group offering tangible aid. Thus, it was, relatively, the largest focused "outside" presence. However, in "Agnes" the Red Cross was dwarfed by the federal presence. This was one disaster in which the Red Cross was not the "whipping boy", the focus of insider/outsider hostility.

This supports our ideas about subjective evaluation. The Red Cross performance, in per capita terms, was comparable to many other disasters, perhaps a bit less. Thus, the objective basis for evaluation certainly didn't vary sufficiently to account for such a radical change in victims' perceptions. I suggest that federal agencies "drew the fire" of the victims and freed Red Cross from the rigors imposed by high

expectation and low trust.

This brings us to the second explanation. Red Cross is always criticized by victims (in smaller disasters) as being too professional, too formal. Several things inhibited the development of this attitude within the Agnes victim community.

1) Relatively speaking, the "bureaucratic" overtones of Red Cross performance during Agnes were overshadowed by the presence of real bureaucracies.

2) Red Cross had minimal long-term responsibility for recovery in Agnes, compared to such self-assumed responsibilities in many other disasters. Thus, the unfavorable "fall-out" caused by the termination of the "altruistic" community didn't catch Red Cross.

3) Red Cross took on many local volunteers to expand its organization in Agnes, many more than is normally the case. This made Red Cross more "inside" and probably helped it to become more informal (because many workers hadn't had routines built around their normal work habits).

In short, Red Cross seems a case in point for arguing that an agency's relative size and position on the recovery spectrum, regardless of objective absolute activity, is one of the most critical, if not the primary, determinants of victim attitudes.

Footnotes - Section IV

1) Douglas C. Dacy and Howard Kunreuther. The Economics of Natural Disaster. New York; The Free Press, 1969. p. 4.

2) Dacy, p. 70.

3) Dacy, p. 70.

4) Milton Friedman. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.

5) This was evident throughout the Agnes flood area.

6) Russell R. Dynes, J. Eugene Haas and E.L. Quarantelli. Administrative, Methodological, and Theoretical Problems of Disaster Research. Ohio State University: Disaster Research Center, Reprint from Indiana Sociological Bulletin, Vol. IV, No. 4, July 1967. p. 6.

7) Charles Loomis. Social Systems - Essays on Their Persistance and Change. Princeton: Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1960. p. 42.

8) The question boils down to one of getting victims back home as soon as possible, at the sacrifice of comfort, or placing them elsewhere, where they may lose interest in returning to rebuild.

9) See p. . for a more detailed discussion of this point.

10) Louis C. Gawthrop. Bureacratic Behavior in the Executive Branch. An Analysis of Organizational Change. New York: The Free Press, 1969-95.

11) Allen H. Barton. Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc. 1969. p. 298.

12) Loomis, p. 147.

13) Barton, p. 294.

14) Anthony Downs. Inside Bureacracy. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967. p. 216.

15) Downs, p. 193.

16) Gawthrop, p. 179.

17) Gawthrop, p. 179.

18) Gawthrop, p. 182.

19) Gawthrop, p. 181.

20) Downs, 51.

21) Loomis, p. 153.

22) Harold Seidman. Politics, Position and Power. The Dynamics of Federal Organization. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. p. 171, 164.

23) Downs, p. 211.

24) Downs, p. 51.

25) Charles Perrow. Organizational Analysis: A Sociological View. California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1970. p. 128.

26) "While this may sound extreme, my own experience leads me to conclude that traditional interagency rivalry and bureacratic intertia can only be overcome with the direct intervention of the Office of the President. While this may be regrettable, it is a fact of life. This is why I seriously doubt that a HUD disaster office will be able to command the respect and cooperation to be able to be responsive in the event of a disaster." Letter of Howard W. Robinson, Member of Congress, of February 22, 1973 to Chet Holifield, Chairman, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, quoted by Frank Horton, in United States Congress. House Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on Legislative and Military Operations. Reorganization Plan Number One of 1973. February 1973. p. 34.

27) William M. Evan. "The Organizational Set: Toward a Theory of Interorganizational Relations," in Merlin B. Brinkerhoff and Phillip Kunz. Complex Organizations and Their Environments. Iowa: William C. Brown Co., 1972. p. 333.

28) William A. Gamson. Power and Discontent. Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1968. p. 21.

29) Gamson, p. 32.

30) Gamson, p. 35.

31) Gamson, p. 35.

32) Gamson, p. 35.

33) Gamson, 35.

34) Perrow, p. 115.

35) Gamson, p. 36; Barton, p. 221.

36) Loomis, 138.

37) Gamson, p. 53.

38) Gamson, p. 113.

39) Gamson, p. 126.

40) Murray Edelman. Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971. p. 3.

41) Edelman, p. 9.

42) Edelman, p. 36.

43) Edelman, p. 37.

44) Edelman, p. 38.

45) Edelman, p. 174.

46) Edelman, p. 175.

47) Edelman, p. 10.

48) Leonard Berkowitz, "Some Implications of Laboratory Studies of Frustration and Aggression for the Study of Political Violence," (paper delivered at 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 5-9, 1967, in Edelman, p. 8.

49) Barton, p. 300.

50) Edelman, p. 180.

51) Harold Lasswell. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1936. p. 104.

52) Barton, p. 299.

53) Barton, p. 299.

SECTION V

A FEDERAL PERFORMANCE TYPOLOGY

A FEDERAL PERFORMANCE TYPOLOGY

To both explain the Agnes experience and to derive generally applicable insights into federal agency operations, it has become increasingly apparent that a system for ordering the relevant after-action data is necessary. "The disaster 'laboratory' has not been adequately utilized, because too little attention has been paid to the development of sets of propositions that can be tested as further disasters are studied."[1] To date, two Tropical Storm Agnes studies exist. The first is a chronological study of the federal operations, describing day-to-day actions, with emphasis on the activities of the FRC.[2] This report offers thorough attention to minute detail, but suffers from a concurrent lack of feeling for the broader picture of agency interaction. No generally relevant insight is explicitly gained, since each episode is peculiar to a detailed set of unique circumstances.

The second study, the Royston OMB Report[3], is grander

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[1] This chapter has been adapted from an earlier work prepared for Professor Herman Somers (in P.A. 503 in the Woodrow Wilson School). The present chapter has been updated, re-written, and brought into conformity with other elements of the text. Further, attempts to make the typology operational and to make predictions (which are tested), are new sections.

in scope, but again makes no attempt to distinguish broad operational principles which might be of value to administrators of agencies in disaster areas which differ in extent or complexity from Wyoming Valley. However, both studies do provide much raw data, as well as intended and unintended identification of significant elements of organizational performance. The present work hopes to provide a draft framework within which these and similar studies may be ordered and compared.

Why a Typology

Previous studies and after-action reports have tended to us one of two foci for the organization of observations. The most prevalent type emphasizes the agency - how it normally performs, how it performed during Agnes, what changes should be made for the future. This is of value if one is exclusively interested in studying a particular agency in a single given context.

However, it is impossible, from such agency studies, to reliably predict agency performance in other situations. A digression will illustrate this point. An after-action report on the Corps of Engineers might demonstrate that that agency met its obligations (debris clearance, etc.) with efficiency and dispatch. It would show the agency confident and held in esteem by the public. From such observations many observers could (and do) conclude that the Corps should undertake much greater responsibility - expanding its role to

supplant those agencies whose performance was perceived as poor, i.e. HUD, FRC, etc. This ignores the fact that changes in role, environment, expectations, clients, goal, change the ability of the agency to respond effectively, even though it remains essentially intact. It is quite conceivable that the Corps would fail completely if assigned new duties. This is because the context within which the agency operates is a key element in determining the agency's eventual efficiency and effectiveness. In short, the agency approach de-emphasizes the dynamic elements of context, enviroment, etc. and mistakenly assumes that an agency's response to a unique situational context is a typical response which can be expected to be generally forthcoming.

The second approach to federal performance is to focus on a single problem area and, then, judge the effectiveness of each agency in dealing with that problem. This approach tends to be normative, in that it assigns expectations of agency performance and then determines how close the agency came to meetings these normal obligations. The difficulty here is that the problem area is usually defined in too general a manner. That is, each disaster is assumed to offer a similar challenge in its requirements for housing, food, medical aid, loans, etc. Thus, agency performance in disaster "A" is seen to predict performance in disasters "B" and "C". Again, we find the analytic method fails to account for the fact that each disaster is unique, hence each set of disaster

problems varies, thus predictions of performance as a function of past problem solving success, is unreliable.

Further, a failure to come to grips with the underlying dynamics of successful operations often leads to recommendations which sound fine, but may prove unworkable in the field, because they are oriented toward program and goal changes rather than changes in implementation and delivery capacity. For example, in the Royston Report, we find "we should reaffirm in the principle of state and local government responsibility for overall management and decision-making ..."[4] This is a fine sentiment, but no suggestions for its implementation and no understanding of why it has been difficult to implement are to be found in the text.

Now, we arrive at the approach which I shall take. For the moment we shall not consider specific agencies or problem areas. Rather, we shall attempt to discover some key universally relevant variables which operate in all agencies, in regard to any disaster relevant problem. To do so, we recognize two broad organizational environments- the external environment within which the agency operates and to which it responds, and the internal environment which determines the limits and nature of that response.

Before progressing to a presentation of this model dor ordering the internal and external inputs to agency operation, we must briefly consider an existing model. It has some defects, but since it may be seen as an initial

forerunner of my approach it should serve as an introduction to the strategy of clasifying agency response modalities.

The Present Model

This model originated with the Disaster Research Center at the Ohio State University.[5] It is based on two basic variables - task and structure. It arose as a reaction to a previous explanation of "de-bureaucratization" which invoked the concept of "informal structure." In brief, it had been held that in a disaster situation of great agency stress, the "formal structure" of the agency was replaced by an emergent "informal structure." This informal structure, which is the unregulated pattern of beliefs and interactions which occur within the more rigid formal structure, was supposed to become the basic operational mode of the agency.

The problem with such an approach was that it did not lend itself to objective measurement or even observation, an, more importantly, it could not be organized or predicted in any meaningful way. Recognizing these difficulties, the DRC refined a classification of four patterned types which allow for description, at the organizational level, of changes in organizational function during periods of high stress.

The four different patterned types are distinguished on the basis of a cross-classification of the two key variables of "structure" and "tasks" (or functions). See Figure I. The first type of adaptation, Type I, involves little change on the part of relevant segments of the organization. This may describe two different degrees of agency involvement

-1) those agencies which are purposefully disaster relevant

THE DRC TYPOLOGY




FIGURE I

and thus purposely structured to meet the exigencies of disaster (OEP), and 2) those agencies which pursue goals as previously, where those goals have become disaster relevant (i.e., surveying, river watch). The key element lies in the fact that the organization consists of an ongoing structure performing regular and familiar tasks.

Type II adaptation involves a modification of the structure on the part of the organization, but a coninuation of regular tasks. This might involve relocation of intra-organizational personnel, alteration of the authority structure, creation of new positions, conscription of new members, etc. Nevertheless, the organization continues to perform familiar tasks. Examples of this type would be organizations with a small professional cadre which takes on many volunteers (Red Cross) or skill organizations which expand to accomodate skilled personnel from outside of the community by reshuffling local personnel and authority patterns (eg. public utilities often receive the services of numerous skilled repair crews from other non-affected utility companies.)

Type III adaptation refers to a change in tasks, but a continuation of the ongoing structure. In this case an organization may be intact, but, prior to the disaster event, primarily involved in non-disaster relevant pursuits. The group retains its structure, but changes the focus of its energies. For example, a women's club may open a canteen, or a fraternal society may engage in organized debris clearance.

Finally, a Type IV adaptation refers to a modification in the group's structure as well as a change in its tasks. This is found in the emergence of ad hoc citizen groups or in the creation of an "administrative core" with an emergency staff, which temporarily replaces elected community political bodies.

The description of this typology demonstrates the possibility of building response categories which classify the restraints and opportunities created by the interaction of internal and external variables relevant to a given agency facing a given problem. Once we have created these categories we can use them as conceptual aids in understanding the effectiveness of any single agency. Indeed, with sufficient application it may be possible to change the focus of this approach from that of graphic aid to one of actual operational value. At any rate, it is clear that agencies may fall into different categories in different disasters, which overcomes the problems inherent in those agency specific and problem area specific approaches cited earlier.

Let us now indicate why a more sophisticated typology than the preceding is required for the study of federal agencies. This DRC typology can be a valuable tool, refined by application to, literally, hundreds of disaster experiences. However, its application has been limited (exclusively as I can ascertain) to patterned emergence of <u>community</u> groups. Thus, the descriptive power is great for Police, Fire, local

social groups, Salvation Army, etc. However, there are numerous reasons why the application of this typology to federal agencies is not significantly productive. Mostly, the differences between community disaster agencies and federal agencies are differences in internal structure (authority patterns, resources, etc.), although some external differences are important.

We shall look at several key differences. First, federal agencies generally operate under legislative control - in the form of specific legal restrictions on goals, personnel policies, mode of operation, etc., which add special constraints to federal initiative. Second, federal agencies are often represented by field offices which are ultimately responsible to distant central offices. Thus, the relevant authority patterns are different.

Third, the federal presence in terms of money and manpower is potentially several magnitudes greater than the local potential. Fourth, the members of the federal agencies are usually not directly affected by the disaster and may have little experience with or commitment to the disaster impacted area.[6] Fifth, the inertia created by the influence of routine and standard operating procedure is often much greater in large federal agencies than in local organizations.[7]

Sixth, as a result of the popular perception of the vast federal potential to assist and as a function of the symbolic nature of the federal establishment as "everyone's government" the federal agencies are usually expected to take

command of the disaster situation in a competent and resourceful manner. In a sense, while given community groups can, understandably, be overwhelmed, the expectation is that such is not the case in the federal sphere.

We sould continue this list, but the critical point has been made. In any given disaster involving federal presence, it is probable that constraints beyond ~~only~~ structure and task are also key variables determining agency performance. If such is indeed the case it is to our advantage to construct a typology which can take these variables into account. We shall do so in the following section.

Variables for the Typology

I have chosen two internal variables and two external variables which seem to provide the greatest descriptive and classificatory power. These are 1) Routine - whether the agency's disaster roles is an integral part of the established operational routine (eg. OEP) or has been activated as a special service for the disaster emergency period (eg. DOI); 2) Field Autonomy[8] - the relative freedom of the agency field personnel to respond to client demands with a high degree of flexibility and discretion; 3) Scope - the degree to which the agency must abandon alternative program commitments of resources in order to focus on disaster-relevant operations, as a function of the scope of the disaster impact; 4)Expectation - the degree of urgency and the strength of expectation of specific performance expressed by disaster-impacted clients. We shall explore each of these in greater detail.

Routine v. Non-Routine

For some federal agencies the disaster situation is one to which the agency is exclusively, or at least primarily, oriented. Such an agency would be OEP,[9] which is normally responsible for coordinating and directing all early federal disaster operations.

On the other side we find agencies which have disaster-relevant programs which are only occasionally called into use and which are not the primary responsibility of any sizeable permanent staff. These programs are usually a small

share of the total agency program. To this purpose, we cite DOL (with a special emergency employment program) and HEW (with a limited emergency service). Also, we find agencies which have no disaster-relevant formal planning, but which may be activated regardless. These may include ad hoc federal groups (eg. the Presidential envoy), federal coordinating groups (eg. FRC), and agencies who find their clients involved in disaster (President's Task Force on the Aging).

The intent here is to differentiate crisis management/assistance agencies which are experienced and routinely familiar with the task from those agencies which become involved on an "as needed" basis in an unfamiliar manner. The underlying assumption is that agencies which are truly prepared for and experienced in disaster operations have an initial operational advantage over agencies which find themselves operating in unfamiliar patterns.[10] Further, lack of routine responsibility opens the door to wide-ranging territorial disputes between agencies.

Field Autonomy For most community groups the field and central offices are the same. Even for those community groups with extra-community ties - Red Cross, Salvation Army, Boy Scouts - a great deal of discretion is usually allowed to the field and, indeed, is expected and encouraged. Such is not necessarily the case with federal agencies.

First, the field office is constrained by either 1) clear legislation (matching funds requirements, etc),

or 2) administrative memoranda with the virtual force of law in the field context (HUD and SBA operating procedures, for example). Second, the authority structure may be such that decisions must be relayed through numerous hierarchical layers before action.

Third the personnel and advancement policies, the influence of Civil Service, the attitudes of key supervisors, etc., may tend to discourage flexibility. Fourth, demands and requests from other influential agencies may constrian the field office's range of autonomy (eg. the FRC decides by achieving "concensus", no member agency or council of directors having ultimate authority).

Whatever the complete array of factors involved, the federal response is clearly affected by the individual agencies' decision options, from relative autonomy (the Presidential envoy) to clear and present limitations (HUD, SBA).

Scope: This concept is dependent on the inter-relationship of the disaster extent and agency capability. Essentially, it is a measure of the stress placed on an agency by the disaster environment in the agency's attempts to cope with disaster problems. Some agencies face no strain. (NOAA). Others must either transfer or recruit a modest number of personnel to the field, as well as divert some attention at higher levels. Still other agencies must establish a massive presence in order to achieve disaster relevant goals (HUD, SBA).

Several clarifications are in order. First, strain may be in terms of manpower, funds, physical resources or whatever is essential to agency operation yet limited in supply.[11] Second, the strain is not absolute, but relative to previous organizational size and equilibrium (eg. the Reserves may call up thousands of men without the strain involved in EPA's providing a few dozen). Third, the strain is relative to alternative demands on the agency stemming from extra-disaster responsibilities (i.e., the previous Reserves example might not hold true during wartime).

The point here is, simply stated, that agencies have alternative uses for their resources and diversion of those resources, to a degree consonant with the disaster's extent, places varying strains on the agencies involved. Further, strain increases exponentially as presence increases arithmetically. Since internal administrative difficulties in the field and in higher levels increases dramatically faster in relation to absolute increases in agency presence we find strain may be created even when alternative resources demands are not significant.

As a further difficulty created by an increase in size, any inconsistencies or friction in the agency structure, which were previously quiescent or at least manageable, may become evident and significantly dysfunctional in a period of rapid, highly visible, expansion.[12]

Urgency and Expectation: Different agencies provide different services of varying degress of perceived importance. Thus, food and clothing urgency gives way to demand for housing loans, gives way to desire for active consumer protection. We shall consider each agency as it reaches peak priority, but it must be understood that agencies may move through the typology as this variable changes. Further, we must realize that some agencies never face situations of great urgency or expectation (eg. NOAA, LEAA).

This concept primarily involves "expectation,", which is the degree to which clients feel that they have a "right" to demand and receive satisfactory service. To this end, housing assistance is expected by the victim; low interest loans may be considered his due. Free psychological counseling or special government-sponsored entertainment can be considered pleasant extras.

Simply stated, agencies face different degress of pressure depending on how relevant their services are to the disaster community and to what extent they are compelled by the community to provide these services.

These expectations may be the spontaneous outcomes of generally held community sentiments (the "emergency consensus") or may be "manufactured" by the agency (to gain prestige, to increase bargaining power with other agencies, to win acceptance of their programs from the community, to maximize partisan benefit, etc.). This variable underscores

the necessity to understand the dynamics of the community in which the disaster operation is located.

Lest we dismiss this variable as not significant, it must be noted that thwarted or poorly-managed expectations form the basis for indignation, depression, hostility, cynicism, scapegoating, etc. It can be a powerful disruptive force, as we shall discover.

Initial Cross-Classification

The agency's environment in the impact area is stressful. We must attempt to measure the agency's accommodation to the unique set of requirements posed by such a disaster context. Thus, we may cross-classify the key variables just discussed to create a variety of agency contexts. It must be understood that different agencies may fall into different categories in different disaster situations, indeed placement in one category need not be constant for the duration of even a single disaster operation. Thus, our attempt here is oriented toward establishing the typology, not in arguing the merits of any particular agency placement (all illustrative agency placements are drawn from the Agnes '72 experience in Wyoming Valley and are open to argument in some cases).

Our first cross-classification sets "task" (routine v. non-routine) against "scope" (same v. increased). The intention is to plot the inter-relation of two potential high stress conditions - lack of routine familiarity with tasks

and problems related to significantly increased disruption created by reallocation of scarce agency resources. (See Figure II).

Type I agencies vary in size and organization, but have one common feature - they retain organization integrity intact and they perform duties with which their personnel are quite familiar. The agencies in Type I may be small (NOAA, LEAA) or large (C of E) relative to the total disaster picture. The point is that whatever their role, they are certainly not overtaxed - either by conflict in intra-organizational resource allocation or conflict generated by redirection of the agency program.

Type II agencies similarly lack significant reallocation of agency resources or because any shift is minimal relative to the whole. Type II differs from Type I in that those resources which are committed, are committed in non-routine areas. This is not necessarily to say that pre-disaster clients are abandoned, although such may be the case. Rather, previous clients (and new clients from the same groups or recently placed in similar groups) may be related to in novel ways - either in terms of benefit received, or manner of service, or degree of service, or some combination, as the case may be. This may reflect the agency's awakened awareness of an existing but previously unperceived problem in the client group, or the perception of a new, disaster related need in the group, or simply an increase in the agency's ability to pursue formerly

TASKS

Structure	Routine	Non-Routine
same	LEAA C of E NOAA	Tsk Frc Aging ACTION DCL DOT USDA
	I	II
increase	III OEP Red Cross Salv. Army ARC Fed/St Co-ord	IV Reserves Nat Grd. FRC SBA HUD Pres. Envoy

FIGURE II

poorly funded programs. Thus, for Type II, resource conflict is absent, but change in the routine of program and service provision may create stress.

Type III agencies fall into two broad categories. The first is those agencies which are purposefully oriented toward disaster service, the second is those agencies which find that normal functions have suddenly become disaster relevant. The first category would include CEP; the second would include regional planning councils and formal inter-governmental and inter-agency coordinating agencies and councils. While stress may be present, at least these agencies are dealing with familiar clients, in familiar contexts with consistent and familiar goals, processes, and procedures.

However, this type is complicated because it must perform these familiar tasks in a larger context - by adding men, money, facilities and related resources or at least by shifting existing resources into a greater disaster relevant commitment, For some agencies these problems take the form of supervision of volunteers, for ~~o~~others it is communication (eg. intragovernmental and interagency groups), for still others it is coordinating the achievement of an extended plan of action (Regional planning commissions, etc.). The point here is that the agency is doing something familiar, but doing it bigger.

Type IV is the hotspot where the unstable ends of both factors converge. The agencies are involved in relatively

unfamiliar tasks, and are involved in an expanded and usually highly visible manner. This means that any agency attempt to change from routine to non-routine tasks (a great source of uncertainty and confusion) is done in an atmosphere of confusion and downright chaos, since the agency is also in the process of gearing up its structure by reallocating resources in an increased quantity to those new tasks. In short, either element is a source of strain and the two together define a cell in which successful operation is quite seriously handicapped.

An example of Type IV is HUD. This agency had a large pre-disaster presence in Wyoming Valley, but it was primarily oriented toward a redevelopment program outside the flood area. After the flood the agency had to shift to emergency housing assistance, a task never previously encountered by a vast majority of HUD personnel. Further, its existing resources were inadequate to meet the scale of the disaster, hence the agency was dramatically exapanded, with a concommitant increase in the difficulties associated with internal mangement, training, control, record keeping, etc.

Now, in and of itself, this cross-classification is helpful. However, it still lacks adequate sophistication and comprehensiveness. This leads to our second typology. (See Figure III).

The Second Cross-Classification

Again we introduce two variables - one internal and

one external to the agency. The internal variable is that of"autonomy" - the actual freedom of the agency to accomodate itself to the exigencies of disaster performance. The external variable is that of"community expectation." Again we develop four types, noted for convenience as "A", "B", "C", and "D".

Type A agencies face a low expectation demand, yet have high freedom to accomodate this demand. This frees the agency to commit itself to whatever degree it feels necessary after meeting the extant demand, in whatever manner seems most practical. This type is not precluded from making valuable and appreciated contributions; the point is that the agency is not expected to meet any specific, popularly assumed tasks. It functions on an "as needed" basis, with great discretion. Its activities may be highly visible or behind the scenes, as the agency wishes, its program determines, and its resources allow. It is to be realized, however, that expectations may change. This is especially true if the agency is playing a low-profile supportive role for a more visible agency. If that visible agency is failing, the support agency may begin to face increasingly specific performance demand to step into the breach. This might be true of, say, Reserve troops who are initially volunteered as police aids in traffic control, who gradually assume overall authority and responsibility in the event of lack of success by the police.



FREEDOM
High
Low
Low
EXPECTATION
High
Tsk Frc Aging
ACTION
LEAA
Nat Grd.
Reserves
Red Cross
Salv. Army
NCAA
CEC
FRC
Fed/St Co-ord
A
C
B
D
C of E
DOL
DOT
OEP
Pres. Envoy
USDA
ARC
HUD
SBA

FIGURE III

Type B agencies have clear and specific responsibilities, as popularly defined, which may be met with a high degree of freedom. The freedom may be a function of the availability of sufficient resources which are well managed and applied in a familiar fashion (C of E); or of a responsibility which is not labor intensive, but one of fund distribution (eg. DOL - expansion of its unemployment assistance program involves an increase in funds more than an increase in physical agency presence); or the agency is given a clear mandate to cut red tape (Presidential Envoy Frank Carlucci); or the agency has been designed and empowered specifically for such crisis management (OEP); or the agency has a high degree of programmatic autonomy, i.e., it may pursue its program without entering jurisdictional disputes (DOL, UA); or the agency is capable of overriding any opposed agencies (C of E because of size and strong Congressional support , Frank Carlucci because of Presidential influence).

It is implied that freedom through management autonomy is valuable only if there are adequate resources to manage. Lacking resources, the agency falls into the low freedom scale regardless of the enlightenment of its management. The point to be made in this category is that the agency is strongly identified with urgently needed tasks and it has the freedom to approach these tasks in a positive, flexible manner.

Task C agencies face low expectation and have little freedom. Agencies in this category tend to be involved in

programs tangentially relevant to the post-disaster period (NOAA). Also, they may be agencies which are not programmatic (i.e., produce a tangible or material benefit) but oriented instead toward coordination.

The point here is that it is difficult to identify a specific coordination task - coordination being such a comprehensive, yet ambiguous concept. The freedom to coordinate is invariably low; almost by definition, it is subject to numerous constraints and is characterized by compromise and bargaining rather than autonomy. Expectation is low in the disaster community since coordination is not as immediately relevant as shelter, or as satisfying as food, or as visible as housing. This high level of abstraction tends to insulate coordinating agencies from all but very general references to "cooperation."

Actually, since coordinating groups' clients may be identified as the agencies being coordinated, we should, perhaps, view those agencies' demands as the relevant ones. However, for a variety of reasons those client agencies are usually not keen on extensive coordination. Thus, the coordinating agencies may be seen as generating their own momentum towards cooperation, responding to a need which they, rather than their clients, perceive. If such is the case, Type C indicates that these agencies will probably lack the requisite freedom to impose this coordinative instinct, much less create viable processes for cooperation.

Type D agencies provide the hotspot for this classificatory scheme, insofar as they encounter high expectation, while enjoying little freedom. This lack of freedom to expedite in spite of high demand may be a function of 1) lack of resources, 2) lack of legislative authority to meet an obligation properly perceived as its own, 3) constraints imposed by conscription of emergency personnel, 4) lack of experienced management, 5) inability to command media attention, which is essential to performance but dominated by other agencies, and 6) misjudgment of the power impact of expectation, hence lack of preparation, thus inability to "get on top of" the situation.

Given these two sets of categories we may now create the typology promised earlier. It brings together all of the preceeding in one large set of comprehensive categories. (See Figure IV).

The Typology- Fully Structured

The typology consists of 16 cells based on the cross-classification of A,B,C,D, agencies and I,II,III,IV agencies. Each cell offers its own unique set of internal and external constraints (and opportunities) and each possible combination is represented. By identifying these constraints an agency may take action to move to a cell which allows greater probability for success and solid achievement. A decision-tree construction is provided to make the relationship between variables easier to manipulate (See Figure V).

A key insight to be gained from this exercise is that agency success in a given disaster is only partly dependent on that agency's internal management. Some forces beyond the agency's control operate to its benefit or detriment. Thus, each agency starts with a different set of handicaps, depending on its role, and the shuffling of agency responsibilities does not necessarily improve the agency's response; it may just rearrange the handicaps.

Cell #1

Agencies in this cell perform routine tasks without excessive strain on status quo internal arrangements. Further, they face little popular demand for their services, yet have a high degree of programmatic discretion. Such agencies would seem to be LEAA (which made grants available, as needed) and other multi-purpose grant making agencies. They are low profile, yet capable of doing much of value if wisely administered.

DISASTER TYPOLOGY

	I	II	III	IV
A	LEAA 1	ACTION Tsk Frc Aging 2	Salv Army Red Cross 3	Reserves Nat Grd 4
B	C of E 5	DOL DOT 6	OEP 7	Pres. Envoy 8
C	NOAA 9	FBI 10	Fed/St Co-ord 11	FRC 12
D	Cons Prot 13	USDA 14	Redev. Auth 15	HUD SBA 16

FIGURE IV

It is hard from them to generate unfavorable publicity unless they make significant, controversial grants.

Cell #2

These agencies retain their basic organization, with, perhaps, a few minor modifications to accomodate non-routine functions. They face low popular demand, yet have high discretion in the goals they accept. Examples would include the diversion of ACTION people to assist other social service agencies, or to carry on small scale neighborhood assistance programs involving counseling, transportation, recreation, etc. Similarly, an organization like the President's Task Force on Aging is particularly sensitive to its clients and has freedom to shift its program to accomodate the needs of the elderly, newly created by the disaster situation.

The switch in routine is particularly offset by the high discretionary base of the agency, and partially offset because the agency's programs lend themselves to accomodation (as opposed, say, to the detailed procedures and programs of an SBA).

Cell #3

The third cell contains a bit of contradiction which tends to preclude placement of government agencies in the category. It becomes, rather, the category for charitable crisis-oriented groups. It involves performance of routine duties of a greatly expanded nature, even though the performance is not necessarily seen as required. The Salvation

Army (and to a lesser extent, Red Cross) seems to meet these criteria. It is prepared to act, it can perform its role with great expansion of size and high freedom, yet it need not be compelled to act.

Another example is found in a case in which the newspaper company in a community proximate to Wyoming Valley published its own paper and the Wilkes-Barre newspaper. The company was doing something familiar (publishing) under stress (two papers rather than one) when it certainly wasn't held obligated to do so. Thus, we find a strong element of volunteerism.

Cell #4

In Cell 4 we find a curious mixture in which an organization performs non-routine functions on a large scale with little obligation to perform specific tasks. Further, since the agency has high freedom to adjust itself as needed, as well as relatively increased resources, it is potentially able to achieve substantial positive results. Agencies in this category would include bodies such as the National Guard, Reserves, etc. Their structures tend to allow conversion and manpower. This is much like Cell #2 (ACTION) but on a much larger scale.

Cell #5

This is a favorable position in which an agency can find itself. The organization will perform routine functions, through an integrated structure, with a limited degree of

freedom. Further, since it faces high popular expectation, its success tends to be vicible and gratifying. The Corps of Engineers is an example of an agency facing this constellation of factors.

Consider, now, my earlier caution. Because of its success the Corps of Engineers has been suggested as the potential coordinator for all disaster relief. If this were to come about the new role would strip the Corps of Engineers of its great freedom (recall the fate of coordinating bodies), force it into non-familiar relief patterns (recall the difficulty of changing routine), and probably force it into greatly increasing its scale of operations (with the consequential handicaps previously discussed). Thus, the Corps of Engineers would find itself in Cell #16 - now inhabited by HUD and SBA, the disfavored agencies it would be replacing. This is why I suggest that the constellation of identified variables strongly influence successful operation by an agency.

Cell #6

In this group we find agencies which retain their basic organizational integrity, yet have freedom to perform non-routine tasks in response to high expectations. This would seem to suggest the case in which an agency activates, or places new emphasis upon, pre-existing programs which were previously not operative. One thinks of DOL's emergency employment and emergency unemployment compensation programs as a case in point. The fact that these are resource (in

this case, money) intensive allows the DCL to retain basic integrity (i.e., it need not take on added field personnel or add non-familiar specialists). Further, the programs exist in law and are designed well, which accounts for the high freedom of the agency to act.

Cell #7

Agencies in this group are those which are oriented for high profile disaster operations. They have programmatic orientation toward disaster needs and, hence, freedom. Difficulties arise in a large scale disaster because of their presence, but the high discretion tends to offset these harmful influences. OEP is a case in point. It is free because it is prepared in advance; it has a good deal of mandated discretion in its own operation; and it has been given the option to contract out many of its operational responsibilities. This option allows it to allocate the response burden to other agencies as it deems appropriate. Further, it saves OEP from some of the constraints normally imposed on coordinating bodies because the coordination has contractual rather than "spirit of cooperation" voluntary basis.

Cell #8

This type is the one that will either fail or succeed spectacularly. It could be used to support or supplant either Cell 6 agencies (in cases where the planned routines won't work) or Cell 16 agencies (in cases where inflexibility proves debilitating - HUD, SBA). Agencies in this cell

face all of the variables at their maximum unsettling impact - high expectations, high freedom, large scale and unfamiliar operations. Essentially, this cell tends to include the high-profile trouble shooters, as witnessed by the principle Cell 8 agency - Frank Carlucci as Presidential Flood Czar. It is the point at which maximum threat meets maximum organizational flexibility. From this typology we may not predict the outcome of the confrontation, for the subtleties of crisis management will tip the balance.

Cell #9

In this cell we find almost the exact opposite of Cell 8. The agency remains intact, performing routine duties with little discretion and little public interest. Agencies in this cell tend to be those performing functions in or for the disaster area which are not particularly disaster-relevant (i.e., Post Office). They also tend to be agencies which are not themselves damaged or inconvenienced by the disaster (i.e., NOAA).

Cell #10

The agencies in this cell are similar to those in Cell 9 except that they find themselves performing some non-routine tasks. This might be the case in which some FBI men were temporarily assigned as an investigative unit for another agency (say, Consumer Protection).

Cell #11

This is the category in which we find most coordinating

and intragovernmental type groups, which attempt to meet normal coordination goals in the disaster context. We might also classify the functioning of most disaster-impacted local governments in this category. In both cases we find an attempt at coordination as usual in the face of overwhelming tasks, coupled with low freedom (either through lack of cooperation in the first case or lack of competence and expertise in the second case). This is based on the assumption that a good deal of coordination need is not perceived by the public. If the public does become aware of the relevant coordinating bodies (say, Pennsylvania's OSPD) they may shift to Cell 15, characterized by high expectation. In point of fact, this would tend to harm them even more since the increased pressure for action would not necessarily be coupled with an increase in the necessary freedom to take action.

Cell #12

This is a danger cell with an escape valve. Faced with large, non-routine tasks, and constrained by lack of freedom, the agency benefits from low public demand for its action. This would tend to typify the high and highest level federal coordinating groups. Their routine is shattered and they mobilize to perform, in public announcement if not in deed. Probably doomed to failure, or at least middling success, the agency benefits from a low profile. FRC is a case in point. Here, even members felt little expectation of success in non-cooperative disaster sites, (like Pennsylvania). FRC

managed to finesse after-action reports by coopting the records of successful constituent agencies (like DOL, HEW, DOT) which had been more succesful, but to which FRC assistance had been limited.

Cell #13


In this cell we find business as usual agencies, facing high demand yet unable to respond. This could be because of lack of resources, as in the case of Consumer Protection. This appears to be a category which admits of token efforts. Surprisingly, perhaps this is a sad commentary on our third branch of government, this seems the most appropriate cell in which to place legislatures, at least in regard to demands for action or large scale non-routine assistance (like full loss reimbursement).

Cell #14

In this cell we find agencies which do not increase in size, but which try to convert their routine in response to high demand in the face of low freedom. This would seem to involve agencies which identify closely with their clients, and thus try to change programs to maintain the confidence of those clients, in spite of the lack of resources. This would include agencies like USDA and associate agricultural extension and cooperative services, which had to switch from production advice to advice of available federal aid.

Cell #15

In cell 15 we find agencies similar to cell 11, but


AGENCY
FREEDOM
high
low
EXPECTATION
EXPECTATION
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high
low
high
SIZE
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SIZE
SIZE
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same
increase
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ROUTINE
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with a higher community profile. This would tend to involve regional planning type agencies, such as a local Redevelopment Authority. Such an agency is administering familiar, constraining laws, in a high expectation, size increase context.

Cell #16

This category is probably the most unfavorable type in the entire scheme. It involves non-routine tasks (which require flexibility); it requires rapid mobilization (which requires flexibility); it deals with size increase and high expectations (which call for flexibility. It is typified by low freedom - rigidity. Thus, it is not surprising to find HUD and SBA, the two major whipping boys, occupying this category.

A Graphical Summary

In Figure VI we have summarized the essential material from the preceding review of the cells. It is held that the following elements are favorable: 1) ability to maintain routine, 2) ability to maintain organizational integrity, 3) high programmatic freedom, 4) low popular expectation of significant action. It is suggested that the following are stress-inducing features: 1) switch to non-routine functions, 2) change in organizational structure, 3) lack of field discretion, 4) high popular expectation. Since the model is additive, if we balance out those factor for each cell we get a feeling for the general position in which an agency

TYPE	CELL #	NUMBER-NEGATIVE VARIABLES	NEGATIVE VARIABLES	NUMBER-POSITIVE VARIABLES	POSITIVE VARIABLES	BALA
I-A	1	0	none	4	R - SS - LE - HF	+
II-A	2	1	NR	3	SS - LE - HF	+
III-A	3	1	IS	3	R - LE - HF	+
IV-A	4	2	NR - IS	2	LE - HF	o
I-B	5	1	HE	3	R - SS - HF	+
II-B	6	2	NR - HE	2	SS - HF	o
III-B	7	2	IS - HE	2	R - HF	o
IV-B	8	3	NR - IS - HE	1	HF	-
I-C	9	1	LF	3	R - SS - LE	+
II-C	10	2	NR - LF	2	SS - LE	o
III-C	11	2	IS - LF	2	R - LE	o
IV-C	12	3	NR- IS - LF	1	LE	-
I-D	13	2	HE - LF	2	R - SS	o
II-D	14	3	NR - HE - LF	1	SS	-
III-D	15	3	IS - HE - LF	1	R	-
IV-D	16	4	IS - HE - LF - NR	0	none	-

Code: R : routine
NR : non-routine
LE : low-expectation
HE : high-expectation
SS : same size
IS : increased size
LF : low freedom
HF : high freedom

DISASTER TYPOLOGY




FIGURE VII

finds itself as it settles into its disaster function. Essentially, we determine if the cell is, or is not, conducive to successful agency operation. A graph of the results of this balancing is quite revealing (See Figure VII).

There are three general zones in which an agency may find itself. In the upper left we find all agencies which face a preponderance of favorable factors. In the lower right we find all agencies which must operate in an environment inimical to success. In the middle range are those agencies which face a delicate balance of factors.

Moving from a "-" or "o" cell to a "+" cells gives us clues as to the changes needed to improve performance from the agencies' viewpoint. Various cell movement options (say, from "7" to either "2" or "3") indicate different strategies for improvement. Examination of the inter-relationships of these variables leads us to the following conclusions.

PREDICTIONS FROM THE TYPOLOGY

At this point we have to demonstrate that this typology works; that is, that it orders the agencies in a coherent manner and that predictions drawn from this ordering are correct. The preceding typology was generated and the agencies were placed within it before the Agnes survey was even designed. Thus, it seems reasonable to use the fruits of that Agnes project as an unbiased validation for the typology.

Taking the Heat

In the typology we found that there were three broad areas - positive, neutral, and negative - which described the amount and degree of unfavorable support which would probably devolve upon each operating agency. A close examination of post-operations testimony seems to bear out the validity of these three categories. Red Cross, Salvation Army, National Guard and Corps of Engineers received virtually no criticism and, indeed, did receive a good deal of credit for their performance. OEP, Department of Labor, Department of Transportation received little attention, while Carlucci, Federal Regional Council, HUD and SBA clearly monopolized the attention of the committee.

However, most of the attention we have described dealt with considerations of objective performance. Hence, the suggestions for HUD, SBA, Carlucci, and FRC dealt with organization, administration, definition of mission, etc.,

with an eye toward redefinition. Similarly, National Guard, Red Cross, Salvation Army, Corps of Engineers, USDA received praise for their objective organizational performance - and tended to be identified as models. In the middle, DOL, DOT, and OEP reported on their activities, were congratulated, but received little further objective attention.

This impression from Committee hearings is seconded by the observations of the Royston OMB Report , which tended to recognize, implicitly, the same three categories.

Subjective Evaluation

The preceding is fine, until we realize that objective criteria are not the sole, or even primary, determinants of victim attitudes. Thus, we might expect an entirely different set of evaluations in the victim community than would be created by an analysis of only objective factors (such as occurs with the three broad areas of the typology).

In the typology we treated each of the four variables as equal and additive when we were deriving our objective criteria. However, in our earlier chapter we learned that expectation, as the primary source of subjective feeling, has a much greater influence than the other variables. We might say its subjective value is interactive or multiplicative.

Let's pursue this. If we can weight expectation, we can derive a predicted ranking which will anticipate victim ranking. Then, we can compare this prediction to the actual victim rankings derived from the survey, so as to test the

validity of the entire typological approach.

Subjective Rank in the Typology

In this endeavor, we identify two variables which will be important for victim perceptions - their expectations (which define attitudes) and agency size (which brings the agencies to the victims' attention). Further, high freedom is important because it implies ability to adapt to victim expectation. Ability to retain routine is important because it means internal stress will not be as great as in those agencies which must convert their internal processes.

Now, those cells with high expectation and increased size are 7 - 8 - 15 - 16. Those with high expectation and the same size are 5 - 6 - 13 - 14. Those with low expectation and increased size are 3 - 4 - 11 - 12. Those with low expectation and the same size are 1 - 2 - 9 - 10. This provides for four ranges:

1) 7 - 8 - 15 - 16
2) 5 - 6 - 13 - 14
3) 3 - 4 - 11 - 12
4) 1 - 2 - 9 - 10

The first two cells in each range have high autonomy. This helps to overcome inertia and inflexibility and it can be assumed that these cells are at a further advantage. Thus, we derive eight ranges.

1) 7 - 8
2) 15 - 16
3) 5 - 6
4) 13 - 14
5) 3 - 4
6) 11 - 12
7) 1 - 2
8) 9 - 10

Now by giving those performing routine tasks an advantage over those involved in non-routine endeavors we finally develop a descending order which predicts how favorably the agency will be viewed by victims:

1) cell 7
2) " 8
3) " 15
4) " 16
5) " 5
6) " 6
7) " 13
8) " 14
9) " 3
10) " 4
11) " 11
12) " 12
13) " 1
14) " 2
15) " 9
16) " 10

We'll replace the cells with agency names and drop those cells which contained agencies that weren't included in the survey. This generates the following ranked agency order:

1) OEP
2) Carlucci
3) SBA
4) HUD
5) Corps of Engineers
6) DOT
7) DOL
8) National Guard
9) Federal Regional Council

Now we must derive a ranked order from the survey. This survey asked each respondent to rate his feelings about each agencies' effectiveness on a 1 to 5 scale (very disappointing to very impressive). By finding the mean score for each agency it is possible to create a list which ranks victim sentiments about each agency. It follows:

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7) " 13
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1) National Guard
2) SBA
3) Carlucci
4) Corps of Engineers
5) DOT
6) HUD
7) FRC
8) DOL
9) OEP

Let us compare the two lists:

Agency	Difference(+ or -)	Predicted Rank From Typology	Actual Rank From Survey
OEP	8	1	9
Carlucci	1	2	3
SBA	1	3	2
HUD	2	4	6
C of E	1	5	4
DOT	1	6	5
DOL	1	7	8
Nat. Grd	7	8	1
FRC	2	9	7

It is evident that the typology hit seven of the nine. What happened with OEP and the National Guard?

Office of Emergency Preparedness

We predicted that OEP would be ranked as the highest agency in the minds of the victims. This obviously was not the case, since OEP, in fact, was ranked dead last. I suggest that an examination of the typology will show us what caused this misplacement.

OEP was predicted high on the basis of its high freedom

exercised in the face of high expectations. This is normally the case. However, the uniqueness of the Agnes case may have unsettled this normal state of affairs. Specifically, it is suggested that the massive size of the Agnes operations swamped OEP and minimized what were normally its strongest assets.

Consider the agency's autonomy. OEP normally operates in a fluid and unrestricted manner as the overall coordinator of disaster and recovery programs. It has been able to do this since its presence, in terms of funds and manpower, has usually been decisive. This was not the case in Agnes, in which HUD and SBA, as well as military units, assumed large and high profile stances. Thus, while OEP's statutory and traditional freedom remained, the very magnitude of the task served to severely limit its effectiveness.

If one recalls all of the difficulties associated with performing the coordination function, one can readily recognize that it is possible for even a federal agency to be overwhelmed.

Not only was OEP shifted onto the low freedom dimension, it also lost its position as center of attention. Normally, OEP is clearly the agency in charge of coordination, and is so recognized by members of the victim community. However, in Agnes it became apparent that larger and more affluent agencies were garnering the spotlight. The appearance of Frank Carlucci served even further to press OEP from the center

Now, if we refer to the typology and trace these new events we find that OEP will have moved from Cell #7 to cell #11 due to these changes. This would lead us to guess that OEP would be ranked #8, when in fact it was ranked #9. Thus, reference to the typology shows us why OEP did not, in point of fact, reflect our first guess.

It is interesting to note that after Agnes the disaster responsibilities of OEP were moved to a new Federal Disaster Assistance Agency, under the auspices of HUD. This placement tends to guarantee that FDAA will not be shunted aside in a major operation and that it will be able to maintain a high public profile. Thus, reasonable steps have been taken to restore the OEP function to its proper position in the larger disaster response scheme.

National Guard

In this one we predicted that the National Guard would be ranked much lower than it really was. This is, I believe an error in placement. National Guard should be in Cell #7 rather than Cell #4. The difference is in victim expectation, which was much higher than I had anticipated.

This seems born out by the assessment of one National Guardsman who noted that flood victims would keep Guardsmen in the flood area forever if they could. A victim put it more succinctly, "They made me feel safe".

Thus, the typology and survey have operated to demonstrate a placement error which was made.

Now, what does all of this mean? Quite simply, the objective typology has served to demonstrate how best to conform to the disaster context, by adjusting to accommodate critical influences on operational style. The subjective work has served to demonstrate, once more, the impact of subjective factors on a community's attitudes toward the agencies - the strongest factor being expectation. The characteristics of the organizations - flexibility, routinization, resources, and so on can then be mobilized to deal with high expectation - the dominant factor.

Footnotes - Section V

1) Allen H. Barton. Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969. p.

2) This report was the responsibility of Robert C, Bingham, a federal employee associated with the FRC during Agnes. The report is not yet printed, but is in final draft. Tentative title: "A Chronology of the Federal Regional Council's Activities in the Long Range Recovery Program Response to the Agnes Flood Disaster". Probably to be distributed by the FRC, Region III, Philadelphia, Pa.

3) This is the"Royston Report", done in response to a call by PL 92-385 for a disaster relief review. Latest copy is February 28, 1973, from OMB.

4) Royston, p. 56.

5) The Disaster Research Center has used this model for years, in a variety of ways. A good introduction is John R. Bouillette and E.L. Quarantelli, "Types of Patterned Variations in Bureacratic Adaptations to Organizational Stress", in Sociological Inquiry, 41, no. 1, Winter 1971, p. 39-46.
That source, as well as Russell R. Dynes, Organizational Behavior in Disaster, DRC: Ohio State University. 1969. have been used extensively, in paraphrase, to introduce and explain the DRC model.

6) In Social Systems - Essays on Their Persistance and Change. Princeton: D. VanNostrand Company, Inc. 1960. Charles Loomis notes in Essay III, "Agencies that employ the professionalized and Gesellschaft-like criteria of needs for making rehabilitation grants, for example, obviously cannot, except within narrow limits, interact in an affective, functionally diffuse, and particularistic manner. p. 139.

7) See Herbert Kaufman. The Limits of Organizational Change. Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1971. 123 pp.; and Section III.

8) This is commonly perceived as a critical problem in both the Royston and Bingham reports, cited earlier.

9) See OEP, Annual Report to the Congress for 1972, for a full account of the many disaster relevant operations handled by the agency.

10) Blau, Peter M., "The Dynamics of Bureaucracy," in Amitai Etzioni, A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1969. pp. 393ff. He deals with some of the personnel difficulties encountered in this situation.

11) Wilbert Moore. Social Change. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 115 pp., 1971. In a short section (p. 57) he deals with reallocation conflict in formal organizations.

12) Dynes, p. 193.

SECTION VI

CONCLUDING REMARKS

AND

THE AGNES LESSONS

AGNES LESSONS - CONCLUSION

In this section we shall review the findings of previous Agnes operations studies - the Bingham Report[1] and the Royston Report[2]. Our goal will be to identify those recommendations which clearly reflect the dynamics indicated in the preceding text. The point is to "flesh out" and support or dispute the findings. This paper has been designed to provide an overview of the elements of recovery. If we can demonstrate the applicability of such material to the development of "hard" recommendations, we will have provided a service of some value. Turn, then, to a consideration of

Conversion Process - the bureaucratic dynamics

A number of elements of bureaucratic behavior which we described earlier arose as serious obstacles to federal performance in the Agnes operation. Among the most evident were: rigidity, over-specialization, competition, lack of coordination, uncertainty, and need for clear disaster operations authority. We will consider each finding and its associated recommendations, if any, in an attempt to evaluate the significance of the problem and the potential success of the proposed solutions.

Rigidity: The identification of rigidity focuses more upon the problems of program inflexibility than attitudinal inflexibility. Thus, the first range of suggestions is

oriented toward changes in legislation and written requirements.

> "Normal agency requirements for categorical grant programs (public hearings, A-95 requirements, etc.) could be streamlined to expedite delivery of assistance to a disaster impacted community.[3]

Naturally, this recommendation conjures up our earlier discussion of "sunk costs", "retooling", etc. Further, an interesting insight is gained in the detection of a difference between statutory and administrative rules.

> Another related problem is the practical difficulty of distinguishing between statutory and administratively-imposed requirements which are normally combined in agency regulations. This often necessitates a lengthy review process which finally ends up in Washington.[4]

One's immediate reaction to such an observation would be that administratively-imposed guidelines should be easier to change than statutory requirements. However, our understanding of sunk costs and decision making hierarchical channels, after some contemplation, leads us to believe that identification of rules amenable to change does not necessarily guarantee increased flexibility.

The obvious answer would seem to be the increase in field autonomy to "short-circuit" this internal agency decision process. Royston offers both short and long term solutions. The short term solution is:

> Until further decentralization takes place, the FCC for long range recovery should have immediate access to agency officials in Washington, including OMB support as necessary.[5]

However, since we recognize that improved access still may not expedite, to any appreciable degree, the waiver process, it seems reasonable to press strongly for the following long-term approach.

> The FCO should have special authority to waive or modify agency administrative requirements in the disaster area for a specified period of time. Such authority could be implemented through an official "statement of intent" process which would give the head of each agency a limited period of time (5 days) to respond before the effective date of the waiver. Authority to reject such waivers should be limited to the agency head through a direct appeal to the Secretary of HUD.[6]

Now this is an effective way to use system inertia to increase flexibility. By granting the FCO autonomy, the burden to act is placed on the individual agency, which then faces a brief time limit within which to develop a compelling defense. Essentially, this shifts the presumption from the guardians of the rules to the official working to change the rules. Our understanding of agency decision making leads us to believe that this approach, indeed, may effectively serve to increase overall flexibility.

As an aside we note that the concept of flexibility has been embraced by all Agnes analysts. Indeed , many suggest that flexibility and immediate accessibility of aid may be more important to a community than the eventual overall amount.

Specialization: It seems clear that a need for "federal

generalists" has been demonstrated by the Agnes experience. This should be strongly encouraged since emphasis on specialization tends to exacerbate the dysfunctional influence of formal rules, impersonality, professionalization, compartmentalized mission views, etc.

Competition: The Royston report identifies many policy and program areas in which disagreement and conflict over responsibilities and authority was severe. Among the policy areas were housing/urban renewal, SBA home repairs, SBA lending, multi-agency rehabilitation programs, and so on. His conclusion is that

> Lack of general guidelines for Federal agencies involved in long range recovery caused confusion, contributed to poor program coordination and delivery, and precluded adequate preparedness planning and training.[7]

Two observations are important. The first is that Royston never explicitly argues the significance of personality and agency qua agency conflict. We earlier pointed out that in periods of high stress and uncertainty officials with identical perspectives could disagree, as rational men, over alternatives. However, we also noted the importance of functional and allocational rivalry, plus individual perceptions of individual power stakes, as strong factors contributing to agency competition. In numerous interviews with participants in the Agnes operation, it has been repeatedly emphasized that personality and

ambition contributed significantly to confusion, overlap, delay and downright warfare between agencies. It does not seem conceivable that these problems can be legislated away. At best, legislation designed to override these rivalries seems expedient. We will consider this when we turn to the authority structure.

Our second observation is that all of the guidelines, assignments of responsibility and delegations of authority which are negotiated in pre-disaster periods will be, as best, of middling effectiveness. Consider our discussion or territoriality in which we identified ranges of bureau control. I submit that the disaster event seriously disrupts these boundaries while opening new, uncharted, and unanticipated functional areas. Further, the actual substance of the actions required in these uncharted areas is unpredictable in pre-disaster periods and even difficult to identify in the post-disaster context. This seriously mitigates the effectiveness of pre-disaster pacts as antidotes for bureau competition.

Further, Royston doesn't deal with the problem of derelection of duty. For example, SBA granted repair money in clear and conscious violation of Executive Order 11296, which prohibits expenditures for assistance in flood plains. This example is particularly impressive because SBA maintained consistently that it would not assume responsibility for ensuring that money would not be used in the flood plain.[8]

It claimed that it could not observe the order until state and local officials noted condemned or flood prone areas and took appropriate formal zoning steps. Of course, these authorities were patently incapable of making any such rulings in light of their post-disaster disarray. Thus, SBA continued to pump money into potentially condemned housing. HUD officials, recognizing the unfavorable consequences which would accrue should such a course be followed, failed completely in their attempts to force SBA to exercise more initiative and foresight.

In summary, then, we find that Royston does not grapple with personality, does not grapple with the dynamics which create tension between formally "cooperating" agencies, and certainly does not touch upon the hostility generated by agency disregard for its obligation to conform to other agencies' reasonable expectations.

Uncertainty: The Royston analysis of uncertainty deals only with lack of information, ignoring most of the argument on human decision making cited earlier in this work. He notes two types of uncertainty. The first is that uncertainty rampant within the community. His proposal, which follows, is reasonable.

> An effective way to support a central planning and coordinating committee is to include a clearinghouse function to expedite delivery of services to the residents of the disaster area. Such a system provides excellent feedback on the demand for services, capacity to respond,

and major gaps. This information can strengthen coordination and improve long range planning for permanent recovery.[9]

The second type of uncertainty is that within policy-making councils, again caused by lack of information. Even a close reading here leaves the impression that if only there were enough information everything would turn out all right. Recall we pointed out that in the disaster context there is never enough information, there is always ambiguity, and all decisions are guesstimates among limited, poorly framed alternatives. Reliance on routine and subjective thinking patterns tends to bridge the uncertainty so that decisions can be made in such situations. However, there is a noticeable lack of these types of aids in those agencies which are not routinely familiar with disaster.

Where does this lead us? Well, my argument is that "more" information, per se, is of limited value as a solution to uncertainty, since information is always inadequate and open to conflicting interpretations. Thus, reliance must be placed on 1) other disaster experience (providing that subjective support), and 2) a strong sense of ultimate agency goal (which has a strong orienting influence). The recommendations which flow from these observations are 1) it is increasingly clear that a strong, experienced, professional disaster cadre is essential to direction of overall operations, 2) it is essential that each agency summon its most exper-

ienced disaster people whenever that agency is involved in recovery, 3) it is critical that a clear, explicit and final resolution of recovery goals be generated and agreed upon.

In reference to the above it is interesting to note that the most maladaptive agencies (HUD,SBA,FRC) relied on new, borrowed, or volunteer workers, inexperienced personnel, or officials on rotating assignment. Thus, uncertainty was exacerbated by personnel cycles which constantly operated to reduce aggregate experience.

In short, uncertainty is a function of much more than lack of information. Conversely, efficient collection of information does not guarantee decreased uncertainty or ambiguity. Rather, reliance on experienced personnel, disaster expertise and repertoires, and a commonly held recovery goal seems to more effectively bridge the gaps created by insufficient information.

Coordination - FRC as the Philosopher's Stone

Better than any other single case, the story of FRC disaster operations relates the sad plight of a coordinating body functioning in a period of high stress and expectation. The Council was called into action on July 10, 1972 by OMB Deputy Director Frank Carlucci, servinf in his capacity as Chairman of the Undersecretary's Group. He requested, "that the Federal Regional Council immediately assume federal leadership in coordinating a longer range reconstruction of the areas in Region III that were flooded by Hurricane

Agnes."[10]

Now, most of the FRC's explicit difficulty resulted from basic conflicts and deficiencies in the legislative underpinnings of Federal assistance programs, if we are to believe Robert Bingham's FRC after-action analysis. I suggest a more fundamental structural deficiency which operated to preclude all authoritative conflict resolution, That is that the FRC's deliberative and decision making processes were, and are, patently incapable of dealing with immediate solutions for disputed problems.

First, there was a basic misunderstanding of the FRC's nature in the initial charge to action. Carlucci instructed the FRC to function as a "corporate entity". However, the FRC is not a single entity, cannot be a single entity, was not intended to be a corporate entity. Rather,

> "The Chairman of the FRC has no power to resolve disputes other than through the process of informal discussions. In the event the problems cannot be resolved through these informal discussions, the Chairman may only refer the matter to the Undersecretary's group for further discussion. If an agency does not feel like tolerating the delay occassioned by referral, the guidelines make it quite plain that the agency is free to proceed on its own.[11]

Even recognizing that the FRC's have no explicit authority to modify agency requirements, we may ask why deliberative, rational, and reasoned judgement does not prevail. Simply stated, the response is that

Personnel assigned to work under FRC

> auspices as general staff members or as program specialists are essentially agency representatives. Their orientation, authority to act, and scope of responsibilities are determined primarily by their parent agencies rather than FRC itself.[12]

Granting this, we might dismiss the phenomenon as an example of Downs' principle of self-servinf loyalty; but there is more here. The fundamental problem is that "Council goals are usually in conflict with the goals of the agencies of ... regular or ad hoc members of the Council. Agency goals probably reflect a concern for a constituency not shared by the other agencies. The various federal departments administer specific programs which have been generated by the interest and support of special publics."[13]

Thus, we find that the FRC cannot, and probably would not want to, exercise final authority in fluid situations.

Authority: It has been observed that the FCO exercises authority during Phase I, but that no such authority figure normally exists to guide the later stages of disaster recovery. To this end, Royston observed:

> If an earlier recommendation assigning HUD total responsibility for short and long range recovery is adopted, HUD would become the single federal manager of disaster assistance. [14]

A large step in this direction was taken when OEP's natural disaster functions were transferred to HUD

through the formation of the FDAA within that agency. The hope was that if the OEP function and the HUD function were merged, the exercise of authority and phase to phase transition would be improved. While this has appeal, serious doubts may be raised. Dwight Ink, Assistant Director of OMB, noted in Senate testimony that the formation of the FDAA does not fully integrate disaster operations; it "does not pull everything together". 15

Now, the merger of the HUD and OEP responsibilities does go a long way toward eliminating confusion created by transition from phase to phase. It does not eliminate the problem of coordinating disparate agency programs. Thus, it seems wise to consider the following Royston recommendation:

> The Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) should require all agencies involved: to give prior notice on site visits or assignments of all agency personnel in the disaster area; to enable the FCO and his staff to review and comment on all plans and applications for agency assistance; and to authorize the FCO to clear or announce all press releases relating to the area. Such prerogatives in no way infringe upon agency statutory authority or program decision making authority but do provide a stronger public image and management role for the FCO. This concept is also essential to avoid unilateral agency decisions, undue competition among agencies for scarce local or state matching funds, and inconsistent policy guidance and public information on levels and types of Federal assistance available.[16]

We can conclude our examination of key elements of the Royston Report as we emphasize the following.

Agencies and Environment: Royston notes two failures of

agencies in their relations with the disaster environment:

> 1) One of the significant problem areas revealed by the study was the inability to more effectively capitalize on the disaster environment to address both short and long range recovery needs. [17]
>
> 2) Local elected officials and ad hoc community coordinating committees for recovery should receive strong support from federal agencies even though their authority and expertise (in the latter group) may be questionable under normal circumstances. The curent study revealed a number of instances where federal agencies seriously undermined local leadership efforts by ignoring or refusing to recognize the necessity for close coordination with such ad hoc committees on program plans. [18]

I think, after all of the material which preceded this section, that we can see why these difficulties emerged and how they were damaging. The second failure, especially, was critical in that it led to inability to adequately deal with partisan emergence.

I would suggest that a thorough understanding of the disaster communty, a concerted attempt to avoid the trappings of the bureaucratic presence, and a real attempt to associate the agency with indigenous sources of pride and trust will go a very long way toward increasing the subjective acceptance of the federal presence.

We have learned that numerous internal forces operate to bar agency success and that the dynamics of the community itself offer a challenge to the agency. It is my sense that reorganization alone will be insufficient to overcome

these barriers. But further, it seems fair to suggest that awareness of the toal disaster environment, as well as a healthy respect for the lessons drawn from Agnes, will go a long way toward increasing the operational effectiveness of any disaster recovery effort.

Footnotes - Section VI

1) Robert Bingham. Federal Regional Council staff analyst.

2) Written for Office of Management and Budget, and discussed in Section V.

3) Royston Report, p. 24.

4) Royston Report, p. 24.

5) Royston Report, p. 23.

6) Royston Report, p. 25.

7) Royston Report, p. 19.

8) United States Congress. House Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on Legislative and Military Operations. Reorganization Plan Number One of 1973. February 1973. p. 275.

9) Royston Report, p. 44.

10) Federal Regional Council discussion paper, September 11, 1972.

11) Federal Regional Council discussion paper.

12) Royston Report, p. 27.

13) Environmental Protection Agency discusssion paper, September 13, 1972.

14) Royston Report, p. 21.

15) United States Congress. Senate Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on Reorganization, Research, and International Organizations. Reorganization Plan Number One of 1973. February 1973. p. 30.

16) Royston Report, p. 16.

17) Royston Report, p. 43.

18) Royston Report, p. 43-44.

APPENDIX

The Agnes Survey

Section IV of this paper demonstrates the relationship between community attitudes toward federal agencies and the actual behavior of those agencies. As the research design unfolded it seemed clear that it was necessary to measure the range of sentiments actually held by the members of the victim community. For this reason, a survey was designed, it is analyzed at some length in the text.

In this brief appendix I have included the summary of responses from all returned questionnaires and copies of particularly important cross-tabulations. Some observations about the survey also seem in order.

580 questionnaires were mailed after the pre-test was completed. Of these questionnaires, 187 were returned. This is a response rate of 32.3%, which seems reasonable. There are several reasons why both the original sample and the respondent group seem representative of the victim community.

First, the distribution of population among Wilkes-Barre, Kingston, and Forty-Fort by 1970 Census, original mailing, and respondent group is roughly the same for all three. It doesn't seem that victims in any one area were over-represented, and it seems that the original sample was, indeed, random. (The sample was chosen by taking the fifth name from the top of every other column in a Wyoming

Valley telephone book.)

Second, the range of property damage in each area is roughly the same as the pre-flood range of property values in each area. This inclines one to believe that no special income group is over-represented.

Third, the respondents are very consistent in their answers. That is, 82.2% suffered flood loss; 82.5% had uninhabitable homes; 89.1% received assistance; 79.8% dealt with federal agencies.

Fourth, the median annual income from the respondents and the median annual income from the area, as reflected in the 1970 Census, are of the same magnitude (approximately $7,500/year).

If the sample is at all biased, it is in favor of homeowners (which makes sense, since renters were relatively more inclined to leave the area after the flood) and older residents (mean for respondents is in low 60's, in the 1970 Census it is mid to high 50's). Neither of these factors would seem to be sufficient to invalidate the results.

I. READ EACH STATEMENT CAREFULLY AND CIRCLE THE NUMBER OF THE RESPONSE THAT BEST INDICATES HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT THE STATEMENT.

	(1) strongly agree	(2) agree	(3) uncertain	(4) disagree	(5) strongly disagree
004) Flood victims have a right to free emergency housing.	56.2	34.5	3.6	3.0	0.6
005) The distribution of trailers by HUD was determined by politics and influence peddling.	11.4	24.6	28.7	29.9	5.4
006) Federal officials promised more help than we eventually received.	16.2	26.3	22.2	26.3	9.0
007) People who complained about being mistreated were really in the minority.	13.8	45.5	13.8	19.8	7.2
008) I was satisfied by the way the Federal agencies performed.	11.6	45.7	7.3	25.6	9.8
009) Many officials acted in an insensitive or high-handed manner.	12.7	27.7	16.9	36.1	6.6
010) I was very depressed about my flood losses.	47.3	32.0	4.0	11.3	5.3
011) The Federal government should have "forgiven" all of the SBA loans. (That is, the full amount)	35.4	18.3	12.2	23.8	10.4

	(1) strongly agree	(2) agree	(3) uncertain	(4) disagree	(5) strongly disagree
012) You really can't trust the government to do what's best.	11.0	18.3	25.0	37.2	8.5
013) The people I talked to at Federal agencies genuinely wanted to help me.	19.5	57.8	11.0	7.8	3.9
014) Federal officials had their hands tied by high up officials in the government.	12.2.	36.6	32.3	14.6	4.3
015) The recovery effort was really botched up by many of the agencies and officials involved.	25.0	36.0	17.7	15.9	5.5
016) Politics wasn't important in the performance of Federal agencies' duties.	9.1	29.1	23.0	25.5	13.3
017) Local officials did a good job representing their communities during the disaster.	18.1	42.2	8.4	19.9	11.4
018) Instead of pulling together as a team, many officials caused confusion and delay by political bickering among themselves.	22.3	42.2	15.7	15.7	4.2

IF YOU WANT TO GO INTO MORE DETAIL ON ANY ONE QUESTION, MARK THE QUESTION NUMBER ON THE BACK OF THE PAGE AND COMMENT THERE.

II. RATE HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EACH AGENCY. USE THE SCALE OF 1 TO 5 (1 is very disappointing, 2 is disappointing, 3 is no opinion, 4 is impressive, 5 is very impressive).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	mean scale
019) Housing and Urban Development	14.4	17.5	13.1	41.3	13.8	(3.05)
020) Small Business Administration	4.5	15.8	9.1	48.5	21.8	(3.66)
021) Federal Regional Council	4.1	6.2	76.0	10.3	3.4	(3.03)
022) Office of Emergency Preparedness	15.7	17.6	32.7	25.5	8.5	(2.94)
023) Presidential Envoy (F. Carlucci)	8.5	11.0	19.5	30.5	30.5	(3.64)
024) Corps of Engineers	10.6	15.6	12.5	35.6	25.6	(3.50)
025) Civil Defense	9.4	14.4	13.1	36.3	26.9	(3.50)
026) Pa. Dept. Community Affairs	10.5	9.9	52.6	18.4	8.6	(3.05)
027) Health, Education, Welfare	3.9	11.2	44.1	32.2	8.6	(3.30)
028) Dept. of Labor	5.3	8.6	67.1	14.5	4.6	(2.95)
029) Dept. of Transportation	7.8	8.4	42.9	29.2	11.7	(3.29)
030) National Guard	4.9	3.1	1.8	41.7	48.5	(4.26)
031) Red Cross	4.8	3.0	4.2	23.4	67.7	(4.4)
032) Salvation Army	3.1	1.9	8.6	24.7	61.7	(4.4)

III. FOR EACH AGENCY BELOW, GIVE IT A RANKING ON HOW IMPORTANT YOU THOUGHT IT WAS TO THE RECOVERY EFFORT. (GIVE THE MOST IMPORTANT AGENCY A "1", THE SECOND MOST IMPORTANT A "2", THE THIRD A "3", ETC.)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9 & be
033) Housing and Urban Development	42.3	24.2	14.8	3.4	5.4	2.0	2.0	0.0	6.0
034) Small Business Administration	48.4	22.6	12.3	5.8	1.3	1.9	1.9	0.6	5.2
035) Federal Regidnal Council	3.5	20.4	20.4	4.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	4.4	36.3
036) Ofc. of Emergency Preparedness	10.0	15.8	21.7	5.8	5.8	6.7	3.3	10.0	20.8
037) Pres. Envoy (F. Carlucci)	26.1	14.2	17.9	7.5	8.2	4.5	5.2	0.7	15.7
038) Corps of Engineers	27.5	13.0	18.1	9.4	8.7	4.3	3.6	5.1	10.1
039) Civil Defense	30.8	12.0	12.8	9.8	6.8	11.3	1.5	5.3	9.8
040) Dept. Community Affairs (Pa.)	8.8	18.4	16.7	1.8	4.4	3.5	4.4	4.4	37.7
041) Health, Education & Welfare	14.3	14.3	17.6	6.7	2.5	3.4	5.9	5.0	30.3
042) Dept. of Labor	9.3	13.6	21.2	2.5	3.4	2.5	1.7	7.6	38.1
043) Dept. of Transportation	20.0	12.5	13.3	5.8	2.5	3.3	4.2	4.2	34.2
044) National Guard	35.3	15.1	12.2	10.8	10.8	4.3	3.6	1.4	6.5
045) Red Cross	49.7	11.4	12.1	8.1	2.7	3.4	2.0	2.0	8.7
046) Salvation Army	37.9	13.6	4.3	5.7	7.9	6.4	7.1	2.9	14.3

IV. THESE QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE YOU SUFFERED FROM AGNES FLOODING.

047) Did you suffer flood-related loss? yes 82.2 , no 17.8.

048) Estimated Damage to Property:

none	26.9%
$ 0 - 3,500	3.6%
$ 3,500 - 7,000	6.6%
$ 7,000 - 10,500	7.2%
$10,500 - 14,000	4.2%
$14,000 - 17,500	7.2%
$17,500 - 21,000	10.8%
$21,000 - 24,500	2.9%
$24,500 - 28,00	7.8%
$28,000 - above	22.8%

049) After flooding, was your home liveable?

yes 17.5 , no 82.5.

050) If your home was not liveable, where did you stay?

evacuation center:	2.6%
camper by home:	14.7%
trailer park:	5.2%
friends:	16.3%
relatives:	44.0%
other:	17.2%

051) Did you receive any assistance from any government or private agencies?

yes 89.1 , no 10.9.

058) Did you, personally, deal with any agencies?

yes 79.8 , no 20.2 .

059) All things considered, were you satisfied or were you disappointed? (Use 1 to 5 scale)

disappointed	1	2	3	4	5	satisfied
	21.1	6.3	18.0	24.2	30.5	

V. THESE ARE BACKGROUND INFORMATION QUESTIONS. PLEASE TRY TO ANSWER THEM FULLY. REMEMBER THAT ALL ANSWERS ARE CONFIDENTIAL.

060) Age:

under 21:	0
21 -30 :	13.3%
31 -40 :	9.5%
41 -50 :	20.9%
51 -60 :	22.8%
61 -70 :	25.3%
over 70 :	7.0%

061) Own your own home? yes 82.1 , no 17.9.

062) Years as Valley Resident?

years:	
1 - 3 :	2.5%
4 - 6 :	1.8%
7 - 9 :	1.8%
10 - 12 :	2.5%
13 - 15 :	0
16 - 18 :	2.5%
19 - 21 :	2.5%
22 - 24 :	1.2%
25 over :	85.3%

063) Married: yes 81.6 , no 18.4

064) Children:

none	:	31.1 %
1 young (under 12)	:	4.2 %
2 young	:	1.8 %
3 young	:	1.8 %
4 young	:	0
5 young	:	0
3 young & older	:	0.6 %
2 young & older	:	1.8 %
1 young & older	:	6.0 %
only over 12 years	:	52.7 %

065) Occupation of head of household: (Uses an occupation scale. The higher the rating on the one to nine scale, the more professionalized, skilled, or highly regarded the occupation).

1	:	2.6 %
2	:	4.3 %
3	:	4.3 %
4	:	3.5 %
5	:	6.1 %
6	:	12.2 %
7	:	28.7 %
8	:	12.2 %
9	:	26.1 %

066) Now live in:

Forty-Fort	:	12.3 %
Wilkes-Barre	:	53.7 %
Kingston	:	34.0 %

067) Approximate Family Income:

below $4,000 :	11.3 %
4,000- 7,000 :	22.6 %
7,000-10,000 :	22.0 %
10,000-13,000 :	18.2 %
13,000-16,000 :	9.4 %
over 16,000 :	16.4 %

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